

PhD Thesis

NEWS MEDIA PERFORMANCE OF INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT IN PAKISTAN: A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS



Researcher

Raja Shahid Ali

16-FSS/Ph.DMC/F17

Supervisor

Prof Dr. M. Zafar Iqbal

DEPARTMENT OF MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION STUDIES

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD PAKISTAN

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Raja Shahid Ali

Dedication

I dedicate this Thesis to
My Beloved
Father (Deceased), Mother, Brothers, Sisters and Their Families
&
My Loving Sons and Daughters

Raja Shahid Ali

DECLARATION

I, Raja Shahid Ali, son of Raja Mehmood Sultan, bearing Registration No. 16-FSS/PH.DMC/F-17, currently enrolled as a PhD scholar in Media and Communication Studies at the Department of Media and Communication Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, International Islamic University Islamabad, Pakistan, solemnly affirms that the data presented in this thesis titled " NEWS MEDIA PERFORMANCE OF INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT IN PAKISTAN: A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS" is the result of my original research and has not been previously submitted or published elsewhere.

I further declare that the entire content of this thesis is free from intentional plagiarism, and I commit not to utilize this thesis to obtain any other degree, whether from the present institution or any other university or educational institution.

Raja Shahid Ali

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Abstract

This study assesses the applicability of Claudia Hillebrand's normative model of media's oversight on intelligence agencies, in the local context of fledgling democracy like Pakistan. This effective watchdog role of the media is viewed as a basic yet challenging requisite. In any authoritarian or hybrid democracies, this 'informal oversight' by civil society or the media is imperative, especially when formal oversight by the parliament or legislature is ineffective or nonexistent. This study analyzes the role during the two significant events: the Abbottabad Raid on May 2, 2011, an 'intelligence failure', and the IHC Judges' Letter on March 25, 2024, an 'intelligence interference'. This study analyzed news reports from Dawn, The News International, The Daily Times, and The Nation concerning the Osama Bin Laden hunt by U.S. special forces and the Islamabad High Court judges' letter regarding 'intelligence interference' in judicial processes. The qualitative method of discourse analysis, as developed by Teun A. Van Dijk, was used to analyze the media texts due to the high-context culture of the country. Subsequently, these texts were evaluated using a matrix based on Hillebrand's model to summarize and identify the oversight role performed by the press. This study in the findings identifies that the press has failed perform the oversight or watchdog role. The deficiencies identified in this research include capacity, resources/expertise, will, lack of precedence, and external or local factors. Security lapses, representing intelligence failures and interferences, are inevitable even in the West or advanced world powers. However, continued neglect of these issues can lead to national or collective failure, which all countries seek to avoid. This study serves as a basic assessment of the quantity and quality of contemporary

informal intelligence oversight in Pakistan, opening avenues for further exploration in the field.

Keywords: Informal Intelligence Oversight, Watchdog Role of Media, Intelligence Agencies, Intelligence Failures, Intelligence Interference, New Democracies, Pakistan, Discourse Analysis

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Among the political systems of the contemporary world, democracy has emerged as the best system available or in practice, especially in the developed world/the West; ergo it should stand strong on its base, the service to the public. The system has four pillars to the edifice and their inter-relation is central to the promised service, to the public, by the whole. In the system, if one pillar influences or affects the other (s) for some vested interest of the few or otherwise, then there are issues to the efficacy of overall structure or the purpose. The original idea of the construct ‘Kratos’ was basically in relation to power or capacity to do good things for the public sphere (Ober, 1998). In mature democracies, especially across the Atlantic, the watchdog role of the young, fourth pillar of the state namely, the media has been well-established in relation to other pillars, particularly the executive and its organs. However, criticism still persists that the media is not doing enough, compared to the earlier “reforms following the intelligence scandals of the 1970s” (León-Reyes, 2023, p. 152). This situation is often referred to as the Snowden Paradox¹.

In case of Pakistan (which is called a nation-state and constitutionally democratic parliamentary republic), out of the total 77 years since independence, 33 have been under direct military dictatorships in three stretches, last was the shortest. In the remaining democratic stretches Pakistan has been best termed as ‘electoral autocracy’ with no free and fair elections. This unilaterally omit much of the innate

¹ Snowden paradox debates the positive and negative consequences of his actions, which are viewed differently by various stakeholders, including governments, media, privacy advocates, and the general public, yet not talking about the atrocities reported therein (An analysis of post-Snowden civil society accountability in book ‘Intelligence Oversight in Times of Transnational Impunity’ by Didier Bego).

value, potential and direction of the real democracy or the process at all (Nord et al., 2024).

Media's role in a democracy is of a watchdog, where the journalists hold government institutions including the intelligence agencies, accountable and responsible for their policies and actions, by exposing abuse of power among the other ills, through critical and skeptical coverage (Siddique, 2019). But in Pakistan the military and intelligence agencies remain the powerful component of 'establishment', both overtly and covertly, especially since the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), despite the recent waves of judicial activism. Even the universally free social media is increasingly restrained due to restrictions, reach, credibility, and maturity issues. On the other hand, the electronic media often appears partisan. In this situation, print media, particularly influential English newspapers, offer a viable option for scrutinizing the overall security apparatus and its intelligence agencies. Another aspect is that the recently consolidated and re-emerged media (since 2008, under continuous democratic regimes) which has a better chance of delivering and resisting pressures as compared to formal parliamentary apparatus.

In old democracies the oversight of intelligence mainly comes under the accountability aspect of governance, where it serves as a tool to the main end. This mean of accountability is mainly divided among the internal and external (in reference to intelligence). In external accountability media has a role, but the media's basic requirement of transparency conflicts with that of intelligence; namely the secrecy. Hence Lester (2012) claims that intelligence matters from the point of view of their necessity do not fit in (fully) with transparency expectations. But the post 9/11 scenario with exposures of different intelligence failures or excesses (interferences)

has made it important to augment the external accountability, which was also found to be lacking along with the internal accountability mechanisms of intelligence agencies.

This is truer for intelligence agencies of Pakistan, where first, the external accountability structure is unable to deliver or at best an overall placebo scrutiny (Hillebrand, 2018) exists and secondly, due to the factor of secrecy, there is no input available on the efficacy of internal accountability inside the intelligence agencies. This consequently influences the meagre academic attention in the area (in contrast of the West) as contemporary studies on security sector reforms in South Asia are limited to Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. In the case of Pakistani press, if there is any, the discussions typically focus on the formal oversight by state or government organs, with little attention paid to independent or informal oversight on intelligence, albeit the internal.

In view of above, this research focuses on news reports (not editorials), analyzing the informal monitoring or oversight role of print media in the contemporary democratic context of Pakistan. It employs the recently upgraded normative framework of Public Communication (Christians, 2009) along with the Hillebrand Model of Intelligence Oversight by media (Hillebrand, 2012). Given the Pakistani social context (a high context environment), reports from main English newspapers, are assessed using Teun A. Van Dijk's discourse analysis (Dijk, 1988), with an overall critical approach to examine the deep power-relations.

The upgraded normative framework presents four normative traditions of public communication for the contemporary world (in contrast to the older normative theories of their time and space). These traditions mainly at the philosophical level include Corporatist, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Citizen Participation. For these traditions at political level, four main models of democracy are presented:

Administrative, Pluralist, Civic, and Direct. In this setting four roles of the media have been proposed as Facilitative, Radical, Collaborative and Monitorial. This research focuses primarily on the monitorial or watchdog role of the media (Christians, 2009).

Hillebrand (2012) and followed by Clerix (2013), identified four monitoring or oversight roles for the media especially in relation to government or intelligence agencies. The first two roles appear as main or direct and the second two more like indirect or derived. The first role involves transmitting and scrutinizing information about intelligence policies or undertakings and bringing issues to the public domain and debate, including for the formal scrutinizers (of executive, legislature and judiciary). In the second role if formal scrutinizers are inept or unwilling, the media then acts as a substitute watchdog for the formal scrutinizers. The third media's role is of a 'legitimiser' of intelligence services and related policies (including monitoring), where due to this monitoring/oversight the agencies are indirectly legitimized that some supervision is being maintained on them. The fourth role is of serving as a 'sensitization platform' for the public, against espionage activities of hostile intelligence. Here the media's task is to sensitize the public regarding espionage risks and activities like fifth-generation warfare. Later Clausing (2016) itemized these roles/their indicators for measuring or identifying them, which was mainly a further explication of the four roles which could help in identification/measurement of each.

It is important to note that these roles, being culturally specific are related to low-context culture of the West, and this model may not be truly applicable to high-context cultures, especially of Pakistani society (Hall, 1976). In viewing this the method of discourse analysis of Van Dijk (1988), being specific to news reports, has

been used to identify the oversight role played by the media, in relation to specific major events of the present times in the country.

From among the contemporary media including social and electronic, the press or print has been chosen to identify the played oversight role. English language press including *Dawn*, *The News International*, *The Nation* and *Daily Times* newspapers have been selected for this study. These papers (deliberately) cover the intelligence issues and represent the political spectrum or orientation along with being considered important, with high circulation, influence and the capacity to take on the desired role, under contemporary situations.

1.2 Problem Statement

Media's monitoring role or of a watchdog, being fourth pillar of estate is universal, where it monitors or oversee the different organs, including executive, in a democratic setting. In the West, it is taken as a full fledged role under the informal oversight, which augments the mainstream formal oversight of the parliament. The role there is more predominant and defined with streamlined frameworks or models. But in Pakistan, the military establishment is claimed to dominate or has dominated the executive through its tentacles like intelligence agencies. The media also has a history of facing this influence and can frequently come under the wrath. However, with its recent exponential growth and the re-emerged role in society, especially during the current consecutive democratic governments since 2008, some improvements have been perceived. Consequently, there is a need to analyze the oversight role of Pakistani media in relation to intelligence (policies and activities) in this recent and continuing democratic stretch.

Pakistan's case is peculiar, where democracy appears to be compromised by behind-the-scenes activities by these agencies, with some degree of impunity on their part. Major/related incidents or accidents, in the above course of time are of potential significance for this study, especially while considering the relationship between press coverage and the quality of democracy. Two types of accidents/incidents need to be analyzed; one which are a surprise, forced upon by the external powers/factors in the due course of history, and the other which are the result of their own deliberate making or were self-created by the agencies. The in-between time differential of these events can also identify the improvement (if any) or otherwise.

The aim of this research is to analyze the informal monitoring or oversight role of the media in relation to intelligence agencies of Pakistan in the contemporary democratic context. Taking lead from the upgraded normative framework, the Hillebrand model of intelligence oversight is being used for this task of analysis. An effort is also be made to analyze the efficacy of this western model in the peculiar condition and context of the country of the East, through a discourse analysis.

1.3 Significance of the Study

Though at the outset it seemed an uphill task as the contemporary state of intelligence is murkier than ever and not much has evolved at the desired pace. But as a first step this research mainly identified the role of media in intelligence oversight and its level of success in the local context. It not only identified the weaknesses of the media in its enshrined role of a watchdog, but also was an effort to enlighten the media about the desired outcome expected from them. This study on one side tried to examine the plausibility and efficacy of a western concept in an eastern setting, while on the other also generated suitable conclusions for local and universal applicability of the construct.

For journalists, intelligence has long been considered as a ‘no go area’ or a difficult proposition, especially due to the paucity of related information and expertise held by them. After this study it is expected a standard *modus operandi* or some kind of contextual model could be generated for news reports, for covering the related issues given in the model. It is also expected that few basic ‘don’ts’ could at least be identified as a starting point. The main thrust of the study though remains on identifying whether the effort of press in the period has been of subservient nature or there was some productivity at all. Yet it also generate suitable lessons for media, intelligence and the government in a democracy. This study will also help the public in getting the required awareness or cognition about their enshrined right of being well informed. The public is also expected to attain a better understanding of the system, which is frequently claimed to be created primarily for them.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The objective of this study is to analyze the contemporary oversight role of Pakistani media or the press in relation to intelligence agencies of the country. In viewing the proposed model of Hillebrand (2012) of identified roles played by western media in intelligence oversight, the objectives of this study are: -

- a. To analyze the media stories and the opinions in them, whether they play the desired role of: -
 - i. Information Transmitter or Stimulator for Formal Scrutinizer
 - ii. Substitutes Watchdog
 - iii. Legitimizing Institution
 - iv. Sensitizer of public for external espionage risks.

- b. To critically analyze Hillebrand's model in the Pakistani context and if felt so, to propose a normative conceptual framework of measuring the press or the media's performance, and the method of assessing the same in local setting. This finally took the form of a detailed matrix or an index culminating into a digit at the end.

1.5 Delimitations of the Study

In view of nature and scope of the study this study has its deficiencies in relation to language, geography, social and economic handicaps and applicability. But it is an earnest effort in the direction, which can be further substantiated by later studies. The major limitations are: -

- a. The study's findings won't be generalized to all the Pakistani media (electronic/digital/social) generating output on the related matter/issue.
- b. Secondly 'Urdu' language newspapers have a better circulation and acceptance in the public, but have not been included in this study. Perhaps in future, Urdu newspapers could be put to test, and the new media added to improve generalizability.
- c. Due to different roles and nature, the research exercise can also be better conducted as agency specific, to provide a more authentic and precise understanding of how different news outlets cover the issue or oversight, while being agency specific.
- d. News production is a full fledged process for each story which influences the final output on the newsprint. No finality can be achieved without analyzing this complete process. Drawing

conclusions from just the story can have relating issues of efficacy and authenticity.

- e. The best impact of any news story on the readers can best be narrated or explained through a reception study, as to how a story is received by a reader, giving a better analysis. Survey research can also be conducted in relation to the findings of this research.
- f. Lastly the researcher (being an old member of country's intelligence setups) remains cognizant of the possibility of individual bias in favor of the intelligence agencies or vice versa.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The chosen topic is new, especially in relation to type of data (news reports and oversight - informal), language and the area or country, so the literature review took relevant input from local and foreign academic sources simultaneously, yet restricting it to three basic constructs: democracy, media's role, and intelligence oversight, in order of their importance to society.

2.1 Democracy

Lexically the original definition of democracy in Greek was a construct of 'demos' meaning village or the people - qua native adult male residents of a polis and 'kratos' meaning power/strength - the root/arche meaning of 'the power of the people'. Among Athenian it was referred to the power in the sense of capacity to make happen or do good things in the public realm. However, the later aberrative concept of majority rule was an intentional inclusion by its/the critics (Ober, 2011). In Pakistan, other than being satirically the best revenge, it means different to different stakeholders and is temporal in nature. However, the public is yet to see the normative/some purest form of the same. This willful reduction of the whole concept to a mere voting drama is flawed, as it unilaterally omits the innate value, potential and direction of the real democracy or process. Stromback (2005) presented four basic normative models of democracy (on a continuum) for their influence on journalism as procedural, competitive, participatory, and deliberative, all with theme of 'service to the public.' Held (2006) has also categorized these models from minimal to maximal variants, namely as elitist, participatory, and deliberative.

According to Szaweil (2009), the new democratization process in the emerging democracies involves following stages: -

- a. Liberalization of Non-Democratic Regime (Authoritarian or Totalitarian).
- b. Transition to democracy (Institutional Change).
- c. Democratic Consolidation.
- d. Institutionalization of Democracy.

This last century's post-colonial '3rd Wave' of global democratization upgraded more than 60 countries from authoritarian rule to some kind of democratic regime believing that this 'rule of the commoners' (democracy) would mutate into a well-established system of government through a 'parliament'. However, this was taken over by the 'influential minority' for their love of *kratos* (power). Progressively the 'rule of/by the majority', has been eroded and eliminated. Dahl (1971) calls it polyarchy, a concept in a functional perspective, which is neither a democracy nor dictatorship, and power is invested in multiple entities or stake holders. This becomes a more nuanced and flexible approach. The temporal dimension of democratic consolidation is a process, where new democracy matures or gains enough strength, where there are unlikely chances of it reverting back to authoritarianism, albeit an external shock. Linz and Stepan (1996) have defined it in a phrase, "the only game in town" (p. 15), stipulating five criteria or 'arenas' of assessment, namely political society, rule of law, bureaucratic structure, economic society, and civil society (including media). Putnam (2000) identified the importance of civic society and voluntary associations, vital to the lifeblood of any democracy, while proposing that civic society in general, and social capital in particular, has suffered substantial

erosion in the postwar (World War Two) years in America, visible through a low level of trust in government and civic participation.

Another important issue, a byproduct of contemporary weak democracy is clientelism, which according to Graham (1997) is a set of actions based on a reciprocal principle of ‘take there, give here’, allowing both clients and patrons to gain advantage from each other's support. This is more common in new democracies due to lack of infrastructure, weak state institutions and the citizens not well off or educated (Stokes, 2013). Dalton (2004) has identified the same as: *“Democracies are facing a challenge today... the challenge comes from democracy’s own citizens, who have grown distrustful of politicians, skeptical about democratic institutions, and disillusioned about how the democratic process function”* (p. 1).

Structurally two types of democracy have been identified: direct and representative. In them according to systems, there are three basic systems: parliamentary, presidential, and mixed. Presently different indexes grade these democracies for being better than one another. In one of democracy index, among 165 democracies in 2023 there are only 24 full fledged democracies. Remaining 50 are called flawed, 34 hybrid and 59, authoritarian. Economist Intelligence Unit - EIU (2024) ranked Pakistan at 118 under Authoritarian regime.

Full fledged democracies have a well-established system of control and oversight system, which includes ministries, parliamentary committees, ombudsmen, civilian review committees and the judicial and penal system. There national intelligence organizations mainly exist for one primary purpose: - ‘to inform and support foreign policy decision-makers’ or information processing services for the elected leadership. The counterintelligence, a ‘high policing’ task is a secondary

mission assigned to a separate civilian agency such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

The concept of New Democracies in Bloc of Four Social Classes Theory, in post-revolutionary China stipulated that, democracy in China is to take a decisively distinct path to that of many other countries of the world (Zedong, 1940). The democratic transition is viewed through different parameters (also used in Central/Eastern Europe and South America). These institutionalize democratic civil–military relations (CMR) by establishing new security institutions—military, police, and intelligence agencies, which progressively come under democratic civilian control. Democratization of intelligence agencies being the most daunting mission, because agencies rely on secrecy for effectiveness and efficiency, whereas democratic control requires transparency, openness, and accountability. This seemingly oxymoronic task can be taken with will to ‘invest’ in intelligence and intelligence reform. External factors (independent and pluralistic media, civil society, international groups, and human rights practitioners), play a crucial role in achieving balance between control and effectiveness.

This democratization of intelligence, (especially in a new democracy) involves few of following steps (Edmunds, 2008): -

- a. Creating a new agency or reorganizing old ones along with process of crafting the legal frameworks (intelligence roles, control, oversight, accountability, and transparency).
- b. Establishing and strengthening institutions and mechanisms to ensure that intelligence at some level is accountable to citizens/their representatives. This includes legislative or its standing or ad hoc

committees, judiciary, internal legal accountability mechanisms within intelligence organizations (general counsels and inspectors general), and finally the external mechanisms like free press, independent think tanks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other international organizations.

- c. Recognition of the need to develop additional principles and practices, that boost the effectiveness of the intelligence agencies and strengthen the democratic nature of control and oversight (raising public interest on intelligence and security matters; increasing civilian expertise in intelligence; institutionalizing processes that support transparency and effectiveness; fostering apolitical culture that supports intelligence in society and inside the agencies; and, professionalization of the intelligence services).

As identified earlier (universal democratic indexing), despite undergone a democratic transition, Pakistan is back to Authoritarian Regimes of 2007, when it was under a dictatorship. Under the civil-military relations, barring the debate of ‘encroachment of space’ or the common principle of inevitability of a vacuum to be left unfilled, Army's involvement in politics, from 1958 onwards, is by now a grim reality. The increasing influence of the military in aspects of foreign policy, nuclear weapons issues, internal security, judiciary, politics and even economics has created unease in most parts of society. Even ‘being on same page’ is far from the desired constitutional equation, as the imbalance had worsened in last democratic government (s). It is basically a kind of one step forward and two step backwards. While in form, democracy seems progressively consolidating, yet the recoil of year 2022 has brought it back to zero or worse and real substance (real executive power by democratically

elected for the welfare of public) worsened to current regressions of 2023 and 2024. Lately, the retort of the executive can be seen in different events from failed attempt to bring ISI under Interior Ministry in 2008, creation of National Counter Terrorism Authority - NACTA in 2009 and superimposition of National Intelligence Coordination Committee – NICC in 2020. The last two also had the purpose of creating a set up like that of Office of Director National Intelligence - ODNI of USA, which brings the military/intelligence under civilian control for its accountability. National Internal Security Policy - NISP in 2012-14, placed 26 Civil and Military Agencies under NACTA for terrorism and extremism, though the same could not implemented till present.

For accountability of executive in USA, researchers compared and contrasted the two approaches of accountability with the ideas of ‘police patrolling’ and ‘firefighting’. (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984) First is of ‘routine vigilance’ where a patroller ‘the lawmakers’ overseer, regularly review executive branch’s programs. In the second case, he only comes when an alarm or breach has occurred or reported and takes the response. But once the firestorm subdues, he returns to relative normalcy or inaction. Following this the researchers identified two periods of accountability or oversight as ‘journalism as usual period’ and ‘whistleblowing period’, but stresses that oversight of media becomes more important during ‘journalism as usual period’ (Bakir, 2017).

In Pakistan, the second case of a firefighting by formal scrutinizer has been ‘more frequent’, and concept of whistleblowing is nonexistent. Even this monitoring was in its placebo form, with not much of tangible output. What it needs is some kind of ‘grand dialogue’ among the state institutions at the highest level, as various organs and institutions have increasingly encroached on each other's space and accountability

cannot be undertaken. On January 17, 2019, Chief Justice of Pakistan - CJP, Justice Asif Saeed Khosa proposed an inter-institutional dialogue at the summit level for solution of these basic issues (Sigamony, 2019).

2.2 Media's Role in Intelligence Oversight

According to Schultz (1998), the press, “starting as ‘bastard estate’ of 18th century, won its independence by following freedom of expression in the next” (p. 1). The less elitist it became, the more power it wielded in public scrutiny. But now, with its head in politics and feet in commerce, it is being termed as a flawed embodiment of the original concept” (p.22). This has resulted in a substitute concept of the fifth estate; a grouping of outlier viewpoints (in contemporary society) of bloggers, publishing in non-mainstream media outlets. It also includes the mainstream media, but as an entity to be monitored (Wiki Leaks a vivid example of the same). Here it is also understood that the desired revival of the ‘fourth estate’ is only possible through journalistic independence, political autonomy, increased accountability, responsiveness, and the transition of the press to the purest task of journalistic investigation.

Media has to be ‘objective to the core’ and to inform, entertain and educate. According to Iqbal’s Structural-Functional model (2014) “all institutions in a society support each other in the Macro Social System for their proper functioning (homeostasis) and a problem in any institution, consequently, causes problems in other institutions too” (p. 13). According to McQuail (1997), “it has to serve the ‘Public Interest’ whether by design or chance, can be held accountable for the same” (p. 68). “For this, the basic proposed values are freedom, equality/justice, and order/solidarity” (p. 70).

A working model for media was also proposed, where the ‘core’ includes Public Service TV and the ‘periphery’ has Private Service Enterprise, Civic, Social Market and Professional sectors. In this the vigilant scrutiny of government and other power centers remains the basic requirement (Curran, 1996).

According to Benkler (2011) this new fifth or Networked Fourth Estate is a set of practices, organizing models, and technologies, associated with the press and provide a public check on government branches. It has a diverse set of actors including small for-profit media organizations, non-profit media organizations, academic centers, and distributed networks of individuals even within the larger traditional organizations. This structure also explains the recent growth of non-traditional journalistic media on Internet and how it affects the traditional press.

The concept of ‘openness’ is an important requirement for democratic governance that relies on an informed electorate. Citizens should be able to make informed judgments and participate in the political community. The focus remains on ‘serious’ news outlets, or ‘public affairs news’. However, in Pakistan despite the mushroom growth of private media or public affair channels, the desired role of public scrutiny is still deficient. Lack of investigative journalism, objectivity, training, over-reliance on official sources, more concentration on economics (conglomeration) and entertainment, discredibility in issues of national security/foreign policy and more concentration on personalities than institutions are few of the reasons of this deficiency.

Pakistani Public Affairs news setups do practice some of the scrutiny functions, but in an infrequent, ad hoc, and informal manner, which does not easily fit into existing conceptual frameworks of intelligence oversight. Inherent weaknesses of

covering intelligence topics, external factors such as military interventions or its hold, government or intelligence service's secrecy agenda, and the weak regulatory frameworks are some of the reasons of this negligence. The recent Pakistani Global War on Terror (GWOT) has further turned the media into a 'lapdog' mainly on the pretexts like national security.

The relationship between citizens, the intelligence services, policymakers/formal scrutinizers, and the informal scrutinizer, is a complex one. The Geneva Centre For Security Governance (DCAF) a think tank has identified four main responsibilities for civil society/media in this role (Born & Wills, 2012): -

- a. To investigate policies and activities of intelligence services and intelligence oversight bodies.
- b. To expose improper, illegal, ineffective, or inefficient conduct of the intelligence services.
- c. To inform the public regarding intelligence service policies, activities, and its oversight.
- d. To encourage public debate about policies, activities of intelligence services and oversight bodies.

For its efficacy and effectiveness, four necessary conditions have been identified, which a press must have (Hastedt, 2016): -

- a. Public must perceive or believe the press, to be a legitimate agent of oversight, in reality or practice.
- b. In press reporting, the information should be given out piecemeal, in a process, giving sustained attention and input with background and context in elementary/uncomplicated manner. For sustenance of issue

Johnson (2007) proposes “A sustained coverage in leading newspapers, say, several weeks running with at least a few front-page stories.” (p. 343).

- c. Being in political domain, the existence of disagreement among the policymaking elites is the third necessary condition. It is proposed that “at the root of all politics is the universal language of conflict; the audience determines the outcome of the [political] fight; which is determined by the extent to which the audience becomes involved . . . the scope of its contagion” (Schattschneider, 1975, p. 2). This especially identifies the importance of both sustained coverage of the event/issue and the framing by the press of the same.
- d. Finally the issue under discussion must be of public’s interest, because “while press coverage directs reader’s attention to the issues, but it may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think. . . . The world will look different to different people” (Cohen, 1964, p. 13). However, these all situations are specific to the political culture of the country and trade-offs between preserving national security and protecting civil liberties being viewed differently, yet reactions can be different on revelations of wrongdoings. There is no specific ‘
- e. ‘Tipping point’ for media attention, however pollster Yankelovich (2006) suggest that it is near when three factors emerge: one, the size of the public majority in favor or opposed to a policy; two, the intensity and urgency of opinions; and three, whether or not the public believes the government is responsible. Yet, Sagar (2013) claims that, “the intelligence oversight in US is an ‘unruly contest’, and that no

easy way exists by which to part the veil of secrecy surrounding intelligence operations” (p. 203).

Reljic (2005) also presented a dynamic model of assessment of media’s performance with four emerging realistic assessment fields: -

- a. The Political Environment of Media
- b. The Economic Environment
- c. Journalistic Skills
- d. The Political Psychology of the Public

He further suggested that media is just one of the factors and in view of the above factors, an idealistic approach be avoided.

In case of condition of contemporary democracy/ranking, according to Freedom House (2024), Pakistan in world freedom index, is ‘Partly Free’ since 2019 (the categories are Free, Partly Free and Not Free). Reporters Without Borders-RSF (2024) has ranked Pakistan at 152 out of 180 in the annual country profile/report, with comments like. “Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's leading military intelligence agency, is prepared to silence any critic once and for all” (para. 7). The Economic Intelligence Unit – EIU (2024) has already ranked Pakistan at 118, as Authoritarian regime under world democracy index.

One of the major issues of this imbalanced relation of ‘establishment’ or their Intelligence Agencies with media is due to a structural problem posed by ‘state secrecy’, which create ‘information asymmetry’, with which intelligence officials manipulate the constitutional safeguards or the proposed balance. Everything is hushed down on the pretext of secrecy or security, to the most elusive construct of

‘national interest’. Sagar (2009) while presenting a ‘retrospective approach’ for addressing this issue states that the nature of goals of two institutions are fundamentally in tension, with factors like ‘Peacetime Oversight’ versus the National Security Crisis. The result (victory or defeat) and type of government (dictatorship or democracy) have a considerable effect on this desired balance. Here the future trends of warfare and changed media environment make media-military relations more difficult. But the symbiotic relation between the two in shapes of leaks, embedding and mutual politicization of intelligence analysis, like that of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq War of 2004, also exist on the same continuum. In Pakistan due to the ‘transitional nature’ of both, (democracy and media) it is too farfetched to expect the oversight role under the western/old democratic principles. However, it does not restrict us from using those benchmarks, with a minimized threshold or lowered brackets. The concept of new democracies can be taken as the direction, yet according to own context and ground realities.

2.3 Intelligence Oversight by Media

Lowenthal (2019) states that intelligence has three connotations. “First as a process, it is the means by which governments request, collect, analyze, and disseminate certain types of required information, leading to covert or counter-intelligence operations. Second as a product of these gathering, analysis, and covert operations. And finally, as an organization, those agencies that carry out these functions” (p. 08).

Intelligence craft, the ‘oldest profession’ has the inherent issue of negative perception due to its nature, scope, and the enshrined role in a state. The most important function in a democracy is keeping the country safe and informed about

external and internal threats. These consolidated organizations include members of intelligence agencies, military intelligence, civilian intelligence, and analysis directorates, operationalized under executive ministries of government. With primary mission of ‘intelligence collection’ and secondary of ‘counterintelligence’, to the main agencies of the country, the domestic security intelligence, or high policing function, is assigned to separate civilian agencies. However, there could also be other types of agencies with different mandates, scopes, and operations.

Whitaker (2009) claims that the term ‘oversight’ refers to supervisory functions and it is being broadly used, while referring to the scrutiny of government action before, during, and after, when dealing with both the matters of propriety and efficacy. Oversight is not accountability, but it may ultimately lead to it. From this perspective, the media has an obligation to keep governments in check and investigate their activities including the field of intelligence. Chesterman (2011) presents the picture of this contest by claiming that “meaningful accountability of intelligence services depends on the level of public debate, which may be opposed by the actors in question, proscribed by official secret acts, and constrained by the interests of elected officials” (page. 80). Whereas Lester (2015) divides accountability into two sets of components: one is of external accountability (by parliament, opposition, judiciary, civil society, and media) and other of internal accountability of intelligence (control mechanisms, institutional culture, and organizational standard operating procedures), but proposes all to have been linked in a chain.

Among the four main set ups (executive/internal, legal, judicial, and public), the public (informal) oversight constitutes the news media, think-tanks, civil society activists and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Scrutiny by these institutions can lead to the final public accountability, through elections, or the public-at-large can

hold the intelligence accountable. Public oversight is primarily focused on security sector and human rights issues, but can also exercise direct political pressure on the government, where media plays a key role in increasing public awareness, as access to reliable information is a pre-requisite for this accountability. Here the scandal can also lead to investigation and result in structural reform, which improves both the accountability and the effectiveness of intelligence. In case of access to information, the legal rules about the classification or declassification of information can reconcile accountability and transparency, while maintaining the required or reasonable secrecy through: -

- a. Initiating the freedom of information laws allowing public access to government's data.
- b. Proper classification schedules or timeframes that clearly define what, when and how long the information will be kept secret and the designated timeframe for its de-classification.
- c. Legal jurisprudence provide protection (from punishment or victimizations for violating their pre-obtained pledge of confidentiality, loyalty or obedience) for intelligence or other personnel who reveal information that exposes misconduct.
- d. Whistleblower protection is equally important with the understanding that such disclosures can compromise national security, even when serving a wider public interest.

The basic concept is that every aspect of intelligence activity, be subjected to democratic control and oversight or will of the people, as it also protects the intelligence services from political abuse, while creating a well-resourced, motivated, merit-based, non-discriminatory workplaces for professionals. Here control means the

power to direct an organization's policies and activities, by making rules, codes, or policies. Whereas oversight means verifying whether rules, laws are obeyed, and codes, policies are applied or otherwise. Oversight can be undertaken by many different institutions, while control is typically of the concerned executive branch. But this all has to work in an agreed system in vogue.

In the 21st century security landscape, the intelligence and security system of a democratic country has to work efficiently on four fronts, simultaneously: -

- a. Control should be brought under the democratic civilian setup, in principle and practice.
- b. The Intelligence setup should be extra effective (from war to peacekeeping).
- c. This efficiency of the Intelligence agencies and missions should be with minimum cost, while remaining within the bounds of propriety and law.
- d. Required approach should be 'offensive defense', with effort on sound preemption and research rather than being responsive and reactive.

The only solution to security–democracy paradox is that democracies must make all-out efforts to balance both the features of deliverance, namely transparency and secrecy, while maintaining the required homeostasis.

2.3.1 Intelligence Failure

The concept of intelligence failure is an old construct and according to Lowenthal (2019) it is the “outcome of inadequacies within the intelligence cycle, which essentially consists of (simultaneous) six steps: requirements, collection,

processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and consumption, and feedback” (p. 49). In the West the study of intelligence failures is the most academically advanced field in the study of intelligence (Hedley, 2005), however limited attention has been given in the case of Southeast Asia. A comparative analysis of intelligence failure of three incidents of the region, including the Bin Laden Killing in 2011, was recently given by Ashraf and Sarkar (2016).

2.3.2 Intelligence Interference

The theorization of this construct involves understanding how intelligence agencies impact state organs such as the judiciary and parliament. This can be approached through various frameworks in political science, security studies, and legal theory. The conceptualization of the construct is yet not complete, as the term is not universally standardized, and is widely discussed under various terminologies such as intelligence oversight, civil-military relations, and intelligence governance. In the academic and policy research, it is included in the context of civil-military relations, democratic governance, and the role of intelligence agencies within a state. Few key theoretical perspectives and academic references that contribute to this understanding are: -

- a. Civil-Military Relations Theory:
 - i. Huntington’s Model: The model of civil-military relations in ‘The Soldier and the State -1957’ can be extended to intelligence agencies, focusing on the balance of power between civilian oversight and military (or intelligence) autonomy (Huntington, 2019).

- ii. Janowitz's Professional Soldier: His work of 'The Professional Soldier' emphasizes the integration of military (and by extension, intelligence) institutions within the political framework of the state, including their influence on civilian institutions (Janowitz, 1961).
- b. Principal-Agent Theory explains the relationship between elected officials (principals) and intelligence agencies (agents). It explores how agents can act independently of, or contrary to, the principals' interests due to information asymmetry and control challenges.
- c. Institutional Theory focuses on how structures, norms, and rules within state institutions, including the judiciary and intelligence agencies, influence behavior and interactions. It examines the formal and informal mechanisms of control and oversight.
- d. Douglas North's Institutional Change: North's work on institutional change highlights how institutions evolve over time, including the role of intelligence agencies in shaping these changes.
- e. Security Governance. The concept of security governance looks at the broad array of actors involved in maintaining security, including intelligence agencies, and their interactions with other state organs. It emphasizes multi-level governance and the role of non-state actors.
- f. Legal and Constitutional Theory. These theories explore the legal frameworks governing intelligence agencies and their interactions with the judiciary. They analyze how laws and constitutional provisions either limit or facilitate interference.

In case of being judiciary specific, the research related to intelligence interference in matters of the judiciary covers a wide range of topics, from direct manipulation of judicial outcomes to more subtle influences on legal processes. The construct of intelligence interference in the judiciary is well-documented in academic and policy research. These resources collectively offer not only a comprehensive view of the mechanisms and implications, but also specific cases of how intelligence agencies can and do interfere with judicial processes, particularly in countries like Pakistan.

Up against the volume of research in the world, the research in Pakistan is limited to few books like ‘The Military and Democracy in Pakistan’ by Hasan-Askari Rizvi, few articles like ‘Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto’ by Shafqat (1997), and the case study or historical analysis of judicial interference of ‘Asghar Khan Case’, where the judiciary has been found influenced by the intelligence agencies (Khan 2005).

2.4 Gaps in Existing Literature

Considerable work on ‘intelligence oversight’ by the media has been undertaken in the mature democracies or the west (USA/UK/Europe). There are also few examples of studies in South America and the ‘new democracies’ of Central and Eastern Europe, where the context of the study appears to change altogether. In Asian region and especially in South Asia, this research is done under ‘security sector reforms studies’ and is limited to Nepal and Sri Lanka only. PILDAT (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency) has done some work on intelligence oversight, but the same is intelligence centric and covers ‘formal oversight’ of parliament. No research of media’s role in this ‘informal oversight’

could be found by the researcher, thus creating a big domain and geographic gap in the literature. Pakistan's peculiar context can have serious implication for the assigned universal oversight role of the media. There is a big gap in understanding and execution of media's role of oversight in relation to Pakistani intelligence agencies, especially under the local structural and political context. So, indigenization or de-westernization of the oversight has to be undertaken.

In recent research, Siddique (2017) of Institute of Communication Studies, Lahore, conducted content analysis of editorials of six Urdu and English dailies from watchdog standpoint. In the research an instrument 'watchdog index' was developed for measuring the dimensions of 'information' and 'criticism' and it finally concluded that the press has been unable to play its democratic watchdog role.

Later in pointed research by a team under Dr Marwan, it has been identified that news reports of Dawn were dependent for information on foreign sources, for ten days reporting on Abbottabad Operation of May 2011. Content analysis was used to identify the inter-media agenda setting (Marwan et al., 2019).

Zulfiqar (2021) also undertook Critical Discourse Analysis of 'editorial coverage' of OBL Operations by two English newspapers (*Dawn* and *The News International*). Agenda setting and framing were identified using Critical Discourse Analysis on thirty-five editorials of the newspapers.

2.5 Theoretical or Conceptual Framework

The lens of this research is normative in nature, where the monitoring role of the media has been well outlined. This benchmark will be used as basic standard for evaluating the performance.

Due to the factor of local ‘high context culture’ and intelligence agencies being a mammoth power houses, with ever expanded influence in the country, the method of discourse analysis (Van Dijk) was used for analysis, for being available in news stories specific format.

The in-vogue accountability approach of ‘firefighting’ (against police patrolling) was utilized for the selected events, being case specific in nature (OBL operation of 2011; an intelligence failure and IHC Judges letter case of 2024; an intelligence interference). These two cases have a 13-year temporal difference, and the analysis can tell us more about over the period improvement in the role or otherwise. This factor also limited the scope of the study to the few well circulated presses, which are or have capability and capacity to view intelligence from the required pedestal.

The oversight model of Hillebrand, duly augmented and further explicated by Kristof Clerix and Luuk Clausing, was utilized, after the required tabulation/grading and due refinements. A final summary and grading indexes were obtained for final representation of the role.

At the end the efficacy of the original model was assessed along with suggestions or modifications. In view of above this study can be loosely termed as a qualitative - theory building exploratory research, where subject specific theorization will take place in the process of operationalization.

In the theoretical domain of intelligence oversight under accountability, Hillebrand (2012) has identified three key oversight roles for the news media: -

- a. A crucial purpose refers to the transmission and scrutiny of information about government's undertakings and bringing issues to public domain and debate.
- b. A step further, in view of a situation, where formal scrutinizers appearing to be inept or unwilling, is that of a substitute watchdog, where media fills in the gap.
- c. In an indirect way, media coverage can contribute to the legitimization of intelligence services and the related policies (including monitoring).
- d. Finally Clerix (2013) talks of role of 'sensitization platform' for espionage activities of hostile intelligence, where the media's task is to sensitize the public regarding the espionage risks and related activities like psychological warfare or commonly known as fifth generation warfare (p. 185).

2.6 Research Questions

- a. In view of the model above, the research questions which now emerge are: -

RQ-1: Has the Pakistani press been able to play its democratic oversight role of Information Transmitter and Stimulator for the formal scrutinizer of Pakistani Intelligence Agencies?

RQ-2: Has the Pakistani media been able to play a Substitute Watchdog in absence of deliverance by the formal scrutinizer?

RQ-3: Has the Pakistani media been able to legitimize the Institution of Intelligence and the process of oversight?

RQ-4: Has the Pakistani press been able to sensitize the public regarding the hostile espionage risks and related activities?

RQ-5: Is this Intelligence Oversight Framework for media, given and exercised in the West, effective in relation to Pakistani context? If not, what could be the model for the same?

b. Further explanation of each research question is as under: -

RQ-1: The most practiced or easiest informal oversight role of media is to act as a conveyor belt of transmitting the information, which will automatically lead to scrutinization of the role of respondent or government, including the intelligence services. It will not only bring the event/issues on the agenda for public for debate, but will also draw political attention to any negative undertaking of human rights infringements or other potential issues of powers abuse, generally related to accountability. The essence of this role is in support to the accountability organ of the government/state and mainly warrants cooperation not animosity or competition.

RQ-2: In case of countries like Pakistan, where intelligence agencies are so powerful that even the government accountability mechanisms are subservient to them or unable to perform their role of oversight or monitoring, despite the fact that these bodies or committees of public representatives are part of formal apparatus of the government or state. In this case an added responsibility comes onto media to act as a substitute watchdog (of formal and informal both). Media actually fills the gap, when the formal oversight bodies are either unwilling, or are incapable, of conducting their task of scrutiny. There are considerable capacity factors which the media must possess before taking on the role, especially with persistence or frequency.

RQ-3: Next role (a kind of a bi-product of first two undertaking/roles) is of a legitimization or a reassuring tool, where, by informing the public about the policies and activities of intelligence services, these agencies and their activities are indirectly legitimized. It is also legitimized that their performance is being monitored/seen by an independent entity. This also provide public support and cooperation, when needed by these services. Media also builds a bridge between the public and agencies in this case, while it being more beneficial to the agencies. The catch in this role is that media should not become a lapdog or an outright foe instead.

RQ-4: For the countries where hostile and outside intelligence agencies or service operate more frequently, Clerix, while following the original lead, has proposed yet another role of sensitization of the public, about the risks of espionage of those Hostile Intelligence Agencies – HIAs. This, a kind of awareness leading to identification of friend and foe and their related activities is equally useful.

RQ-5: The final research question tries to assess the applicability or efficacy of this model in local setting of Pakistan, where the context is different from the west in physical, social, cultural and psychological dimensions. Is there a need to modify the model or prepare it afresh for the local environment or setting.

Chapter 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

The orientation is essentially 'responsive' in nature, as the study is being conducted after the event or case, in hindsight or retrospect (Clausing, 2016). The monitoring role of the media has been well outlined in the book 'Normative Theories of the Media: Journalism in Democratic Societies,' a sequel to the famous 'Four Theories of the Press' of 1956 (Christians, 2009). The media roles are explained from three levels of philosophical, political and the media's role, including each stage of media as monitorial, facilitative, radical, and collaborative, with different matrices for each. But due to minimal theorization of intelligence oversight in academic research and neglect to the setting or context of the East, no local benchmarks are available for evaluation of efficiency of media's role therein. The theoretical framework of a traditional media research also becomes challenging due to normal journalistic practices (newsworthiness, source, or sequence of 5Ws/1H) while covering the intelligence (Mischler, 2015), yet the overall approach remains normative in nature. The high context culture of Pakistan (including of the journalists) was also taken in consideration for selecting the discourse analysis.

Due to the existing 'less' or 'placebo' oversight (referred as firefighting) the case specific orientation of two major events (OBL Raid and IHC Letter case) was maintained, especially when press is unable to fulfill its four necessary conditions/requirements, duly stipulated above by Hastedt (2016). This also narrowed

down the scope to few well circulated presses, with capacity and capability to take on this difficult task, from the position of a supervisor or monitoring.

The nature and influence of intelligence agencies in Pakistan as a power-brokers was also kept under view, as on one side is a well-established organ of the state and on the other an institution (press) claimed to be still not coming out of its so called ‘myopic view’.

The public (main stakeholder or factor, for whom all this machination of accountable democracy has been created) is also devoid of basic citizenry cognition and is claimed to be tamed to reflect in a particular way, for being gullible or best credulous. The public doesn’t demand, and the media doesn’t provide. It is also understood that the contemporary situation of the country, when placed under Hillebrand’s perspective, warrants a substitute dog’s role, because the formal oversight/scrutinizer is somewhat non-existence, incapable or marginalized.

The approach taken by different researchers (Hastedt, Clausen, Bakir and the local researchers) has been mainly quantitative and sometimes qualitative for editorials only, however ‘news reports’ have been somehow left unattended. Therefore, discourse analysis, with both of its dimensions, first as a method of analysis of the text and second as a perspective of power relations between two power houses of the country (intelligence and media) is being utilized. The methods of Teun A. Van Dijk of News Schemata, Textual Discourse Analysis and Opinions & Ideologies in Press, is used to analyze the text of news reports (comments, opinion included in reports). The analysis is then viewed under the Hillebrand model for desired democratic role, whether it is performed or otherwise. For this the identified

or ‘itemized’ indicators for measuring these four roles (Clausing, 2016) have been utilized in this research.

3.2 Population.

The population for this study constitutes the media reports, reported in the English press during the OBL Raid of May 2011 and IHC Judges Letter Case of March 2024. The basic criterion is the relevance to the topic of intelligence oversight role, either partially/referentially or totally, covering intelligence failure or intelligence interference in each case respectively.

3.3 Sampling

Due to the expected shortage of relevant news reports, the census sampling frame was used for all the four newspapers. Relevance to the issue or case and the temporal relevance to the incident or scandal, governed the selection of the news reports.

3.4 Conceptualization/Operational Definition

Four newspapers namely *Dawn*, *The News International*, *The Nation*, and *The Daily Times* were selected for this study. These newspapers belong to major media groups of the country and cover the complete political spectrum. They have been chosen for their importance, influence, circulation and publication in the English language. Possibility of their covering this difficult topic or beat was more than the rest of the newspapers of the same kind. It was also a combination of new and old, left and right and liberal and conservative.

In the light of the model, the four major variables emerged as: -

- a. Transmitter or Stimulator
- b. Substitute Watchdog
- c. Legitim�er
- d. Sensitizer

Additional variable for this study was the ‘efficacy’ variable of the Hillebrand model in relation to Pakistani context and setting.

3.4.1 Conceptualization/Operationalization of Variables

The main aim was to identify presence/absence, degree, along with some statistical account (numbers/index) of the desired roles of the five variables: -

a. **Media for Information Transmission & Stimulation of Formal Scrutinizers.**

- i. The main aim here is to bring issues to Agenda of Public Debate (Public/Political Attention), including human rights infringements, abuse of power or lack of accountability. Media can break new stories or new insight to an existing story. Media can cover the aspects of intelligence activity in a story, including, content, objectives and limits. The transmission and stimulation (scrutinizing) for formal scrutinizers (the information-transmitted/scrutinized). It covered:-

- aa. The transmission of information and or observation (both facts or comments) to include, origin/source of either own – journalist, editors, newspaper (the acquisition efforts) or of outside – guest author (journalist or non-journalists) and the critical

assessment efforts or just the regurgitation of facts or the origin or source remains anonymous.

- bb. Scrutiny of intelligence policy or activity (beyond factual) covering the investigative efforts performed (real/significance) which are in-directly referred by in-‘text signals’. The nature of information – critical/new insight to intelligence. (considerably dependent on source). The intervention level for its exposure covering own effort or source initiated of recent disclosure or already held knowledge (for years), the source (exclusive or common), approach to source (initial or secondary). Is the source human (formal scrutinizer, politician, official/expert, or intelligence community) and was it through exclusive interview/conversation. Is the source non-human (achieves, database, others).
- ii. Critical discussion, review or assessment covering the journalist’s co-relation and interpretation of available information, retrieved by journalist/self with significant line of thought either elaborative or descriptive, or inquisitory (questions), or criticizing, judgmental. The presentation by journalist like nature of output (elaborative/descriptive, inquisitory, criticizing or judgmental), time factor, with clear line of thought and norms (legal or ethical).
- iii. Stimulation or assistance to formal scrutinizer (formal oversight-politicians or bodies) with identification, attention,

initiation of pressure, persistence, public debate, policy amendment or response generation.

- iv. Role of organization (newspaper organization etc.), Including its standing, positioning and the treatment given.

b. **Media as Substitute Watchdog** (when the formal oversight bodies are incapable or unwilling).

- i. This is in case of incapability or unwillingness of formal scrutinizer. Also to provide a channel for leaking information. Can be used (or abused) by politicians as well. Include translation of official reports (but not sensationalization). It is a specialized field requiring experience, resources, and time (expensive) where well-established investigative journalism is a pre-requisite. Factors for efficiency of this role are capacity of media (economic and political), size of intelligence community and number of intelligence operations, history of state (repressive/facilitative), nature of society (open/deep/closed), public awareness and level of democracy.
- ii. Possible roles (with element of persistence) are: -
 - aa. Scandals (especially in absence of input from government or intelligence).
 - bb. Assistance to whistleblowing, channel for leakage of information (not an investigative journalism).
 - cc. Use by opposition for public interest/otherwise.
 - dd. Second opinion to intelligence related legislation.
 - ee. Sharp translation of official reports.

ff. Education of formal scrutinizer, public, civil society and agencies.

gg. Development of academic literature.

c. **Media as Legitimizing Institution**

i. As a reassuring & legitimizing tool that the intelligence performance is being overseen (independently), especially in situations of need of public support/cooperation for activities or for broad public acceptance (mandate/work) or when negotiating for more powers/budget by intelligence.

ii. It is legitimizing intelligence services and their activities (reassuring tool, but not through neutral language) covering legitimization, informing the public (intelligence policies, services, secrecy and openness), public acceptance for existence, mandate and budget, building faith that intelligence is being observed independently (investigative journalism) and building public support and co-operation for services.

iii. Build a bridge like reporting successful operations, point out reform processes (to show that learning is taking place), role taken seriously to suggest that services are trustworthy and follow the mandate. 'Building Bridges' would include reports on successful operations/assistance, showing of reform process, drawing away of undue blame/credit from agencies (even though through a neutral expression).

d. **Media to Sensitize the Public regarding the Espionage Risks.** This role was later added by Clerix (2013).

It included identification of hostile agencies for public for espionage risks, their motives and themes, operations and operatives. Covering the prevention, reporting and counter measures, while being educational (intelligence craft) as well. It also covers identification of own agencies (for secrecy) and educational (fifth generation warfare).

e. **Efficacy of Model in Local Setting of Pakistan**

Since it being a model of the West, it may not fit into Pakistan's setting or requirement, and may require modification or even replacement. At the end of the final analysis, arguments were generated for reply to this question. This study is mainly a jumping-off point or milestone towards understanding this new topic of informal oversight of intelligence agencies by the press or media, especially in case of the countries like Pakistan.

3.5 **Selection Criteria of the Four English Newspapers**

Dawn, *The News International*, *The Nation* and *The Daily Times* newspapers were selected for being important, published in English language, high circulation, and influential, with capacity of taking on the desired role. *Dawn* is the oldest, leading and most widely read elite newspaper of the country established since 1947. The political orientation is liberal, centrist and progressive. *The News International* starting in 1991 is the largest English language newspaper in Pakistan with a moderate and somewhat balanced political orientation. *The Nation* starting from 1986 is a (possible) liberal manifestation of a basically conservative newspaper. *The Daily Times* starting from 2002 under ex-Governor Punjab Salman Taseer, has made it mark as a liberal and secular paper. These four newspapers belong to major media houses or groups of the country (*Dawn*, *Jang*, *Nawa-i-Waqt* and *Media Times Limited*), who

have the capability to stand and report on matters related to intelligence oversight. These are also the trend setters for conservative and liberal press which follows them in the direction. They also represent the two (main) schools of thought of the political and the national domain or spectrum.

3.6 Instrument

Two models (Van Dijk and Hillebrand) were used as instruments in this textual data analysis research. In first stage the individual text or story is processed through Van Dijk's model of discourse analysis under following three steps: -

- a. Microstructures-Local (Semantics-Coherence). Model of Van Dijk (Annexure A).
- b. Thematic Realization (Macro-Micro)-Themes. Model of Van Dijk. (Annexure A).
- c. Topic Derivation (Schema-Superstructure)-Topics. Model of Van Dijk. (Annexure A).

After analysis through above Van Dijk's Model, the text is further analyzed through Hillebrand model, while utilizing the identified/itemized indicators explicated by Clausen (2016). In this second stage same report or text of the newspaper was analyzed by the oversight template (derived by this researcher) from above itemized indicators. This stage is tabulated as: -

- d. Oversight Roles Played by News Media. Claudian Model with Clausen itemization and this researcher's indexing (attached as Annexure B).

After these stages the final summary was prepared where these items were further synthesized and finally given a digital number or final index (while in viewing the importance of each factor) by the researcher. This is transfers of qualitative data into quantitative representation was just to augment further assessments and conclusions.

3.7 Procedure for Data Collection

The data (relevant news reports) was collected from digital newspaper archives, websites, newspaper offices and National Library Islamabad, in hard and soft form. Help was also taken from Lexis-Nexis web source through an acquaintance using key words of Osama and Abbottabad, which identified 13 news reports of *The Daily Times*, which were indirectly related to Abbottabad Operation of 02 May 2011.

3.8 Data Analysis

Data was analyzed through above given two methods or models (with two stages and four steps) and final quantitative index, achieved through summarizing. After that key qualitative features or factors were discussed individually for drawing the collective conclusions and recommendations.

3.9 Ethical Consideration, Reliability and Validity

Following ethical considerations were visualized by the researcher, yet the chance of missing out few is a possibility: -

- a. The analysis is retrospective in nature and this research at hindsight cannot portray the actual environment of the occurrence or incident. The 'presently held' temporal advantage of actually knowing the consequences will shed a different light on the production.

- b. The field realities of a journalist can best be known and explained by a journalist himself and desk's understanding, presentation and critique of a story may not be as justified as presented.
- c. Intrinsic bias of the researcher either against or for, places a unique dilemma. All efforts have been made to be as objective as possible though to err is a human feature.
- d. Due to nature of intelligence agencies the respondent point of view was not available. This even if given, could be indirect for any conclusion or judgement. Paucity of complete knowledge can easily lead to weak cognition. Though the researcher having the background of intelligence can make some calculated assessments.

Reliability and Validity

Quantitative reliability is a difficult proposition to achieve in qualitative research when involving methods like discourse analysis. Yet an effort has been made to achieve the same with following measures in this research: -

- a. The dependability in the research process has been ensured by it being logical, traceable, and documented clearly. For that: -
 - i. The research process, including data collection, its coding procedures and the later statistical analysis has been well documented by the researcher.
 - ii. An audit trail has been maintained in form of notes, memos, and records of all research activities. This comprehensive account of the research process can be followed by others for checking and subsequent research.

- b. For consistency a code book in shape of summarized notes has been developed by the researched from Van Dijk's book 'News as Discourse' (Dijk, 1988). This summarized account is attached as Annexure A.

In case of validity for ensuring accuracy and trustworthiness of the findings, following steps have been taken by the researcher: -

- a. The construct validity is to ensure that the research accurately reflects the concept which it aims to measure. For this the study utilized the theoretical framework of Van Dijk's discourse analysis model, for qualitative research. It is a well-established framework in media studies, ensuring a robust analysis of news discourse and the appropriate statistical methods for quantitative analysis. In operational definitions, the key concepts were clearly defined, based on existing literature and the researchers professional experience, ensuring consistency. The selected events or cases (Abbottabad Operation 2011 and IHC Judges Letter case of 2024) were relevant and significant events providing clear context for examining media oversight of intelligence agencies.
- b. The internal validity mainly concerns the credibility of the findings, and the accuracy of the relationships explored. This study employed methodological triangulation by combining qualitative discourse analysis and some quantitative data analysis. This triangulation is also undertaken by employing the two models of Van Dijk and Claudia Hillebrand thus providing two credible theoretical frameworks. The detailed descriptions of the analysis process, including examples,

enhance internal validity by allowing depth and context of the findings. Multiple data sources triangulation of four different newspapers (*Dawn, The News International, The Daily Times, and The Nation*) and the employed media coverage metrics, or other relevant datasets also augmented the validity of this exercise.

- c. The external validity of generalizability of the findings beyond the given two specific cases studies, stand on selection of cases which are significant and have broader implications for the understanding media oversight and intelligence agency interactions in Pakistan. This study can provide analytical generalization, which can be applied to similar phenomena in other contexts or countries.
- d. Investigator or researcher's background in intelligence provides unique insights which enhanced the study. The reflection that researcher's professional experience has informed the analysis, has been made to humanly possible levels. Efforts were also made to be transparent about potential biases. Cognitively, steps were taken to ensure objectivity, through an iterative process of refinements through multiple rounds of reading, coding, and data analysis. Yet it is also acknowledged that individual background does shapes one's interpretation of the data or text.

Chapter 4

RESULTS AND FINDINGS

Data/news reports/news stories were collected from digital newspaper archives, websites, and National Library Islamabad in hard and soft form by the researcher. Considerable news reports were re-typed from the originals as digital section of National Library has been scrapped due to shortage of funds.

The main data collection was about oversight responsibility of press, however other factors have also emerged, which tell further about this watchdog role of the media. Each report, from the start of event till the end, when the public/media's interest saturated in the issue, was analyzed. A total of 117 news reports (75 stories of Abbottabad Operation and 42 stories of IHC Judges letter) of the four newspapers were selected for their segregation and detailed analysis. This excludes the other reports/stories of foreign and other papers. Reports like 'Abbottabad Commission Report', 'Faizabad Dharna Judgement' and reports of think tanks, which were also analyzed for required understanding of each case and the input. These relevant reports of the four newspapers were segregated and tested individually under the two staged, four stepped instruments for final summary or analysis.

Later a summary of these relevant reports was prepared to derive main points of the observations, which further lead to yet another shorter summary to derive the crux from all this data.

4.1 Abbottabad Operation of 02 May 2011 – An Intelligence Failure

On 02 May 2011 at around 1 AM, US Navy Seals (Team Six composed of 79 commandos and a dog) conducted a raid, code named 'Operation Neptune Spear' on two Black Hawk helicopters to kill Osama Bin Laden in a compound (at a distance of 1400 meters from Pakistan Military Academy-PMA Kakul), in Abbottabad. The CIA led heliborne team (with air support of three helicopters) came from Jalalabad Airfield, Afghanistan and after an operation of 38 minutes at the compound, killed OBL, two bodyguards, Osama's son and 1 x women. Out of the remainder 17, the youngest wife of Osama was also injured. Pakistan Armed Forces including intelligence had no prior or during knowledge of this raid. Thus, a two-count intelligence failure was alleged on the forces. In Para 734 - Finding of Abbottabad Commission Report (page 302), this raid or event is labelled as the greatest humiliation since breakup of 1971. Summary of Abbottabad Commission Report is attached as Annexure C.

4.1.1 Intelligence Failure

In this research the most common theme/topic or construct, common in most of the news reports had been that of Intelligence Failure. Some reports exacerbated it to Military Failure or to the ultimate National Failure. It was called an intelligence failure of two counts: first of not knowing about the presence of OBL in Abbottabad and second a security lapse of not knowing/responding to the conduct of raid on 02 May 2011 by US special forces. The theoretical explication identifies that the contemporary study of Intelligence Failures has three major perspectives for its occurrence. Namely the role of intelligence organization, the cognitive beliefs (both policymakers and intelligence analysts) and the operational performance of security and intelligence agencies. Accordingly, Johnson (2007) notes that in an intelligence

organization the weaknesses are inherent to each step of 'Intelligence cycle', from planning and direction to collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination.

- a. In Planning and Direction step, it is caused due to lack of well-defined planning and direction by senior officials and intelligence customers.
- b. In Collection and Processing step, the overwhelming of the task of Intelligence collectors, due to abundance of data, resultantly makes him to fail to process the data in a timely manner and provide it to the analysts.
- c. In the Analytical step, the Intelligence analysis being at the heart of Intelligence cycle, requires the analyst to add his/her insight to convert a piece of information into actionable Intelligence. The factors which can cause poor analytical judgment include professional incompetence, limited information, or the political manipulation.
- d. In the Dissemination step, it is the failure to draw due attention of the national security decision makers (by Intelligence Analyst) who are often pre-occupied with multiple competing issues. Or it can be due to lack of attention of policymakers or tendency to cherry-pick preferred information from Intelligence reports.

The introduction of this term in the reports was a consequence of the use of term 'Intelligence Success' in US/Western Press. This term also suited the Pakistan's initial narrative of a better option (or of a taking a lesser evil) rather than being portrayed as complicit/involved in supporting/hiding Osama (though at the time with exception of initial response by the Prime Minister, this has not been clearly stipulated by the Pakistani Government, rather later rejected officially).

For sustenance of issue (Johnson, 2007) this narrative remained persistent, in all four newspapers and was imposed by US/Media from the outset. Neither the confused government nor the weak media of Pakistan could properly respond to this theme, or generate any of its own, in response or otherwise.

4.1.2 Day-wise Summary

Selected news stories were first analyzed through Dijk model/instruments and later put through Hillebrand's model/instrument for final analysis. Due to expanse of data, one sample of a single news report is attached as annexures (D, E, F, G) below: -

- a. Microstructures-Local (Semantics-Coherence). Model of Van Dijk (Annexure D).
- b. Thematic Realization (Macro-Micro)-Themes. Model of Van Dijk. (Annexure E).
- c. Topic Derivation (Schema-Superstructure)-Topics. Model of Van Dijk. (Annexure F).
- d. Oversight Roles Played by News Media. Model of Claudia Hillebrand (Annexure G)

After analysis of individual story two types of summaries were prepared: day wise and role wise. Day-wise because the newspapers are generated on daily basis and date wise format is maintained. The number of related reports is prefixed with date and all four newspaper's stories being placed in a row. Within the newspaper, the front page and onward sequence has been followed. This (day wise) summary of data is related to first stage of the data collection and the related steps, which form part of this stage. The summarized data of day-wise summary of the concerning reports or stories of the four newspapers along with important remarks is as under: -

Day wise Summary and Analysis of News Reports (02 May to 31 May 2011)

S/ D	<i>Dawn</i>	<i>The News International</i>	<i>The Daily Times</i>	<i>The Nation</i>	Remarks
1/2 Mon	COPTER CRASHES ON KAKUL ROAD MONITORING DESK a. Helicopter crash b. Website c. Basic/32 words	CHOPPER CRASHES, 3 BLASTS HEARD NEAR PMA KAKUL News Desk d.Chopper crash e.Website f. Basic/114 words.	-	HELICOPTER CRASH CREATES HAVOC THE NATION MONITORING g.Creates Havoc h.Website i. Basic/240 words. j. Factual mistakes.	k. <i>Dawn</i> had better and timely coverage (but the briefest). l. Though all stories were basic and on web pages (no exact time mentioned, just date). m. Due to shortage of time and the process involved in printing the same could not be included in final newsprint. n. <i>The Nation</i> using adjective and factual mistakes.

2/2	<p>OBAMA UNDERLINES PAKISTAN HELP IN REACHING OSAMA (Death of Public enemy number one)</p> <p>a. Theme: Pakistan's Appreciation.</p> <p>b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (19 %).</p> <p>c. Death (Intelligence sharing, cooperation) suspicion, complicit or inefficient.</p> <p>d.Reproduction.</p>				<p>e. <i>Dawn</i> maintains quality and quantity.</p> <p>f. Though reproductions.</p> <p>g. Main Themes</p> <p>i. Failure/</p> <p>ii. Nightmare</p> <p>iii. Cooperation Account</p> <p>h. New Concept</p> <p>i. Intelligence Failure.</p> <p>i. Construct of 'False Dilemma' (Complicit or In-efficient)</p>
3/2	<p>PAKISTAN MILITARY CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE (Military struggle to explain)</p> <p>a. Theme: Intelligence</p>				

	Failure. b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (15.25 %). c. Damage Control. d. Reproduction.				
4/2	THE NIGHTMARE HAS HAPPENED Intelligence Failure/Nightmar e. a. Theme: b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (29 %). c. Trouble Future. d. Fear creating Analysis.				
5/2	THE RAID AS DESCRIBER BY US OFFICIALS a. Theme: Timeline. b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (2 %). c. Reproduced				

	short summary.				
6/2	GILANI HAILS' A VICTORY OF ANTI-TERROR ALLIANCE' a. Theme: Cooperation. b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (10.25 %). c. Defensive (Knee Jerk) Response.				
7/2	OPPOSITION RESENTS GOVT'S SILENCE a. Theme: Undue Silence. b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (0 %). c. Weakest Report.				
1/3 Tue	UN AUTHORISED RAID MUST NOT SERVE AS PRECEDENT,	INTELLIGENCE SHARING MADE IT POSSIBLE-GILANI (FO and PM statements)	OSAMA BIN LADEN KILLED g. Theme: 'A Well-Planned Raid.	AMERICAN TROOPS KILL OSAMA l. Theme: 'American Raid' detailed	p. <i>The News, The Daily Times</i> and <i>The Nation</i> joined in. q. Delay, Reproductions. r. Main Themes (New) i. Precedence.

	US TOLD. a. Theme: Belated Correction. b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (23.75 %). c. Modification in Stance.	d. Theme: Intelligence Cooperation. e. Oversight Role: Weak Role (07.25 %). f. Delayed Report.	h. Oversight Role: Weak Role (6.75 %). i. Considerably Late and Weak output with factual and textual mistakes j. A basic report/603 word. k. Reproduction and Repetitions of US media.	account. m. Oversight Role: Weak Role (5.75 %). n. Military/Intelligence Cooperation- Narrative. o. m. Factually weak account.	ii. ii. Mistrust. iii. Questions. iv. Embarrassment /Stumped. v. Sovereignty. vi. Al Qaeda. vii. Divide viii. Justice ix. Great Victory/Success. x. Right Approach to Counter Terrorism s. New Narrative/ Concept (except Dawn) i. False Dilemma. t. Editorial type news report (few).
2/3	US TROOPS TOOK AWAY'OSAMA'S SON a. Theme: Aftermath of Raid. b. Factually incorrect report of BBC journalist c. Reproduction without checking.	OSAMA LEAVES PAK ARMY, INTELLIGENCE EMBARRASSED d. Theme: Embarrassment on Intelligence Failure. e. Oversight Role: Good/ Satisfactory (40.5 %). f. Delayed Report (Editorial type) by Mariana Baabar. g. New Concept of	JUSTICE IS DONE h. Theme: 'Justice has been done'. i. Oversight Role: Weak Role (3.75 %). j. Considerably Late and Weak output with factual mistakes k. A brief report of 194 words. l. Reproduction and Repetitions of US media and their	MANY QUESTIONS UNANSWERED n. Theme: 'Aftermath of OBL Operation's questions on Intelligence Failure. o. Oversight Role: Weak Role (8.25 %). p. False Dilemma (Complicit or Involved). q. Factually weak but good questions raised.	

		Bakshoo/Subaltern (Antonio Gramsci/Gayatri Spivak).	narrative without any knowledge of it (word Justice). (Dawn 3/2) m. Medium of leaking of US narrative.		
3/3	CIA FEARED PAKISTAN MIGHT ALERT OSAMA a. Summarized report of Times Magazine Interview of Director CIA. b. Reproduction.	GEN PASHA CLAIMS ISI WAS AWARE OF OSAMA RAID (Asia Times) c. Theme: Divide (FO and Army). d. Oversight Role: Good (58.5 %). e. Investigative Journalism. f. Saleem Shahzad murder.	IT'S A GREAT VICTORY g. Theme: 'Great Victory or success' h. Oversight Role: Weak Role (3.75 %). i. Late and Weak output with factual mistakes j. A brief report of 190 words only. k. Reproduction and Repetitions of US media and their narrative without any knowledge of it (word Victory and Success). (Dawn 3/2).	OPERATION INTEL-DRIVEN:FO m. Theme: Foreign Office's Briefing on OBL Operation. n. Oversight Role: Satisfactory (8.25 %). o. Delayed Report Weak effort. p. Backlash predicted.	

			l. Medium of leaking of US/PM's narrative.		
4/3	PAKISTAN HELPED IDENTIFY OSAMA COURIER: ZARDARI a. Summarized report of Washington Post's Opinion written by President Zardari. b. Reproduction.		OSAMA'S DEATH NOT AN END TO TERRORISM: IMRAN c. Theme: 'Right Approach to Terrorism'. d. Oversight Role: Good Role (37.5 %). e. Late, but good output with strategic orientation. f. A basic report of 355 words only. g. Original report of own reporter. h. Presenting local counter narrative. i. Can be a medium of leaking or propagating opposition's	US VIOLATED SOVEREIGNTY j. Theme: Sovereignty Violated. k. Oversight Role: Weak (10.25 %). l. Delayed Report m. Ex President Interview. n. Reproduction of Agencies reports.	

			point of view.		
5/3			<p>US tracked Courier to find Bin laden's hideout- (An AFP Story)</p> <p>a. Summarized report of AFP's story.</p> <p>b. A Reproduction.</p> <p>c. Information Leak.</p>	<p>ABBOTTABAD ACTION TERMED ATTACK ON PAK SOVEREIGNTY</p> <p>d. Theme: Sovereignty Violated.</p> <p>e. Oversight Role: Weak (06.75 %).</p> <p>f. Opposition Religious Parties.</p> <p>g. Good Issue Raised: Listing of ISI as Terrorist Organization.</p>	
1/4 Wed	<p>INTELLIGENCE FAILURE OF THE WHOLE WORLD GILANI</p> <p>a. Theme: Ownership of Intelligence Failure.</p> <p>b. Oversight Role: Weak Role.</p> <p>c. Short Report covering other topics.</p> <p>d. Less attention to</p>	<p>ISI EMBARRASSED BUT REJECTS COMPLICITY</p> <p>e. Theme: 'Embarrassed, not Complicit'.</p> <p>f. Oversight Role: Weak (7.5 %).</p> <p>g. Factual Mistakes.</p> <p>h. Medium of <u>leaking</u> of ISI information.</p> <p>i. We are Good, Not God</p>	<p>Pakistan did its part-Washington Post- Asif Ali Zardari</p> <p>k. Report of Washington Post's Opinion written by President Zardari.</p> <p>l. Reproduction.</p> <p>m. Information Leak of Government.</p>	<p>ISI ADMITS INTELLIGENCE FAILURE</p> <p>n. Theme: Intelligence Failure.</p> <p>o. Oversight Role: Weak (10 %).</p> <p>p. Factual Mistakes/Corrected.</p> <p>q. Medium of <u>leaking</u> of ISI information.</p> <p>r. We are Good, Not God.</p>	<p>u. <i>Dawn</i> dominates <i>The Nation</i>, <i>The News</i> and <i>The Daily Times</i>.</p> <p>v. Reproductions.</p> <p>w. Main Themes (New)</p> <p>i. Reactive.</p> <p>ii. Demarche.</p> <p>iii. Ownership/ Sharing of failure.</p> <p>iv. Mistrust (Unilateralism narrative in response).</p> <p>v. Accomplice or Incompetent (Incompetence accepted as a lesser evil). False Dilemma.</p> <p>x. Information Leaks (deliberate) - Lapdog.</p>

	PM visit of France. (1)	Narrative. j. Reply to False Dilemma.		s. Reply to False Dilemma. t. Source/BBC	
2/4	PAKISTAN EITHER ACCOMPLICE OR INCOMPETENT CIA {1} a. Theme: 'Accomplice or Incompetent'. b. Oversight Role: Weak (07.0 %). c. Regurgitation without checking. d. Misrepresentation. e. Concept of False Dilemma .		PAKISTAN EXPRESSES DEEP CONCERN OVER US RAID f. Theme: 'Demarche'. g. Oversight Role: Weak Role (10.25 %). h. Late and Reproduction of Press Release of FO. i. A basic report of 461 words only. j. Factual and comprehension mistakes. k. Being used by FO for leaks.		
1/5 Thr	-	PAKISTAN EITHER INCOMPETENT OR INVOLVED: CIA {1} a. Theme:	WHOLE WORLD SHARES OSAMA BLAME: GILANI (2)	MR PANETTA WHAT ABOUT 9/11 HIJACKERS? l. Theme: Failure can happen to any nation. Inevitability	o. Nation, News and The Daily Times now cover the aspects. p. Delay, Reproduction. q. Main Themes (New) i. Afghan Comments. ii. Mistrust.

		<p>‘Incompetent or Involved’ questions on Intelligence Failure.</p> <p>b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (6.5 %).</p> <p>c. False Dilemma (Complicit or Involved).</p> <p>d. Deliberately <u>leaked</u> by US/Media.</p> <p>e. Weak Report on multiple aspects.</p> <p>f. A re-re-production (CBS/CNN-INP).</p>	<p>h. Theme: Intelligence Failure of whole world.</p> <p>i. Oversight Role: Weak Role.</p> <p>j. Short Report on failure while covering other topics.</p> <p>k. Main event was PM visit of France</p>	<p>of Failure (narrative).</p> <p>m. Fear of Isolation for Pakistan (again).</p> <p>n. An editorial placed in a News Report Section (though mentioned as News Analysis) by Saleem Bokhari.</p> <p>o. Oversight Role: Weak Role (8 %).</p>	<p>iii. Revision of Strategy or Stance.</p> <p>iv. Nuclear Security.</p> <p>v. Inevitability of Failure. Share the failure. (Collective)</p> <p>r. Editorial as News Report.</p> <p>s. COAS represents Pakistan or Army?</p>
2/5		<p>WORLD AGENCIES FAILED ON OSAMA: PM</p> <p>a. Theme: Sharing Intelligence Failure.</p> <p>b. Oversight Role: Weak Role.</p> <p>c. Report covering the other topics.</p> <p>d. Less attention to</p>	<p>PAKISTAN SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OSAMA WAS HIDING</p> <p>(~)</p> <p>b. Theme: Intelligence Failure and Nuclear Security.</p> <p>c. Oversight Role:</p>	<p>PAK ROLE SHOULD NOT BE DOUBTED, SAYS KAYANI. (!)</p> <p>g. Theme: Demarche/Complaint.</p> <p>h. Revision of <u>Pakistan's</u> Security Strategy.</p> <p>i. <u>Source</u> TV/ISPR.</p> <p>j. Oversight Role:</p>	

		PM visit of France. (3) a. PM's /Govt Response.	Weak Role (6 %). d. Allegations from Afghanistan. e. Source/Reuters. f. Reproduction.	Weak Role (6 %). k.COAS represents Pakistan or Army?	
3/5		ISI KNEW ABOUT BIN LADEN HIDING: AFGHAN OFFICIALS (~) a. Theme: Intelligence Failure and Nuclear Security. b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (6 %). c. Allegations from Afghanistan. d. Source/Reuters.		WORLD SHARES OSAMA BLAME-GILANI (4) e. Theme: Own the Failures also. f. A <u>good</u> visit (France) Report tailored to fit situation. g. Pakistan is part of solution. h. Oversight Role: Weak Role (5 %). i. Intel failure of whole world, not just Pakistan's.	
4/5				PAKISTAN SHOULD HAVE KNOWN ABOUT BIN LADEN – KABUL (~) a. Theme: Intelligence	

				<p>Failure and Security of nuclear weapons?</p> <p>b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (6 %).</p> <p>c. Allegations from Afghanistan.</p> <p>d. Original Source is Reuters.</p>	
1/6 Fri	-	<p>INTEL AGENCIES UNDER SHARP FOCUS</p> <p>a. Theme: Restructuring of Intelligence and Formal Oversight.</p> <p>b. Oversight Role: Good Role (60 %).</p> <p>c. Good Investigative Journalism and Recommendations (Umar Cheema).</p> <p>d. Personal Information and Self acquisition of writer.</p>	<p>PAKISTAN WARNS US OF 'DIRE CONSEQUENCES'</p> <p>e. Theme: 'Demarche'.</p> <p>f. Oversight Role: Weak Role (Not Counted).</p> <p>g. Late and Reproduction of Press Briefing or Press Release of FO.</p> <p>h. Reproduction of what is stated in the Press Release.</p>	-	<p>i. <i>The News International</i> dominates <i>The Nation</i>, <i>Dawn</i> and <i>The Daily Times</i> in identifying the true topic.</p> <p>j. Writer centric and less of an editorial.</p> <p>k. Main Themes (New)</p> <p>i. Restructuring for Formal Intelligence Oversight.</p> <p>ii. Past Intelligence Failure.</p> <p>iii. Old and New Democracies.</p> <p>l. The News International Report (The News) was a good example of (required) Investigative Journalism.</p>
2/6			ARMY THREATENS		

			TO 'REVIEW' COOPERATION . (!) a. Theme: 'Demarche'. b. Oversight Role: Satisfactory Role (27.75 %). c. Late and Reproduction of Press Release - ISPR. d. Raised a good point of absence of Written Protocol for Intelligence Cooperation. e. Rest is a routine report.		
1/7 Sat	-	ISPR REJECTS PRESSURE ON ISI CHIEF TO QUIT {1} a. Reproduction: Original report of The Newsweek Magazine picked up by The Daily Beast (News Website-	US SHOULDN'T HAVE BYPASSED PAKISTAN {5} e. Old report of PM visit to France (return/onboard flight of 06 May) considerably late report. f. Main Issues covered are: -	'ISI DG MAY RESIGN' PASHA MEETS CIA STATION CHIEF {2} h. Reproduction: Original report of The Newsweek Magazine picked up by The Daily Beast (News Website-Tabloid)	m. Paucity of topics leads to reproduction and speculation for sensationalism (<i>The News, The Nation</i> and <i>The Daily Times</i>). No such report from Dawn. n. Belated reports. o. Main Themes (New) i. DG ISI Resignation. ii. CIA's Intelligence Efforts. iii. Disclosing names of ISI operatives in contact with Al Qaeda.

		<p>Tabloid) and reproduced by The News International.</p> <p>b. Which turned out to be false or incorrect later.</p> <p>c. Also picked up by The Nation.</p> <p>d. Comparison of Newsweek, Daily Beast, The News International, The Nation also substantiate the same.</p>	<p>i. Visit/Meetings</p> <p>ii. Pak-US Relations</p> <p>iii. Terrorism</p> <p>iv. Politics</p> <p>v. Sovereignty.</p> <p>g. Not much related to Intelligence/ Oversight Role.</p>	<p>and reproduced by The Nation.</p> <p>i. Which turned out to be false or incorrect later.</p> <p>j. Also picked up by The News International.</p> <p>k. Comparison of Newsweek, Daily Beast, The News International and this report of The Nation also substantiate the same.</p> <p>l. Weak and belated Oversight Role.</p>	<p>iv. By passing Pakistan in operations.</p>
2/7		<p>US OFFICIALS ADMIT CIA BASE IN ABBOTTABAD</p> <p>a. Reproduction: Original report of Washington Post captioned “CIA spied on bin Laden from safe house”, by Greg Miller and reproduced by The News</p>			

		<p>International.</p> <p>b. A total cut and paste case.</p> <p>c. Comparison of Washington Post and The Nation also substantiate the same.</p>			
1/8 Sun	-	<p>US DEMANDS NAMES' OF ISI OFFICIALS IN BIN LADEN PROBE (2)</p> <p>a. Reproduction: Original report of NYT captioned “U.S. Demands More From Pakistan in Bin Laden Inquiry”, by Helene Cooper/Ismail Khan and of Reuters captioned “Bin Laden directed Qaeda from Pakistan compound” was reproduced by The News International.</p>	<p>US DEMANDS PAKISTAN DISCLOSE NAMES OF ISI OPERATIVES (1)</p> <p>e. Reproduction: Original report of NYT captioned “U.S. Demands More from Pakistan in Bin Laden Inquiry”, by Helene Cooper/Ismail Khan and reproduced by The Daily Times.</p> <p>f. A shorter version (377 against 1166 words) of NYT report using</p>	<p>US DEMANDS NAMES OF TOP ISI OPERATIVES (3)</p> <p>i. Theme: Distrust and Identification of Rogue ISI officials.</p> <p>j. Oversight Role: Weak Role (4 %). Weak and belated.</p> <p>k. Intelligence Blaming’ is the dominant Narrative.</p> <p>l. Reproduction: Original report of NYT captioned “U.S. Demands More from Pakistan in Bin Laden Inquiry”, by Helene</p>	<p>o.Reproduction of foreign news reports is counterproductive and not true journalism.</p> <p>p.New Themes were Failure/ Complicit, Double Game and Civilian Oversight.</p> <p>q.Main Themes (Maintained).</p> <p>r. Disclosing names of ISI operatives in contact with Al Qaeda (AQ).</p>

		<p>b. A nearly equal version of NYT and Reuter's report using maximum/considerable text of the original reports.</p> <p>c. Comparison of NYT, Reuters, The Express Tribune and this report of The News International also substantiate the same.</p> <p>d. Weak and belated Oversight Role.</p>	<p>maximum/considerable text of the original report.</p> <p>g. Comparison of NYT and The Express Tribune also substantiate the same.</p> <p>h. Weak and belated Oversight Role.</p>	<p>Cooper/Ismail Khan and reproduced by The Nation.</p> <p>m. A shorter version (623 against 1166 words) of NYT report.</p> <p>n. Comparison of NYT, Reuters, The Express Tribune and this report of The Nation also substantiate the same.</p>	
1/9 Mon	<p>ARMY CHIEF CRITICISES POOR MEDIA HANDLING AFTER RAID</p> <p>a. Theme: Image restoration and Blame Game.</p> <p>b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (9 %). A type of Gullible Lapdog.</p> <p>c. Presenting ISPR</p>	<p>CIA INCREASES PRESSURE ON PASHA TO QUIT ISI {3}</p> <p>e. Theme: Relationship of ISI and CIA.</p> <p>f. Oversight Role: Good Role (14.7 %).</p> <p>g. Narrative: 'Intelligence Relations' with 'divergence'</p>	<p>NO PROOF PAKISTAN KNEW OF OSAMA: US</p> <p>l. Theme: 'Continuation of Love and Hate Relations'.</p> <p>m. Oversight Role: Weak Role (10.25 %).</p> <p>n. Late and</p>	-	<p>q. <i>Dawn</i> pays attention to a new topic (Image Restoration and Blame) but fails to do justice with it.</p> <p>r. The News falls prey to the narrative of Foreign/US media. Reproduction of Newsweek Article (belated).</p> <p>s. <i>The Daily Times</i> produced 2 x reports, one a weak report (Reproduction) with mistakes and the second a true Investigative Journalism.</p> <p>t. Main Themes (New)</p> <p>i. Army's Image and Blame Game.</p> <p>ii. Pressure on ISI DG.</p>

	<p>narrative without any critical comment/assessment.</p> <p>d. <u>Source</u> is ISPR.</p>	<p>mantra.</p> <p>h. Good Investigative Journalism is an art that is not common.</p> <p>i. More sensationalism not substantiated by referred reports.</p> <p>j. Personal Information and Self-perception of writer (Ansar Abbasi).</p> <p>k. Pakistani media being <u>used</u> by foreign media (Newsweek Article).</p>	<p>Reproduction of NBC Programme.</p> <p>Few comments are out of transcript (fugitive)</p> <p>o. Factual and textual mistakes.</p> <p>p. Basic Report of 404 words, routine effort.</p>		<p>iii. ISI/CIA Relationship.</p> <p>iv. Love and Hate Relationship.</p> <p>v. Hush Up/Under the Carpet.</p> <p>u. Weak Oversight Role.</p>
2/9	-	-	<p>PM SET TO GIVE 'CLEAN CHIT' TO ISI TODAY</p> <p>a. Theme: 'Hush Up Planned'.</p> <p>b. Oversight Role: Good Role (51.25 %).</p> <p>c. Timely and</p>	-	

			<p>Original work through sources (Muhammad Akram).</p> <p>d. Near to exposing a scandal.</p> <p>e. Good Investigative Report of 466 words.</p> <p>f. Further explication of Intelligence Failure.</p> <p>g. Real Substitute Watchdog role.</p> <p>h. Critical orientation.</p>		
1/10 Tue	-	<p>WHO'S TO BLAME</p> <p>a. Theme: Not Blame Game but Coming out Clean.</p> <p>b. Oversight Role: Good/ Satisfactory Role (49.25 %). A true specimen of reporting ISPR's</p>	-	<p>ARMY 'HAD TO KNOW' ABOUT OBL</p> <p>a. Theme: Intelligence Agency's Double Game.</p> <p>b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (4.25 %).</p> <p>c. Reproduction: A cut and paste case (of Reuters report).</p>	<p>m. <i>The News</i> presented a good critical report in response to ISPR output (Writer specific).</p> <p>n. <i>The Nation</i> continued the reproduction/Cut and Paste. Reproduction of Reuters and ISPR input.</p> <p>o. Main Themes (New)</p> <p>p. Blame Who.</p> <p>q. Double Game and Lack of Knowledge.</p> <p>r. Formal Oversight Bodies.</p>

		<p>Press Briefings.</p> <p>c. Presenting ISPR narrative with critical comment/assessment.</p> <p>d. Source is the Writer (Mariana Baabar).</p> <p>e. Good Oversight Role.</p>		<p>d. Presenting foreign/Reuters narrative without critical comment/assessment.</p> <p>k. Source is the Reuters (captioned as 'Pakistan army "had to know" about bin Laden: expert' by Michael Georgy's interview of Dr Ayesha Siddiqua).</p> <p>l. Poor Oversight Role.</p>	s. Weak Oversight Role
2/10				<p>BODY FOR PROBE INTO 'INTELLIGENCE FAILURE'</p> <p>a. Theme: Overall Failure (Security and Intelligence) and Probe Demand (by PCNS).</p> <p>b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (6.5 %). A Reproduction of Press Release by Parliamentary Committee on National Security.</p> <p>c. Presenting</p>	

				<p>Government's narrative without any critical comment/ assessment.</p> <p>d. <u>Source</u> is the Press Release.</p> <p>e. Weak Role by a Useless Committee.</p>	
1/11 Wed	-	-	-	<p>MPS' BODIES ON DEFENCE, SECURITY PERFORMANCE REPORT UNVEILED</p> <p>a. PILDAT Report on Parliamentary Committees (2008-11).</p> <p>b. Theme: Failure of Parliamentary Accountability.</p> <p>c. Oversight Role: Weak Role (4.25 %). A Cut Paste Reproduction of Press Release by PILDAT, a Think Tank.</p> <p>d. Presenting Think Tank's narrative without any critical</p>	<p>g. <i>The Nation</i> reproduced a good report of a Think Tank, giving direction and guidance to Formal Scrutinizer.</p> <p>h. However, forgetting the oversight of the Informal (Media).</p> <p>i. In presence of a good Oversight role by Think Tank a Weak Oversight Role by the Media.</p> <p>j. Main Themes (New)</p> <p>i. Defence, security performance.</p> <p>ii. Unconventional War.</p> <p>iii. Lack of Will (Parliament, Politicians, Political).</p> <p>iv. Parliamentary Control/ Committees/Accountability and Oversight (Defence Sector).</p> <p>v. Compromise and Welfare State.</p> <p>vi. Multiple Power Centers.</p> <p>vii. Big Failure.</p> <p>viii. New National Security Policy.</p> <p>ix. Re negotiation of Cooperation with US.</p>

				<p>comment/assessment.</p> <p>e. Source is the Press Release of Pildat.</p> <p>f. Think Tank doing the job of formal oversight bodies.</p>	<p>x. civilian and democratic control on defence sector.</p> <p>xi. Knowledge and Expertise of Civilian Government.</p> <p>xii. Institutional Strengthening.</p>
1/12 Thr	-	<p>FORMER GENERALS WANT INDEPENDENT PROBE</p> <p>a. Good own (Ahmed Noorani) Acquisition effort (though late and statements only)</p> <p>b. Theme: Endorsement of Ex Generals for Independent Judicial Commission.</p> <p>c. Oversight Role: Weak Role (11.25 %).</p> <p>d. Only 3 x <u>likeminded Generals</u> have been included (not asking Pakistan Ex</p>		<p>NAWAZ FOR CJ'S-LED PROBE INTO OSAMA DEBACLE</p> <p>f. Theme: Demand for Independent Judicial Commission-PML-N.</p> <p>g. Oversight Role: Weak Role (4.25 %).</p> <p>h. Belated Report (reported in piecemeal) without any critical comment/assessment.</p> <p>i. Being used for <u>leaking</u> of information for Opposition.</p>	<p>j. The News initiated a report of Likeminded Ex Generals in support of establishment of Independent Judicial Commission.</p> <p>k. Interview of Ex President Musharraf is reported by The News International.</p> <p>l. Both are reproduction of ABC News Interview.</p> <p>m. Main Themes (New)</p> <p>i. Rogue Elements.</p> <p>ii. Mistrust (Mutual).</p> <p>iii. Alienate Pakistan.</p> <p>iv. Great, massive slip-up.</p> <p>v. Sensitivities involved.</p> <p>vi. Win-win for both.</p> <p>n. The Nation has initiated a report of PML-N meeting for an Independent Judicial Commission. Indicating inclination for party/ opposition.</p>

		<p>Servicemen Society-PESS).</p> <p>e. Weak Oversight Role.</p>			
2/12		<p>ISI, MILITARY ROGUE ELEMENTS MIGHT HAVE KNOWN OSAMA LOCATION: MUSH [1]</p> <p>a.Reproduction: Original report of ABC News captioned “Chris Cuomo’s Interview with Pervez Musharraf on ABC News”, by Chris Cuomo and a smaller version (736 against 2894 words) was reproduced by The News International.</p> <p>b.Comparison of ABC News and this report of The News International also</p>			

		<p>substantiate the same.</p> <p>c. Poor and belated Oversight Role. Regurgitating the narrative of US/West.</p>			
1/13 Fri	<p>DG ISI SHUJA PASHA BRIEFS PAKISTAN PARLIAMENT (web)</p> <p>a. Theme: Admission of Intelligence Failure with offer to parliament for accountability/re sign by DG ISI.</p> <p>b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (08 %).</p> <p>c. Half report of 2 x day's parliament proceedings (13 and 14 May).</p> <p>d. An example of Placebo Reporting common in media.</p>	<p>PAKISTAN TO REDEFINE COOPERATION WITH US</p> <p>h. Theme: Redirection of Policy.</p> <p>i. Oversight Role: Weak Role (19.75 %) despite opportunity.</p> <p>j. Reproduction of Press Release with some critical assessment/ observations of the formal scrutinizer.</p> <p>k. Source: Press releases DCC meeting of 12 May (PM Address and Proceedings).</p>		<p>ISI-CIA CO-OP COLLAPSED- PM</p> <p>n. Theme: Declining Pak-US Relations along with number of other themes.</p> <p>o. Oversight Role: Weak Role (04.25 %).</p> <p>p. Ditto Reproduction of 2 x Reports of Time Magazine. These reports are of 11 and 12 May. By Omar Waraich.</p> <p>q. Comparison of these two Reports and this report of The Nation also substantiate the reproduction.</p> <p>r. The interviews were conducted / spread for: -</p>	<p>s. Paucity of topics, capacity and resultant reproduction of foreign media reports is visible.</p> <p>t. Media is also being used by other stake holders.</p> <p>u. Sustainable Development Policy Institute - SDPI has followed PILDAT and media gave it the same treatment (placebo reporting).</p> <p>v. Ownership of foreign themes can't be claimed by own media.</p> <p>w. Poor performance of media.</p> <p>x. Even Dawn reported a mediocre report about Joint Parliamentary (In Camera) Session, though timely, about a fresh event of the day.</p> <p>y. Placebo reporting.</p>

	<p>e. Resignation offer was though not part of final resolution shared as press release.</p> <p>f. Gave some space to demonstration of PTI.</p> <p>g. A later report was also reported with repetitions.</p>	<p>l. Comparison of MOFA Press Release and this report of The News International also substantiate the reproduction.</p> <p>m. Weak Media Role about a Useless Committee.</p>		<p>i. US Consumption in view of change in strategy.</p> <p>ii. For Pakistani public (in English and Urdu).</p> <p>iii. For Pakistani Media to pick it up.</p> <p>iv. To project a Civilian Response.</p>	
2/13	<p>MILITARY OFFERS ITSELF FOR ACCOUNTABILITY</p> <p>a. Theme: Admission of Intelligence Failure with offer to parliament for accountability/resign by DG ISI.</p> <p>b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (08 %).</p>			<p>SDPI DEMAND TRIPARTITE INQUIRY COMMISSION</p> <p>g. A Report on SDPI's Special seminar on "War on Terror: Post-Osama regime" demanding a Tripartite Inquiry Commission' on Collective Failure. With recommendations for Government, Military Establishment,</p>	

	<p>c. Half report of 2 x day's parliament proceedings (13 and 14 May).</p> <p>d. An example of Placebo Reporting common in media.</p> <p>e. Resignation offer was though not part of final resolution shared as press release.</p> <p>f. Gave some space to demonstration of PTI.</p>			<p>Secret Agencies, Media and Public.</p> <p>h. Theme: Tripartite Commission' on Collective Failure, Failure of Parliamentary Accountability.</p> <p>i. Oversight Role: Weak Role (4.5 %). A Cut Paste Reproduction of Press Release by SDPI, a Think Tank.</p> <p>j. Presenting Think Tank's narrative without any critical comment/assessment (even related to Media.</p> <p>k. Think Tank doing the job of formal oversight bodies (strong criticism).</p>	
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3/13				CIA'S WORST INTELLIGENCE FAILURES IN HISTORY a. Theme: Legitimization, Universality of Intelligence Failures. b. Oversight Role: Poor Role (4.00 %). c. Being used by Intelligence Agencies. d. Counterproductive tabulation of date (some incorrect).	
1/14 Sat	-	-	ISI ADMITS 'FAILURE' OVER BIN LADEN a. Theme: Parliamentary Supremacy. b. Oversight Role: Weak Role	PASHA 'RESIGNS' BEFORE PARLIAMENT i. Theme: Intelligence Failure resulting into offer of resignation by DG ISI. j. Oversight Role:	n. Two weak reports of The <i>Daily Times</i> and <i>The Nation</i> reporting Parliamentary Session. o. Fake Theme of Parliamentary Supremacy is being passed on to the reader without realizing its existence. A Placebo Parliamentary Supremacy. p. A Placebo Monitoring or Oversight

			<p>(06.25 %).</p> <p>c. Late as 2 x day's proceedings of the parliament joint session (13 and 14 May).</p> <p>d. An example of Placebo Reporting common in media, showing a placebo parliamentary supremacy.</p> <p>e. Resignation offer was though not part of final resolution shared as press release.</p> <p>f. Considerable details were though missed out.</p> <p>g. A routine report.</p> <p>h. Information Leak of Government.</p>	<p>Weak Role (06.25 %). Belated.</p> <p>k. 2 x day's proceedings of the parliament joint session (13 and 14 May).</p> <p>l. An example of Placebo Reporting common in media.</p> <p>m. Resignation offer was though not part of final resolution shared as press release.</p>	<p>Role by newspapers.</p> <p>q. Return of routine reporting.</p> <p>r. Mistakes.</p> <p>s. New Theme/ Narrative.</p> <p>i. Parliamentary Supremacy.</p>
1/15 Sun	-	-	-	END ONE - SIDED	g. This was a PML-N move in

				US TIES: NAWAZ a. Theme: National/Intelligence Failure so Change Policy or Strategy of Subservience. b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (04.25 %). Belated. c. Press-talk after Meeting of Opposition Leader with US Ambassador. d. <u>Leaking</u> of information for Opposition/ PML-N. e. Reproduction of Statements only. f. Oversight of Army budget was recommended as a new theme.	response to discussion of unification of PML. h. Reporting of regular politics starts.
1/16	-	-	-	-	-
1/17 Tue	IN-CAMERA SESSION: THE ULTIMATE BETRAYAL a. Theme Failure of Parliament' in view of Joint Resolution.	GEO POLLS ON OSAMA KILLING, DANGERS TO ATOMIC ASSETS f. Theme: Nuclear Security and US	-	-	j. Good innovative introduction of public polls by <i>The News International</i> . k. Good critical analysis of Parliament/Parliamentarian's smugness/gullibility by Dawn. l. <i>Dawn</i> New Themes are: - i. Ultimate Betrayal.

	<p>b. Oversight Role: Good/ Satisfactory Role (55 %). A true specimen of reporting policy reports (more like investigation or editorial).</p> <p>c. Presenting gullibility of Civilian Leadership at the hands of Military.</p> <p>d. Good/Self Acquisition and analysis by the writer (M. Badar Alam).</p> <p>e. Identification of root causes (professional/ intellectual output).</p>	<p>Relations after OBL Operation.</p> <p>g. Oversight Role: Good Role (47 %). Though OBL Operation was included in the second half of Survey of May 2011 (first half - Apr 2011).</p> <p>h. An innovation in Pakistani print/ electronic media of inclusion of public in opinion giving in a democratic process (primacy of public).</p> <p>i. Selection of topics for questions/themes is also questionable for:</p> <p>-</p> <p>i. Being too early.</p> <p>ii. Complicit/ Involved theme (46 %).</p> <p>iii. Intelligence</p>			<p>ii. Parliament Failure.</p> <p>iii. Civilian- Military Imbalance.</p> <p>iv. Flawed Security Discourse.</p> <p>m. Rapprochement from US starts by visit of Senator John Kerry from 17 May which also affects the media output.</p>
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		Failure theme (40 %).			
1/18	-	-	-	-	

1/19 Thr	ARMY CHIEF WANTED MORE DRONE SUPPORT a. Theme: Leadership Failure in view of Drone Issue. b. Oversight Role: Good/ Satisfactory Role (53.75 %). A true specimen of reporting policy reports (more like investigation or scandal). c. Presenting Treachery of military and civilian leadership at national level. d. Good/Self Acquisition and analysis by the writer/newspape r (though quite late). e. Good identification of	-	-	-	f. A good move by <i>Dawn</i> to shift to other related issues or narratives instead of reproduction. g. Treachery of leadership in failures/issues (like drone) is though common in both the issues. h. A new scandal has been initiated. i. New Themes are: - i. Leadership Failure. ii. Drone Issue. iii. Treachery of Leaders. iv. Double Game, Duality, equivocality. v. Ritualistic Denunciation. vi. Wikileaks. vii. Efficacy of Drone Strikes.
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	root causes (a professional/intellectual output).				
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1/20	-	-	-	-	
1/21	-	-	-	-	
1/22 Sun	-	-		CIA, ISI BACK IN BUSINESS a. Theme: Restart of Relation (ISI-CIA). b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (06 %). Placebo monitoring. c. Account of Inter Agency meeting towards normalization. d. Reproduction (reduced) of original report of The BD News/Reuters. e. Considerable portion of original report not included.	f. A good/exclusive report by Sumera Khan/Indus News/Express Tribune. g. Subsequently re-produced by The Nation. h. Start of resumption of relation (US-Pakistan) after the OBL Raid Pause.
1/23	ATTACK ON NAVAL BASE KARACHI				
1/26	-	-	-	-	
1/27	CIA TEAM INSPECTS OSAMA COMPOUND	-		-	
1/31	OSAMA: WHY BLAME PAKISTAN? a. Theme: Handling of Intelligence Failures.	-	-	-	f. Awaited good output by <i>Dawn</i> News where the paper gives an example to other regurgitating papers. g. Though too late. h. Handling of Failure which are

	<p>b.Oversight Role: Good/ Satisfactory Role (54.75 %). Identification of new points and their handling/reasoni ng is original/different (more like an editorial).</p> <p>c.Propagating universality of failures.</p> <p>d.Good/Self Acquisition and analysis by BRIG (Retd) Khalid Hassan Mahmood (though quite late).</p> <p>e. Good identification of root causes (an intellectual output).</p>				<p>inevitable in contemporary world.</p> <p>i. New Themes are: -</p> <p>i. Intelligence Lapse/ Mistakes.</p> <p>ii. Unknown Unknowns.</p> <p>iii.Learning cycle of US Intelligence.</p> <p>iv. Frankenstein.</p>
Sum	<p>Summary a. Good Reports – 6/19</p>	<p>Summary f. Good Reports – 5/18</p>	<p>Summary k. Good Reports – 1.74/15</p>	<p>Summary q. Good Reports - 0/23</p>	<p>Grand Summary w. Good Reports - <i>Dawn</i></p>

	b. Days Reported - 10 c. Average – 22.05 (13) c. Reproductions – 7 (36.8 %). d. Info Leaks – 1 (ISPR) e. Max in a Day – 7 (2 May)	g. Days Reported - 12 h. Average – 27.35 (12) j. Reproductions – 9 (50 %). j. Info Leaks – 2 (Generals and US-Media) k. Max in a Day – 3 (3 May)	l. Days Reported - 08 m. Average – 17.75 (9) n. Reproduction – 10 (66.66 %). o. Info Leaks- 7 (3 US/ Media, 3 x Government and 1 x Opposition) p. Max in a Day – 5 (3 May)	r. Days Reported - 12 s. Average – 6.23 (21) t. Reproduction – 10 (43.4 %). u. Info Leaks – 5 (ISI, ISPR, PCNS, Opposition) v. Max in a Day – 5 (3 May)	x. Days Reported – <i>News/Nation</i> y. Overall Average – 18.34 (<i>The News</i> = 27.35) z. Reproduction – <i>The Daily Times/The Nation</i> (?) aa. Info Leaks – <i>The Daily Times</i> (7) aa. Max in a Day – <i>Dawn</i> (7)
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4.1.3 **Role-wise Summary**

In view of the research questions of this research, this (role wise) summary is related to the text/data of second stage and its corresponding steps. The final question (RQ-5) will be analyzed in the next chapter and will be based on this data summary. The summarized data of role wise summary of the concerning reports or stories of the four newspapers with remarks is as under: -

Role-wise Summary and Analysis of Selected Newspapers

INFORMATION TRANSMISSION AND STIMULATION (100) * (For Formal Scrutinizers)			SUBSTITUTE WATCH DOG (200) *	LEGITIMIZE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND ACTIVITIES (50)	SENSITIZE PUBLIC (50)
S/D	<i>Dawn</i>	<i>The News International</i>	<i>The Daily Time</i>	<i>The Nation</i>	Remarks
1/2 Mon	COPTER CRASHES ON KAKUL ROAD MONITORING DESK a. Transmitter and Stimulator b. Substitute Watchdog c. Legitim�er d. Sensitizer e. Efficacy f. Final	CHOPPER CRASHES, 3 BLASTS HEARD NEAR PMA KAKUL News Desk f. Transmitter and Stimulator g. Substitute Watchdog h. Legitim�er i. Sensitizer j. Efficacy k. Final	-	HELICOPTER CRASH CREATES HAVOC <u>THE NATION MONITORING</u> l. Transmitter and Stimulator m. Substitute Watchdog n. Legitim�er o. Sensitizer p. Efficacy q. Final	r. Answer of efficacy question will be derived from these scores.

2/2	OBAMA UNDERLINES PAKISTAN HELP IN REACHING OSAMA (Death of Public enemy number one) a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 40 b. Substitute Watchdog - 15 c. Legitim�er - 12 d. Sensitizer-12 e. Final – 79/400 (19.75%)				f. Being first to report <i>Dawn</i> maintains quality and quantity of the roles with seven (7) related stories.
3/2	PAKISTAN MILITARY CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE (Military struggle to explain) a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 31 b. Substitute Watchdog – 20 c. Legitim�er - 05 d. Sensitizer- 05 e. Final – 61/400 (15.25 %).				
4/2	THE NIGHTMARE				

	HAS HAPPENED a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 46 b. Substitute Watchdog - 50 c. Legitim�er - 10 d. Sensitizer – 10 e. Final – 116/400 (29 %).				
5/2	THE RAID AS DESCRIBER BY US OFFICIALS a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 08 b. Substitute Watchdog - 0 c. Legitim�er - 0 d. Sensitizer – 0 e. Final – 08/400 (2 %).				
6/2	GILANI HAILS' A VICTORY OF ANTI-TERROR ALLIANCE' a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 21 b. Substitute Watchdog -10 c. Legitim�er - 10 d. Sensitizer – 0 e. Final – 41/400 (10.25 %)				

7/2	OPPOSITION RESENTS GOVT'S SILENCE a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 0 b. Substitute Watchdog -0 c. Legitim�izer - 0 d. Sensitizer – 0 e. Final – 0/400 (0 %)				
1/3	UN AUTHORISED RAID MUST NOT SERVE AS PRECEDENT, US TOLD. a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 35 b. Substitute Watchdog - 30 c. Legitim�izer - 10 d. Sensitizer -20 ▪ Final – 95/400 (23.75 %)	INTELLIGENCE SHARING MADE IT POSSIBLE- GILANI (FO and PM statements) e. Transmitter and Stimulator - 20 f. Substitute Watchdog - 5 g. Legitim�izer - 8 h. Sensitizer -3 ▪ Final – 36/400 (7.25 %)	OSAMA BIN LADEN KILLED i. Transmitter and Stimulator - 15 j. Substitute Watchdog - 10 k. Legitim�izer - 1 l. Sensitizer -1 ▪ Final – 27/400 (6.75%)	AMERICAN TROOPS KILL OSAMA m. Transmitter and Stimulator - 20 n. Substitute Watchdog - 3 o. Legitim�izer - 0 p. Sensitizer -0 ▪ Final – 23/400 (5.75%).	q. On 3 May other papers <i>The News</i> , <i>The Daily Times</i> and <i>The Nation</i> joined in.
2/3	US TROOPS TOOK AWAY 'OSAMA'S SON a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 0 b. Substitute Watchdog -0	OSAMA LEAVES PAK ARMY, INTELLIGENCE EMBARRASSED e. Transmitter and Stimulator - 42 f. Substitute	JUSTICE IS DONE i. Transmitter and Stimulator - 8 j. Substitute Watchdog - 5 k. Legitim�izer - 1	MANY QUESTIONS UNANSWERED m. Transmitter and Stimulator - 23 n. Substitute Watchdog- 10	

	c. Legitim�izer - 0 d. Sensitizer - 0 ▪ Final – 0/400 (0 %). Not to be included in final assessment.	Watchdog -80 g. Legitim�izer - 20 h. Sensitizer – 20 ▪ Final – 162/400 (40.5 %)	l. Sensitizer - 1. ▪ Final – 15/400 (3.75%) Reproduction.	o. Legitim�izer - 0 p. Sensitizer – 0 ▪ Final – 33/400 (8.25%)	
3/3	CIA FEARED PAKISTAN MIGHT ALERT OSAMA a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 0 b. Substitute Watchdog -0 c. Legitim�izer - 0 d. Sensitizer - 0 ▪ Final – 0/400 (0 %). e. Not to be included in final assessment.	GEN PASHA CLAIMS ISI WAS AWARE OF OSAMA RAID (Asia Times) f. Transmitter and Stimulator - 54 g. Substitute Watchdog -150 * h. Legitim�izer - 15 i. Sensitizer - 15 ▪ Final – 234/400 (58.5 %) * 33 % cap removed due to scoop/leaks.		OPERATION INTEL-DRIVEN:FO j. Transmitter and Stimulator -16 k. Substitute Watchdog - 3 l. Legitim�izer - 4 m. Sensitizer - 10 ▪ Final – 33/400 (8.25%)	
4/3	PAKISTAN HELPED IDENTIFY OSAMA COURIER: ZARDARI a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 0 b. Substitute Watchdog -0 c. Legitim�izer - 0 d. Sensitizer - 0		OSAMA'S DEATH NOT AN END TO TERRORISM: IMRAN e. Transmitter and Stimulator - 45 f. Substitute Watchdog - 90 g. Legitim�izer - 7 h. Sensitizer -8. ▪ Final – 150/400 (37.5 %)	US VIOLATED SOVEREIGNTY i. Transmitter and Stimulator -16 j. Substitute Watchdog - 10 k. Legitim�izer - 5 l. Sensitizer - 10 ▪ Final – 41/400 (10.25 %)	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Final – 0/400 (0 %). <p>Not to be included in final assessment.</p>				
5/3			<p>US tracked Courier to find Bin laden's hideout- (An AFP Story)</p> <p>a. Summarized report of AFP's story.</p> <p>b. Reproduction.</p>	<p>ABBOTTABAD ACTION TERMED ATTACK ON PAK SOVEREIGNTY</p> <p>c. Transmitter and Stimulator -12</p> <p>d.Substitute Watchdog - 5</p> <p>e.Legitimizer - 5</p> <p>f. Sensitizer – 5</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Final – 27/400 (6.75 %) 	
1/4	<p>INTELLIGENCE FAILURE OF THE WHOLE WORLD GILANI</p> <p>a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 20</p> <p>b. Substitute Watchdog -0</p> <p>c. Legitim�er - 0</p> <p>d. Sensitizer - 0</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Final – 20/400 (05 %). <p>(1)</p>	<p>ISI EMBARRASSED BUT REJECTS COMPLICITY</p> <p>e. Transmitter and Stimulator - 11</p> <p>f. Substitute Watchdog -10</p> <p>g. Legitim�er - 4</p> <p>h. Sensitizer - 5</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Final – 30/400 (7.5 %) 	<p>Pakistan did its part- Washington Post- Asif Ali Zardari</p> <p>i. Report of Washington Post's Opinion written by President Zardari.</p> <p>j. Reproduction.</p>	<p>ISI ADMITS INTELLIGENCE FAILURE</p> <p>k. Transmitter and Stimulator -15</p> <p>l. Substitute Watchdog - 10</p> <p>m. Legitim�er - 5</p> <p>n. Sensitizer - 10</p> <p>o. Final – 40/400 (10 %)</p>	
2/4	<p>PAKISTAN EITHER ACCOMPLICE OR</p>		<p>PAKISTAN EXPRESSES DEEP CONCERN OVER US RAID</p>		

	INCOMPETENT CIA a.Transmitter and Stimulator - 11 b.Substitute Watchdog -10 c.Legitimizer - 02 d.Sensitizer - 05 ▪ Final – 28/400 (7.0 %)		e.Transmitter and Stimulator - 21 f.Substitute Watchdog - 10 g.Legitimizer - 5 h.Sensitizer - 5 ▪ Final – 41/400 (10.25 %).		
1/5	-	PAKISTAN EITHER INCOMPETENT OR INVOLVED: CIA a.Transmitter and Stimulator - 11 b.Substitute Watchdog -10 c.Legitimizer - 01 d.Sensitizer - 05 ▪ Final – 27/400 (6.75 %)	WHOLE WORLD SHARES OSAMA BLAME: GILANI (2) e.Transmitter and Stimulator - 0 f.Substitute Watchdog -0 g.Legitimizer - 0 h.Sensitizer - 0 ▪ Final – 0/400 (0 %). Not to be included in final assessment.	MR PANETTA WHAT ABOUT 9/11 HIJACKERS? i. Transmitter and Stimulator -25 j. Substitute Watchdog - 10 k.Legitimizer - 2 l. Sensitizer - 10 ▪ Final – 32/400 (8 %)	
2/5		WORLD AGENCIES FAILED ON OSAMA: PM (3) a.Transmitter and Stimulator - 0 b.Substitute Watchdog -0 c.Legitimizer - 0 d.Sensitizer - 0	PAKISTAN SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OSAMA WAS HIDING (~) e.Transmitter and Stimulator - 09 f.Substitute Watchdog - 10 g.Legitimizer - 0 h.Sensitizer - 5	PAK ROLE SHOULD NOT BE DOUBTED, SAYS KAYANI. (!) i. Transmitter and Stimulator - 9 j. Substitute Watchdog - 10 k.Legitimizer - 5 l. Sensitizer - 0 ▪ Final – 24/400 (6 %)	

		<p>▪ Final – 0/400 (0 %).</p> <p>Not to be included in final assessment.</p>	<p>▪ Final – 24/400 (6 %).</p> <p>* Reproduction.</p>		
3/5		<p>ISI KNEW ABOUT BIN LADEN HIDING: AFGHAN OFFICIALS (~)</p> <p>a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 09</p> <p>b. Substitute Watchdog - 10</p> <p>c. Legitim�izer - 0</p> <p>d. Sensitizer - 5</p> <p>▪ Final – 24/400 (6 %).</p>		<p>WORLD SHARES OSAMA BLAME- GILANI (4)</p> <p>e. Transmitter and Stimulator - 20</p> <p>f. Substitute Watchdog-0</p> <p>g. Legitim�izer - 0</p> <p>h. Sensitizer - 0</p> <p>▪ Final – 20/400 (5 %).</p>	
4/5				<p>PAKISTAN SHOULD HAVE KNOWN ABOUT BIN LADEN – KABUL (~)</p> <p>a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 9</p> <p>b. Substitute Watchdog - 10</p> <p>c. Legitim�izer - 0</p> <p>d. Sensitizer - 5</p> <p>▪ Final – 24/400 (6 %).</p>	
1/6	-	<p>INTEL AGENCIES UNDER SHARP FOCUS</p> <p>a. Transmitter and</p>	<p>PAKISTAN WARNS US OF 'DIRE CONSEQUENCES'</p> <p>g. Theme: 'Demarche'.</p>	-	

		Stimulator - 55 b.Substitute Watchdog – 125 * c.Legitim�er - 30 d.Sensitizer - 30 ▪ Final – 240/400 (60 %). e. * 33 % cap (partially)removed due to scoop/leaks. f. Umer Cheema.	h.Oversight Role: Weak Role (Not Counted). i. Late and Reproduction of Press Briefing or Press Release of Foreign Office. j. Reproduction of what is stated in the Press Release.		
2/6	-	-	ARMY THREATENS TO 'REVIEW' COOPERATION. (!) a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 41 b.Substitute Watchdog - 30 c.Legitim�er - 15 d.Sensitizer - 25 ▪ Final – 111/400 (27.75 %). e. A good point raised.	-	
1/7	-	ISPR REJECTS PRESSURE ON ISI CHIEF TO QUIT a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 0 b.Substitute Watchdog -0 c.Legitim�er - 0	US SHOULDN'T HAVE BYPASSED PAKISTAN f. Transmitter and Stimulator - 0 g.Substitute Watchdog -0 h.Legitim�er - 0 i. Sensitizer - 0	'ISI DG MAY RESIGN' PASHA MEETS CIA STATION CHIEF {2} k. Transmitter and Stimulator - 0 l. Substitute Watchdog - 0 m.Legitim�er - 0 n. Sensitizer - 0	

		d.Sensitizer - 0 ▪ Final – 0/400 (0 %). e. Not to be included in final assessment. {1}	▪ Final – 0/400 (0 %). j. Not to be included in final assessment. (5)	▪ Final – 0/400 (0 %). o. Not to be included in final assessment. {2}.	
2/7		US OFFICIALS ADMIT CIA BASE IN ABBOTTABAD a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 0 b. Substitute Watchdog -0 c. Legitim�er - 0 d. Sensitizer - 0 ▪ Final – 0/400 (0 %). e. Not to be included in final assessment.			
1/8	-	US DEMANDS NAMES' OF ISI OFFICIALS IN BIN LADEN PROBE a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 0 b. Substitute Watchdog -0 c. Legitim�er - 0 d. Sensitizer - 0	US DEMANDS PAKISTAN DISCLOSE NAMES OF ISI OPERATIVES f. Transmitter and Stimulator - 0 g. Substitute Watchdog -0 h. Legitim�er - 0 i. Sensitizer - 0	US DEMANDS NAMES OF TOP ISI OPERATIVES (3) l. Transmitter and Stimulator - 11 m. Substitute Watchdog - 5 n. Legitim�er - 0 o. Sensitizer - 0 ▪ Final – 16/400 4 %).	p. A story “A confusing scenario” on page 17- Metropolitan, Islamabad of <i>Dawn</i> was good investigative report but not followed or properly placed by press.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Final – 0/400 (0 %). e. Not to be included in final assessment. (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Final – 0/400 (0 %). j. Not to be included in final assessment. k. Reproduction. (1)		
1/9	ARMY CHIEF CRITICISES POOR MEDIA HANDLING AFTER RAID <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 16 b. Substitute Watchdog -10 c. Legitim�er - 05 d. Sensitizer - 05 ▪ Final – 36/400 (9 %) 	CIA INCREASES PRESSURE ON PASHA TO QUIT ISI <ul style="list-style-type: none"> e. Transmitter and Stimulator - 19 f. Substitute Watchdog -10 g. Legitim�er - 20 h. Sensitizer - 10 ▪ Final – 59/400 (14.7 %) {3}	NO PROOF PAKISTAN KNEW OF OSAMA: US <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Transmitter and Stimulator - 21 j. Substitute Watchdog -10 k. Legitim�er - 5 l. Sensitizer - 5 ▪ Final – 41/400 (10.25 %) Reproduction.	-	
2/9	-	-	PM SET TO GIVE 'CLEAN CHIT' TO ISI TODAY <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 60 b. Substitute Watchdog - 90 c. Legitim�er – 45 d. Sensitizer - 10 ▪ Final – 205/400 (51.25 %). e. Investigative Journalism. 	-	
1/10	-	WHO'S TO	-	ARMY 'HAD TO	

		BLAME a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 52 b. Substitute Watchdog -100 c. Legitim�er - 25 d. Sensitizer - 20 ▪ Final – 197/400 (49.25 %).		KNOW' ABOUT OBL e. Transmitter and Stimulator - 7 f. Substitute Watchdog - 10 g. Legitim�er - 0 h. Sensitizer - 0 ▪ Final – 17/400 (4.25 %).	
2/10				BODY FOR PROBE INTO 'INTELLIGENCE FAILURE' a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 11 b. Substitute Watchdog - 5 c. Legitim�er - 5 d. Sensitizer - 5 ▪ Final – 26/400 (6.5 %)	
1/11	-	-	-	MPS' BODIES ON DEFENCE, SECURITY PERFORMANCE REPORT UNVEILED a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 7 b. Substitute Watchdog - 10 c. Legitim�er - 0 d. Sensitizer - 0 ▪ Final – 17/400 (4.25 %)	

				%).	
1/12	-	FORMER GENERALS WANT INDEPENDENT PROBE a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 15 b. Substitute Watchdog - 10 c. Legitim�er - 10 d. Sensitizer - 10 ▪ Final – 45/400 (11.25 %).		NAWAZ FOR CJ'S-LED PROBE INTO OSAMA DEBACLE e. Transmitter and Stimulator - 8 f. Substitute Watchdog-3 g. Legitim�er - 3 h. Sensitizer – 3 ▪ Final – 17/400 (4.25 %)	
2/12		ISI, MILITARY ROGUE ELEMENTS MIGHT HAVE KNOWN OSAMA LOCATION: MUSH a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 0 b. Substitute Watchdog -0 c. Legitim�er - 0 d. Sensitizer - 0 ▪ Final – 0/400 (0 %). Not to be included in final assessment.			
1/13	DG ISI SHUJA PASHA BRIEFS	PAKISTAN TO REDEFINE		ISI-CIA CO-OP COLLAPSED- PM	

	PAKISTAN PARLIAMENT (web) a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 20 b. Substitute Watchdog -04 c. Legitim�er - 03 d. Sensitizer - 05 ▪ Final – 32/400 (8 %)	COOPERATION WITH US e. Transmitter and Stimulator - 13 f. Substitute Watchdog - 10 g. Legitim�er - 10 h. Sensitizer - 10 ▪ Final – 43/400 (19.75 %)		i. Transmitter and Stimulator - 5 j. Substitute Watchdog- 4 k. Legitim�er - 3 l. Sensitizer - 5 ▪ Final – 25/400 (6.25 %)	
2/13	MILITARY OFFERS ITSELF FOR ACCOUNTABILITY a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 20 b. Substitute Watchdog -04 c. Legitim�er - 03 d. Sensitizer – 05 ▪ Final – 32/400 (8 %)			SDPI DEMAND TRIPARTITE INQUIRY COMMISSION e. Transmitter and Stimulator - 12 f. Substitute Watchdog- 2 g. Legitim�er - 2 h. Sensitizer – 2 ▪ Final – 18/400 (4.5 %)	
3/13				CIA'S WORST INTELLIGENCE FAILURES IN HISTORY a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 4 b. Substitute Watchdog- 2 c. Legitim�er - 0 d. Sensitizer – 10	

				▪ Final – 16/400 (4 %)	
1/14	-	-	ISI ADMITS 'FAILURE' OVER BIN LADEN a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 13 b. Substitute Watchdog - 4 c. Legitim�er - 3 d. Sensitizer – 5 ▪ Final – 25/400 (6.25 %)	PASHA 'RESIGNS' BEFORE PARLIAMENT e. Transmitter and Stimulator - 13 f. Substitute Watchdog - 4 g. Legitim�er - 3 h. Sensitizer – 5 ▪ Final – 25/400 (6.25 %)	
1/15	-	-	-	END ONE - SIDED US TIES: NAWAZ a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 12 b. Substitute Watchdog - 0 c. Legitim�er - 3 d. Sensitizer – 2 ▪ Final – 17/400 (4.25 %)	
1/16	-	-	-	-	-
1/17	IN-CAMERA SESSION: THE ULTIMATE BETRAYAL a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 55 b. Substitute Watchdog -100 c. Legitim�er - 35 d. Sensitizer – 30	GEO POLLS ON OSAMA KILLING, DANGERS TO ATOMIC ASSETS e. Transmitter and Stimulator - 37 f. Substitute Watchdog -100 g. Legitim�er - 25	-	-	

	▪ Final – 220/400 (55 %)	h.Sensitizer – 25 ▪ Final – 187/400 (46.75 %)			
1/18	-	-	-	-	
1/19	ARMY CHIEF WANTED MORE DRONE SUPPORT a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 60 b. Substitute Watchdog -100 c. Legitim�er - 30 d. Sensitizer – 25 ▪ Final – 215/400 (53.75 %).	-	-	-	
1/20	-	-	-	-	
1/21	-	-	-	-	
1/22	-	-		CIA, ISI BACK IN BUSINESS a. Transmitter and Stimulator - 10 b. Substitute Watchdog - 4 c. Legitim�er - 0 d. Sensitizer - 10 ▪ Final – 24/400 (6 %).	
1/23	ATTACK ON NAVAL BASE KARACHI				
1/26	-	-	-	-	
1/27	CIA TEAM INSPECTS	-	-	-	

	OSAMA COMPOUND				
1/31	OSAMA: WHY BLAME PAKISTAN? a.Transmitter and Stimulator - 54 b.Substitute Watchdog -100 c.Legitim�izer - 35 d.Sensitizer – 30 ▪ Final – 219/400 (54.75 %).	-	-	-	
	Transmitter and Stimulator	Substitute Watchdog	Legitim�izer	Sensitizer	Remarks
S u m	a. Dawn - 29.1 b. News - 28.1 c. Daily – 24.3 d. Nation -12.6 e. All – 94.1/4 f. Average – 23.52 (2)	a.Dawn - 30.3 b.News - 51.6 c.Daily - 26.4 d.Nation - 5.71 e.All – 114.1/4. f. Average - 28.52 (1)	a. Dawn - 10.6 b. News - 14 c. Daily – 8.2 d. Nation- 2.1 e. All – 34.9/4 f. Average – 8.72 (3)	a. Dawn - 10.1 b. News - 13.1 c. Daily – 6.5 d. Nation - 4.3 e. All – 34/4. f. Average - 8.5 (4)	<u>Overall Category Only</u> 1. <i>The News</i> at top, 26.7 (12 out of 18 stories). 2. <i>Dawn</i> second, 20.2 % (15 out of 19 stories). 3. <i>The Daily Times</i> third, 16.35 (10 out of 15 stories). 4. <i>The Nation</i> last, 6.1 (21 out of 23 stories).

4.2 IHC Judges Letter of 25 March 2024 – An Intelligence Interference

Interference by establishment/intelligence in judicial affairs has been a frequent feature in Pakistan, which also included the famous Asghar Khan Case of 1990 and the recent removal of Justice Shaukat Aziz Siddique in 2018. Following the precedence this time it was the political issue of maintainability of Tyrian White case against PTI Chairman Imran Khan, which in 2023 brought pressure on judiciary and resulted in the interference prompting the judges to write a letter to Supreme Judicial Council / Supreme Court of Pakistan.

In that, after getting no solution from Chief Justice, Islamabad High Court, on March 26, 2024, six serving judges out of eight (Mohsin Akhtar Kayani, Tariq Mehmood Jahangiri, Babar Sattar, Sardar Ejaz Ishaq Khan, Arbab Muhammad Tahir and Saman Rafat Imtiaz) wrote a letter to Supreme Judicial Council of Pakistan (SJC), complaining interference by Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in judicial matters. Next the Chief Justice of Pakistan (Qazi Faez Isa) held two full court session to check the grievances in between his meeting with Prime Minister on 28 March. Consequentially on 30 March, the cabinet approved the formation of an inquiry commission under former Chief Justice of Pakistan Tassaduq Hussain Jillani. However, due to pressure from opposition and lawyers, Justice Jillani recused on 01 April. Resultantly, the Supreme Court had to take the demanded ‘suo moto notice’ and started the proceeding under a seven-member bench. On 2 April, all IHC judges and later other judges, received threatening letters containing some powder/chemical. The original case expanded to other cases and activities, leaving the original allegation in situ. The proceeding of the Supreme Court started under CJP on a slow pace and differences emerged within. The next proceeding was planned to be held after the judicial summer vacations, but nothing happened as the situation changed altogether.

Same procedure of data collection and analysis was adopted as was done in the case of Abbottabad Operation. The final summary of main data is reproduced for final analysis of the points of discussion, duly derived according to the event.

4.2.1 **Intelligence Interference.**

The construct of Intelligence Interference in other organs of the state; the judiciary and parliament, include actions which have influence, control, or manipulate these institutions in order to achieve certain political, security, or strategic objectives. There are different forms of intelligence interference which could cover any one of the listed below or their combination: -

- a. **Surveillance and Monitoring.** Intelligence agencies may conduct surveillance of judges or other judicial officials to gather compromising information, or to monitor their decision-making processes.
- b. **Manipulation of Legal Processes.** Influencing court cases by providing or withholding evidence, pressuring judicial officials, or even manipulating legal procedures to ensure favorable outcomes.
- c. **Disinformation and Propaganda.** Spreading false or misleading information to undermine the credibility of the judiciary or specific judges.
- d. **Coercion and Blackmail.** Using information obtained through surveillance or other means to blackmail judges into making decisions that align with the agencies or other interests.
- e. **Infiltration and Recruitment.** Placing operatives within the judicial system to directly influence decisions or gather intelligence.

- f. **Economic Leverage.** Offering financial incentives or threats to sway judicial decisions.

4.2.2 Day-wise Summary

As newspapers are generated on daily basis, the same format was maintained here. The number of related reports was prefixed with the date and all four newspaper's stories of the date were included in the row. In case of more numbers of stories in a day, the date was prefixed with the number of the story, while also following the front page and onward sequence of the newspapers. This summary of data is related to first stage of the data collection and the related steps which form part of this stage. The summarized data of day wise summary of the concerning reports or stories of the four newspapers along with important remarks is as under: -

Day wise Summary and Analysis of News Reports

S/D	<i>Dawn</i>	<i>The News International</i>	<i>The Daily Times</i>	<i>The Nation</i>	Remarks
1/25 Mon	ATTACK ON CHINESE IN BESHAM AND NAVAL AIR STATION TURBAT				
1/26	-	-	-	-	Day of occurrence of writing a letter by IHC Judges
1/27	IHC JUDGES DETAIL ‘BRAZEN MEDDLING’ IN LETTER TO SUPREME JUDICIAL COUNCIL a. Narrative/Theme: Independence of Judiciary’ and Intelligence Interference. Few themes left out (Para 10) b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (12.5 %). c. Explicit naming of Intelligence. d. Only one component of Schema	SIX IHC JUDGES WRITE TO SJC OVER SPY AGENCIES’ ‘INTERFERENCE’ h. Theme: Independence of Judiciary and Spy Agency’s Interference. i. Oversight Role: Weak Role (7.5 %). j. Only one component of Schema (situation) used. k. No naming of Intelligence. l. Unnecessary inclusion of Opposition/PTI’s remarks. m. Basic/791 words.	IHC JUDGES SEEK SJC MEETING OVER ‘INTERFERENC E’ IN JUDICIAL AFFAIRS o. Theme: Independence of Judiciary and Intelligence Interference. p. Oversight Role: Weakest Role (3.75 %). q. Only one component of Schema (situation) used. r. Explicit naming of Intelligence and operatives. s. Basic/241 words	SIX IHC JUDGES WRITE TO SJC AGAINST MEDDLING OF SPY AGENCIES’ OPERATIVES v. Theme: Independence of Judiciary’ and Intelligence Interference. w. Oversight Role: Weak Role (5.25 %). x. Only one component of Schema (situation) used. y. Naming of Intelligence and ‘operatives’ in place of Agency. z. Basic/903 words. More words, less	cc. Common concept of Interference and Meddling used throughout. dd. Spy and Intelligence a common word. ee. Though all stories were basic and on web pages (no exact time mentioned, just date). ff. Due to shortage of time and the process involved in printing the same could not be included in final newsprint. gg. <i>Dawn</i> had better and timely coverage (but briefest). The <i>Nation</i> using adjective and factual mistakes. hh. One component of schema was mostly used. ii. Reproductions of letter, no analysis. jj. Basic reports. kk. <i>Dawn</i> and <i>The Daily Times</i> explicitly named the Intelligence-ISI/DG-C, which was also repeated subsequently by <i>Dawn</i> .

	(situation) used. e. Meaningful word. f. Basic/784 words. g. Summarized Reproduction.	n. Extremely Summarized Reproduction.	only. t. Briefest reproduction. u. Factual mistakes.	topics. aa. Summarized Reproduction. bb. Mistakes.	
2/27	CALLS FOR PROBE INTO LETTER BY 6 IHC JUDGES ON 'BRAZEN MEDDLING' IN JUDICIAL AFFAIRS a. Narrative/Theme: Collective Resistance to Intelligence Interference b. Oversight Role: OK Role (37 %). c. Naming of Intelligence. d. Meaningful word. e. Extreme length/3069 words. f. Reproduction. g. No analysis.	IHC JUDGES' LETTER: SC FULL COURT MEETING DELIBERATES ON 'MEDDLING BY SPY AGENCIES' h. Theme: SC (Full Court) Meeting Under Pressure on Intelligence Interference. i. Oversight Role: Weak Role (5.75 %) j. Maximum Reproductions, just mentioning events. k. Basic/685 words only. l. Poor effort by an experienced Journalist.	LETTER OF 6 JUDGES OF ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, CHIEF JUSTICE CALLED A FULL COURT MEETING m. Theme: Judicial Wrangling on Intelligence Interference. n. Oversight Role: Weak Role (4.25 %) o. Extremely brief report, just mentioning events. p. Basic/192 words only. q. PML-N affiliated advocate given space.	IHC JUDGES LETTER: CJP CALLS FULL COURT MEETING r. Theme: SC Full Court Meeting. s. Oversight Role: Weak Role (3.75 %) t. Maximum Reproductions, just mentioning events. u. Basic/363 words only. A brief Report. v. Weak effort by a renowned newspaper. x. Repetition of words (Full Court Meeting) y. Mistakes.	z. <i>Dawn</i> had better and timely coverage, but the lengthiest. Covering all stakeholders except respondents (military, Intelligence). Explicit naming of Intelligence. aa. Common Theme of 'Intelligence Interference' formalized from this onward. bb. Repetition and Reproduction. cc. <i>The Daily Times</i> produced the briefest report ever while being the weakest as well.
1/28	SUO MOTU ON	PM, CJP DECIDE	SC FULL COURT	IHC JUDGES'	z. Major Narrative remains the construct of

Thr	THE TABLE AS SC TAKES STOCK OF 'MEDDLING' a. Theme: SC Full Court Meeting In-conclusive on Intelligence Interference. b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (10 %) c. Maximum Reproductions, just mentioning events and Repetitions. d. Basic/877 words. e. Weak effort. f. No Analysis.	ON FORMING COMMISSION TO PROBE SPY AGENCIES' INTERFERENCE IN JUDICIARY g. Theme: Formation of Judicial Commission in CJP/PM meeting. h. Oversight Role: Weak Role (6.75 %) i. Reproduction and Repetitions. j. Basic/536 words. k. Biased Report (Govt and CJP). Weak effort. l. Copy pastes of <i>The Nation</i> Report	TAKES INTO ACCOUNT JUDGES' LETTER OVER 'MEDDLING' m. Theme: Full Court Meeting, Under Pressure. n. Oversight Role: Weakest Role (2.75 %) o. Reproduction and Repetitions (own). p. Basic/466 words. q. Disappointing Report (not needed). r. Weak effort, no substance.	LETTER: PM SHEHBAZ HOLDS MEETING WITH CJP QAZI FAEZ ISA s. Theme: Meeting of Government and Judiciary. t. Oversight Role: Weak Role (6.75 %) u. Reproduction and Repetitions. v. Basic/343 words. w. Weak effort. x. Copy pastes of The News International Report. y. Half report already covered the previous day.	'Intelligence Interference' yet other related themes are maintained alongside or under it. aa. Word 'Alleged' from now being prefixed to 'Interference' by all newspapers. bb. Word 'Intimidation' added to the word 'Interference'. cc. Reports of The News International and The Nation were copy-paste of each other. The News International more biased. A disappointing report of <i>The Daily Times</i>
2/28	INTERFERENCE OF EXECUTIVE IN JUDICIAL AFFAIRS WILL NOT BE TOLERATED CJP ISA [1] a. Theme: Interference will not be tolerated,	-	-	-	h. <i>Dawn</i> maintains quality and quantity. i. Though reproductions. j. Information Glut. k. Being used by CJP and Government (no opposition). l. Format and Text is somewhat same (especially of <i>Dawn</i> and <i>The News International</i>)

	<p>CJP</p> <p>b.Oversight Role: Weak Role (8.75 %).</p> <p>c.More Quantity Less Quality.</p> <p>d.Extreme length/2780 words.</p> <p>e.Medium of leakage of Information (CJP and Government only)</p> <p>f. Information Glut.</p> <p>g. Repetition and Reproduction.</p>				
1/29 Fri	<p>CJP, PM AGREE TO PROBE CLAIMS OF ‘MEDDLING’ [2]</p> <p>a. Theme: Formation of Judicial Commission in CJP/PM meeting.</p> <p>b. Oversight Role:</p>	<p>PTI REJECTS FORMATION OF INQUIRY COMMISSION ON IHC JUDGES’ LETTER</p> <p>f. Theme: PTI Rejects Inquiry Commission.</p> <p>g.Oversight Role: Weak Role (21.5 %)</p> <p>h.Basic/497 words.</p> <p>i. Giving space to opposition.</p>	<p>INTERFERENCE IN JUDICIARY INTOLERABLE, CJP TELLS PM [1]</p> <p>k. Theme: PM-CJP Meeting forming Inquiry Commission.</p> <p>l. Oversight Role: Weak Role (6.25 %)</p> <p>m.Considerably late</p>	<p>COMMISSION OF INQUIRY TO PROBE JUDGES’ ACCUSATIONS [2]</p> <p>q. Theme: Commission of Inquiry Formed.</p> <p>r. Oversight Role: Weak Role (3 %)</p> <p>s. Considerably late and summing up previous missed events.</p>	<p>w.This day even <i>Dawn</i> was late in reporting along with other three.</p> <p>x. A good and original report by <i>Dawn</i>, which other three copied. Maximum copying done by <i>The Daily Times</i>.</p> <p>y. <i>The News</i> gave space to Opposition, which was followed by <i>Dawn</i> and <i>The Daily Times</i> the next day.</p>

	<p>Good Role (43.5 %)</p> <p>c. Basic/944 words.</p> <p>d. Critical assessment and report.</p> <p>e. A good original effort though late.</p>	<p>j. A good effort though late.</p>	<p>and sum up previous missed events.</p> <p>n. Basic/903 words.</p> <p>o. Weak effort.</p> <p>p. Copying from <i>Dawn</i>, <i>The News International</i> and <i>The Nation</i>.</p>	<p>t. Basic/695 words.</p> <p>u. Weak effort with mistakes.</p> <p>v. Same style of report of <i>The Daily Times</i>.</p>	
1/30 Sat	<p>PTI CALLS ON SC, IHC CJS TO RESIGN FOR 'INACTION' OVER MEDDLING</p> <p>a. Theme: PTI Response on Handling of Judges Case.</p> <p>b. Oversight Role: Satisfactory Role (26.5 %)</p> <p>c. Basic/556 words.</p> <p>d. Giving space to opposition.</p> <p>e. A good effort though considerably late.</p>	<p>EX-CJP TASSADUQ JILLANI TO LEAD COMMISSION FORMED TO INVESTIGATE JUDGES' ALLEGATIONS {1}</p> <p>f. Theme: Head of Commission of Inquiry Appointed.</p> <p>g. Oversight Role: Weak Role (7.75 %)</p> <p>h. Considerably late and summing up previous missed events with a contemporary story. Giving unnecessary details (profile).</p> <p>i. Reproduction and</p>	<p>PTI DEMANDS CJP, IHC CJ STEP DOWN AMID LETTER CONTROVERSY</p> <p>l. Theme: PTI Press Conference on Handling of Judges Case.</p> <p>m. Oversight Role: Weak Role (8.75 %)</p> <p>n. Basic/471 words.</p> <p>o. Giving space to opposition/PTI.</p> <p>p. An effort though late.</p> <p>q. Change of words to more neutral ones.</p>	-	<p>r. <i>The News</i> considerably late, yet with <i>The Daily Times</i> (finally) giving space to opposition.</p> <p>s. Shrinking of Intelligence and Interference related strong words to more neutral words.</p> <p>t. Super-imposition of word alleged.</p>

		<p>Repetitions.</p> <p>j. Basic/1031 words.</p> <p>k. Copy of <i>The Nation's</i> Report with mistakes.</p>			
1/31 Sun	<p>IHC JUDGES' LETTER OVER 300 LAWYERS CALL ON SC TO TAKE NOTICE UNDER ARTICLE 184(3) < T ></p> <p>a. Theme: Lawyers' dissatisfaction on Judicial Processing of IHC Letter Case.</p> <p>b. Oversight Role: Satisfactory Role (40.25 %)</p> <p>c. Lengthy/1967 words.</p> <p>d. Un necessary repetitions.</p> <p>e. Good and timely effort.</p>	<p>OVER 300 LAWYERS URGE SC TO CONSTITUTE BENCH ON IHC JUDGES' LETTER UNDER ARTICLE 184(3) < T ></p> <p>f. Theme: Lawyers' dissatisfaction on Judicial Processing of IHC Letter Case.</p> <p>g. Oversight Role: Weak Role (17.5 %)</p> <p>h. Brief/540 words.</p> <p>i. Unnecessary repetitions of background.</p> <p>j. Ok summary of the letter.</p> <p>k. Timely effort.</p>	<p>GOVT HANDPICKS EX-CJP JILLANI TO LEAD LETTER PROBE COMMISSION {1}</p> <p>f. Theme: Head of Inquiry Commission Appointed.</p> <p>g. Oversight Role: Weak Role (7.5 %)</p> <p>h. Late Stories clubbed together.</p> <p>i. Basic/402 words (283 used for this story).</p> <p>j. Weak and Routine Report (24 hour late)</p>	<p>FEDERAL CABINET APPROVES COMMISSION TO PROBE JUDGES' CLAIMS</p> <p>k. Theme: Commission of Inquiry Approved by Cabinet.</p> <p>l. Oversight Role: Weak Role (6 %)</p> <p>m. Story (from Press Release) clubbed with another main story.</p> <p>n. Basic/936 words (357 used for this story).</p> <p>o. Weak and Routine Report.</p>	<p>p. A new format of including background (day or date wise) in every report at cost of repetition/reproduction.</p> <p>q. A subgrouping has emerged where <i>Dawn</i> and <i>The News International</i> reporting contemporary stories and <i>The Daily Times</i> and <i>The Nation</i> falling a day/24-hours behind.</p> <p>r. <i>Dawn</i> produced a good or satisfactory story, yet reproduction and repetition continue. Good and timely representation of public/judicial sentiments.</p>
1/1 Mon	<p>IHC JUDGES' LETTER</p>	<p>EX-CJP JILANI STEPS BACK FROM</p>	<p>LAWYERS SKEPTICAL</p>	<p>OVER 300 LAWYERS URGE</p>	<p>u. <i>The Daily Times</i> and <i>The Nation</i> 24-hour late and Cut and Paste Case.</p>

<p>JILLANI RECUSES HIMSELF FROM INQUIRY COMMISSION AS SC TAKES SUO MOTU NOTICE</p> <p>a. Theme: Government and CJP on Backfoot. b. Oversight Role: Satisfactory Role (26 %) c. Lengthy/1589 words. d. Unnecessary repetitions and Reproductions. e. Clubbed two Reports together. f. Good and timely effort.</p>	<p>HEADING COMMISSION ON IHC JUDGES’ LETTER</p> <p>g. Theme: Government and CJP on Backfoot. h. Oversight Role: Weak Role (15.75 %) i. Lengthy/476 words. j. Unnecessary repetitions and Reproductions. k. Too Brief/Routine. l. Timely effort.</p>	<p>ABOUT INDEPENDENCE OF EX-CJP-LED COMMISSION</p> <p>< L > m. Complete Cut and Paste of Dawn News Report of 31 March n. Except Headline, Sub Headline and Dateline rest is cut and paste of Dawn Report. o. The background and The Letter portion not included in the reproduction. p. Source is mentioned as Agency. q. Poor Effort.</p>	<p>SC TO TAKE NOTICE OF IHC JUDGES’ CHARGES</p> <p>< L > p. 70 % Cut and Paste of Dawn News Report of 31 March and rest of letter. q. Except Headline and Dateline rest is cut and paste of Dawn Report/letter. r. The Letter portion not included in the reproduction. s. Source is mentioned as own reporter. t. Poor Effort.</p>	<p>v. <i>Dawn</i> leads with satisfactory report. w. <i>Dawn</i> maintained length (reproduction and repetition) while <i>The News International</i> remained brief/routine. x. Poor effort of <i>The Daily Times</i> and <i>The Nation</i>.</p>
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1/2 Tue	FIR REGISTERED AS ALL 8 IHC JUDGES RECEIVE THREATENING LETTERS LACED WITH 'WHITE POWDER' a. Theme: Threat/Pressure to all IHC Judges. b. Oversight Role: Satisfactory Role (28.75 %) c. Basic/883 words. d. Unnecessary repetitions and Reproductions. e. Timely reporting.	IHC CJ AMONG EIGHT JUDGES RECEIVE 'THREATENING LETTERS CONTAINING SUSPECTED ANTHRAX POWDER' f. Theme: Threat/Pressure to all IHC Judges. g. Oversight Role: Satisfactory Role (19.75 %) h. Brief/437 words. i. Unnecessary background/reproductions. j. Timely reporting, yet sensational.	SC TAKES SUO MOTU NOTICE ON JUDGES' LETTER k. Theme: Government and CJP on Backfoot. l. Oversight Role: Weak Role (5 %) m. Basic/778 words. n. Unnecessary repetitions and Reproductions (Deep Background). o. 24-Hour late and Routine.	SUPREME COURT TO HEAR SIX HIGH COURT JUDGES' CASE TOMORROW p. Theme: Government and CJP on Backfoot. q. Oversight Role: Weak Role (8.25 %) r. Lengthy/1404 words. s. Unnecessary Repetitions and Reproductions. t. Clubbed three Reports together. u. 24-hour late report.	v. <i>The Daily Times</i> and <i>The Nation</i> again 24-hour late. <i>The Daily Times</i> added yet another background (Deep Background). The <i>Nation</i> being late clubbed 3 x stories in a single report. w. <i>The News International</i> , being sensational labels the powder as Anthrax without substantiation. x. <i>Dawn</i> presented a satisfactory story. y. SENATE ELECTIONS BEING CONDUCTED ON THE DAY.
1/3 Wed	IHC JUDGES RECEIVE LETTERS LACED WITH 'TOXIC CHEMICAL' (Repeat with some	-	EIGHT IHC JUDGES RECEIVE 'THREATENING LETTERS' a. Theme: Threat/Pressure to	ISLAMABAD JUDGES REPORT MYSTERIOUS MAILINGS, PROMPTING IMMEDIATE PROBE	k. <i>The Daily Times</i> and <i>The Nation</i> again 24-hour late. Weak Reports with mistakes. l. <i>Dawn</i> repeats a report whereas <i>The News International</i> reports no story.

	new details-trivial)		all IHC Judges. b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (8.5 %) c. Brief/351 words. d. Brief and late. e. Mistakes.	f. Theme: Threat/Pressure to all IHC Judges. g. Oversight Role: Weak Role (9.5 %) h. Basic/748 words. i. Brief and late. j. Mistakes.	
2/3	CJP SAYS ATTACK ON JUDICIARY'S INDEPENDENC E WON'T BE TOLERATED, HINTS AT FULL COURT FOR SUO MOTU CASE a. Theme: Start of Judicial Wrangling and Division. b. Oversight Role: Satisfactory Role (31 %) c. Too Lengthy/3070 words and 81 Paras/Lines. d. Un necessary repetitions.				f. Domain change of the issue takes place from Intelligence Related to Judiciary Related. g. Extremely lengthy, yet a satisfactory effort despite the repetitions. h. <i>Dawn</i> the only newspaper reporting it timely.

	e. Good and timely effort.				
1/4 Thr		IHC JUDGES LETTER: CJP HINTS AT FORMING FULL COURT IN SUO MOTU CASE a. Theme: Start of Judicial Wrangling and Division. b. Oversight Role: Weak Role (19.25 %) c. Too Lengthy/2612 words and 29 Paragraphs. d. Un necessary repetitions. e. 24-hour late and lengthy effort.	CJP ISA HINTS AT FULL COURT OVER MEDDLING ALLEGATIONS f. Theme: Start of Judicial Wrangling and Division. g. Oversight Role: Weak Role (9.25 %) h. Short/686. i. Missing details and incomplete. j. 24-hour late and weak effort.	JUDGES WILL RESIST ATTACK ON JUDICIARY CHIEF JUSTICE k. Theme: Start of Judicial Wrangling and Division. l. Oversight Role: Weak Role (14.25 %) m. Too Lengthy/1888 words and 29 Paragraphs. n. Un necessary repetitions. o. 24-hour late and lengthy effort.	p. Reporting of the First Hearing of the case at length. q. Coverage represented the political inclination of the newspaper. r. Cherry picking of own oriented details while missing the others. s. <i>Dawn</i> had already posted a report a day earlier.
1/5 Fri	Investigators hunt source of ‘toxic letters’	Threat letters to judges PM promises credible probe into sensitive matter	Government vows probe into letters threatening judges	Government investigating suspicious powder-laced letters: PM	a. Not counted. b. Due to response of SC other topics get the importance. c. Original issue also mutates or morphs into other numerous issues. d. Thus, reduction in attention. e. RESURGENCE OF TERRORISM
6-14	EID UL FITR HOLIDAYS (FROM WEEKEND TO NEXT WEEK) - till 14 April				
	A JUDICIAL TUG OF WAR STARTS (With Establishment, CJP, Government and CJ IHC on one side)				
S	Summary	Summary	Summary	Summary	Grand Summary
u	a. Good Reports –	a. Good Reports –	a. Good Reports –	a. Good Reports -	a. Good Reports - <i>Dawn</i>

m	4/13 b.Days Reported – 11 c.Average – 24.02 (11) d.Reproductions – 6 (46.1 %). e.Info Leaks – 1 (Government & CJP) f. Max in a Day – 2 (27 & 28 Mar)	0/10 b.Days Reported - 09 c.Average – 13.46 (09) d.Reproductions– 7 (70 %). e.Info Leaks – 1 (Government & CJP) f. Max in a Day – 2 (27 Mar)	0/10 b.Days Reported - 08 c.Average – 5.57 (10) d.Reproduction–4 (40 %). e.Info Leaks – 0 () f. Max in a Day – 2 (27 Mar)	0/9 b.Days Reported - 08 c.Average – 6.27 (9) d.Reproduction – 6 (66.6 %). e.Info Leaks – 0 () f. Max in a Day – 2 (27 Mar)	b. Days Reported - <i>Dawn</i> c. Overall Average – 12.33 (Dawn = 24.02) d. Reproduction – The News International (?) e. Info Leaks – Dawn/The News (1/1) f. Max in a Day – All
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4.2.3 **Role-wise Summary**

In view of the research questions of this research, this summary is related to the data of second stage and its corresponding steps. The final question will be analyzed in the next chapter and will be based on this data summary. The summarized data of role wise summary of the concerning reports or stories of the four newspapers with remarks is as under: -

Role-wise Summary and Analysis of Selected Newspapers

INFORMATION TRANSMISSION & STIMULATION (100) * (For Formal Scrutinizers)			SUBSTITUTE WATCH DOG (200) *	LEGITIMIZE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES & ACTIVITIES (50)	SENSITIZE PUBLIC (50)
S/ D	<i>Dawn</i>	<i>The News International</i>	<i>The Daily Times</i>	<i>The Nation</i>	Remarks
1/26 Tue	a. Transmitter & Stimulator b. Substitute Watchdog c. Legitim�er d. Sensitizer e. Efficacy f. Final	g. Transmitter & Stimulator h. Substitute Watchdog i. Legitim�er j. Sensitizer k. Efficacy l. Final	m. Transmitter & Stimulator n. Substitute Watchdog o. Legitim�er p. Sensitizer q. Efficacy r. Final	s. Transmitter & Stimulator t. Substitute Watchdog u. Legitim�er v. Sensitizer w. Efficacy x. Final	y. Efficacy will be derived from the individual scores. z. No Investigative input prior the event by any newspaper. aa. All taken by surprise.
1/27 Wed	IHC JUDGES DETAIL ‘BRAZEN MEDDLING’ IN LETTER TO SUPREME JUDICIAL COUNCIL a. Transmitter & Stimulator - 25 b. Substitute Watchdog - 10 c. Legitim�er - 5	SIX IHC JUDGES WRITE TO SJC OVER SPY AGENCIES’ ‘INTERFERENC E’ f. Transmitter & Stimulator - 15 g. Substitute Watchdog - 5 h. Legitim�er - 5 i. Sensitizer – 5 j. Final – 30/400 (7.5)	IHC JUDGES SEEK SJC MEETING OVER ‘INTERFERENC E’ IN JUDICIAL AFFAIRS k. Transmitter & Stimulator - 10 l. Substitute Watchdog - 5 m. Legitim�er - 0 n. Sensitizer – 0 o. Final – 15/400	SIX IHC JUDGES WRITE TO SJC AGAINST MEDDLING OF SPY AGENCIES’ OPERATIVES p. Transmitter & Stimulator - 14 q. Substitute Watchdog - 3 r. Legitim�er - 2 s. Sensitizer – 2 t. Final – 21/400 (5.25)	u. <i>Dawn</i> leads (both in quality/quantity). v. Just reproduction of the letter of IHC Judges. w. No explicit naming of Intelligence like ISI & DG-C (except <i>Dawn</i> & <i>The Daily Times</i>). x. Briefest (<i>The Daily Times</i>). Mistakes & using word ‘Operatives’.

	d.Sensitizer - 10 e. Final – 50/400 (12.5 %)	%)	(3.75 %)	%)	
2/27	CALLS FOR PROBE INTO LETTER BY 6 IHC JUDGES ON 'BRAZEN MEDDLING' IN JUDICIAL AFFAIRS a. Transmitter & Stimulator- 48 b. Substitute Watchdog - 50 c. Legitim�er - 25 d. Sensitizer - 25 e. Final – 148/400 (37 %).	IHC JUDGES' LETTER: SC FULL COURT MEETING DELIBERATES ON 'MEDDLING BY SPY AGENCIES' f. Transmitter & Stimulator - 8 g. Substitute Watchdog - 5 h. Legitim�er – 5. i. Sensitizer – 5. j. Final – 23/400 (5.75 %)	LETTER OF 6 JUDGES OF ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, CHIEF JUSTICE CALLED A FULL COURT MEETING k. Transmitter & Stimulator - 10 l. Substitute Watchdog - 5 m. Legitim�er - 1 n. Sensitizer – 1. o. Final – 17/400 (4.25 %)	-	p. <i>Dawn</i> leads. q.No second report from <i>The Nation</i> despite the occurrence of this 'Breaking News'.

1/28 Thr	SUO MOTU ON THE TABLE AS SC TAKES STOCK OF 'MEDDLING' a. Transmitter & Stimulator - 20 b. Substitute Watchdog - 5 c. Legitim�izer - 12 d. Sensitizer - 13 e. Final – 50/400 (12.5 %).	PM, CJP DECIDE ON FORMING COMMISSION TO PROBE SPY AGENCIES' INTERFERENCE IN JUDICIARY f. Transmitter & Stimulator - 20 g. Substitute Watchdog - 5 h. Legitim�izer - 1 i. Sensitizer – 1. j. Final – 27/400 (6.75 %).	SC FULL COURT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT JUDGES' LETTER OVER 'MEDDLING' k. Transmitter & Stimulator - 4 l. Substitute Watchdog - 5 m. Legitim�izer - 1 n. Sensitizer – 1. o. Final – 11/400 (2.75 %).	IHC JUDGES' LETTER: PM SHEHBAZ HOLDS MEETING WITH CJP QAZI FAEZ ISA p. Transmitter & Stimulator - 20 q. Substitute Watchdog - 5 r. Legitim�izer - 1 s. Sensitizer – 1. t. Final – 27/400 (6.75 %).	u. <i>Dawn</i> leads v. Major Narrative of 'Intelligence Interference' is settled from now.
1/29 Fri	CJP, PM AGREE TO PROBE CLAIMS OF 'MEDDLING' a. Transmitter & Stimulator - 34 b. Substitute Watchdog - 80 c. Legitim�izer - 30 d. Sensitizer - 30 e. Final – 174/400 (43.5 %).	PTI REJECTS FORMATION OF INQUIRY COMMISSION ON IHC JUDGES' LETTER f. Transmitter & Stimulator - 26 g. Substitute Watchdog - 50 h. Legitim�izer - 5 i. Sensitizer – 5. j. Final – 86/400 (21.5 %).	INTERFERENCE IN JUDICIARY INTOLERABLE, CJP TELLS PM k. Transmitter & Stimulator - 10 l. Substitute Watchdog - 5 m. Legitim�izer - 5 n. Sensitizer – 5. o. Final – 25/400 (6.25 %).	COMMISSION OF INQUIRY TO PROBE JUDGES' ACCUSATIONS p. Transmitter & Stimulator - 8 q. Substitute Watchdog - 2 r. Legitim�izer - 1 s. Sensitizer – 1. t. Final – 12/400 (3 %).	u. <i>Dawn</i> led with a good report
1/30	PTI CALLS	EX-CJP	PTI DEMANDS	-	p. <i>Dawn</i> leads

Sat	ON SC, IHC CJS TO RESIGN FOR ‘INACTION’ OVER MEDDLING a. Transmitter & Stimulator - 26 b. Substitute Watchdog -50 c. Legitim�er - 5 d. Sensitizer - 25 e. Final – 106/400 (26.5 %)	TASSADUQ JILLANI TO LEAD COMMISSION FORMED TO INVESTIGATE JUDGES’ ALLEGATIONS f. Transmitter & Stimulator - 17 g. Substitute Watchdog -10 h. Legitim�er - 2 i. Sensitizer – 2. j. Final – 31/400 (7.75 %)	CJP, IHC CJ STEP DOWN AMID LETTER CONTROVERSY k. Transmitter & Stimulator - 15 l. Substitute Watchdog -10 m. Legitim�er - 5 n. Sensitizer – 5. o. Final – 35/400 (8.75 %)		q.No report from <i>The Nation</i>
1/31 Sun	IHC JUDGES’ LETTER OVER 300 LAWYERS CALL ON SC TO TAKE NOTICE UNDER ARTICLE 184(3) (\$) a. Transmitter & Stimulator - 31 b. Substitute Watchdog -70 c. Legitim�er - 25	OVER 300 LAWYERS URGE SC TO CONSTITUTE BENCH ON IHC JUDGES’ LETTER UNDER ARTICLE 184(3) f. Transmitter & Stimulator - 25 g. Substitute Watchdog -30 h. Legitim�er - 10 i. Sensitizer – 5. j. Final – 70/400	GOVT HANDPICKS EX-CJP JILLANI TO LEAD LETTER PROBE COMMISSION k. Transmitter & Stimulator - 16 l. Substitute Watchdog -10 m. Legitim�er - 2 n. Sensitizer – 2. o. Final – 30/400 (7.5 %)	FEDERAL CABINET APPROVES COMMISSION TO PROBE JUDGES’ CLAIMS p. Transmitter & Stimulator - 14 q. Substitute Watchdog -10 r. Legitim�er - 0 s. Sensitizer – 0. t. Final – 24/400 (6 %)	u. <i>Dawn</i> led with a good report

	d.Sensitizer – 35. e. Final – 161/400 (40.25 %)	(17.5 %)			
1/1 Apr Mo n	IHC JUDGES’ LETTER JILLANI RECUSES HIMSELF FROM INQUIRY COMMISSION AS SC TAKES SUO MOTU NOTICE a. Transmitter & Stimulator - 29 b. Substitute Watchdog -30 c. Legitimizer - 10 d. Sensitizer – 35. e. Final – 104/400 (26 %)	EX-CJP JILANI STEPS BACK FROM HEADING COMMISSION ON IHC JUDGES’ LETTER f. Transmitter & Stimulator - 23 g. Substitute Watchdog -25 h. Legitim�izer - 10 i. Sensitizer – 5. j. Final – 63/400 (15.75 %)	LAWYERS SKEPTICAL ABOUT INDEPENDENCE OF EX-CJP-LED COMMISSION k. Transmitter & Stimulator -0 l. Substitute Watchdog - 0 m. Legitim�izer - 0 n. Sensitizer – 0. o. Final – 00/400 (0 %) p. (Cut & Paste Case)	OVER 300 LAWYERS URGE SC TO TAKE NOTICE OF IHC JUDGES’ CHARGES (\$) q. Transmitter & Stimulator -0 r. Substitute Watchdog - 0 s. Legitim�izer - 0 t. Sensitizer – 0. u. Final – 00/400 (0 %) v. (70 % Cut & Paste Case of Dawn & rest of Letter)	w. Dawn led with an OK report x. <i>The Daily Times & The Nation</i> reproduce/cut & paste
1/2 Tue	FIR REGISTERED AS ALL 8 IHC JUDGES RECEIVE THREATENIN G LETTERS LACED WITH	IHC CJ AMONG EIGHT JUDGES RECEIVE 'THREATENING LETTERS CONTAINING SUSPECTED ANTHRAX	SC TAKES SUO MOTU NOTICE ON JUDGES’ LETTER k. Transmitter & Stimulator -12 l. Substitute Watchdog - 5	SUPREME COURT TO HEAR SIX HIGH COURT JUDGES’ CASE TOMORROW p. Transmitter & Stimulator -18 q. Substitute Watchdog	

	‘WHITE POWDER’ a. Transmitter & Stimulator -40 b. Substitute Watchdog - 30 c. Legitim�er – 10. d. Sensitizer – 35. e. Final – 115/400 (28.75 %)	POWDER’ f. Transmitter & Stimulator -29 g. Substitute Watchdog - 20 h. Legitim�er – 10. i. Sensitizer – 20. j. Final – 115/400 (28.75 %)	m. Legitim�er – 5. n. Sensitizer – 0. o. Final – 22/400 (5 %)	- 10 r. Legitim�er – 5. s. Sensitizer – 0. t. Final – 33/400 (8.25 %)	
1/3 We d			EIGHT IHC JUDGES RECEIVE ‘THREATENING LETTERS’ a. Transmitter & Stimulator -18 b. Substitute Watchdog - 10 c. Legitim�er – 5. d. Sensitizer – 5. e. Final – 38/400 (9.5 %)	ISLAMABAD JUDGES REPORT MYSTERIOUS MAILINGS, PROMPTING IMMEDIATE PROBE f. Transmitter & Stimulator -18 g. Substitute Watchdog - 10 h. Legitim�er – 3. i. Sensitizer – 3. j. Final – 34/400 (8.5 %)	
2/3	CJP SAYS ATTACK ON JUDICIARY’S INDEPENDEN				

	CE WON'T BE TOLERATED, HINTS AT FULL COURT FOR SUO MOTU CASE a. Transmitter & Stimulator - 44 b. Substitute Watchdog - 30 c. Legitim�er – 15. d. Sensitizer – 35. e. Final – 124/400 (31 %)				
1/4 Thr		IHC JUDGES LETTER CJP HINTS AT FORMING FULL COURT IN SUO MOTU CASE a. Transmitter & Stimulator - 22 b. Substitute Watchdog - 20 c. Legitim�er – 10. d. Sensitizer – 25. e. Final – 77/400 (19.25 %)	CJP ISA HINTS AT FULL COURT OVER MEDDLING ALLEGATIONS f. Transmitter & Stimulator - 12 g. Substitute Watchdog - 10 h. Legitim�er – 5. i. Sensitizer – 10. j. Final – 37/400 (9.25 %)	JUDGES WILL RESIST ATTACK ON JUDICIARY CHIEF JUSTICE k. Transmitter & Stimulator - 27 l. Substitute Watchdog - 20 m. Legitim�er – 5. n. Sensitizer – 5. o. Final – 57/400 (14.25 %)	
1/5 Fri	Investigators hunt source of ‘toxic letters’	Threat letters to judges PM promises credible	Government vows probe into letters threatening judges	Government investigating suspicious powder-	a. Not counted. b. Due to response of SC other topics get the importance.

		probe into sensitive matter		laced letters: PM	c. Original issue also mutates or morphs into other numerous issues. d. Thus, reduction in attention.
6-14	EID UL FITR HOLIDAYS (FROM WEEKEND TO NEXT WEEK) – Till 14 April				
Transmitter and Stimulator		Substitute Watchdog	Legitim�izer	Sensitizer	Remarks
a. Dawn- 31.7 b. News-20.5 c. Daily Time-10.7 d. Nation-14.8 e. All Average – 77.7/4 f. = 19.4 (1)		a. Dawn- 36 b. News-18.8 c. The Daily Times- 6.5 d. Nation- 7.5 e. All Average – 68.8/4. f. = 17.2 (2)	a. Dawn- 14.2 b. News- 7.4 c. The Daily Times- 2.9 d. Nation- 2.1 e. All Average – 26.6/4 f. = 6.65 (4)	a. Dawn- 24.8 b. News- 8.1 c. The Daily Times- 2.9 d. Nation- 1.6 e. All Average– 37.4/4. f. = 9.35 (3)	<u>Overall Category Only</u> a. <i>Dawn</i> at top, 26.6 (10 out of 13 stories). b. <i>The News</i> second, 13.7 (09 out of 11 stories). c. <i>The Nation</i> third, 6.5 (08 out of 11 stories). d. <i>The Daily Times</i> last, 7.8 % (10 out of 12 stories).

Chapter 5

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS, CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

5.1 Introduction

The main aim of this research is to analyze the role of oversight played by Pakistan's media/press in relation to two specific and important events (one a failure and other of an excess/interference by the agencies) while monitoring the intelligence agencies under the informal accountability on behalf of the public, under watchdog role. In Pakistan this is a new concept even for the media, or its staff, who are supposed to undertake it persistently. Media mainly plays this role to support the formal system of accountability and monitoring. There is also an institutional, national, regional and international context to the exercise of this role. The existing gap of type, time and the environment also affected the outcome in relation to the normative requirements, as no theory can best guess the results.

The research/final index of the role of selected newspapers will at least identify the direction of press, along with any appreciation or depreciation therein.

5.2 Discussion and Analysis of Abbottabad Operation – An Intelligence Failure

5.2.1 The Final Summary

The final summary of main data is reproduced for final analysis of the points of discussion duly derived according to the event. This summary is derived from the first summary and only provides the digital details. For clarity and detailed analysis, the first and the main summary can be consulted.

Final Summary of Selected Newspapers on Abbottabad Operation

<i>Dawn</i>	<i>The News</i>	<i>The Daily Times</i>	<i>The Nation</i>	Summary
a. Good Reports – 6/19	a. Good Reports – 5/18	a. Good Reports – 1.75/15	a. Good Reports - 0/23	a. Good Reports - <i>Dawn</i>
b. Days Reported - 10	b. Days Reported - 12	b. Days Reported - 08	b. Days Reported - 12	b. Days Reported – <i>News/Nation</i>
c. Average – 22.05 (13)	c. Average – 27.35 (12)	c. Average – 17.75 (9)	c. Average – 6.23 (21)	c. Overall Average - 18.34 (<i>The News</i> = 27.35)
d. Reproductions – 7 (36.8 %).	d. Reproductions – 9 (50 %).	d. Reproduction – 10 (66.66 %).	d. Reproduction – 10 (43.4 %).	d. Reproduction – <i>The Daily Times/The Nation</i> (?)
e. Info Leaks – 1 (ISPR)	e. Info Leaks – 2 (Generals and US-Media)	e. Info Leaks – 7 (3 US/ Media, 3 x Government and 1 x Opposition)	e. Info Leaks – 5 (ISI, ISPR, PCNS, Opposition)	e. Info Leaks – <i>The Daily Times</i> (7)
f. Max in a Day – 7 (2 May)	f. Max in a Day – 3 (3 May)	f. Max in a Day – 5 (3 May)	f. Max in a Day – 5 (3 May)	f. Max in a Day – <i>Dawn</i> (7)

Table – 1 Showing Performance of Oversight Role of Selected Newspapers on OBL Raid

From this quantitative data the concluding points of the summary have been subsumed or consolidated under the following suitable headlines.

5.2.2 Oversight or Watchdog Role

According to Curran (1996) Watchdog role is said to override in importance, all other functions of media, and to dictate the form in which the media should be organized. But the collective performance of oversight role of the selected four newspapers remained dismal at 18.34 level out of 100, which is low by all standards. *The News International* tops the average at 27.35, while *The Nation* remained the lowest at 6.23 despite producing maximum of reports (23) in the same period. *Dawn* and *The Daily Times* remained at 22 and 17

respectively. In the case of ‘Good Oversight Reports’ *Dawn* leads with six reports of 50 percent or above mark, whereas *The Nation* could not produce a single good oversight report. *The News International* and *The Daily Times* produced five and two respectively. Overall, the quantitative and the most important qualitative factor of *Dawn* remained at the top with *The News International*, *The Daily Times* and *The Nation* respectively.

5.2.3 Timeliness

“News value of timeliness includes the related concepts of newness, recency, currency, immediacy, and so on, since they are all concerned with establishing the relevance of the event in relation to the time of publication” (Bednarek & Caple, 2017). In the case of this study *Dawn* was the quickest to report (mostly on digital website) with seven related reports on the first day of the event, whereas others (*The News*, *The Daily Times* and *The Nation*) could only report on the next day (being 24 x hours late). The reported stories of *Dawn* were diverse and covered the topic from both ends thus maintaining the standard and setting the pace. *The News International*, *The Daily Times* and *The Nation* were late by 24 hours and could not comprehend and report a single related report in the period despite the obvious nature and quantum of the event. These three newspapers also could not report a single report from their monitoring desk on the webpage, till they finally reported on the next day along with other newspapers.

5.2.4 Reproduction or Cut and Paste

News stories are supposed to be original acquisition/piece of the journalist who had taken input from different sources and presented in his own wordings with required attribution. The same are then vetted by ‘Editorial Board’ or staff of newspaper before its final printing. Under ‘Be Accountable and Transparent’ in Society of Professional

Journalists-SPJ Code of Ethics it is stated that, Journalists have a moral obligation to be accountable to the public for the work they produce and how they produce it (SPJEthics, 2014). However, this ‘how’ was kept hidden and a large number of the reports (36) out of total (75) have been reproduced (48 percent) from reports of either foreign or local media (even newspapers), press releases and input of news agencies. In some cases, it was a ‘cut and paste’ case without any output from the journalist or newspaper. Being a capacity issues of the papers it also identifies paucity of investigative journalists, weak knowledge of intelligence related matters, deficiency of English language (also identified by mistakes in the text) and lethargy. *The Daily Times* and *The Nation* had the maximum of reproductions of 66 and 45 percent with no or few comments or remarks. Even *Dawn* regurgitated and misrepresented foreign reports of which few were later found to be factually incorrect as well. This point was also identified as elite sources of agenda setting in case of recent research of Dr Marwan’s team (Marwan et al., 2019).

5.2.5 Press Being Used for Information Leaks

Watch dog role demands that media should excoriate those in power or public office while being critical to the core, albeit it starts working in cohorts with local or external masters. This also becomes more dangerous when the media does not even recognize of being used by others. Under Act Independently in SPJ Code of Ethics it is stated that journalist must be wary of sources offering information for favors or money. But despite the incidental nature of the reported event, visible signs of influence could be identified in 15 reports out of total 75 making a percentage of 20 percent. In this *The Nation* and *The Daily Times* were more influenced than *The News International* and *Dawn*. Influencing institutions included US/Media, Intelligence Agencies like ISI or ISPR, Opposition, Retired Generals,

Parliamentary Committee on National Security-PCNS and the government. Main purpose remained of either responding to a narrative or creating a new for local or external readers.

5.2.6 Narrative/Major Themes

Media has always been a single most decisive factor in shaping the minds of the people (Hafeez, 2015). So different competing narratives (and also the responses) were built during the incident reports between the well synchronized US and its media on one side and somehow confused leadership of Pakistan and unprepared media on the other. US media had initiative on its side and was well prepared, whereas Pakistani media received the first report with shock or surprise (labelled as nightmare).

The First US narrative of 'False Dilemma' showing an equivocality was initiated by US media and reproduced first by *Dawn* as 'Complicit or inefficient' (word 'caught' was used). The PM of Pakistan somehow initiated confusion by initially 'hailing' the event as victory (appreciating own facilitation) and later asking for sharing the blame of failure. The media followed with words like 'stumped' or 'embarrassed' in the headlines. Ironically *The Daily Times* was too simple for carry-on the two narratives of US and Pakistani Government of 'Justice is Done' and 'A great Victory' respectively.

The second US narrative of 'Mistrust' was also picked up by *Dawn*. The paper also shared the response (government's) along with later modification of stance to 'Violation of Sovereignty'. Taking the lead, *The News International* proposed the narrative of 'Subaltern' (bakshoo) as a response to US hegemonic narratives. *Dawn* also reported the first Pakistani narrative (in response) of 'Collective Ownership of Failures' whereas *The News International* reported the defensive narrative of 'We are good but not God'. *The Nation* also took up the

‘Demarche’ narrative (along with *The Daily Times*) and ‘Inevitability of Failures’ and ‘Revision of Policy and Strategy’ subsequently.

Finally on 06 May 2011, *The News International* picked up the narrative of ‘Formal Intelligence Oversight’ with an investigative report, but the next day the third narrative of US/Media was launched through *Newsweek*. This narrative of putting pressure on ‘DG ISI to Quit’ was again taken up by all three newspapers (except *The Daily Times*). It was also clubbed by the narrative of ‘Disclosure of In-Contact ISI Operatives with OBL’ (by US) for further pressurizing Pakistan. The narrative of ‘Poor Media handling’ covering ‘Image Restoration’ and ‘Blame Game’ was initiated by Chief of Army Staff/ISPR but was not followed by the press.

On 13 May 2011, the narrative of ‘Parliamentary Supremacy’ was proposed after a briefing of joint session by military/intelligence. Though next day *The Daily Times* also presented this narrative under the headline of ‘ISI Admit Failure’.

From 17 May 2011 the US due to the (final) tough stance of Pakistan, changed course and after frequent visits of MPs/CIA operatives the new narrative was of ‘Reproachment’. Here *The News International* through innovative idea of ‘public polls’ idea, clubbed the old narrative of ‘Nuclear Security.’

On 19 May 2011 *Dawn* (possibly due to saturation) changed to introspective narrative of ‘Leadership Treachery’ while in viewing the drone issue, which continued further for some time.

On 31 May 2011 *Dawn* also initiated the narrative of ‘How to Handle National Failures’ to the arena which was subsequently followed and later changed with yet another.

After this preponderance of narratives in the media field, the normalcy returned and both the nations or their agencies and media started working together, though some bitterness remained.

There were also (numerous) supporting/opposing themes taken against these narratives in the text, which were either given by the reporter or being reported upon.

5.2.7 Professionalism/Investigative Journalism

Specialized beat reporting and investigative journalism are the considered cornerstone of any newspaper or media; however, these were found to be the most neglected fields. Beat reporter were not prepared for this task which resulted in different mistakes (including textual, factual, and judgmental). Reproduction and not being able to report on time were a symptom of this deficiency. This resulted in input from external writers (mostly editorial writers) which changed the genre of the reports to a hybrid (report cum editorial). Despite few mistakes *Dawn* did not take support of externals, and 3 good investigative reports were initiated (by Badar Alam and Khalid Hassan Mahmood). *The News International* took help of Umer Chema, Saleem Shahzad (later killed during the reporting) and even Ansar Abbasi for writing investigative pieces. *The Nation* did not pay attention to this aspect at all, and resultantly had the maximum of mistakes. Editorial type reports included two reports of Mariana Baabar (*The News*), Saleem Bokhari (*The Nation*) and Ahmed Noorani (*The News*). A true inside Investigative Report was presented by *The Daily Times*, a day in advance about the internal decision of government to give clean chit to ISI in the parliamentary address of Prime Minister through reporter/source Muhammad Akram. This report also further explicated the details of the narrative of 'intelligence failure' for understanding of the readers.

In the intellectual output think tanks like PILDAT and SDPI played a positive role to fill up the deficiency.

5.2.8 Oversight (Formal and Informal)

The News was the first to report about restructuring of intelligence and formal oversight in the report of Umer Cheema on 6 May 2011, which was followed up by other newspapers. Two of the formal oversight bodies (Parliamentary Standing Committee on National Security – Senate – PCNS and Defence Committee of Cabinet – National Assembly - DCC) also conducted meetings on 9th and 12 May 2011, which were reported by *The Nation* and *The News International* accordingly. *The Nation* also reported on the input of think tanks (PILDAT and SDPI) on formal oversight bodies and their actions on 11th and 13th May.

This somewhat meager coverage was all about the formal oversight bodies and their undertakings, who just conducted single meetings to show their presence or derive some form of legitimacy of their existence. As institutions media or judiciary had no knowledge of their oversight role in such like situations. The word ‘Informal Oversight’ was not even used in press releases of the think tanks as if it never existed. This ignorance prevailed throughout as a blessing for intelligence agencies and the military establishment/government.

5.2.9 Research Questions

The quantitative data collection and analysis has been summarized as under giving an overall picture of different expected roles and their percentages.

Transmitter and Stimulator	Substitute Watchdog	Legitimizer	Sensitizer	Remarks
a.Dawn - 29.1	a.Dawn - 30.3	a.Dawn - 10.6	a.Dawn - 10.1	Overall Category Only 1. <i>The News</i> at top, 26.7 (12 out of 18 stories).

b.News - 28.1	b.News - 51.6	b.News - 14	b.News - 13.1	2. <i>Dawn</i> second, 20.2 % (15 out of 19 stories). 3. <i>The Daily Times</i> third, 16.35 (10 out of 15 stories). 4. <i>The Nation</i> last, 6.1 (21 out of 23 stories). <u>Role Wise</u> 1. Substitute Watchdog. 2. Transmission and Stimulation. 3. Legitimization. 4. Sensitization.
c.Daily – 24.3	c.Daily - 26.4	c.Daily – 8.2	c.Daily – 6.5	
d.Nation -12.6	d.Nation - 5.71	d.Nation- 2.1	d.Nation - 4.3	
e.All – 94.1/4	e.All– 114.1/4.	e.All – 34.9/4	e.All – 34/4.	
f. Average –	f. Average-	f. Average –	f. Average -	
23.52 (2)	28.52 (1)	8.72 (3)	8.5 (4)	

Table – 2 Showing Performance of Oversight Role of Selected Newspapers on OBL Raid

Overall, media could only perform at an average of 18 level out of 100 of it enshrined role by all general standards. This is despite to the unanimous (terminal) agreement that, the incident was a failure.

AQ-1: Pakistani press has been able to play an average of 23.52 of its democratic oversight role of Information Transmitter and Stimulator for the formal scrutinizer.

AQ-2: Pakistani media has been able to play an average of 28.52 of its democratic oversight role of Substitute Watchdog role in absence of deliverance by the formal scrutinizer.

AQ-3: Pakistani media had been able to play an average of 8.72 of its democratic role of legitimizer of Intelligence Institution and process of oversight.

AQ-4: Pakistani press had been able to play an average of 8.5 of its democratic role of sensitizer of the public regarding hostile espionage risks and related activities.

AQ-5: The Intelligence Oversight Framework for media, given and exercised in west is not effective in relation to Pakistani local context. The factors are the different ground realities of political, economic, social and psychological indexes with contemporary situation and setting, considerably different from the West.

The advised Pakistani model must be of basic and transitory nature, with periodic improvement of media's capacity and will, sensitization of public to demand same from other stake holders, involvement and concurrence of establishment for transparency and space and temporal consolidation of democracy with effaceable rule of law. High context of social discourse will not be much of an issue then. For all this a national dialogue by all the stakeholders for a new social contract becomes imperative. Draft of the proposed intelligence oversight model for Pakistan is attached as Annexure H.

5.3 Discussion and Analysis of IHC Judges Letter Case – An Intelligence

Interference

5.3.1 The Final Summary

The final summary of quantitative data is reproduced for analysis of the points of discussion, duly derived according to the event.

Final Summary of Selected Newspapers on IHC Letter Case

<i>Dawn</i>	<i>The News</i>	<i>The Daily Times</i>	<i>The Nation</i>	Grand Summary
a. Good Reports – 4/13	a. Good Reports – 0/10	a. Good Reports – 0/10	a. Good Reports - 0/9	a. Good Reports - Dawn
b. Days Reported -11	b. Days Reported - 09	b. Days Reported - 08	b. Days Reported - 08	b. Days Reported - Dawn
c. Average – 24.02 (11)	c. Average – 13.46 (09)	c. Average – 5.57 (10)	c. Average – 6.27 (9)	c. Overall Average – 12.25 (Dawn = 24.02)
d. Reproductions – 6 (46.1 %).	d. Reproductions – 7 (70 %).	d. Reproduction – 4 (40 %).	d. Reproduction – 6 (66.6 %).	d. Reproduction – The News International (?)
e. Info Leaks – 1 (Government and CJP)	e. Info Leaks – 1 (Government and CJP)	e. Info Leaks – 0 ()	e. Info Leaks – 0 ()	e. Info Leaks – Dawn/The News (1/1)
f. Max in a Day – 2 (27,28 Mar and 03 Apr)	f. Max in a Day – 2 (27 Mar)	f. Max in a Day – 2 (27 Mar)	f. Max in a Day – 2 (27 Mar)	f. Max in a Day – Dawn (Thrice)

Table – 3 Performance of Oversight Role of Selected Newspapers on IHC Letter Case

The concluding points of the final quantitative summary have been consolidated under following suitable headlines or points.

5.3.2 Oversight or Watchdog Role

According to Curran (1996) Watchdog role is said to override in importance all other functions of media, and to dictate the form in which the media should be organized. But the collective performance of the oversight role of the selected newspapers remained dismal at average of 13.13 out of 100, which is low by all standards. *Dawn* tops the average at 24.02, while *The Daily Times* remained the lowest at 5.57. *The News International* and *The Nation* remained at 13 and 06 respectively.

In the case of Good Oversight Reports, *Dawn* was the only newspaper which could produce and lead with four reports of 40 or above level or mark, whereas *The News International*, *The Nation* and *The Daily Times* could not even produce a single good oversight report of the level. Overall, the quantitative and qualitative factor of *Dawn* remained at the top followed by *The News International*, *The Nation* and *The Daily Times* respectively.

In the initial reports of 27 March and 28 March strong and blunt words for intelligence agencies to the likes of ISI, DG-C, Major General Faiz Hameed and officials, were repeatedly used in the text, *The Daily Times* and *Dawn* being the vocal of the rest. However, later *The Daily Times* reverted to more ‘neutral’ words like intelligence agencies, apparatus, officials, agencies and finally transitioned to ‘executive’, which is mainly a collective name. *The News International* and *The Nation* remained cautious after the start.

Other words and pre-fixes like ‘alleged’ and ‘intimidation’ also crept in progressively, probably as part of self-correction on the basis of legal interpretations or identification/pointing by the respondents (military or intelligence). The words like allegations, confusion and claims were later used in place of interference.

At the start, the naming of intelligence agencies was more explicit, than the normal precedence/culture in the country, however, it reverted back to ‘normal’ threshold which had been in vogue, throughout. These words became more implicit and indirect. The effect of overall contemporary situation/oppression or the context was easily visible in the use of these texts.

The only exception here was *Dawn*, which continued using the same words explicitly and throughout. Dawn also used and maintained the word ‘meddling’ in place of interference, which is a better choice, in view of covert nature of intelligence agencies, who interfere indirectly rather than being overt, as in the case of the literal meaning of word ‘interference’.

The respondent (intelligence agencies and military) remained a no-go area for all the journalists of all the newspapers and no input of whatsoever form was included in any of the story, nor efforts made therein to contact them, for getting their or ‘organizational response’. ISPR also did not shared any press release, possibly for the reason of matter being sub-judice. On the other hand, foreign newspapers of the likes of *The Guardian* were able to get a point of view or response, which was reported in their story or report.

5.3.3 Timeliness

The news value of timeliness includes the related concepts of newness, recency, currency, immediacy, and so on, since they are all concerned with establishing the relevance of the event in relation to the time of publication (Bednarek & Caple, 2017). In the case of

this study *Dawn* was the quickest to report (yet mostly on digital website) with two related reports on the first day of the event, whereas others (*The News*, *The Daily Times*, *The Nation*) could only follow for first two days. Later a common precedence set in, where *Dawn* and *The News International* use to report on the day of occurrence and *The Daily Times* and *The Nation* use to follow the next day, again being twenty-four hours late. This speaks weak of ‘beat infrastructure’ of the particular newspaper. This factor also led to other ills of reproduction and repetition and joining together of two or three stories in a single belated report. Though some new and contemporary information was added to this report, yet it remained devoid of flow and relevance. *The Daily Times* was the weakest of all in this aspect. This delayed reporting approach provided an advantage of possibility of reproduction of reports of *Dawn* and *The News International* in a better format with more clarity and finishing. But the disadvantage was that the story is one day older than and already known to the reader.

5.3.4 Reproduction, Repetition and Cut and Paste

News reports are supposed to be original acquisition/piece of the journalist who had taken input from different sources and presented in his own wordings with required attribution. The same are then vetted by ‘Editorial Board’ or staff of the newspaper before being printed. Under ‘Be Accountable and Transparent’ in SPJ Code of Ethics it is stated that, Journalists have a moral obligation to be accountable to the public for the work they produce and how they produce it (SPJ Ethics, 2014). However, this ‘how’ was kept hidden and a large number (24) of the reports out of total (42) either totally or partially reproduced (57.14 percent) from reports of either own or other newspapers or media including the press releases and texts shared through other media. In some cases, it was frequent repetition of own reports or stories and in few a total ‘cut and paste case’ without any output from the

journalist or newspaper. In that headlines and datelines were amended with few additions here and there, while taking the account of available space. The summarized reproduction was also a common feature, which was taken as acceptable, while not attributing it to original source. While it being capacity issues of the papers, also identifies a lethargic attitude, paucity of investigative journalists, weak knowledge of intelligence related matters and deficiency of English language (also identified by mistakes in the text). Even *Dawn* regurgitated and repeated its own reports at the cost of excessive length of the output. *The News International* and *The Nation* had the maximum of reproductions of 70 and 66 percent with no or few comments or remarks.

5.3.5 Press Being Used for Information Leaks

Watchdog role demands that media should even excoriate those in power or public office while being critical to the core, albeit it starts working in cohorts with local or external masters. It also becomes more dangerous when the media does not recognize of being used by others. Under Act Independently' in SPJ Code of Ethics it is stated that 'be wary of sources offering information for favors or money'. But despite the incidental nature of the reported event, visible signs of influence could be identified in two reports out of total 42 making a percentage of 4.7 percent. In this case *Dawn* and *The News International* seemed more influenced than *The Daily Times* and *The Nation*. A common explanation of this influence and use is the success and improvement of respondent crafts of influence and hidden pressure of the state and governments apparatus or the intrinsic power. Contemporary situation and the follow up of this case substantiate the given argument to an extent. Influencing institutions included intelligence agencies or ISPR or the government. CJP and even the opposition also generate pressure on either side. Main purpose of this pressure remained of either responding to a narrative or creating a new for local or external readers.

5.3.6 Narrative/Major Themes

Media has always been a single most decisive factor in shaping the minds of the people (Hafeez, 2015). So, in this inland bipolarity at large, different competing narratives (and also their responses) were built during the incident reports between the well synchronized establishment with intelligence agencies, government and part of colluding judiciary and mainstream media (not all) on one side and the internally divided part of judiciary (complaining judges), their silent sympathizers in the judiciary and the related media (mostly social media and few recognized individual journalists). The first narrative of ‘Independence of Judiciary’ was taken up unanimously at the start of the case by the media on either side. The coupled theme of ‘Naming and Shaming’ though could not last long with this main narrative, which has maintained its position till late. Later this was also added up by correct theme of ‘intelligence interference’ or ‘meddling’.

This narrative also took shapes of ‘Collective Resistance’ or ‘Institutional Response’ by the complaining judges and the related media. The opposite side of the proponents and media took the narrative of ‘Judicial Divide’ or best labelled as ‘Judicial Wrangling’ owing to the delaying tactics by CJP and Government in addressing the case.

The narratives (more precisely themes) mostly remained event related. Firstly, these were in relation to the intra judiciary meetings by CJP and that of CJP with PM. This led to the second theme of ‘One Member Inquiry Commission’ by the government. After recusal of its proposed head the theme turned to ‘Suo Moto’ or ‘Full Bench of Supreme Court’ till the time the theme of ‘Lawyers Dissatisfaction’ emerged. Once finally CJP started the proceedings of Suo Moto Case the impetus of the movement somewhat dissipated. After this the narrative started mutation to further narratives of further intimidation of judges by cases

and threat letters. The event of Eid Holidays (from 06 to 14 April) put a break on proceedings in Supreme Court and automatically the whole impetus of the case/its themes.

Under these major narratives small event related themes also dominated the output by the media, which were more related to jurisprudence than politics (with exception of giving some space to PTI, exclusively initiated by *The News International*).

Due to silence of ISPR, inefficiency at government level and the intrinsic strength of the narrative of judicial independence, no counter narrative could be built other than a go-slow policy in dealing with these cases. Few complaints and references were filed against the proponent judges but had been counterproductive, though brought the impetus to zero. The summer vacation of judges is also a factor for the slow pace/death of this case.

5.3.7 Professionalism/Investigative Journalism

Specialized beat reporting and investigative journalism are considered cornerstone of any newspaper or media; however, these were found to be the neglected field in this case. Beat reporter were not prepared for this task nor had any prior knowledge of the brewing up of such letter or the case. The letter came to the notice of relevant journalist or media after 24 hours it had been written and that too indirectly (through electronic media). This resulted in different types of mistakes (including textual, factual, and judgmental). Reproduction and not being able to report on time were a symptom of this deficiency. This resulted in legal input from related experts, which was purely legal and devoid of the social implication of the story.

Tuen. A. Van Dijk has presented different categories or headings of a particular news report, however, it has been observed that only one category of the whole categories (Situation) was used in most of the reports or stories. The other segment (Comment) was not used at all. This depicts a weakness of knowledge in the held beat by the reporters or the

confidence of the editors in the same. The reports were presented as one sided, without any input from opposition or intelligentsia of the field. *Dawn* produced four good reports, but those can't be termed as a product of investigative journalism.

During the case, once the demanded *Suo Moto* proceedings of Full Court started at Supreme Court the newspapers interpreted the proceedings and remarks of the judges according to newspaper's political orientation. This resulted in two divergent accounts of the same proceeding of a single hearing. Due to length and delay in proceedings and hearings, this cherry picking led to development of corresponding narratives of a partisan press.

In news reports the inclusion of background (and old background starting from first day of the occurrence till yet another recent background) led to reproduction and repetition forming 'information glut' without much of substance and a lengthy report or story. Though summarizing and paraphrasing was carried out by few papers but was not carried forward.

As the proceeding of the court were live televised on Supreme Courts website and resultantly on electronic media, the reader soon lost interest in the newspaper output. In return the press also lost interest in the story and started clubbing different stories together. Secondly, the original story led to other stories and developments, that the original story got buried under the new developing stories (like threatening letters, initiation of complaints or references against the complaining judges and the smear campaigns or the resultant contempt proceedings).

5.3.8 Oversight (Formal and Informal)

This time the formal oversight bodies were silent throughout the issue for the reason of fluid nature of the issue along with being some kind of a party to the issue. The issue had a bipolarity from the outset, where one party of the government, CJP, and establishment's

concern was to mute or hush up the issue with ‘silence treatment’ and mitigation of the controversial case. In the informal oversight, *Dawn* was the first to report comprehensively (3069 words) on the issue on 27 March covering all the stakeholders (including PTI) with a theme of ‘collective resistance’. On 29 March *Dawn* covered the CJP-PM meeting in a report and gave a new and fresh opinion to the issue, along with sharp translation of the old ‘Faizabad judgement’ in resistance of intelligence interference as guidance for this case. On 31 March *Dawn* reported a story of ‘300 lawyers’ letter’ as a good and timely representation of public/judicial sentiments, which was followed up by other newspapers as well. Another timely (yet lengthy - 3070 words) report by *Dawn* on 03 April where CJP hinted for a ‘full court bench’ on the suo moto case, which other newspapers followed on next day output. The think tank PILDAT had also been reporting this issue on regular basis in its monthly reports.

The overall oversight of press (and electronic) media was much muted and defensive. In case of social media, it was the opposite, thus setting a precedence for future.

5.3.9 Research Questions

The data collection (qualitative) and analysis has been summarized as under giving an overall picture of different expected media roles and their averages.

Transmitter and Stimulator	Substitute Watchdog	Legitimizer	Sensitizer	Remarks
a.Dawn- 31.7	a. Dawn- 36	a.Dawn- 14.2	a.Dawn- 24.8	<u>Overall Category Only</u> 1. <i>Dawn</i> at top, 26.6 (10 out of 13 stories). 2. <i>The News</i> second, 13.7 (09 out of 11 stories).
b.News-20.5	b. News-18.8	b.News- 7.4	b.News- 8.1	
c.Daily Time-	c. The Daily	c. The Daily	c. The Daily	

10.7	Times- 6.5	Times- 2.9	Times- 2.9	3. <i>The Nation</i> third, 6.5 (08 out of 11 stories). 4. <i>The Daily Times</i> last, 7.8 % (10 out of 12 stories). <u>Role Wise</u> 1. Transmission and Stimulation 2. Substitute Watchdog 3. Sensitizer 4. Legitim�izer
d.Nation-14.8	d. Nation- 7.5	d.Nation- 2.1	d.Nation- 1.6	
e.All Average – 77.7/4	e. All Average – 68.8/4.	e.All Average – 26.6/4	e.All Average– 37.4/4.	
= 19.4 (1)	= 17.2 (2)	= 6.65 (4)	= 9.35 (3)	

Table – 4 - Performance of Oversight Role of Selected Newspapers on IHC Letter Case

Overall, media only performed an average of 13.13 level out of 100 of it enshrined role by all standards. The issue was bipolar and controversial, yet the interference was condemned by all. Thought at the end the government/intelligence finally prevailed.

AQ-1: Pakistani press has been able to play 19.4 level of its democratic oversight role of Information Transmitter and Stimulator for the formal scrutinizer.

AQ-2: Pakistani media been able to play 17.2 level of Substitute Watchdog role in absence of deliverance by the formal scrutinizer.

AQ-3: Pakistani media had been able to play 6.65 level of legitimizer role of Intelligence Institution and process of oversight.

AQ-4: Pakistani press been able to play 9.35 level of role of sensitizer of the public regarding hostile espionage risks and related activities. This aspect being negligible.

AQ-5: It is somewhat substantiated that the Intelligence Oversight Framework for media, given and exercised in west is not effective in relation to Pakistani local context, even in local issues. The factors are the different ground realities of political, economic, social and psychological indexes with local situation, considerably different from the west.

The advised Pakistani model be of basic and transitory nature, with periodic improvement of media's capacity and will, sensitization of public to demand same from other stake holders, involvement and concurrence of establishment for transparency and space and temporal consolidation of democracy with effaceable rule of law. What contemporarily suits Pakistan is a basic model than this advanced one. An effort has been made to make a 'contextual model' for the country. Draft of intelligence oversight model for Pakistan is attached as Annexure H.

5.4 Conclusion

In view of the aim of this research and the data analyzed, several conclusions are evident from both events or cases (OBL raid and Judges letter) studied: -

a. **Decline in Media Performance**

The most concerning finding is the depreciation in the average role performed by the newspapers or the press over thirteen years, declining from an overall average score of 18 to 13. In an evolving democratic setting, this should have improved, not worsened. This decline is, however, substantiated by the regression in democratic standards in the country during the study period (reference democratic indexes). The regression continues afterwards.

b. **Dominance of Primary Oversight Roles**

As expected, the first two major oversight roles—the stimulator and transmitter roles for formal scrutiny and the watchdog role in the absence of formal scrutiny—remained the most exercised by the press/newspapers. The other two roles, legitimizer and sensitizer, were less frequently undertaken, creating a group of two major and two secondary roles.

c. **Neglect of Watchdog Role**

The overall neglect of the watchdog or oversight role by the press remained constant, despite the local nature of the issue. Intelligence agencies are still considered a no-go area by journalists, despite the pressing need for oversight.

d. **Lapdog Role of the Media**

The media often assumed a lapdog role, being used by government institutions and agencies for their ends through covert/strategic leaks. This includes both press and electronic, excluding the social media in the power relations.

e. **Followed Narratives and Lack of Independence**

The press often followed narratives set by others and lacked the capacity to generate its own narratives or align with democratic guidelines or the country's constitution. Most media outlets, being businesses, continue to look up to powerful personalities or institutions rather than the public.

f. **Professionalism and Investigative Journalism Deficiency**

It is an intrinsic weakness in professionalism and a deficiency in investigative journalism. This labor-intensive and somehow counter-productive endeavor in Pakistan is often avoided due to the fear of oppression or conflicts of interest.

g. **Counter-Productive Practices**

Excessive reproduction, frequent repetition, and cut-and-paste practices undermine journalistic integrity and effectiveness to a considerable extent.

h. **Lack of Timeliness**

Failure to post stories in a timely manner is another significant issue, especially with contemporary advancements in technology. Social media often technically fills this gap, but also attracts wrath of the opposite side.

i. **Performance of Newspapers**

Among the newspapers studied, *Dawn* emerged as the most efficient in fulfilling the oversight role, followed by *The News International*. *The Daily Times* and *The Nation* were observed as weaker links in this role.

5.5 **Summary**

In Pakistan, the imbalance between institutions, including intelligence agencies and the media, is more complex than it appears and has developed over seventy-seven years. The core issue is the struggle for acquisition/retention of ‘acquired space’ that no institution is willing to relinquish easily. A mutually agreed, temporal, reconciliatory/progressive, local/comprehensive solution by all stakeholders is necessary to avoid frequent oscillations that could eventually lead to centrifugal forces/paradox tearing the whole system apart. In this power struggle, the public; main stakeholder, has been intentionally relegated to a state of oblivion. Yet, it is only the ‘demos’ that can yield the ‘kratos’.

5.6 **Implications of the Study**

At the outset, this research appeared to be an uphill task due to the murky state of contemporary intelligence affairs and the slow pace of desired democratic evolution. The qualitative nature of the study further complexed the undertaking. However, it has successfully established a basic benchmark for assessing the role of media in intelligence oversight within the Pakistani context.

The overall oversight role of the selected four English newspapers (*Dawn*, *The News International*, *The Daily Times*, and *The Nation*) in quantitative manner averaged between 13 to 19, which is notably low. The more effective roles involved the transmission of

information and stimulation for formal scrutiny, as well as acting as a substitute watchdog when necessary. The given model exceeds the current capacity of the contemporary press, suggesting the need for a basic or softer model during the transition period. Except for Dawn, other newspapers struggled to meet the task. Most narratives or themes originated externally, to the media. These findings are significant for recognizing the current state, providing a starting point for future improvements.

a. **Theoretical Contribution**

This study has enriched the main framework of discourse analysis and the intelligence oversight model by offering a practical analyzing mechanism within the Pakistani context. It has demonstrated how discourse analysis can uncover latent and hidden features in media texts, making it a robust methodological tool. Quantitative aspects (a byproduct) augmented the same.

b. **Practical Contributions**

The study serves as an initiative to encourage researchers to delve into what has traditionally been a no-go area using Western frameworks. Its findings have practical applications for both the press and intelligence agencies, guiding them to understand their roles and enhance their effectiveness. The alarming retardation in the exercise of oversight roles under a democracy demands immediate attention.

c. **Methodological Insights**

Discourse analysis (DA) has been proven more effective in the Pakistani context, and its facilitation through quantitative methods can also yield significant insights. Future research could extend this approach to the Urdu language newspapers, further substantiating the findings or otherwise.

d. **Societal Implications**

The findings highlight a power imbalance of society, nearing a tipping point. The public, as the primary stakeholder in democracy, remains detached from the process. A new social contract, centered around the public, is needed now.

e. **Limitations and Future Research**

This research was limited in scope, focusing on the press, qualitative analysis, and specific language. It addressed the intelligence agencies at collective level and employed a model not indigenous to the environment. Future studies can consider a broader scope and develop localized models. Overall, this study represents an earnest effort to contribute to the academic field.

Key Points to Address for Future Research and Practical Application

a. **Developing Localized Models**

Adapt and localize the oversight models to better fit the Pakistani context. The Hillebrand model can be used as a reference point for the same.

b. **Enhancing Professionalism in Journalism**

Focus on improving the capacity, resources, and investigative skills of the journalists for taking on this basic and needed task of the media.

c. **Balancing Power Relations**

Address the imbalance in power relations through policy reforms and public engagement and reduce information asymmetry for creating a needed balance.

d. **Expanding Methodological Approaches**

Explore discourse analysis in Urdu newspapers and integrate it with quantitative methods for a more comprehensive analysis. These can improve media's oversight role, ensuring a more balanced and democratic society.

5.7 **Recommendations**

a. **Truth and Reconciliation Before or After a Grand National Dialogue**

In Pakistan it appears that the whole democratic system has been flawed with different manifestation visible in one form or the other, involving all the stakeholders. No individual effort is expected to deliver, unless there is first a collective realization, which can be developed through a national dialogue.

Best recipe of first outlining the truth about past, and later reconciliation effort for the future is the available course to be adopted. The main objective of this is to establish a new social contract that is more public-centric and is truly democratic, to foster national cohesion and ensure civilian primacy.

b. **Publicize the Abbottabad Commission Report**

For achievement of truth, the failures of past be recognized along with punitive actions to individuals and institutions. The release of complete Abbottabad Commission Report, including the missing pages, can be undertaken and a system or mechanism developed for future, based on the findings. An independent commission should also be formulated for IHC Judges letter case, thus setting a just precedence to be followed.

c. **Strengthen Formal Accountability Systems**

Following the precedence in the world or in matured democracies, the original scrutinizer be made more powerful and operational, while enhancing its robustness, professionalism, reach and deliverance of the task assigned. There is also a need to improve internal agency mechanisms such as ombudsmen to ensure rigorous internal oversight or accountability as well.

d. **Encourage and Build Informal Accountability Mechanism**

Alongside the formal oversight mechanism, the informal oversight can also be encouraged to get established and deliver. This will (also) have to be done from the scratch. Encourage the civil society and media to fulfill its role as a substitute watchdog until formal oversight systems are fully effective.

e. **Promote Professionalism and Investigative Journalism in Media**

At the media level these basics, be improved for properly taking on the watchdog role. Need is to enhance the professionalism and investigative

capabilities of journalists and media organizations. Provide training and resources to support high-quality journalism.

f. **Harness Social Media for Positive Initiatives**

The social media has a potential which needs to be harnessed, especially towards the positive direction and approach. There is a need to utilize social media strategically for fifth-generation warfare and countering hostile entities, including foreign intelligence. Instead of curtailment, promote its use for positive societal initiatives with due guidance and facilitation.

g. **Separate Homeland Security from Regular Intelligence**

Due to the nature of threat to the country and the peculiar environment, it seems right to make needed structural changes. For better results there is a need to distinguish high policing functions of homeland security from regular intelligence operations. In order to ensure balance and competition/check, the resources and capabilities of (civilian) Intelligence Bureau - IB needs to be enhanced for an effective security role and others.

h. **Implement the Freedom of Information Act**

In relation to easy access to information the 'Freedom of Information Act' needs to be implemented in its true spirit. Introduce policies for classification and declassification of information and initiate/establish whistleblower protection legislation and its subsequent implementation.

i. **Develop a Local Intelligence Oversight Model or Index**

In view of peculiar setting and the environment there is a need to create a (tailored) oversight model or index to monitor and evaluate the performance and accountability of media for intelligence agencies oversight, within the local context. As a first step a draft model has been proposed by the researcher (Annexure H) which understandably has to take its evolutionary course.

These recommendations aim to create a more transparent, accountable, and democratic framework for intelligence oversight by the media in Pakistan. Both formal and informal mechanisms are emphasized, along with the importance of public engagement, and involvement of other stake holders, for a better future.

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ANNEXURES

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DA Instrument of Teun A. Van Dijk

(Structure of News - Chapter – 2)

- 1) **Explicit/Systematic Description of Language Use** (Text & Context). Written Discourse.
Theories of Graphic Realization (of alphabets). TEXT
- 2) **Structure at Levels of Description (Micro-Macro)**
 - a) Micro Level of Description through Micro Rules. Grammar. (@)
 - i) *Syntax* (Form)
 - (1) Structure or Category (Noun, Clause, Phrase, Sentence).
 - (2) Combination (Arrangement, Order-Words)
 - ii) *Semantics* (Meaning of words, sentences & Discourse) Formulate Rules which assign Interpretations)
 - (1) Meaning (+ Truth/F).
 - (a) Denotation. (Literary, Primary Meaning). Concept of Things (Object, Person, Event). Object is a concept.
 - (b) Extension.
 - (2) Reference (with concepts & things; objects, person & events)
 - (3) For Coherence or Relation specify: -
 - (a) Intentional. (Relation of meaning of subsequent sentences)
 - (b) Extensional. (Relation of Facts of sentences)
 - iii) *Pragmatics*. (Sociolinguistics; Speech/Social Act & its appropriateness or practicality. News Discourse is mostly Assertion only (declarative).
 - 3) **Microstructure of News Discourse**
 - a) Local Semantics. (@)
 - i) *Propositions* (Predicate + Arguments).
 - (1) Predicate- What is said.
 - (2) Argument- About/Subject. Argument: -
 - (a) Premise(s).
 - (b) Conclusion.
 - (3) Operators/Aux: can modify propositions.
 - (4) Roles. Arguments have different semantic roles/cases (agent, beneficiary, object).
 - (5) Level of Propositions. Propositions may be of various levels of complexity (level, conjunction/disjunction, connectives). Various Clause structure (with levels). Semantic Relationship & sentences having Several Propositions.
 - (6) Proposition Sequences (+ Pragmatic & Cognitive factors)
 - (7) Local Coherence
 - (a) Functional (inter propositional relation).
 - (b) Conditional (factual relation/Referent) of different degree/strength: -
 - (i) Causal/Strong/Empirical.
 - (ii) Weak/Probable/Possible.
 - (iii) 2 x Directions: -
 1. Forward (Consequences).
 2. Backward. (Cause/Conditions).
 - (c) Topic & Knowledge Control.
 - (i) Cohere if match the Topic.
 - (ii) Consistent with Listener's Knowledge (belief/script).

- (d) Cognitive Strategy & Subjectivity. As Beliefs are Different of writer/reader, so Subjectivity. Reader begins establishing coherence on reading the first word/ sentence (Coherence by Reader not D).
 - (8) Discourse is **Iceberg** (Implicit Information).
 - (a) Pre-Supposition (Prior Assumption by Writer (known by reader-Pragmatics).
 - (b) Entailment (entailed by sentences-Logical/Assertion-Semantics).
 - (c) Implication
 - (i) Conceptual/Necessary
 - (ii) Weak
 1. Suggestion
 2. Association
 3. Intuition
 - b) Local Coherence of News Discourse (Semantics). Propositions should be (conditionally/functionally) connected/relative to topic/relevant world knowledge.
 - i) *But news stories* are not in chronological order, (though globally display **top-down, schema-driven & relevance dependent realization**). So Consequentially Functional relations of Specification are developed where further Clarifications with details are given in subsequent sentences. Content relation also.
 - ii) *With Functional/Conditional Relations*, news report has Specifications (details), Content, Additions (non-coherent related news) & Cause/Condition & Consequence.
 - iii) *News D don't express Topics continuously* (as Topic shifts occur), so subsequent propositions may not always be directly connected.
 - c) Implication of News D (many things unsaid). Can be
 - i) Inferred from Lexical Items, propositions & propositional sequences.
 - ii) Presupposed (on General Knowledge) covering Semantic Implication, Presupposition: -
 - (1) Including entailment & implication, with strong relation.
 - (2) Suggestion, association, intuition with weak relation.
 - iii) Can be Indirect, Subtle & Negative for them-group & Neutral for we-group.
- 4) **Macrostructure of News Discourse**
- a) Macro Level of Description (derived through Macro Rules).
 - i) *Macro Syntax* (Form). Schemata, Overall Form, Superstructures like Conventional Categories (Opening, Closing, Setting, Headline).
 - ii) *Macro Semantics*. Themes, Topics of whole paragraph, Sections, Chapters or Overall Meaning & Context/Reference.
 - iii) *Macro Pragmatics*. Of Speech Act (like Macro Assertion).
 - b) Style. Traces of Context in Text or Constraints, Variations, Choices, Lexical Styles, which *cut through various levels*. Style is not arbitrary or free, but is context related (either personal, social, situational, institutional).
 - c) Rhetoric. *Effective use of language for persuasion*. Example Figure of Speech (Alliteration, Parallelism, Metaphor). Transformation (deletion, repetition, substitution, permutation) are not grammatical & enhance organization, attention, storage/retrieval. It includes socio-psycho aspects & deal with: -
 - i) *Formulation*. (#)
 - ii) *Context*.
 - d) Style is a necessary property of Discourse Analysis, but Rhetoric structure is optional.

- 5) **Thematic Structure.** CONTEXT. For driving Topics or Themes. *Hierarchically (based on Semantic Theory for meaning/context)*. Semantic Macro Structures.
- a) Macro Propositions (Structure) includes: -
 - i) *Propositions* (subject/concept + verb/state)
 - (1) Predicate (Verb/state) & can be implicit.
 - (2) Argument (about thing, person, event)
 - (3) Pragmatics. Truth Value is only relevant when Propositions are expressed in Speech Act; Assertion; News Discourse-declarative.
 - (4) But we also need Semantics for questions, command, promise or threats/accusations.
 - ii) *Macro Propositions*. Only expressed in-directly by large stretches of text/talk (Topic/Topics).
 - iii) Macro structure is the ‘complete structure’ M1, M2, M3.
 - b) *Macro Rules*. Semantic Mapping Rules or transformation. They are recursive/ repetitive. For Reduction/Summarizing. The ways are Deletion, Generalization, Replacement & Construction. Overall Macro Structure gives Thematic Organization, Global Coherence & Semantic Unity (by topics). Order is bottom to up (hierarchical) But news?
 - c) *Subjectivity of Macro Structure*. Cognitively, topics are subjective & clearly signaled in text by writer.
 - d) *Knowledge*. Macro Rule require knowledge of world (frames, scripts-beliefs, interests)
 - e) *Strategic Macro Understanding*. Even at start reader start guessing the Topic (is aided by Thematic Signals of writer). Already given Topic acts as Major Control Instances for further interpretations & understanding of text. Psychologically it is Top-Down Processing: strategies of Understanding.
 - f) Topic Derivation from News D (Coherence?). *Topic is (routinely) Summarized in Headline (or expressed/ signaled by) or Lead. Can be Elitist also (related to one topic only).*
 - i) Macro Proposition (s) are expressed in headline (*summary* function-Headline + Lead).
 - ii) Or obtained by *deleting* (most powerful rule) info – Reduction.
 - iii) Or *subsumed by construction* (if related/ normal) based on general Knowledge of script. (cognitive representation).
 - iv) There could be *Sub-ordinate topic(s)*. or Independent Subtopic (if participants same, thematically related & under goal of event).
 - v) Part of Implied/pre-supposed information can be deleted/subsumed by construction if it is about previous news report.
 - g) Thematic Structure (the Organization).
 - i) *Hierarchical* (not list). Ordering is **not** bottom-up, but Inverted Pyramid/Relevance to topic based on Semantic Positions.
 - ii) Macro Structures can be *further organized by fixed cats* of Causes (reasons)/Condition, Antecedents, Consequences & their Relation an Important Organizing Feature of Thematic Structure.
 - iii) Also depend upon Cognitive Representation of Language Users have about *Situation Models* (old or making new).
 - h) Thematic Realization (from **Macro** to Micro-structures). Topics can be of text only, be realized (directly/in directly) in Episodic manner. Their Derivation stimulates

Understanding (of reader) & their Analysis (reverse process) stimulates how expressed, detailed, elaborated signaled (by writer).

- i) *Topics Realization/Elaboration in News D.* Installment Character & Top-down principle (Relevance; from general to particular, main actors-politically relevant & sometime Important to Less Important.
- ii) *Specification Rules* (Inverse Macro Rule) in News D. High Level Specifics, Abstract Information specified first (in cycles) & detailed description given later. Production strategy considering relevance/space constraints/inverted pyramid.

6) **Super Structure** (News Schema/Schemata)

- a) Overall Syntax/Form in which Topic/Theme can be **inserted/ordered** (Rule based Schema of series of hierarchical ordered categories). Or a Syntactic Structure where Schematic Representation can be mapped on.
- b) Superstructures. Discourse Schemata consist of: -
 - i) *Specific Structure Categories & Rules* (Grammar or Syntactic). Narrative Cats/Rules.
 - ii) *Semantic Macrostructures*, Topics/Themes (given under each Superstructure).
- c) News Scheme Categories. Can be recursive.
 - i) *Headline & Lead*. Semantic Macro-Structure-Major Topic, as initial 'Summary'. Mandatory.
 - (1) Headline. Several Decks & Banks (Main, Sub, Super; kicker, snapper, eyebrow).
 - (2) Lead. Separate/Coinciding with first sentence (or special markers for signals)
 - ii) *Episode* (of News Story). Mandatory.
 - (1) Main Event (+ Context)
 - (2) Background (Comprehensive)
 - (a) Circumstances
 - (i) Context
 - (ii) Previous Event
 - (b) History (Non recent past)
 - (3) Consequences/Reaction
 - (a) Event Acts
 - (b) Verbal Reaction
 - iii) *Consequences*. Newsworthiness dependent, giving Causal Coherence.
 - iv) *Verbal Reaction*. For Objectivity.
 - v) *Comments* (of Journalist/Newspaper on Story). Final Comment Category. Can be Indirect.
 - (1) Evaluation (Opinion)
 - (2) Expectations (Consequences/Prediction).
- d) Ordering.
 - i) *Schema* determines Overall Ordering/Organizes Topics & Realization of Thematic Structure. Topics are never semantically independent.
 - ii) *Transformation* is possible under specific constraints (like Relevance).
 - iii) General *Relevance* Principle can overrule; cyclical, installment, top down, left to right strategy, due to news values.
 - iv) *Integration* of 2 x stories is possible in a report.

7) **Style-News Discourse**. Constraints: -

- a) Language Use/Context Markers. Formal Style.
- b) Variability (Language Variation is not Arbitrary).

- i) *Style Invariability*. Surface Structure (syntax) can vary but not meaning (semantics).
 - ii) *Its Choices* from alternatives & Comparisons.
 - iii) *Topics Selection* (Men-Cars, Thematic).
 - (1) Selection on Person (pragmatics), Textual (constraints of monological/written/printed) & Communicative Context (discourse type & social situation-sociolect).
 - (2) Specific Cats. Control Semantics & Syntax.
 - c) Possible Notions. These are Personal, Ad hoc momentaneous, Group, Contextual, Functional, Medium, Sociolectic, Discourse type or the Combination of above all.
 - d) Readers (Large/Similar Political Ideology), Writer (Institutional with Impartiality & Secondary id, but beliefs/attitude appear implicitly).
 - e) Long Complex Sentences (packed with more information). Routinization (syntax/lexicon; set/vocabulary/dictionary) & Propositions are condensed to nominalization (adjective/verb functioning as noun).
 - f) Indirect feedback & sales imperatives.
 - g) News Syntax. How it is: -
 - i) *Sentence*. Summary/Complex with several Embedded Clauses (with conjunctions) & Nominalizations, giving many propositions.
 - ii) *Complexity* (2.5) 2.5 EC with 1 main Clause.
 - iii) *Semantic reference* to actual events.
 - iv) *Schema*. Single Sentence covers several fragments of Superstructure categories.
 - v) *Word Order* (syntax) & Semantic Functions.
 - (1) Marking of main actors throughout.
 - (2) The hierarchy of actors maintained.
 - (3) Position of actor important/it signals the biasness.
 - h) Lexical Style of News.
 - i) *Word choice* signals formality/relationship, group/institutional embedding, attitudes / ideologies & forms link with semantic content analysis.
 - ii) *Ideologically based Lexical Variation* (terrorist/ freedom fighter) is case of associated values incorporated in shared-word meanings.
 - iii) *Lexical choices* can be part of professional registers.
- 8) **Rhetoric** of News Discourse (Bulk of news is Assertion) or dominant beliefs of elites as it is not advertising.
- a) Rhetoric & Effectiveness. Use depends on goals & intended effects. Writer want Reader to know.
 - i) *Syntax*. Organize surface structures & use syntactic patterns (rhythm, intonation & alliterations).
 - ii) *Semantic* operations (comparisons/under statements, metaphor, irony).
 - iii) What is *functional* can be used for persuasion.
 - iv) *Cog-Semantic*, Reader to understand & build textual representation/given situation model.
 - v) *Pragmatically*, understand underlying meanings, accept/believes our assertion, perform requested actions, & execute our commands.
 - vi) *Perlocutionary Dimension* (accepted as truth).
 - (1) Locution (What is said). 'Is there any salt'.
 - (2) Illocution (Meant). 'Please give me salt'.
 - (3) Perlocution (What happened). 'To cause somebody to offer salt'.

- vii) *Factuality*. Just to enhance belief (not change attitudes/behavior) but opinion. A complex process, minimal coherence with knowledge.
- viii) *Argumentation*. (Content more important). Proposition coherently added to reader's Situation Model & make it memorable.
 - (1) Content Aspect. Explicit or implicit for cog-acceptance. But structures, organization & cognitive relevance, each treated separately.
 - (2) Form Aspect. (#) Rhetoric regulates Formulation of Propositions/argument, for help in organization, retention (memorable), retrieval/use & influence belief/opinion. **But** in news discourse-emphasized by Relevance Structures (hierarchical organization/order, schematic structures & corresponding layout; headlines, leads, size, frequency). No sophisticated, creative writing. Not primarily based on grammatical levels.
 - (3) Persuasive Content Feature. (Truth/ Plausibility). Standard Strategies: -
 - (a) Emphasize Factual Nature. of Events.
 - (i) Direct descriptions, eyewitnesses/ sources, precision/exactness, direct quotes/opinions.
 - (ii) News Value System of production. Attention for the negative - report hard facts, with witnesses & precise numbers of victims, cast in narrative structures, reflecting opinions (officials/participants), direct quotations, emphasize causes & consequences. Satisfy basic cognitive/emotional conditions of effective information processing.
 - (iii) Direct Description & Eyewitness Reports (basic conventional conditions of truth-immediacy). Eyewitness reports in interviews (are substitutes). Descriptions of immediate events are also model dependent, concrete & imaginable. Events closer to such models are more credible / memorable.
 - (iv) Sources and Quotations (subtle use). Primary sources/immediate participants (for facts description-as eyewitnesses, for formulation of opinions). But hierarchy/reliability. Next is Quotation/quasi-quotations.
 - (v) Numbers. Truthfulness by implied exactness of precise numbers, other numerical indication (age, date).
 - (b) Build Strong Relational Structure for Facts.
 - (i) Mention previous events as conditions/ causes, predict next as consequence, insert facts in known situation models, use well-known scripts/concepts, organize facts in well-known specific structures/ narratives.
 - (ii) Familiarity & Ideological Coherence. News to represent events that fit our models, but unpredictably. Exceptional & unexpected make events memorable but has to be understandable. Everyday Models can also be updated here.
 - (c) Provide information of attitudinal/ emotional dimensions: -
 - (i) Facts better memorized if arouse strong emotions (not too strong-as reader can disbelief).
 - (ii) Truthfulness of events enhanced when opinions of different backgrounds/ideologies quoted (but ideologically close will be given primary attention as possible sources of opinions).

- b) Concluding Remarks. Strategic devices enhance truthfulness, plausibility, correctness, precision, and credibility.
 - i) *These devices include:* -
 - (1) Remarkable use of numbers.
 - (2) Selective use of sources.
 - (3) Specific modifications in relevance relations (incompatible propositions are played down or fully ignored).
 - (4) Ideologically coherent perspectives in description of events.
 - (5) Use of specific scripts/attitude schemata.
 - (6) Selective uses of reliable, official, well-known, credible persons/institutions.
 - (7) Description of close, concrete details.
 - (8) Quotation of eyewitness/direct participants.
 - (9) Reference/appeal to emotions.
 - ii) Rhetorical analysis cannot be *fully independent* of semantic/ideological analysis & its operations may involve all levels of discourse analysis.

9) **Additional Information**

- a) Discourse. Use of language in Social Context.
- b) Text. Written.
- c) Language. The way a language is used.
- d) Discussion. Interaction.
- e) Argument Model.
 - i) Narration
 - ii) Description
 - iii) Exposition
- f) Linguistics.
 - i) Plus, Socio-political
 - ii) Plus, Socio-psychological.
- g) Syntax
 - i) Together Arrangement
 - ii) Sets of Rules for Analysis
 - iii) Branch of Linguistics
 - iv) Structure.

Indicators Role Played by Media in Intelligence Oversight

(Claudia Hillebrand + Luuk Clousing + Kristof Clerix)

<p>1. Aim To identify presence/absence, degree, and statistical account (numbers) of the desired roles.</p> <p>Information Transmission & Stimulation for Formal Scrutinizers</p> <p>a. <u>Bring Issues to Agenda of Public Debate</u> (Public/Political Attention).</p> <p>i. Issues</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Human Rights Infringements 2) Abuse of Power or 3) Lack of Accountability <p>ii. Can Break New Stories or New Insight to Existing Story.</p> <p>iii. Media can cover following Aspects of Intelligence Activity in a story: -</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Content 2) Objectives 3) Limits 	<p>3. Transmission and Stimulation for Formal Scrutinizers (100)</p> <p>a. <i>Transmission - Information and / or Observation (Facts/Comments)</i></p> <p>i. <u>Origin/Source</u> (10)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Own – Journalist, Editors, Newspaper (acquisition efforts) (4) 2) Outside – Guest Author (Journalist or Non-Journalists) (3) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Critical Assessment Efforts (2) b) Regurgitation of Facts 3) Anonymous (1) <p>b. <i>Scrutiny of Intelligence Policy or Activity (Beyond Factual) (40)</i></p> <p>i. <u>Investigative Efforts Performed</u> (Real/Significance) indirectly referred by in-text signals. (15)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) <u>Nature of Information</u> – Critical/New Insight to Intelligence. (Considerably dependent on source) (5) 2) <u>Intervention Level for its Exposure</u> (5) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Own Effort or Source Initiated b) Recent Disclosure or already Held Knowledge (for years) c) Source (Exclusive or Common) d) Approach to Source (Initial or Secondary) 3) <u>Source</u> (5) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Human (Formal Scrutinizer, Politician, Official/Expert, or Intelligence Community) through exclusive interview/conversation. b) Non-Human (Achieves, Database, Others) <p>ii. <u>Critical Discussion, Review or Assessment</u> (15)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) <u>Journalist's Co-Relation and Interpretation</u> (7) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Available Information b) Retrieved by Journalist/Self 2) <u>Significant Line of Thought</u> (8) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Elaborative/Descriptive b) Inquisitory (Questions) c) Criticizing d) Judgmental <p>iii. <u>Presentation by Journalist</u> (10)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Nature of output (Elaborative/Descriptive, Inquisitory, Criticizing or Judgmental) (3) 2) Time Factor (4) 3) Clear Line of Thought (2)
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	<div>4) Norms (Legal or ethical) (1)</div> <div>c. <i>Stimulation or Assistance to Formal Scrutinizer</i> (Formal Oversight-Politicians or Bodies) (10)</div> <div><div>i. Identification</div><div>ii. Attention</div><div>iii. Initiation of Pressure</div><div>iv. Persistence</div><div>v. Public Debate</div><div>vi. Policy Amendment or Response generation</div></div> <div>d. <i>Role of Organization</i> (newspaper organization etc.) (10)</div> <div><div>i. Standing and Positioning (2)</div><div>ii. Treatment Given (8)</div></div>
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<p>4. Media as Substitute Watchdog (formal oversight bodies incapable/unwilling).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Provide a Channel for leaking information.</u> b. <u>Used by Politicians (or abused).</u> c. <u>Translation of Official Reports (but sensationalization).</u> 	<p>5. Substitute Watchdog (in case of incapability or unwillingness of formal scrutinizer) (200)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>A specialized field</i> requiring experience, resources, and time (expensive) where well-established Investigative Journalism is a pre-requisite. b. <i>Factors for Efficiency of this role</i> (50) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Capacity of Media (economic and political) ii. Size of Intelligence Community and number of Intelligence Operations iii. History of State (Repressive/Facilitative) iv. Nature of Society (Open/Deep/Closed) v. Public Awareness and Democracy c. <i>Possible Roles</i> (with persistence) (150). (with 33 % cap of absence of common culture of leaks/translations, like west). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. <u>Scandals</u> (Especially in absence of Input from Intelligence). (30) ii. <u>Assistance to Whistleblowing</u> (15) iii. <u>Channel for Leakage of Information (Not an Investigative Journalism)</u> (10) iv. <u>Use by Opposition for Public Interest/Otherwise</u> (10) v. <u>Second opinion to intelligence related legislation</u> (10) vi. <u>Sharp Translation of Official Reports</u> (10) vii. <u>Education of formal scrutinizer, public, civil society and agencies</u> (10) viii. <u>Development of literature</u> (05)
<p>6. Media as Legitimizing Institution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Reassuring & Legitimizing Tool.</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Intelligence performance is being overseen (independently) ii. In situations of need of Public Support/Cooperation for activities. iii. For Broad Public Acceptance (mandate/work) iv. When Negotiating for more 	<p>7. Legitimizing Intelligence Services & Their Activities (Reassuring Tool) (50)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Legitimization</u> (25) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Informing the public (Intelligence Policies, Services, Secrecy and Openness) ii. Public Acceptance for Existence, Mandate and Budget iii. Building Faith that Intelligence is <u>being observed</u> independently (Investigative Journalism) iv. Building Public Support and Co-operation b. <u>Building Bridges</u> (25) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Reports on successful operations/assistance ii. Showing of Reform Process iii. Drawing Away of <u>Undue Blame/Credit</u> from Agencies (even through neutral language)

<p>Powers/Budget.</p> <p>b. <u>Build a Bridge.</u></p> <p>i. Reporting Successful Operations.</p> <p>ii. Point out Reform Processes (to show that learning is taking place).</p> <p>iii. Role taken Seriously to suggest: -</p> <p>1) Services are trustworthy &</p> <p>2) Follow the mandate.</p>		
	<p>10. Sensitize the Public regarding the Espionage Risks (Kristof Clerix) (50)</p> <p>a. <u>Identification of Hostile Agencies for Public</u> (Factual) for Espionage Risks (30)</p> <p>i. Motives and themes</p> <p>ii. Operations an Operatives</p> <p>iii. Prevention, Reporting and Counter measures</p> <p>iv. Education (Intelligence craft)</p> <p>b. <u>Identification for Own Agencies</u> (Secrecy) (10)</p> <p>c. <u>Education</u> (Fifth Generation Warfare) (10)</p>	
Note	<u>Underlined indicator</u> can be identified through discourse analysis.	
INDIVIDUAL MARKS/SCORE		
Role	Score	Rationale
<p>1. Transmission (including scrutiny) and Stimulation</p> <p>a. <u>Origin/Source</u></p> <p>i. Own – Journalist, Editors, Newspaper (acquisition efforts). [4]</p> <p>ii. Outside – Guest Author (Journalist or Non-Journalists). [3]</p> <p>1) Critical Assessment Efforts. [2]</p> <p>2) Regurgitation of Facts. [0]</p> <p>iii. Anonymous. [1]</p> <p>b. <u>Scrutiny of Intelligence Policy or Activity (Beyond Factual)</u></p> <p>i. Investigative Efforts Performed</p>	<p>100</p> <p>(10)</p> <p>(40)</p>	<p>Half of Substitute Watchdog which is doubly difficult</p> <p>A cap of 30% is placed on own research for not covering ‘media attention’.</p> <p>Routine work/structure with a well-established system.</p> <p>Could be a whistle</p>

<p>2. Substitute Watchdog (in case of incapability or unwillingness of formal scrutinizer)</p> <p>a. A specialized field requiring experience, resources, and time (expensive) where well-established Investigative Journalism is a pre-requisite.</p> <p>b. Factors for Efficiency of this role.</p> <p>i. Capacity of Media (economic and political). [10]</p> <p>ii. Size of Intelligence Community and number of Intelligence Operations. [10]</p> <p>iii. History of State (Repressive/Facilitative). [10]</p> <p>iv. Nature of Society (Open/Deep/Closed). [10]</p> <p>v. Public Awareness and Democracy. [10]</p> <p>c. <u>Possible Roles</u> (with persistence). The most difficult task for the media or newspaper.</p> <p>i. <u>Scandals</u> (Especially in absence of Input from Intelligence). [30]</p> <p>ii. <u>Assistance to Whistleblowing</u>. [15]</p> <p>iii. <u>Channel for Leakage of Information</u> (Not an Investigative Journalism) [10]</p> <p>iv. <u>Use by Opposition for Public Interest/Otherwise</u>. [10]</p> <p>v. <u>Second opinion to intelligence related legislation</u>. [10]</p> <p>vi. <u>Sharp Translation of Official Reports</u>. [10]</p> <p>vii. <u>Education of formal scrutinizer, public, civil society and agencies</u>. [10]</p> <p>viii. <u>Development of Literature</u>. [05]</p>	<p>200</p> <p>50</p> <p>150/ [100]</p>	<p>Will be doing the task of 2 oversight bodies (formal and informal)</p> <p>Score will be on effect of the feature (negative/positive).</p> <p>33 % cap for absence of scandal/leaks/translations , like west. (so, [100])</p>
<p>3. Legitimizing Intelligence Services & Their Activities (Reassuring Tool)</p> <p>a. <u>Legitimization</u>. [25]</p> <p>i. Informing the public (Intelligence Policies, Services, Secrecy and Openness)</p> <p>ii. Public Acceptance for Existence, Mandate and Budget</p> <p>iii. <u>Building Faith</u> that Intelligence is being observed independently (Investigative Journalism)</p> <p>iv. Building Public Support and Co-operation</p> <p>b. <u>Building Bridges</u>. [25]</p> <p>i. Reports on successful operations/assistance</p> <p>ii. Showing of Reform Process</p> <p>iii. Drawing Away of <u>Undue Blame/Credit</u> from Agencies (even through neutral language)</p>	<p>50</p>	<p>Directly & Indirectly</p> <p>Preparing for 5th Generation Warfare</p>

<p>4. Sensitize the Public regarding the Espionage Risks (Kristof Clerix)</p> <p>a. <u>Identification of Hostile Agencies for Public</u> (Factual) for Espionage Risks. [30]</p> <p>i. Motives and themes</p> <p>ii. Operations an Operatives</p> <p>iii. Prevention, Reporting and Counter measures</p> <p>iv. Education (Intelligence craft)</p> <p>b. Identification for Own Agencies (Secrecy). [10]</p> <p>c. <u>Education</u> (Fifth Generation Warfare). [10]</p>	50	For Hostile Intelligence Activities
<p>Note.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Major Features are Legality, Propriety, Effectiveness and Efficiency (for activities and policies, accountability, specific Intelligence Organization or Additional issues). 2. Specific Intelligence Agency will also be identified (if possible) 3. Volume of Media Attention will also be identified (if possible) though not included in score or percentages (as the cap has been already placed). 4. Presence of Information Leaks not taken account by formal oversight bodies and Translation of official reports published by formal inquiries are not included (as done by Luuk Clausing). A cap of 33 % has this been imposed in this research. 5. Overlap or double entry/double score will be avoided. 		

Abbottabad Commission Report - Aljazeera
(Summary)

- 1) **Executive Summary**
 - a) 1 x km away from PMA (not).
 - b) Body probably has been taken to US.
 - c) Joint session of Parliament 09 May 2011.
- 2) **Chapter 1 Introduction**
 - a) Set up of commission on 21 Jun 11.
 - b) Mandate
 - i) Presence of OBL
 - ii) Operation
 - iii) Lapses
 - iv) Recommendations
- 3) **Chapter 2 The Fateful Night of 1/2 May**
 - a) Amal (Youngest Wife)
 - b) Sumaya (Daughter)
 - c) Marium (Daughter)
 - d) Sharifa Siham (Mother of Khalid)
 - e) Khariyah (Eldest Wife)
 - f) Khalid (son) was killed on stairs
 - g) Abrar & Bushra already killed, downstairs
 - h) Ibrahim Killed (wife Marium Injured)
 - i) LEAs
 - j) Hospital/ISI
 - k) Will of Osama.
- 4) **Chapter 3 Account of Wives of OBL & A Kuwaiti**
 - a) No mixing of families.
 - b) Khariyria (stayed/captured in Iran)
 - c) Maryam story before 02 May
 - i) Father (Naeemuddin) was friend of father of Ibrahim/Abrar.
 - ii) Shangla & Kuwait
 - iii) Saw KSM in swat
 - iv) Moved to Haripur (Naseem Town)
 - v) Moved to Abbottabad in 2005.
 - vi) 'Miskeen Kaka' & identification
 - d) Commissions Observations
- 5) **Chapter 4 Operation Neptune Spear**
 - a) US Raid
 - i) Cutting of trees, US AID & 4 x Parado (Islamabad-Abbottabad)
 - ii) 4 x Heli (Black Hawk & Chinooks) 1 at Kala Dhaka for refueling. AWACS in Air Support (Afghanistan side of the border)
 - iii) 34 plus crew members
 - iv) NVDs, silencers
 - v) Route; River Kabul, Chakdara, Kala Dhaka
 - vi) Floods in Jul-Aug 2010 identified compound.
 - vii) 1 x helicopter's hard landing and 2 x Chinooks came.

- viii) Ibrahim Annexy first (then electricity 0035)
- ix) Cordon & Search groups (+ground guides)
- x) OBL No wife used as shield & not armed/weapon
- xi) 30 bullets in 38 minutes (helicopter circling)
- xii) OBL body in Black Hawk
- 6) **Chapter 5 Residents & officials of Kala Dhaka**
 - a) Abdul Munaf (Kandar Hassanzai) Tor Ghar Kala Dhaka. Tied by US troops. Abdul Khaliq
 - b) DCO & DPO
- 7) **Local Civil Administration Officials, Abbottabad**
 - a) XEN Wapda. 4 x single phase meters?
 - b) Dir Revenue. Land purchased by Abrar (M. Arshad) on fake NIC. No Checking.
 - c) DCO. Vaccination Campaign.
 - d) Commissioner. No OBL.
- 8) **Chapter 7 Cantt & Military Officials**
 - a) DMO Land.
 - b) Negligence in country
 - c) Security Officer/QRF Commander.
 - d) Military/ISI prevented Civil Admin.
 - e) ISI. Umer Patek (Aram Bagh) early arrest.
- 9) **Chapter 8 Local Notables**
 - a) Shamraiz (front house).
 - b) Maj Amir Aziz. USAID hired house & visits of Shakil Afridi team. LC (R) Saeed Iqbal in expensive car (son ADC to Musharraf)?
 - c) Shoaib Akhtar. Twitter/accurate account.
 - d) Dr Suleman (Bilal Town). NGO in house of Shamraz.
- 10) **Chapter 9 Local Media**
 - a) 1 x Spook coming under cover was asked to leave.
- 11) **Chapter 10 Local Police**
 - a) Constable Nazar M.
 - b) SHO Inspector Nazir K
 - c) Regional CID officer
 - d) DPO. Weak
 - e) DIG. Commandant PMA asked everybody to go out.
- 12) **Chapter 11 Senior KPK Officials**
 - a) IG Police
 - b) Home Secretary
 - c) Chief Secretary
 - d) Chief Minister
- 13) **Chapter 12 Dr Shakil Afridi (SAVE the Children)**
 - a) DHO Khyber Agency. kidnapped in 2008 by Mangal Bagh for 1 Mn ransom.
 - b) California but returned in 2009 & back at KA.
 - c) Met STC (Michael Mac Graugh) & Kate & started working for her. Vaccination Campaign in Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Abbottabad. 1.3 Mn. Sue asked him to extend campaign in Nawanshahr. Waziristan Kothi was skipped/no response. Sarah. Cost of campaign 5.4 Mn, completed 23 Apr.
 - d) Was given a Satellite Radio (for voice print of Ibrahim). Arrested on 23 May.

- e) ISI claimed he was cultivated/recruited & employed in Pathan Gali specifically & work directly/payments.
 - f) (later) Trumped up Jirga against him was also bad.
 - g) EDO Health District had no knowledge (officially).
 - h) Mst Asmat Khattak identified the area for Afridi.
 - i) Provincial Coordinator NPFP & PH Dr Ehsan Ullah Turabbi. Afridi asked for approval for his Post Grad in Hepatitis for Free Medical Camp. He asked Ms Shaheena Asst District Coord to facilitate.
 - j) Ms Amna LHW. Dr Shaheena told them to go to Nawan Shahr on Apr 20. Afridi joined and contacted Ibrahim for vaccination, but. Earlier Amna administered polio vaccine to 7 +3 children of compound.
 - k) Ms Mukhtiar LHW. LHS told them to attend meeting of Shaheena/Afridi & work for them.
 - l) Country Dir STC, David Thomas Wright. Denied all links with Afridi (checked from Mac Graugh). One Mr Bruce was expelled but came back to Pakistan.
- 14) **Chapter 13 Chairman NADRA.**
- a) Fake NIC. Now CNIC. Has issues still.
 - b) FIA. Poor work.
- 15) **Chapter 14 Aviation/Explosive Expert**
- a) Brig Khalid Dar, Aviation. These are specially built Black Hawk converted to Stealth. Only 3 x heli came. People are wrong of hearing before the blast. Miscellaneous officers accounts.
- 16) **Chapter 15 Ghazi Base Tarbela**
- a) 4 x US trainers (Mar 2009-Aug 2010). Flights in Flood Relief were accompanying, no land given to them & OBL body was not kept in cold storage.
- 17) **Chapter 16 DG MO**
- a) Told COAS at 0200.
 - b) Poor work
- 18) **Chapter 17 DG JSHQ**
- a) JS not command 3 x forces
 - b) DCC meeting was held on 12 May.
 - c) Defense Policy & Joint Strategic Directive not reviewed since 2004/07.
- 19) **Chapter 18 Air Defense Command**
- a) Violated Airspace twice. Second to Indian sea to the Carrier through Osprey (85 x flights on 02 May).
 - b) Shooting down required few conditions.
 - c) Board of Inquiry. Time difference. Deployment on Peacetime front & technology deficit of Radars.
- 20) **Chapter 19 Senior PAF Officials**
- a) D COAS (Ops). Poor response, policy, technology & complacency. No eye on latest indications from US or changing threat perception.
 - b) ACM Rao Qamar Suleman (Air Chief). Data not manipulated after 2 May. PAF only responds to Radar identification & not phone calls. Hamid Mir, Confusion of Peace Time Deployment. Mobile Observer Units were abandoned after Afghan War. No shoot down clarity to pilots. Army & Navy also got their own Air Defense, so authority shifted to JS HQ. Min of Def to make policies, but military making these.
- 21) **Chapter 20 DCAS AVM Shahid Lateef**

- a) Most threats are at low level, so deploy accordingly. No truth in reduction (MOU) after 1980.
- b) Stealth Technology only delays detection. Terrain Masking/Nap of Earth technique was identified in 2008 & gaps are to be identified & delt accordingly.
- c) PAF was actually sleeping. Abnormal activities were reported on western borders. Should have alerted.
- d) India can also find gaps. HARs can be used as LARs.
- e) News Report of 'The News' of a conversation with Air Traffic Control Post was also reported.

22) Chapter 21 Investigative Report by Army & ISI.

- a) Army Board of Inquiry (LG Javed Iqbal)
 - i) Compound construction started in 2004. 3rd floor in 05/06. OBL family came in 06.
 - ii) Usual Institutional/dept failure in Pakistan.
 - iii) Have more agencies & less coordination among.
 - iv) Issues of cutting down of trees, heli approach.
 - v) Only visa entries of operatives.
 - vi) No legal cover, ATA pending for 5 years.
- b) ISI Investigative Report (under Brig M Aslam)
 - i) Did not know about real owner of Trees (outside) & Investigation of Maj Amir Aziz?
 - ii) CIA closed Special Unit after Tora bora bombardment. OBL not active after 2005.
 - iii) ISI facilitated US official visit after 2 May.
 - iv) Commission Observation
 - (1) Guests Maryum identified before 2 May.
 - (2) HVTs handed over in haste (Patek).
 - (3) Total Failure. ISI Overburdened.

23) Chapter 22 Civil & MI Chiefs

- a) Acting DG IB
 - i) CI not a priority in (now weak) IB.
 - ii) Charter revised 2005, limited to IS/Pol Fallout.
- b) DG IB
 - i) Poor performance.
 - ii) Obama's other son married a local girl.
- c) Acting DG FIA
 - i) Poor, Not read Schedule of 1974.
 - ii) Poor DG & poor efficiency.
- d) DG MI
 - i) Usual Rant against others.
 - ii) 5 x SUVs moved at 2300 on 1 May, Pakistani drivers reverted to Embassy at Golra Morh.
 - iii) 1 x Safe House identified near compound.
 - iv) No Rogue elements (serving/retired).
 - v) Garrisons are 'Open' garrisons now.
 - vi) COAS visit to PMA?
- e) DG ISI
 - i) Took over task of CT, CTW established in 2007.
 - ii) Too many expectations & political fallouts.

- iii) Operations & information came from 2000 to 2005. Abu Faraj Libbi was reported nearby. KSM (ill) was handed over after 4 x days.
- iv) CIA shared wrong info & last was in 2005. 4 x telephone numbers shared 09/10 but dead.
- v) Statements 09/10 of OBL in Pakistan, 2 x US memos, but nothing done to
- vi) ISI support to OBL is not acc to common sense.
- vii) Musharraf gave more than asked. Shamsi.
- viii) Intelligence Failure only.
- ix) Pressure for release of Dr Afridi through KSA.
- x) 1300 NGOs, STC history of working for CIA.
- xi) Drone a political understanding only (US-Pak).
- xii) Civil Lawsuit against DG ISI in US & the US Propaganda (Double Game/Do More).
- xiii) Visas applied but no required info provided. They got visa from other sources (Journalists).
- xiv) Placing of ISI under Civil Control/MoI was not a good idea (impractical/morale).
- xv) Action against own rogue/involved actors.
 - (1) Major Amir. Not important.
 - (2) Brig Ali K. Disillusioned/Hazb ut Tehrir.
 - (3) LC Saeed Iqbal 408/ISI. Not much reported/ observed. Moved to US, selling property.
- xvi) Zawaheri could be in Pakistan, US holding info.
- xvii) Apathy of state & ISI. (Page 197 missing)

24) Chapter 23 NSA MG Mahmood Durrani

- a) US went unilateral since 2007, its reports speculative.
- b) Pakistan can't fight Superpower. Pragmatic.

25) Chapter 24 Hussain Haqqani Visa regime

- a) He stated that 'no extra issues of visa' but lying. Without clearance issued. Overuse of powers.
- b) An unauthorized letter of PM Secretariate. FO?

26) Chapter 25 Federal Secretaries & Ministers

- a) Secy Law. No response
- b) Secy Information. Weak statement of Minister.
 - i) Media Coord Committee exists, but.
- c) Secy Defense.
 - i) No formal agreement. Non-NATO Ally. Unwritten template of Intelligence Sharing.
 - ii) NDU given task to update Def Policy 2004. National Security Policy is under-process.
- d) Minister of Defense (Ahmed Mukhtar)
 - i) Ask secretary and DCC, I am Mali.
 - ii) It is Pakistan, here things happen this way.
- e) Foreign Secy
 - i) First statement at 11 AM, Press Conf on 05 May & ISPR Briefing with Foreign Secy.
 - ii) Another Mali (yet smart)
- f) Foreign Minister (Hina Rabbani Khar)

- i) Kerry Lugar Bill, US Legislation for Investment in Private Security Coys & Terrorism Reform & Prevention Act 2004 (Pak as center of Terror).
 - ii) Usual rant by her.
 - g) Secy Interior Kh M Siddique (for Qamar Z Ch)
 - i) 389 houses rented in Islamabad only.
 - ii) NACTA?
 - h) Minister Interior (Rehman Malik)
 - i) Office of Defense Representative was established by US to facilitate visas.
 - ii) Inter Risk Security Agency (Captain Zaidi) was to facilitate. 1 x Section Officer issuing visas for (\$ 17000) caught. Weapons in IB Inspector Garage. License cancelled & no pressure taken.
 - iii) Aviation Squadron of ministry being operated by US/Dyne Corp/XE/Black Water. Not now.
 - iv) Visa Issue (interior) wrongly handled by MoFA.
- 27) Chapter 26 Assessment of Commission**
- a) Has OBL Died, Close File?
 - i) OBL's Last Audio Message was in Jan 2011.
 - ii) US did not close the file.
 - b) Killing of OBL/Associates. No effort of arrest at all.
 - c) Killing one wife, sparing other was an accident.
 - d) Load shedding; planned/accidental, Unclear.
 - e) Choice of Abbottabad. Haripur was never a choice.
 - f) Kuwait Bros & Family Living in Compound. 11+16.
 - i) LHW earlier vaccinated 7+3 (3 be of Osama)
 - ii) People still not believe that OBL was here.
 - g) Failure to Detect Incoming Helicopters.
 - i) First noise of helicopter in Abbottabad at 0025.
 - ii) How US so sure of unforeseen/mishap.
 - h) Chuck Pfarrer's 'Seal Target Geronimo'.
 - i) CIA had a ground team (elaborate). Told that,
 - ii) Everybody arrested in 36 hours (no Afridi after 3 x weeks) was a propaganda to save existing staff.
 - iii) He checked locks & more involved, but stayed?
 - i) Remarks by Pak Ambassador to UK (Wajid Shams ul Hassan)
 - i) BBC: We knew everything (more plausibility).
 - ii) Was Dishonest/Abrupt, as later backtracked.
- 28) Chapter 27 Assessment of GOP Response**
- a) FO first statement on 02, 03 & 05 May. President article on 03 May, Info Min statement on 02 May, PM Parliament Address on 09 May & Joint Session on 09 (Joint Resolution). Total 8 x Responses.
 - i) 02 May. Info Minister. Ill informed. PM & FO. No issue of sovereignty mentioned/pointed.
 - ii) 03 May. MoFA. No knowledge/concurrence, but no condemnation. Not a Precedence. A truly shameful statement still. Fearful response.
 - iii) 05 May. Press Briefing Foreign Secy. Only Violation of UN Charter, no condemnation.
 - iv) 09 May. PM endorsed US action.
 - v) 14 May. Joint Session Condemnation for first time, but the government did not.

29) Chapter 28 Legal Aspects (Ahmed Bilal Sufi)

- a) UN Charter. No intervention allowed except self-defense, humanitarian, uniting for peace, rescue nationals. No UNSC Resolution authorised action or assassination.
- b) Durand Line is a recognized border, so no US Force.
- c) International Legal Opinions
 - i) No justice, but crime under military/civil laws.
 - ii) US Attorney General. Kill or capture mission.
 - iii) Colonial Inquest on violent death repeated.
 - iv) US not at war in Abbottabad, Legal Experts could not justify killing of OBL. No Global Assassination Policy is allowed.
- d) Noam Chomsky. Worst option of war, not separation of Terrorist was done by US. No fair trial. US did not quickly learn that AQ did 9/11. What if Iraq does the same against President George Bush.
- e) Killing a component of Vengeance and an easy way out, without challenges, no follow up/legal issues.
- f) German Chancellor 'violation of international law'.

30) Chapter 29 US-Pak Relations

- a) Not strategic (with India these are), but on economic/military assistance grounds vs temp utility of Pak.
- b) After 9/11 Musharraf finished distinction between AQ & Taliban & US operation in Afghanistan/7 Oct 01. Major non-Nato Ally in 2004, so free visas given.
- c) Huge ISI GWOT Operation. But since 2008 US started allegations of Double Play/holding info.
- d) Salala Attack 26 Nov 2011 (24 x deaths) & Raymond Davis Case, Private Security Contractor in Jan 2011.
- e) Revelations Bob Wood words 'Obama's War'. Dishonest Partner, Living a lie. ISI. Change Pak Calculus. Bruce Ridel negative Comments.
- f) NYT Sq Bombing Attempt, 01 May 2010, Faisal Sh

31) Chapter 30 Findings of Commission

- a) Presence of OBL. Yes. Killing. Yes.
 - i) Why not made public. Mutilated body.
 - ii) How Long in Abbottabad. From Aug 2005.
 - iii) In Pakistan. From Summer of 2002.
 - iv) Where else did he stay. FATA, Peshawar, Swat, Haripur. Family. Son (hamza & Saad?)
 - v) Why no detection in Pak. Small support set up, low profile, minimum security/signature. Bros/ Couriers comm from outside compound.
 - vi) Cantt. Open Cantt, cover of all. But Int Failure.
 - vii) Support Network. Small, Pakistani. Unknown.
 - viii) Sympathizers (Mil/Civ). No
 - ix) Culprit Agency. PM Office (ISI/IB in sup) ISI.
 - x) Int sharing with US. Yes, but CIA= false info.
 - xi) CIA share info which was incomplete. Mutual Mistrust/exclusivity. Credit of operation
 - xii) Why Compound failed to attract attention.
 - xiii) Betrayal? felt by Pakistan
 - xiv) Exploitation of leads & Mosaic development.
 - xv) OBL Control on AQ?

- xvi) Efforts of GOP. Only relied on ISI.
- xvii) No intra government discussion on OBL.
- xviii) Priority to OBL issue was initially only.
- xix) OBL protected by IC of Pak. Not possible.
- xx) Negligent, Incompetent, but not Complicit.
- b) Circumstances/Facts of US Operation.
 - i) How Operation Possible. Surprise/betrayal. Mil & Tech asymmetry. But a lot could have done.
 - ii) Should it be a surprise. No the warnings were conveyed (statements/complaints).
 - iii) Only practical/possible response was diplomatic.
 - iv) Radars/Policy should have done better.
 - v) Then why feeling of despondency. There is suspicion among PAF staff.
 - vi) Leadership was probably informed by US as they (US) couldn't have taken the risk.
 - vii) Timely information not by Garrison/COAS.
 - viii) Was Pakistan offered an option of cooperated operation. Probably yes.
 - ix) Ground Support Network of US. Yes. No school.
 - x) Safe House. Yes.
 - xi) How CIA able to set up network. Leaders failed.
 - xii) How ISI missed them. Not complicit at least.
 - xiii) Why India Enemy 1. Army's historic mindset.
- c) Nature Background & Causes of Lapses.
 - i) Failure/Sovereignty. Yes.
 - ii) Avoidable? Yes.
 - iii) Failure (Professional/technical or that of Policy/Leadership). More Leadership.
 - iv) Junior Officers at Fault. Up to a level only.
 - v) Leadership absolved of Responsibilities. No, it was a 'systemic failure'.
 - vi) Was 2 May an Exception. No, 2nd after 1971.
 - vii) National Tragedy? In Manner of Conduct.
 - viii) Responsible on 100 % Evidence? No, it is a Commission, not a trial court.

32) **Chapter 31 Recommendations**

- a) Review of Existing System & Procedures. Thorough review of systems & procedures, training, merit, corruption, confidence.
- b) Addressing Capacity Issues
 - i) Shortages & political interferences.
 - ii) Re-emp of military is short term beneficial.
 - iii) Vacuum of IB & Police, filled by mil. Ministry of Interior.
 - iv) De-politicization & Professionalization.
- c) Intelligence Coordination
 - i) JICC at JS HQ, but no Civil Coord Org.
 - ii) At field level. Dept of Homeland Security.
 - iii) Intelligence, Oversight & accountability.
 - iv) Dysfunctional Sec State to Func Dev State.
- d) Security Agencies. Scrutiny of power, mandates, accountability.
- e) Providing Legal Cover for Int Agencies. No un-regulated discretions, Rule of Law & HR.
- f) Civilian Control

- i) National Defense & Security Policy under. Transparent Political Process, Public Oversight & Accountability. Ownership of Public.
- ii) Example of Baloch Alienation. Constitution.
- g) Competent/Committed Civilian Leadership.
 - i) Lacking at highest level, deteriorating.
 - ii) Non-Civilian Rule damages, but democratic substance is needed in democratic rule.
 - iii) So active Citizenry & Civil Society needed.
- h) Review of Higher Defense Organizations.
 - i) Make JS HQ more effective/potent/powers.
 - ii) Military Governments made COAS powerful.
- i) Civil Military Relations
 - i) Governance & future. Pol & Governance failures & the aggrandizement of powerful institutions.
 - ii) Expansion of Military Role is bad idea. So, the democracy could not mature.
- j) Parliamentary Control. No quality. True representative of public.
- k) Performance of Intelligence Community. Experts under NA & Senate to review/oversight.
- l) Agreements Understanding, Meeting with Foreign Officials. Brought under Parliament & Government.
- m) Threat assessment & identification. National Policy (Security Policy, Def Policy, Joint Strat Directive) need Nat Pol Consensus. But exclude Civ input.
- n) Nat Sec Policy. As Democratic Dev State a broader concept. Has non mil components (soft assets)
- o) Establishment of National Security Council (not Defence Committee of Cabinet)
- p) Nat Sec Advisor. Incl all segments under Sectt.
- q) White Paper. Last written in 1976. Transformation & Development.
- r) CT Policy. Maj lapse of 2 faced policy. ISI an external agency (jehadis in contact) used for domestic T. Qanoor-e-Shadat & NACTA (real/operationalized, in coord with NSC), improve CRPC & Penal Code. PM Office (rep of ISI/IB with coordination)
- s) Taking Down Extremist Infrastructure. Zia legacy; Fitna (sedition)/Fassad (corruption) leading to final destruction.
- t) HVTs. CIA not sharing Information since 2005, was criminal. No immediate handing over, inclusion of own agencies in ops. Pakistan Rules & Regs first.
- u) Police Reforms. Hard Core (Criminal Justice System) to be improved. No Politicization. Efficiency. Merit.
- v) US Embassy. Hiring of 370 houses in Islamabad. Non diplomatic activities.
- w) Pak-US Relations. Democratic, Realistic, Pak centric. False pretense of 'Strat Relationship'. Transparency.
- x) Tagging Service Provision with NADRA Database.
- y) Foreign NGOs. Eco Affair Div. Oversight. Law. USAID & STC used by CIA. But assistance also.
- z) Control Illegal Entry/Exit of Foreigners. Western border. Checking System, Biometric. Afghanistan. Wire/Fence. Regulate not restrict.
- aa) Visa Policy. Of 2010 be followed.
- bb) Security Companies. Re-employment of retired officers.
- cc) Foreign Spy Network. Militants. Sovereignty.
- dd) Witness Protection Programs.


ee) Dealing with Systemic Problems.

ff) Setting Priorities.

- 33) **Chapter 32 Conclusion.** Complacency, ignorance, negligence, incompetence, irresponsibility at low & high levels. Has an old history of it, not a one-time event.
- a) Responsibility. Primarily an Int-Security Failure. Pol leadership. Those Powerful.
 - b) Warranting Apology.

Microstructures-Local (Semantics-Coherence)

PAK MILITARY CAUGHT IN THE CROSSEIRE
 From the Newspaper Published May 2, 2011
 Illustration of Abbottabad Compound



A drawing, released by the United State Department of Defense May 2, 2011, shows the compound that Osama bin Laden was killed in on Monday in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Bin Laden was killed during a US assault on his Pakistani compound on Monday, then quickly buried at sea, in a dramatic end to the long **manhunt** for the al Qaeda leader who had become the most powerful symbol of global terrorism. – Photo by Reuters

ISLAMABAD: As the United States announced the death of Osama bin Laden, the Pakistani state, especially its military struggled to explain the role it played in the momentous event and contain the domestic political fallout on Monday.

In a **damage control exercise**, the Pakistan military tried to find refuge in **'intelligence failure'** as the elusive Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden was killed in a CIA-led helicopter borne raid on a house **right under the nose** of Pakistan military's training academy.

"We had been looking for him in no-go areas, unaware that he was living so close to an installation of ours. Yes, it is an **intelligence failure**," a **senior military official** told Dawn in a background session on OBL's death in an operation carried out by a US Navy SEAL strike team under CIA command.

Even as military officials tried to downplay Osama's killing in a compound less than a kilometer away from Kakul academy, they found **very few takers of their explanation**.

This was hardly surprising as it is hard to believe that the paranoid security agencies never conducted a **reconnaissance** of the vicinity of their main training facility during times when military installations faced a continuous threat of terrorist attacks. Odder still is the fact that the military authorities or the **intelligence sleuths** never felt the need to find out who was using a **heavily guarded structure** that was protected by barbed wires and fortified walls and had the extra precaution of surveillance cameras.

It is in fact **tragically comical** that this compound was at a **stone's throw** from where Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani attended a parade around a week ago; when he said publicly that his soldiers had broken the back of militants.

Was the general completely unaware that the most wanted man lived but a short distance away? Did he also not have a clue about what was to happen in the coming days in that town?

Military officials vehemently insist that they had **not been taken on board** by the Americans about the operation.

In **hindsight**, the **flurry of activity** that took place in the past week or so indicates that something was up.

ISAF Commander Gen Petraeus paid an extraordinary visit to Islamabad last Monday (April 25), when he is said to have held 'a short and crisp' discussion with Gen Kayani at an unusual meeting venue -- Chaklala Airbase. The two generals are even said to have taken a short trip to an undisclosed location on board an aircraft. The same night Gen Petraeus had through teleconferencing attended a White House meeting chaired by President Barack Obama.

Observers feel that President Obama referred to that meeting in his speech on Monday morning, in which he announced the death of Osama: "And finally, last week, I determined that we had **enough intelligence to take action**, and authorised an operation to get Osama Bin Laden and bring him to justice."

The very next day, Pakistan's top military coordination body -- Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee -- held its quarterly session, which was attended among others by ISI Chief Gen Shuja Pasha, who otherwise isn't a regular member of the body. The meeting was unscheduled.

The final orders for the raid were signed by President Obama last Friday in the presence of National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, his deputy Denis McDonough and counter-terrorism adviser John Brennan.

However, it is not just the denial of the Pakistan army of any prior knowledge of the operation that is raising eyebrows.

Another anomaly in the Pakistan military's account of the raid is their explanation of how four US helicopters evaded the country's air defense system for about an hour (almost 30 minutes each side) as they flew in from Bagram and returned after a 40-minute-long foray.

One official claimed that the helicopters succeeded in avoiding detection through 'Nap of the earth flight' -- a military tactic involving low-altitude flying to evade air defense systems. Yet another maintained that the air defense systems had been jammed by the Americans.

If this sequence of events is to be believed, then why did President Obama appreciate Pakistan's cooperation in the operation? Was it out of love for the country?

"But it's important to note that our **counter-terrorism cooperation** with Pakistan helped lead us to Bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding," Mr Obama said.

Whatever the case, Pakistani commanders took heart from President Obama's and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's statements on the incident.

They think that the statements had provided Pakistan with a way out of the awkward situation and given the space for both sides to continue with their war on militancy cooperation.

It was in line with this assessment of the situation and the subsequent American stance that the Foreign Office statement on Osama's killing was drafted. The carefully worded statement renewed its pledge to continue cooperation with the US in fight against militancy.

"Pakistan has played a significant role in efforts to eliminate terrorism. We have had **extremely effective intelligence sharing arrangements** with several **intelligence agencies**, including that of the US. We will continue to support international efforts against terrorism."

The statement had hailed the operation as "a major setback to terrorist organizations around the world".

Evident from the statement were the worries in the foreign ministry and among the civilian leadership and among military command about the questions that would be asked, especially about the violation of country's sovereignty during the conduct of the operation. Hence, it took recourse to America's right of defense and international law.

<https://dawn.epaper.pk/>

on 08 Oct 2023

Headline Lead & Paragraphs

Pak Military caught in the crossfire

Lead.

- 1) United **State** announced death of OBL, Pakistani **State** (military) **struggled to explain**: -
 - a) Role played in **momentous event**.
 - b) Contain the domestic **political fallout** on Monday.

Paragraphs

- 2) Damage control exercise, tried to find refuge in 'intelligence failure' as (elusive) Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden was killed in a CIA-led helicopter borne raid on a house right under the nose of Pakistan military's training academy.
- 3) "We had been looking for him in no-go areas, unaware that he was living so close to an installation of ours. Yes, it is an intelligence failure," a senior military official told Dawn in a background session on OBL's death in an operation carried out by a US Navy SEAL strike team under CIA command.
- 4) Even as military officials tried to downplay Osama's killing in a compound less than a kilometer away from Kakul academy, they found very few takers of their explanation.
- 5) This was hardly surprising as it is hard to believe that the paranoid security agencies never conducted a reconnaissance of the vicinity of their main training facility during times when military installations faced a continuous threat of terrorist attacks. Odder still is the fact that the military authorities or the intelligence sleuths never felt the need to find out who was using a heavily guarded structure that was protected by barbed wires and fortified walls and had the extra precaution of surveillance cameras.
- 6) It is in fact tragically comical that this compound was a stone's throw from where Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani attended a parade around a week ago; when he said publicly that his soldiers had broken the back of militants.
- 7) Was the general completely unaware that the most wanted man lived but a short distance away? Did he also not have a clue about what was to happen in the coming days in that town?
- 8) Military officials vehemently insist that they had not been taken on board by the Americans about the operation.
- 9) In hindsight, the flurry of activity that took place in the past week or so indicates that something was up.
 - a) ISAF Commander Gen Petraeus paid an extraordinary visit to Islamabad last Monday (April 25), when he is said to have held 'a short and crisp' discussion with Gen Kayani at an unusual meeting venue -- Chaklala Airbase. The two generals are even said to have taken a short trip to an undisclosed location on board an aircraft.
 - b) The same night Gen Petraeus had through teleconferencing attended a White House meeting chaired by President Barack Obama.
 - c) Observers feel that President Obama referred to that meeting in his speech on Monday morning, in which he announced the death of Osama: "And finally, last week, I determined that we had enough intelligence to take action and authorised an operation to get Osama Bin Laden and bring him to justice."
- 10) The very next day, Pakistan's top military coordination body -- Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee -- held its quarterly session, which was attended among others by ISI Chief Gen Shuja Pasha, who otherwise isn't a regular member of the body. The meeting was unscheduled.
- 11) The final orders for the raid were signed by President Obama last Friday in the presence of National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, his deputy Denis McDonough and counter-terrorism adviser John Brennan.
- 12) However, it is not just the denial of the Pakistan army of any prior knowledge of the operation that is raising eyebrows.
 - a) Another anomaly in the Pakistan military's account of the raid is their explanation of how four US helicopters evaded the country's air defense system for about an hour (almost 30 minutes each side) as they flew in from Bagram and returned after a 40-minute-long foray.
 - b) One official claimed that the helicopters succeeded in avoiding detection through 'Nap of the earth flight' -- a military tactic involving low-altitude flying to evade air defense systems. Yet another maintained that the air defense systems had been jammed by the Americans.
- 13) If this sequence of events is to be believed, then why did President Obama appreciate Pakistan's cooperation in the operation? Was it out of love for the country?
- 14) "But it's important to note that our counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to Bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding," Mr Obama said.
 - a) Whatever the case, Pakistani commanders took heart from President Obama's and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's statements on the incident.
 - b) They think that the statements had provided Pakistan with a way out of the awkward situation and given the space for both sides to continue with their war on militancy cooperation.
- 15) It was in line with this assessment of the situation and the subsequent American stance that the Foreign Office statement on Osama's killing was drafted. The carefully worded statement renewed its pledge to continue cooperation with the US in fight against militancy.

- a) "Pakistan has played a significant role in efforts to eliminate terrorism. We have had extremely effective intelligence sharing arrangements with several intelligence agencies, including that of the US. We will continue to support international efforts against terrorism."
- b) The statement had hailed the operation as "a major setback to terrorist organizations around the world".
- 16) Evident from the statement were the worries in the foreign ministry and among the civilian leadership and among military command about the questions that would be asked,
 - a) especially about the violation of country's sovereignty during the conduct of the operation.
 - b) Hence, it took recourse to America's right of defense and international law.

Examination of News Report

Lead.

As the United States announced the death of Osama bin Laden, the Pakistani state, especially its military struggled to explain the role it played in the momentous event and contain the domestic political fallout on Monday.

1) Syntax (Micro)

a) Clause 1. As the United States announced the death of Osama bin Laden

- i) **As** is a Proposition used as conjunction and an adverb. Mostly used for comparison (simile; comparison of two dissimilar things and simultaneity). Also used as Reason or Cause of next sentence. Its use makes the clause 'dependent clause'.
- ii) **the United States announced the death of Osama bin Laden**
 - (1) **the** is a definite article, used before a noun to indicate that the identity of the noun is known to the reader.
 - (2) **United States** is a singular noun taking singular verb forms.
 - (3) **announced** is a verb in past tense.
 - (4) **death of Osama bin Laden.** Osama bin Laden is a proper noun (word death) used before a name of a person (the complete name is Osama bin Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden). Here **of** (preposition) connects death with Osama bin Laden (name). Full name of Osama bin Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden. Name Osama in Arabic means 'Lion'. In description of a lion, Brave, the one who is bold, pious, and courageous like a lion. The name derives from the Arabic stem (A-S-M - Alif Seen Meem) "name" and means "the one with a name". After 9/11 has been used commonly for leader of Al Qaeda, a terrorist organization.

iii) A dependent clause or sentence.

b) Clause 2. the Pakistani state, especially its military struggled to explain the role it played in the momentous event

- i) **the**
- ii) **Pakistani state** is an adjective noun/name showing belongingness (Pakistani).
- iii) **especially** a common adverb used to represent something standing out.
- iv) **its** is the possessive of the pronoun "it".
- v) **military** is a noun which can also be used differently (adjective, adverb).
- vi) **struggled to explain** is a phrase of combination of a verb, a preposition and a verb, which tells about the inability of a subject.
- vii) **the**
- viii) **role it played** is a phrase of combination of a noun, a third person singular pronoun and a simple past tense/past participle of play, which tells about some action pf a subject.
- ix) **in** (preposition) **the**
- x) **momentous event** is an adjective noun which tells about the extraordinary importance of the event.
- xi) **and** is a coordinating conjunction for the phrases.
- xii) **contain** (verb) **the**
- xiii) **domestic political fallout.** Here 2 x Coordinate adjectives have been placed before the noun (fall out). A punctuation mark (,) between the adjectives is mostly preferred for making it clearer.
- xiv) **on Monday** is a proposition with a proper noun of the day of week giving out temporal dimension.

c) It has Complex clauses.

2) Semantics (Local)

a) Propositions

US (Agent/Argument) announced (Predicate) death of OBL	PS (military) (Argument) struggled to explain (Predicate)
	role it played in
	contain domestic

	momentous event	political fallout
Simple	Compound	
Complex Assertion with Focus on Second		

- i) **Meanings.** Straight & Denotational with some reference to other concepts.
 - ii) **Level.** Second more complex, being the main, which is further divided into two with oxymoronic requirements (role it played and contain domestic political fallout).
 - iii) **Sequence.** In line with Temporal covering well the pragmatic & cognitive factors. Contrast between US and PS.
 - iv) **Topic/Knowledge.** Coherence due to same topic and according to knowledge/situation model of reader/writer with few chances of subjectivity.
 - v) **Presupposition.** Considerable information is presupposed.
 - vi) **Entailment.** The first proposition entails the second.
 - vii) **Implicitness.** The comparison.
 - viii) **Coherence.** Conditional relation with Causality/empiricism. Temporal and Condition-Consequence Relation. Different Specification/details add up to coherence.
 - ix) **Implication.**
 - (1) The **comparison**.
 - (2) One state announces and other struggles to explain (the opposites of openness and secrecy/deceit). Action and reaction or Us and Them Narrative.
- 3) **Pragmatic**
- a) **Social Act in Culture.** Assertions in News Discourse.
 - b) **Conditions of Appropriateness.** A Superpower State taking action in a client state and announcing the same afterwards, while putting it in defensive/fix.
- 4) **Style** (Following General Constraints & Variation of News Style in vogue)
- a) **Style.**
 - i) Formal with constraints & variations with Institutional variability of The Dawn. Following National & International precedence & according to Communicative Context of Print News.
 - ii) Bipolarity (Us & Them) has been maintained at the cost of exclusion of one of the main actor "Al Qaeda".
 - iii) Routinization of the text & Stylistic Markers of News Production visible.
 - b) **News Syntax-The Structure.**
 - i) 2 x Embedded clauses under the second (main) clause make it complex enough with complexity of 2.5.
 - ii) Sentences covering the fragments of Superstructure categories.
 - iii) Word Order. Marking of Main Actors while maintaining the hierarchy (USA first). Missing 1 x Main Actor could be intentional also.
 - c) **Semantic Reference to the past event.**
 - d) **Ideological Representation visible in choice of words** (death, role, momentous event, political fallout).
 - e) **Lexical choices are based on professional register.**
- 5) **Rhetoric** (for persuasion using Formulation & Context)
- a) **Syntax.**
 - i) First Factual Proposition has been followed up by a Futuristic Projection of a dire consequences (for Pakistan). Use of names/words/shorter forms **United States & Pakistani State** have been used purposefully to draw parallelism against the other alternatives. This is also transformation through Repetition.
 - ii) Adjective/Noun of **momentous event** is a Hyperbole & **domestic political fallout** works as a Threat Statement.
 - b) **Semantic.**
 - i) Operation of Comparison.
 - ii) Pakistan is in a fix (**Pakistan struggles to explain**).
 - iii) The actual respondent is the Military (**especially its military**).
 - c) **Cognitive Semantic.**
 - i) A subtle modification in understanding of Situation Model (beliefs/scripts) of reader is proposed by juxtaposing Fact & Threats.
 - ii) A perlocutionary dimension.
 - d) **Pragmatics.**

- e) A Threat following the main clause/proposition, which give out Assertions.
 - i) Putting Pakistani State in Defensive Position.
- f) Factuality. First clause is given to enhance belief for the following threat.
- g) Argumentation/Persuasion.
 - i) Content. Factual (first sentence) mentioning the previous factual event (Abbottabad Raid) as Condition/Cause & subsequently predicting Consequences, thus creating a strong Structural Relation of the facts.
 - ii) Form. A comparison.
 - iii) Emotional (religio-emotional) dimension is implicit.

First Paragraph

In a damage control exercise, the Pakistan military tried to find refuge in 'intelligence failure' as the elusive Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden was killed in a CIA-led helicopter borne raid on a house right under the nose of Pakistan military's training academy.

1) Syntax

- a) Clause 1.
 - i) Phrase-1. **In a damage control exercise**,
 - (1) **In** (preposition).
 - (2) **a** (determiner)
 - (3) **damage control exercise** (compound noun)
 - (4) **,** (punctuation mark)
 - ii) Phrase-2. **the Pakistan military tried to find refuge in 'intelligence failure'**
 - (1) **the** is a definite article, used before a noun to indicate that the identity of the noun is known to the reader.
 - (2) **Pakistan military** is a compound noun taking singular form.
 - (3) **tried** is past participle of verb try.
 - (4) **to** is a proposition
 - (5) **find** verb
 - (6) **tried to find** (verb + proposition + verb) is an Infinitive form of try which means that something is difficult, but an effort is being made or tried but failed.
 - (7) **refuge** is a noun here.
 - (8) **find refuge** is an idiom meaning to go to or into a place for shelter or protection from danger or trouble
 - (9) **in**
 - (10) **'intelligence failure'** a composition of Unaccountable Noun & Variable Noun. The commas (quotation marks) are used to signal beginning and end within the sentence. Newspapers as a convention mostly use single quotation marks in place of double. British use single and American double and according to correct grammar single are to be used once they come inside the double in a sentence. These are also used around a word or phrase that is being discussed. These are also used around a word or phrase that is being discussed.
- b) Clause 2
 - i) Phrase 1. **as the elusive Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden was killed in a CIA-led helicopter borne raid**
 - (1) **as** is a preposition or a conjunction.
 - (2) **the**
 - (3) **elusive** is an adjective (something or someone difficult to find, describe, remember, or achieve).
 - (4) **Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden** is a compound noun.
 - (5) **was** is past tense indicative form of the verb.
 - (6) **killed** (transitive, intransitive) verb used as noun. Word assassination seems more appropriate for being pre-planned.
 - (7) **in a**
 - (8) **CIA-led helicopter borne raid**
 - (a) **CIA** is a proper noun – US government intelligence agency. Complete is "the Central Intelligence Agency"
 - (b) **led** is a passive, infinitive, and past tense version of the verb lead. Can also be used as noun or adjective.

- (c) **helicopter borne.** Borne is a verb (past participle of bear and can be used as adjective. Also used as heliborne in techno-military terms.
- (d) **raid** a noun that can be used as verb. With a prefix becomes noun (heliborne raid).
- ii) Phrase 2. **on a house right under the nose of Pakistan military's training academy.**
 - (1) **on**
 - (2) **a**
 - (3) **house** is basically a noun but can be used as verb or adjective.
 - (4) **right under the nose** is an idiom used to describe something that someone fails to see or notice even though he or she should.
 - (5) **of** is a preposition that indicates relationships between other words/phrases.
 - (6) **Pakistan military's training academy** is a compound noun, commonly known as Pakistan Military Academy -PMA.

2) Semantics

- a) Intelligence Failure (explained below).

Second Paragraph

"We had been looking for him in no-go areas, unaware that he was living so close to an installation of ours. Yes, it is an intelligence failure," a senior military official told Dawn in a background session on OBL's death in an operation carried out by a US Navy SEAL strike team under CIA command.

Third Paragraph

Even as military officials tried to downplay Osama's killing in a compound less than a kilometer away from Kakul academy, they found very few takers of their explanation.

Fourth Paragraph

This was hardly surprising as it is hard to believe that the paranoid security agencies never conducted a reconnaissance of the vicinity of their main training facility during times when military installations faced a continuous threat of terrorist attacks. Odder still is the fact that the military authorities or the intelligence sleuths never felt the need to find out who was using a heavily guarded structure that was protected by barbed wires and fortified walls and had the extra precaution of surveillance cameras.

Analysis

- 1) Intelligence Failure. Most common Theme/Topic or construct in the report which needs further theoretical explication. Few related basics to the concept are: -
 - a) Contemporary Study of Intelligence Failures has 3 Major Perspectives for its occurrence.
 - i) Role of Intelligence Organization.
 - ii) Cognitive Beliefs (both Policymakers & Intelligence Analysts).
 - iii) Operational Performance of Security & Intelligence Agencies.
 - b) Intelligence Organization. Loch Johnson notes: "Weaknesses exist in each step of Intelligence cycle, from planning & direction to collection, processing, analysis, & dissemination" (Johnson 2006: 116).
 - i) Planning & Direction Failure. Caused due to lack of well-defined planning & direction by senior officials & intelligence customers (Johnson 2006: 118).
 - ii) Collection & Processing Failure. Overwhelming of the task of Intelligence collectors, due to abundance of data, who resultantly fails to process the data in a timely manner & provide it to the analysts (Johnson 2006: 120).
 - iii) Analytical Failure. Intelligence analysis is the 'heart' of Int cycle, which requires the analyst to add his/her 'insight' to convert a piece of information into actionable Intelligence (Johnson 2006: 120). Factors which can cause poor analytical judgment include professional incompetence, limited information, or political manipulation.
 - iv) Dissemination Failure. Failure to draw the attention of the national security decision makers (by Intelligence Analyst) who are often pre-occupied with multiple competing issues. Or lack of attention, policymakers' tendency to "cherry-pick" preferred information from Intelligence reports (Johnson 2006: 121).
- 2) Comments
 - a) The introduction of this term in the report is a consequence of the use of term "Intelligence Success" in US/Western Press.
 - b) This also suits the Pakistan's narrative as a better option (of a lesser evil nature), rather than being complicit/involved in supporting/hiding Osama. Though it has not been clearly stipulated by the Pakistani Government, but rather rejected officially.

Fifth Paragraph

It is in fact tragically comical that this compound was at a stone's throw from where Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani attended a parade around a week ago; when he said publicly that his soldiers had broken the back of militants.

Sixth Paragraph

Was the general completely unaware that the most wanted man lived but a short distance away? Did he also not have a clue about what was to happen in the coming days in that town?

Seventh Line

Military officials vehemently insist that they had not been taken on board by the Americans about the operation.

Eighth Line

In hindsight, the flurry of activity that took place in the past week or so indicates that something was up.

Ninth Paragraph

ISAF Commander Gen Petraeus paid an extraordinary visit to Islamabad last Monday (April 25), when he is said to have held 'a short and crisp' discussion with Gen Kayani at an unusual meeting venue -- Chaklala Airbase. The two generals are even said to have taken a short trip to an undisclosed location on board an aircraft. The same night Gen Petraeus had through teleconferencing attended a White House meeting chaired by President Barack Obama.

Tenth Paragraph

Observers feel that President Obama referred to that meeting in his speech on Monday morning, in which he announced the death of Osama: "And finally, last week, I determined that we had enough intelligence to take action, and authorised an operation to get Osama Bin Laden and bring him to justice."

Analysis

1) Justice (word)

- a) Presidential Address. It has been used intentionally & frequently as: -
 - i) Vicious attack to justice.
 - ii) Bring him to justice.
 - iii) **Justice has been done.**
 - iv) Pursuit of justice.
 - v) With liberty and justice for all.
- b) NYT
 - i) Used in Headline (Justice has been done)
 - ii) Justice has been done (used twice)
 - iii) Justice will be done
- c) WP
 - i) Used in Headline (Justice has been done)
 - ii) Justice has been done
 - iii) Justice will be done
- d) Reuters
 - i) Justice has been done
 - ii) Bring Bin Laden to Justice
- e) Dawn
 - i) Used the phrase "Bring him to Justice" while referring to a statement of President Obama.
 - ii) Used once.

2) Comments

- a) Wittingly or unwittingly while following the US/Western's narrative, the word has been reproduced, without going into it details, connotations and implications.
- b) Killing (despite the option of capturing Osama alive) has been justified under the word 'justice'.
- c) Word has been used as synonym of the word 'revenge' or 'assassination' or 'target killing'.

i) References

- (1) Cox, L., & Wood, S. (2017). 'Got him': Revenge, emotions, and the killing of Osama bin Laden. Review of International Studies, 43(1), 112-129. doi:10.1017/S026021051600022X
- (2) Berkowitz, R. (2011). Assassinating Justly: Reflections on Justice and Revenge in the Osama Bin Laden Killing. Law, Culture and the Humanities, 7(3), 346-351. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1743872111418172>
- (3) Gollwitzer, M., Skitka, L. J., Wisneski, D., Sjöström, A., Liberman, P., Nazir, S. J., & Bushman, B. J. (2014). Vicarious revenge and the death of Osama bin Laden. Personality & social psychology bulletin, 40(5), 604-616. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167214521466>

- (4) Dumouchel, Paul. (2012). **Revenge or Justice?: Obama Gets Osama**. Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture. 19. 9-17. 10.1353/ctn.2012.0011.
- (5) Rogers, A., & McGoldrick, D. (2011). ASSASSINATION AND TARGETED KILLING—THE KILLING OF OSAMA BIN LADEN. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 60(3), 778–788. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23017030>.

Eleventh Paragraph

The very next day, Pakistan's top military coordination body -- Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee -- held its quarterly session, which was attended among others by ISI Chief Gen Shuja Pasha, who otherwise isn't a regular member of the body. The meeting was **unscheduled**.

Twelfth Paragraph

The final orders for the raid were signed by President Obama last Friday in the presence of National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, his deputy Denis McDonough and counter-terrorism adviser John Brennan.

Thirteenth Paragraph

Another anomaly in the Pakistan military's account of the raid is their explanation of how four US helicopters evaded the country's air defense system for about an hour (almost 30 minutes each side) as they flew in from Bagram and returned after a 40-minute-long foray.

Fourteenth Paragraph

One official claimed that the helicopters succeeded in avoiding detection through 'Nap of the earth flight' -- a military tactic involving low-altitude flying to evade air defense systems. Yet another maintained that the air defense systems had been jammed by the Americans.

Fifteenth Paragraph

If this sequence of events is to be believed, then why did President Obama appreciate Pakistan's cooperation in the operation? Was it out of love for the country?

Sixteenth Paragraph

"But it's important to note that our counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to Bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding," Mr Obama said.

Seventeenth Paragraph

Whatever the case, Pakistani commanders took heart from President Obama's and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's statements on the incident.

Eighteenth Paragraph

They think that the statements had provided Pakistan with a way out of the awkward situation and given the space for both sides to continue with their war on militancy cooperation.

Nineteenth Paragraph

It was in line with this assessment of the situation and the subsequent American stance that the Foreign Office statement on Osama's killing was drafted. The carefully worded statement renewed its pledge to continue cooperation with the US in fight against militancy.

Twentieth Paragraph

"Pakistan has played a significant role in efforts to eliminate terrorism. We have had extremely effective intelligence sharing arrangements with several intelligence agencies, including that of the US. We will continue to support international efforts against terrorism."

Twenty-first Line

The statement had hailed the operation as "a major setback to terrorist organizations around the world".

Twenty-second Paragraph

Evident from the statement were the worries in the foreign ministry and among the civilian leadership and among military command about the questions that would be asked, especially about the violation of country's sovereignty during the conduct of the operation. Hence, it took recourse to America's right of defense and international law.

Thematic Realization (Macro-Micro)-Themes

<p style="text-align: center;">PAK MILITARY CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE</p>
<p>From the Newspaper Published May 2, 2011</p>
<p>ISLAMABAD: As the United States announced the death of Osama bin Laden, the Pakistani state, especially its military struggled to explain the role it played in the momentous event and contain the domestic political fallout on Monday.</p> <p>In a damage control exercise, the Pakistan military tried to find refuge in 'intelligence failure' as the elusive Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden was killed in a CIA-led helicopter borne raid on a house right under the nose of Pakistan military's training academy.</p> <p>"We had been looking for him in no-go areas, unaware that he was living so close to an installation of ours. Yes, it is an intelligence failure," a senior military official told Dawn in a background session on OBL's death in an operation carried out by a US Navy SEAL strike team under CIA command. Even as military officials tried to downplay Osama's killing in a compound less than a kilometer away from Kakul academy, they found very few takers of their explanation.</p> <p>This was hardly surprising as it is hard to believe that the paranoid security agencies never conducted a reconnaissance of the vicinity of their main training facility during times when military installations faced a continuous threat of terrorist attacks. Odder still is the fact that the military authorities or the intelligence sleuths never felt the need to find out who was using a heavily guarded structure that was protected by barded wires and fortified walls and had the extra precaution of surveillance cameras.</p> <p>It is in fact tragically comical that this compound was at a stone's throw from where Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani attended a parade around a week ago; when he said publicly that his soldiers had broken the back of militants.</p> <p>Was the general completely unaware that the most wanted man lived but a short distance away? Did he also not have a clue about what was to happen in the coming days in that town?</p> <p>Military officials vehemently insist that they had not been taken on board by the Americans about the operation.</p> <p>In hindsight, the flurry of activity that took place in the past week or so indicates that something was up.</p> <p>ISAF Commander Gen Petraeus paid an extraordinary visit to Islamabad last Monday (April 25), when he is said to have held 'a short and crisp' discussion with Gen Kayani at an unusual meeting venue -- Chaklala Airbase. The two generals are even said to have taken a short trip to an undisclosed location on board an aircraft. The same night Gen Petraeus had through teleconferencing attended a White House meeting chaired by President Barack Obama.</p> <p>Observers feel that President Obama referred to that meeting in his speech on Monday morning, in which he announced the death of Osama: "And finally, last week, I determined that we had enough intelligence to take action, and authorised an operation to get Osama Bin Laden and bring him to justice."</p> <p>The very next day, Pakistan's top military coordination body -- Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee -- held its quarterly session, which was attended among others by ISI Chief Gen Shuja Pasha, who otherwise isn't a regular member of the body. The meeting was unscheduled.</p> <p>The final orders for the raid were signed by President Obama last Friday in the presence of National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, his deputy Denis McDonough and counter-terrorism adviser John Brennan.</p> <p>However, it is not just the denial of the Pakistan army of any prior knowledge of the operation that is raising eyebrows.</p> <p>Another anomaly in the Pakistan military's account of the raid is their explanation of how four US helicopters evaded the country's air defense system for about an hour (almost 30 minutes each side) as they flew in from Bagram and returned after a 40-minute-long foray.</p> <p>One official claimed that the helicopters succeeded in avoiding detection through 'Nap of the earth flight' -- a military tactic involving low-altitude flying to evade air defense systems. Yet another maintained that the air defense systems had been jammed by the Americans.</p> <p>If this sequence of events is to be believed, then why did President Obama appreciate Pakistan's cooperation in the operation? Was it out of love for the country?</p>

“But it’s important to note that our counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to Bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding,” Mr Obama said.

Whatever the case, Pakistani commanders took heart from President Obama’s and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s statements on the incident.

They think that the statements had provided Pakistan with a way out of the awkward situation and given the space for both sides to continue with their war on militancy cooperation.

It was in line with this assessment of the situation and the subsequent American stance that the Foreign Office statement on Osama’s killing was drafted. The carefully worded statement renewed its pledge to continue cooperation with the US in fight against militancy.

“Pakistan has played a significant role in efforts to eliminate terrorism. We have had extremely effective intelligence sharing arrangements with several intelligence agencies, including that of the US. We will continue to support international efforts against terrorism.”

The statement had hailed the operation as “a major setback to terrorist organizations around the world”.

Evident from the statement were the worries in the foreign ministry and among the civilian leadership and among military command about the questions that would be asked, especially about the violation of country’s sovereignty during the conduct of the operation. Hence, it took recourse to America’s right of defense and international law.

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on 08 Oct 2023

Thematic Realization (The Organization)

MAIN EVENT GRAVE SITUATION OF PAK MILITARY AFTER OBL RAID (Damage Control Exercise on Intelligence Failure)				
MAIN EVENT-1 Abbottabad Raid		MAIN EVENT-2 COAS attended PMA Passing Out Parade	MAIN EVENT-3 JCSC Meeting	MAIN EVENT-4 Foreign Office Statement
ANTECEDENT IASF Commander Meeting with COAS (April 25)	CONSEQUENCE Announcement by US President Obama			
Comment * Flurry of activity in past week. * Short & crisp discussion at an unusual venue -- Chaklala Airbase. * Short trip to an undisclosed location on board an aircraft. * ISAF Commander attended meeting of Obama. Implicature Pak Military is complicit.	Comments * Intelligence Failure * Downplay * Intelligence Failure (sleuth) * Evasion of Air Defense System * Obama praise of cooperation * Statement of Hillary Clinton	Comments * Stone Throw away from PMA parade. * Broken the back of militants. * Taken on board by US?	Comments * Attended by ISI Chief (non-regular member) * Unscheduled meeting	Comments * Worries Evident in Statement. * Question about violation of country’s sovereignty. * Taking of recourse to America’s right of defense & international law.

Comments


1. Fixed categories (Causes/Conditions, Antecedents & Consequences) with inter relations.
2. Realization in Episodic Manner.
3. Top-down Principle.
4. Based on ‘Relevance’ principle of news, in viewing size constraints.
5. Use of Inverse Macro (high level/macro/abstract information is specified first). In Installments & cyclic manner.
6. References are both (intentional & extensional).
7. For each theme (Context/Situation & Participants) are not properly defined.
8. Situation Model

- a. Due to the exceptional nature of the event the situational structure of this news report is not totally in line with the Situation Model of Newspaper/readers for ideology & belief respectively.
- b. New Situation Models are also being made.

Topic Derivation (Schema-Superstructure)-Topics

on 08 Oct 2023

1) Schemata/Schema (News report)



a) SUMMARY

i) HEADLINE: TOPIC, SUPERSTRUCTURE/MACRO PROPOSITION

(1) Syntax.

- (a) **Pak Military** (Subject/Compound Noun (Abbreviation). **Caught** (Predicate/verb) **in** (preposition) **the** (article) **Cross Fire** (Compound Noun).
- (b) **Pak Military** (Predicate) and **Caught in the Cross Fire** an Argument: Premise & Conclusion.

(2) Semantic.

- (a) Meaning; unintended casualties caused to third party due to belligerent's action (collateral damage).
- (b) An idiomatic expression/phrase (with figurative meaning). Literal meaning applies partially.

(3) Pragmatics.

- (a) Assertion
- (b) Inference; Caught presupposes innocence.
- (c) Cross Firing between 2 opponents.

(4) Style.

- (a) 'Pak Military' is a stylistic variation in surface structure, while meaning remains as Pakistan Military
- (b) Word choice represents ideology (as Pak in Urdu language).

(5) Rhetoric.

- (a) Word 'Pak Army' appeals or arouses attitude and emotions.
- (b) Word 'Caught' precludes the chance of tacit involvement.

ii) **LEAD** (Summary Function with Headline): Coinciding Lead.

(1) Thematic Realization

- (a) Antecedent. **US announce death of OBL.**
- (b) Consequence. **PS (military) struggle to explain its role.**
- (c) Conditions

- (i) Containment of Domestic Political Fallout.
 - (ii) Momentous Event.
- b) STORY
 - i) SITUATION
 - (1) EPISODE
 - (a) **MAIN EVENT** (Serial-1)
 - (b) **CONSEQUENCES/REACTION (Verbal Reaction)** (Serial-2)
 - ii) COMMENTS (OF WRITER ON VERBAL REACTION).
 - (1) CONCLUSION
 - (a) **EVALUATION.** (Serial-3 & 4)
 - (i) **Opinion**
 - 1. **Journalist.** or
 - 2. Newspaper.
 - (b) **Note.** There is an inaccuracy in the (first) comments of Journalist or Newspaper as “the distance from PMA is not less than a kilometer away” (but actually it is exactly 1375 meter from PMA/academy) and has been wrongly mentioned as such based on **sources** of the news report.
 - (2) SITUATION
 - (a) BACKGROUND
 - (i) CONTEXT
 - 1. **PREVIOUS EVENT** (Serial-5)
 - iii) COMMENTS
 - (1) **EVALUATION** (Serial-6)
 - (a) **Opinion**
 - (i) **Journalist**
 - (ii) Newspaper
 - iv) SITUATION
 - (1) EPISODE
 - (a) MAIN EVENT
 - (b) **CONSEQUENCES/REACTION.** Remarks. (Serial-7)
 - v) COMMENTS
 - (1) **EVALUATION** (Serial-8)
 - (a) **Opinion**
 - (i) **Journalist**
 - (ii) Newspaper
 - vi) SITUATION
 - (1) EPISODE
 - (a) EVENT
 - (i) BACKGROUND
 - 1. CIRCUMSTANCES
 - a. **PREVIOUS EVENT** (Serial-9)
 - vii) SITUATION
 - (1) BACKGROUND
 - (a) CONTEXT
 - (i) **CIRCUMSTANCES** (Observers Feel) (Serial-10)
 - viii) SITUATION
 - (1) EPISODE
 - (a) **CONSEQUENCES** (JCSC Meeting) (Serial-11)
 - ix) SITUATION
 - (1) EPISODE
 - (a) EVENT (Signing of Order) (Serial-12)
 - x) COMMENTS
 - (1) CONCLUSIONS
 - (a) **EVALUATION** (Serial 13 & 14)

- (i) **Concerns/Opinion**
 - 1. **Journalist**
 - 2. Newspaper
 - xi) COMMENTS
 - (1) **VERBAL REACTION** (Response to Concerns) (Serial-15)
 - xii) COMMENTS
 - (1) CONCLUSION
 - (a) **EVALUATION** (Serial-16)
 - (i) **Opinion**
 - 1. **Journalist**
 - 2. Newspaper
 - xiii) SITUATION
 - (1) EPISODE
 - (a) **EVENT (Obama's Statement)** (Serial-17)
 - xiv) COMMENTS
 - (1) CONCLUSIONS
 - (a) **EVALUATION** (Serial 18, 19, & 20)
 - (i) **Opinion**
 - 1. **Journalist**
 - 2. Newspaper
 - xv) SITUATION
 - (1) EPISODE
 - (a) CONSEQUENCES (FO Statement) (Serial-21 & 22)
 - xvi) COMMENTS
 - (1) CONCLUSIONS
 - (a) **EVALUATION** (Serial-23)
 - (i) **Opinion/Prediction/Expectation**
 - 1. **Journalist**
 - 2. Newspaper
- 2) **Comments**
 - a) Summary is complete with Headline & Lead. They have been dealt with according to the Schema.
 - b) Story including Situation & Comments are next to follow according to the Schemata. In that Situation & Comments appear in a cyclic order with no pattern.
 - c) The story being a major story has been covered in small paras (total 23) to cover it 360 degrees.
 - d) The story has covered maximum of segments of Schemata. Only History & Expectations have not been covered. This is probably due to the fragile nature of the story.

Oversight Roles Played by News Media

PAK MILITARY CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE	
From the Newspaper Published May 2, 2011 11:15 PM PKT (21:45 hours after the Raid)	
ISLAMABAD: As the United States announced the death of Osama bin Laden, the Pakistani state, especially its military struggled to explain the role it played in the momentous event and contain the domestic political fallout on Monday.	
1.	In a damage control exercise, the Pakistan military tried to find refuge in 'intelligence failure' as the elusive Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden was killed in a CIA-led helicopter borne raid on a house right under the nose of Pakistan military's training academy.
2.	"We had been looking for him in no-go areas, unaware that he was living so close to an installation of ours. Yes, it is an intelligence failure," a senior military official told Dawn in a background session on OBL's death in an operation carried out by a US Navy SEAL strike team under CIA command.
	Even as military officials tried to downplay Osama's killing in a compound less than a kilometer away from Kakul academy, they found very few takers of their explanation. This was hardly surprising as it is hard to believe that the paranoid security agencies never conducted a reconnaissance of the vicinity of their main training facility during times when military installations faced a continuous threat of terrorist attacks. Odder still is the fact that the military authorities or the intelligence sleuths never felt the need to find out who was using a heavily guarded structure that was protected by barded wires and fortified walls and had the extra precaution of surveillance cameras.
3.	It is in fact tragically comical that this compound was at a stone's throw from where Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani attended a parade around a week ago; when he said publicly that his soldiers had broken the back of militants.
4.	Was the general completely unaware that the most wanted man lived but a short distance away? Did he also not have a clue about what was to happen in the coming days in that town?
	Military officials vehemently insist that they had not been taken on board by the Americans about the operation.
5.	In hindsight, the flurry of activity that took place in the past week or so indicates that something was up.
	ISAF Commander Gen Petraeus paid an extraordinary visit to Islamabad last Monday (April 25), when he is said to have held 'a short and crisp' discussion with Gen Kayani at an unusual meeting venue -- Chaklala Airbase. The two generals are even said to have taken a short trip to an undisclosed location on board an aircraft. The same night Gen Petraeus had through teleconferencing attended a White House meeting chaired by President Barack Obama.
6.	Observers feel that President Obama referred to that meeting in his speech on Monday morning, in which he announced the death of Osama: "And finally, last week, I determined that we had enough intelligence to take action, and authorised an operation to get Osama Bin Laden and bring him to justice."
7.	The very next day, Pakistan's top military coordination body -- Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee -- held its quarterly session, which was attended among others by ISI Chief Gen Shuja Pasha, who otherwise isn't a regular member of the body. The meeting was unscheduled.
8.	The final orders for the raid were signed by President Obama last Friday in the presence of National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, his deputy Denis McDonough and counter-terrorism adviser John Brennan.
9.	However, it is not just the denial of the Pakistan army of any prior knowledge of the operation that is raising eyebrows.
	Another anomaly in the Pakistan military's account of the raid is their explanation of how four US helicopters evaded the country's air defense system for about an hour (almost 30 minutes each side) as they flew in from Bagram and returned after a 40-minute-long foray.
10.	One official claimed that the helicopters succeeded in avoiding detection through 'Nap of the earth flight' -- a military tactic involving low-altitude flying to evade air defense systems. Yet another maintained that the air defense systems had been jammed by the Americans.

If this sequence of events is to be believed, then why did President Obama appreciate Pakistan's cooperation in the operation? Was it out of love for the country?	
11.	"But it's important to note that our counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to Bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding," Mr Obama said.
12.	Whatever the case, Pakistani commanders took heart from President Obama's and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's statements on the incident.
They think that the statements had provided Pakistan with a way out of the awkward situation and given the space for both sides to continue with their war on militancy cooperation.	
13.	It was in line with this assessment of the situation and the subsequent American stance that the Foreign Office statement on Osama's killing was drafted. The carefully worded statement renewed its pledge to continue cooperation with the US in fight against militancy.
"Pakistan has played a significant role in efforts to eliminate terrorism. We have had extremely effective intelligence sharing arrangements with several intelligence agencies, including that of the US. We will continue to support international efforts against terrorism." The statement had hailed the operation as "a major setback to terrorist organizations around the world".	
14.	Evident from the statement were the worries in the foreign ministry and among the civilian leadership and among military command about the questions that would be asked, especially about the violation of country's sovereignty during the conduct of the operation. Hence, it took recourse to America's right of defense and international law.

<https://dawn.epaper.pk/>
on 08 Oct 2023

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ROLE PLAYED BY NEWS MEDIA IN INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (400) (Indicators)			
INFORMATION TRANSMISSION & STIMULATION (100) * For Formal Scrutinizers	SUBSTITUTE WATCH	LEGITIMIZE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES &	SENSITIZE PUBLIC (50)

				DOG (200) *	ACTIVITIES (50)	
ORIGIN/SOURCE (10)	SCRUTINY OF POLICY / ACTIVITY (40)	STIMULATION OR ASSISTANCE TO (10)	ROLE OF ORGANIZATION (10)	POSSIBLE ROLES (100)	LEGITIMIZATION (25), BUILDING BRIDGES (25)	HOSTILE AGENCIES (30), ESPIONAGE RISKS, OWN (10), EDUCATION (10)
Comment * Weak Acquisition (after 21:45 hours*) * Mix of Regurgitating Facts & Critical Assessment. * (5)	Comment * Weak Investigative Effort with No New information, Weak Intervention Level (secondary source). Interview of Local Sources (anonymous) only * Only review of activity, without much significant line of thought. * Late & Judgmental. * (15)	Comment * Identification & Attention. * Public Debate. * (5)	Comments * Strong Standing & Positioning. * Weak treatment. * (6)	Comments * Despite capacity, just reproduction & comments. * Channel for leaking information of foreign media. * (20)	Comments * Challenging activities. * Asking questions * Labelling Failure * Only reproduction of FO Statement. * Counter-productive. * (05)	Comments * Creating more confusion. * HIA not identified. * Facilitating 5th Generation Warfare. * (05)
31				20	05	05
Final Comments <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weak Role played by the media 61/400 (15.25 %) 						

Comments

9. Capacity issues of the beat and paucity of related infrastructure.
 10. No Investigative Journalism.
 11. Intelligence Antagonism prevents Assistance.
 12. Despite the opportunity the Substitute Role is missing.
 13. No legitimization.
 14. No Sensitization.
 15. Intelligence Failure is the dominant Narrative taken throughout.
- Note. Military & Intelligence word used interchangeably due to existent structure in the country.

Oversight Evaluation Index

(A Contextual Model)

By Claudia Hillebrand, Kristof Clerix, Luuk Clausing and Raja Shahid Ali

1. Introduction

We find different indexes being frequently referred to measure and report different indexes, which are otherwise complex to explain. Scientific methods and techniques substantiate the findings, and these indexes have also evolved over time. In view of same an effort has been to devise a contextual model of measuring the informal oversight role of media in relation to intelligence agencies' monitoring in Pakistan.

- a. Purpose of the Index. In order to measure the informal oversight by media on Intelligence Agencies, there is a need to develop an index, deliberate enough to report or predict to a level of certainty instead of a wild guess or just the perception.
- b. Geographical scope. Presently at national level (Pakistan).

2. **Conceptual Framework:** Key dimensions and indicators that will be measured are the desired media's roles given by Claudia Hillebrand's as four oversight roles: -

- a. Transmission and Stimulation for Formal Scrutinizers of the country.
- b. Substitute Watchdog in case of incapability or unwillingness of formal scrutinizer.
- c. Legitimizing Intelligence Services & Their Activities.
- d. Sensitize the Public regarding the Espionage Risks of Hostile Intelligence Agencies operating in the country.

3. Dimensions and Indicators

- a. **Transmitter and Stimulator** (100 marks)
 - i. Objective. To assess the media's ability to provide the formal scrutinizer and public with information about intelligence agencies' activities (transmit and stimulate the formal scrutinizer).
 - ii. Indicators
 - (1) Transmission - Information and or Observation (Facts/Comments)
 - (a) Origin/Source (10 marks)
 - (i) Own – Journalist, Editors, Newspaper (acquisition efforts) (4)
 - (ii) Outside – Guest Author (Journalist or Non-Journalists) (3)
 1. Critical Assessment Efforts (2)
 2. Regurgitation of Facts (0)
 - (iii) Anonymous (1)
 - (2) Scrutiny of Intelligence Policy or Activity (Beyond Factual) (40 marks)
 - (a) Investigative Efforts Performed (Real/Significance) indirectly referred by in-text signals. (15)
 - (i) Nature of Information – Critical/New Insight to Intelligence. (Considerably dependent on source) (5)
 - (ii) Intervention Level for its Exposure. (5)
 1. Own Effort or Source Initiated

2. Recent Disclosure or already held knowledge (for years)
3. Source (Exclusive or Common)
4. Approach to Source (Initial or Secondary)
- (iii) Source (5)
 1. Human (Formal Scrutinizer, Politician, Official/Expert, or Intelligence Community) through exclusive interview/conversation.
 2. Non-Human (Achieves, Database, Others)
- (b) Critical Discussion, Review or Assessment (15)
 - (i) Journalist's Co- Relation and Interpretation (7)
 1. Available Information
 2. Retrieved by Journalist/Self
 - (ii) Significant Line of Thought (8)
 1. Elaborative/Descriptive
 2. Inquisitory (Questions)
 3. Criticizing
 4. Judgmental
 - (c) Presentation by Journalist (10)
 - (i) Nature of output (Elaborative/Descriptive, Inquisitory, Criticizing or Judgmental) (3)
 - (ii) Time Factor (4)
 - (iii) Clear Line of Thought (2)
 - (iv) Norms (Legal or ethical) (1)
- (3) Stimulation or Assistance to Formal Scrutinizer (Formal Oversight-Politicians or Bodies)
 - (a) Identification } (2)
 - (b) Attention }
 - (c) Initiation of Pressure } (3)
 - (d) Persistence }
 - (e) Public Debate }
 - (f) Policy Amendment or Response generation } (5)
- (4) Role of Organization (newspaper organization etc.) (10)
 - (a) Standing and Positioning (2)
 - (b) Treatment Given (8)
- b. **Substitute Watchdog** (200)
 - i. Objective: To substitute formal scrutinizer in his absence or incapability to perform the desired role. It is a specialized field requiring experience, resources, and time (expensive) where well-established Investigative Journalism (training and experience) is a basic pre-requisite.
 - ii. Factors for Efficiency of this role (50 marks be given to deficient nations)
 - (1) Capacity of Media (economic and political)

- (2) Size of Intelligence Community and number of Intelligence Operations
 - (3) History of State (Repressive/Facilitative)
 - (4) Nature of Society (Open/Deep/Closed)
 - (5) Public Awareness and Democracy
- iii. Indicators/Possible Roles (with persistence) (150 marks) or [100]
 - (1) Scandals (Especially in absence of Input from Intelligence). (50) [30]
 - (2) Assistance to Whistleblowing (40) [15]
 - (3) Second opinion to intelligence related legislation (30) [10 each]
 - (4) Sharp Translation of Official Reports
 - (5) Education of formal scrutinizer, public, civil society and agencies (20) [10]
 - (6) Development of literature (10) [5]
 - (7) Channel for Leakage of Information (Not an Investigative Journalism) (10) [10]
 - (8) Use by Opposition for Public Interest/Otherwise [10]
- d. **Legitimization Role** (50)
 - i. Objective: A reassuring tool, where (indirectly) by informing the public about the policies and activities of intelligence services, these agencies and their activities are indirectly legitimized.
 - ii. Indicators:
 - (1) Legitimization (25)
 - (a) Informing the public (Intelligence Policies, Services, Secrecy and Openness) (5)
 - (b) Public Acceptance for Existence, Mandate and Budget (5)
 - (c) Building Faith that Intelligence is being observed independently (Investigative Journalism) (10)
 - (d) Building Public Support and Co-operation (5)
 - (2) Building Bridges (25)
 - (a) Reports on successful operations/assistance (5)
 - (b) Showing of Reform Process (10)
 - (c) Drawing Away of Undue Blame/Credit from Agencies (even through neutral language) (10)
- e. **Sensitization Role for Public regarding the Espionage Risks** (Kristof Clerix) (50)
 - i. Objective: Assess the media's role in advocating for transparency and reforms in intelligence agencies.
 - ii. Indicators:
 - (1) Identification of Hostile Agencies for Public (Factual) for Espionage Risks (30)
 - (a) Prevention, Reporting and Counter measures (15)
 - (b) Motives and themes (5)
 - (c) Operations and Operatives (5)
 - (d) Education (Intelligence craft) (5)
 - (2) Identification for Own Agencies (Secrecy) (10)
 - (3) Education (Fifth Generation Warfare) (10)

4. **Methodology**
 - a. Data Collection
 - i. Content Analysis: Three analyses from selected newspapers (Dawn, The News, The Daily Times, The Nation and The Express Tribune) over a different specified period.
 - ii. Surveys and Interviews: Surveys and interviews with journalists, experts, and stakeholders to gather qualitative insights are yet to be undertaken.
 - iii. Secondary Data: Reports from press freedom organizations, media watchdogs, and academic research have also been collected in the continued process.
5. **Scoring and Weighting**
 - a. Normalization: Normalizing of data to ensure comparability across different indicators is not the requirement of this index as different values have been given to each indicator due in process.
 - b. Weighting: Different weights to each indicator have been assigned different 'marks' based on the importance within each oversight role and within the roles.
 - c. Composite Scoring: Aggregate scores to create a composite score for each oversight role and an overall index score have been calculated.
6. **Validation and Reliability**
 - a. Internal Validation.
 - i. Reliability Testing: Use statistical tests to ensure the reliability of the index (like, Cronbach's alpha) has not been taken so far.
 - ii. Expert Review: Engage experts to review the methodology and provide feedback.
 - b. External Validation.
 - i. Comparative Analysis: Compare the index results with other related indices (e.g., press freedom indices).
 - ii. Case Studies: A case studies will be initiated to validate the index findings.
7. **Reporting and Dissemination**
 - a. Documentation.
 - i. Methodology Report: Documentation of methodology, including indicator selection, data sources, and scoring process is in process.
 - ii. Index Report: To publish the index results, including detailed country profiles and case studies an index report will be produces soon.
 - b. Dissemination.
 - i. Academic Publications. Publishing of findings in academic journals is in process.
 - ii. Media and Public Reports. Release of reports to the media and public to raise awareness will be taken in due course of time.
 - iii. Workshops and Conferences. The opportunity of presenting findings at relevant workshops and conferences to engage stakeholders is being pursued.
8. **Conclusion**

By no mean this index and the related study is complete and will have to go under the scrutiny of researchers and time till it is finally proven useful overtime. But the importance of

this type of matrix can't be denied at any level. It will not only impact the stakeholders but will promote transparency and accountability, the ultimate aim of the vocation. In future there is a strong need to synthesize this concept and model for the optimal requirement of the same, like any other model in the market.