

# Media [& Political] Discourse In Pakistan Since 9/11: A Critical Discourse Analytic Approach

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A research dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of a PhD  
(English) degree

Department of English Language and Literature  
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
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
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
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
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## Declaration

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I, Akhtar Aziz, do hereby solemnly declare that the work produced for this dissertation is my own, and has not been presented to any other institution or university for a degree.

This work was carried out and completed at International Islamic University Islamabad, Pakistan.



Akhtar Aziz

## Dedication

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To my wife Cyma who has, alongside, completed a PhD in patience and tolerance.

"Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es"

(They do not know it, but they are doing it)

Das Kapital, Karl Marx

## List of Abbreviations

AD	American Dream
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CI	Communist Ideology
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
DE	Discursive Event
DH	Discourse Historical
EF	Evil Force
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (USA)
FI	Fiercely Independent
IDFs	Ideological-Discursive Formations
II	Islamic Ideology
ISAs	Ideological State Apparatuses
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
JD	Jehad Dispositive
JUI	Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Pakistan)
MO	Mighty Oppressor
NA	Northern Alliance (Afghanistan)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
RSAs	Repressive State Apparatuses
SFG	Systemic Functional Grammar
TTP	Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan

TNSM Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (Pakistan)

UN United Nations

UR Universal Rights

US United States

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

WoT War on Terror

WTC World Trade Center



## Abstract

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This project is a linguistic investigation of the political and media discourse in Pakistan in a post 9/11 scenario regarding religious militancy with a major focus on the workings of ideology through language. The study has also analyzed an apparent shift in the Pre- and Post-9/11 discourses by making use of the Discourse Historical Method within the broader Critical Discourse Analytic (CDA) perspective. As CDA has a lot to do with relations of power this study sets out with an assumption that the political and media discourse in a weak third world country like Pakistan may be influenced by a powerful country like the US and how all of these discourses may have been propagating wars by making use of religious ideologies.

In order to appreciate the effect on the political discourse this study has included an analysis of the important statements of the political leadership in the US and Pakistan regarding religious militancy in the region. For the analysis of media discourse, excerpts of editorials from three mainstream English newspapers in Pakistan have been analyzed for their use of language on some Discursive Events pertaining to or originating from the 9/11 bombings.

An important objective of this research was to analyze the vital role that mass media has assumed in shaping the destiny of a country like Pakistan and to create awareness in the general public regarding the agendas working through language used in the political and media discourse. Being a potential publication, it may help professionals in understanding the delicate workings of this overwhelming domain of modern life.

The study has found out that the religious militancy has been promoted in the region in the Pre-9/11 era through an organized discourse drawing upon religious ideology and the same ideology is being used to mortify that militancy in a post-9/11 scenario. The study has also found out that Pakistan as a third world country does not have an independent discourse and borrows it from a dominant super power. The dissertation comprises eight chapters

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## Chapter 01: Introduction

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There have been two famous bombings in recent history that have changed the face of this earth in contrasting ways. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 brought an end to a deadly and destructive war but the bombings in America on September 11, 2001 (9/11), on the other hand, ushered in a new era of death and destruction in the world. Whether we call it 'terrorism', 'militancy', 'Jihad' or 'guerrilla warfare', the fact remains that the world has not remained the same as it used to be before 9/11. This incident has changed the world in many ways. It has not only set in train war and destruction but has also converted the theoretical construct of the 'Clash of Civilizations' into a concrete reality by pitching the Islamic and the Western worlds against each other.

As human beings we describe and record our realities in our languages and whenever there is a shift in reality it is bound to affect the languages that describe it. This research aims at understanding an apparent shift in the political and media discourse regarding religious militancy in Pakistan since 9/11. It is pertinent to mention here that the religious militancy in this part of the region is not a post-9/11 phenomenon and its roots may be traced back to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent struggle by the Afghan nation to end that occupation. The post 9/11 discourse analysis would, therefore, be superficial unless it includes the Pre-9/11 developments that led to a catastrophe like 9/11. That's why this research includes a brief analysis of the political and media discourse in a selected Pre-9/11 period to find out whether an actual shift in these discourses has taken place after 9/11 and what may be the reasons behind that.

### **1.1. Afghanistan-A Brief History since 1953:**

Despite a consistent denial by the Pakistani and American governments for many years, it is a truth now universally acknowledged that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was resisted by the Afghan people who were funded and supported by the US and many other Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Pakistan, taking the role of a frontline state, not only served as a conduit for arms supply to the Afghan resistance but also collaborated with CIA to recruit, train and facilitate the guerrilla fighters from all across the Muslim world (Crile, 2007) (Nichols, 2007). Though this fact has remained an open secret for a long time, it was always labelled as 'moral support' and 'humanitarian assistance' by the US and Pakistani governments. Following is a brief historical description of events leading up to 9/11.

#### **1.1.1 Sardar Daud and the Saur Revolution:**

The roots of the current situation in Afghanistan may be traced back to the 1950s during the reign of King Zahir Shah (1933-73) when Afghanistan entered a process of modernization and democratization under the supervision of Prime Minister Sardar Daud (1953-63), an ambitious brother-in-law of King Zahir Shah. He introduced many social reforms aiming at education, land distribution and women rights. He irritated the deeply religious sections of the society by encouraging women not to veil themselves as it was not ordained by any Islamic law. He also encouraged female education, employment and representation in the parliament. He imprisoned many religious leaders for their protests and preaching against his reforms (Rasanayagam, 2005).

His positive social reforms agenda was, however, marred by his obsession with the idea of creating a Pakhtunistan federation including the Pakhtun and tribal regions of the newly independent Pakistan. The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan thus has been a sour

one right from the beginning with Pakistan still dreaming to have a friendly government on its long north western frontier. A tribal feud on the border areas turned into a short war between the two countries in 1960 when Ayub Khan was ruling Pakistan. This led to the closure of consulates and then in 1961 Daud broke diplomatic relations with Pakistan and closed the border for 5 months. This was a grave mistake on his part as Pakistan was the only trade transit route for the landlocked country. The Afghan economy was on the verge of collapse when after the refusal of the US the Soviets agreed to bail out the country and continued to help Afghanistan both in cash and kind. This included construction of infrastructure and training of the military officers who spent years in the USSR. The success of the Communist Saur Revolution in 1978 in a deeply conservative and religious society has probably a lot to do with this training of the Afghan army.

Daud's inclination towards the USSR, however, was economical rather than ideological. In fact Daud kept many budding Marxists in prison for a long time that included Dr Abdur Rehman Mahmoodi, Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghubar, Mir Akbar Khyber and Babrak Karmal. Nur Mohammad Tarakai was basically a short story writer with leftist leanings and served as cultural attaché in Washington for the Daud government. He was sacked but not imprisoned after his anti-monarchy statements. All these kept promoting Marxism among the youth of Afghanistan through their secret study circles. They also managed to inspire a significant number of Army officers who later on helped them in the Saur Revolution. They established the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1965 but it got divided into two factions Khalq and Parcham after two years because of differences between Tarakai and Karmal (Rasanayagam, 2005).

Just as the communist ideology started influencing the youth and elite of the Afghan nation, there was a parallel Islamist movement in the educational institutions which was deriving its inspiration from Al Azhar University and Ikhwan ul Muslimeen Movement in Egypt based on the teachings of Hasan al-Bana and Syed Qutub. An equally potent inspiration was from the teachings of Abul Aala Maududi in the neighbouring Pakistan who had founded his Jama'at-i-Islami before the partition of India. These proponents of Pan-Islamism were different from the Ulema from traditional seminaries like Deoband and Aligarh in that they focused more on the political dimensions of Islam and considered it to be both religion and state (Olesen, 1996). They considered Islam to be a complete code of life rather than mere rituals and wanted to establish states based on laws of Islam. They in fact were running currents of an Islamic Renaissance all across the Muslim world that was to be based on progress in science and technology and was to create an Islamic brotherhood well equipped to meet the requirements of a modern world. As against the orthodox religious movements taking their inspiration from the traditional seminaries, this movement targeted the highly educated class of people studying or teaching at modern educational institutions.

The origins of this pan-Islamism in Afghanistan can be traced back to the creation of Jamiat-i-Islami by a group of professors at the Kabul University in 1965 headed by Ghulam Mohammad Niazi. The Afghan Jamiat-i-Islami included teachers like Prof Burhanuddin Rabbani and Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf and they patronised its student wing Sazman-i- Jawanan-i-Mussalmaan (Organization of Muslim Youth) that included Ahmad Shah Masood and Gulbadin Hekmatyar (Rasanayagam, 2005). All these, as we know them later on, became the leading Mujahideen leaders against the Russian occupation.

Sibghatullah Mujaddadi, belonging to the most influential spiritual family of Afghanistan also aligned himself with the Jamiat for some time which was a kind of breaking away from the Sufi tradition of Islam and he later on founded his own political party and also remained part of the Mujahideen formations during the Soviet occupation. There was a state of violent conflict between the Islamist and the leftist student groups in the educational institutions of Afghanistan throughout this period that included killing of each other's members and acid throwing on unveiled women (Olesen, 1996). They also tried to topple the Daud government and had to flee to Pakistan after failure. They continued to live in Pakistan and worked against the successive communist governments in Kabul till the Soviet intervention (Ahmad Shah Masood, 2001).

Sardar Daud had to resign for his failures in 1963 but he came back after toppling King Zahir Shah in 1973 when he was in Europe on a holiday. He continued on his agenda of social and agrarian reforms and also his dream of creating Pakhtunistan. He allegedly supported the Pakhtun nationalists in Pakistan led by Ghaffar Khan in the Frontier and Baluchistan provinces and many of its leaders spent years in exile in Afghanistan after failed insurgencies in Pakistan particularly during the Bhutto era after the separation of East Pakistan. Daud thought it to be the most appropriate time to encourage separatist movements in Pakistan but Z A Bhutto's government managed to suppress those movements and allegedly encouraged the Islamist and other anti-Daud groups to topple his government (Rasanayagam, 2005).

In April 1978, decades of training the Afghan officers by the Soviet Army bore its final fruit when the leftist officers led by Major Aslam Watanjar and backed by PDPA (Khalq & Parcham) staged a coup against the Daud government which later on came to be known as the Saur Revolution. Daud was killed and Noor Mohammad Taraki took over as Prime Minister



whereas Babrak Karmal, Hafizul Amin and Watanjar were made deputy Prime Ministers. The Parcham faction led by Babrak Karmal was soon sidelined and ousted by the conspiracies of the shrewd Hafizul Amin and they started resisting the government along with other groups based on national, social, ethnic and religious grounds.

In March 1979 a mutiny in Herat resulted in the killing of many Soviet advisors and their families. Further internal strife within the party created a rift between Tarakai and Amin and in September 1979 Amin overthrew Tarakai and sent him to prison. Amin believed that the Soviets would protect him because of his long term close relations and his command of the military. The Soviets however stormed his palace on Dec 27 and executed him probably because of his alleged secret relations with the west. He was replaced by Babrak Karmal who managed to survive till 1985 with the support of the Soviet occupation forces.

#### **1.1.2. The Soviet Era and the Fall of Kabul (1979-92):**

That the Saur Revolution will culminate into a full-fledged invasion and occupation of Afghanistan was probably not a part of the plan till the involvement of players from the west who did not want Afghanistan to be turned into another satellite state of the Soviet Union. The west projected this invasion as an expansionist move to get control of the oil-rich Gulf region. The Soviet perspective on this move, however, refutes this allegation and they project it as a move in self-defense against American expansionist operations through supporting the Islamist fighters against the communist government in Kabul, living in the neighbouring Pakistan.

As described by Cooley (1999), there is an interesting debate on these conflicting propositions during the Oslo Conference in 1995 when policy-makers from both the sides shared

some facts about the 'behind the scenes' developments. These included Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor of President Jimmy Carter and the main architect of the US policy in Afghanistan and Gen. Varennikov who was part of the Kremlin meeting that took the decision to invade Afghanistan. Gen. Varennikov was categorical in saying:

Pakistan took its orders from Washington. That was clear and was [already] training and supplying the Islamic guerrillas that opposed the regimes of Amin and Taraki, whom we supported. So the threat to the Soviet Union was not "from" Afghanistan. It was from the US, via its overwhelming influence in the region. (p. 18)

The participants from the Russian side also revealed that Brezhnev and Kremlin's inner circle believed Amin to be an American agent and killing him was part of the plan. The American side, however, kept projecting the Soviet intervention as an expansionist move till in 1998, Brzezinski himself made the following confession during an interview:

According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise. Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.... We didn't push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would... Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter. We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war. Indeed.

for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable by the government, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire. (Brzezinski, *The CIA's Intervention in Afghanistan*, 1998)

This policy no doubt managed to force the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and also led towards the disintegration of the USSR and the end of Cold War but it seems that the US is still paying the price for that grand victory. Brzezinski himself has later on admitted that the 'possible adverse consequences' of this grand alliance with the Islamists did not 'weigh heavily in their calculations' at that time (Cooley, 1999).

Pakistan, having a history of conflict with Afghanistan over the Pakhtunistan issue and the insurgencies in its provinces bordering Afghanistan, was already sheltering more than 80000 refugees and the Islamist leaders before the Soviet intervention. The number of refugees, however, increased rapidly after the Soviet intervention and reached up to 400000 by 1980 (Rasanayagam, 2005). Pakistan at that time was being ruled by General Zia-ul-Haq who was leading a government almost alienated by the rest of the world because of his toppling a democratic government and hanging its Prime Minister Z A Bhutto. He seized the opportunity of getting out of that isolation by becoming a frontline state for the West against the alleged Communist expansionist designs towards the warm waters and oil of the Gulf. He himself was an Islamist and was already supporting the Afghan Islamist resistance leaders stationed in Pakistan.

The Islamist leaders apart from having a common enemy had probably nothing to unite them into a single party as all of them were deeply divided along ethnic, tribal and religious lines as was the case with their communist counterparts in Afghanistan leading to divisions in the PDPA and overthrowing and killing of Tarakai and Amin within 20 months of the Saur

Revolution. There were also some famous personality clashes like Ahmad Shah Masood vs. Gulbadin Hekmatyar from among the Islamists and Hafizul Amin vs. Babrak Karmal in PDPA right from their student life. These clashes also had some historical repercussions for the future of Afghanistan.

The original Jamiat-i-Islami gradually divided into seven different parties that constituted a united resistance against the Kabul regime. A similar coalition of the predominantly Shia sect parties emerged in the neighbouring Iran which was also sheltering refugees from its border areas. Apart from their frustrating conditions after the Russian intervention, the seven party coalition managed to get the support of the Afghan refugees by a Pakistani government policy of supplying relief supplies to only those refugees who belonged to one of these parties. The Americans initially planned a limited involvement in the conflict and Gen Zia rejected the \$400 million package as 'peanuts' which was later on increased to \$3.2 billion during the Reagan administration.

It was the beginning of the largest covert military operation in the history of the US and it was going to involve the cooperation from countries as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Iran, China, Egypt and even Israel which supplied a huge quantity of Russian-made weapons as the use of the US weapons would have exposed the American involvement and could have led to an active World War. Apart from the arms supply the Afghan fighters were trained in guerrilla warfare by the CIA and the ISI, the intelligence agencies of the US and Pakistan. This training coupled with their aggressive tribal instinct made the life of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan miserable (Crile, 2007).

And it was not just the Afghans who were trained but volunteers from all across the Muslim world including the Arab, African and Central Asian republics apart from many enthusiasts from Pakistan were recruited to take part in this 'Jihad'. These foreigners also established their own militias along ethnic lines just like the Afghan factions despite being part of the same struggle. The most influential person in this recruitment process was Dr Abdullah Azzam who was a Jordanian professor at a Saudi university and one of his colleagues was Mohammad Qutb, the brother of Syed Qutb, the Egyptian scholar behind the pan-Islamist movement. It was at this university that a student named Osama bin Laden was influenced by these two people. Azzam became Osama's mentor and took him to Peshawar in 1981 where they established a recruitment and information centre for Afghan Jihad named Maktab Al-Khidmat.

The Afghan resistance continued at a gradual pace till 1985 but was not able to force a Russian withdrawal till the introduction of the Stinger missiles to the guerrillas who were now able to shoot down Russian planes and helicopters. It was also accompanied by the significant developments of the change in regimes both in Kabul and Moscow. Dr Najibullah the former intelligence Chief replaced Karmal and Mikhail Gorbachev took charge of the Kremlin with his realistic approach of reforms in the domestic and global policies of the Soviet Union keeping in view its financial conditions and the insanity to continue with an unwinnable war in Afghanistan.

As the guerrilla attacks increased rapidly and the Russians started suffering heavy casualties Gorbachev announced his willingness to withdraw from Afghanistan. After lengthy negotiations for a final settlement of the Afghan issue after the withdrawal, the Geneva Accords were signed between the Pakistan and Afghan governments guaranteed by the US and the USSR in April 1988. The Soviet forces withdrew in Feb, 1989 but no negotiated settlement could unite

the Kabul regime and the Afghan Resistance fighters. The Superpowers kept supporting both sides for the ultimate victory through war and it took another three years for the final showdown at the gates of Kabul in 1992.

These years also exposed the ever-present rift between the various Afghan factions based on their age-old religious, ethnic and tribal divide. Despite being able to form an interim government beforehand to be led by Prof Burhannuddin Rabbani, everyone wanted to capture Kabul for its own faction. Ahmad Shah Masood the Defense Minister in the interim setup from the North, managed to enter Kabul before anyone else whereas his old rival from student life and the favourite of the Pakistani government, Hekmatyar started bombing his forces in Kabul from outside. Dr Najibullah ran away from the Presidential palace and took refuge in the UN offices.

### **1.1.3. The Mujahideen and the Taliban Government till 9/11:**

After the fall of Kabul the network of relationships between the various factions of the Afghan 'Mujahideen' and their relationships with their supporters across the world started to crumble apart. All the partners in this long struggle had diverse agendas but they managed to gel together for such a long time because of a common enemy and a common ideology. When the enemy retreated, the Americans left the region without taking steps to resolve the internecine conflicts of the comrades who fought their proxy war. The Americans had not only given the Soviets their Vietnam but a still greater and unexpected achievement was the resultant disintegration of the great Soviet Empire. This is reflected from Brzezinski's interview (1998) quoted above in which he refuses to regret their policy because it earned them a historical victory.

The various factions of the Afghan freedom fighters kept fighting for the control of Kabul for around three years and during this period it is said that more Afghans got killed than were killed

by the Soviets (Rasanayagam, 2005). This Civil War was essentially based on the age-old religious, ethnic and tribal conflicts. The old players from outside Afghanistan were still involved with their conflicting objectives regarding the future government of Afghanistan. It is alleged that Pakistan supported Hekmatyar as their favorite for a friendly future government in Afghanistan so as to achieve a 'strategic depth' against threats from India. The concept is supposed to have been promoted by the ex-Army Chief Mirza Aslam Baig who succeeded Gen Zia (Haider, 2011). It not only implies a friendly government but also a refuge for relocation of army and other military assets in case of an Indian attack. Some also add a concept of a possible confederation with Afghanistan.

Despite that support, Hekmatyar could not manage to move into Kabul and the war continued till a mysterious new force of the Taliban appeared towards the end of 1994. Ahmad Rasheed (2002) calls them "the children of Jihad but deeply disillusioned with the factionalism and criminal activities of the once idealized Mujahidin leadership" (p. 23). These included not only the frustrated Jihad Veterans but also their children who were born in refugees camps in Pakistan and studied at madrassas that belong to the Deobandi ideological tradition mostly under the patronage of Jamiat Ulema-Islam (JUI) Pakistan of Maulana Samiul Haq and Mufti Mehmood and later his son Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman.

The Taliban showed a phenomenal rise in their strength and achievements from their small rescue mission of Pakistani trucks in November 1994 to the capture of all major cities and finally Kabul in September 1996. It was again alleged that they were supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia with a passive backing by the US (Rasanayagam, 2005). They managed to get control of over 90% of the territory of Afghanistan except for the valley of Panjsher which was the

motherland of Masood and he resisted Taliban attacks till his death in a suicide bombing just before 9/11.

The Taliban named their state as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and established a Khilafat (Caliphate) which was a type of Islamic government based on the model of the Second Islamic Caliph Hazrat Omer (RA). The name of their leader was also Mullah Omar, a man of humble origins, who was taught and trained at a Pakistani Madrassa run by JUI. He himself was a Jihad veteran associated with the Hizb e Islami and had lost one of his eyes while fighting against the Soviets. He was sworn in as the Amir ul Momineen in Kandahar in April 1996 when he appeared wrapped in a cloak of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) that was preserved at a shrine in Kandahar (Rashid, 2002).

The Taliban ruled Afghanistan till the American intervention in Afghanistan and were greatly criticized for their rigid and deeply conservative view of Islam. Their most distinguishing feature was that they were predominantly Pukhtoons and strongly against the Northern Alliance (NA) of non-Pukhtoons who were controlling Kabul at that time under Ahmad Shah Masood. By virtue of their strong connections with the Saudis they were also influenced by the Wahabbist ideological tradition which is strongly against the Shia sect in Islam and thus anti-Iranian as well. This tradition is also against the sects that venerate the mystical Saints and visit their shrines.

The Taliban imposed a strict code of Shariah (Islamic system) in which people were forced to perform the rituals of Islam. Islamic punishments were given for crimes through a swift system of Justice and a ban on women education or jobs was imposed. Their whole system was greatly criticized in the western world as a violation of human rights but many who lived in



Afghanistan also believe that it was an era of relative calm and peace and it significantly decreased the crime ratio in Afghanistan.

#### **1.1.4. Origins and Evolution of Al Qaeda:**

After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the Arabs and other foreign Jihadists had to take a decision to go back to their countries or to continue with their Jihad. They did not believe that there is no need for Jihad after the Soviet withdrawal. They were not satisfied with the governments of their own countries as not being truly Islamic. Despite getting the aid from the Americans during the Soviet occupation, they always were clear in their minds that the Americans and the whole West was as much an enemy of Islam as the Soviets. They were as scornful of America as of the Soviets because of the former's policies regarding Israel, Palestine and the whole Arab world. They were too excited at defeating one Super power and were confident that they can manage to do the same to other forces against Islam.

Thus they decided to continue their Jihad against their own governments and the western world as a whole till the solution of the problems of the Muslims all across the globe. Azzam the mentor of Osama was against fighting fellow muslims and it is alleged that he was killed through a roadside bomb by the radical Egyptian cleric Ayman al Zawahiri, the second most influential leader after Osama. The Maktab Al-Khidmat that recruited around 35000 mujahideen from around 43 countries is said to have evolved into the most fearsome organization 'Al Qaeda' sometime in late 1989 or early 1990 (Nirmal & Asthana, 2009). But this claim about the origins of Al-Qaida seems controversial as it is based upon the revelations of one Jamal al-Fadl during an FBI interrogation after Kenyan Bombings in 1998. Jamal al-Fadl was a deserter of Osama after stealing a huge amount of money and thus not reliable (Burke, 2004).

Osama Bin Laden or any of his associates never referred to his organization as Al-Qaida before 9/11. Al-Qaida was in fact a popular term used during the Afghan Jihad to refer to the base-camp for operations of various kinds as it literally meant 'a base/foundation'. The Americans knew that there are dozens of militant groups all around the globe working against American interests and they are not working under a central command. In order to wage a war against these groups they needed a name that can refer to all these scattered and disorganized groups. They believed in al-Fadl who, being the kind of man that he was, might have thrown this name as a joke but he gave the Americans a name for their enemy. When the name became popular after 9/11, Osama and his associates also came to know about their new identity and started owning that name.

A number of bombings during the 90s hitting mostly American targets are attributed to al Qaeda. Prominent among these include WTC New York (1993), US embassies in Kenya (1998), US warship Cole (2000) and finally 9/11 (2001). It was due to these attacks that the Americans kept pressurizing the Taliban government to hand-over or to expel Osama Bin Laden from Afghanistan but the Taliban paid no heed.

#### **1.1.5. The Post-9/11 Decade:**

The 9/11 bombing was such a tragic event that it stirred the emotions of the whole world and created a situation that demanded a serious action to curb the growing menace of 'terrorism'. The Americans immediately pointed fingers towards the Taliban government and urged them to hand over Osama Bin Laden, the alleged culprit behind these attacks. The Americans indulged into a rhetoric that soon evolved as 'the war on terror' and warned all nations that 'Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists' (Bush G. W., 2001). This included not only the Taliban but also

Pakistan and all those who had been backing the Taliban government. President Musharraf (2006) tells in his memoirs that Richard Armitage the US Deputy Secretary of State threatened to bomb back Pakistan to the Stone Age. All others including Pakistan managed to understand the implications of the threat but the Taliban remained as defiant as ever.

The US and other Allied forces started air strikes on Afghanistan on Oct 07, 2001 and supplied arms to the United Front (previously Northern Alliance) for ground combat. They managed to take control of the whole country by December after killing and capturing the Taliban and their foreign guests on a massive scale along with a large number of civilian casualties. Many of the Taliban and the foreign fighters went back to their mountains along the Pak-Afghan border and started their guerrilla warfare against the Americans just as they spent a decade against the Soviets. They have been doing the same things to the Americans during all these years as they did to the Soviets but now they were not considered heroes or Mujahids but as 'militants' or 'terrorists' in the dominant political and media discourse in Pakistan.

The displaced Taliban and the foreign fighters and the Al Qaeda network continued their guerrilla warfare not only in Afghanistan but also turned their focus towards Pakistan. Just like the conflict of opinion between Azzaam and Zawahiri mentioned above there were groups among these militants including foreign fighters who thought that Pakistan should be as much a target of their activities as Afghanistan. The reason behind that was not only Pakistan's support to the coalition forces but also to impose the same kind of Shariah as they did in Afghanistan that is popularly known as the 'Talibanization' of Pakistan.

The West and the Karzai government, on the other hand, have been alleging that Pakistan despite being a coalition partner in the WoT has been supporting some groups of these Taliban

under Mullah Omar and foreign elements who carry out subversive activities in Afghanistan. It has also been alleged that Pakistan is only against the local Taliban and the Uzbek and Chechen fighters who carry out activities within Pakistan and that military actions in tribal areas are directed against these elements only.

The first major leader in the local Taliban was Nek Mohammad who helped many foreign fighters like Tahir Yuldashev flee from Afghanistan and gave them protection for a long time. He was one of the main targets of the Waziristan Operation until he signed the famous Shakai agreement with Gen. Safdar to register the foreign fighters in April, 2004. The agreement did not last long as Nek Mohammad refused to register the foreign fighters and was later on killed in a missile attack by Pakistan Army in June 2004. He was followed by Abdullah Mehsud who was captured by the US while fighting for the Taliban and spent some 2 years at Guantanamo Bay prison before being released to indulge more forcefully in the 'Jihadist' activities mainly targeting Pakistan. He killed himself in July 2007 before being captured by security forces in Baluchistan.

The next dynamic leader of these Taliban was Baitullah Mehsud who founded the Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to organize these groups as a formal entity. The TTP has carried out an unprecedented series of deadly attacks not only on military targets in Pakistan but also suicide bombings targeting Shia community and the shrines of various Saints. Baitullah Mehsud is known for the deadliest attacks on military installations in Pakistan and has also been accused of killing the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Baitullah also got killed in a US drone strike in August, 2009. The TTP is currently being led by Hakimullah Mehsud and the TTP claims responsibility for most of the terrorist activities in Pakistan openly.

The Talibanization of Pakistan was not a post-9/11 phenomenon as there was a militant campaign in 1994 in the Swat and Malakand regions known as Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) led by Maulana Sufi Mohammad who was a respected cleric of the area. TNSM can be said to be a precursor of the Taliban ideology as it aimed at the imposition of the same code of Sharia since its foundation in 1992. They managed to do so at least for their own area after they struck a deal with the government in 1994 after violent clashes and occupation of many schools, police stations and an airport.

Sufi Mohammad sent ten thousand followers into Afghanistan after the American invasion in 2001 and thousands got killed there (Hussain, 2010). Sufi Mohammad was later on arrested for this instigation and TNSM was declared a banned outfit by the Musharraf Regime. After his arrest, his son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah took charge and proved to be more radical and violent than him. He established an alliance with the TTP and was able to completely take control of the whole area of Swat and Malakand where a Taliban-style Sharia was imposed twice in 2007 and 2009. Both times the Pakistan Army had to move in to establish the writ of state through long-drawn military operations with great loss of life.

Talibanization was also not limited to the tribal areas and it managed to show its potential even in the capital Islamabad through the Lal Masjid episode. Lal Masjid also served as a recruitment centre during the Jihad against Soviet Union being run by Maulana Abdullah who was later on killed mysteriously. His two sons Maulana Abdul Aziz and Abdur Rasheed Ghazi started a vigilante campaign through the male and female students at their madrassa to eradicate evil from the city by threatening video shops and brothels and even established a court of their

own. They kept detaining policemen, prostitutes and even kidnapped a few Chinese national from a massage centre.

In July 2007, the mosque was besieged by the army after firing and burning incidents by the student militia. The stand-off continued for more than a week after which the military stormed the mosque and allegedly killed hundreds including Ghazi. It was an incident that served as a catalyst for the suicide bombings in Pakistan and it is also said that it was the main inspiration behind the formation of TTP in December 2007 (Ahmad A. , 2013). It also raised a hue and cry in the West that in case of Talibanisation the nuclear weapons of Pakistan may get into the hands of these 'terrorists' and that Pakistan should 'do more' in this regard. Pakistan, on the other hand, has paid a huge price for its Afghan policy after 9/11 to join and support the 'War on Terror'. According to estimates there have been 46907 deaths related to terrorist violence in Pakistan since 2003 including 16139 civilians, 4970 security personnel and 25798 insurgents (Institute of Conflict Management, 2013).

This brief introduction to the evolution of religious militancy in Pakistan will serve as a background to the analysis of the political and media discourse that this research aims at. It shows that apart from many other factors religious ideology has played a major role in the conflicts in this region which probably started as a political conflict.

## **1.2. What is Discourse Analysis?**

Discourse in its Latin origins is from '*discursus*' meaning "running about" and can refer to "a formal lengthy discussion of a subject, either written or spoken" (The Free Dictionary, 2013). Some other sources explain this word as referring to "extended expression of thought on a subject" (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2013) or "a formal discussion of a topic in speech or

writing" (Oxford Dictionaries, 2013). But the use of this term in linguistics broadly refers to "the use of spoken or written language in a social context" (Nordquist, About.com, 2013).

Being users of one or more languages we are well aware of the fact that it is not just the words or sentence constructions that carry meaning. The meaning-making process goes beyond that to include the context in which we use that language. There is an intention in the mind of the speaker to generate a meaning and for that meaning to be communicated properly there is expected to be a recognition of that intention by the listener (Yule, 2008). That's why Yule defines Pragmatics as "the study of speaker meaning" "of contextual meaning" and "how more gets communicated than is said" (p. 3).

Language is understood as 'Discourse' when it is approached for analysis in the above-mentioned interpretations. Gillian Brown and George Yule (2003) have also described discourse as a notion of language as it is being used in a particular situation for a particular purpose. They believe language as having a "Transactional" function in the transmission of information and an "Interactional" function "in expressing social relations and personal attitudes" (p. 1).

### **1.3. Thesis Statement:**

This study explores the impact of 9/11 on the political and media discourse in Pakistan with a focus on the representation of religious militancy in a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) perspective. The study has also traced the evolution of the representation of religious militancy in this region by drawing parallels between discursive practices before and after 9/11.

By describing this militancy as 'religious' this study assumes that its roots are more ideological than political or geographic and thus a large part of this analysis will focus on the

workings of ideology in these discursive practices. This analysis has been done by taking into account the social structures, processes and practices that determined this discourse and were in turn sustained or changed by it.

In order to appreciate the political discourse, some statements of the main political leaders have been analyzed whereas the media discourse has been analyzed by using extracts from the coverage of the various events originating from 9/11. As the roots of 9/11 and its aftermath lie in the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan, a brief corpus of the political and media discourse after the Russian invasion will be analyzed to serve as a background and to make a comparative analysis of the discourse after 9/11. By virtue of the importance of the historical context of this militancy a Discourse-Historical approach within CDA, developed by Ruth Wodak and others, has been adopted for analysis.

Media in this study would mean three mainstream English newspapers of Pakistan. Discourse in this study would mean language use not only as a social process but as a socially conditioned process (Fairclough, 1989). The CDA includes not only a given text but also a process of its production and a process of its interpretation. The social structures in this case are mainly the relations of power between weak third world countries like Pakistan and the Allied Western Powers, between the Allied powers (including Pakistan) and the militant groups and also the relations between the Allied powers and the corporate media. The processes and practices will mean the processes and practices of domination and survival between the above mentioned pairs.



#### **1.4. Rationale and Significance of the Study:**

Media had acquired the status of the fourth pillar of the state long ago but the introduction of satellite channels through dishes or cables and the invention of the internet have given the media an unprecedented power in moulding opinion and in cultural transformation all across the globe.

The rationale of this research is that the powers such as media necessitate such analyses that can expose the workings and consequences of their use or abuse and lay bare the exploitation carried on by a few dominant groups in a society. This research believes that problem sensing would help progress towards problem solving. It will not only help to create awareness in the general public but it may also help the professionals working in the media to realize the 'hegemony of common sense' that pervades on all our thoughts and actions and our words may seem our own but they are in fact constructions of the social conventions that we have internalized over the years while living in a particular society and working in a particular institution.

#### **1.5. Research Questions:**

In order to give a direction to its analysis, the present research has been based on the following three Research Questions.

1. What are the historical roots of the Post-9/11 media and political discourse in Pakistan regarding religious militancy and what role, if any, did religious ideology play in the representation of the Russian intervention in Afghanistan?
2. How has religious militancy been discursively constructed in the mainstream English newspapers of Pakistan in a post-9/11 scenario and do we see a shift in the representation of religious militancy as compared to the Pre-9/11 scenario ?

3. To what extent does Pakistan, as a third world country, construct an indigenous discourse on such issues or does it borrow its discourse from the dominant allies?

### **1.6. Research Objectives:**

- To examine the workings of ideology through the use of language in political and media discourse regarding religious militancy
- To explore the evolution of these discursive practices by drawing parallels before and after 9/11
- To appreciate the representation of religious militancy in the political and media discourse.
- To trace the process of production and to follow the process of interpretation of the selected texts for analysis

### **1.7. Structure of the Study:**

The study has been divided into eight chapters. The introductory chapter traces the historical evolution of religious militancy in this region to serve as a background for the analysis of the selected texts. The second chapter reviews the literature on the nature and working of ideology. The third chapter reviews the literature regarding discourse and the Critical Discourse Analysis and also the working of media in modern times. The fourth chapter describes the Research Design of the study including methods and tools adopted for analysis. The fifth chapter is the first core analytical chapter that includes the analysis of the selected Pre-9/11 data. The Sixth and seventh chapters include the analysis of the selected Post-9/11 data. The eighth and last chapter concludes the analysis. This is to be followed by the Works Cited and the Appendices A, B & C consisting of the complete texts of the excerpts analyzed.



## Chapter 02-Ideology and Myth

Critical Discourse Analysis and most of the other discourse analyses have remained preoccupied with the role that ideology plays in discursive practices and the power relationship within and between various social structures. An understanding of this role can be generalised into two broader perspectives on ideology. On the one hand are authors who view ideology as “partisan views and opinions” that “represent a particular bias characterising specific social formations with specific interests.” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 159). They consider ideology “as a specific set of symbolic representations-discourses, terms, arguments, images, stereotypes . . . operated by specific groups or actors” (p. 158). The various schools of thought, doctrines and ‘-isms’ are included in this perspective of ideology.

The other perspective considers ideology “as a general phenomenon characterising the totality of a particular social or political system, and operated by every member or actor” (p. 158). This view considers ideology to be something that is not limited to a group but has penetrated “the whole fabric of societies or communities and results in normalized, naturalised patterns of thought and behaviour” (p. 159). Ideology according to this perspective operates through what we normally call common sense and we are unable to recognize the ideological in our thought processes and discursive practices because it is just common sense.

For this reason, the Critical Discourse Analysts have focused a great deal on this second perspective on ideology concerning the hegemony of common sense on our discursive and non-discursive practices as members of a particular society. Ideology is one of the main concerns of

CDA and the Critical Discourse Analysts are not at all defensive at taking an ideological position in their analysis as against the popular notion of objectivity in research. They don't analyse language as an academic exercise but to expose and resist the abuse of language in relations of power and domination. Teun Van Dijk (2001b) is very explicit when he says:

CDA is a critical perspective on doing scholarship: it is so to speak, discourse analysis 'with an attitude'. It focuses on social problems, and especially on the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination...critical discourse analysis research combines what perhaps somewhat pompously used to be called 'solidarity with the oppressed' with an attitude of opposition and dissent against those who abuse text and talk in order to establish, confirm or legitimate their abuse of power. Unlike much other scholarship, CDA does not deny but explicitly defines and defends its own socio-political position. That is CDA is biased – and proud of it. (p. 96)

Norman Fairclough (1989), in the same vein, earlier on, had stated his position in the following terms:

...For the moment, let me say that I write as a socialist with a generally low opinion of the social relationships in my society and a commitment to the emancipation of the people who are oppressed by them. (p. 5)

This political stance taken by most of the leading theorists in CDA has been criticised by many for being biased and for depriving the perspective of the cardinal principle of Objectivity in research. H.G. Widdowson and E.A. Schegloff while being appreciative of the work in CDA have criticised its political stance (Billig, 2003). There's no doubt that objectivity is considered to be an essential ingredient of all research but if research aims at problem-solving and general

betterment of humanity then it cannot be robotic in its pursuits. If a discourse analyst is analysing sites of domination and exploitation and is not challenging that exploitation through his/her analyses then that research does not contribute anything significant for the well-being of humanity.

What is important to realize is that it is probably unnatural for human beings to completely ignore their belief systems, world-views, values or biases while conducting a research though they may be successful in hiding those with the support of their empirical evidence and logical reasoning and pose themselves as being objective. Instead of sticking with this traditional notion of objectivity, the CDA theorists have tried to be forthright about their own ideological inhibitions. They have been quite blunt, as the above quotations suggest, on taking sides with the oppressed and the down-trodden in their perspective just as Billig (2003) says that "the analysis of ideology must, and should, be based upon ideological presuppositions itself" (p. 36). He, however, forewarns the CDA analysts to beware of their own use of language for conducting such an analysis as their own language can have a malicious ideological content. It will be doing the same thing yourself while criticising others for that.

CDA, thus, is a leftist approach for analysing discourse and being so it has its ideological roots in the Marxist tradition. The Marxist tradition has a long critique about the nature and working of ideology from Karl Marx up to the present age. It is therefore pertinent to be aware of that tradition before indulging in a Critical Discourse Analysis that aims at deciphering the extent to which political and media discourse may have been influenced by dominant ideologies.

## 2.1. Ideology as an Ideology:

The word ideology was first used by Destutt de Tracy, a French intellectual who worked as part of a think tank known as the Institut National after the French Revolution (Azouvi, 1999). The group of Parisian intellectuals who worked at this institute were known as Ideologues. Tracy presented ideologie as a new way of philosophising which may replace the old metaphysics. He considered ideologie to be "concerned with the formation of our ideas on the basis of sensations, their geneology, transformations, and application to the moral, political and legal spheres" (p. 568). He thought that in this way philosophy would be able to examine phenomenon by focusing on how they generate each other i.e. philosophy (ideas) and phenomenon generate each other.

On the contrary, when Karl Marx talked about the idea of ideology some fifty years later, he presented a quite different view from Tracy (Althusser, 1971). He did not believe life to be determined by consciousness but life as determining consciousness (Marx, 2009). He considered Ideology to be a representation of the "production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness," all that "men say, imagine, conceive," and include such things as "politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc." (Felluga, 2011). He also considered ideology to be representing the material conditions of life including the means of production and the relations of production.

To put that in simpler terms, all social formations are based on the production of something and that production will require some means like 'raw material, fixed installations (buildings), instruments of production (machines)' and it will also require the reproduction of relations of production between the capitalists and the labour power (reproductive forces) (Althusser, 1971). While giving his concept of historical materialism, Karl Marx (2000), explains that there has always been a materialistic connection between men which is determined

by their needs and mode of production. 'Mode of Production' refers collectively to the means of production and the relations of production and in a given society we have 'Modes of Production' like Slavery, Capitalism or Feudalism etc (Althusser & Balibar, 1970).

Karl Marx (2009) also talks about consciousness as being 'animal consciousness' based on perceptions of natural surroundings but what is actually considered as consciousness (ideology) is determined by the material reality. The ruling ideology at a given time is always the ideology of the ruling class who produce or reproduce that ideology to perpetuate their domination in the relations of production. Marx and many of his followers consider ideology to be a false consciousness which is removed from reality or actually tries to hide the reality.

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The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or -- this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms -- with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. (pp. 11-12)

Marx considers the structure of society to be divided into 'the *infrastructure*, or economic base (the 'unity' of the productive forces and the relations of production) and the *superstructure*, which itself contains two 'levels' or 'instances': the politico-legal (law and the State) and ideology (the different ideologies, religious, ethical, legal, political, etc.)' (Althusser, 1971). He



thinks that the superstructure is determined by what happens in the economic base and not vice versa.

Despite agreeing with many of his views, many Marxists in the 20<sup>th</sup> century have differed with Marx's view regarding economic determinism and have tried to dissociate ideology from it. Antonio Gramsci (1971), the early 20<sup>th</sup> century Italian intellectual who spent many years in prison because of his anti-fascist ideas, introduced the concept of 'Hegemony'. He was a staunch Marxist and accepted the Marxian views on the mode of production and class struggle but he did not believe that they were merely the coercive methods of the dominant class to subjugate the working class. He thought that coercion does play a role but it cannot sustain the subjugation for a longer period of time. The continuous subjugation is brought about by propagating the dominant ideology in such a way that it becomes common sense and the subjugated classes accept that as a truth. He believes that this hegemony of the common sense is an essential ingredient for the functioning of the society and that we should move from common sense to good sense by thinking about it and that the subjugated classes need to create a hegemony of their good sense in order to get out of that subjugation.

In the same way, Louis Althusser (1971) agrees with Marx that production always requires the reproduction of the conditions of production including the means and relations of production. The reproduction of the labour force, according to Althusser (1971) is primarily based on providing them wages for their work but most of this reproduction occurs outside the firm i.e. in the society where they are born and raised. The capitalist society not only gives them the necessary knowledge and skills through an educational system but also gives them the

required attitudes of submissiveness and compliance. All this is achieved through what Althusser calls Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) and Repressive State Apparatuses (RSAs).

What Althusser meant by this is based on his notion that the Marxist tradition has always considered the State to be a repressive machine that helps the bourgeois class to achieve their end of surplus-value extortion from the proletariat. He agrees with the repressive dimension of the state but adds to this concept by dividing these apparatuses into the two categories of ISAs and RSAs. The RSAs include the traditional state apparatuses of the government, the army, the police, the courts, the prisons, etc. and they work through violence and coercion to achieve the domination of the bourgeois. The ISAs on the other hand include 'distinct and specialised institutions' including religion, family, education, law, political parties, trade unions, media, culture and arts. The ISAs are doing the same job as RSAs not through violence but through 'ideology' in a peaceful and non-perceptible way (*ibid*).

Althusser agrees with the traditional Marxist proposition that 'Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence'. This relationship is imaginary because people have been made to believe in a false relation by the RSA agents like the priests and despots to achieve their ends and the actual relation has been hidden by that manufactured ideology. Obeying the king because of a theory of Divine Right is to create an imaginary relation between the state and its subject. But this does not mean that consciousness or ideology itself is imaginary. Althusser presents a new proposition regarding the materiality of ideology by saying 'that the 'ideas' of a human subject exist in his actions, or ought to exist in his actions' and his actions make his ideology to be a material reality. Althusser further moves on to give another proposition that ideology interpellates the individuals and turn them into

subjects. What he means by this is that ideology pokes us and makes us believe who we are and what we are expected to do being what we are. It's just like saying 'hello' to a person in the street who becomes a subject by turning towards you (Althusser, 1971).

A contemporary philosopher, Slavoj Žižek has contributed significantly to the critique of ideology in the Marxist tradition. Apart from his indebtedness to Marx and Hegel, Žižek belongs to a group of thinkers who were deeply influenced by the work of Jacques Lacan, the famous psychoanalyst of the 20<sup>th</sup> century who re-established the authority of Freudianism dethroned by the post-modern thought. Althusser is also indebted to Lacan for his concept of interpellation as discussed above. Lacan (Dino, 2011) divided the Psyche into the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic. The Real refers to our State of nature at the neo-natal stage when the child has only 'needs' to fulfil. The self remains Real till it encounters language that creates an awareness of the outer world and language can never explain or represent the Real. The Real always works behind our actions but we cannot explain it. The encounter with the outer world creates the Imaginary and the Symbolic self which are intertwined with each other. The Imaginary refers to the mirror stage when the child progresses from needs to 'demands' of finding his real self in the outer world. The Symbolic comes into existence after the encounter with language and the rules and regulations of the outside world and the child begins to accept those laws through language.

The Real in this sense is merely the child's own self being part of the mother and has no concept of the 'Other' or outer world. When the child acquires the sense of the outer world, it creates a sense of depravity of the Real single Self composed of the child and its mother and the child throughout its life desperately continues to find the Real through the Imaginary and the Symbolic. This concept is similar to the Freudian distinction between the Id, Ego and Super-ego

where the Id may be taken as the Real self but Lacan is more elaborate in its description than Freud.

Zizek improvises upon the same concepts to divide the concept of ideology into three 'moments'. The first moment is labelled as 'Ideology in itself' which refers to a series of ideas. The second moment is 'Ideology for itself' referring to the materiality of ideology through the ISAs in Althusserian terms. The third moment is 'Ideology in and for itself' which refers to its entry into social practices (Garcia & Sanchez, 2008). It is at this point Zizek believes that ideology seems to disappear and gets replaced by a 'hegemony of common sense' in Althusserian terms. It is here that Zizek quotes Marx that 'they do not know it, but they are doing it' (Zizek, 2008). Zizek agrees with Althusser that ideology interpellates us and turns us into subjects because our Real self in Lacanian terms feels a void that needs to be filled and ideology fills it by telling us who we really are. This is in fact the same concept that Marx called 'false consciousness' that tries to hide the reality to perpetuate the dominance of the capitalist.

Zizek, however, questions the Marxian concept of doing and not knowing in the present day world and puts forth the proposition of Peter Sloterdijk that we are well aware of the workings of ideology on our minds and we still do things according to that ideology. That means we are doing despite knowing and thus ideology is not hiding a reality as Marx puts it. It is not a deceiving 'false consciousness' but an 'enlightened false consciousness' (p. 26) which means that we may be continuing with an activity despite knowing it to be based on a false ideology and that probably we may be living in a post-ideological world.

This proposition seems very apt when we look at the kind of things being said on the media and then being reproduced by the general public against status quo and the status quo still

continues and the people continue to be a part of it despite being against it. Zizek calls it Ideological Fantasy which is associated with the social activities that we continue to do despite knowing them to be based on an illusion we call ideology. The ideological fantasy is a phantasmatic structure that tries to fill in the void of the Real in Lacanian terms with our various social activities (Garcia & Sanchez, 2008). Our demands and desires in Lacanian sense force us to fill in the gap that we feel within ourselves after we lose the Real by coming into contact with language and the outer world.

Sloterdijk's proposition and Zizek's explanation is a significant addition to the Marxist tradition and is quite logical in today's age of information and technology. This study, due to its limitations has touched upon only the most significant milestones in the evolution of the concept of ideology and has excluded the significant contributions made by many notable theorists like Habermas, Bourdieu, Laclau, Mouffe, Barthes, and Voloshinov and others. As this research is based on CDA, it seems appropriate to have a brief look at how the CDA theorists have drawn upon the work of these thinkers and made use of ideology as a cornerstone of their approach towards discourse analysis.

## **2.2. Ideology in CDA:**

Apart from their major concern with power and domination, CDA theorists have extensively written about the nature and working of ideology in discursive and other social practices. They, however, take the traditional Marxist view of an invisible ideology working upon the minds of people who are unaware of it. Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress (Hodge & Kress, 1979), two of the pioneers of 'Critical Linguistics' that finally evolved into CDA, consider language to be "immersed in the on-going life of a society, as the practical consciousness of that society" (p. 6).

They also, following Marx, consider it to be a 'partial and false consciousness' and call it ideology which is a "systematic body of ideas, organized from a particular point of view" (p. 6). They similarly believe the language to be ideological because it systematically distorts realities to serve class interests.

Fowler and Kress (1979) talk of the connections between linguistic and social structures and the influence of the 'ideological press' of society on language use. They also take the Marxist view that ideology is habitual for the people and is linguistically mediated. They criticise the fact that linguistics as an academic discipline has been neutralized as an instrument for analysis and language is assumed to be devoid of ideology. Language on the hand is not actually neutral but is intertwined with ideology and only a linguistic analysis that is critical of the language use as carrying ideological and social structures can help understand the relations of power and control.

The Critical Linguists become more aggressive and assertive when they say that ideology is mediated through language and they consider language to be a tool of social control (Fowler, Hodge, Kress, & Trew, 1979). They believe the structure of language to be "seen as having been formed in response to the structure of the society that uses it" (p. 188) . They do not believe in the Sassurian notion that there is an arbitrary relationship between the form and meaning of a linguistic item and the form itself is without content. For analysing language they mainly rely on the Systemic Functional Perspective of Grammar as the most effective set of tools available for a critical analysis of how the language actually works in its meaning-making process.

The Systemic Functional perspective as developed by Michael Halliday, is called Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) because it is based on the Systemic theory and it takes a

functional view of grammar rather than the traditional one. Halliday (1985) explains the Systemic theory as "a theory of meaning as choice, by which a language, or any other semiotic system, is interpreted as networks of interlocking options" (p. xiv). These choices are at every level of the text from the word to phrase to the clause level and these choices have contextual and functional significance in the meaning-making process. It is on this Systemic assertion that the Critical Linguists believe that if we have to make choices of linguistic items for their meaning then it means that those words have a significant content that we feel suits our worldview of a social reality and that those terms are not without content as Saussure asserts.

Norman Fairclough (1989), the main proponent of CDA, believes that "ideology is most effective when its workings are least visible" (p. 85) and he draws upon Gramsci's 'hegemony of common sense' for his approach to discourse analysis. Ideology may be an abstraction but Fairclough (1995a) tries to locate it in political, economic, social and linguistic structures and believes that the linguistic structures and their actual usage in discursive practices are conditioned by "social conventions, norms, histories." (p. 71). He considers language to be a "material form of ideology" (p. 73) and believes that there can be more than one ideologies competing for domination and the one that gets a dominating position takes a process of Naturalization. This process turns it into common sense and the discourse seems to lose its ideological orientation.

Fairclough (2006) also agrees with Althusser's concept of 'interpellation' that ideology turns us into subjects and also agrees with him that ideology has material existence in the practices of institutions and that language itself is one such manifestation but he criticizes some limitations of the Althusserian perspective. He thinks that Althusser probably is overdoing the

role of ideology as a “one-sided imposition and reproduction of a dominant ideology” and a “marginalization of struggle, contradiction and transformation” (p. 87) of that ideology. What he wants to convey is that ideology is definitely working behind social and discursive practices but it is not an all-pervading phenomenon and that there are contradictory ideologies rising up against the dominant ones and which can sometimes overthrow the dominant ideologies.

Fairclough (1989) also believes that ideologies may be residing in texts but that is not their only abode and we should not consider that if a text is ideological it will affect the reader with that ideology. This is so because the meaning-making process is not dependent only on the creation of a text in a particular way and it also depends on how it gets interpreted by various people who may not be taking similar ideological messages from the same text because of their own different worldview. That is why, apart from the text itself, he includes a process of the production and interpretation of a text in his version of CDA.

Teun van Dijk (1998) , another notable analyst in CDA, has also carried the Marxist tradition in his social cognitive approach without making much fuss about agreeing or contradicting the old tradition. He, however, believes that despite the evolution and innovation in the critique of ideology from the Marxist to the Neo-Marxist thinkers till the demise of Communism in the 1990s, the “socio-economic and symbolic power of elite groups” (p. 3) still remains the central point in the concept of ideology. He elaborates his idea of an ideology along the three dimensions of cognition, society, and discourse.

Van Dijk (2005) believes that if ideology is about ideas then it has to do with cognition as these ideas are stored in the long-term memory as social belief systems. He also says that these ideas have a social significance and thus ideology also has something to do with society as well.



It means all social activities have an ideological dimension but both cognition and social activities cannot probably be analysed as being ideological till they are expressed through language which is a concrete social practice that can be put under the microscope of analysis. He however believes that all ideologies are not negative as propagated by the traditional theorists on ideology. There can be ideologies of both the dominant and the dominated classes and thus ideologies can be good or bad.

Ruth Wodak and de Cillia (2006) also conform to the views of other CDA theorists regarding ideology and believe discourse to be “the place where language and ideology meet, and discourse analysis is the analysis of ideological dimensions of language use and of the materialisation in language of ideology” (p. 715). They make a special reference to Michel Pecheux, the French theorist who believed that people are placed in imaginary positions as sources of their discourse but actually their discourse is merely driven by their ideological positioning. They speak from specific discursive formations which are formed by the dominant discursive formation which Pecheux calls the ‘Interdiscourse’ (p. 715).

Titscher, Meyer, Wodak and Vetter (2000) consider the cultural dimension to more significant in power relations than the economic and also believe that there may not be any “strict separation between infrastructure and superstructure” (p. 145) as against the traditional Marxist view. They label the whole theoretical background of CDA as Neo-Marxist except for the immense influence that it has received from Michel Foucault which will be dealt with in the next section.

### **2.3. Dispositive and Myth:**

Apart from following the Marxist tradition, the Critical Discourse Analysts have also drawn upon a great deal on the works of the famous French philosopher and discourse theorist Michel Foucault who in turn draws upon the thoughts of Wittgenstein and Nietzsche regarding his concepts of power in discourse (Powers, 2007). The current research has chosen Foucault's concept of Dispositive as a tool for its macro-level analysis and as this concept has a lot to do with social, ideological and discursive practices this chapter also includes a brief overview of that concept. Apart from the concept of Dispositive this study has also included the concept of Myth, mainly adopted from Roland Barthes, for its Macro-level analysis.

This research assume both of these concepts as variants of the concept of the working of ideology discussed above. They also had the additional potential of being used as instruments for a discourse analysis and that's why it is considered necessary to take a brief overview of these concepts.

#### **2.3.1. The Dispositive:**

Michel Foucault started off as a Marxist but then spent all his life trying to find his own unique place in the history of thought and he successfully managed to do that. He did not agree with the Marxist view of the role of ideology as 'false consciousness' in the relations of power in a society and ascribes it to a particular accumulation of knowledge based on instruments of investigation and research that he calls 'apparatuses of control' (Kumar, 2005). He is also against the notion of ideology as something that is up against something else supposed to be a truth. The first proposition, however, does not seem to refute the Marxian concept as it is ideologies that work behind the production of such tools and the accumulation of such knowledge. The second

objection has also been removed by neo-Marxists like Van Dijk that there can be good and bad ideologies and that ideologies can be based on truth.

The dispositive, as Michael Foucault uses it, is the relationship or interplay between discursive practices, non-discursive practices and their materializations/manifestations. Foucault himself elucidates the concept of Dispositive in an interview in the following words:

What I'm seeking to characterize with this name is, first of all, an absolutely heterogeneous assembly which involves discourses, institutions, architectural structures, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific enunciations, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions; in short: as much the said as the un-said, these are the elements of the dispositive. The dispositive is the network which is arranged between these elements...with the term dispositive, I understand a type of—so to speak—formation which in a certain historical moment had as its essential function to respond to an emergency...I said that the dispositive is by nature essentially strategic, which indicates that it deals with a certain manipulation of forces, of a rational and concerted intervention in the relations of force, to orient them in a certain direction, to block them, or to fix and utilize them. The dispositive is always inscribed in a game of power and, at the same time, always tied to the limits of knowledge, which derive from it and, in the same measure, condition it. The dispositive is precisely this: an ensemble (set) of strategies of relations of force which condition certain types of knowledge and is conditioned by them. (Foucault, 1978 as cited in (Bussolini, 2010))

This concept of the Dispositive seems to be an improvisation in the Marxian, Gramscian and Althusserian concepts on ideology but the concept of Dispositive seems an all-encompassing one and covers a wider landscape than the others. According to Bussolini (2010) 'The dispositive is not so much the individual elements which make it up—the long list that Foucault gives in the

first paragraph—as it is the particular arrangement and relations between them.’ (p. 92) It is a tool for analyzing ‘power in the perpetually dynamic social field. It bears on the relationship between different actors and discourses in an ongoing series of rivalries’ (pp. 90-91).

Siegfried Jager has tried to incorporate the Foucauldian concept of the ‘Dispositive’ into his model of CDA. He believes like many of the Marxists above that discourse constructs realities and if the discourse withdraws from a reality or the people withdraw from a discourse that they had given meaning, that reality becomes meaningless (Jager, 2001). If other meanings are allocated to that reality, it becomes another object. This is an important concept regarding the present research as it takes into consideration contrasting discourses on somewhat similar realities spanning over three decades.

Jager says that “A thing to which I allocate no meaning is not a thing to me; indeed it is completely non-descript to me, invisible or even non-existent; I do not even see it, because I overlook it.” (p. 42). For almost two decades, the reality of the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviets was described through discourse as a ‘war against Islam’ and people kept believing that it was actually so and they responded by waging a Jihad to defend Islam. Now, for over a decade after 911, the American occupation of Afghanistan is being described as a ‘War on Terror’ and the government and the majority of people in Pakistan have started believing it to be so. The fact, however, is that the American war on Afghanistan has a similar potential of being called a ‘war against Islam’ but because people have stopped using that discourse, it has become a new reality. On the other hand, the religious militants against whom this war is being waged still consider it to be ‘a war against Islam’ and they are continuing a Jihad against the Americans as well.

Neils Anderson (2003) considers Dispositive to be a strong analytical strategy focusing on the “connections between various discourses, institutions, practices, self-technologies, tactics and so on, within a particular period.” (p. 27). The Dispositive works on a dichotomy between Apparatus and Strategic Logic. The Apparatus refers to “a system of elements between which there exists a functional connection” whereas the Strategic Logic “is a generalized schematic that brings about a particular logic” (p. 27). The Strategic Logic may be the same as ideology and the Apparatuses are the various institutions, practices, tactics etc. Both of these dimensions of the Dispositive are binaries that are dependent on each other and cannot effectively work in isolation. Foucault has given many examples of these two like the schematic between legal/illegal creates laws to declare things as legal or illegal or the security/insecurity schematic generates the workings of an army.

The concept of Dispositive can be a viable tool of investigation in many disciplines but in the field of linguistics it probably cannot go deep down into the workings of a language. That’s why this study has placed it at the Macro-level in its hierarchy of analytical tools.

### 2.3.2. Myth:

The word ‘Myth’ in its literal sense refers to an ancient story of supernatural beings or a story that has come to be associated with a person, place, institution etc. It also refers to a half truth that may be part of an ideology or a fictitious story, person or thing (The Free Dictionary, 2013). This study, however, has taken it in its ideological meaning and makes use of the particular interpretation given to this term by Roland Barthes (1984).

According to Cyril Morong (2011) myths tell stories but they are related to ideology because these stories give values to a society. He believes that as this world is full of

uncertainties everyone needs ideologies and myths to live by and this attachment is emotional rather than scientific. Every ideology has a myth within it to provide an emotional foundation to that ideology so that it may be used for political purposes to mobilize masses. But can we say that the nature of ideology and myth are entirely the same or do we need to make a distinction between the two?

Myth is sometimes explained as a form of ideology and sometimes it may be something different. Ben Halpern (1961) makes a fine distinction between the two by stating myth as "a study of the origin of beliefs out of historic experience" whereas ideology "is a study of the moulding of beliefs by social situations" (p. 137). What he means by it is that myth precedes ideology and myth is the expression of a particular experience that becomes the belief of a whole community at a particular point in time. Ideology on the other hand is a molding of such beliefs in a social situation at another point in time.

Halpern believes that Myth becomes a belief system for all but ideology becomes the belief of a group that is in conflict with another group having another ideology. That's why he also says that myth is the belief system of the primitive man whereas ideology is the belief system of modern man. He also makes a distinction between the social functions of both the concepts by saying that Myth works to "bind together social groups as wholes or, in other words, to establish a social consensus" whereas ideology works "to segregate and serve special interests within societies in the competition of debate" (p. 137). He considers ideology to be a rational structure that has its foundation in the irrational myth. Ideology thus seems to manipulate the emotional power of the myth to achieve its ends and may sometimes make a dead myth alive to

achieve those ends. A very apt example of this is the revival of the Jihad myth by the Americans to defeat the Soviets as will be discussed in the succeeding chapters of this research.

Linguistics is a discipline that established itself during the 20<sup>th</sup> century and apart from looking at language from a grammatical, syntactic or semantic etc. perspective, various linguists had started looking at the workings of ideology through language quite early. Ferdinand de Saussure, considered to be the father of modern linguistics, introduced *Semiology* as a new way of studying language which later on developed into the present day *Semiotics* or the study of signs. Saussure (1959) came up with the idea of an arbitrary relationship between the word and its meaning and tried to elaborate it with his concepts of the *Signifier*, the *Signified* and the *Sign*. The *Signified* is the concept or meaning which is abstract, mental or psychological whereas the *Signifier* is the mental or Acoustic image of the word that we associate that meaning with. The word which is physical or concrete is a combination of both the *Signified* and the *Signifier* and is called the *Sign*.

Roland Barthes (1984) talks of ideology in more or less the same terms as the other Marxist do and appreciates the concept of the *Sign* given by Saussure. He, however, goes a bit further and incorporates his concept of *Myth* into it. He considers *Myth* to be "a type of speech" and it is not the concept, idea or the content of speech rather a form of speech that is generated by history and "does not evolve from the nature of things". He considers *Myth* to be a level of meaning up and beyond the three-dimensional Saussurian level. Whereas the Saussurian levels talk in terms of the semantic meaning, *Myth* is a kind of communication beyond the semantic. *Myth* gets hold of language to create its own set of meaning labeled as *Signification* by Barthes which is a kind of metalanguage.

Signification is another level of meaning given to the Signifier which itself is a meaning given to the *Signified*. He also labels the Signifier as the *Meaning* and the Signification as the *Form*. The Form or Myth lives as a parasite on the Meaning which is alive but has lost its value. "However paradoxical it may seem, myth hides nothing: its function is to distort, not to make disappear" (Barthes, 1984). It is thus different from the 'false consciousness' of the Marxists as it does not aim at hiding a reality but creating a new one by distorting the old one (Robinson, 2011). Myth is also different from Signifier because it is not arbitrary and is based on some sort of a relationship between the Signification and the Signifier. Myths also provide little room for the reader to understand the message and is received rather than read.

The way Barthes has explained Myth apparently seems a roundabout and complicated way of talking about ideology and its coercive influence upon the meaning. It is thus a different concept where Halpern's concept of ideology seems to have become the concept of Myth in Barthes though they approach it from different perspectives. Barthes' explanation seems quite handy as it not only explains the nature of ideology but also gives some tools to analyze the way myths work through language. These tools have been described in Chapter 04.

Unlike the philosophic interpretations of the above theorists, Michael Geis (1987) has tackled the notion of Myth in a very matter of fact way and has brought it down to earth. He draws upon the work of Murray Edelman to present his views on the use of Myths in political language. He considers "a political myth to be "an empirical, "but" usually not verifiable, explanatory thesis that presupposes a simple causal theory of political events and enjoys wide public support" (p. 29). It explains the causes behind political events and justifies solutions to political problems.



## 2.4. Conclusion:

The brief critique of Ideology in this chapter shows that it is a major concern in CDA and this critique will serve as the ideological background in this particular research. This study, despite the new and contradictory developments in the concept, does not reject the old Marxist notions about ideology and considers it viable to take a view of ideology that considers it to be a phantasmatic structure while being a concrete reality in many ways. The Marxists and Neo-Marxists have mostly presented a bleak picture of the nature of ideology but their views regarding the way it works in human societies is undeniable. The presence of ideology as an abstract reality and disguising itself as common sense is an important discovery for every human being who is affected by this presence. It necessitates an awareness in the general public to be conscious about this presence so as to protect themselves against exploitation and distortions of realities.

This study, however, does not consider ideology to be merely a monstrous construct, out to reduce the human potential as has been projected in the Marxist tradition. It can be and it is, in many cases, a vibrant force of change that can challenge the dominant discourse or reality for the betterment of mankind. Ideology is at work behind all social activities and discursive practices and it does help sustain existing power relations as Marx earlier proposed. To oppose and to defeat an exploitative ideology will always require a competing ideology that ensures the protection and well-being of the general public even if it also works as common sense.

Literature Review for this research has been anchored around three main dimensions including the critique of ideology, the workings of modern media and the evolution of CDA as a perspective for discourse analysis. Discussing all the three aspects in a single chapter would have

made it too long and unwieldy. That is why, having traced the evolution in thought regarding ideology and its influence on CDA, it seems fair enough to devote a separate chapter for the other two dimensions of this research. The next chapter would thus deal with media and Critical Discourse Analysis.

## Chapter 03: Media and Discourse Analysis

The development of media in the past few decades has been phenomenal and in countries like Pakistan it has ushered in a new era of information and entertainment. With hundreds of TV channels and online available newspapers that are competing with each other to break a news story every next moment, the general public does not have to switch over to BBC radio for credible news as it used to be the case just over a decade ago. That does not, however, imply the Presupposition that our media is always credible but it is certainly being watched and read by the general public with an enthusiasm and excitement that is unprecedented in our history. Political Talk shows and news bulletins in fact seem to have pushed down TV plays, the most popular genre of the past, as a second or third option even for the general, semi-literate masses. That's why media has become a popular field for Discourse Analysis as well.

### **3.1. The Massive Media Mold:**

With the amazing popularity of news channels, the Pakistan media has emerged as a new power center in the recent past in Pakistan (Aziz, 2011). The phenomenal rise in this power has run currents down the spines of the traditional power centers like the Executive, the military and other ruling elites of the Pakistan society. It has introduced new trends in news reporting and analysis by emulating the western media so that everything that happens gets reported instantly with discussions from experts and opinions of the general public. The stringent state control and censorship seems a matter of past and most of the time the governments seem helpless, weak and embarrassed while facing bold and insulting questions regarding their performance. The news and talk-show anchors sit in their comfortable seats as indifferent and harsh judges in a court-

room and dominate the on-going discourse with their aggressive questioning. Same is the case with print media where bold stories get published and newspapers columnists enjoy the same status of being stars like the TV anchors.

All this creates a new image of a strong and credible post-9/11 media which is serving as a check on the performances of governments and seems to have generated a great process of Social Change in a country like Pakistan. It also seems to have initiated a discourse that challenges the traditional dominant discourses produced and reproduced by the traditional dominant classes of our society. It seems thus to be in the process of becoming a voice of the exploited, the down-trodden and the neglected segments of the society. It highlights the injustice and cruelty meted out to the common man in our society and does not allow the ruling classes to hide their wrong-doings.

There is, however, another side of the picture. Media may be doing all those things described above but it may be doing other things which may not be as praiseworthy. The Pakistan media emulates the western media and the western media, despite its use of cutting-edge technologies and its global reach, has been criticized a lot for its bias, distortion of facts, double standards and agenda-setting roles. Modern western media, however, does all that in a very shrewd manner while successfully keeping a very objective and neutral posture for the general audience who are not so well aware of the delicate workings of modern propaganda. There have been a few very strong voices of dissent regarding this general impression of the western media that have helped in demystifying the myths created by modern media.

War reporting, in the beginning, was mostly done by the soldiers fighting on the front and was thus only a partial picture of what actually happened on the battlefield. William Harvard

Russell was the first civilian correspondent of The Times during the Crimean War in 1850s (Freedman, 2004) and his reporting led to the resignation of the commanding general and the collapse of the government in Britain. This led the government to devise a mechanism to control such reporting by introducing the concept of 'embedded journalists' during the World War I by keeping the reporters at military installations away from the front. Although later on journalists have been trying to take liberties at the risk of their lives but the majority of reporters till the present times have been reporting from luxurious hotels in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (p. 64). They still rely a lot on the military and government sources but due to revolutionary changes in mass communications based on modern Information Technology and Social media, lots of such facts also manage to creep into the limelight which may otherwise be hidden.

Another powerful mechanism of media control during the WWI was the establishment of a Press Bureau in Britain and the Creel Commission in the US to propagate favorable news and to hide the harmful ones. The Creel Commission according to Noam Chomsky (2004) was "the first modern government propaganda operation" (p. 11) which was established by the Woodrow Wilson government to motivate the American public to get involved in World War I. That commission was a great success and then many thinkers like Walter Lippmann and Edward Bernays came up with their innovative ideas of 'manufacturing consent' (molding the opinions) of the 'bewildered herd' (general public) (p. 16). The originators of modern propaganda may have thought about bringing a positive change in the society but the way these skills have been used by politicians and media up till now, the word 'propaganda' has assumed all the negative connotations that a word can have. Chomsky is probably right when he says "propaganda is to democracy what the bludgeon is to a totalitarian state" (p. 20). What he means to say is that same

objectives as are achieved by a dictator through coercion are achieved by a democratic government through propaganda.

A recent example of the way propaganda works is the role media played in the war on Iraq. Some very concrete evidence has been provided by different writers which lays bare the amount of Media Distortion that served as a support to the official discourse leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. David Miller (2004) believes that media is “all about lies and misinformation and how-all too often- the mainstream media act as ciphers for the powerful.” (p. 06). That is why he titled his book as “Tell Me Lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq”. This may sound a strong judgment and present a completely negative picture of modern media but it is believable in many ways.

The whole killing and destruction during this war was sanctioned by creating a Myth that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass-Destruction (WMD). After killing over a million people in Iraq the West failed to come up with any evidence on WMD in Iraq. John Pilger (2004), another strong critic of modern media, says that the Iraq War was the most ‘covered’ and ‘most covered-up’ war in history. There is very little mention of the number of civilian casualties in the media discourse and it proves American Commander General Norman’s statement that it will be the first war “where every screw-driver, every nail is accounted for” (p. 18) but no details about human casualties will be available.

As compared to the WWI situation, it has become quite difficult to convince the general public to go for a war due to an increased awareness regarding propaganda but the American government seemed quite successful in doing that in the case of Iraq while using some common Public Relations strategies. These included a tight control over the delivery of only relevant

information through well-trained managers, focus groups and other type of market research and media monitoring (Miller, Stauber , & Rampton, 2004). These also include such trained groups or individuals who successfully generate identities for themselves of being third parties. They were in fact so successful that they managed to get two-thirds of Americans convinced that “Iraq was behind the terrorist attacks of 9/11” (p. 45). This is not something easy to do and it all happens mostly through a skillful manipulation of ideas through an effective use of language.

It does not, however, happen through a direct control of the media by employing coercive means of censorship as was the practice in the past. Modern media is controlled through other means and according to the Chomsky-Herman Propaganda model there are five filters through which a news item has to pass before it finds a place in the newspaper or TV screen. These include ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak, and anticommunist ideology (Herman, 1996). They presented this model more than two decades ago but apart from some change in the nature of the last two filters, the first three are still as current as two decades ago. The decision of a news organization as to what is newsworthy depends on whether a news item is supporting or threatening these elements.

The first two of these filters, that is ownership and advertising, belong to the self-interests of the media industry. News media are profit-oriented industries and cannot publish news that, in any way, is harmful for their business or for their advertisers who are the main source of their income. The third filter is the reliance of the media on institutional sources for their news collection. Most of the reporting is based on press releases issued by governmental or other institutional sources and are written in a language that suits their interests and the reporters or editors don't bother a lot about publishing the press release as it is received. The fourth filter that

affects a news item is the governmental or institutional Flak as a control mechanism. Sometimes the news may lead to punitive actions and libel suits and thus such news also don't get published. The last filter was relevant to the cold war era based on a tussle between the Communist USSR and the Capitalist West and news items were to be published on the basis of an anti-communist ideology (Chomsky & Herman, 2002). The filter of the anti-Communist ideology now has become irrelevant because of the end of the Cold War but it seems that it has been replaced with an anti-terror/anti-Islamic ideology as discussed in the previous chapter.

These five filters may be a generalization of the most important driving forces behind media control but they are no doubt irrefutable factors that regulate the workings of modern media. We can say that in recent times the governmental Flak may not be as strict as it used to be in the past when there were strict laws to punish the media for violating the censorship but a lot of advertisements that the media get, come from the government and is often used as a blackmail tactic to harness the media when it starts taking liberties. In countries like Pakistan governments also bribe journalists directly by giving them money in cash or kind and indirectly by giving them favors and privileges that they are not otherwise eligible to get. At times they may get punished physically by various intelligence agencies and sometimes may get killed.

Since the WoT began Pakistan has become one of the most dangerous countries for the journalists because of being targeted by the religious militants and other state and non-state actors. The Committee to Protect Journalists placed Pakistan at 10<sup>th</sup> position in a ranking based on unsolved cases of journalists murdered from 1992-2010 (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2010). The Press Emblem Campaign had placed Pakistan at No 3 in its report of the most dangerous countries for Journalists by 2012 and has put it at No 1 during the first quarter of 2013



(Press Emblem Campaign, 2013). Thus things have changed a lot from the time when Chomsky-Herman propaganda model was presented and it needs to incorporate many new factors or filters that are controlling the modern media.

### **3.2 The Myth of a Free Media:**

The analysis of the media discourse after the Soviet intervention in the chapter 05 would suggest that just as the Zia regime was a Client Dictatorship in Chomskyan terms, the media was a Compliant Media under a strict state control. The language of those editorials was so submissive that at times it seemed a mere copy-paste of a political statement. After Zia, there was a decade of democracy in Pakistan and during that time the Pakistan media tried to assert its independence on a gradual pace. Ironically enough it was during the period of another dictatorial role in Pakistan during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century that Pakistan media made a phenomenal progress in asserting itself as an independent new force to reckon with.

Gen Musharraf, probably in an effort to do away with the traditional Machiavellian image of a dictator, allowed the private satellite channels to flourish at a rapid pace. He not only allowed dozens of new TV channels but also allowed them enough space to say things that were unprecedented in the history of Pakistani journalism. This was probably the worst decision of his life as the new media without the traditional stringent control soon turned into a Frankenstein for his own government and played a decisive role in his overthrow by a democratic setup in 2008. The rise of the satellite media in Pakistan, apart from ushering in a huge social change in this country, has also developed a culture of an open, frank, and at times insulting culture of political debate. The excited reporters and aggressive talk-show anchors seem to have made life miserable for the ruling elites.

The Western media has gone through a similar phase of excitement and assertiveness during the Vietnam War and events like the Watergate scandal in the 70s. The media was so defiant that a Trilateral Commission in 1975 “concluded that the media have become a ‘notable new source of national power’, one aspect of an ‘excess of democracy’ that contributes to ‘the reduction of governmental authority at home and a consequent ‘decline in the influence of democracy abroad’ (Chomsky, 1989, p. 2). The questions that arises in the mind is whether this new ‘free and independent’ media is actually free and whether it is working under a noble missionary zeal to bring about positive social change in societies?

Chomsky and Herman (2002) consider Mass Media to be corporations that are driven by market forces rather than by a ‘search for truth’. These corporations sell their audience as a product to their advertisers who are the major source of revenue for a media organization (Chomsky, 1989). Fairclough (1995b), the main proponent of CDA, also agrees with Chomsky that modern media is competitive and works under economic compulsions. He believes that modern media works under “a tension between the pressure to increase ratings through opting broadly for more entertainment, and the pressure to provide public service information and education” (p. 44). This phenomenon of rating also crept into Pakistan media in recent years and there are independent organizations who rate the TV programs through public surveys and then the advertisers flock to those programs. The more the rating of a program the more the advertisements, the more the profit of the channel and the more the anchor or actor getting paid. That is how the chain of profits work in the modern media. They are not missionaries pursuing a noble cause but are merely selling what is sellable.

The media corporations have, however, refined their propaganda skills to such a level that they are quite successful in presenting themselves as champions of democracy and truth and defenders of the down-trodden segments of the society. The fact is that they serve the causes of the elitist groups including themselves. The condemnation of an official enemy of America or the West in general can go on without concrete evidence and gives an easy excuse for an American intervention. This holds true for the current investigation as the Soviet Union in the past and more recently the Taliban, Iraq and Iran have been projected as the evil enemies and the Western media has been successfully promoting the hatred against the Islamic world without sufficient evidence. Same is the case with the Pakistani and Indian media which can cross all limits in their mutual blame-game as both are each other's official enemies.

### **3.3. Critical Discourse Analysis:**

Discourse analysis, in recent times, has become a popular field of inquiry in various disciplines like sociology, anthropology, psychology, media studies, philosophy and linguistics. Many different perspectives on how to actually analyze discourse have also been established. Vijay K. Bhatia, John Flowerdew and Rodney H. Jones (2008) have discussed seven major approaches to discourse analysis including Conversation Analysis (CA), Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Corpus-based Discourse Analysis, Multi-model Discourse Analysis, Mediated Discourse Analysis, Ethnographic-based Discourse Analysis and Genre Analysis. There are some others like the Feminist Post-structuralist Discourse Analysis (FPDA), Semiotic Analysis, Social Semiotic Analysis, Socio-cognitive Analysis, Discourse-Historical Analysis and so on.

Despite being grounded in a similar intellectual pursuit in the study of text and its social context, these approaches differ in their explanation of their notions about text and how it is used

in a social context. This study has chosen CDA for its analysis which is an open-ended perspective imposing no hard and fast rules and is non-prescriptive in the selection of tools for data analysis. CDA has concerned itself mainly with the issues of power and ideology in domains like politics, media, gender, advertisements, economics, education and some other institutional discourses. CDA does not have a long history as the term was used by Norman Fairclough in his seminal work *Language and Power* (1989) but he preferred to call his perspective as Critical Language Study (CLS). He kept using the term Critical Discourse Analysis as part of CLS in his subsequent publications till 1995 when he titled his new book as *Critical Discourse Analysis* which established the use of this term for the perspective that he and some other linguists had been following for the past few years.

Critical Discourse analysis as we know it today is a perspective that evolved from 'Critical Linguistics' developed by a group of linguists at the University of East Anglia during the 70s. These included Roger Fowler, Gunther Kress, Bob Hodge and Tony Trew. Hodge and Kress (1979) trace the influences on Critical Linguistics to the works of Michael Halliday with his Systemic Functional Grammar and also to Chomskyan Transformational Grammar. They also feel indebted to the work of Benjamin Whorf apart from non-linguistic thoughts of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. They considered language to be a social and psychological phenomenon and advocated an interaction of linguistics with its neighbouring disciplines like sociology, anthropology and psychology. They believed that language constructs realities for us so that the way we express or understand reality becomes the actual reality which may be far from what it actually was.

The Critical Linguists mainly draw upon the SFG for their tools of linguistic analysis as discussed in Chapter 2 of this study. The Systemic Functional perspective is called 'functional' because it sees language as satisfying various human needs through an appropriate use of language in a particular context. The language system gets established over centuries of language use to fulfil recurring human needs. That's why Halliday calls SFG as a "natural grammar" (p. xiii). He also calls it 'functional' because it serves to fulfil three meta-functions described as Ideational, Interpersonal and Textual. In its ideational function, language tries "to understand the environment" and to represent it whereas in its Interpersonal function it tries to "act on the others" in that environment and in its Textual function it "breathes relevance into the other two" (p. xiii).

In simple terms, the Ideational can be referred to as the organization, understanding and expression of our perceptions of the world and our own consciousness whereas the Interpersonal allows us to use language to take roles, express and understand feelings, attitudes and judgements in a communicative event (Bloor & Bloor, 1995). The Textual function can be said to relate "what is said (or written) to the real world and to other linguistic experiences" (p. 9). It refers to the coherence between word groups, phrases and clauses to create a meaningful language structure. All these functions or at least one of them are always present in a linguistic structure and thus this perspective provides a new way of understanding the workings of language in a social context.

On the basis of these three meta-functions, the Systemic Functional perspective looks at three levels of Clause construction. SFG takes the Clause as the highest structure for the construction of meaning in a sentence and is followed by groups, words, and morphemes in a

hierarchy known as Rank Scale. The Ideational function is realized by looking at a Clause as a Representation of various experiences of realities and that's why it is also known as the Experiential function. The reality according to Halliday is realized through the Transitivity Structure in a language which mostly includes words of "happening, doing, sensing, meaning, and being and becoming" (1985, p. 106). All these 'goings-on' are labelled as Processes in SFG and corresponds to the concept of Verbs in traditional grammar but it is certainly a more dynamic concept than the 'word for action' concept in traditional grammar.

The Interpersonal meta-function in SFG is realized by looking at the Clause as an Exchange of communication between a speaker and a listener. This exchange pertains to a 'Giving' or 'Demanding' of 'Information' or 'Goods & Services' (p. 68). Just like the Transitivity in Clause as Representation, it is the Mood Structure of the sentence that establishes the Clause as an Exchange. It is the Mood of the sentence that turns it into an Offer, a Command, a Statement and a Question. The Textual meta-function in SFG is realized by looking at the Clause as a Message communicated between interlocutors.

The structure that establishes the Clause as a Message is called the Thematic Structure. It consists of a word or group or clause at the beginning of a sentence and it is defined as "the point of departure of the message; it is that with which the Clause is concerned" (p. 37). The Theme gets its significance by the fact that it is the thing that is on the mind of the speaker and that's why it comes in the beginning of the sentence. Apart from the Theme, the Thematic Structure also consists of a Rheme which the remaining part of the message in which the Theme is developed.

Apart from these three dimensions at the Clause level, Halliday also looks at the meta-functions at five other levels of language use as well. These are Below the Clause, Above the Clause, Beside the Clause, Around the Clause and Beyond the Clause levels where some structures lower in level than a Clause contribute to the meta-functions at the Clause level. Below the Clause level focuses on these meta-functions at the Group and Phrase level. Halliday considers Group to be next to the Clause in the Rank Scale of SFG and it is a group of words just like a phrase but he differentiates between the two by saying that “whereas a Group is an expansion of the word, the Phrase is a contraction of a Clause” (p. 180).

The Group level functioning is studied in terms of Nominal, Verbal, Adverbial, Conjunction and Preposition Groups and Phrases. SFG also distinguishes the Ideational meta-function into an Experiential and a Logical sub-function at the Group level. The Experiential as its name indicates refers to the general meaning ascribed to the Ideational function i.e. a representation of our experiences of realities which is expressed as ideas. The Logical refers to the relationship between those ideas (Bloor & Bloor, 1995). All the Groups mentioned above are formed under some logic so that only those words can become part of the group that have logical relationship with each other.

This research does not make an extensive use of the Tools provided by the SFG but this brief overview of the SFG was necessary not only because CDA theorists have drawn upon this perspective for their models but also because some of these tools have also been employed in this research. SFG is no doubt a reservoir of tools that suits the CDA perspective but there is one major limitation that has forced this research not to make an extensive use of tools from SFG. Applying SFG on a text is a meticulous process that no doubt goes beyond the sentence level but

has to go through a delicate micro-level analysis of the bits and pieces of a sentence. Such an analysis may be very concrete and empirical but it suits texts of small or moderate length. An analysis like the one in the present study that spans over decades and is time-barred cannot be based on such a scrupulous and detailed analysis.

The Critical Linguists made use of the various tools in SFG like Transitivity, modality, coherence etc. for their analysis but it was, however, Norman Fairclough who improvised upon Critical Linguistics and SFG to develop CDA. He was joined by many others like Ruth Wodak and Teun van Dijk who contributed towards its establishment as a viable model for an analysis of language use. CDA, as discussed above and in the previous chapter, has remained a problem-driven approach and has focused mainly on issues of power and social inequality (Bhatia, Flowerdew, & Jones, 2008). It has mainly drawn upon the work of social theorists like Bourdieu, Baudrillard, Foucault, Giddens, Habermas and Zizek so as to relate a text with its social context.

John Flowerdew (2008) believes that the specific agenda of CDA has been to support the struggle against inequality and to bring about a social change. He also believes that CDA is preoccupied with power relations and is emancipatory in nature. Discussing the nature of CDA as an approach, theory or method, Flowerdew is of the opinion that it may not be a theory *per se* but it draws upon a number of theories and uses lots of methods. CDA can thus be considered as an approach relying upon various theories and methods from social sciences and humanities.

Norman Fairclough has a major contribution towards the establishment of CDA as a viable method of textual analysis across various disciplines. He considers language to be not only a social process but also a socially conditioned process and that's why he considers the analysis of a text to include the social context in which it is written (Fairclough, 1989). He



considers text to be a part of the whole process of communication which can be termed as discourse. Discourse includes a process of the production of the text, the text itself and a process of the interpretation of the text. 'Text' is thus a product of a process of production and a resource for the process of interpretation which means that the various properties of a text serve as "traces of the productive process" and also "as cues in the process of interpretation" (p. 24). That's why there are three stages in his model of analysis which correspond to these three dimensions of the discursive process.

The first stage in his model is the Description of the formal properties of the text like the Experiential, Relational and Expressive properties of vocabulary, Grammar and other textual structures. This micro-level analysis, as is evident from the terminology, draws mainly upon the tools of SFG. He renames the Ideational function as Representations because it is concerned with the representation of the world and describes the Interpersonal functions as Relations and Identities because this function generates the relations and identities of the interlocutors (Fairclough, 1995b). The second stage is the Interpretation of the text being a product/trace and a resource/cue of a productive and interpretative process. It is the third stage of Explanation where the text is analysed in its relationship with the social context. Fairclough has progressed a lot in his methodology since his seminal work in 1989 but it is largely an extension of these basic principles that he introduced 24 years ago.

As discussed in the previous chapter Fairclough believes in an ideological naturalization of language use and in order to expose that an analysis, according to him, should focus on a text both at the Micro and Macro-levels. He believes that the social institutions are the highest levels of social formations whereas social events and actions are the lowest and most concrete

(Fairclough, 1995a). Thus an analysis of political events and actions, as is the case in the present study, need to take into consideration the “Ideological-discursive formations” (IDF) of the political institutions. Fairclough has probably borrowed the IDF concept from Pecheux’s specific discursive formations called ‘Interdiscourse’ as discussed in the previous chapter. The present study is also an attempt at deciphering the Ideological-discursive formations of the political and media institutions through their discourses on religious militancy.

Fairclough (1995b) acknowledges his indebtedness to Critical Linguistics but is also critical of its focus on text and the processes of production without taking into consideration the interpretative process. He talks about the shift of focus in media studies “from text analysis to audience reception” and also downplays the exaggerated “role of media in ideological reproduction” (p. 28). This research agrees with the notion that this preoccupation with a negative projection of media as an ISA in Althusserian terms is true to a large extent but it is still a half truth. It is not only distorting the image of media but is also overshadowing the immense role media is playing in bringing about positive changes in the attitudes and conditions of the people it is catering to. This research also believes that the theorists associated with CDA are themselves overdoing the negative image of media.

The other significant contributor in the establishment of CDA as a viable method of research is Teun Van Dijk. He shares the ideological positioning of CDA with Fairclough and others as discussed in the previous chapter but he comes up with his own version of CDA which is rooted in cognitive linguistics. He calls CDA to be a “dissident research” aiming “to understand, expose and ultimately resist social inequality.” (van Dijk, 2001a, p. 352). He considers CDA to be a perspective that focuses on social and political instead of other research

paradigms and it is always a multidisciplinary approach rather than a merely linguistic one. CDA dissects “the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and dominance in society.” (p. 353)

Teun van Dijk (2001b) calls his version of CDA as “socio-cognitive discourse analysis” because he values the study of cognition to be as much important in the study of discourse as the study of social structures. He calls it a “theoretical discourse-cognition-society triangle” where the social and cognitive dimensions serve as the context of discourse. The cognitive dimension includes both personal cognitions referring to “personal memories, knowledge and opinions” (van Dijk, 2001a, p. 354) and the social cognitions referring to shared belief, values and goals etc. as members of “groups, movements, institutions, organizations and social processes” (van Dijk, 2001b, p. 98).

The socio-cognitive dimension of discourse analysis is very significant because it takes into consideration the mental environment from where the discourse originates and can be quite helpful in understanding the processes of the Production and Interpretation of a text as described by Fairclough in his model. Van Dijk (2001a) also talks about the bifurcation of the analysis on a Micro and a Macro-level so as to relate the use of language at the micro-level with its socio-cognitive context at the Macro-level. Thus the micro-level would consist of analysing things like textual features whereas the Macro-level would include an analysis of things like ideology, power, inequality etc. This research has also divided its analysis into a micro-level dealing with referential, predication, and argumentation strategies whereas the Macro-level analysis relates these features to ideological Myths and Dispositives.

The third important proponent of CDA is Ruth Wodak who believes that CDA is “not concerned with language or language use *per se*, but with the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures” (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000). She agrees with most of the precepts of CDA like discourse and society being mutually constitutive, language use is ideological, discourse as a social behaviour etc. She, however, emphasises the historical context of a discourse as a pivotal dimension in discourse analysis. Keeping that in mind, she comes up with her own version of CDA labelled as Discourse-Historical (DH) method.

The inclusion of ‘historical’ in the labelling of this method is because of the significance attached to the historical context in the analysis of a text. The DH approach integrates “available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the social and political fields in which discursive events are embedded.” (Wodak, 2006, p. 134). Reisigl and Wodak (2001) talk of the significance of such an analysis in the following words:

A very specific form of critical social practice directed against the status quo is ‘retrospective critique’. In criticizing the status quo ante — that is to say, in critically reconstructing the past, the effects of which are still related to the present — and, at the same time, in criticizing the present way of dealing with the past — that is to say, in criticizing the status quo — it has the quality of prospective critique, since it aims at the revision of an actual ‘picture’ or ‘narrative’ of history and, in consequence and in the future, at a new, responsible way of dealing with the past and its effects. (pp. 34-35)

Such a retrospective critique suits the present study as well which aims at understanding the contemporary discourse on religious militancy by trying to locate its roots in history and by drawing parallels between the present and the past discourses on some social or political actions.

The DH method according to Wodak (2001) follows a concept of social critique which is a combination of an Immanent critique, a socio-diagnostic critique and a Prognostic critique. The Immanent focuses on inconsistencies, self-contradictions, paradoxes etc. in the text internal structures. The Socio-diagnostic exposes the manipulative nature of discourse practices by putting them in wider social, historical or political context. The Prognostic critique suggest ways of improvement in discursive practices to rid them of their exploitative nature.

As compared to Fairclough and van Dijk, Wodak seems more concrete and down to earth when it comes to presenting a viable methodological framework for analysis. She also appreciates the potential of SFG for a microlevel analysis but she also comes up with lots of other categories from Rhetorics like metaphors, metonymies, rhetorical questions, Argumentation strategies etc. and some others like Referential and Predicational strategies adopted and modified from van Leeuwen ( Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). This research also has relied mainly on the strategies described by her for a Discourse-Historical CDA of the selected data..

Discourse includes everyday knowledge conveyed through media, communication in school and family etc and also the particular knowledge produced by cultural and natural sciences (Jager, 2001). Researchers should know that they are situated inside the discourse they are analysing and their analysis is based on the norms, values, laws and rights that are a historical result of discursive practices and their analysis instead of being a universal truth may be just a position that they have taken. Discourse is a regulating body that forms our consciousness by putting limitation on what can be said through prohibitions, explicit taboos, conventions, internalizations etc. Jager believes that "Discourses exercises power as they transport knowledge

on which the collective and individual consciousness feeds. This emerging knowledge is the basis of individual and collective action and the formative action that shapes reality." (Jager, 2001, p. 38)

James Paul Gee (2011) has recently come up with a comprehensive toolkit for discourse analysis in general but a lot of that is already being employed in CDA. To make amends to his earlier work which was probably less concrete in its composition of a methodological framework, he has now come up with a list of 27 tools for discourse analysis in the form of sharp questions. Gee has come up with many innovative names for tools like Making Strange tool, Frame Problem tool, Doing and not just saying tool, The Why This Way and not That way Tool, Context is reflexive tool, Significance Building tool, Identities Building tool, the Politics Building tool etc.

This toolkit may be useful for the analysis of a variety of discursive practices but despite giving a direction to the analyst as to how the analysis is to be done, these tools, being too generalized, still run short of handling the delicate linguistic data. That's why this study has not picked any of his tools although many of the selected tools incorporate most of the question tools of Gee. His Context is Reflexive tool is the same as CDA's concept of discourses shaping realities and realities shaping discourses. His explanation of the context is quite handy for all contextual studies of language:

Context includes the physical setting in which the communication takes place and everything in it; the bodies, eye gaze, gestures, and movements of those present; all that has previously been said and done by those involved in the communication; any shared knowledge those involved

have, including cultural knowledge, that is, knowledge of their own shared culture and any other cultures that may be relevant in the context. (p. 84)

This implies that what is said is combined by the listeners with the context to extract meaning but Gee himself admits that it will be a static concept as it excludes the manipulative power of the speakers to shape the understanding of the context by the listeners. Our language does not just fit into the context but helps create that context as well. He labels it as the Reflexive property of the context. So the question that needs to be asked about a text is whether what is being said and the way it is being said is creating or shaping or reproducing or changing a context. (p. 85)

### 3.3.1. Criticism on CDA:

CDA has been much criticised for lacking both in a genuine theoretical background and a truly employable method of analysis. This criticism has seemed to hold ground as the CDA theorists themselves tried to develop a sound theoretical base and a viable method of analysis for many years after the publication of *Language and Power* (Fairclough, 1989). Blommaert (2005) notes that the origins of CDA as discussed by various proponents suggest that they have been selective in getting their influences rather than evolving through “genuine historical networks”. This is probably because of the explicit leftist stance taken by the CDA theorists and that’s why most of the ideological influences discussed in Chapter 02 of this study belong to the Marxist tradition. Most of its critics argue that taking such explicit political positions harms the credibility of the CDA perspective as an objective research pursuit.

Unlike many who criticise CDA for its explicit progressive stance, Widdowson (2004) greatly appreciates it as having a “crucial importance”

This critical perspective is of crucial importance in that it engages scholarly enquiry with matters of immediate and pressing concern in the non-scholarly world. What CDA has done, greatly to its credit, is to make discourse analysis relevant by relating it to a moral cause and an ideological purpose. In this respect, as I make clear in the preface to this book, I regard its work as highly significant. (p. 89)

He is, however, critical of CDA in lacking a proper theoretical ground to hold on. He says that the CDA theorist like the Critical Linguists and Fairclough mainly present the SFG as their theoretical framework but then they go on to include lots of others as well. Even in using the SFG CDA is very selective and does not take the framework as a whole. He quotes Fowler who admits that SFG is "too detailed and complicated for application" (p. 97) and the critical linguists actually make use of a very few concepts from SFG. Widdowson considers CDA to belong to his concept of Pretext by which he means "an ulterior motive" in the designing and understanding of text. The CD Analyst has an ulterior motive or a pre-conceived notion regarding the meaning of a text in his mind and he just tries to prove it to be true by making use of the suitable tools from SFG or any other framework.

This research acknowledges Widdowson's critique to be very rational and objective as after going through an extensive literature review of the seminal works in CDA, this research felt at crossroads in designing a viable methodological framework for its analysis. The end result as will be seen in the next chapter is a "random enterprise" as Widdowson calls it, where tools from many different theoretical frameworks have been picked and made to fit in to the immediate concerns of this research. And that is how most of the work is going on in the world of Critical Discourse Analysis. This research, however, is not being apologetic for its selection of tools. Notwithstanding the fact that Widdowson's critique holds ground on idealistic footings but in the



absence of a prescriptive theory there is no harm in making use of tools from different resources as long as they conform to the "moral cause" and "ideological purpose" that Widdowson so highly appreciates.

Fairclough and other leading theorists have been conscious of this lack of theory and method in CDA and have been coming up with their defences up till the present day. An important contribution in this regard has been the work by Lilie Chouliariki and Fairclough (1999) who state this at the outset that the purpose of writing this book is to 'ground' and establish a theoretical base of CDA. They ground and locate CDA in two theoretical paradigms. The first one is CDA's placement in "a tradition of critical social scientific theory and analysis" (p. 19). This tradition considers discourse to be one of the many social practices in a society and believes in the shaping of discourse by these practices and also getting shaped by discourse in turn. It is based on Bourdieu's Structuralist Constructivism that is "a way of seeing and researching social life as both constrained by social structures, and an active process of production which transforms social structures." (p. 1)

The second location as suggested by Chouliaraki and Fairclough is the critical research on social change in a late modern society. They believe CDA has a lot to contribute to this kind of a research and they identify various themes of a late modern world on which critical research and CDA can collaborate like globalization, colonization, appropriation, ideology etc. They discuss the significance of language that social theorist have come to realize and then go on to present the SFG as the analytical framework for CDA and make a plea that the SFG and CDA should collaborate with each other to develop a strong critical approach to the study of discourse.

Teun van Dijk (2001a) is also aware of the lack of a unified theoretical framework in CDA as it is being employed by researchers through very diverse theoretical and analytical frameworks. What unifies them, however, as belonging to the CDA perspective is their concern with things like "power, dominance, hegemony, ideology, class, gender, race, discrimination, interests, reproduction, institutions, social structure and social order" (p. 354). He, however, tries to present a theoretical framework that can work through joining discourse, cognition and society as discussed above. Having said that and then trying to develop a theoretical framework throughout the article, he goes on to say that CDA is neither a theory nor a method.

It becomes quite confusing when these pioneers of CDA say such self-contradictory things and elicit harsh criticism from various quarters. Fairclough (1989) has all the way been saying that CDA is just "a guide not a blue print" and then he goes on to write a whole book (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999) to assert that CDA is both a theory and a method. This study assumes that the fact that CDA has become such a popular perspective in research and is being employed across many disciplines is for the reason that it is non-prescriptive and that it has a strong moral grounding in its approach towards research. That's why the CDA theorists should not labour hard in being apologetic or defensive about things that have only an academic value.

Like Widdowson, Blommaert (2005) has also put forth a strong critique of CDA while at the same time appreciating the approach with a lot of respect. He wants CDA to tilt more towards ethnography than the textual analysis. He is also of the view that CDA has focused more on the issues of the First World and neglected the Third World so that the approach seems incapable of being applied to the issues of the third world. The present study has the ability to fill in that gap by focusing on third world countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan to understand the

nature of their relationship with super powers like America and the former USSR and how that relationship affects their discourses.

Richardson (2007) agrees with Blommaert that the majority of the world population is probably being neglected by the CDA theorists and he says that the problems of the first and third worlds may be of different nature but they are “the product of the structuring influence of Capitalism” alike. He is, however, critical of CDA that asserts a progressive identity but has not focused on the actual exploitative structures in the capitalist societies. He believes that CDA has been focusing on discourses regarding marketization and globalisation but it has largely neglected the discursive practices that are consistently reproducing class inequality.

Flowerdew (2008) while pondering upon the future of CDA says that CDA should rid itself from demonizing the powerful and also take into account the discourses of resistance which are ever-present on the sites of power struggles. He quotes Blommaert (2005) and Scott (1990) that the powerless and under-privileged may have powerful discourses (hidden transcripts) of their own in private which can surface and become public in moments of crisis. This is a very important direction for any discourse analyst to look for such discourses as well that challenge domination apart from analysing the discourses of domination

Blommaert (2005) also criticises CDA for trying to establish itself as a distinct school based on ‘critical’ analysis which implies that the others are non-critical and this may not be a justifiable claim. He also criticises the deliberate institutionalisation of CDA through publication of many books, journals, websites and university exchange programs. He is of the view that such institutionalisation leads to “closure and exclusiveness”. This critique may not be logical as this study assumes institutionalisation and marketization to have become a necessary requirement of

this hi-tech world and if research is not disseminated through modern mass media and internet, it will get lost into oblivion without making any significant contribution.

This study also believes that a neglect of this institutionalisation may also help other hegemonic or repressive ideological regimes, who are good at marketization, to take the centre stage. Such a critique goes against the basic aims of a research based on CDA as CDA considers itself to be subversive in nature which means that it tries to subvert the practices of exploitation that it analyses and tries to expose the abuse of power.

### **3.4. Conclusion:**

This brief review of the nature and evolution of modern media reveals that media, on the one hand, has become a vehicle of social control by the dominant classes of the society but , on the other hand, it has also become a force to reckon with for the same classes. There is a lot on media that can be manipulated for the perpetuation of dominance but there is a lot more that is probably bringing about positive changes in the society at the same time. Everything that goes on media cannot be controlled and there is a lot, that may challenge dominance and exploitation, that creeps into the general stereotypical discourse.

The CDA as discussed in this chapter is a perspective that aims at analysing discourse in a way that has more than mere academic value. It takes the analysis beyond the textual level to include the social structures that shape a discourse and how those structures themselves are shaped by various discourses. CDA does not merely interpret discourse; it aims at a positive social change. It takes sides with the oppressed in the society and wants to help them understand the way they are being fooled around through a manipulated use of language.

These two chapters have traced the evolution of thought regarding ideology, media and CDA and provided a theoretical and methodological background to place the current project in a proper context. The selection of a method and the appropriate tools for analysis is a very critical stage in the research process. It not only equips the researcher to handle the data in a logical and scientific way but also gives an authenticity to the ultimate findings of the research. This research now moves on to the next chapter that will describe the methods adopted from various perspectives within CDA. It will also give an inventory of the various tools that have been adopted from various sources for the analysis of selected media texts.

## Chapter 04: Methods

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As discussed in the previous chapters this study has chosen a Critical Discourse Analytic perspective for its data analysis. Most of the Critical Discourse analysts have come up with certain broad guidelines regarding the actual method of conducting this type of analysis and they leave it to individual researchers to choose or to construct their own tools. This has made CDA a flexible and non-prescriptive method and has established itself as a cross-disciplinary field of enquiry. Even the leading theorists in CDA have come up with categories that are far from being formulaic.

With a rapid growth of interest in CDA, however, researchers have started coming up with comprehensive toolkits in their recent publications. This research is mainly indebted to Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk, Ruth Wodak and Theo van Leeuwen for benefiting from their versions of CDA but it is predominantly the Discourse-Historical (DH) version developed by Ruth Wodak and Resigil (2001) and the Sociosemantic Inventory of van Leeuwen (2008) that has shaped the methodological contours of this research. Apart from these two, tools for analysis have also been borrowed from a variety of sources compatible with CDA .

### **4.1. Conceptual Design:**

This research takes a Top-bottom approach for its analysis as described by Nicola Woods (2006). This refers to an analysis that begins at a Macro-level from “a conceptualization of the context in which the discourse is taking place” (p. xi). The analyst then looks down “from this position into the utterances produced and rehearsed, in the expectation of finding evidence-linguistic evidence-of the assumptions, expectations and social constructs that create and define that

context” (p. xi). The approach is similar to the Macro and Micro-level analysis of van Dijk’s socio-cognitive model as discussed in the previous chapter.

As discussed earlier, ideology is considered to be primarily residing in language apart from many other locations. This research focuses on tracing the workings of ideology in the language of Pakistani newspapers regarding the representation of the post-9/11 religious activism and the on-going ‘war on terror’ in a Pakistani context. The title of this research, by putting ‘political’ in parenthesis suggests that it will briefly focus on the analysis of the political discourse apart from its primary focus on the media discourse. The basic reason behind that as suggested earlier is that media primarily reports the political discourse and is considered to be one of the most powerful Ideological State Apparatuses in Althusserian terms. Media discourse gets shaped by the political discourse and then it shapes the public opinion. On the other hand public opinion shapes media discourse and media discourse also shapes political discourse as well.

To put that in simple terms, the immediate focus of this research is to analyze the media discourse in Pakistan but because of the mutually constitutive nature of these discourses it is pertinent to focus on the ideological underpinnings of the political discourse so as to appreciate its influence on media. These Ideological-Discursive Formations (IDFs) in Faircloughian terms as described in the previous chapter lead to the creation of various Myths that contribute, apart from many other things, towards the establishment of a ‘Dispositive’ among the various stakeholders. That’s why the analysis in the present study has been anchored around the creation of Myths and Dispositives, both of which are ideological constructs.

## **4.2. Discourse-Historical Method in CDA:**

The Discourse-Historical method as discussed in the previous chapter is a 'context-sensitive' approach. Ruth Wodak (2006) has based her DH method on triangulation, probably to defend the allegations of bias against CDA, and provides more levels of analysis than the Macro and Micro-levels of the socio-cognitive model described in the previous chapter. It includes an immediate text-internal level focusing on purely linguistic features followed by a level focusing on intertextual and interdiscursive relation between texts, genres and discourses. The third level focuses on the extralinguistic social variables based on middle-range theories and the fourth one takes into consideration broader socio-political and historical contexts based on grand theories. The Grand theories according to Wodak serve as the foundation and the middle-range theories support the analytical aims.

Although this research is Pakistan specific but when a DH approach was employed on the post-9/11 scenario, it seemed impossible to not to take into consideration the happenings in the region during the past fifty years in order to find out the historical context of 9/11 and religious militancy in Pakistan. That is why the first chapter gives a brief overview of the political events in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States of America so as to place the happenings after 9/11 in that historical context.

And that is why, apart from the data taken from the Pakistani political and media discourse, extracts from the statements of the American leadership have also been analyzed as this research assumes that the political discourse in a weak third world country like Pakistan gets influenced by the dominant political discourse of a super power like the US and both in turn influence the media discourse. This dimension of the present analysis will help fill in the gaps in



CDA regarding its neglect of the third world and would help understand the nature of its interaction with the first world.

### **4.3. Sampling and Delimitation:**

In order to find out the answers to the research questions posed in chap 1, this research has adopted a Longitudinal Approach for data collection. The primary focus of this research was to analyze the media (and political) discourse in Pakistan in a post 9/11 scenario but a brief comparative study with some pre-9/11 data was also included to appreciate its historical context. This meant a study that would span over more than three decades and that also meant a huge body of corpus from the print and electronic media of Pakistan.

As it seemed beyond the scope of this research to analyze such a huge corpus, a representative sample of the corpus for this research has been collected from three mainstream Pakistani English newspapers based on their coverage of a few very important political events during this period. The electronic media was not chosen for analysis as most of the mainstream TV channels were established a few years after 911 and so a comparative pre-911 data would not be available. The idea of taking data from electronic media was also dropped as most of the mainstream TV channels are owned by the same media groups that publish the newspapers and this research assumes that the Discourse Position of the TV channels will be the same as that of the newspapers.

This being an essentially qualitative project, the sampling technique used for data collection is Purposive Sampling which is a Non-probability Sampling technique used in qualitative research. This particular technique has been selected because the data spans over a very long period of time and Purposive Sampling or its more specific type Criterion Sampling

sets a basic criterion for the selection of its sample that arises out of the Research Questions. It has an additional advantage that instead of being based on strict timeframes or periods for data collection it continues the data collection to a Saturation Point beyond which it seems that no new conclusions can be drawn.

The Criterion for sampling devised in this research is based on collecting texts from the Pakistani media and political discourse regarding the coverage of certain Discursive Events (DE) regarding militant religious activism in a post 9/11 scenario. A DE in this research refers to an event which gets emphasized politically and it gets a wide coverage in media for many days, weeks or months (Jager, 2001). The selection of text for the political discourse includes speeches, statements or interviews of important political leaders and text for media discourse includes most relevant parts of the Editorials. Complete Editorials have been given in the Appendices for evaluating the selection criteria of the analyzed texts. The selection of Editorials is based on the fact that this genre of print media reflects the Discourse Position of a newspaper. A Discourse Position refers to the policy or a specific ideological location of an individual or a medium (Jager, 2001).

The DEs influence the direction and quality of the discourse depending on various agendas. Thus all events have discursive roots as they are the manifestation of that discourse but they also have roots in other DEs and history which can be called their Discursive Context. An analysis of any DE, therefore, always leads to an analysis of its Discursive Context. That's why the methodological framework has been anchored around Reisigl and Wodak's (2001) Discourse-historical method as discussed above and in the previous chapter. The post-9/11 DEs chosen for analysis seem to have their discursive roots in the Pre-9/11 DEs as revealed through

the historical background given in Chapter 1. In order to understand the Discursive Context of the post 9/11 DEs and to find out if there has been any qualitative shift in the Pre-and Post-9/11 discourses two of the most important DEs of these two eras have been chosen for analysis in the two core analytical chapters in this dissertation. These DEs include the invasion of Afghanistan by the Russians in 1979 discussed in chapter 05 and by the Americans in 2001 discussed in chapter 06.

The Post-9/11 sample, apart from the American invasion in 2001, also includes the coverage of two selected DEs by the two mainstream English newspapers in Pakistan in chapter 07. These DEs include:

- i. The Waziristan Operation
- ii. Lal Masjid Operation

The selection of the newspapers has been based on a criterion of their continuous publication during the selected DEs. This has been done to trace the consistencies or inconsistencies of trends and patterns of coverage of same newspapers and to avoid the conflict between the Discourse Positions of newspapers that were not being published in all of the selected DEs. This criterion however posed a problem that there was only one newspaper, that is, the daily Dawn which has continued its publication since 1979. The others being published at that time could not survive during the next two decades except for the Pakistan Times that continued its publication till 2006.

On the other hand the present-day mainstream newspapers like the News, the Nation, the Times, and the Express Tribune emerged at different points of time much later than 1979 and continue to get published till the present day. The problem has been resolved by limiting the

comparative analysis of the Russian and the American invasions of Afghanistan to the daily Dawn and the Pakistan Times as both were getting published on both the occasions. Similarly the post-9/11 DEs of the Waziristan and Lal Masjid Operations analysis has been limited to the daily Dawn and the News under the same criterion.

The Pre-9/11 data has been collected from the National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad in picture format and selected clips have been converted to MS word through the Optical Character Reading software. The post-9/11 data has been collected from the online available archives of the selected newspapers.

#### **4.4. Tools for Analysis at the Macro-level:**

James Paul Gee (2011) considers 'a tool for discourse analysis' to be 'a specific question to ask of data' (p. x). What he means by this is that carefully formulated questions serve as tools and answers to these questions reveal the process through which texts communicate their meanings the way they do. Many theorists in Discourse Analysis like Fairclough (1989) and Gee (2011) have suggested tools formulated in the form of questions regarding the meaning-making process in a language. This study has picked tools from various models of CDA furnished by its leading theorists but all these tools have been restructured as questions to support the Research Questions that this study attempts to answer.

The DH model suggests four levels of analysis as discussed above but this study has preferred to divide its analysis into a Macro and a Micro-level (van Dijk, 2001a) which is inclusive of the four levels of the DH model. The present study includes a Grand and a middle-range theory at the Macro-level whereas the Micro-level deals with the text-internal level. The Grand theory in the present case would be the concept of Dispositive whereas the Middle-range

theory would be the concept of Myth that would make up the Macro-level or the socio-political and historical level in the present analysis. These concepts were discussed in detail in Chapter 02 but following is a brief account of how the concepts of the Dispositive and the Myth have been employed by the present research in its analysis.

#### **4.4.1. Dispositive: The Grand Theory**

The Grand Theory of the Dispositive, as explained earlier, is a Foucauldian term for the network of relationship between discursive practices, non-discursive practices and their materializations/manifestations. This network of relationships establishes itself at a particular historical moment and is initiated as a response to cope an emergency. This research takes this concept of the Dispositive as the corner-stone of its theoretical framework and will begin its analysis by briefly analyzing the political and media discourse during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the eighties followed by an analysis of the political and media discourse during the American occupation of Afghanistan after 9/11.

Gilles Deleuze (1992) describes the concept of Dispositive as social apparatuses composed of 'lines' of different nature and they are in a state of flux all the time- moving, turning, breaking, drifting, bifurcating etc. These metaphorical lines include lines of visibility and enunciation which refers to seeing and speaking. Lines of visibility are lines of light that makes us see things and each Dispositive throws light in a different way and changes our visibility of things. Same is the case with lines of enunciation. A dispositive directs what is to be spoken and heard. The lines also include lines of force that act as "go-betweens between seeing and saying and vice versa, acting as arrows which continually cross between words and things, constantly waging battles between them" (p. 160).

In simple terms it is the Dispositive that helps us see and say things the way it wants and it is the Dispositive that generates a battle between words and things to bring about a change. Foucault does not believe in the universality of things as these lines keep on curving, breaking bifurcating and giving rise to new lines or new Dispositives. With a new Dispositive we cease to be what we were before and become the Other which is also real. Thus reality apart from what it actually is, is also in part a matter of how we perceive it. It is in this sense that the present study employs the concept of Dispositive on the events before and after 9/11

The Dispositive includes the relationship between different actors and discourses in an ongoing series of rivalries. That's why this research focuses on the power relations between the super powers (US and Allies) and a third-world country like Pakistan to find out as to whether the Pakistani discourse on religious activism before and after 9/11 is an upshot of the political discourse of the US and its allies or do we have an independent or alternate discourse of our own? The study will then focus mainly on the media discourse in Pakistan to find out as to whether the media toes the line of the political discourse or does it reflect religious activism in a different way. The Dispositive or the network of relationship between various discursive and non-discursive practices in the pre-9/11 era has been labeled as the *Jihad Dispositive* whereas the post-9/11 network has been labeled as the *Terror Dispositive*.

The inclusion of a small and selective corpus from the pre-9/11 period seems uncalled for as this research primarily aims at a post-9/11 analysis but the reason behind that inclusion is the fact that whatever has happened in a post-9/11 scenario has its roots in the happenings during the two decades before 9/11. The brief Pre-9/11 analysis will not only help trace the origins of 9/11 and its aftermath but will also help draw parallels between the contrasting representations of

almost similar actors and happenings in both these periods. The CDA perspective as already discussed assumes discourse as producing, reproducing or challenging domination of particular individuals, classes, groups or institutions over each other. This research focuses on this struggle but also goes beyond the group or institutional level to include a focus on the states engaged in this struggle of domination.

The question tool for Dispositive at the Macro-level would be:

Q.What Dispositives have governed the events and actions in the Pre- and Post-911 representation of religious militancy in the political and media discourse in Pakistan?

#### **4.4.2. Myth: The Middle-Range Theory**

The Middle-range theory employed by the present research is the concept of the Myth given by Roland Barthes and Michael Geis as discussed in Chapter Two. The Myth may seem to be the same thing as ideology described in the Marxist tradition but whereas an ideology serves as an all-encompassing concept, the Myth would be just a part contributing to the whole. This also does not mean that the Dispositive is made up of many Myths but it does mean that Myth is one of the many things that a Dispositive is composed of. Myth is also different from ideology hiding it as ideology does in the Marxist view.

Geis (1987) quotes Edelman's three main mythical themes used in the political discourse in the US and gives working examples of those myths in the American politics. These themes include "the Conspiratorial enemy, the valiant leader and United We Stand" (p. 26). The American nation is always made to believe the myth that there is an enemy (USSR) that is out to destroy the American nation. They are also made to believe that they have a 'valiant president' who is there to take care of that enemy and they are also made to believe that they should stand

united behind the valiant leader if they want to be saved from the enemy. These Myths work through a clever use of language in the political discourse and it does not require a high flown language and special rhetorical tropes to propagate these myths. They are part of the day to day language of common man.

As against the concept of Dispositive that does not offer any concrete tools for analysis, the concept of Myth does offer a set of tools that can be readily employed to understand the workings of Myths within discursive practices. Whereas the concept of Myth belongs to the Macro-level analysis the Myth-making tools belong to the Micro-level analysis. This study will follow the pattern of Geis in developing its categories of analysis at the Macro-level like 'The Myth of a War against Islam, The Security Threat Myth' etc. The tools given by Barthes to find out the working of myths behind the political and media discourse regarding religious militancy in Pakistan will be used at the Micro-level of analysis.

The question tool for the Myth-making process at the Macro-level would be:

Q. What Myths have been propagated to legitimize the events and actions in the Pre- and Post-9/11 representation of religious militancy in the political and media discourse in Pakistan?

#### **4.5. Tools for Analysis at the Micro-level:**

Critical Discourse Analysis and other modern trends in discourse analysis assert their approaches as going beyond the textual level to include the context and the processes of the production and interpretation of a text. None, however, can deny the fact that no matter where your analysis takes you, it always begins at the sentence level. That's why every linguistic



analysis has to find out concrete tools that are applicable to data at the word, group and clause level.

Fairclough (1989) has divided his model of CDA into three broad categories by asking basic questions regarding the Experiential, Relational and Expressive dimensions of the vocabulary, grammar and other structures in a text. These three dimensions more or less correspond to the Ideational, Interpersonal and Textual Metafunctions of the language as described by the Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday, 1985).

These basic questions, however, can be answered by answering a series of other questions related to the three Metafunctions of a text. As the Research Questions posed by this study are largely concerned with the Representation of religious activism in the political and media discourse in Pakistan, only those tools have been picked for this analysis that are helpful in digging the Experiential/Ideational dimension of a text. The basic question of Representation is to be answered by finding out more question-tools borrowed from other models of discourse analysis that have the potential to fit into the CDA perspective.

The data has been analyzed from the lower level structures to the higher level structures of the text. The lower-level structures have been analyzed at the Group and Clause level using the Referential and Predicational and Argumentational Strategies from the Discourse-historical CDA ( Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) and van Leeuwen (2008), the Metaphor and Framing theories (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and various tools from Traditional and Systemic Functional Grammar. This lower-level analysis also includes some useful concepts from Pragmatics that work slightly beyond the sentence level. All these Experiential structures in their meaning-making process lead to the creation of various Myths beyond the sentence level as described above. The highest level

of analysis is the constitution of a Dispositive through various strategies and through the creation of Myths of the two eras included in this analysis.

Following is a brief description of the various Experiential Tools that have been used in this research:

#### **4.5.1. Referential Tools Inventory:**

The Referential Strategy refers to the naming of people and other entities in a particular way by making a choice from among many possible ways of doing so. An individual can have dozens of identities at the same time like being a male, a student, a political activist, a muslim, a Pakistani, a Pukhtoon and so on. The choice to refer to that person by using a Nominal group has always an Experiential or Representational value that indicates the foregrounding of one particular identity out of so many available.

Theo van Leeuwen (2008) considers all texts to be representations of social practices and considers discourse in its Foucauldian sense to be "socially constructed knowledge of some social practice" (p. 6). He believes the discourse to be not only representing a social practice but also evaluating, justifying, defending it. In order to analyse the representation of Social Actors in discourse, he has come up with dozens of Referential strategies that he labels as his "Sociosemantic Inventory" (p. 23). This analysis will use many question tools based on the various categories presented by Wodak (2001) and Van Leeuwen (2008) and also make use of the working of the Nominal Group in the Systemic Functional Grammar.

The main question tool would thus be:

Q. What Referential strategies have been used to refer to the participants and events or things concerning religious militancy in the Pre- and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?

In order to give an answer to the above question the following features of the Nominal Group borrowed from Reisigl & Wodak (2001) and Van Leeuwen (2008) have been identified as evidence of representation of religious militancy.

- i. *Assimilation*: It refers to people as groups which can be done through *Collectivization* or *Aggregation*. *Collectivization* refers to the use of Deictics like I, we, you etc. and Collective Nouns like army, class, tribe, team, people, nation etc. to show unison, solidarity or otherwise. *Aggregation* groups people by quantifying them in order to authenticate and to persuade people like 'survey' 'opinion polls'. *Association* refers to another form of grouping based on common interests or activities like "lawyers, teachers, students, politicians being part of a protest against the coup" (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 37)
- ii. *Exclusion*: It takes place through *Suppression* or *Backgrounding*. *Suppression* is the complete absence of any reference to the social actors whereas *Backgrounding* allows reference in an indirect and non-striking way. (p. 29)
- iii. *Genericisation and Specification*: *Genericisation* refers to social actors as classes through plurals or singulars with Articles like 'Afghan refugees'. *Specification* refers to them as individuals. (p. 36)
- iv. *Indetermination*: *Indetermination* is realized through 'somebody' 'someone' 'some' which anonymize the agent. It can also be aggregated like 'many'. (p. 39)

- v. *Honorification*: Honorification refers to the use of formal titles like Dr., Prince, Sir etc. (p. 40)
- vi. *Appraisement*: Appraisement refers to an evaluation of Social Actors as good or bad, loved or hated etc. like 'darling, bastard, thug'. . (p. 45)
- vii. *Impersonalisation*: Impersonalisation refers to referring to people as not humans. It can be done through *Abstraction* and *Objectivation*. Abstraction means to refer to people through a quality given to them like 'people referred to as 'problem'. Objectivation occurs through Metonymy by referring to people in terms of places or things associated with them or with the action they are engaged in. It takes place through *Spatialization*, *Utterance autonomization*, *Instrumentalization*, and *Somatization*. Spatialization refers to people through the place they are associated with. 'Good morning Pakistan' for Pakistanis. Utterance nomination refers to people through their utterances as 'the report says' 'the survey proved'. Instrumentalization refers to people as the instruments they are using like 'bomb kills ten people'. Somatization refers to the people by referring to any part of their body like 'safe hands' referring to a cricketer (pp. 46-47). Reisigl and Wodak (2001) include many other features in this category like racialising, engendering, and enageing names like 'neger,white', 'man, woman' and 'youngster, old man' etc. It also includes reference in terms of health, physical and mental handicaps, sexual orientation and bad habits like 'blonde, asshole, loony, gay, drug-addict' (pp. 48-49). In this sense it is the same as Negative Appraisement.

- viii. Actionalisation/ Professionalisation: The use of actional or professional names highlighting the kind of action and professions associated with people. (pp. 48-52)
- ix. Culturalisation: This includes strategies like ethnification, linguification, religionisation, and primitivisation through the use of names like 'pukhtoon, Pashto-speaker, muslim, and barbarian' (pp. 48-52).
- x. Politicisation: This includes nationalization, classification, political & party alignment, organizationalisation, actionalisation and professionalization like Afghans, upper-class, leftist, Muslim Leaguer, parliament, voter, legislator etc. (pp. 48-52)
- xi. Militarisation: It refers to names highlighting the military identity of an entity like soldier, warrior, mujahid etc (pp. 48-52)
- xii. Social Problematisation:: It includes criminalization, negative ideologisation, pathologisation, and victimization with names referring to entities as crimes or criminals, psychological patients or victims like drug lords, illegal occupation, chauvinist, schizophrenic, oppressed etc. (pp. 48-52)
- xiii. Relationalisation/Sociatavisation: It includes using names that create a relationship like friends, opponents, relatives, etc (pp. 48-52)

#### 4.5.2. Predicational Tools Inventory:

The Predicational strategies are often part of the referential strategies but they may be more than that as well. They refer to describing or giving qualities to the social actors by using adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns, relative clauses, similes, metaphors and other figures of speech like metonymies, synecdoches, hyperboles, euphemisms etc. (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). These strategies may enhance or reduce the

significance of certain things or events as intended by the writer/speaker. One way of doing that is through the packaging of clauses into main, subordinate or embedded clauses and clauses converted into phrases. It implies that material in the subordinate clause is assumed/not asserted whereas main clause information is foregrounded/asserted.

The question tool for Predicational strategies would be:

Q. What Predicational strategies have been used to represent religious militancy in the Pre- and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?

Apart from the Referential and Predicational tools drawn from Reisigl and Wodak, this study has picked a few tools for both the strategies from the SFG, the Conceptual Metaphor theory and the Framing theory. These will include:

- 1) **The SFG Tools:** As discussed in the previous chapter the Systemic Functional Perspective considers all languages to be organized around three meta-functions (Halliday, 1985). It considers language to be not only a means of representing our experiences of various realities but can also play a formative role in the determination of that reality. The present study is analysing a huge corpus of data spanning over three decades and it would have become impossible to attempt a Systemic-functional analysis on that. As this research is primarily concerned with the representation of religious militancy, it has chosen only the concept of Nominal Group from Below the Clause level and Transitivity at some points to serve as supporting tools for the main tools borrowed from the Discourse-Historical Method of Reisigl and Wodak (2001). This research has its main focus on the Experiential function of language in which Clause is studied as a Representation of experiences by focusing on Processes in relation with the Participants and Circumstances. This study has primarily

concerned itself with the Participants represented through the Nominal Group because the referential/and predication strategies work particularly through the Nominal Group in terms of Systemic Functional Grammar and whatever modifies the noun can be generalized as Pre-modifiers and Post-modifiers as has been done in the present research. The Processes and Circumstances have generally been ignored except at a few places where they may be adding significantly to the representation of the Participant in the Nominal Group. It is, however, appropriate to give a brief introduction to these concepts as these would be at work as tools of analysis in the next two chapters.

- a) **Nominal Groups:** The Nominal Group will be mainly discussed as a Referential and Predicational Tool as discussed above. The Nominal group can be a single noun, a phrase and sometimes a whole Clause may be functioning as a Nominal Group (Bloor & Bloor, 1995). The noun or Thing serves as the Head of this group with some words coming before the Head and describing it in some way. These can be called Pre-modifiers and are generally classified as Deictics, Numeratives, Epithets and Classifiers in SFG (Halliday, 1985). Deictics like this, my, each etc. make the Thing specific or non-specific whereas the Numeratives like one, few, first etc. give its quantitative description. The Epithets like green, fat, long may give an objective description of the Thing whereas the ones like foolish, brilliant, beautiful may give its subjective description. The Classifier may describe a particular subcategory of a Thing like 'energy-saver' is a subclass of bulbs. All these categories belong to the traditional Grammatical category of Adjective but again with a difference in their functional meaning potential that is a distinguishing feature of the terms in SFG. The Noun /Thing may also take some words after it as well which are termed as Post-modifiers or Qualifiers and they are generally phrases or Clauses that are

termed as 'Rankshifted' in SFG because in the general Rank Scale they may be higher or equal to the Nominal Group and should not be made part of it. This study in general may be referring to all these categories as Pre-modifiers and Post-modifiers unless a categorical distinction contributes to the analysis.

The Question Tool at this level would be:

Q. What choices of Pre- and Post-Modifiers have been made to represent religious militancy in the Pre and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?

- b) **Process Tools:** Clause as representation not only represents the context but can add to that context as well. Looking at the **Processes** would mean looking at the words for the events taking place (walk, run, write, think etc) or for relationships between things (is, has, seems etc) and whatever goes with them (who did what to whom, when, where, why, how etc) (Martin, Mathiessen, & Painter, 1997). Though this concept of Processes is mainly concerned with the verbal groups in the sentence but it goes against the traditional concept of considering verbs to be 'doing verbs' as discussed earlier. Processes thus express the Experiential meanings of a clause and Hallidayan Grammar differentiates between the Material, Mental, Relational, Verbal, Existential, and Behavioral processes.

- i) **Material Processes:** Material processes are actually the traditional 'doing words' and they involve one or more participants. The participant who is the actual performer of the action is known as **Actor** known as the Subject in traditional grammar whereas the participant on whom/which the process is directed is the **Goal** known as the Direct Object in traditional grammar. In the passive voice the Goal becomes the subject but it is still considered the Goal in SFG and the Actor may be omitted as



often happens in journalistic language. Material processes can be intransitive when there is one participant and transitive when there is more than one. When there are more than two participants one of those is known as **Beneficiary** in SFG because it is the one getting the benefit of the process. Another type of participant is the **Circumstances** which are normally adverbial groups or prepositional phrases and they refer to time, place, manner, cause, accompaniment etc of the processes. The significance of using material processes in sentences is that it shows concrete actions and happenings and refers to the participants.

- ii) **Mental Processes:** These are processes that reflect states of mind or psychological conditions. They are realized through verbs like think, feel, know, smell, see, hear, want, like, hate etc. They are always transitive as they require two participants. Participants in this case are labeled as **Sensor** and **Phenomenon**. Sensor is the one who experiences the process and is expected to be a human or human-like entity. Phenomenon is the one thought, felt, perceived by the sensor and is usually a word or clause acting as a noun. The use of Mental Processes in texts shows that conscious cognition rather than bodily behavior is the primary concern.
- iii) **Relational Processes:** These refer to processes realized by the verb 'be' or some verb of the same class (copular verbs like seem, become, appear, feel, look, remain etc). They are used to ascribe an **Attribute** to some entity and the entity that carries that attribute is known as **Carrier**.
- iv) **Verbal Processes:** These refer to direct narration verbs like 'said' and 'asked' where the speaker represented as a nominal group is called the **Sayer** and the speech in inverted commas is known as **Quoted**. If it is indirect narration then the utterance is

known as **Reported**. Verbal processes become very significant when instead of the neutral 'say' or 'ask', the verbs having illocutionary force are used to convert the utterance into a Speech Act. These verbs include 'agree, promise, explain, grumble, bawl, whisper etc'.

- v) **Existential Process**: These refer to any form of 'be' or other copular verbs and looks similar to Relational Process but it has only one Participant known as the **Existent**.
- vi) **Behavioral Process**: These also mostly require a single participant and are said to be in between the Material and Mental processes as they represent a concrete action but it has to be experienced by a sentient entity known as the **Behaver**.

The Question Tool at this level would be:

Q. What choices of Processes have been made to represent religious militancy in the Pre and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?

- c) **Nominalization**: They may also include the conversion of clauses into phrases which leaves out certain information particularly the subject of the clause. This process of deriving a noun phrase from an underlying clause or the conversion of a verb, adjective or any other part of speech into a noun is known as Nominalization (Nordquist, 2013). It creates abstraction and generalization in a sentence and some semantic elements like tense and modality get lost and it also helps in hiding the agency behind some action (Fairclough, 2003). 'The destruction of Babri Mosque', for example gives clause-like information (someone destroyed the Babri Mosque) but omits the verb and the subject who has destroyed.

The Question Tool at this level would be:

Q. How have nominalizations been used to represent religious militancy in the Pre and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?

- 2) **Metaphor Tool:** Of these Modifiers this research will particularly focus on the use of Metaphors as they significantly add to the contextual meaning of an utterance as compared to other categories and contribute towards the creation of certain Frames in the minds of the public through the use of language in media. This research will draw upon the concept of Conceptual Metaphor as given by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980) and the concept of Framing as given by George Lakoff (2004). Metaphor is generally associated with literature as a figurative device but we are generally unaware of the fact that metaphor is more a part of our common language than being a mere literary device. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) consider the human conceptual system to be metaphorical in nature and it implies that the way we think, experience, and do things in our life is largely a matter of metaphor. They also believe that "people in power get to impose their metaphors" (p. 156). One way of understanding the metaphorical thought processes is by looking at the language we use on a daily basis. Lakoff and Johnson distinguish between Structural, Orientational and Ontological metaphors. Structural metaphors are those 'where one concept is metaphorically structured in terms of another'. They also believe that metaphor is not a random equation of two different categories but has an experiential value attached with that comparison. 'Time is money' is one example of Structural metaphor that they find in sentences like "You are *wasting* my time." (p. 7) The words 'wasting' and 'spend' are actually words associated with money but because of being a valuable commodity in modern times, 'Time' is equated metaphorically with money in such sentence constructions. The **Orientational** metaphors 'have to do with spatial orientation: up-down, in-out, front-back,

on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral' (p. 14). Examples of Orientational metaphors include 'happy, more, conscious, good, virtue,' is up, whereas 'sad, less, unconscious, bad, depravity' is down'. All these Orientational metaphors have an experiential value as a drooping posture of our bodies or lying down is associated with sleep, depression or defeat whereas an erect posture is associated with happiness, being awake, being healthy etc. **Ontological** metaphors treat our experiences, events, activities, emotions, ideas etc., as 'discrete entities or substances of a unique kind'. They give an example like "*Inflation* is lowering our standard of living." (p. 26) Ontological metaphors may also be in the form of Personification or Metonymy as in "Life has *cheated* me. (pp. 33,37)

The Question Tool at this level would be:

Q. How Conceptual Metaphors have been used to represent religious militancy in the Pre and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?

- 3) **The Framing Tool:** Closely connected with the Conceptual Metaphor theory of Lakoff is his concept of Framing. A frame includes a whole set of connotations or associations attached with words that we use in our language. Lakoff (2004) focuses on the deliberate use of certain words or phrases in political discourse to evoke certain desired ideas in the minds of the public. He believes that 'Framing is about getting language that fits your world view. It's not just language. The ideas are primary-and the language carries those ideas, evokes those ideas' (p. 4). He gives the example of the phrase 'Tax relief' used by the Republicans in their discourse which evoke a frame of taxation being an affliction for the public and the one (republican) who wants to get them out of it is a hero. When these words or phrases are popularized by the politicians they become a part of the idiom of the language and even their adversaries start using them.

The Question Tool at this level would be:

Q. What Frames have been evoked with a specific use of language to represent religious militancy in the Pre- and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?

#### 4.5.3. Argumentation Tools Inventory:

Persuasion is a key objective in both political and media discourse and molding the public opinion always requires sound and logical arguments. Arguments based on truth, however, are not generally the best ones to use when the opinion makers have to manipulate truth to justify their wrongs. This is achieved through a skillful use of various kinds of Fallacies instead of logical arguments. This study has made use of Reisigl & Wodak (2001) again to find out fallacies of various types as enumerated below:

- i. *Argumentum ad baculum* refers to threatening arguments to terrorize the opponents with the use of force of any kind.
- ii. *Argumentum ad hominem* refers to character assassination of the opponents
- iii. *Argumentum ad misericordiam* refers to the exploitation of sympathy and kindness of people in a situation which actually does not demand it.
- iv. *Argumentum ad populum* refers to using arguments that target the populist opinions and emotions of masses
- v. *Argumentum ad verecundium* refers to supporting one's arguments by making use of the views or quotations of heroes, experts, scholars etc. who are venerated by the general public.
- vi. *Secundum quid* refers to the use of synecdoches to create generalizations in which part may represent the whole or *vice versa*.

- vii. *Petitio principii* fallacy refers to Presupposition of a fact to be true that is controversial and debateable.
- viii. *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc* refers to ignoring the actual argument and representing events that occur first as causes to events happening later in time whereas there may not be any actual causal relationship between them.
- ix. *Ignoratio elenchi* refers to focusing on arguments that are not in question and are not related to the current discourse.
- x. *Straw man* Fallacy refers to the distortion of opponents' views to make it easier to prove one's point. It can be done very easily by exploiting statements having linguistic ambiguities.
- xi. *Argumentation ad consequentium* refers to ignoring the truth of an argument by highlighting its possible negative consequences.
- xii. *Trajectio in alium* refers to putting the responsibility on someone else than the actual causes.

The Question Tool at this level would be:

Q. What Argumentation tools have been employed to represent religious militancy in the Pre and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?

#### 4.5.4. Myth-making Tools Inventory:

This study takes a few tools used by Roland Barthes (1984) to find out the Myths working through the discursive practices of the selected corpus at the Micro-level. These include:

- i. *Inoculation*: It refers to confessing small evils to hide or shift the focus from the principal evils (p. 20).

- ii. Privation of History: It is the removal of history or origin of some entity to present it as something new or different from the actual one (p. 20).
- iii. Identification: This refers to the removal of differences between two things to assimilate those as one and the same thing because that is what is required at that moment (p. 20).
- iv. Tautology: It refers to defining like by like and is used when one's language and logic fails him (p. 21)
- v. Neither-norism: This refers to equalizing two different objective realities to reject them as being equally insignificant (p. 21).
- vi. The quantification of Quality: This refers to quantifying the realities when they become difficult to be accepted or defended (p. 21).
- vii. The statement of the fact: This refers to the use of proverbs or reflexive language that generalizes facts as truths (p. 21)

The above-mentioned tools will be used in this study to ascertain the myth-making process in the selected texts but this does not mean that myth-making takes place just through these techniques. These are too few and too generalized to fully account for the complex process of the creation of Myths. There will be many tools at the micro-level like the Referential, Predicational and Argumentation strategies discussed above that will be contributing to the myth-making process. In fact most of the categories described by Barthes seem to belong to the Argumentation strategies because it is through argumentation that one can create things like Privation of History, Inoculation, Identification and others.

The Question Tool at this stage would be:

Q. What Myth-making strategies have been employed to represent religious militancy in the Pre and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?

For a clear picture of the tools being employed in the present study, a list of all the Question Tools is reproduced below:

List of Question Tools for analysis:

- I. What Dispositives governed the events and actions in the Pre- and Post-9/11 representation of religious militancy in the political and media discourse in Pakistan?
- II. What Myths have been propagated to legitimize the events and actions in the Pre- and Post-9/11 representation of religious militancy in the political and media discourse in Pakistan?
- III. What Referential strategies have been used to refer to the participants and events or things concerning religious militancy in the Pre- and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?
- IV. What Predicational strategies have been used to represent religious militancy in the Pre- and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?
- V. What choices of Pre- and Post-Modifiers have been made to represent religious militancy in the Pre and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?
- VI. What choices of Processes have been made to represent religious militancy in the Pre and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?
- VII. How have nominalizations been used to represent religious militancy in the Pre and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?



- VIII. How Conceptual Metaphors have been used to represent religious militancy in the Pre and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?
- IX. What Frames have been evoked with a specific use of language to represent religious militancy in the Pre- and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?
- X. What Argumentation tools have been employed to represent religious militancy in the Pre and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?
- XI. What Myth-making strategies have been employed to represent religious militancy in the Pre and Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan?

#### **4.6. Presentation of Data and Analysis:**

The data in this research consists of political statements of the US and Pakistani leadership and editorials from three mainstream English newspapers of Pakistan. As this is a Longitudinal research spanning over more than three decades to trace the evolution of the political and media discourse, a purposive sampling technique has been used to select the most relevant sample for analysis. After the selection it is not the whole statement or the whole editorial that goes through the analysis line by line. Some most important extracts from these statements and editorials are presented for analysis and the whole statement and editorial is given in the appendix for a ready reference and to keep a check on any bias in that selection on part of the researcher. Each extract is followed by its immediate analysis using the Question Tools mentioned above.

The selected extracts have been presented under the main headings of the dominant Myths in chapter 05 that concerns itself with the Pre-9/11 data under the Grand Theory 'Jihad Dispositive'. The extracts have further been divided into extracts from political and extracts from media discourse. Chapter 06 concerns itself with the Post-9/11 data under the Grand Theory

'Terror Dispositive' and this time the extracts have been divided into political and media discourse whereas the Myths, because of the increase in their number, have been separately described in the beginning of the chapter. This was also done because division of extracts along two dimensions was proving difficult and would have led to a lot of repetition. Chapter 07 also concerns itself with post-9/11 data and is based on a single 'Myth of Talibanisation' with the same 'Terror Dispositive'. This time the political discourse has been excluded from the analysis as it was felt that there was no significant change in that from the one discussed in the previous chapter.

#### **4.7. Conclusion:**

This study has thus divided its analysis into a Macro and Micro-level with a Top-bottom approach where Dispositive is at the top of hierarchy of various tools. That is why the next three chapters of the analysis have been titled according to the dominant Dispositives of the periods that have been analysed. All the tools in the lower hierarchy drawn from various sources like the Discourse-Historical method, the Systemic Functional and Traditional Grammar, Rhetorics, the Conceptual metaphor and the Framing theories, contribute towards the build-up of the two main Dispositives that have shaped the political and media discourse in Pakistan during the past three decades.

## Chapter 05: The Soviet Intervention and the Jihad Dispositive

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As stated in the previous chapter, religious militancy in Pakistan after 9/11 has its roots in the period of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. That's why this chapter will briefly focus on the political and media discourse after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on Dec 27, 1979. The next chapter will focus on the political and media discourse in a post-9/11 scenario after the American intervention in Afghanistan on Oct 07, 2001 to draw parallels between the two events. The selection of these two Discursive Events has been made because of the similar nature of the action involved, that is, invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Both interventions aimed at a change of regime in Kabul (for different reasons may be) and to install a friendly government.

The agents behind the action, however, are different in both cases and that will allow this research to draw parallels between the political and media discourse vis-à-vis the Soviet and the American interventions. All the actors involved in the conflict are the same except for Russia which is not part of the post-9/11 US intervention. All these actors including the US, Afghan and Pakistani governments, various Afghan fighting factions, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and 'others' seem to be doing the same things as they did during the Russian occupation but their identities seem to have suffered a change and friends seem to have turned foes during the US intervention.

The data to be linguistically analyzed includes extracts from the speeches/statements of the important representatives of the Pakistani and the US governments on these two important Discursive Events and the representation of these events by the two mainstream English

newspapers of Pakistan, the daily Dawn and the daily Pakistan Times through their editorials. These two newspapers have been selected because these are the only two English newspapers that continued to get published from 1979 to 2001. This will help purge the analysis of any differences between the ideological or political orientations that may be associated with media houses that were not getting published during both the Discursive Events. The extracts of the political discourse have been taken from various sources, like the online archives of the speeches of American Presidents and some from the video clips available on YouTube, apart from the directly quoted statements in the selected newspapers.

### **5.1. The Jihad Dispositive:**

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan occurred in the last week of 1979 in an era of global politics known as the Cold War period. It created an emergency situation in the rival Western camp and necessitated an immediate response in the form of a new Dispositive. That response was to take the shape of an armed resistance movement by the Afghan people and they were to be supported by the west in their struggle against the Russian occupation. The emergency situation therefore required a Dispositive that could unite not only the various Afghan fighting factions who were divided along tribal, linguistic and ethnic lines but also to garner support from the rest of the world.

The Dispositive that got generated as a response to the Soviet intervention at that time has been labeled as the Jihad Dispositive (JD) in the present study. As discussed in the previous chapter, a Dispositive is a multi-layered network of relationship between the discursive practices, non-discursive practices and their manifestations. This study however does not aim at a holistic appreciation of all those practices and manifestations as it will be beyond the scope of this

project. The study has thus limited itself to the discursive practices of the political leadership of Pakistan and the US and the print media in Pakistan.

As stated in the previous chapter, the Micro-level analysis will focus on the Nominal Group working as a word, phrase, or clause by making use of Referential and Predicational tools borrowed from Discourse-Historical model in CDA. The creation of a Dispositive includes lots of persuasive practices and this analysis thus also includes a focus on the Argumentation strategies with the help of various tools from Rhetorics. As the analysis below would reveal, the Jihad Dispositive was anchored around such discursive practices that propagated, apart from many others, two dominant Myths regarding the Soviet Agenda. This analysis has thus been anchored around these two myths at the macro-level.

#### **5.1.1. The Myth of a War against Islam:**

Religion is a powerful Ideological State Apparatus in Althusserian terms and in this case it seems that Islamic religious ideology and particularly the concept of Jihad provided the most potent ideological weapon to unite the pre-dominantly Muslim society of Afghanistan that had to wage the actual battle against the Russians. That this intervention is a 'war against Islam' is the myth that seems to have been propagated through the political and media discourse at that time as is suggested by the following analysis.

##### **5.1.1.1. Political Discourse:**

The CDA perspective assumes that the powerful get to impose their discourse on the weaker ones, it is pertinent to briefly analyze the American political discourse on the Soviet intervention to try to trace its influence on the Pakistani political and eventually media discourse. This research begins its analysis by taking some excerpts from an address to the nation by the

American President Jimmy Carter on Jan 04, 1980, just days after the Soviet intervention. The President starts talking about the issue with these words:

- 1) Recently, there has been another very serious development which threatens the maintenance of the peace in Southwest Asia. Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, nonaligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan, which had hitherto not been an occupied satellite of the Soviet Union. Fifty thousand heavily armed Soviet troops have crossed the border and are now dispersed throughout Afghanistan, attempting to conquer the fiercely independent Muslim people of that country. (Carter, Speech on Afghanistan, 1980). (See Appendix B:1)

Most of the Clause Complexes<sup>1</sup> in a speech are expected to be Declarative in Mood as a speech is expected to give information. The speaker by virtue of being a speaker has a dominating role as he/she talks from above as an expert or something like that and his language is bound to show that dominance.

He begins with referring to the soviet intervention through the Nominal Group 'serious development'. This is a dramatic start to give information about something which is not mentioned directly through an explicit Nominal Group but through a nominalized Process 'development'. Nominalization often serves to turn actions into concepts and thereby making them abstract and ambiguous and also serves to hide the agency behind the action. The modification of that nominalization with the Pre-modifier Epithet 'serious' adds to that abstraction and arouses suspense and alarm among the audience. 'Serious' is a subjective Epithet in SFG as it reveals the personal view of the speaker, and it may not be 'serious' in reality. That

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<sup>1</sup> The sentence in Systemic Functional Grammar is labeled as a Clause Complex by virtue of being a combination of various clauses. Even if it has a single clause it is still called a Clause Complex. This study will make use of the term instead of calling it a sentence.

suspense and alarm continues through the Relative Clause which is serving as a Post-modifier for 'development' in a Rankshifted position.

This clause also does not reveal the actual event but by using *Argumentation ad consequentium* it represents the 'development' as a threat to peace in Southwest Asia. The Relative clause also includes the second participant in the action and that is 'maintenance of peace' with a Circumstantial Adjunct/Adverb 'in southwest Asia'. Both the participants 'development' and 'maintenance' being nominalizations and Personifications are used as Ontological Metaphors referring to the Russian intervention and the security of the region in an indirect way. The first clause complex thus builds a tempo for a bad news that will come in the next clauses and it also starts representing that reality in a negative way at the outset by using the Behavioral Process 'threatens' which signifies this as something dangerous.

The second clause complex starts with a nominal group 'massive soviet military forces' serving as the Theme<sup>2</sup> and the Actor of the clause representing the concrete action through a Material Process word 'invaded'. An active voice construction always highlights the Actor who is the actual doer of the action and the theme of a clause is what is on the mind of the speaker. Thus the abstract and alarming 'development' of the previous clause is now highlighted as the invasion by the 'Soviet military forces' which has a Numerative Pre-modifier 'massive' to exaggerate the number of troops involved in an ambiguous way. The Referential strategy of Militarisation foregrounds Russia as a military force instead of a country. The Goal of that

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<sup>2</sup> Theme in SFG is a word or group or clause at the beginning of a sentence and it is defined as "the point of departure of the message; it is that with which the Clause is concerned" Halliday, 1985 (p. 37). The Theme gets its significance by the fact that it is the thing that is on the mind of the speaker and that's why it comes in the beginning of the sentence.

invasion is a nominal group with three Objective Epithets as Pre-Modifiers 'small, non-aligned, and sovereign'.

This loaded Nominal Group is very significant in the representation of the Social Actors being talked about. 'Small' serves to contrast the 'massive' and this contrast evokes a Frame of a contest between unequals, a mighty oppressor and a weak victim. This may be termed as the *Mighty Oppressor (MO) Frame* for the present analysis. 'Non-aligned' gives another dimension to the wretchedness of the victim by highlighting it as a nation that is part of the Non-Aligned Movement, a grouping of nations that wanted to stay out of the rival blocs during the Cold War. This may be termed as the *Non-Aligned Frame* for the present research. The third modifier 'sovereign' evokes the Frame of universal rights of freedom and sovereignty of nation-states and adds to the tyranny of the oppressor. This may be labeled as the *Universal Rights (UR) Frame* for the present purposes. This Nominal group not only evokes these Frames but also makes use of *Argumentum ad populum* to arouse sympathy for the victims.

The dependent clause again emphasizes the non-alignment of the victim by saying that it was not 'an occupied satellite of Soviet Union' which is a metaphorical expression. This Metaphor was used to label many states around the Soviet Union that were part of the Russian Bloc during the cold war. A satellite in its literal sense is a celestial/artificial body that orbits a planet but in its metaphorical sense it refers to an obsequious and slavish person and in this case it is such a state. 'Satellite' is also modified with 'occupied' which has a Presupposition that all these states had been turned into satellites through coercive means. It is the use of *Petitio principii* to convey a perception as a fact. This is also a use of *Argumentum ad hominem*, an argumentation strategy to malign the opposition (Russia) as an imperialist force.19733



The last clause complex in the above extract again makes use of the Referential strategy of Militarisation by using a Nominal Group 'fifty thousand heavily armed Soviet Troops'. Troops are always expected to be armed but to still modify it with the Epithet 'armed' is to foreground the perception that it is an actual war than a small operation to help a friendly government in Afghanistan. The Epithet is further modified with adverbial to enhance its effect. The Nominal Group harps on the same MO Frame and this time that might is quantified through Numerative 'fifty thousand' which suggests that it is a full-scale invasion. The second elliptical clause reinforces their huge number through the Material Process 'dispersed' which denotes the scattering of things in large number over a wide space, that is, every nook and corner of Afghanistan.

The third elliptical clause introduces another loaded Nominal Group 'fiercely independent Muslim people' which is referring to the same Social Actor that was represented by the nominal group 'small, nonaligned, sovereign nation' in the previous clause. This time, however, the nominal group is not constructed to represent the Afghans as a wretched victim but to evoke a Motivational Frame by using the Referential strategy of Culturalisation that foregrounds ethnic, cultural, religious or primitive etc. identities. This frame may be termed as *Fiercely Independent (FI) Frame* for the present research. Through the Pre-modifying Epithet 'independent' which itself is modified with a Circumstance of manner 'fiercely', it represents the Afghan nation as a violently aggressive and independence-loving people and identifies their primitive tribal instinct. This is a positive Appraisal of the Afghan people suggesting their bravery and unyielding nature. The Material Process 'attempting' reminds one about all the unsuccessful attempts made by foreign invaders to conquer Afghanistan in the past.

Whereas the MO Frame seems to address the rest of the world to evoke its sympathy for the Afghans, the FI Frame seems to be an attempt to warn the Russians through the use of *Argumentum ad baculum* which is an argumentation strategy to threaten the opponents. It also aims at motivating the Afghans to know their potential for a collective action. In addition to that there is the Classifier 'Muslim', the immediate modifier of the 'people'. This is a significant attempt at creating the identity of the Afghans as Muslims thus evoking the frame of religion and projecting that aggression to be against Islam as a religion or against the whole Islamic world. This may be termed as the *Islamic Ideology (II) Frame* for the present analysis.

After a few more sentences, trying to falsify the Russian claim that they have been invited by the Afghan government, the President adds two more clause complexes giving support to the above discussion:

- 2) This is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter. It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people. (Carter, Speech on Afghanistan , 1980) (See Appendix B:1)

The first clause complex represents the incident as an illegitimate act by evoking the UR frame of International Law and the UN charter. This is done through an Attributive Relational clause with 'This' functioning as the Carrier of the Attribute '*callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter*'. The Soviet intervention is attributed as a '*Violation*' which is again a nominalization and a Criminalization Referential strategy creating the same impression of being dramatic and abstract. It is Pre-modified by a subjective Epithet 'callous' which makes it a Negative Appraisal and turns it into an Ontological metaphor which has its metaphorical roots in the word 'callus' meaning an area of the skin that has become hardened and thick,

usually because of prolonged pressure or rubbing like the sole of foot or elbows. This implies a dimension of consistent violations of the same kind by the Soviet Union in the past that have made her hardened and indifferent to such acts. The speaker is making use of *Argumentum ad populum* to evoke the sympathies of the people against this 'callous violation'.

The second clause complex is again Attributive Relational and this time with a loaded Intensive Complement<sup>3</sup> that contains many Nominal Groups. The Head word of this Complement is 'effort' which is Pre-modified as 'deliberate' which is a subjective Epithet reflecting the speaker's personal view rather than a reality. This Intensive Complement is again juxtaposing two Nominal Groups representing the oppressor and the victim. The oppressor is still represented as 'powerful' but this time a very significant Identity-building Classifier 'atheistic' has been used which seems a unique choice at this place to modify the Soviet Government.

The choice is significant because it is a Negative Ideologisation that turns the Soviets into a Godless nation having no respect for religion. It was actually a strong point in the American propaganda against the Soviets and their Communist system which presented them as an irreligious creed and an 'Evil Empire' as President Reagan popularized the label. The choice of this Pre-modifier evokes this whole frame of the Cold War propaganda and may be termed as the Communist Ideology (CI) Frame. 'Atheistic' seems to be juxtaposed with 'Islamic' in the second Nominal Group and it confronts the II Frame evoked already and represents the Discursive Event as a conflict between religion and atheism or between Islamic and Communist ideology.

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<sup>3</sup> A Complement works as a Nominal Group to answer the question what or who after the verb in a clause. It can be as short as a single pronoun or very long and complicated to include many nominal Groups, phrases or clauses and is known as Intensive Complement. (Bloor & Bloor, 1995)

This is a very powerful Motivational frame for the whole Islamic world in general and for the Afghan people in particular. President Carter is creating this Myth of a war between the Islamic and Communist world by making use of the Privation of History tool in the Myth-making process. In terms of Cold War it could have been represented as conflict resulting from the expansionist policies of one super-power to include yet another country into its bloc but there is a Suppression of the Cold War scenario by replacing it as a conflict between atheism and Islam. This is what could be called the central theme of the Dispositive that slowly and gradually established itself over the next decade till the withdrawal of the soviet troops and the final disintegration of the USSR.

As discussed in the introductory chapter, the Afghan Guerilla warfare did not start with the Russian intervention. It was a result of the Saur Revolution in April 1978 which established a Russian supported regime in Afghanistan and it was after that that the Super Power rivalries in the region began as revealed by Carter's National Security Adviser Brzezinski in an interview quoted in Chapter 1. It is pertinent to mention here that Pakistan at that time was facing sanctions from the US on account of its nuclear program and military take-over and the relationship between the two countries lacked mutual trust. With the change in the scenario the Americans were quick to mend fences and Brzezinski reached Pakistan to establish a new relationship and strangely enough it was not based on shared interests but on belonging to the same religious tradition as his discourse suggested. His first statement upon arrival was based on the Referential strategies of Collectivisation and Relationalisation.

- 3) Our cooperation has to take these changes into account and I particularly note the vitality of the Muslim world. The US shares with the Muslim world a deep religious faith and this provides us with another basis for our friendship. The Pakistan Times. 2/2/1980 (See Appendix A:1)

With the use of Deictics like 'our' and 'us' the tone is set for a unified approach of 'cooperation' that should take into account the changes that this region has witnessed. He is quite ambiguous as to what he means by these changes but he adopts *Argumentum ad populum* and mentions that one such change is the increase in the 'vitality' of the Muslim world in recent times. He uses a Mental process word 'note' revealing his personal opinion and Pre-modifies it with an Circumstance of Emphasis 'particularly'. Having acknowledged that change on a positive note he adopts a Culturalisation/Association strategy through the 'deep religious faith' that belongs to the same tradition. He thus evokes a Frame based on 'Ahl ul Kitab' that considers all the Jews, Christians and Muslims as the 'People of the Book' believing in the same God. It may be termed as the People of the Book Frame. The concept is Islamic as the Holy Quran mentions the People of the book and gives them a kind of preference over people of other polytheistic religions and Athiests by allowing eating, drinking and inter-marriages between them. One such verse in the Holy Quran states

O people of the Book! Come to common terms as between us and you: that we worship none but Allah. The Holy Quran 3:64.

It is significant to note how the American leadership, drawing upon the most sacred Book of the Muslims, tried to create a 'friendship' between the Muslim and the Christian world through the Assimilation Referential Strategies of Collectivisation, Association and Relationalisation against the atheistic Communist Ideology that is Excluded through Suppression Referential strategy. It thus also evokes the II and the CI Frames in an indirect way by assuming that we may belong to different religions but we are religious at least whereas the enemy is outright athiestic. This a clever use of the removal of differences through the Myth-making tool of Identification.

While speaking at a dinner hosted by President Zia, Brzezinski continued with his Collectivisation and Relationalisation strategies, showing solidarity and building trust. After praising the contributions made by Muslims in the past and welcoming the resurgence of Islam in the world he made the following remarks:

- 4) We in the United States neither fear nor deplore but welcome the Islamic resurgence. We see in it a new element of strength and a new contribution through which the mankind could only live in peace. The Pakistan Times, 3/2/80 (See Appendix A:2)

Brzezinski using the First person plural pronoun is trying to assert his position as the representative of the whole nation and makes use of the Myth-making tool of Neither-norism to negate any fear or disapproval of the Islamic resurgence. Resurgence also has an Implicature<sup>4</sup> that refers to the glorious past of the Muslims as you can 're-surge' only when you have 'surged' before. He becomes prophetic in the next clause complex by saying that this resurgence will in fact strengthen mankind and will be an addition to the contributions of the Muslim world in the past. The Pre-modifier 'new' used twice has also an Implicature that you have been strengthening and contributing to mankind before. The use of the adverbial 'only' leaves no other option except peace as a result of this resurgence.

While visiting a group of Afghan refugees he continued to use religion as a tool to establish solidarity and trust:

- 5) We know of their deep belief in God, and we are confident that their struggle will succeed. Now that land over there is yours. You will go back to it one day because your fight will prevail and

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<sup>4</sup> An Implicature is the communication of more than what is being said and the listener has to understand it via inference. (Yule, 2008)

you will have your homes, your mosques back again because your cause is right and God is on your side. (Brzezinski, 1980)

The first clause complex begins with a Mental Process clause revealing Brzezinski's belief about the religiosity of the Afghan people. The Pre-modifier subjective Epithet 'deep' only serves to emphasize that Religionisation through 'belief' as being very strong. He begins by using the third person 'their' but soon realizes that he is actually facing those people and then goes on to use the Second Person 'you' and 'your' eight times in the next two clauses. This shows the 'you-attitude' which is considered to be an effective marketing skill to sell your products. The 'you-attitude' makes your customers realize that you are selling the product for the benefit of the customer and not for personal profit.

The extract seems to reveal the subconscious of the American mind at that moment as they wanted to motivate the Afghans for their proxy war against the Soviets. Brzezinski feels confident that their struggle will succeed because he knew that Islamic Ideology Frame can serve as the most potent motivational force for these people to defeat the Russians. There seems to be an Intertextual element in this speech from classical speeches of a Greek or Roman King using his rhetoric to stimulate his army facing the enemy. He points towards the mountains of Afghanistan and reminds them that they are the owners of that land and they are going to get that back because they will ultimately win that war.

He reminds them that they have to fight for their homes that they have lost and also adds mosques to make them realize that they have also lost their freedom to worship thus evoking the II and CI Frames. To try and get back one's home is quite natural for human beings as everyone has a personal emotional attachment with homes but to add the mosque with the homes is to

transfer the same intensity of attachment with the mosque as we do have for our homes. Just like the Greek gods supported and took part in battles, Brzezinski tells them that they will win the war because they are on the right path and God is supporting them.

The discourse initiated by the Carter regime continued for almost a decade after the Russian intervention and established itself as a Dispositive during the Reagan Administration. The Afghan fighters with the help of America and other allies managed to force the Russians to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. This was done through the Geneva Accords signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan with the US and the USSR signing as the guarantors. This was hailed as a historic victory by all those involved in this 'Jihad'.

The political discourse in Pakistan on the Soviet intervention began on a cautious note with an official statement declaring the matter to be an internal matter of Afghanistan.

- 6) Foreign Office sources here today declined to offer any comments on the latest development in Kabul. They thought it was Afghanistan's internal matter and should not be commented upon by Afghanistan's friendly neighbors. Dawn 29/12/79. (See Appendix A:3)

The next day, however, probably after having weighed all the pros and cons of the policy, Pakistan showed its 'gravest concern' at the developments in Afghanistan.

- 7) The Government of Pakistan cannot but regard the recent induction of Russian troops in Afghanistan as a serious violation of the norms of peaceful co-existence and the sacrosanct principles of the sovereignty of States and non-interference in their internal affairs as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Dawn, 30/12/79 (See Appendix A:4)



The official statement began by mentioning the neutral role played by Pakistan regarding the three 'bloody changes' of regimes in Afghanistan as it thought it was an internal affair of the country. This serves to establish Pakistan as a responsible and law-abiding nation of the world by evoking the UR frame just like President Carter above. Pakistan's reaction still seems careful as the Nominal Group 'recent induction' suggests probably because the picture is still not clear and Pakistan doesn't know how the events would unveil in the coming days. 'Induction' is a Nominalization again, eliding agency as to who inducted them. It seems a poor attempt at Euphemism to call the Soviet intervention as 'induction' and not 'invasion' like in the American discourse as 'induction' normally refers to place someone in some office or service. The statement then makes use of Criminalisation through 'serious violation'.

The use of the subjective Epithet 'sacrosanct' and the Material Process 'enshrined' metaphorically turns the laws of the UN to be something sacred. Having established Pakistan as a non-interfering state, the statement moves on to argue that the present situation is different from the previous ones in the following way:

- 8) The change which took place two days ago, is, however, qualitatively different because of the factor of external military intervention. The Government of Pakistan therefore views this development with the gravest concern. The concern is all the more profound since the country, which has been subjected to military intervention is an Islamic country which is its immediate neighbor and is member of the Islamic conference as well as of the Non-Aligned Movement.  
Dawn, 30/12/79 (See Appendix A:5)

The first Attributive Relational clause represents the latest regime change through Nominal Group 'qualitatively different' which is Post-modified by a Causal Clause giving the reason why

is it so. This is a very logical argument having an Intertextual dimension because the vocabulary and structure of the Clause Complex looks just like a scientific hypothesis in academic language. It serves to solidify the argument before leading to the conclusion in the next clause. The 'concern' Pre-modified with 'gravest' represents a seriousness of a superlative degree. The next Attributive Clause again attributes the 'concern' as 'profound' which is again Post-Modified with a long Causal Clause enumerating four reasons behind that seriousness.

The first and the third reason evoke the II Frame by referring to the shared Islamic identity of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the second one may also be a referral to the value that is assigned to a neighbor in Islam. The fourth reason evokes the Non-Aligned Frame of impartiality symbolized by the Non-Aligned movement of which Pakistan was also a member. All these shared identities seem to compel Pakistan to show its 'gravest concern' over the developments in Afghanistan.

After this initial reaction the Pakistani leadership kept coming up with reactions at various forums that seemed to be an upshot of the political discourse in the United States. Pakistan's Representative at the UN Mr Niaz A Naik spoke at the UN in the following way:

- 9) Our concern now is all the more profound since the country which has been subjected to military intervention this time is an Islamic country which is our immediate neighbor, is a member of the Islamic Conference and one of the founding members of the non-aligned movement. Niaz A Naik  
Dawn 11/1/80 (See Appendix A:7)

It is almost an exact repetition of the above extract from the official statement, Mr Naik emphasizes the Islamic and Non-Aligned identity of Afghanistan that compelled Pakistan to show its grave concern.

A few days later Pakistan's Foreign Affairs Advisor (Minister) Mr Agha Shahi also spoke in the same way:

- 10) "It is the earnest hope of the people of Pakistan that the indomitable people of Afghanistan will soon emerge from their travail, find peace and stability in their country and fully assert their national and Islamic identity".... Dawn,12/1/1980. (See Appendix A: 8)

In the first Nominal Group 'hope' is Pre-modified with a positive Appraisement Epithet 'earnest' and is Post-Modified by a Prepositional phrase and then a series of clauses all Predicating the 'hope'. Collectivisation is used to present this official statement as the voice of the 'people' of Pakistan being concerned about the 'people' in Afghanistan who are represented through a similar FI Motivational Frame as was evoked by President Carter in his speech above. The Epithet 'indomitable' refers to the same 'fiercely independent' tribal instinct of the Afghan people through Primitivisation. The people of Pakistan not only seem to hope for 'peace and stability' but also the assertion through Nationalisation and Religionisation of 'national and Islamic identity'. It also includes a Presupposition that those identities have been suppressed by the Russian intervention.

Another clause complex in the same speech again resonates the MO Frame in the Carter speech above with amazingly similar modifiers like 'massive' 'small' and 'non-aligned'

- 11) Mr. Shahi said the massive military intervention by a powerful neighbour in a small, defenseless non-aligned country had jeopardized the peace and security in the region and in the world... (See Appendix A:8)

Mr Shahi further goes on to present a defense of the allegation that Pakistan had been training the 'Mujahideen' long before the Russian intervention.

- 12) The sustained uprising of the people of Afghanistan was an entirely internal phenomenon, he said. It signified their rejection of the efforts to impose on them an alien ideology. "The Afghan resistance is rooted in the people's devotion to Islam and their glorious tradition of never to submit or yield to foreign conquerors," he stated. (See Appendix A:9)

The first clause complex is again Attributive Relational that relates two Nominal Groups. In the first one 'uprising' is Pre-modified with 'sustained' which is a positive Appraisal showing consistency and post-modified by a Prepositional phrase representing the uprising as a purely Afghan phenomenon. This is further strengthened by the second Nominal Group which Pre-Modifies the phenomenon through a Classifier 'internal' which is further modified by a Circumstance 'entirely'. 'Uprising' is a noun that seems to have been created from the verbal phrase 'rising up' with positive metaphorical connotations as up is associated with positive Orientational metaphors. 'Uprising' is thus a positive representation as compared to say 'rebellion' or 'revolt'.

The second clause complex neither has quotation marks nor a verbal process word and may thus be a construction of the reporter but it is a causal clause giving the reason behind the uprising which is the imposition of an 'alien ideology' on the people of Afghanistan through the Marxist revolution in April 1978. The phrase 'alien ideology' can be assumed to have actually been used by Mr Shahi as it was repeatedly used by representatives of the Pakistan government and media during those days. The phrase is a Negative Ideologisation referring to the myth regarding communism as an atheistic philosophy that was 'alien' to the believers of a religion. The use of the material process 'impose' signifies that this ideology was a coercive enforcement on the religious people even before the Russian intervention.

The last clause complex furthers the same argument with the same motivational FI frame as was evoked by 'indomitable' but this time it has added emphasis because of an Intertextual element in it. 'Never to submit or yield' is a famous line from the speeches of Satan in the epic 'Paradise Lost' by John Milton. Satan is no doubt the villain of the story but the way he was portrayed by Milton somehow has associated heroic qualities of rebellion and resistance with his character. That's why whenever the lines from his speeches are quoted they are mostly used with positive connotations. Mr Agha Shahi also seems to be doing the same over here.

President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan, known for his religious leanings also took little time to catch up with the American governmental discourse on Communism being an atheistic philosophy and continued to spearhead the 'Jihad' against that alien ideology for the next ten years. After showing his 'grave' concern as an immediate reaction he kept talking about the conflict as an ideological confrontation. He took no time in deciding to go to the Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtoonkhaw (KP) and addressed the tribal elders who asked his permission to start a Jihad against the 'irreligious system' being imposed on a 'deeply religious people'. He is apparently trying to pacify the emotions of the tribal elders by saying that time has not yet come to give such a call but his whole speech is loaded with motivational frames to get ready for that. He praises the tribals as 'brave and hardy' and tells them that they are the 'first line of defense' for Pakistan.

- 13) The President told the tribesmen that he fully understood their sentiments and appreciated their spirit of 'Jihad'. He said: "This martial spirit is the hallmark of our tribal culture. It was because of this martial spirit that even big Powers could not succeed in their efforts to absorb the tribal areas in their territory before the establishment of Pakistan. No big Power was ever able to subjugate

them and their morale and courage remained high and unconquerable like the invincible mountains" The Pakistan Times 14/1/1980 (See Appendix A:11)

The same FI Frame as was evoked by Carter and Shahi is evoked throughout this extract as the tribal areas in Pakistan share the same culture and traditions as the Afghans across the Durand Line. 'Hallmark' is actually a specific mark stamped on pure gold and silver in England and has acquired a metaphorical usage for anything that is to be appreciated for its purity and excellence. Thus the Relational Identifying clause (which is used to define something) signifies that the tribal culture acquires its excellence and purity by virtue of the martial spirit of the tribal people. Martial spirit, apart from being the Militarisation strategy, has a metaphorical significance as well. Mars is the god of war in Roman mythology and to call someone's spirit to be martial is to relate or equate that person with that Roman god.

The causal clause in the next clause complex further glorifies that martial spirit as being the reason behind the failure of the big powers like the British Empire to conquer Afghanistan and the adjoining tribal areas. The same glorification continues in the next clause complex with a Relational Attributive clause supported by a simile to compare the morale and courage of these people with the 'invincible' mountains in being high and unconquerable. All the clauses evoke the FA motivational frame discussed already.

President Zia went on further to say about the Afghan refugees coming to Pakistan:

- 14) They have come here because their life, their honour and their property were in danger and an attempt was being made to force on them an ideology which is opposed to their faith, their nature and their traditions. The great Afghans, who had clashed in the past with big powers, could not be forced to accept an un-Islamic ideology. The Pakistan Times 14/1/1980 (See Appendix A:11)

The first clause complex beginning with an existential process clause refers to the coming of the Afghan refugees followed by a causal clause giving reasons for their coming. Zia is also using *Argumentum ad populum* by representing the refugees through the Referential strategy of Victimization which also evokes the MO Frame. One reason given is insecurity which is always associated with a warlike situation but the second reason given is unique to this situation. It is a passivized construction that hides the Actor or the agency behind the forceful imposition of an ideology that is in conflict not only with their religion but also with their attitudes and culture. It evokes the II Frame and reinforces the myth of Communism being an atheistic ideology. It is further reinforced in the next clause where he first evokes the FI frame to motivate the 'great Afghans' and then uses the Pre-Modifier Epithet 'un-Islamic' with ideology as a Negative Ideologisation strategy. At other occasions during those days he termed it as an 'alien ideology'. While talking to BBC he said:

- 15) The Afghan refugees are coming here because they respect their prestige, their safety, their security, their lands and above all because their faith is in danger. 2/2/1980 Dawn. (See Appendix A:12)

By putting the threat to their religion 'above all' the other reasons behind the influx of refugees in this causal clause, he is evoking and foregrounding the II Frame.

Inaugurating the Organization of Islamic Countries Foreign Ministers conference on Afghanistan he called upon all the Muslim countries to become united as the Umma which is the Islamic name for the Muslim community all across the globe. Islam considers all muslims as part of the Umma no matter what country or culture they belong to. At one point in this motivational speech he warns the muslims of the consequences for not forging unity:

- 16) The establishment of the Islamic Umma is ordained by God and negating this would be to go against the word of God. Going against the word of God brings retribution. 28/1/1980 Dawn ( See Appendix A:13)

Zia here seems to assume the role of a priest and reminds the Muslims that the creation of Umma is a commandment of God. He makes use of Religionisation through 'Islamic Umma' and the Performative<sup>5</sup> Verb in terms of Pragmatics turns it into a Speech Act of God. He also makes use of use of Syllogism<sup>6</sup> through successive clauses to reach the conclusion that if we do not establish Umma we'll face punishment from God. This has an Implicature that the whole Islamic world should rise and stand up against the 'un-Islamic' and 'Alien' ideology of Communism.

Agha Shahi also addressed the OIC meeting and talked about the Muslim resurgence in the wake of hegemonic ambitions of global powers

- 17) This revolutionary upsurge is rooted in the devotion of the Muslim peoples to their common faith and in their profound aspirations for peace and progress. It is motivated by a vision inspired by the eternal precepts of Islam which call upon its adherents to wage unrelenting struggle against injustice, alien domination, oppression and exploitation. (See Appendix A:14)

The Muslim resurgence is presented as a 'revolutionary upsurge' equating it metaphorically with the surge of waves. This may be a reference to the recent Islamic revolution in Iran but to generalize that revolution as an Islamic resurgence all across the globe was a bit too early. It was however the Jihad Dispositive after the Russian intervention that slowly and gradually inspired

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<sup>5</sup> Performative Verb is the verb that makes the illocutionary force in a Speech Act explicit like order, promise, warn etc. (Yule, 2008)

<sup>6</sup> Syllogism is "a form of deductive reasoning consisting of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion; for example, *All humans are mortal*, the major premise, *I am a human*, the minor premise, *therefore, I am mortal*, the conclusion." (The Free Dictionary, 2013)



that resurgence all across the globe. The second clause complex is a causal clause in which Mr Shahi quite explicitly tells us that the 'revolutionary upsurge' is caused by a 'vision' which in turn is caused by the 'eternal precepts of Islam'. All three Nominal Groups are Ontological Metaphors through Personification and present the phenomenon of resurgence as an ideological compulsion of being Muslims.

Thus all three Nominal Groups evoke the II Frame and are based on Religionisational strategy and the ideological personification 'eternal precepts of Islam' is Post-modified by a Relative Clause which actually defines the Islamic concept of 'Jihad' the way it was to be understood at that time. The 'precepts' personification is shown as authoritative by the use of the verbal phrase 'call upon' which makes it obligatory for all the Muslims to 'wage unrelenting struggle' against 'injustice, alien domination, oppression and exploitation'.

These four negative attributes may refer to any entity in general but in the present context it seems to refer to the Soviet intervention through the Referential strategies of Social Problematization and Negative Ideologisation. Three of these are Nominalizations from the verbs 'dominate, oppress, and exploit' which highlight the negative actions through Actionalisation. Agha Shahi, just like the Americans, is addressing not just the Afghans but the whole Muslim world by using words like 'Muslim peoples' and 'adherents' of 'Islam' through the use of Genericisation Referential strategy. The aim at that moment was not just to motivate the Afghans but the whole Islamic world to join hands with them in the Jihad against the Soviets.

This in brief is an analysis of the political discourse in the US and Pakistan regarding the Myth of a war against Islam generated by the Russian intervention in Afghanistan. Now this research takes into consideration its effects on the media discourse in Pakistan during that time.

### 5.1.1.2. Media Discourse:

The editorial of the daily Dawn seems to resonate the argument of the above official statement (10, 11) the very next day. It is titled as 'Not just another coup' which clearly refers to the 'bloody changes' of regimes in the past two years and negates the recent development to be a similar change. The coup is there but it is something more than that.

The editorial begins in the same way, as the official statement a day ago, by referring to the successive changes of governments in Kabul but that the recent change cannot be termed as a conflict between rival forces within the country because:

- 18) Overwhelming evidences point to the change having been forced by overt and blatant military intervention from outside... The events in Kabul have evidently touched Iran and Pakistan even more deeply than others and the governments of both have reacted with understandable concern and anxiety. For aside from being immediate neighbours of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan have strong affiliations with Afghanistan, with which they also share membership of the Islamic Conference and the non-aligned Movement. Dawn Editorial 31/12/1979 (See Appendix A:15)

Overwhelming primarily means the surging over and submerging of the waves and turns 'evidences' into a Structural Metaphor 'Evidences are waves'. The Thematic positioning of this Nominal Group with the loaded Pre-modifier 'overwhelming' help enhance the significance of the evidences as being undeniable and having the ability to submerge all pretexts presented in defense of the military intervention behind the recent coup. Evidences are also used as an ontological metaphor through personification of 'evidences' and through Utterance Autonomization which hides the fact that it may be the opinion of the editor which is presented as 'overwhelming evidences'.

The concreteness of the evidences is also enhanced by the use of two synonymous Epithets 'overt' and 'blatant' that Pre-modify 'military intervention' to present it as an open attack instead of being a targeted action on the request of a friendly government as claimed by the Soviets. The Referential Strategies of Culturalisation and Politicisation are again at work as a few more causal clauses give the same reasons for the significance of this intervention as are given in the above official statement a day ago, that is, emphasizing the Islamic and non-aligned identities of the two countries. These identities also create *Argumentum ad populum* by appealing to the emotions of the general public.

The Pakistan Times in its Editorial titled 'The Moment of Truth' a day later began on the same note as the official statement and the Dawn editorial above about the successive changes of regimes in Kabul and how the latest was different from the others. The title is suggestive of the fact that Pakistan knew about the involvement of Russians since the Saur Revolution but kept deluding itself that it was an internal matter of the Afghans but now is the moment to speak the truth. The editorial evokes the II Frame in more emphatic and unambiguous terms.

- 19) The driving motive behind Soviet action appeared to be the rising crescendo of Muslim rebellion which was sparked off by the advent of a socialist regime. There is no doubt that Afghans are an Islam-loving people and cannot stomach a Godless creed. The Pakistan Times, 1/1/80. (See Appendix A:16)

The first causal clause complex represents the gradually increasing Muslim resistance against the communist revolution to be the most potent force behind the Russian intervention by using the Pre-Modifier 'driving'. The Muslim resistance is represented by using two Structural metaphors, that is, 'Muslim rebellion is music' and 'Muslim rebellion is fire'. Both the

metaphors represent the resistance as rising gradually just like 'crescendo' -the increasing loudness of music- and the spread of fire from a spark and that spark is the Saur Communist revolution. The Editorial seems to be using the fallacy of *Petitio principii* by putting forth a conspiracy theory based on an ideological conflict between communism and Islam that will be elaborated in the subsequent sentences.

The next clause complex clearly evokes the II Frame and represents the Afghans as 'Islam-loving people' by using Religionisation and the last elliptical clause uses another metaphor 'Creed is food' signifying that creed is like food without which human beings can't live. Just as the stomach rejects any bad food so it is impossible for the Afghans to accept a 'Godless creed' that is atheistic just like the bad food that is thrown up by the stomach. This again pitches the II and CI Frames against each other through Negative Ideologisation of the Communist ideology.

The editorial moves on to an extensive conspiracy theory that the Muslim resistance in Afghanistan and the recent Islamic revolution in neighboring Iran can be exported to the adjacent central Asian republics that were part of the Soviet Union. The editorial says:

- 20) And therefore, although the Soviet Union has for long sought to make inroads into Afghanistan, they felt a strain of compulsive necessity to checkmate the spreading fire of Islamic Influence. The truth is that the ideological power of Communist permeation is at an ebb even as the Islamic renaissance, started by emergence of Pakistan, is enveloping the Muslim world and generating world-wide repercussions. The Pakistan times, 1/1/1980 (See Appendix A:16)

The motivation behind the attack is now presented as a Structural metaphor 'Russian intervention is a game of chess' by using the word 'checkmate' which is the final move in a game of chess. The Embedded clause is based on *Petitio principii* through a Presupposition that

the event is a result of a long-planned policy of Russia to subjugate Afghanistan and make it a satellite as described in Carter speech above. The main clause describes the Soviet action as the final move of chess to defeat the threatening forces of the Islamic resurgence.

The next clause complex gets more hyperbolic as it sets out to tell a 'truth' by arguing that the Islamic resurgence began with the creation of Pakistan on the basis of an Islamic Ideology and the recent Islamic revolution in Iran proves that the resurgence is now at its full swing and is threatening communism which is presented as an ideology on the decline. The spread of Communism is presented metaphorically as liquid that permeates as against the Islamic one above which is presented as fire. The whole extract is based on *Petitio principii* fallacy as many assumptions that are debatable and controversial are presented as truths without concrete proofs.

The argumentation also includes the *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc* fallacy as old events like the creation of Pakistan are presented as causes behind the present situation which seems far-fetched and lacks evidence. It also includes *Ignoratio elenchi* fallacy as the Islamic Resurgence may not probably have much to do with the Russian intervention as it was more a result of the typical Cold War policy of the Soviet Union and America to have more and more countries included in their bloc. The whole extract reveals the intentional creation of a Jihad Dispositive that tried to pitch Islam against a Communist expansionist ideology.

In its editorial titled 'Islamic World and Afghanistan' the daily Dawn evokes the II frame just as the title suggests. After evoking the UR frame in the beginning of the editorial and representing the Russian intervention as a 'flagrant' violation of the Universal Rights the editorial moves on to project the importance of this intervention as one against an Islamic

country. This is again an attempt at motivating the Muslim brotherhood for a united response through *Argumentum ad populum*.

- 21) But over and above this the implications of the Afghan situation for the Islamic Conference can be quite far-reaching. In the first place, the fact just cannot be slurred over that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an Islamic country, a member of the Islamic Conference, has been violated by a non-member and that too a super power. If on this occasion the Islamic Conference fails to take a principled stand on the issue or to show a due awareness of the gravity of challenge the violation of a member country's sovereignty presents, the very credibility of this organization could be jeopardized. Dawn, 11/1/1980. (See Appendix A:17)

'But over and above this' being the Theme serves to enhance the significance of what is now to be said as against what has already been said about the Afghan situation. It is further enhanced by the use of phrasal verb 'slurred over' signifying that we cannot belittle the fact that it is the violation of the Universal Rights of an 'Islamic' country which is also a member of the Islamic Conference. The Referential strategies of Religionisation of the 'country' through the Pre-Modifying Classifier 'Islamic' and the Association and Organizationalisation of its membership in OIC create the 'Us (member/Islamic brotherhood) vs Them (non-member/non-Islamic)' conflict of identities between the whole Muslim world and the Soviet Union. The Muslim world and the Soviets are represented as two distinct or opposing groups through the Referential strategy of Specification.

The third Clause Complex is an if-conditional clause which is used to express that an action in the main clause will only be fulfilled when the condition in the if-clause is met. The main clause in this case states an occurrence that is undesirable, that is, the credibility of OIC can

be jeopardized if the conditions in the if-clause are not met. This argumentation is based on *Argumentation ad consequentium* that serves to forewarn the OIC against the negative consequences and to motivate it for a principled stand or at least an awareness of the gravity of the situation.

The editorial titled 'The Islamabad Conference' in Dawn on the OIC ministerial conference in Islamabad also focuses on the Russian intervention described as 'developments' through Nominalization just like the Carter speech above. It begins by underscoring the importance of the conference as a 'critical juncture in world politics'. The second clause complex directly establishes it as not only a threat to regional security but also to the whole Islamic World.

- 22) That the developments in Afghanistan pose a threat not only to the peace and security of the region but also to the stability of the Islamic world is now widely recognized by the Muslim states. Dawn, 27/01/1980 (See Appendix A:18)

The Clause Complex begins with a that-clause which is joined by a but-Relative elliptical clause and both of these are working as a Nominal Group in the passivized construction. In an active construction, this Nominal Group would have been towards the end but the passivized construction foregrounds the information in this elaborate nominal group at the beginning of the sentence. The information that this Nominal Group reveals are the two dominant myths propagated at that time which form the focus of this chapter. It describes the Russian intervention as a threat to the security of the 'region' and to the whole 'Islamic world/Muslim states' through the Referential Strategies of Religionisation, and Collectivisation. The Editorial continues to reinforce these propositions through many other clause complexes like

- 23) In the present context the need for the Islamic world to present a unified front can hardly be overemphasized... Moreover, a united approach would certainly help to bolster the moral and political position of the Muslim countries on the periphery of Afghanistan which now constitutes the first line of defense for the Islamic world. (See Appendix A:18)

The Collectivisation and Religionisation Referential strategies continue through this extract as well through the usage of Nominal groups like 'Islamic world, unified front, united approach, Muslim countries'. The 'Muslim countries' is post-modified by a Circumstantial Adverbial group 'on the periphery of Afghanistan' which reveals the proximity of the supposed threat. The same Nominal group is further Post-Modified with the Relative clause that describes the 'Muslim countries' as the first line of defense for the whole 'Islamic world'. It implies that the threat is not just for the immediate neighbors but can engulf the whole 'Ummah'.

In its editorial titled 'Muslims First' the Pakistan Times projects the identity of Islam as the basic identity of all Muslim nations and that in the present circumstances they need to assert that identity. The editorial talks about the Islamic Conference in Islamabad as a huge success and an opportunity to unite the whole Muslim Ummah as urged by General Zia in his speech discussed above.

- 24) Moreover, this is the opinion of a bloc of people who are ideologically motivated, representing an ever expanding horizon, going through a momentous ferment of resurgence, possessing the strategic advantages of oil and a highly sensitive habitat. Their reaction is bound to have worldwide repercussions and can even touch the hearts within the Soviet empire itself for after all, the people in the Central Asian republics are Muslims, blood of our blood and flesh of our flesh. Pakistan Times, 30/1/1980 (See Appendix A:19)



The first clause complex consists of a series of elliptical clauses all having the Islamic nations as their subject which is represented as a 'bloc of people'. This is the Referential strategy of Collectivisation aiming at creating unity. It is also an attempt to present the Islamic nations as a potentially powerful bloc like the American and Russian blocs and the elliptical clauses express the various dimensions of that potential. This includes the power of Islamic ideology which is not only expanding the concept of nation beyond boundaries but also inspiring a 'resurgence' of Islam.

This resurgence is described as a 'ferment' which turns it into a structural metaphor 'Resurgence is ferment (yeast etc)' which is a chemical reaction converting one organic material into another. Fermentation also refers to a state of excitement or agitation. 'Ferment' is Pre-modified by the subjective Epithet 'momentous' that enhances the significance of this resurgence as of historic importance. The last two clauses refer to the natural resources possessed by all Muslim nations that can be used as strategic weapons to assert that Islamic identity. It has an Intertextual element as well as it reminds about the use of this weapon of oil by the Gulf countries during the early seventies.

The whole argument seems to be based on *Petitio principia* as all these notions of an Islamic Renaissance may have been unfounded at that time as discussed above and it is such discourses that may be attempting to initiate that resurgence. The next clause complex also continues to enhance the significance of the power of the Muslim nations and how the resolution of the OIC will affect the global power strongholds including the hostile Russian bloc. The all-inclusive concept of Muslim Ummah as projected by the political and media discourse now turns

hyperbolic and makes a rhetorical attempt at including the Muslims living in Russia to be also part of that identity and to motivate them for protest against this intervention.

The language now turns literary and Intertextual as the editorial draws upon the lines of 'Paradise Lost' written by John Milton in which Adam expresses his love for Eve by addressing her as bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh. It is now a historical fact that the Muslims of those Soviet Republics later on became part of that 'resurgence' and broke away from Russia as independent countries. Just like the above extract evoking the II Frame, the editorial goes on further to assert the Islamic identity of the Muslim nations

- 25) The words of the resolutions are therefore not likely to prove a voice in the wilderness, especially when they emanate from nations who have become acutely conscious that the Soviet action in Afghanistan is a challenge and threat to their identity and existence. What the Conference has done is to reinforce the authenticity of that identity and existence. They are determined to preserve it at all costs. (See Appendix A:19)

The editorial assumes that despite the invention of weapons of massive destruction, words have not lost their strength and the words of this resolution will be particularly powerful because they are coming from the nations who consider this intervention as a threat to their collective Islamic Identity and survival. The Collectivisation of the Nominal group 'nation' is further enhanced and described by the Predicative Adjective<sup>7</sup> 'conscious' through a post-modifying Relative Clause. This Relative clause is further modified with another Relative clause that presents the intervention as a threat to the Islamic Identity.

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<sup>7</sup> Predicative Adjective comes after a linking verb usually and not before a noun. It is also known as Subject Complement. (Nordquist, About.com, 2013)

Thus the Nominal group having 'nation' as its Head includes the two Post-modifying Relative Clauses as a Predicational Strategy to enhance and elaborate the referential strategy of Collectivisation. The Soviet action in the last clause is referred to as a 'challenge' and 'threat' which reflect the Referential Strategy of Social Problematisation. They evoke the MO Frame and turns not only the Afghans but the whole Islamic Ummah into victims. The noun 'challenge' however has some motivational connotations as it means 'calling to confrontation' or 'to call into question' which inspires a courageous response from the one being challenged.

This implies that the intervention has called into question the Islamic Identity of the Muslim World as against the general perception that they are all different nations living in different countries. The editorial believes that the conference has accepted the challenge and through its resolution has authenticated their collective identity. The last clause complex is hyperbolic, sweeping and motivational. The Islamic leadership is referred to as 'determined' which is again a Predicative Adjective describing the will of the leadership to defend their identity 'at all costs'.

While commenting on the remarks made by Mr Brzezinski discussed above in (3) the editorial in the Pakistan Times elaborated at length the contextual meaning of his statement with reference to the 'People of the Book'. After expressing the disillusionment of the Islamic world over the scornful attitude adopted by the Christian world the editorial goes on to welcome the new approach and that's why the title of the editorial is 'Never too late'.

- 26) It is therefore a matter of the utmost gratification that the Muslims and Islam are being viewed, at this crucial juncture of human history, in the light of friendship and reconciliation. Islam and Christianity are by no means identical but they have a common ground of basic values. That is

why the Quran invited 'the Men of Book' to cooperate with the Muslims in matters of shared beliefs and interest. Pakistan Times, 3/2/1980. (See Appendix A:20)

The editorial calls the views expressed by Brzezinski and Carter through an Existential clause to be a 'matter of the utmost gratification' and post-modifies it with an Adjectival that-clause which tells us the reason behind that gratification. The Relationalisation strategy through 'friendship' 'reconciliation' and 'common ground' seems to create alliance between the Christian and the Muslim world on the basis of their common religious ideology and identity to confront an atheistic Communist ideology. The last Clause Complex is significant in using *Argumentum ad verecundum* by referring to the Holy Quran which instructs the 'Men of the Book' to help Muslims in 'shared beliefs' and 'interests' as the verse quoted in (3) above.

The analysis of these extracts from the political and media discourse after the Russian intervention show that the intervention was forcefully being portrayed as a war against Islam. The next section will discuss some more extracts to show that the intervention was also being portrayed as a security threat not only for the neighboring countries but also for the whole world.

#### **5.1.2. The Myth of Security Threat:**

Another dominant myth that seems more than visible in the political and media discourse at that time was the presentation of the Russian intervention as an expansionist move to reach the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and to finally hold control of the oil-rich Gulf States. This myth was theorized by the West without any concrete evidence and the Soviets not only refuted it but did not actually make any advances towards the warm waters during their decade long occupation of Afghanistan. The security threat Myth was, however, a very potent tool for propaganda and served to alarm the neighboring countries like Pakistan, Iran and the Gulf region. This Myth was

part of the Jihad Dispositive that was being created by the Political and Media Discourse of that time.

#### 5.1.2.1. Political Discourse:

President Carter in the same speech as discussed in (1) above also made a clear mention of this threat in the following words.

- 27) This invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in Southwest Asia.... We must recognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan to stability and peace. A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a steppingstone to possible control over much of the world's oil supplies.  
(Carter, 1980) (See Appendix B:1)

The first Clause Complex presents the Soviet invasion as a 'threat to peace' through an Attributive Relational clause. The Attribute 'threat' is intensified with the Pre-modifiers 'extremely serious' followed by a causal phrase that describes the nature of that 'threat'. This evokes a sense of alarm and a sudden realization that if it is Afghanistan today then it may be us tomorrow who may be getting killed and homeless and all that is associated with war comes to one's mind. This may be termed as the Alarm Frame for the present purposes.

He then goes on to elaborate the 'strategic importance of Afghanistan' and tries to be prophetic by saying that the Soviet Union while sitting in Afghanistan will think Iran and Pakistan as the next steppingstones in its attempt to reach and control the oil supplies in the Gulf. This is again the use of *Argumentation ad consequentium* by highlighting the supposed negative consequences of an event without evidence. The MO Frame again seems at work and this time it goes beyond Afghans to include more victims in the future. He goes on further to say

28) This would threaten the security of all nations including, of course, the United States, our allies, and our friends. (See Appendix B:1)

Expanding the range of that threat to the whole world, the President again evokes the Alarm Frame and refers to the rest of the world as 'our allies' and 'our friends'. This is the use of Referential strategies of Collectivisation (use of Deictics) and Relationalisation (allies, friends) which aim at inspiring solidarity and unison. There are many paragraphs at the end of this speech (See Appendix) that make use of *Argumentum ad baculum* by threatening the Soviets with sanctions of various kinds and to make them pay the price for their choice.

On January 23, 1980 President Carter, in his State of the Union address reiterated his stance on the Soviet intervention in a similar way as in (1) above. The state of the Union address is the most important annual policy statement of a US President to the joint sessions of the parliament regarding the most pressing domestic and international issues. After referring to the Iran-hostage crisis the President talks again about the 'massive Soviet troops' 'the fiercely independent' and 'deeply religious people' using the Referential strategies of Militarisation, Religionisation Primitivisation as discussed above.

29) Also at this moment, massive Soviet troops are attempting to subjugate the fiercely independent and deeply religious people of Afghanistan. (Carter, 1980a) (See Appendix B:2)

He goes on to focus mainly on the Soviet intervention and again talks about the supposed Soviet expansionist designs.

30) The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean

and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil. (Carter, 1980a) (See Appendix B:2)

The President is describing the strategic importance of the Gulf region as discussed in (25) above. The second and third clause complex quantifies that importance in terms of the production of 'two-thirds of the world's exportable oil' which is just '300 miles' away from the 'Soviet troops/military forces' which is again a use of the Militarization strategy. It also makes use of the Circumstantial Adjuncts like 'the Indian Ocean' and 'the Strait of Hormuz' to identify the locations having pivotal importance. The Strait of Hormuz is post-modified with an Appositive clause to predicate the significance of the Strait being the main supply-line of oil.

The last clause Complex relates the strategic position of the Soviet Union as a threat to the 'free movement of Middle East oil' and evokes an Alarm Frame not only for the oil-producing Gulf but also for all those who are dependent on that oil. The whole argument is based on *Argumentation ad consequentium* and *Petitio principia* because the Russian expansionism is being taken for granted and nobody seems to present the Russian point of view except at a few places where it is mentioned only to distort it through *Straw man* Fallacy. Take, for example, the following extract from President Carter's first speech

- 31) The Soviets claim, falsely, that they were invited into Afghanistan to help protect that country from some unnamed outside threat. But the President, who had been the leader of Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, was assassinated along with several members of his family after the Soviets gained control of the capital city of Kabul. Only several days later was the new puppet leader even brought into Afghanistan by the Soviets. (Carter, 1980) (See Appendix A:1)

The first clause complex is a Mental Process clause where the Mental Process 'claim' is straightaway rejected by the post-modifier Adverb 'falsely' without any proof. The 'claim' has been described through a that-clause working as the object but it seems to lose its credibility because of the adverb before it. The notion of some 'outside threat' is also made questionable by the Pre-modifier 'unnamed' as it suggests that if there is no name there is no threat. The argument in the next clause complex seems quite plausible that if they were invited by the President then why did they kill him.

Historical details, however, reveal as discussed in chap 1 that the Americans were part of that 'outside threat' while supporting the rebels against President Amin's government and he had invited the Soviets to help him out in crushing the rebellions. The argumentation seems plausible but is still a Straw man fallacy and a *Petitio principia* as it rejects the other argument as a falsehood and presents a logic that is controversial and debateable. The last clause Complex presents the new President Karmal as a 'puppet leader' that metaphorically turns the Soviets as puppeteers and the whole event as a puppet show. Historical facts however show that if Karmal was a puppet then he was a mere replacement of an earlier puppet Amin who himself was a replacement of Tarakai and that he was no more and no less a puppet than the American backed President Hamid Karzai after 9/11.

As discussed above the US Security Advisor visited Pakistan to initiate the Jihad Dispositive and made full use of his Rhetorical skills to win the hearts of the Pakistani nation and the Afghan refugees. He also made his contribution to the Security Threat Myth and gave them a patronizing pat on the back.



32) We admire you as a people as you are a brave people and this is a quality that is not evenly and generously distributed among the mankind. It is particularly assuring at a time of challenge as for you it is a time of challenge. There is a threat at your door. We are here to meet with you the threat. Pakistan Times, 3/2/1980 (See Appendix A:2)

There is a Collectivization strategy at work throughout the extract to create solidarity through the use of Deictics like 'we' and 'you'. There seems to be another labored 'You-attitude' attempt and Mr Brzezinski here seems to be marketing a new policy and ideology to the people of Pakistan. That's why he is eulogizing them as 'a brave people' which is again a Collectivisation and Culturalisation strategy. He further elevates their 'bravery' by putting them in a select club of nations that are brave in this world. He then moves on to evoke the Alarm Frame by using 'at a time of challenge' first a Prepositional phrase and then converting that into a Complement in the same Clause Complex thus enhancing its effect through repetition and change in grammatical category. The next clause Complex again evokes the Alarm Frame by personifying the Russian intervention as an Ontological Metaphor 'threat' which seems to suggest a monster 'at your door'. The last Clause Complex is a word of reassurance through Collectivisation that 'we' will face the monster together with 'you'.

The Pakistani political discourse also emphasized on the Security Threat Myth in much the same way as the Americans initiated it. After taking a reasonable reaction time the Pakistan government started coming up with a clear stand on Afghanistan and it was, as discussed above, toeing the US lines as usual. Pakistan's Foreign Affairs Advisor Mr.Agha Shahi spoke at the General Assembly describing the Soviet action as a threat to security.

33) "This intervention has jeopardized peace and security in the region and the world....Today, it is Afghanistan which is the victim: tomorrow, it may be its neighbours and the small countries of the Middle East". Dawn, 12/1/1980 (See Appendix A:8)

Mr Shahi is expanding the range of that threat from being regional to being global just as Mr Carter did in his speech through this Material Process clause. He goes on further to make a prophecy using *Argumentation ad consequentium* strategy to present the Russian intervention as an event that can lead to more such interventions in the neighboring countries and Gulf States. The MO Frame is again invoked explicitly by highlighting Afghanistan as the victim through an it-Cleft<sup>8</sup> sentence. The normal sentence would be 'Afghanistan is the victim' but for the sake of emphasis it has been moved towards the end in a relative clause with the introduction of 'It' in the beginning .

The MO Frame is extended to the 'neighbors' and 'small countries of the Middle East' where the Pre-modifier 'small' again inspires sympathies for the potential victims as against the Mighty Oppressor. The use of two Paratactic clauses having Cohesive markers like 'Today' and 'tomorrow' at the beginning of the two clauses is significant for rhetorical purposes .<sup>9</sup> Parataxis gives a narrative tone to the argument thus making it more attractive and emotional. The similar structure of both the clauses helps equate the present victimization with futuristic one. The whole extract in fact evokes the Alarm Frame by creating a doomsday scenario.

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<sup>8</sup> Cleft Sentence: The division of a normal sentence by moving a part of it to a relative clause for the sake of emphasis on one aspect of the meaning. (Nordquist, About.com, 2013)

<sup>9</sup> Parataxis: Independent Clauses joined without Coordinating Conjunctions (Nordquist, About.com, 2013)

A few days later, President Zia while addressing a Press Conference made good use of Rhetorics while describing the Afghan situation.

34) What change has taken place in this region? It is not an ordinary phenomenon. A qualitative change has taken place. I would not go beyond that. But if you visualize the map of this region and if you extend the hammer and sickle over Afghanistan and then see from there onwards which are the areas that are likely to come under influence. Where is Iran? Where is the Gulf and where is the strait of Hormuz and where lies Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Muslim world. I leave that to your imagination and to your study of Geography. Dawn, 16/1/1980 (See Appendix A:21)

The extract is full of Rhetorical questions which is an important persuasive technique that works through suggestiveness. The answers to these questions are obvious and not expected to be given but sometimes the one who poses the question gives the answer for the sake of emphasis. That is what the President does over here and describes that 'change' as an extraordinary phenomenon and also modifies it with 'qualitative' in the third Clause Complex. The same proposition with the same words is later on repeated by the Dawn editorial as discussed in (8) above.

That he is merely being suggestive is revealed by the fourth Clause Complex. In the fifth Clause Complex he turns Metonymic and refers to the Soviet Union as the 'hammer and sickle' which were not only a part of the Soviet Flag but also symbolized the Communist ideology. This evokes the CI Frame as done by President Carter in (2) above but this time it carries significant additional meaning by the use of 'hammer and sickle' in a metaphorical way. The obvious metaphorical meaning of 'hammer and sickle' may be that it represents the working classes that

use these tools during their work but the way President Zia has used it to refer to the Soviet Union may be termed as the Referential strategies of Actionalisation, Professionalisation and Politicisation simultaneously.

The 'hammer and sickle' thus represent not only the working classes, the Soviet Union and the Communist ideology but it also refers to the way both these tools work. The hammer is used to strike and the sickle to cut and the way President Zia has used it seems to suggest that the Russian action implies striking and cutting everything on its way to the oil-rich Gulf. This evokes the Alarm Frame in a very dramatic and sensational way. Then just like President Carter in (27) above he mentions the significance of the oil-producing regions and the supply line of the Strait of Hormuz. He does not explain their significance like Carter but uses Rhetorical questions again to underscore its obviousness. The last Clause complex again proves that he is intentionally being metaphorical and suggestive and to give some food for thought to the audience.

Agha Shahi spoke about the nature of Security Threat in a comprehensive and academic way at the OIC meeting and presented the Islamic world as a prize catch for both of the Superpowers because of its rich natural resources.

35) The Islamic countries still remain the focus of global rivalry and contention for spheres of Influence and control of world's natural resources....Pakistan Times, 28/1/1980 (See Appendix A:14)

Mr Shahi also evokes the Myth of Security Threat throughout the speech but he seems objective in his approach and does not present that 'threat' to be from the Soviet side only. The 'Islamic

countries' have become vulnerable by virtue of their 'natural resources' and both the rival camps are contending for a control of this region.

The political discourse in Pakistan thus also projects the Myth of Security threat to alarm and awaken the whole Muslim World that it is a matter not only of Afghanistan but the whole Ummah should feel threatened by this intervention. The media discourse in Pakistan also resonated the Myth of Security threat as will be shown in the following section.

#### 5.1.2.2. Media Discourse:

The daily Dawn in its editorial of Jan 11, 1980 seems to generate the same alarm regarding the security of the world with a particular focus on the Islamic countries thus evoking the II Frame as well. The title 'Islamic world and Afghanistan' itself establishes the significance of the developments in Afghanistan for the Islamic world.

- 36) The Soviet action also poses a direct threat to the peace and stability of the region since it has tended to disrupt global equations and the diplomatic status quo in the region. But over and above this the implications of the Afghan situation for the Islamic Conference can be quite far-reaching.... Dawn, 11/1/1980 (See Appendix A:17)

The Nominal 'threat' in the first Clause Complex is Pre-modified by 'direct' to underscore the obviousness of the threat. The superpower rivalries during the cold war are represented through a Structural metaphor 'Power politics is mathematics' by the use of the nominal Group 'global equations' referring to the balance of power that seems to have been 'disrupted' by this intervention. The next Clause begins with two Transition Devices 'but' and 'over and above' and both of these serve to subordinate the importance of the threat being global to the threat being Islam-centered. Again *Argumentation ad consequentium* seems at work through 'far-reaching'

implications and 'possible consequences' of the intervention and the editorial then categorically singles out the Islamic countries as being the target. It goes on to say

- 37) Moscow's military intervention is seen as an early warning of a southward thrust of the Soviet power. This leads towards the central region of the Islamic world — the area in which the Arabian peninsula is situated. (See Appendix A:17)

The first Clause complex uses the Militarisation referential strategy through 'military intervention' as the clause presents the intervention as a military move planned in 'Moscow'. That's why the *Secundum quid* Argumentation strategy is used through the Synecdoche (*pars pro toto*) 'Moscow's' instead of 'Soviet' to particularize the Soviet government sitting in Moscow. The Clause is a passivized construction that does not tell as to who is seeing this warning of the 'southward thrust' because it is only the rival camp of the Soviets that is seeing or establishing this as a warning. The *Petitio principia* seems again at work as the last Clause complex carries that threat to the 'central region of Islamic world' further described as the 'Arabian peninsula' through an Appositive clause.

The editorial titled 'Full Circle' in The Pakistan Times traces the history of US-Pakistan relationship, giving an impression of jubilation and excitement at the fact that the Americans after a long time of indifference are again in need of Pakistan because of the Russian threat.

- 38) It is naturally asked whether the newly awakened sense of danger in the West—more especially in the United States—is sufficiently keen and consistent to be commensurate with the titanic dictates of the challenge. Pakistan Times, 15/1/1980 (See Appendix A:22)

Keeping in view the love-hate relationship between the US and Pakistan the editorial poses a question regarding the keenness and consistency of the American wish for cooperation. That the 'challenge' or Security Threat is too demanding is represented through 'titanic dictates' which is a hyperbolic and allusive Nominal Group referring to the mighty Titans of the Greek mythology who were defeated by the Olympians. It may thus be assumed that the Soviets are the Titans and the Americans need to have the strength and commitment of the Olympians to defeat them. The Editorial goes on further to quote Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State and an acknowledged expert on International Affairs.

- 39) The qualitative change in the situation has compelled the former U.S. Secretary of State Mr. Kissinger to say that supply of arms alone would not enable Pakistan to stand up to the might of a super-Power, and the US. must extend to it such guarantees as are "backed by its own military presence." The statement is a measure of the gravity of the crisis and' the scale of the requisite military wherewithal. (See Appendix A:22)

This again is a use of *Argumentum ad verecundium* by quoting an opinion of an expert to prove a point. The gravity of the threat seems to have 'compelled' Mr Kissinger that arms supply will not be sufficient to cope with 'the might of a superpower' and the threat can only be managed if the US sends its own army. As if the first elaborate Clause Complex was not sufficient to convey the enormity of the threat, the editorial goes on to state again 'the gravity of the crisis' and the 'requisite military wherewithal'. The whole extract uses the Militarisation strategy and the *Petitio Principii* by presupposing a threat that was probably not there. The editorial does go on to quote the Soviet Leader Mr Brezhnev about the presupposed threat but only to distort his statement using the Straw Man fallacy.

40) Of course, Mr Brezhnev has declared that Pakistan and Iran have nothing to fear but it does not ring true. In the first place it might be asked why did Moscow have to occupy the country if it was anyhow being run by at its behest and by its stooges? (See Appendix A:22)

The editorial rejects Brezhnev's explanation that Pakistan and Iran should not feel threatened as false at the outset and goes on to distort the explanation by theorizing against the assumed soviet intentions . The use of 'Moscow' is again a *Secundum quid* for particularizing the Soviet leadership being behind the intervention. Then the editorial asks a series of Rhetorical questions to make assertions about the intentions of the Soviet leadership. The first of these questions implies the assertion that the Soviet intervention was an expansionist move as there was no need to occupy a country that was being ruled by a friendly government.

The government in Kabul is, however, represented as 'stooges' which is a derogatory representation not only of the Afghan government but also of the Soviet leadership. A stooge is idiomatically someone being controlled by someone else but it actually refers to a comedian who feeds lines to a main comedian and is the butt of jokes. It thus turns into a Structural metaphor that 'Soviet leaders and Afghan leaders are comedians' where the Soviets are the main comedians. The editorial moves on to make more fun of Brezhnev's statement

41) He also alleged that the Soviet Union was endangered on its southern borders. In other words, Pakistan and Iran have menaced its borders. Can there be a more absurd proposition? (See Appendix A:22)

That the Soviets felt threatened from the South is made fun of through another Rhetorical question. The statement is represented as an 'absurd proposition' which is again by using the Straw Man fallacy. The editorial does not mention the US support to the Afghan fighters that



were living and being trained in Pakistan long before the Soviet intervention as discussed in Chapter 1. This is a significant silence that we find throughout the political and media discourse. The editorial then moves on to ask two more question. The first one is that if The Soviet Union could not respect its border with Afghanistan how can it respect the Durand Line which is Afghanistan's border with Pakistan. This seems just jumping to conclusions and making use of *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc* Argumentation as there seems no causal relation between the intervention in Afghanistan and the supposed intervention in Pakistan. The second question is also formulated using the same Argumentation.

- 42) More pertinently if Moscow could not tolerate a half-baked Communist regime in Kabul, would it put up with a full-fledged Islamic state. It would not be difficult for it to find a pretext for provocation to attack. It has already accused Pakistan of 'harbouring' Afghan 'saboteurs' and training them to join battle with Kabul. (See Appendix A:22)

It begins with a Transitional phrase 'more pertinently' that makes this question to be the most relevant one to be asked. The question, however, seems quite absurd as to how 'a half-backed communist regime' has been related with a 'full-fledged Islamic state'. There seems no clear point of comparison between the two and no explanation as to how an Islamic state could be more instigating for the Soviets than a Communist one? The next two Clause Complexes , however, seem to give the logic that the Soviets only want a pretext for advancement towards the Gulf. If it can find a pretext with a Communist regime than it will be easier to find one with a Muslim one and as the last Clause Complex suggests they have already 'accused' Pakistan of 'harbouring' Afghan 'saboteurs'. Both the words are put in quotes which indicate that the editorial does not agree with the allegation. The allegation, however, was a truth as discussed in Chapter 1.

The Pakistan Times Editorial on Jan 28, 1980 titled 'we can count' while talking about the OIC meeting as the best option available continued with the Security Threat Myth.

- 43) Again the countries of this area are connected like links in a chain. They are so geo-politically bound up with each other that if one were to fall, others would be profoundly affected by its repercussions.... The far-reaching and disastrous consequences of the occupation of Afghanistan are apparent. Pakistan is automatically threatened and with it the entire Middle East becomes a danger zone. Pakistan Times, 28/1/1980 (See Appendix A:23)

The first clause complex uses a simile to describe the bondage between the countries of the region as the links of a chain implying that if one link breaks, the chain breaks. This is explained in the next Clause Complex through a verbal phrase Complement 'bound up' pre-modified with a compound adverb 'geo-politically' and post modified with a Prepositional phrase 'with each other'. The whole Nominal Group is therefore combining a Collectivisation and Politicisation Strategy simultaneously to show these countries as one entity. The next Clause Complex makes use of *Argumentation ad consequentium* by pointing out the 'consequences' as an elaborate Nominal Group Pre-modified with 'far-reaching' and 'disastrous' thus employing the Social Problematisation strategy. The Consequences are also described as 'apparent' to prove the truth of the statement. The last Clause Complex suggests that if Afghanistan is a link in the 'chain' then Pakistan is the next one followed by the whole 'Middle East'. The threat is describe as automatic which makes it more 'apparent'. The 'Middle East' is represented as a 'danger-zone' which is a Militarisation strategy.

In its editorial on Jan 29, 1980, titled 'Pakistan's Pivotal Position' the Pakistan Times tries to assert the strategic importance of Pakistan while drawing upon its history and theorizes it as a force to reckon with.

44) Today even the blind can see that Pakistan occupies a crucial geopolitical position in the so-called "arc of crisis". It holds key to the defence of the entire Muslim Middle East. The whole seriousness of the Soviet threat lies in the fact that were it to make a thrust into Pakistan to reach the warm waters of the Indian ocean, it would be in a position to dominate the surrounding oil-producing area and not only rule the lives of the people there but also hold the west to ransom. Pakistan Times, 29/1/1980 (See Appendix A:24)

The editorial begins with a hyperbolic clause to assert the 'crucial geopolitical position' of Pakistan by saying that it is so apparent, as discussed in (43) above, that the blind would manage to see that. This 'position' is stated to be part of the 'arc of crisis' which is a term that was used by Brzezinski (1979) to describe the region along the Indian ocean up to the Horn of Africa. Brzezinski thought this region to be of vital importance to the US because of its natural resources and he used this term because it was moving towards destabilization.

The editorial tries to establish that Pakistan maintains a 'pivotal position' in this 'arc of crisis' as it is the first line of defense for the oil-rich Middle-East. The seriousness of the threat is described by saying that the supposed 'thrust' of the Soviets towards the 'warm waters' of the Indian Ocean will lead it to rule not only the Middle-East but the whole world. The editorial turns the Soviets into Blake-mailers or kidnappers metaphorically by using the idiom 'holding to ransom'. The Soviet Union will dictate its terms to the West once it gets control of the Gulf because the West is dependent on its oil. This again is a use of Social Problematization to present a negative image of the Russians.

The analysis of the media discourse thus also shows that it followed the same pattern as the American and Pakistani political discourse regarding the representation of the Russian intervention as a threat to global security.

## 5.2. Discussion and Conclusion:

The analysis above of the political and media discourse regarding the Russian intervention in Afghanistan indicates that Jihad Dispositive evolved out of a necessity to cope with an emergency and that it made an intelligent use of the Islamic ideology of Jihad. These practices established a Myth that this attack was an attack on Islam by the infidels and it has become a religious obligation for the whole Muslim Ummah to resist that aggression and to wage a Jihad against it. This discourse also established a Myth of Security Threat that the Soviets have invaded Afghanistan to reach the warm waters and oil of the Gulf and it will soon attack Pakistan or Iran to reach there.

The brief analysis of the American political discourse has suggested that their statements were carefully planned and well-organized to establish the two Myths. Their word choices at the clause level were clearly based on a positive Ideologisation of Islam and they seemed to pitch that ideology against the Communist ideology which is represented as an atheistic and evil worldview through negative Ideologisation. This representation makes a very clever use of the Privation of History and projects the Myth that the Soviet intervention is a war against Islam instead of being an effort to install a friendly government. It is not just the Americans who are doing it; President Zia and his top aides were also making lots of references towards an 'alien' ideology being imposed on the Afghan people.

The Referential and Predicational strategies used in the political and media discourses eulogized the Afghan fighters as brave warriors by repeatedly evoking the FI Frame and motivated them to wage a Jihad against the Russians. The Russians on the other hand are represented through such word choices that consistently evoke the MO Frame. The whole

Muslim world is in fact turned into a victim and Collectivisation and Relationalisation strategies are used to create a bond of affinity with the Western World.

The Argumentation strategies on the other hand seem to focus more on the establishment of the Myth of Security threat by consistently evoking the Alarm Frame and presenting the Soviet intervention as an expansionist move. Many such arguments are also given that aim at winning the popular support for the Jihad being a compulsion against such expansionist designs of the Soviets.

## Chapter 6: American Intervention and the Terror Dispositive

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The nature of the Russian intervention in Afghanistan and the consequent Jihad Dispositive, as discussed in the previous chapter, continued to influence the political and media discourse for more than a decade not only in Pakistan but throughout the world outside the Soviet Bloc. It resulted in the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 and it also led to the weakening of the Communist bloc in Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall symbolically ended the Cold War era in 1989. After more than two years of fighting, the 'mujahideen' forces finally managed to topple the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul in 1992. The US not only managed to give the Soviets their Vietnam but it also resulted in the disintegration of the mighty Soviet empire and many of the Central Asian Republics were given independence by the Soviet Union in 1991.

The Jihad Dispositive continued to strengthen itself till the beginning of the civil war in Afghanistan after the defeat of the Najib government in Kabul in 1992. As discussed in Chap 01, this civil war continued for almost a decade till the 9/11 bombings in 2001. It was an era of swift shifts in the identities of all the key players involved in the Jihad Dispositive during the previous decade. The Mujahideen Commanders from different factions became 'war lords' and the mujahideen for some time were represented as fighters of various factions known by the name of their parties or the names of their leaders. The emergence of the Taliban and the Al-Qaida as new players in the war was merely a new alignment or grouping of the same Mujahideen. What is most important in this context is the fact that the vacant place of the most vital enemy, the Soviet

Union, was now filled by the US. Thus in terms of CDA the Jihad Dispositive after the Soviet intervention kept getting 'reproduced' for more than a decade till the disintegration of the USSR and the civil war in Afghanistan necessitated a new kind of Dispositive that slowly and gradually evolved and manifested itself as the Terror Dispositive after 9/11.

## **6.1. The Terror Dispositive:**

The Terror Dispositive includes a network of new relationship between the same old participants of the Jihad Dispositive. It includes a change of identities, perceptions and objectives of these participants. It required the creation of new Myths and evocation of new Frames through new Referential, Predicative and Argumentation Strategies. This Dispositive may have generated many myths to achieve its ends but this research has chosen three dominant Myths for its discussion of the Post-9/11 political and media discourse in Pakistan. This chapter does not follow the same pattern for its analysis as in the previous one. The Myths have been introduced in the beginning followed by the analysis of the political and media discourse so as to avoid repetition and not to break the flow of discussion.

### **6.1.1. The Myth of 9/11 as an Act of War**

The 9/11 bombing is essentially an act of sabotage and massacre that is normally associated with guerilla warfare. It was not part of a 'war' in which the army of one country comes face to face with the army of another country and a battle ensues that may continue from a few days to years of mutual destruction and killing. The reasons behind choosing to present 9/11 as 'an act of war' are similar as described by George Lakoff (2004) regarding the term 'war on Terror'. To present 9/11 as an 'act of war' was to get the extraordinary wartime constitutional

powers by the American President that also included military interventions in other countries. It justified all the wars that America went into after 9/11 in pursuit of the terrorist enemy.

### **6.1.2. The Myth of a War not Against Islam**

The Post-9/11 political and media discourse seems to give an overall impression that the surge of 'terrorism' can be ascribed to the Islamic World and the Jihadist ideology of Islam. This however is not being done through a direct pointing finger towards the Islamic World but in an indirect way by pointing out the few 'extremist elements' within the Islamic World. This is very aptly described by a popular proposition "not all Muslims are terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslims" (Kilmeade, 2010). Thus time and again attempts are made in the discursive practices to single out the 'extremist' elements from the entire Muslim World and to assert that it is not a War against Islam. The analysis below, however, would reveal that this blame-game ultimately targets the same Islamic ideology that was used to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan. The Myth is thus opposite to the Myth of representing the Russian intervention as a war against Islam in the Jihad Dispositive as discussed in the previous chapter.

### **6.1.3. The Myth of Security Threat**

The Myth of Security Threat from the Jihad Dispositive also continues but now the threat is from Islam rather than Communism. The rise of 'Islamic fundamentalism' is highlighted as a threat to world peace in the same way as the Communist ideology and Soviet expansionism was projected after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. If Communism was an evil that necessitated a joint defense by the Christian and the Muslim worlds on the basis of their common faith, then the Islamic 'extremism' has also been projected as a menace that threatens the whole world and necessitates a new coalition of forces.



This chapter aims at appreciating the way these Myths have been working behind the new Referential, Predicative and Argumentation strategies in the political and media discourse on a few Post-9/11 Discursive Events. This chapter focuses on the Discursive Event of the American intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11 followed by an analysis of brief episodes of religious militancy in Pakistan in the next chapter.

## **6.2. 9/11 and the American Intervention in Afghanistan**

Human history is full of bloodshed but 9/11 was an unprecedented catastrophe by virtue of the innovative methods employed to bring about that massive destruction. Passenger flights were hijacked and forced to ram into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon which are two buildings that symbolize the American economic and military power. This research will take two speeches by the American President George W Bush and one speech by the Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf to understand as to how 9/11 impacted the political discourse in America and how that American discourse affected the Pakistani political discourse. The study will then take into account the impact of the political discourse on the media discourse in Pakistan with reference to 9/11 and the American intervention in Afghanistan.

### **6.2.1. Political Discourse:**

The first reaction to the event by President George Bush was emotionally charged as is expected on such occasions.

45) Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts... Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror... America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom

and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining... (Bush G. W., 2001)

(See Appendix B:3)

The use of Collectivization through Deictics is quite normal on such occasions to forge unity among the people in moments of crisis but the targets of these attacks are described as 'our way of life' and 'our very freedom' apart from the 'fellow citizens. This is an attempt at Privation of History as is also illustrated by the subsequent Clause Complexes. The President wants to assert that the motive behind the attack is to target a nation that is the best in the world for being a land of Opportunities for a better life according to one's abilities and a land of freedom to achieve happiness without any social or political barriers. This is what is known as "the American Dream" a term popularized by the historian James Truslow Adams (1931). The President is thus trying to evoke a Frame that may be called the American Dream (AD) Frame for the present purposes.

The 'terrorists' on the other hand have never expressed such a motive and from their statements it is generally concluded that they are targeting the US for its anti-Islamic and pro-Jewish policies. Thus the President by not mentioning the actual motives behind the attacks is removing actual History from the incident and creating a Myth that the militants are jealous of the prosperity and happiness of the American way of life. The President also represents the action as an 'act of terror' which is pre-modified by 'despicable' and 'evil' and repeats the description 'evil' four times in the speech. This is the same description that was used for the Soviets and popularized by Ronald Reagan (1983) in his famous 'Evil Empire speech'.

This is an attempt at negative Appraisal and the Religionisation Referential strategy to describe the enemy as a Satanic force and may be termed as the Evil Force (EF) Frame for

this study. Thus the 'Mujahideen' and the 'moral equivalents of America's forefathers' (Ahmad E. , 1998) have now replaced the Communists as the new 'evil' that needs to be fought with a religious devotion. The actions of these are described also as 'despicable acts of terror' through the Referential strategy of Social Problematization and Negative Ideologisation. The 'terrorists' ,on the other hand, still bask in their earlier identity and continue to consider themselves to be on the path of God leading towards heaven. The President goes on to say:

46) We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them... America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world and we stand together to win the war against terrorism... (Bush G. W., 2001) (See Appendix B:3)

The President makes use of Identification strategy of creating the Myth that the protectors are identical to the 'terrorists' and thus deserve the same treatment as the militants. This strategy is very significant as it gives the President the license to make interventions in any country on the pretext of harboring 'terrorists'. They have in fact been doing that by waging full-scale wars as in Afghanistan and Iraq and through their Drone program in Algeria, Libya, Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan (McKay, 2013). The President also makes use of *Argumentum ad baculum* to warn those like Pakistan who may be supporting or harboring these militants.

The President goes on to use Assimilation through Collectivization and Relationalisation Strategies by the use of Deictics and words like 'friends' and 'allies' who are the ones 'who want peace and security in the world'. The post-modifying clause has a Presupposition that Americans and their allies want peace and security whereas the militants are the 'others' who don't want peace and security. It also implies that all those who want peace and security are against these

militants. He uses the term 'war against terrorism' which may be metaphorical at this stage but it reflects the way the President and his Think Tanks had started projecting 9/11 as an act of war that necessitates the waging of an actual war by the Americans . The President goes on to use the Religionisation strategy which is very effective at such moments of grief and advises everyone to pray for those who mourn their loved ones.

47) And I pray they will be comforted by a power greater than any of us spoken through the ages in Psalm 23: "Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me." (Bush G. W., 2001) (See Appendix B:3)

He refers to God as the great comforter and makes use of the *Argumentum ad verecundium* by quoting from the Psalm of David in Bible. These are very apt lines for the occasion as they throw light on the situation through a religious perspective and the US at that moment was a 'valley of the shadow of death'. The President reminds them that they should not be afraid of 'evil' which shows that he uses the word 'evil' for the militants four times in the speech to evoke the EF Frame to represent them as a satanic force against God.

The Pakistani President Gen Pervez Musharraf responded to the post-9/11 situation by addressing the nation on Sep 19, 2001. His speech reflected the U-turn in Pakistan's political discourse towards Afghanistan as discussed in Chapter 01. The following extracts show how he makes use of the Myth of Security threat by believing in the Myth of 9/11 as an act of war that necessitates a war in response. He also denies the general impression that it will be a war against Islam and identifies Al-Qaeda, Taliban and an International war against terrorism as the three targets of the American response. This is the use of *Trajectio in ailiu*m by putting the blame on

Al-Qaeda and Taliban and making no mention of the causes behind the creation of these two enemies. He goes on to say

- 48) The thing to ponder is that in these three targets nobody is talking about war against Islam or the people of Afghanistan (Musharraf, 2001) . (See Appendix B:4)

Like President Bush, President Musharraf also indulges in the process of the alienating of the Al-Qaeda and Taliban although Pakistan was among the three countries that recognized the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Thus the Myth of a War against Islam in the Jihad Dispositive is not to be a part of the Terror Dispositive. It will be based on a new Myth that the war against terrorism will not be a war against Islam and it will include Frames like Islam is a religion of peace and only a bunch of radical extremist Muslims are the real enemies who are not following the mainstream interpretations of Islam. These ideas may be termed as the Real Islam Frame and the Alienation Frame as these elements are projected as extraneous elements in the 'original' peace-loving Islamic nations of the world. The President goes on to intensify the Myth of Security threat by saying

- 49) Pakistan is facing a very critical situation and I believe that after 1971, this is the most critical period. The decision we take today can have far-reaching and wide-ranging consequences. The crisis is formidable and unprecedented. If we take wrong decisions in this crisis, it can lead to worst consequences. On the other hand, if we take right decisions, its results will be good. The negative consequences can endanger Pakistan's integrity and solidarity. Our critical concerns, our important concerns can come under threat. When I say critical concerns, I mean our strategic assets and the cause of Kashmir. If these come under threat it would be a worse situation for us.

On the other hand, we can re-emerge politically as a responsible and dignified nation and all our difficulties can be minimized. (Musharraf, 2001) (See Appendix B:4)

The President again makes use of Identification by referring to the separation of East Pakistan and equating that with the current situation. The current situation is referred to twice in the same Clause Complex with sensationally loaded modifiers as 'very critical situation' and 'the most critical period'. It is again referred to as a 'crisis' that is Complemented as 'formidable' and 'unprecedented'. All these Nominal groups and their Predicatives represent a very threatening situation and evoke the most tragic East Pakistan Frame in the history of Pakistan which resulted in a humiliating defeat of the Pakistan Army at the hands of the separatist elements in East Pakistan and the Indian Army.

This Identification clearly indicates a security threat that Pakistan may face at the hands of the Allied forces in case it does not comply with their demands. The Identification strategy is thus used for *Argumentation ad consequentium* to highlight the negative consequences of non-compliance. The 'consequences' are modified as 'worst' and 'negative' and they are said to threaten the 'integrity and solidarity' of Pakistan implying that Pakistan may disintegrate once again. This representation reflects that the President and his government are afraid of facing the consequences but the President tries to repel that impression by saying:

50) At this moment, it is not the question of bravery or cowardice. We are all very brave. My own response in such situations is usually of daring. But bravery without rational judgement is tantamount to stupidity. There is no clash between bravery and sound judgement. Allah Almighty says in the holy Quran. "The one bestowed with sagacity is the one who get a big favor from Allah". We have to take recourse to sanity. We have to save our nation from damage. We have to

build up; our national respect. "Pakistan comes first, everything else comes later"... (Musharraf, 2001) (See Appendix B:4)

The President seems to adopt a Defense Mechanism to avoid the embarrassment of bowing down before the US pressure and says that it does not mean that his government is playing a coward. He makes use of the Somatisation Referential strategy through Identification of bravery with 'stupidity' if bravery is without 'rational judgment'. It helps not only to defend his position but also to Somatise the Taliban and their supporters in Pakistan in a negative way who want to face the American music. To reinforce his defense he makes use of *Argumentum ad verecundium* by quoting from the Holy Quran about the importance of being rational. He then goes on to utter his most famous quote that was later turned into a political slogan to defend his policy regarding 'war on terror'. This can be termed as the Pakistan First Frame for the present analysis as it is an attempt to tackle the Security Threat Myth by arguing the safety of Pakistan as the top priority.

51) I am the Supreme Commander of Pakistan and I give top priority to the defense of Pakistan, Defense of any other country comes later. We want to take decisions in the interest of Pakistan. (Musharraf, 2001) (See Appendix B:4)

The PF frame negates every other political or strategic consideration when it comes to the security of Pakistan. By prioritizing Pakistan over 'everything else' allows for any U-turns or compromises in all government policies and every action of the government whether right or wrong becomes justified just by evoking this frame. This is what seems to have been done all these years after 9/11.

The President continues with *Argumentum ad verecundium* and *Argumentum ad populum* through the Religionization Referential strategies by referring to a few incidents from the life of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) to prove that his policy is not based on cowardice. If the Prophet could migrate from Makkah, or sign pacts with the Jews and Makkans on weaker footings than his government can do the same for the ultimate protection of Pakistan (See Appendix). For Muslims the sayings or actions (Sunnah) of the Holy Prophet are no less than the will of God and it becomes very difficult to refute an argument based on the Prophets Sunnah. Thus the President is making use of the same ideology of Islam to join a war against Afghanistan that was used in the previous era to defend Afghanistan. He uses many explicit Clause Complexes to assert his argument

52) Whatever we are doing, it is according to Islam and it upholds the principle of righteousness...

Even otherwise it is said in Shariah that if there are two difficulties at a time and a selection has to be made it is better to opt for the lesser one... .... Pakistan is considered a fortress of Islam. God forbid, if this fortress is harmed in any way it would cause damage to the cause of Islam.

(Musharraf, 2001) (See Appendix B:4)

Pakistan being a fortress of Islam is a popular Myth in Pakistan that originates from the Ideology of Pakistan as will be discussed in Chapter eight and the President makes good use of that Myth to enhance the Security Threat Myth. The President's speech seems a complete Privation of History to create all these Myths as it projects Pakistan using the Structural metaphor of a fortress and does not throw any light on the Taliban in Afghanistan who consider themselves to be the only truly Islamic government of the world. It does not say anything about the Jihad Dispositive and the role of Pakistan in it that culminated in the establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.



After President Musharraf speech, President Bush spoke to the Congress the next day on Sep 20, 2001 to elaborate his policy in the wake of 9/11 attacks. The speech begins with a Collectivization strategy by giving a new meaning to the State of Union address which normally refers to the address of the American President to the joint sessions of the American Congress.

- 53) We have seen the state of our Union in the endurance of rescuers, working past exhaustion. We have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers in English, Hebrew, and Arabic. We have seen the decency of a loving and giving people, who have made the grief of strangers their own. My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire world has seen for itself the state of our Union and it is strong. (Bush G. , 2001) (See Appendix B:5)

The whole extract uses 'the state of union' to refer to the courage, sacrifice and sympathy shown by the American Public after 9/11. All Clause Complexes begin with the First Person Deictics to stress upon the unity of the American nation. He employs the Actionalisation Referential strategy through Nominalization by making use of a series of verbal nouns (unfurling, lighting, giving, saying) followed by prepositional phrases. It hides the Actor and projects the action as a Nominal entity. He particularly mentions the 'saying of prayers' in three languages referring to the Christians, Jews and Muslims. This is to evoke at the outset the Myth that the war is not against the Muslims or Islam and to present the Muslims as equal victims and sympathizers in this catastrophe. The President goes on to declare 9/11 as an act of war:

- 54) On September the eleventh, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941... Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking:

Who attacked our country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al-Qaida... (See Appendix B:5)

The President converts 9/11 into an act of war and uses Identification to project it as similar to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The Pearl Harbor attack was a real act of war as it was committed by a real army that belonged to a country and they attacked the army of another country. 9/11 on the other hand was not such an attack by a regular army of a country and if Americans want to label it as a 'war' then they require the name of the enemy and a country that is to be attacked. That's why the President tries to defend his labeling by using a question statement on part of all Americans and then gives the answer himself that the name of that enemy is Al-Qaida.

He describes Al-Qaida as a Nominal group 'a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations' which means that Al-Qaida is not one formal militant organization. The description is significant by virtue of its ambiguity as it allows for the inclusion of as many organizations in as many countries as the US wishes to target. The enemy was thus baptized as Al-Qaida by the Americans themselves after 9/11 as described in Chapter 01. That, however, does not mean that the enemy was hypothetical but the Americans were now able to declare a war against an enemy named Al-Qaida that was spread all across the globe.

The President then goes on to establish the Myth that this war is not against Islam by saying:

55) The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics, a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam... I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world: We

respect your faith. It is practiced freely by many millions of Americans and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah... (See Appendix B:5)

The President describes the 'terrorists' behind 9/11 as followers of 'a fringe form of Islamic extremism' thus evoking the Alienation Frame. Both the Nominal groups are based on Negative Ideologisation as compared to the Positive Ideologisation of the II Frame in the Jihad Dispositive. To call it 'a fringe form of Islamic extremism' is to put it twice away from reality because to call it extremism is to put it away from the real Islam and to call it a 'fringe form' of that 'extremism' is to push it more towards the periphery. This 'extremism' is post-modified by a Relative Adjectival Clause that is based on *Argumentum ad verecundum* to reject this 'extremism' because it has been rejected by the Muslim 'scholars' and 'clerics'.

This dichotomy between 'scholars' and 'clerics' is also significant as clerics are generally perceived to be conservative as compared to scholars and that's why probably that clerics is pre-modified with 'vast majority' to Quantify their significance. The Clause Complex does not end here but adds an Apposition to describe that extremism as 'a fringe movement' which is further modified by another Relative Adjectival Clause based on Social Problematisation and *Argumentum ad hominem*. The Material Process 'pervert' turns the extremists into 'perverts' who are out to distort the teachings of Islam and the teachings of Islam are pre-modified as 'peaceful' and 'good' thus evoking the Alienation Frame.

The President then goes on to address the Muslim World directly through the second person Deictics to emphasize the Myth that the war is not against Islam. He continues with the process of alienation of the 'extremist' elements by calling their acts as 'evil' thus evoking the EF Frame

again in this speech. He in fact enhances the intensity of that evil with the use of the Behavioral Process 'blaspheme' which is something about which the Muslim world is emotional to the extent of insanity. He intensifies his Religionisation strategy further by using the name of 'Allah' instead of God because he wants to be clear that he is talking about the blasphemy against Allah, the God of Muslims.

56) Americans are asking: Why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other... (See Appendix B:5)

This extract again is an attempt at Privation of History as in the first speech above. The President is evoking the AD Frame to argue that the 'terrorists' hate us for our way of life, our liberties and our democratic system which are things they don't have themselves. He is making use of Argumentation strategy *Ignoratio elenchi* by saying things which are not relevant to the current discourse and the militants have probably never thought or expressed their views in those terms. He then goes on to make further use of Negative Ideologisation by saying

57) We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions by abandoning every value except the will to power they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism... (See Appendix B:5)

The President is again making use of Identification to create the Myth that these militants believe in an ideology which is similar to Fascism, Nazism and Totalitarianism of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. He pre-modifies 'ideologies' by 'murderous' and makes use of *Argumentum ad*

*hominem* to malign these militants as nothing more than murderers. The President also uses the term 'war on terror' for the first time and then goes on to draw a line between those who support this war and those who don't.

58) Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated...Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. (See Appendix B:5)

As Lakoff (2004) mentioned above the use of this phrase 'war on terror' is now not metaphorical but a well thought out actual war that will give the American President a license to intervene in any country that it deems is spreading terror. The way this phrase has been popularized since then, it seems quite absurd now to question the use of this term as it has become part of the common idiom and every nation either uses the same phrase or its translation to refer to whatever is happening under this label. Even those who are the targets of this war or are against this war use the same term and that is how modern propaganda actually works.

The phrase 'War on Terror' has two Presuppositions. The first one is that when one uses this term one seems to believe that an actual war between two or more countries is going on. The second is that you show your belief that the war is not against a country or a nation or a religion but against an abstract entity 'terrorism'. It may include all those militant movements as terrorist which may actually be movements for liberty from exploitation and occupation but because the Americans consider them as terrorist we also seem to become part of that propaganda. It can be and was adopted by Indians, Israelis and other such nations who are occupying foreign lands and facing resistance or liberation movements. It includes all those negative Frames that the

Americans associate with 'terrorism' and they keep getting reproduced even when the Americans are criticized for this 'war'.

The President then directly addresses all the nations of the world by using the second person Deictic to warn them in a dictatorial manner. He uses the either/or construction for the Clause Complex which is used to give choice between two different objects and does not leave room for a third option. The option in this case is to side with the Americans or with the 'terrorists'. That means you are not allowed to be neutral or non-aligned. It implies that the whole world is going to become a part of that war and they don't have a choice to stay away. The President is using *Argumentum ad baculum* to warn of the consequences of not siding with the Americans in this war. He is also making use of Relationalisation by giving a choice between a relationship of friendship or enmity.

The President also intensifies the Myth of Security Threat by saying:

59) This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom.

This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. (See Appendix B:5)

This evokes a similar Alarm Frame that was evoked repeatedly after the Soviet Intervention but this time the world needs to feel alarmed by the Islamic terrorists rather than the godless communists. There is a repetition of 'fight' in possessive constructions in short Clause Complexes to create a rhetorical effect. The construction 'civilization's fight' is significant as it may refer to the general meaning that it is the fight between being civilized and being barbaric but it can evoke the Clash of Civilizations Frame in the context of Samuel Huntington's famous

construct during the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In that context it is a similar kind of linguistic blunder that the President made during a press conference a few days back.

60) This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while. (Bush G. W., 2001)

The Clash of Civilization Frame and the Crusade Frame both are in conflict with the Myth of a war not against Islam. The Crusades were Christian wars against Islam for the capture of Jerusalem during the 11<sup>th</sup> century whereas the Clash of Civilizations theoretical construct prophesizes a future war between the Western and Islamic civilizations. By using 'war on terrorism' as an Appositive to the Crusades was a mistake that was criticized throughout the world and the White House had to issue clarifications in that regard.

Apart from complying with the dominant American discourse against the 'extremist' elements, Pakistan also continued with its own discourse on its decades old policy of a friendly government and strategic depth in Afghanistan. As discussed in the first chapter Pakistan did not have good relations with the various governments in Kabul before the Saur Revolution and all of those governments were dominated by the non-pakhtuns belonging to the North of Afghanistan. During the Jihad Dispositive Pakistan backed the predominantly Pukhtoon factions and when they were unable to get control of Kabul, Pakistan supported the predominantly Pukhtoon Taliban till 9/11 shattered their dream of Strategic Depth. This, however, was not the time to be assertive about that policy but we can find strands of that old bias towards the Northern Alliance in the political and media discourse even in those early days after 9/11. When there were reports about the American planning to arm the Northern Alliance against the Taliban for a ground offensive, Pakistan was quick to react to that news as Pakistan's foreign minister Abdul Sattar stated:

61) We are concerned to read reports that Afghan groups are asking for military assistance from the United States. Any such decision on the part of any world power will be a recipe of adding suffering to the Afghan people. Dawn. 26/9/2001 (See Appendix C:1)

Abdul Sattar does not name the groups and says that they have read reports which probably means media or intelligence reports and also says that it is these groups who are requesting American help and not that Americans want to use them for a ground offensive. This construction of the clause Complex blames the Northern Alliance instead of the Americans who were actually looking for such groups on ground. The decision to support the Alliance is represented as 'a recipe of adding suffering' for the Afghans by using a Social Problematisation Referential strategy and by using *Argumentum ad populum* to get popular support against Northern Alliance.

We find an interesting example of Intertextuality when Sattar refers to Afghan people as 'fiercely independent' which evokes the FI Frame of the Jihad Dispositive and then says:

62) They have never acquiesced to a proxy government imposed on them from the outside. This should be borne in mind in the future...Those who intervened and tried to plant their own preferred leaders in Afghanistan paid a very heavy price for that blunder...We ourselves are learning lessons and we will not commit such a blunder. Dawn. 26/9/2001 (See Appendix C:1)

The FI Frame of the Jihad Dispositive described the independent nature of the Afghan people by quoting examples from their past resistance of colonial powers but now this explanation is a bit different and is based on the Afghan civil war after the Soviet withdrawal. The statement clearly indicates the involvement of many outside powers including Pakistan in the bloody game of installing a friendly government in Afghanistan. The previous FI Frame referred to the



resistance of the Afghans to foreign aggression and occupation but now it also means no proxy governments. The Foreign Minister is making use of Inoculation by admitting to have learnt lessons after efforts to establish a friendly government in Afghanistan. This confession hides the blood-spattered past of Pakistan's involvement in that struggle and does not seem to be a sincere confession as Pakistan is involved in that game till the present day.

#### 6.2.2. Media Discourse:

It was quite natural for the media to have expressed grief over the tragic incident of 9/11 as it included the killings of many innocent civilians. The media however was also quick in understanding the delicacy of the situation and adjusted quite well to the shift in the political discourse in Pakistan. The editorial in Dawn on Sep 12, 2001 expressed that shock and also was quick in its defense as to why the blame should not be directed towards Osama or the Muslim 'extremists'. The perpetrators of 9/11 are condemned as 'criminal mind' and 'maniac bombers' through Social Problematisation. The editorial two days later also shows its full support to President Musharraf by saying that he acted 'promptly' and 'correctly' by offering cooperation to the US. In its editorial on Sep 16 titled 'Responding to the US demands' the Dawn describes the situation of Pakistan through a Statement of Fact which is a Myth generating tool through the use of proverbial language.

- 63) Without doubt, Pakistan is caught between the devil and the deep sea. On the one hand is the US and its determination to get at the elements and organizations behind last Tuesday's terrorist attacks. On the other are those sections of the domestic opinion which have a soft corner for the Taliban and do not consider them the devils that some of their actions make them out to be.  
Dawn, 16/9/2001 (See Appendix C:2)

The proverb 'between the devil and the deep blue sky' refers to a situation in which one is trapped between two choices that are equally bad or harmful. One of these choices is to cooperate with the US against those behind 9/11 but in doing so Pakistan will have to face the opposition of those forces who are sympathetic towards Taliban. These forces are represented as 'sections of domestic opinion' which is the use of *Secundum quid* to avoid mentioning the names of various parties and sections of government and society who sympathized with the Taliban. The editorial says that these forces do not consider Taliban to be 'the devils' which is a significant choice between the two labels in the proverb. Taliban could well have been referred to as the 'deep blue sea' and the US as 'the devil' but the editorial not only labels Taliban as 'devils' but also goes on to state that their actions prove them to be so. A similar Discourse Position is taken in another editorial titled 'Developing a Consensus' on Sep 18.

64) The military government is doing the right thing by trying to develop a consensus on how to face up to what indeed is a grave international crisis in which Pakistan has become a key player...There are also a couple of religious parties which have backed the Taliban to the hilt and agree with their extremist interpretation of Islam. Dawn, 18/9/2001 (See Appendix C:3)

The editorial appreciates the handling of the 'grave international crisis' by the government and then refers to the few religious parties who have been backing the Taliban 'to the hilt'. The what-clause is serving as a nominal group not only expressing the seriousness of the situation but also turns Pakistan into a 'player' through Structural metaphor 'politics is a game'. The statement seems to have some undertones of excitement at Pakistan's turning into a player which is pre-modified with 'key' to underscore the importance of Pakistan in the upcoming 'war on terror'.

It evokes all the Great Games of politics that have been played in this region by the super powers for a control of this region including the Soviet intervention and may be referred to as the Great Game Frame. It also makes use of a Privation of History by saying that it is only a couple of religious parties who have been backing the Taliban whereas as stated above Pakistan was among the only three countries to have recognized the Taliban government and its role in the creation of the Taliban is an open secret now. The editorial thus apart from the alienating of the Taliban also includes the alienating of those few religious parties who agree to their 'extremist views' thus evoking the Alienation Frame.

President Musharraf's address to the nation discussed above was welcomed by the Dawn editorial on Sep 21, titled 'National Interest comes first' which is an evocation of the PF Frame.

- 65) President Musharraf's address to the nation on Wednesday came across as a plain and simple message from a leader who believes in the justness of the cause he is espousing and the correctness of the policies he is pursuing. The speech was characterized by realism and constitutes an appeal to the people of Pakistan to look at the present crisis from the point of view of Pakistan's national interest. Dawn, 21/09/2001 (See Appendix C:4)

The language of this editorial is suggestive of being some explanatory notes to the text of the President's speech just like the editorials after the Soviet interventions resonated with the statements of Gen Zia at that time. The address is represented as 'plain and simple message' from a leader who is represented as straightforward and honest in his objectives through the post-modifying Relative Clause as a Predicational strategy. This relative clause describes the leader as the one who has a 'justness of the cause' where 'justness' being a Nominalization of the adjective 'just' is made the Head of the Nominal Group instead of 'cause' to highlight the quality

of that 'cause'. Same is done through the Nominalization 'correctness' in the succeeding Nominal Group.

The leader is described as having established a relationship with that 'cause' like a marriage through the use of a Structural metaphor evoked by 'espousing'. It implies a new relationship between Pakistan and the US which is based on loyalty and sacredness as is expected of a marriage. The last Clause Complex evokes the PF Frame through the Nationalization Referential strategy by referring to 'Pakistan's national interest'. The editorial goes on to make use of *Argumentation ad consequentium* to lend more support to the President's speech:

- 66) In the given context, the choice before Pakistan is between its enlightened self-interest and the ignominy and risks of isolation. The nation's choice should obviously be the first...Non-cooperation with the world coalition, led by the US, would not only mean political isolation, it would also pose a serious danger to what the President called Pakistan's "strategic assets". (See Appendix C:4)

The editorial presents two choices for Pakistan with a clear indication as to what should be the better choice. One choice is the 'enlightened self-interest' which again evokes the PF Frame. The self-interest is pre-modified by 'enlightened' which means an intellectual or spiritual understanding that siding with the US is our 'self-interest'. It also has metaphorical connotations as it refers to give or shed light on something to make it visible. The other choice is not to side with the USA and it is represented as 'ignominy' and 'isolation' which is a Somatisation Referential strategy. 'Ignominy' refers to a kind of humiliation and public shame.

The reference to the second choice makes use of Argumentation *ad consequentium* by pointing out the risk of 'isolation' from the world community. The next Clause Complex adds the threat to nuclear assets of Pakistan by not siding with the US as described by the President. The logic behind that is explained through *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc* Argumentation by assuming that if Pakistan does not side with the US, India will do that and then there will be Indian planes flying over Pakistan's territory to attack Afghanistan and there will be a chance that they may strike Pakistan's nuclear assets. The President did talk about the threat to the strategic assets but it is the editorial that explains how that threat can be materialized. The editorial further goes on to eulogize the President's speech by saying:

67) ...the Chief Executive illustrated how wisdom prevailed over emotions and how in the end there was victory for Islam...Anyone who loves Pakistan and believes in the motto of "Pakistan comes first" would approve of the decisions so far taken by the government in the matter. (See Appendix C:4)

The editorial praises President Musharraf's plea that wisdom should prevail over emotions by giving examples from the life of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) as discussed above. The editorial sums it up by saying that the present choice will also end in 'victory for Islam' just as it did during the Prophet's (PBUH) time. This evokes the II Frame of the old Jihad Dispositive so as to convey that siding with the US to invade and eliminate the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will ultimately bring 'victory to Islam'.

The next Clause Complex turns the words 'Pakistan comes first' used by President Musharraf into a motto and it became a most dominant phrase in the propaganda campaign of the Musharraf government. It is still in fact written on the insignia of the Musharraf's political party

All Pakistan Muslim League that he established after being forced to resign in 2009. The editorial presupposes that only those believing in this motto are the ones who love Pakistan and believing in this motto is not just believing in the literal sense of the phrase but to believe in everything being done in the name of this motto including the immediate decision to side with the US.

As discussed above the political discourse in Pakistan also focused on its own political interests in Afghanistan, the media discourse also seems to toe the same lines. In response to Mr. Abdul Sattar's statement on Northern Alliance discussed above the Dawn editorial on Sep 27 is significantly titled 'Backing the wrong horse in Afghanistan'. It is the Statement of the Fact in Barthes' terminology to make use of a proverb that metaphorically represents the Northern Alliance and other fighting factions as racing horses that are being backed by the Americans and other countries as if a game is taking place. The title also asserts the Northern Alliance as the wrong horse because it does not have the winning potential. The editorial approves of Sattar's warning by saying:

68) Pakistan has done well to caution the world against the hazards of arming the Northern Alliance...The Northern Alliance is seeking power for reasons of self-vindication and for no higher purpose. They think that they are the ones who waged Jihad against the Soviets and won and therefore it is they who are the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan. This view however is not shared by all sections of Afghanistan's polyglot population... Dawn, 27/9/2001 (See Appendix C:5)

The editorial fully approves Sattar's statement and calls the arming of the Northern Alliance a 'hazard' because the NA wants 'power' for 'self-vindication'. The editorial is thus making use

of Social Problematisation and Somatisation Referential strategies and *Argumentum ad hominem* to project a negative image of the NA. They are presented as having no higher mission than a mere lust of power. The NA comprised all those parties that waged the Jihad against the Soviets but the editorial tries to deny that privilege to them by making use of *Straw man* Fallacy. The assertion of the NA as the actual mujahideen is distorted by presenting it as their argument to grab power. The editorial does not tell as to who from the NA presented such arguments and then goes on to dismiss that argument by saying that it is not recognized by the 'polyglot' population of Afghanistan. The editorial thus makes use of Racialisation and Ethnification Referential strategies to prove that Afghanistan is a multilingual and multi-ethnic nation and NA is rejected by the majority of Afghans.

As discussed in chap 2, the modern media works in an imperceptible way to propagate the agendas that it may be following. In order to build its credibility it needs to present both sides of the picture in an objective and neutral way. It seemingly does so by a clever manipulation of the language being used and the post 9/11 discourse at various times, despite looking anti-Taliban and anti-American, may actually be defending or serving the purposes of both the entities. It is not a consistent pattern and the criticism of any entity depends on the demands of a situation in a particular moment or period of time. In its editorial titled 'Principle of self-esteem' on Oct 05, 2001, the Pakistan Times also tries to be objective while being partial.

69) Americans' war mania is at its peak...Afghanistan's or Taliban's Amirul Momineen Mulla Muhammad Omar who, according to the western media is ignorant of global affairs, still does not believe that the United States would go for a war with Taliban-led Afghanistan. Pakistan Times, 5/10/2001- (See Appendix C:6)

The American discourse in a post-9/11 situation is described as 'war mania' using Social Problematisation strategy to present the American war policy in negative terms. Quickly, however, the editorial moves on to represent the Taliban in a negative way as well to give an air of neutrality to the argument. Using the title 'Amirul Momineen' is satirical as it was a title used in the early Islamic period by the Caliphs of Islam and no modern Muslim ruler uses it anymore. The Taliban have started using it to identify themselves with the pioneers of Islam. Mullah Omar is further pre-modified with the possessives 'Afghanistan's or Taliban's' thus creating a question mark on the identity of Mullah Omar as the ruler of the Afghan nation or the Taliban only.

The editorial thus evokes the Alienation Frame through Primitivisation and Nationalisation Referential strategies. This Alienation continues with the post-modifying embedded clause representing Mullah Omar through Somatisation as a semi-literate or 'ignorant' person who is unable to understand the seriousness of American intentions. The last Nominal group 'Taliban-led Afghanistan' pre-modified by a Compound Adjective also evokes the Alienation Frame by saying that the war is only against that Afghanistan which is led by Taliban.

The editorial is quite unique in that instead of the routine declarative mode of writing it comprises about 11 long questions some of which probably require answers but most have a rhetorical function and they either don't require an answer or they are answering the preceding questions. This is a clever way of criticizing the American intentions of invading Afghanistan in an indirect way. Instead of saying that the Americans are being insolent and irresponsible and want to turn Afghanistan into their fiefdom, the editorial conveys the entire message through a series of questions to decrease the intensity of the criticism and also to give the impression that the Taliban are not being defended. The editorial asks a question regarding the kind of response



that the Americans wanted from the Taliban and then asks a series of questions not only to describe that response but also to ask whether it was appropriate.

70) Should the Afghans or the dominating Taliban faction succumb forthright to all the demands of the United States and its Allies? Does any sovereign nation, whatever its small size, in terms of resources, geography, or clout in global politics, respond so slavishly and obsequiously even if its people are not accustomed to an extremely independent lifestyle typical of Afghans? Isn't it naïve to expect such submissiveness from a nation, whatever the grievances against that nation or the offences committed by its rulers or their protégés? Pakistan Times, 5/10/2001 (See Appendix C:6)

The Taliban are distinguished from the Afghans as a nation by using Nationalisation Referential strategy and are represented as only a 'faction' that is currently dominating the scene. So the Alienation Frame is at work even when trying to defend the Taliban. The first question requires an answer as to whether the Taliban should yield completely to the demands of the West but the second one is a Rhetorical question which does not require an answer. The question itself is an answer to the first question in an indirect way. The editor probably forgets the distinction it created earlier between the Taliban and the Afghans and now makes use of Identification to compare Taliban with a hypothetical 'sovereign nation'.

This nation is described as weak by all means by post-modifying it with an adjectival phrase and is also not used to live as independently as the Afghans. This again evokes the FI Frame and the elaborate description of that hypothetical nation is to defend the attitude of the Taliban who are being forced to behave 'slavishly and obsequiously'. The third question is also Rhetorical and condemns the American policy through Somatisation as 'naïve' if they think they can force

the Fiercely Independent Taliban to surrender in an insulting way. There are some further Rhetorical questions targeting the Americans like:

71) Hasn't the world today totally changed considerably from the world of fiefdoms and serfdoms of yore at least in the context of peaceful coexistence, every nation being given ample opportunity to survive without any risk of invasion or naked aggression?...doesn't the US and other states of the West claim to be highly civilized and tolerant towards others' existence and advancements? Taliban's crime that the West thinks they have committed by protecting terrorists may be unpardonable but what about the violation of the basic principle of self-esteem that forms the axis of international relations? Pakistan Times, 5/10/2001- (See Appendix C:6)

The first two questions have Implicatures that Americans are looking for 'fiefdoms and serfdoms' and that they are not 'civilized' and 'tolerant'. These are followed by a declarative that admits the 'crime' of Taliban to evoke Alienation Frame but also makes use of *Argumentum ad misericordiam* to evoke sympathies for Taliban when there seems no room for that in the given situation. It also makes use of Politicisation by referring to the 'principle of self-esteem' and refers to it as 'the axis of international relations' which metaphorically projects it as the most important principle. By calling the American attitude a 'violation' of that principle is to make use of *Trajectio in ailium* to throw the blame of everything on the US.

After taking a reaction time of one month the American jets started pounding targets in Afghanistan on Oct 07, 2001, with the ground offensive being left to the Taliban opposition forces. This time was probably taken by the US to plan its offensive and not to think whether they should attack Afghanistan or not. Despite Taliban's offer to hand over Osama bin Laden to a third country the Americans were not ready to settle on anything less than a bloodbath for the

Afghan nation. They even went on to say that the 'war on terror' may extend to some other countries like Iraq, Syria, Libya and other states declared as 'rogue states'. This proved that the Myth propagated by the American and Pakistani political discourse after 9/11 that it will not be a war against Islam proved to be lip-service only. The incidents of violence against Muslims in the Western world and the reaction of the Muslim world against indiscriminate bombing of civilian population in Afghanistan seemed to indicate that 9/11 had divided the world on religious lines and that 'war on terror' was in fact a war against Islam.

The political discourse in Pakistan was still careful but the Pakistan media was probably not ready to buy the Myth that it was not a war against Islam. The Pakistan Times in its editorial titled 'Self-restraint is the answer' on Oct 10 defines the conflict as follows:

- 72) Therefore quite obviously it is a fight between prosperity and poverty, haves and have-nots and certainly between 'the people whose faith in the Creator is greater than their rivals' faith in the worth of power and pelf. For the materialist world that is the Western world, the repeated, avowed reliance of Taliban functionaries on Allah the Almighty alone for their survival in their fight against the powerful alliance led by the United States, appears to be a case of self-deception. In fact, it is not. Pakistan Times, 10/10/2001- (See Appendix C:7)

The beginning of the first Clause Complex is interesting as the editorial, despite presenting it as a war between religions, also seems to evoke the American Dream Frame as discussed above. This is an Intertextual influence from the American political discourse that the Muslim world is against the West because it is backward, poor and feels jealous of the prosperity of the Western world. The editorial goes on to make a comparison between the Muslim and the Western societies on the basis of their 'faith'. It evokes the same conflict as was between the Islamic

Ideology and Communist Ideology Frames of the Jihad Dispositive but now the CI Frame is replaced by a Materialism Frame that is associated with the Western world.

The Materialism Frame includes a representation of the Western society to be based on a lust for power and wealth and they are ready to get these two by using any means available. They cannot be termed as atheists like the Communists because they are 'the people of the book' and the Materialism Frame does not have the same potential as the CI Frame to represent the Western world as a society of infidels but the editorial makes an attempt to do that by juxtaposing the faith of the Muslims in their God with the faith of the West in 'power and pelf'. This is an attempt at Identification in Althussarian terms to present the Western society in similar terms as the Communists were projected in the Jihad Dispositive.

The editorial seems to suggest that the West is unable to understand the strength of the belief in a 'Creator' as being logical because they believe in material progress to be the only source of strength. The next Clause Complex is clearer in putting 'western world' in Apposition to 'materialist world' through a post-modifying that-clause. The 'materialist world' is a Negative Ideologisation Referential strategy for the Western world that has a reliance on material strength and it is juxtaposed with the 'repeated, avowed reliance' of the 'Taliban functionaries' on 'Allah the Almighty alone' for their 'survival'.

Pre-modifying that reliance with 'repeated, avowed' is to stress the confidence and trust of the Taliban in that Force and that force is referred to as 'Allah' to evoke the II Frame through Religionisation strategy. The West considers it as 'self-deception' and the editorial asserts in a short but confident Clause complex that it is not. The language of the editorial suggests that the indiscriminate killing of civilians by the American jets during the past three days and the

American threat of extending the war to other Islamic countries has probably let loose the pent up emotions of the cautious media discourse since 9/11. The editorial goes on to reject the construct of 'the clash of civilizations' as untrue:

- 73) In this particular perspective, the clash of beliefs that is higher in degree and form than the trumpeted and oft-discussed clash of civilizations, has materialized in concrete terms and is likely to take any turn in the foreseeable future. Pakistan Times, 10/10/2001 (See Appendix C:7)

The editorial projects the 'war on terror' as an ideological and religious war rather than a cultural one as civilization is predominantly cultural rather than religious. It is a 'clash of beliefs' between Allah and material sources as a source of strength. It evokes the II Frame but it evokes a particular II Frame associated with the political discourse of the Taliban who believed that if the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and his companions could defeat the super powers of their time with inadequate resources and without material strength, they can also do the same. They were in fact emboldened by the victory they achieved against the Soviets and thought that that they could do the same to the Americans. This may be called the Taliban Islamic Ideology Frame and the editorial seems to evoke the same by calling it a clash of the Islamic and the materialistic beliefs.

The Dawn editorial on the same day is critical of America for its threat to extend the 'WoT' to other Islamic countries and that's why it is titled as 'A dangerous idea'.

- 74) The end result would not only be war and chaos in the Middle East; the fight against terrorism may degenerate into a worldwide conflict on religious lines. This could throw the world back into medieval times. Dawn, 10/10/2001 (See Appendix C:8)

The editorial talks about the 'strong anti-Muslim slant of American policies' regarding countries like Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and uses *Argumentation ad consequentium* to evoke the Alarm Frame for the whole Muslim World. The 'WoT' is anticipated to 'degenerate' into a World War on 'religious lines'. 'Degenerate' refers to moving to an inferior state of being and thus creates a Presupposition that WoT is a kind of legitimate war for a noble cause which can turn into a degenerated world war. The last Clause Complex evokes the Crusade Frame by referring to the wars between Christians and Muslims as discussed above in Bush's speech.

Thus the Myth of Security Threat in the Terror Dispositive is mutual between the Islamic world and the West and both express apprehensions regarding each other to justify their decisions and actions. The Pakistan Times editorial titled 'Saviour of the world' on Oct 11, 2001 also evokes the Alarm Frame on the news that the US wants to extend 'WoT' to other countries. The title is ironic as it satirically represents the US as posing to be the Saviour of the world when it actually wants to wreak havoc. After saying that the West perceives all Muslim states 'with contempt and suspicion for harboring terrorism' the editorial goes on to say:

75) In fact, the Western perception of Muslims is highly jaundiced. It should rather be termed total misperception about the Muslims living a lifestyle different from the irreligious multitude of people inhabiting the so called advanced and refined Western world. Pakistan Times, 11/10/2001  
(See Appendix C:9)

The editorial calls that perception of the West as 'jaundiced' which is a Pathologisation Referential strategy for condemnation by using an Ontological metaphor- personifying the American perception as suffering from Jaundice. The editorial goes on to call it a 'misperception' about the Muslims living a religious life as compared to the west represented as

an 'irreligious multitude' that again evokes the Materialism Frame as discussed above. The 'advanced and refined Western world' is pre-modified with 'so-called' to represent that advancement and refinement as fake if they are not able to understand the Islamic way of life.

Two days later the Pakistan Times gets more emotional after fresh reports of civilian casualties going beyond 500.

76) But why doesn't the American administration and the Western leaders intoxicated with power fever understand that all their military options are going to add to Afghan people's sufferings. What more devastation the US is willing to bring to Afghanistan? And how will Washington absolve itself of this crime against humanity? Pakistan Times, 13/10/2001- (See Appendix C:10)

All three are Rhetorical questions meant to criticize the 'military option' as a solution to the problem of 'terrorism'. The American and the Western leaders are post modified as 'intoxicated with power fever'. This is again a use of Pathologisation strategy for a negative representation but the use of 'fever' after power seems a Performance Error as fevers are not intoxicating and it would have been appropriate to use 'intoxicated' with 'power' only. Performance Errors can occur in the use of language because of being in a hurry, being tired or being emotional etc. The editor is probably too angry and wants to show utmost disdain of the Western leadership. 'What more devastation' implies a Presupposition that the US had a role in the previous devastation in Afghanistan and it should not bring more. The last question uses Criminalisation strategy to refer to the killings as a 'crime against humanity' which is also the title of the editorial.

As against that the Dawn newspaper despite being critical about America seems to take a Discourse Position that is less emotional as compared to the Pakistan Times. When Bush made

an offer to the Taliban to hand over Osama Bin Laden, the editorial was quick in giving a sane piece of advice to the Taliban.

- 77) Given the gravity of situation, the Bush offer is not something that should be brushed aside brusquely or rejected out of hand as a propaganda stunt. In fact, if it is a propaganda ploy of 'sweet reasonableness' then the Taliban have an excellent chance of exposing it to be so by grabbing the offer. Dawn, 14/10/2001- (See Appendix C:11)

The 'Bush offer' is said to be something not to be 'brushed aside' as something insignificant. The Phrasal Verb is post-modified with 'brusquely' which means 'discourteously blunt' and seems an apt representation of the attitude of the Taliban at that time. As if one description of that attitude was not enough another description 'rejected out of hand' is used to refer to the rejections made earlier by the Taliban. The editorial advocates that it should not be considered as a propaganda trick of 'sweet reasonableness' which is a reference to the Christian virtue of gentleness without weakness or compromise on truth (Wiersbe, 2001). The editorial goes on to say that even if it is a fake posture of a Christian virtue it should be exposed by the Taliban by accepting the offer and then it will be clear as to whether the Americans are sincere or not. The editorial goes on to toe the lines of the American and US political discourse that the attack is focusing on 'military targets'.

- 78) While air strikes have focused on military targets, there has been a considerable loss of civilian lives. Unavoidable though the "collateral damage" in every war is, the civilian casualties have added to the plight of a people who have already been victims of war for more than two decades. 'Another chance for the Taliban' Dawn Ed 14/10/2001- (See Appendix C:11)



The dependent clause beginning with the coordination conjunction 'while' is put in the beginning to stress the idea and the independent clause is pushed towards the end to lessen the impact of the killing of civilians. The same strategy continues in the second Clause Complex by putting the Complement 'unavoidable' in the position of the subject is to stress the unavoidability of the 'Collateral damage'.

The Dawn editorial on Oct 15, 2001 titled 'Impudent and Ostrich-like' couldn't, however, resist being emotional on the news that New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani rejected the Aid from a Saudi Prince that carried an advice for the US to rethink its policies regarding Muslims as terrorism is a result or reaction of those policies. The editorial criticized Giuliani's statement in the following words:

- 79) The sentiments expressed there perfectly capture the self-righteous arrogance that has long been the hallmark of US foreign policy...For Giuliani and others like him, it is far more comforting to view the perpetrators of such acts as evil barbarians motivated solely by envy for the American way of life and its power and affluence. In his obsessively self-righteous mindset, no vaguely rational motivation can be allowed. To detach history from events of this nature has the benefit of conveniently denying one's own culpability, direct or indirect, in a crime. Dawn , 15/10/2001- (See Appendix C:12)

The editorial represents the statement as an expression of 'self-righteous arrogance' which is again a Pathologisation strategy to indicate an attitudinal problem. Giuliani, being taken as a Representative of the whole West, is presented as a 'self-righteous mindset' that likes to put the blame on others to avoid thinking about one's own 'culpability' in the 'crime' of 'terrorism'. That's why the editorial has been given the title 'Impudent and Ostrich-like'. It suggests that the

West is not only 'impudent' towards the Islamic world but is also behaving like the Ostrich that hides its head in sand in the face of danger.

This Compound-Adjective made out of a Simile is used for those who refuse to recognize the obvious reality which in this case is the American anti-Islamic policy as the root-cause of 'terrorism'. The editorial also rejects the American Dream Frame as evoked by Bush to lay the blame on Muslims as being 'evil barbarians' who are jealous of the American prosperity. It also criticizes the EF Frame from an American perspective and the Primitivization of Muslims as 'barbarians'. The proposition is presented as a 'comforting' Defense Mechanism to avoid the bitter truth behind events like 9/11. The editorial describes it as an attempt to 'detach history' from 9/11 which is the Privation of History in Althussarian terms. The editorial goes on to give examples from the blemished history of the US in this regard:

80) The US has steadfastly refused to see any connection between its self-serving policies and actions and the reaction they provoke. It has sponsored despots of every kind, backed thuggish regimes, condoned horrendous massacres and destabilized and overthrown democratically elected governments from Indonesia to Chile, and from Nicaragua to Iran and beyond. Dawn, 15/10/2001- (See Appendix C:12)

The Americans apart from being 'self-righteous' are now also represented as self-centered through their 'self-serving' policies and denying those 'steadfastly' as the cause behind 'terrorism'. The next Clause Complex describes a series of such policies using negative Referential strategies like sponsoring 'despots' and 'thuggish regimes', ignoring 'horrendous massacres' and overthrowing democratic governments in many countries. All the Nouns and their modifiers belong to the Somatisation and Criminalisation Referential strategies and both the

above extracts make use of *Argumentum ad hominem* to project the darker side of the global policies of the US.

The daily Dawn, however, soon recovered from that emotional charge and welcomed the meeting between President Musharraf and US Secretary of State Collin Powell and titled its editorial as 'A meeting of minds' which is a Pun on the 'meeting' as being a meeting between two leaders but also an identity of views on Afghanistan and Kashmir.

81) The world has realized what terrorism is...More important the world coalition has clearly seen the difference between terrorists and freedom fighters, whether in Palestine or in Kashmir. A meeting of minds'. Dawn, 18/10/2001- (See Appendix C:13)

What the editorial really welcomes is the mention of Kashmir by Powell as the 'central' issue between India and Pakistan and that leads the editor to conclude that the world understands 'what terrorism is' which is a Rhetorical question serving as a Nominal Clause and its answer obvious . It further concludes that the world knows the difference between 'terrorists' and 'freedom-fighters' although both may be doing the same kind of things like killing and destruction by covert means.

The editor also concludes from that statement that the Kashmiris and Palestinians are 'freedom-fighters' through a post-modifying Adverbial but it again does not use any modifiers with 'terrorists' which again is an Implicature that it is what is happening in Afghanistan that is 'terrorism' and it is Al-Qaeda and Taliban who are 'terrorists'. All these conclusions have been drawn by the editor from Powell's statement by using the Strawman Fallacy as calling Kashmir

to be the central issue does not entail all these conclusions and how can the US think that the Palestinians are freedom-fighters.

The decision to join the coalition for 'WoT' and to become a part of the Terror Dispositive seems to have the support of the Pakistan media despite its anti-American rhetoric. The Pakistan Times in its editorial on Oct 16, 2001 titled 'Anti-American demonstrations' talks about the misunderstandings regarding the concept of Jihad as the main reason behind the anti-American protests by various religious parties in Pakistan and in some other Islamic countries.

82) There are many interpretations of this religious duty enjoined upon Muslims, most of the scholars suggesting that Jihad becomes obligatory only if a Muslim community or state is attacked by non-believers that means the pagans having no faith in any of the chief religions... Here the country needs the support of all the learned people to come forward and guide the masses about the true meaning of Jihad. Pakistan Times, 16/10/2001- (See Appendix C:14)

It is interesting to note that after having said that there are many interpretations of Jihad, the editorial comes up with just one of those interpretations. That interpretation is said to be suggested by 'most of the scholars' which gives it an air of authenticity. The interpretation that is given allows Jihad only against the non-believers of the main religions and has thus a significant Implicature as it excludes the US and its Allies as potential targets of any Jihad because they are the People of the Book and are not like the atheistic Soviets. Towards the end, the editorial states that it is the duty of the scholars to guide the masses about the 'true meaning of Jihad' which has a Presupposition that the people don't know the true meaning and are being misguided.

The daily Dawn titled its editorial on Oct 26, 2001 as 'reining in the militants' which converts the militants into animals through Structural metaphor 'militants are animals'. The title suggests that militants are to be controlled just as animals are controlled by pulling their reins and it evokes the Alienation Frame. The editorial welcomes Islamabad's request to the Taliban not to allow Pakistanis to join their ranks for the defense of their government against the American attack. The term 'militant' as defined by various dictionaries is a neutral term used for someone engaged in armed conflict for a cause. The extensive use of this term to refer to the Muslims engaged in different sorts of combats has somehow given it negative connotations of being almost synonymous with 'terrorist'. That's why the 'militants' engaged in militancy in Pakistan do not like to be referred to as 'militants' in the media and still like to be identified as Mujahids and 'Shaheed' in case they die.

- 83) Helping the people of Afghanistan in their freedom struggle was one thing; letting some religious organizations run the show themselves quite another. The man who created this Frankenstein was Ziaul Haq. He let them open camps and recruit Pakistanis for the 'holy war' against the Soviet Union without realizing that one day these groups and organizations would become a government within government. Dawn, 26/10/2001- (See Appendix C:15)

The editorial talks about the evolution of militancy from helping the Afghan 'freedom struggle' to the present day terrorism. The Nominal group 'Helping the people of Afghanistan in their freedom struggle' projects the Jihad Dispositive as a noble cause of helping a freedom struggle and makes use of Privation of history by not presenting it as a Cold War phenomenon. 'Helping' 'Afghan people' and 'freedom struggle' are references based on Collectivisation, Victimisation and positive Politicisation strategies. These are juxtaposed with another dependent clause that presents the current militancy as a different reality from the earlier one and that

reality is presented as a 'show' being produced and directed by 'some religious organizations' which is now the use of negative Politicisation and Religionisation strategy. The clause implies that it is a different reality because the present 'show' is not being produced and directed by the US and its Allies as was the case during the Jihad Dispositive.

The editorial goes on to refer to militancy as a 'Frankenstein' created by Gen Zia. This is a reference to Mary Shelley's novel of the same title. Victor Frankenstein was actually the name of the scientist in that novel who created a monster that went out of his control to destroy his life. Thus the name 'Frankenstein' may probably be used for Gen Zia instead of militancy but as the term has become part of the English idiom to refer to the monster so the usage seems appropriate over here as well. The militants are thus labeled as Frankenstein or 'monster' which is a negative Social Problematisation strategy that evokes a Frame of a monster which is out to destroy its own creator. This may be termed as the Frankenstein Frame and can be said to be a part of the Alienation Frame as discussed above to marginalize the militants to a pariah status. By dehumanizing the militants the editorial is making use of *Argumentum ad hominem* to malign the militants as social outcasts.

The editorial keeps making fun of the Jihad Dispositive by referring to it as the 'holy war' in single quotation marks which are used to distinguish a word or phrase by virtue of its being controversial or debatable. It is the same war that was actually considered 'holy' during the Jihad Dispositive but now it is enveloped in quotation marks to demystify it as a political ploy. The editorial makes use of *Trajectio in ailium* to blame Gen Zia for allowing these organizations to train militias to fight against the Soviet Union whereas it was not just him but the whole Islamic Ummah, the US and Allies and above all it was the media both western and Pakistani as

discussed in the previous chapter that eulogized these militants and glorified their struggle as Jihad during that time.

The editorial goes on further to condemn those religious parties I Pakistan which are encouraging youth to join the Taliban in their defense against America.

84) This gradual assertion of governmental authority and the process of reining in the militias should continue. Some of the religious parties involved in the anti-Soviet war may be quite well-meaning, but many of them have tasted the heady brew of street power and on occasions feel strong enough to defy the government's writ. Dawn, 26/10/2001- (See Appendix C:15)

The editorial makes use of the metaphor 'militants are animals' just as its title suggests as discussed above and approves of the governmental efforts to control these elements. It condemns those parties that are encouraging the youth to cross over the borders to join the Taliban but begins by praising 'some' religious parties that were part of the anti-Soviet 'war'. It seems just a balancing act as no names of such parties are given and the use of 'well-meaning' makes it an ambiguous statement as to how those parties are well-meaning. The editorial then calls the non-compliant religious parties as having 'tasted the heady brew of street power' which represents the militants as arrogant because of their street power but this done through the use of the structural metaphor 'militants are drunkards'. This again evokes the Alienation Frame through Social Problematisation strategy.

### **6.3. Discussion and Conclusion:**

The analysis of the American intervention in Afghanistan shows that there is a shift in the political and media discourse although it is a similar kind of intervention as the Soviets did about

two decades ago. During the Soviet intervention the political and media discourse was condemning the attack on Afghanistan but now it seems to be producing a supportive discourse for the American invasion.

Both the American and the Pakistani Presidents are making a Privation of history just as it was done after the Soviet intervention. Whereas at that time the Soviet intervention was presented as a war against Islam instead of being a Cold War confrontation, the event of 9/11 is now being represented as an act based on jealousy for the American way of life. The militants are now represented as a satanic evil force just as the Soviets were then represented as evil infidels. The American President through his speech consistently evokes the EF Frame by making use of *Argumentum ad verecundum* by quoting from Bible and trying to turn the conflict again into a religious obligation.

President Musharraf in the same way makes use of *Argumentum ad verecundum* by quoting from Quran and Sunnah to justify his governments U-turn on their Afghan policy in the face of American threats. He also evokes the Pakistan First Frame as a face-saving act and to pave the way for any compromises that may have to be made under the US pressure. He is also vocal on alienating the militants as not representing Islam by evoking the Real Islam Frame. He clearly denies the American intervention to be a war against Islam and advocates a rational instead of an emotional response to it.

Both the Presidents project 9/11 as an act of war and both try to foreground it as a threat to global security. They consistently evoke the Alarm Frame through their use of language to sensitize the world about the threat and to garner support for a collective action against religious militancy. The Pakistani political discourse also, however, seems to have the undertones of its



strategic depth policy towards Afghanistan as it does not want to see its role wiped out in any future negotiations. It does not seem to be a complete compliance of the American dictates and Pakistan seems to be making an attempt to develop an independent discourse of its own within the largely compliant discourse regarding religious militancy.

The media discourse, immediately after 9/11, seems to fully endorse and espouse the Terror Dispositive as initiated by the American and Pakistani political discourse. The editorials also try to follow the rational response advocated by Musharraf and harp on the same Pakistan First Frame. It is the similar pattern that was followed after the Soviet intervention when the Pakistani political and media discourse espoused the Jihad Dispositive initiated by the Americans. The editorials represent the militants as devils and animals by using many Social Problematization strategies and *Argumentum ad hominem*.

It is, however, unlike the Jihad Dispositive, not a completely compliant discourse with the US or Pakistani political discourse. The immediate post-9/11 discourse was short-lived as the indiscriminate bombardment on Afghanistan and later the American threat to attack more Islamic countries produced a strong reaction in the Pakistani media discourse. The editorials are full of the anti-American rhetoric regarding its brutal killing and destruction in Afghanistan and attempts are made to expose the Myth that it is not a war against Islam. By evoking the Frankenstein Frame, they also come up with arguments that try to shatter the Privation of History in the political discourse and expose the fact that this militancy is the result of the Jihad Dispositive.

The media response to the US intervention is also different because it is a somewhat different media from the one that we had in 1980. The newspapers are the same but the

environment is different and there is less stringent control on the media in a post-9/11 situation as compared to the iron-hand of the Zia regime on the media. That is why the media can go anti-American unlike the one during the earlier era. However, despite the anti-American rhetoric, the media on the other hand seems to have espoused the Terror Dispositive and represents religious militancy through negative Appraisement.

## Chapter 07: The Myth of Talibanisation and the Terror Dispositive

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This chapter will take into consideration the media discourse regarding the Myth of the 'Talibanisation' of Pakistan in a post 9/11 scenario. The political discourse has not been taken into consideration as it almost remained the same as described in the previous chapter except that the mutual distrust between the US and Pakistani leadership grew with the passage of time as will be revealed by the analysis of a statement of Richard Armitage in this chapter. The rest of the chapter analyzes the editorials from the Dawn and The News on the two Discursive Events of the Waziristan Operation and the Lal Masjid Operation.

Talibanisation, as described in Chapter One, was a Pre-9/11 phenomenon but it became a real threat for Pakistan after the collapse of the Taliban government in Kabul. The Taliban were no match to the superior might of the Coalition forces and thousands got killed or captured whereas the rest along with the foreign fighters belonging to various countries went into hiding along the porous Pak-Afghan and Afghan-Iran borders. These areas were quite familiar to these fighters as they had spent two decades there, fighting the Soviets and later during the civil war.

The foreign fighters had in fact married local women and some of them had started living peaceful lives with their families but many of them remained committed to their 'Jihad' against the new Afghan government and the Coalition forces. That is why soon after 9/11 Pakistan had started receiving pressure from the Afghan government and the US to go after these elements in the tribal areas. Pakistan as usual had to comply and a series of operations started that have continued for more than a decade now. It was, however, not a complete compliance as Pakistan

allegedly kept supporting some elements of the Taliban and kept fighting with the other factions at the same time.

Some of these groups also started establishing the Taliban-style code of Islamic law in the tribal areas where they were hiding and slowly their influence started reaching the settled districts of Pakistan. The Lal Masjid episode in 2007 was a shocking incident that alarmed the whole world that Talibanisation has managed to reach the Capital Islamabad. That is why this study has chosen these two important DEs for an analysis of their representation.

### **7.1. The Waziristan Operations 2003-04:**

With a minimal success in the decade old 'war on terror' there has been consistent blame game going on between the various stake-holders of this conflict. The American and the Afghan Governments think that despite being an ally in the 'war on terror' Pakistan is not sincerely doing what it can potentially do to stop militancy in Afghanistan. That's why the American political discourse has consistently been dominated by a 'Do More' rhetoric against successive Pakistani governments.

Pakistan on the other hand is presenting itself as the actual victim of this war because of more than 30000 casualties and grave losses in economy. The Pakistani government, media and intelligentsia seem to be going through a sort of disillusionment because of the ostensibly thankless job of being the allies in 'WoT'. This has produced, in Pakistan, a very critical discourse on the American role in the actual creation of these 'terrorists' who were at that time represented as 'mujahideen'. Both of these viewpoints are to be labeled as the 'Do More Frame' and 'the Frankenstein Frame' as described in the previous chapter.

Although the hunt for the 'extremist' elements had begun soon after the defeat of the Taliban but the first major operation in Waziristan was launched in September 2003 and was intensified after the visit of US deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to Pakistan in October when he said:

85) I personally believe President Musharraf is intent on being supportive of President Karzai... but I do not think that affection for working with us extends up and down the rank and file of the Pakistani security community. (See Appendix B:6)

This is a statement that revealed the mistrust of the Americans in the sincerity of the Pakistan government and military regarding the WoT. The statement begins by praising the commitment of President Musharraf but goes on to say that probably the Army under his command is not committed to the Americans. It has an Implicature that some sections of the Army are not obeying their Commander and that they may be independently pursuing their own agenda. Thus despite praising President Musharraf, the Implicature amounted to his insult by implying that the army is bypassing the Commander-in-chief. That is why the Pakistan foreign Office was quick in responding to the statement in a straightforward manner (See Appendix B:6).

The daily Dawn in its editorial titled 'troubled frontier' on Oct 4, 2003 talked about Armitage's statement in the following way.

86) Pakistan, for instance, should try to ascertain the meaning of US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's claim that not all sections of our establishment are behind the government in the war on Al Qaeda. The Pakistan foreign office spokesman has hotly denied this, but more may need to be done to remove misgivings abroad. As for Afghanistan, it must set its house in order. Troubled Frontier- (See Appendix B:8)

The editorial is suggesting the government to try to understand the meaning of Armitage's statement instead of emotionally denying it. It suggests that there is more to it than the apparent meaning and it has a presupposition that the government has not been able to understand it. The editorial seems to agree with Armitage's statement and rephrases it through a Scalar Implicature<sup>10</sup> 'not all' which implies that some or few sections of our establishment may be working against the 'war against Al Qaeda'.

The editorial also advises the government to remove the misunderstandings of the Americans instead of a heated reply. WoT is labeled as 'war on Al Qaeda' which seems an appropriate label because the Waziristan operations were focusing only on the foreign elements in the tribal areas and the Talibanisation of the tribal areas was at a nascent stage and not a force to reckon with. The locals only came under consideration as they were hosting and helping those foreign elements.

The News in its editorial titled 'The Osama Game' on Sep 05, 2003 writes about the ongoing hunt for Osama and represents it as a 'game' probably referring to the hide and seek game.

87) While one refers to the ongoing military operations to catch the elusive billionaire turned Afghan mujahid turned a bete noire for United States, the other by the minister evidently caters to the civilian side of our government's current predominant concern... This is the right spirit for an interior minister whose duty it is to catch international or home-grown criminals, but one hopes that more of that spirit will be shown on the ground. The News, 5/09/2003 (See Appendix B:7)

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<sup>10</sup> Scalar Implicatures are communicated by choosing a word expressing one value from a scale of values and when one word is chosen from the scale, the negative of all other values is implied e.g. choosing 'some' would imply 'not all' 'not many' 'not most'. (Yule, 2008)

The extensively loaded Nominal group referring to Osama reflects the evolution in his identity during the past two decades. He was merely a 'billionaire' before coming to Afghanistan and then he became a 'Mujahid' and now he is a 'bete noire' for the US. It is a use of three different Referential strategies for the same person. 'Billionaire' is Professionalisation, 'Mujahid' is Religionisation/Militarisation and 'bete noire' is Social Problematisation/Somatisation as it is a French word meaning 'black beast' and is used for a detestable person. Thus his most recent representation is a dehumanization or a demonization and the editorial goes on further to complement the Interior minister for doing everything to hunt the 'black beast'. Describing the job of the minister to catch international or national criminals has also a Conversational Implicature which turns Osama into a criminal as well through Criminalisation strategy.

The daily Dawn in its editorial titled 'Operations in tribal belt' dated Feb 26, 2004 evokes the Frankenstein Frame by tracing the origins of the current militancy.

- 88) The current operations against Al Qaeda must, therefore, make a clear distinction between these two sets of people. It is the militants, sectarian extremists, and the remnants from the anti-Soviet jihad of the '80s that need to be tackled. The foreign media claim that the latter category also has supporters in the Pakistani military. Dawn 26/02/2004 (See Appendix B:9)

The editorial argues about targeting only the 'militants, sectarian extremists and the remnants from the anti-Soviet Jihad' and not all the seminaries that have been imparting religious education for centuries. 'Remnant' literally means the part left over after use and to call these elements as remnants signifies their insignificance after being used during that 'jihad'. The

editorial also seems to agree with the American view that these elements have support in the Pak Army and goes on to refer to the creation of this Frankenstein by Gen. Zia.

89) One should not be surprised, because, during his 11-year rule, Ziaul Haq unabashedly politicized part of the army and encouraged certain religious political parties to propagate their views even to cadets. One hopes the armed forces' high command has learnt its lessons, and the Pakistan Army's professionalism will not be eroded by further exposure to the hidebound ideas and notions of any religious party or groups of so-called ideologues. Dawn 26/02/2004 (See Appendix B:9)

Mentioning the General and the President as merely Zia ul Haq indicates the lack of respect for that past 'hero' of the Jihad era and the modification of the process by the adverb 'unabashedly' is an obviously insulting modification. The editorial evokes the II Frame in a negative way by referring to the trainee cadets being preached about the Islamic Jihadist ideology. It has a Particularized Implicature that the cadets of that time must be some commanding officers now and it is they who may still be supporting these elements in the trance of their now-obsolete Jihadist ideology.

The editorial hopes that lessons have been learnt by the Army as is indicated by their operations and goes on further to brand the Jihadist ideology as prejudiced and narrow-minded through the pre-modifying adjective 'hidebound'. 'Hidebound' literally refers to the rough dry skin of large animals closely attached to the flesh beneath and it thus metaphorically represents these religious parties as animals whose skin cannot be separated from their flesh which may be referring to their ideology. They are also represented through Negative Ideologisation as 'so-called ideologues' to represent their identity as fake. The Clause complex has also a



Presupposition that the professionalism of the Army has been eroded because of this ideological politicization.

The daily Dawn again evoked the Frankenstein Frame in its editorial titled 'Foreign Militants' on Mar 17, 2004.

90) Led by Gen Zia ul Haq, Pakistan played second fiddle to the US and served as a sanctuary and a training and recruitment ground for the fighters. Those who joined this US-led war were not only Afghans and Pakistani tribesmen but also zealots from other Muslim countries. While some were indeed motivated by religious considerations, many had less than holy reasons for their involvement in it... Dawn , 17/3/2004 (See Appendix B:10)

The pre-modifying Verbal Phrase 'led by Gen Zia ul Haq' again puts the blame solely on Gen Zia using the *Trajectio in ailiu*m. The editorial makes use of the Statement of Fact in Althusserian terms by using a proverb 'to play a second fiddle' to put the frontline-state role of Pakistan during the Afghan Jihad as a secondary or subordinate role. Again the editorial does not seem to realize that Pakistan and its media are again playing the second fiddle to the US by joining another 'US-led war'. Putting the blame on Zia only and negating the present reality again amounts to a Privation of History.

The editorial now refers to those 'Mujahideen' as 'fighters' and 'zealots' and also refers to the then 'Jihad' as 'US-led War' to evoke the Alienation Frame. It intensifies that frame by using the Scalar Implicature through 'some' and 'many' where some is used for the dedicated and committed 'mujahideen' and 'many' is used for the ones who did not have any 'holy reasons' to join that Jihad. It is an ambiguous statement as the editorial does not explain what

those reasons were but to call them 'less than holy' purges them of sincerity and commitment to a cause. The Scalar Implicature 'many' with the second category clearly implies that the majority of these fighters had some nefarious, probably materialistic or criminal, designs rather than Jihad.

The News in its editorial titled 'Aliens in FATA' on May 1, 2004 evokes the Myth of Security threat to justify the operations in Waziristan

91) Expelling the al-Qaeda activists from FATA is essential from a security point of view as it is dangerous to allow committed and battle-hardened foreign fighters to live in a sensitive area along the border. This is something no country would have allowed, its sense of hospitality notwithstanding. The News, 1/5/2004 (See Appendix B:11)

The title refers to the militants as 'aliens' which not only evokes the Alienation Frame but also dehumanizes the militants using Somatisation to refer to them as creatures from some other planet. They are described as 'committed and battle-hardened foreign fighters' using the Militarisation Referential strategy to reveal their commitment to their cause and their expertise in warfare. Allowing them to stay in the tribal areas is described as 'dangerous' and something that no country can allow. The editorial again makes Privation of History by ignoring the fact that it was not a new development and these elements had been living and moving freely in these areas for the past two decades.

The News in its editorial titled 'Aliens issue' on May 11, 2004 again evokes the Alienation Frame.

92) But at the same time it will not be safe to permit aliens in the sensitive area whose credentials do not omen well. No government with an eye on national security can tolerate the presence of unregistered foreigners. The government's best bet lies in getting the tribes of the area to exercise their influence and punch if necessary to force the recalcitrant tribal hosts to be more co-operative. *The News*, 11/5/2004 (See Appendix B:12)

The editorial again terms the foreign fighters as 'aliens' as discussed above and questions their 'credentials'. The editorial does not explain what those 'credentials' are but it does give a negative slant by describing them as portending some evil through the use of 'do not omen well'. The next Clause Complex evokes the Myth of Security Threat by presenting the 'unregistered foreigners' as a threat for any country's security. The heroes of the past are now 'unregistered foreigners' which again evokes the Alienation Frame. The next Clause Complex also targets the tribal hosts of these 'foreigners' as a threat and argues for convincing or using the 'punch' to force the 'recalcitrant tribal hosts' into cooperation. The Pre-modifier 'recalcitrant' refers to obstinacy and disobedience and projects the hosts as rebels through Social Problematisation.

The daily Dawn in its editorial titled 'Wana Confusion' on May 20, 2004 emphatically demands the militants to be sent back to where they belong.

93) If the government believes foreign militants or terrorists are hiding in parts of the tribal areas, it is necessary that such elements are flushed out, apprehended and sent back to their respective countries of origin. *Dawn* 20/5/2004 (See Appendix B:13)

The editorial refers to these elements as 'foreign militants or terrorists' thus evoking the Alienation Frame by making use of Nationalisation and Social Problematisation. The editorial advocates that these elements need to be 'flushed out' which is verbal phrase referring to cleaning through flooding and is normally used for cleaning toilets.

After the refusal of Nek Mohammad not to hand over the foreign fighters under the Shakai Pact as discussed in chap 01, the Army resumed its operation in Wazirisatn and Nek Mohammad was killed in a precision guided missile attack on June 2004. The daily News in its editorial on Nek Mohammad's death justifies the government's action in the following words.

94) However, the government cannot be faulted as it had to keep the security of the state uppermost and in pursuit of its policy could not have permitted a few persons to oppose its policy. The government is on record as having offered to register the foreign elements to regularize their stay in Pakistan and enable them to settle down peacefully... The unwillingness of the aliens to accept the offer and the protection being provided them by their tribal hosts created a situation which led to the missile strike. The News, 20/6/2004 (See Appendix B:14)

The editorial evokes the Threat to Security Myth to justify the killing of Nek Mohammad and uses *Trajectio in ailiun* to put the responsibility of the action on those 'few persons' who were against the government's policy of 'flushing out' the foreign elements from the tribal areas. The use of the Pre-modifier 'few' makes it a Scalar Implicature to imply that the government policy was approved by an overwhelming majority of the population. That the militants did not accept the government's offer of registration is presented as further evidence of the responsibility of the action on the militants. The foreign fighters are again referred to as 'aliens' which evokes the Alienation Frame as discussed above.

The Daily Dawn in a similar way continues with the dissociation from the Jihad Dispositive in its editorial on Nek Mohammad's death.

95) Tribal militant Nek Mohammad's death in a missile attack by security forces brings to an end the drama that began with the famous "Shakai embrace" on April 24... Honour and promise have a

special place in a tribal society. For that reason, Nek lost the sympathy of many tribal elders...

Dawn, 20/5/2004 (See Appendix B:15)

Nek Mohammad is Pre-modified as 'tribal militant' through Primitivisation and Militarisation to dissociate him from any heroic or ideological warfare. The Shakai pact is referred to as a 'drama' and as 'Shakai embrace' within quotes which projects the pact as something controversial or fake. It may also be satirizing the Army in an indirect way who seemed to be bullied by the militants who got their men released and did not hand over the foreign fighters. The editorial goes on to alienate Nek Mohammad as a disgraced tribal as he did not keep his promise and thus lost his honor and both of these are considered to be highly valued traits in a tribal culture. The editorial goes on to say that Nek had lost sympathy of 'many' tribal elders which is misrepresentation of the actual situation as reported in various news stories of the same newspaper. Nek was a popular local hero and people mourned his death like a family member. The editorial is thus making use of *Petitio principia* to presuppose that he had lost sympathies of his elders.

The editorial then goes on to convince the tribals how supporting the foreign elements was wrong.

- 96) The tribesmen should be made to realize that Al-Qaeda and foreign militants were involved in acts of terror, violence and subversion in Pakistan and that the victims of their terrorist activity were often innocent Pakistanis. They must be told that such criminal offences in no way serve the cause of Islam or contribute to this country's peace, progress and stability. Dawn, 20/5/2004 (See Appendix B:15)

The editorial makes use of *Argumentum ad hominem* to alienate the foreign fighters combined with Al Qaeda as being involved in terrorism and subversion through the use of Social Problematisation. It also makes use of *Argumentum ad populum* by stating that the targets of these activities were innocent Pakistanis through a Nationalisation and Collectivisation Referential strategy. The editorial then moves on to evoke the Alienation Frame and the PF Frame by Criminalising the activities of these elements as against the true spirit of Islam and that that they are not contributing towards the 'peace, progress and stability' of Pakistan. The editorial tries to convince the tribals that it is not a war for or against Islam.

## **7.2. Lal Masjid Operation:**

The killing of Nek Mohammad did not put an end to the process of the Talibanisation in the Waziristan agencies and the phenomenon was soon exported to other tribal agencies and even to some settled districts adjoining these tribal belts. Despite the continued Operations by the Pakistan security forces they managed to establish a parallel government of their own in these areas based on the Taliban model. The groups of militants who wanted to target the NATO forces in Afghanistan continued their activities and the 'Do More' narrative from the Americans consistently tested the nerves of the Pakistani government.

The heirs of Nek Mohammad like Abdullah Mehsud, and Maulana Fazlullah in Swat continued to focus on Pakistan and their militant activities intensified manifold during the next few years and they expanded their militant operations across Pakistan to target government and military installations. It was however the vigilantes of Lal Masjid who startled the whole world that Talibanisation has managed to reach the very heart of the capital city. After showing restraint for many months the government decided to go after the Lal Masjid militants in the

beginning of July 2007 and the mosque was besieged by security forces for many days before the final storming on July 10 that resulted in the killing of hundreds of inmates including women and the leading Imam Abdur Rasheed Ghazi.

The event was no doubt tragic and the then President Gen. Pervez Musharraf is currently facing a trial for that operation and the media is also asking questions about those responsible for that killing. The media during that time, however, not only clearly approved of that operation but also used instigative language to force the government take action as will be revealed from the analysis of the editorials of the leading newspapers below.

The editorial in the daily News titled 'Lal Masjid endgame ' on July 04 discussed the first day of the final conflict in the following words:

97) The 30th anniversary today of Gen Ziaul Haq's coup d'etat finds a central part of the capital of Pakistan a virtual battlefield... While the death toll so far is most unfortunate, the fact of the matter is that the government seems to have little choice but to act in the manner that it did since Tuesday. It is a sign that the government of President Pervez Musharraf has at last decided to grasp the nettle and started a process it was needlessly putting off. The News, 4/7/2007 (See Appendix B:16)

The editorial begins in a dramatic way by relating the events of the day with the anniversary of the Martial Law imposed by Gen Zia 30 years ago. The mention of Gen Zia seems far-fetched but it creates a Particularized Implicature that evokes not just a Frame or Myth but the whole Jihad Dispositive in the mind of the reader and presents the events of Lal Masjid as the natural result of the policies of Gen Zia. Thus the media continues to scapegoat the General whereas media itself was part of that Dispositive at that time. The editorial while criticizing the policies

of a former General by using *Trajectio in ailium* is now approving the policy of the current General and presents the action as something inevitable. The people in Lal Masjid are represented as 'nettle' which is a hairy plant causing irritation which is a Structural Metaphor 'militants are irritating plants'.

The editorial goes on to appreciate the government tactic of disconnecting the electricity and water of the inmates of Lal Masjid and laments that this should have been done before. It then goes on to represent the students who had left the compound as follows:

98) It's surprising that the government didn't know that, as is apparent now from the interviews of the bewildered pupils leaving Lal Masjid, a large number of the occupants were virtual prisoners, or at least didn't know exactly why they were there or were being held, more or less, against their will... The question that should be foremost on everyone's minds and which governments past and present need to answer is why the situation was allowed to come to this. Why wasn't the jihadi manufacturing machine fuelled by extremist seminaries and mosques such as Lal Masjid not reined in and kept a tight leash on? The News, 4/7/2007 (See Appendix B:16)

The students are presented as 'bewildered pupil' and as 'virtual prisoners'. The Pre-modifier 'bewildered' implies that the students were so innocent that they were clueless as to what was happening around them and that they were kept there as 'prisoners' indicates that the leaders were forcefully keeping them inside as human shields. This seems a distortion of facts and the editorial is making use of *Petitio principia* to present the students as innocent victims rather than being part of what was going on inside the mosque for so many months. The fact is that these students were highly indoctrinated and motivated and were unwilling to leave the place even when their parents were waiting outside to take them.



The editorial then poses a question to the past and present governments as to why these elements were not controlled before. The phenomenon is said to be 'the Jihadi manufacturing machine' which can be called a Quantification of Reality in Althusarian terms and a Deglorification of the Jihad Dispositive. The Jihadist movement is now represented as a machine that produced something like Jihadist robots which are no longer in demand. This machine is said to have been 'fuelled by extremist seminaries' which is the use of Negative Ideologisation and the process of Deglorification continues by using Structural Metaphor 'Jihadist are animals' with the use of 'rein in' and 'tight leash' as both these words are used to control animals particularly dogs.

The daily Dawn in its editorial titled 'An end at last?' on July 05, 2007 continues with the condemnation of the militants and the title suggests a longing to see an end to the vigilantism of the Lal Masjid militants. There is a series of about seven Rhetorical questions aimed at evoking Alienation and Real Islam Frames. The vigilantism of the Lal Masjid is termed as a 'rebellion' which evokes the Writ Frame and serves to instigate the government to take action against those who have established a 'government' and a 'court' of their own. All their past actions are Criminalized and the editorial moves on to use *Argumentum ad verecundum* by quoting a Hadith of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) to present the militants in very negative terms as follows:

99) Did not the Holy Prophet (PBUH) say that the best Muslim was one from whose hands and tongues other Muslims were safe? Did the self-deluded clerics of the Lal Masjid conform to this Hadith?... Dawn, 5/7/2007 (See Appendix B:17)

The Hadith directly targets the militants by saying that Muslims are not expected to harm their fellow Muslims. This evokes the Alienation Frame by dissociating those militants from the

real Islam and that's why they are represented as 'self-deluded clerics' and 'misguided clerics' who may be following a brand of Islam different from the one propagated by the Holy Prophet (PBUH). As the Hadith quoted refers to those Muslims who may be harming the fellow Muslims, this quotation also implies that the editorial only targets those groups of militants who are targeting Pakistan and its Muslim population and not those who may be targeting Afghanistan or NATO forces.

The editorial goes on to reject negotiation as a way out of the situation in clear-cut terms which implies that the government must use force.

- 100) But one thing is clear: the government must not offer more talks. Such a move will be misunderstood and encourage the misguided clerics. The Lal Masjid brothers are guilty of blackmail, murder, vandalism, trespass and kidnapping. If they surrender or are captured alive, they must be given the benefit of a fair trial in an open court. The crimes they have committed are a blot on the fair names of the ulema. That is not how the great ulema produced by South Asia — Shah Waliullah, Maulana Maudoodi, Ahmad Raza Khan Barelvi, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani and others — ever asked their followers to behave. .. It is now for the Pakistani people to decide whether they want the kind of Islam that Iqbal and Jinnah stood for or the intolerant, obscurantist brand being preached and practiced by bigoted semi-literates.

The editorial Criminalizes the Lal Masjid leaders through *Argumentum ad hominem* by using Social Problematisation through Nominals like 'blackmail, murder, vandalism, trespass and kidnapping'. The editorial goes on further to make use of *Argumentum ad verecundum* again and now quotes the names of various prominent Islamic scholars and then quotes the names of Iqbal and Jinnah who are the founders of Pakistan. The editorial wants to prove the point that the

Islam propagated by these 'bigoted semi-literates' was an 'intolerant, obscurantist brand' totally different from the one represented by the aforementioned scholars.

The editorial evokes the Real Islam Frame and addresses the Pakistani public to persuade them to make a choice between the militant brand of Islam and the real Islam of the Prophet (PBUH), the scholars and the founders of Pakistan thus bracketing all the credible and venerated sources to one side and putting the militants on the other side. The editorial thus makes use of *Petitio principia* to prove that these are in fact two opposing groups of people whereas the militants also make use of same sources of Quran and Hadith to prove their interpretation of Islam. The editorial also makes use of the Straw man fallacy as it distorts the views of the militants to prove them as 'aliens' to the real Islam.

As Maulana Abdul Aziz got captured by the security forces when he tried to escape the mosque disguised as a woman wearing a burqa, the media grabbed the golden opportunity to malign the militants in the worst possible way. He was humiliated before the whole nation when he was presented on the state-owned Pakistan Television channel wearing the same burqa and the interviewer asked him questions in a very insulting way. The newspapers also lambasted his escape as cowardice and hypocrisy. The daily News in its editorial titled 'A shameful capture' on July 06 described the incident in a similar way as the title indicates.

101) Hence, it is all the more surprising that the maulana should have taken a route that was at best cowardly... Those who had been pleading with the government to take decisive and strong action against such elements for a long time seem, till now, proven correct. This strategy should now be put to effective use in other trouble spots in the country, where extremists and obscurantists have tried to enforce their own twisted version of faith on ordinary Pakistanis, in the process making the lives of the latter a living hell. The News, 6/7/2007 (See Appendix B:18)

The editorial expresses its surprise at the method of escape adopted by the Maulana because it seemed an act of cowardice. Many people including the famous Maulvi Tameezuddin, Mulla Omar and Osama Bin Laden had used the same way of escape earlier on but that they managed to succeed, they were eulogized as heroes. Maulana Aziz is referred to as a coward because he got captured and it was not a time to eulogize such elements. The editorial again laments the delay in action by the government and demands similar action against all such elements described again through Negative Ideologisation as 'extremists and obscurantists' and their religion also described in a similar way as 'twisted version of faith' that again evokes the Real Islam frame.

The editorial titled 'No quarter for the militants' on July 06 in Dawn on the same event is more scathing:

- 102) EVERYTHING phoney reveals itself to be so sooner or later. The Lal Masjid episode has precisely done this. All noble Islamic concepts have been reduced to a joke by semi-literate fanatics lacking in some of Islam's fundamental virtues. The circumstances of Maulana Abdul Aziz's arrest, hiding himself in a burqa, shows that behind all that bravado and fiery speeches supposedly infused with the spirit of jihad, was a phoney man who had brainwashed thousands of boys and girls merely to show his power to threaten and blackmail the government and the nation at large. His threat to launch a series of suicide bomb attacks turned out to be the bullying of an inherent blackmailer, and the entire fortress based on propaganda and religious rhetoric collapsed like a house of cards... The Lal Masjid drama is a symptom of a deeper malaise. It is a disease that has been with us since Pakistan played host to the anti-Soviet mujahideen and turned the entire country into a tribal area. The religious militancy, funded by the CIA and backed by sections of the army, has now become a Frankenstein monster. Dawn, July 6/7/2007 (See Appendix B:19)

The editorial Somatises Maulana Abdul Aziz as 'phoney' which is a Nominal used for a person who professes beliefs that he does not actually hold. Negative Ideologisation is again used to describe him as 'semi-literate fanatics' and then further degrades him to be a mere 'blackmailer' instead of being a Mujahid that he posed himself to be. That's why he has been described as 'phoney'. The editorial uses a Simile to describe the exposure of the true person behind the fake 'Mujahid' as the collapse of a house of cards. He is also described as a liar and bully who threatened 'suicide bomb attacks' when he was actually 'an inherent blackmailer'. The editorial goes on to trace the roots of this militancy and to evoke the Frankenstein Frame.

The editorial uses Pathologisation to depict the event as a 'malaise' and goes on to diagnose the causes behind the 'disease'. It is ironical that the editorial uses the word 'mujahideen' to refer to the militants who fought against the Soviets but is not ready to give the same identity to the Lal Masjid inmates who are their remnants. Converting the 'entire country into a tribal area' metaphorically refers to the anarchy spread by these elements and evokes the Writ Frame to instigate the government for action. The editorial clearly refers to the whole phenomenon of religious militancy as the Structural Metaphor 'militancy is the Frankenstein monster'.

The daily Dawn in its editorial titled 'While the innocent suffer' on July 8 describes the condition of the inmates of Lal Masjid in the following words:

- 103)        THERE are two categories of people who are the worst sufferers in the current standoff at Lal Masjid: to one category belong the hostages. Their exact number is not known, but they are believed to be in their hundreds, and include women, girls and children. They are holed up in the midst of rotting bodies and living between hope and despair. Food supplies and water are either exhausted or are in short supply. Either the terrorists may themselves shoot them in panic and put

the blame on the security forces or the hostages may die in the crossfire when the authorities finally decide to move in. Dawn, 8/7/2007 (See Appendix B:20)

The editorial labels the inmates as 'hostages' through the use of Victimization Referential strategy just like the News depicted them as 'prisoners' as discussed above in (96) which is against the actual facts. The editorial describes their situation as extremely precarious and makes use of *Argumentum ad misericordiam* to elicit the sympathy of the people for the inmates that include 'women, girls and children' the categories of human beings that always stimulate empathy. They are presented as victims rather than militants to isolate the Maulana brothers as the real culprits. They are described as living in 'hope and despair' as to whether they will be rescued or will get killed.

The editorial then turns prophetic and jumps to two conclusions that may prove wrong. The first one is that these people may in fact be killed by their own leaders to show that they were killed by the security forces. This is a highly irresponsible use of *Argumentation ad consequentium* to highlight such consequences which are slanted against the militant leaders to distort their image as barbaric. The second conclusion which ultimately proved right is that they may be killed by the security forces once they storm in. This, however, is stated in an indirect way by saying that they may 'die in the crossfire' which is a clever way of distancing the security forces as killers of these 'hostages'. 'Dying in the crossfire' is something that cannot be blamed on anyone.

The editorial predicts their death in any case and again makes use of *Argumentum ad misericordiam* by referring to these 'hostages' as 'innocent souls' and that is why the title 'While the innocent suffer'.

- 104) Death could be their fate anytime. Belonging in most cases to the low income groups, they are innocent souls. Their only fault was that they believed in what the two maulanas told them... Abdul Rasheed Ghazi seems to be determined to hold on. He is detached from reality and is indifferent to death and destruction and to the suffering which his obstinacy may cause to other human beings... His criminality is evident from the way he refused Bilqees Edhi's plea to let her take away the children with her. His acolytes have also fired at parents who were approaching the mosque to secure their children's release. Dawn, 8/7/2007 (See Appendix B:20)

The editorial also makes reference to these 'hostages' as belonging to the poor segments of society to generate more empathy. The two Maulanas are again presented as having misguided these 'innocent souls'. Abdul Rashid Ghazi is represented as an obstinate and 'indifferent' person who seems apathetic to the suffering of these 'hostages'. His devilish nature is more exposed by using *Argumentum ad populum* by mentioning Ms Bilqees Edhi's request who is a popular and venerated social worker. It directly appeals to the masses as a mean act which is referred to as 'criminality' of Abdul Rasheed Ghazi. His barbarity is further enhanced by mentioning his devotees firing at the anxious parents outside which may again be a concocted story.

The Lal Masjid's week-long siege culminated into a final storming in of the complex by security forces after all attempts at a negotiated settlement seemed to have failed. Abdul Rasheed Ghazi along with many of his devotees got killed. His killing was discussed by the editorials in both the newspapers. The News in its editorial titled 'A bloody end' on July 11 defended the desired military operation in the following way.

- 105) By his actions, Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi proved to be a very difficult customer. He kept changing his demands and conditions and used the media to further what now seem to be

very selfish ends... Whatever has happened at Lal Masjid should also give some much-needed warning to the state to permanently disentangle and disengage itself from some of its affiliations and relationships of the past. It offers many lessons to the government and it would be good if some of these were learnt -- foremost among them is that militancy and extremism is best nipped in the bud and allowing it to fester actually ends up damaging the national interest. The News July 11, 2007 A bloody end (See Appendix B:21)

The Maulana is represented through Professionalization as a 'difficult customer' in his dealings with the government and who used media to pursue his 'selfish ends'. Being selfish implies that he had some personal motives rather than ideological ones and that he was not dealing fairly with the negotiators. The editorial goes on to criticize the government for not getting out of the relationships of the Jihad Dispositive completely and demands it to dissociate from the realities of the past.

The daily Dawn is more expressive in its response to the killing of Abdul Rasheed Ghazi in its editorial titled 'A gruesome end' on July 11:

106) While no tears will be shed over the death of the well-armed militants gathered around him by Ghazi, our hearts go out to the families of those innocent men, women and children who were killed during Tuesday's operation or in the fighting earlier. The responsibility for the death of the innocents and the trauma of those who have survived rests with the extremists who held hostage those whom they had lured into the mosque for giving them lessons in Islam. Instead, in a most perfidious way and in a way that behooves perhaps hardened criminals, they used men and women as a human shield to save themselves. Dawn, 11/7/2007 (See Appendix B:22)

The editorial, as in the previous one, continues with its bifurcation of the inmates as 'hostages' and 'militants' to malign and isolate Ghazi from the majority present in the Lal



Masjid and to turn the 'culprits' into a minority. The first Clause Complex begins on a callous note on the death of Ghazi and his comrades described as 'well-armed militants' through Militarization Referential strategy that was consistently applied by the media to project the arms and ammunition inside the compound. The facts later on proved that the inmates were not 'well-armed' except for a few rifles and grenades. The editorial turn Ghazi into a villain almost by saying that no one will weep on his death as it is only villains whose death does not arouse pity and fear in Aristotelian terms.

The editorial again makes use of *Argumentum ad misericordiam* by referring to the women and children killed in the final storming. They are again represented as 'innocent' and their tragedy is extended by using Pathologisation to their surviving family who will go through a 'trauma' and then makes use of *Trajectio in ailiun* to put the blame of that trauma on the 'extremists'. The extremists are also described as bullies by describing how they 'lured' those students for teaching Islam and turned them into militants. The editorial makes further use of Social Problematisation and Criminalization by saying that instead of giving them lessons they used them as human shields to protect themselves and this method is described as a 'perfidious way' that 'behooves hardened criminals'. The editorial further moves on with the Criminalization strategy

- 107) On the Lal Masjid mafia's directives, its militants had raided a home, attacked shops, and kidnapped not only police officials but also seven Chinese nationals... There is no room for complacency, and the government must relentlessly pursue terrorists and criminals masquerading as 'soldiers of Islam'. They are in a position to keep creating trouble for the government every now and then, but as Abdul Aziz's escape bid and the outcome of the Lal Masjid stand-off show, they are cowards because they know their stand lacks a moral basis. The nation's support for the

authorities on the crackdown against the Lal Masjid brigade should strengthen the government's position. The episode also shows that self-proclaimed mujahids committing crime after crime cannot fool the Pakistani people by taking cover under religious slogans. *Dawn*, 11/7/2007 (See Appendix B:22)

The Lal Masjid leaders are now labeled as 'mafia' Godfathers through Criminalisation who order raids, attacks and kidnappings. The editorial warns the government against 'complacency' against these 'soldiers of Islam' written within quotes to show that it's a fake label and they are actually 'terrorists' and 'criminals'. The editorial further goes on to label them as 'cowards' because of Maulana Aziz's escape bid but does not mention the preference of Ghazi and his disciples to die instead of surrender. The editorial makes use of Straw man fallacy to present its assumption as a truth that the militants know they don't have a moral basis and they may be doing these activities for some personal material gains as the ordinary criminals do. The editorial also makes use of Collectivisation strategy to show that the 'nation' or 'Pakistani people' know this fact that the 'self-proclaimed mujahids' of the 'Lal Masjid brigade' are actually criminals and they have fully backed the government on this action.

### **7.3. Discussion and Conclusion:**

The post-9/11 media discourse on the two selected DEs suggests that the Terror Dispositive has slowly and gradually established itself as a mode of thought and action during these years. Many counter-narratives have also emerged in the discourse but these don't affect the overall working of the Terror Dispositive. The process of alienation of the religious militants has continued at a steady pace and established their identities as 'terrorists'.

The media discourse on the Waziristan Operation is strongly critical of the presence of foreign fighters in the tribal belt of Pakistan. The editorials are fully supportive of the military operations in Waziristan to 'flush out' these elements from the Pakistani territory. These fighters are consistently referred to as aliens having no legal right to live in the country. The Referential strategies continue to dehumanize and de-glorify these fighters by referring to them as aliens, black beasts, terrorists, criminals and so on.

The media discourse also demystifies and exposes the Jihad Dispositive as being fake and tries to dissociate itself from the 'narrow-minded' and 'biased' ideology working behind that. The editorials make extensive use of *Trajectio in ailium* and the Frankenstein Frame by putting the whole blame of the Afghan Jihad on Gen Zia and the Americans. There is no mention of the compliant role that media played in that Jihad. There is also no realization of the fact that the media is currently against supporting another US led war against terrorism and another General is facilitating that war.

The editorials on Lal Masjid also continue with the same process of the alienation of the religious militants and the process of dissociation from the Jihad Dispositive. It has in fact become blunter in insulting and humiliating the militants. The media is bitterly criticizing the vigilantism of the Lal Masjid clerics and forcefully instigating the government to take action against them. The episode of the escape of Maulana Abdul Aziz was turned into a humiliating show to de-glorify the heroes of the Jihad Dispositive. There is an extensive use of Social Problematisation, Somaticisation and Negative Ideologisation Referential strategies in the representation of the Lal Masjid clerics. The Frankenstein Frame and the Real Islam Frame are continuously being evoked through the use of language in these editorials.

The analysis of these two DEs also shows that the anti-American rhetoric has also increased as the Jihad Dispositive is time and again being referred to as an American venture that has created this Frankenstein of religious militancy. That does not, however, mean that the media discourse being anti-American is also anti-Terror Dispositive. The alienation of the militants and the dissociation from the Jihad Dispositive provides ample evidence that the Terror Dispositive has been embraced by the Pakistan media as the new hegemonic ideology.

## Chapter 08: Discussion and Conclusions

Having gone through the analysis of the selected text in the previous three chapters it is pertinent to visit the Research Questions posed by this research in the introductory chapter so as to know how far this analysis has been able to find answers to those questions. The research posed the following three questions:

1. What are the historical roots of the Post-9/11 media and political discourse in Pakistan regarding religious militancy and what role, if any, did religious ideology play in the representation of the Russian intervention in Afghanistan?
2. How has religious militancy been discursively constructed in the mainstream English newspapers of Pakistan in a post-9/11 scenario and do we see a shift in the representation of religious militancy as compared to the Pre-9/11 scenario ?
3. To what extent does Pakistan, as a third world country, construct an indigenous discourse on such issues or does it borrow its discourse from the dominant allies?

Following is a brief discussion on the findings of this research regarding the first two questions.

### **8.1. Ideology and History at Work:**

As discussed in chapter two, Ideology is one of the major concerns in CDA and this study has also focused mainly on the working of ideology in the representation of religious militancy in the political and media discourse in Pakistan after 9/11. This study has also chosen the Discourse-Historical perspective in CDA which necessitated the analysis to be linked to the historical roots

of the Post-9/11 discourse. Thus ideology and history have served as the main context for this analysis and the findings of the analysis at the Micro-level in the previous three chapters have been linked with the workings of ideology and history at the Macro-level.

The analysis in the previous three chapters has indicated that religious militancy in this region is more an ideological rather than a political or geographical conflict. This conflict has its roots in the ideological conflict between the Capitalist and Communist ideologies in the Cold War era that was turned into a hot war in Afghanistan by the introduction of an Islamic Ideology to take a sweet revenge from the Soviets for the humiliation that the Americans faced in Vietnam. As discussed in chapter one, they not only managed to do that but also managed to disintegrate the vast Soviet Empire which was not part of the plan as it was too ambitious to have been thought about at that time. The Soviets, by their intervention into Afghanistan, had actually shot into their own feet.

The Americans, however, were not the ones who introduced the Islamic ideology in this region. As discussed in chapter 01, the history of Islamic ideology in the region is very old and the Americans just turned that to their use. As far as Pakistan is concerned, it came into being in 1947 on the basis of a 'two-nation theory' that the Hindus and Muslims were two different nations and cannot live together in a United India. It is also believed that Pakistan was created to establish a state which will be run according to the injunctions and principles of Islam. These two ideas have come to be known as the Ideology of Pakistan and the way it has been propagated and asserted, it is not merely a theoretical construct for the Pakistani nation. After Pakistan came into being the government couldn't manage to develop a constitution of the country for about a decade till 1956. The first step, however, towards the formation of the constitution was the

passing of the Objectives Resolution in 1949 (The Objectives Resolution, 1949) which set the direction of the future constitution to be based on the principles of Islam which means the ideology of Pakistan. It was later on made a part of the 1973 constitution which is also, at least on a theoretical level, based on the ideology of Pakistan.

Apart from its inculcation in the constitution, this ideology has been made part of our textbooks and during the period of Gen Zia a special compulsory course 'Pakistan Studies' was introduced from the school to the university level to propagate this ideology. It has become a part of our culture, values, and common sense and is protected by the state as a sacred asset. Thus the working of the Islamic Ideology is not something new for Pakistan or for the whole region as the discussion on the Pan-Islamist movements and the influential Deobandi tradition in chapter one suggests.

The strongest preachers of the Ideology of Pakistan have been the religious parties belonging to the Deobandi and the Pan-Islamist traditions. These parties believe that if Pakistan was made in the name of Islam then it should have an Islamic constitution and system. It was under this pressure that the Objectives Resolution was passed and was later on made a part of the 1973 constitution. Despite the Islamic injunctions in the constitution, all the governments have not been able to implement those injunctions the way these religious parties wanted and the demand for an Islamic system in Pakistan has continued till the present day.

This brief overview of the history and ideology of Pakistan was necessary for this discussion because it has a strong connection with the religious militancy that this country has seen over the past three decades. The religious parties, till the start of the Afghan Jihad in the early eighties, had been using the democratic process of going to elections, protesting and

campaigning for the implementation of an Islamic system. Apart from the Afghan fighters and recruits from around the world, many youngsters belonging to these religious parties also took part in the Afghan Jihad that glorified them as Mujahideen. It not only gave them training in guerrilla warfare but also a confidence that they can win their ideological struggle in Pakistan in the same way.

The Mujahedeen were followed by Taliban who also received their ideological training in the seminaries in Pakistan being run by these religious political parties. When the Taliban established an Islamic state in Afghanistan according to their ideals, their Pakistani counterparts and mentors started thinking about importing that system to Pakistan. This is what is known as the Talibanisation of Pakistan and this is how the religious militancy in Pakistan has drawn upon the Ideology of Pakistan.

That, however, does not mean that the Ideology of Pakistan is the only factor behind this religious militancy. This study assumes that religious militancy is a direct product of the Jihad Dispositive that was driven by many conflicting ideologies and objectives. The super power rivalry, the 'strategic depth' theory of the Pakistani establishment, the ever burning issues like Palestine and Kashmir, the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the sectarian strife between Sunni sects backed by the Wahabi/Salafi doctrines from Saudis and the Shias supported by Iran, and many other factors support or confront this militancy. Talibanisation and Religious militancy is not an isolated phenomenon; it is part of the global power politics.

This study through its analysis of extracts from the political and media discourse has tried to place the discursive practices in media and politics in the historical and ideological context discussed above. The traces and cues pointed out in the previous three chapters at the



Micro-level of analysis clearly reflect the processes of the production and the interpretation of these texts. Following is a brief discussion on the representation of religious militancy in the Pre- and Post-9/11 scenario to find the answers to the three research questions .

## **8.2. Pre-9/11 Discourse:**

The Micro-level analysis of the selected political and media discourse after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 suggests that the discursive practices successfully represented the intervention as an ideological confrontation between Communism and Islam. The introduction of the Islamic ideology to serve as a proxy ideology for the Capitalist ideology was to take the shape of a proxy war in which the brave Afghans defeated a mighty power and they thought it was merely their staunch belief in the Islamic ideology that resulted in this miracle.

It is quite natural for any nation to defend its territorial integrity and to resist any foreign aggression but to turn that fight as a fight to protect your religion against the infidels adds glory to that fight and makes it a religious obligation for a believer in Islam. The Americans also knew the power of that ideology but they also knew that mere ideologies don't win wars and that's why they provided covert military support to these fighters through Pakistan. A Dispositive thus was created to tackle an emergency situation in the form of the Soviet intervention.

This Dispositive was a network of relationships between the American, Pakistani and many other western and non-western governments of the world. It was also a network of relationships between the international intelligence agencies like CIA, ISI, MI and many others. It was also a relationship between these governments and the Afghan fighters and a relationship in-between various warring factions of these fighters. It was a network of official statements,

speeches, interviews, resolutions, news-stories, editorials, research papers, books, and so on. It was also a network of logistics, training camps, trainers, trainees, arms, stingers and donkeys from America for transportation. The main driving ideological force behind the whole network of these physical and non-physical structures was the Islamic concept of Jihad that had long been forgotten by the Muslims. That's why this research has labelled its analysis of the Pre-9/11 period as the Jihad Dispositive.

For the Soviet government, as per their statements, it was an intervention on the request of a friendly Afghan government to crush a rebellion. It was in fact similar to over 50 American attempts to overthrow foreign governments, crushing more than 30 populist nationalist movements and killing several millions in the process during the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Blum, 2006). It was just like the violent American interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965), Congo (1967), Laos and Cambodia (1968), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989) etc. to crush or promote rebellions. It was in fact quite similar to the American intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11 to get rid of the non-friendly government of Taliban.

The analysis in Chapter 05 clearly highlights the workings of ideology through language to attain political objectives. The projection of the Russian intervention as a war against Islam was meant to rally support for the condemnation and resistance of the Soviet occupation throughout the Muslim World. It was a very clever use of 'Privation of History' through Suppression/Exclusion of the Cold War narrative which would have been the actual description of this conflict. This narrative was successfully replaced with a narrative of a war between the Islamic and Communist ideologies as many Referential, Predicational and Argumentation strategies evoked the CI and II Frames and pitched those against each other.

The political and media discourse at that time also represents the Soviet intervention as an immediate threat to the security of the neighbours of Afghanistan and to the whole world in the coming future. There is a consistent use of *Argumentum ad consequentium* that projects the intervention as leading to supposed consequences like attack on Pakistan or Iran and the attempt of the Soviets to reach the warm waters of the Arabian sea and the oil resources of the Gulf region. The Referential and Predicational strategies at the clause level evoke the Alarm Frame to sensitize the issue as a portending danger for the whole world.

The political and media discourse also makes great use of Assimilation and Relationalisation strategies to create and establish a long-term relationship with the Muslim world as their supporters and true friends in need. The Americans make use of religion in establishing that bond by welcoming the Renaissance in Islam and by projecting Islam and Christianity as religions sharing many beliefs and belonging to the same tradition. The Pakistani political and media discourse also reciprocates by showing the same desire but also showing concern and caution because of the previous ups and downs in the relationship between the two countries.

This analysis thus leads us to believe that the Russian intervention and the ensuing Jihad Dispositive was an attempt to turn that Cold War conflict into an ideological conflict between the Islamic and the Communist world. This partially answers the first research question described at the beginning of this chapter.

As far as the positive or negative representation of the subsequent religious militancy is concerned, it is quite obvious that it received a positive representation in the political and media discourse at that time. While Assimilating the Christian and the Muslim world, there is an effort

to represent the Soviet empire as an evil force and many lexical choices portray the Soviets as the Mighty Oppressor and the Afghans as the victims. The UR, Non-Aligned and FI Frames, evoked by the choices made at the clause level, represent the Afghans as the sufferers and arouse sympathies for them. There is an extensive use of *Argumentum ad populum* to stir popular support for the Jihad against the Soviets and the use of *Argumentum ad hominem* for the Soviets to malign them as an Imperialist force.

The Afghan fighters are represented as 'Mujahideen' and eulogized as a brave and valiant nation that has never yielded to foreign aggression. The FI Frame consistently evokes their primitive tribal instinct of being fearless fighters and the things they did during the next decade turned them into Martyrs and Ghazis which are two great religious titles given to those who lose their lives or survive as fighters against infidels. This positive Appraisal coupled with the defeat of the Soviets has provided an impetus to the religious militancy that allowed it to thrive during the next two decades till the present day and these militants have come to believe that they can defeat the American in a similar manner as the Soviets. They also believe that they can establish a truly Islamic state in Pakistan by their militant struggle.

The Soviets and the Communist ideology, on the other hand, were represented through Negative ideologisation or Social Problematisation strategies as infidels and oppressors. It can be concluded thus that the Soviet intervention was given a negative representation whereas the Afghans and the consequent religious militancy received a positive representation.

### 8.3. Post-9/11 Discourse:

The post-9/11 political and media discourse as discussed in Chapter six and eight reveals that the emergency situation posed by the 9/11 attacks necessitated a new kind of Dispositive. It is not that 9/11 suddenly created the Terror Dispositive but that it proved to be the decisive factor behind the establishment of the said Dispositive that had started evolving during the previous decade due to the targeting of American interests by the Islamic militants. The new Terror Dispositive has thus replaced the old Jihad Dispositive in global politics during the post-9/11 decade.

This is not, however, a complete replacement of the Jihad Dispositive. Terror Dispositive is in fact an attempt to disintegrate the Jihad Dispositive that had started to backfire on its own creators. It is an attempt to redefine the identities of the Islamic militants who are no more 'mujahideen' or 'moral equivalents of the American forefathers' because they are now killing the Americans and Allies instead of the evil and infidel Soviets. They are now to be given the identity of 'terrorists' and strangely enough this is also done by making use of religion as was done to make them 'mujahideen'.

Both the American and Pakistani Presidents make use of *Argumentum ad verecundum* by quoting from Bible and Quran and evoke the Alienation Frames to label these militants as 'terrorists' who have nothing to do with the Real Islam. Religion as an ideology is thus made use of in both the Jihad and Terror Dispositives but to achieve opposing goals. It is the religious ideology that makes those fighters 'Mujahids' and it is the same religious ideology that is used to turn them into 'terrorists'. The discourse that evoked the II, UR, Non-Aligned and FI Frames in

the Jihad Dispositive is now evoking the Real Islam, Evil Force and Alienation Frames in the Terror Dispositive.

As compared to the Jihad Dispositive, the post-9/11 media discourse represents religious militancy in a negative way. It has turned the fiercely independent holy warriors of the past into criminals, cowards, animals and aliens through appropriate Referential, Predicational and Argumentation strategies as described in the previous chapters. There is however a gradual progress of the mortification of these militants from the American intervention in 2001 to the Lal Masjid episode in 2007. The initial focus of this process was the foreign fighters only but up till Lal Masjid it was everyone associated with the old Jihad Dispositive.

The Terror Dispositive, however, does not seem as all-encompassing as the Jihad Dispositive was during the Russian intervention. The Jihad Dispositive network of relationships seemed to gel together smoothly for more than a decade in which the stake-holders seemed to work in a harmonious way towards a shared goal. The Terror Dispositive, on the other hand, seems too complex to work as a unified whole. The following section will discuss the nature and workings of this Dispositive and will also try to answer the third research question regarding the discourse of the third world countries.

#### **8.4. A Discordant Dispositive:**

The Terror Dispositive has, so far, proved to be a network of relationships that is frictional and lacks mutual trust and there are a number of discordant chords that hamper a rhythmic movement. The Jihad Dispositive seemed quite tuneful as all the stake-holders hoped to achieve their individual goals by defeating a common enemy. The Terror Dispositive is a complicated web where there are many diverse and at times opposing discourses and objectives so that it

becomes difficult to identify as to who is supporting whom to achieve what ends. It is a world of illusions where it becomes difficult to establish the exact identities of the players and still more difficult to find out who is siding with whom and why?

The post-9/11 analysis has shown that there has been an intensification in the anti-American rhetoric in the political and media discourse in Pakistan. Should that not mean that the Pakistani political and media discourse has rejected the Terror Dispositive and is trying to come up with a discourse of its own? The answer to that question can be 'yes' to some extent but by and large the Pakistani discourse seems to borrow its discourse from the West just like most of the third world countries. Apart from the various instances of this compliance shown by the present research, a clear evidence to that argument would be that we call it Jihad when the West calls it Jihad and we call it 'terrorism' when the west calls it terrorism.

The discussion on ideology in chapter two suggests that there is a hegemony of common sense and the common sense is always based on some dominant ideology. The Pakistani political and media discourse seems at times to willingly espouse the Terror Dispositive but most of the times it may be using the dominant discourse without knowing it. Thus when we are using the terms like 'Afghan Jihad' and 'Mujahideen' or 'War on Terror' and 'terrorists' and at the same time we are talking against Jihad or WoT, we would unconsciously be using the dominant hegemonic discourse and we would continue to reproduce that discourse till we keep using the language that is being given to us by the dominant super powers.

The increase in the anti-American discourse can also be because of the reason that just as the American discourse is given a freedom to be anti-Russian by virtue of being declared enemies, the Pakistani discourse has also acquired the freedom to be anti-American. The modern

media, however, as discussed earlier, works in a very sophisticated way to propagate the things that are part of its agenda. It works through building a trust and goodwill and by giving an impression of being objective by giving both sides of the picture. The reader or the audience is not always that clever to read between the lines and starts taking things presented on media for granted.

### **8.5. Suggestions for Further Research:**

This research has shown that the media tries to show a balanced view of the situation and takes all social actors on board but still manages to influence the reader the way it wants. Most of it happens through the spin of language that continues to be used to sustain the hegemony of common sense. That makes media a battleground for conflicting ideologies and a vehicle for propagating agendas in a subtle and sophisticated way. That also makes media an area having a great potential for discourse analysts so as to expose the hidden agendas and to bring back objective and neutral reporting.

CDA does provide a strong theoretical framework to analyze power relations and the workings of ideology but most of its theorists do not go far beyond philosophizing or intellectualizing. Their concepts can be used as categories or tools for analysis at the Macro level but they have not been able to come up with effective analytical tools at the Micro level and researchers feel handicapped when they start analyzing their data at the sentence level. It would be great if future researchers can come up with proper toolkits for analyzing linguistic data just as this research has attempted to do. Apart from CDA many other perspectives on discourse analysis have emerged over the past two decades as discussed in chapter 2 & 3 in this dissertation. Many researchers currently pursuing a research in discourse analysis seem to have



developed a fondness for CDA which is not a healthy sign for future research. When people start drawing upon a singular model, it soon reaches its saturation level and then research is unable to produce or discover anything new. Most of the research in CDA, at least in Pakistan, seems to have reached a saturation point and most of it has become repetitive in nature.

This research also claims to be different from other researches in CDA in focusing on issues of the third world for research as against the dominant tradition of the research focusing on issues of the developed world. The third world is not only a victim of international power structures but is also suffering many problems due to its primitive social fabric based on age old feudal and capitalist exploitation. Due to very low literacy rates in these countries it is still quite easy for the dominant classes to spread lies and distorted facts and to make use of language to continue reproducing their dominance. The development of a culture of research in this country is a remarkable achievement of the past decade but we need to know what kind of research can help solve our problems and how we can catch up with the developed world in the shortest possible way without compromising on the quality of our research.

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## Appendix A:

### 1. Pakistan Times:2/2/1980

TEXT: The following is the text of the statement made by Mr. Brezinski: The President was asked us to come to affirm clearly—and for all to hear—our friendship for Pakistan, to consult with our Pakistani friends, on the situation created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, as our concrete ways to enhance peace and stability in this region. We want to enhance peace in a manner that threatens none and respects the independence and integrity of all the countries of the region. We know the world, and particularly this region, has changed greatly since the 1950's. Our cooperation has to take

these changes into account and I particularly note the vitality of the Muslim world. The U.S. shares with the Muslim world a deep religious faith, and this provides us with yet another basis for our friendship.

It is in this spirit that we enter the consultations.

2. Pakistan Times: 3/2/1980

# It will work together for peace: Brzezinski Old ties will flourish: Zia

WASHINGTON, Feb. 28. Mr. Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan, said today that the United States and Pakistan will work together for peace. He said the friendship between the two countries will flourish.

Mr. Zia said that the United States and Pakistan have a long and fruitful relationship. He said that the United States has always been a friend and ally of Pakistan.

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3. Dawn: 28/12/1979

## Pakistan: Coup Kabul's own affair

Islamabad Bureau by the President's Foreign Affairs  
Adviser, Mr. Asghar Shahi, which  
was to begin on Dec 30, is ap-  
parently off today, decided abruptly on. The visit had been  
arranged following protracted ne-  
gotiations between the two Govern-  
ments in the wake of occupation  
forces from Afghanistan in order  
to organise anti-Afghan guerrilla  
forces. Official sources in Islam-  
abad were not ready to answer  
questions about the future rela-  
tionship between Pakistan and the  
Afghan Government, headed by  
Babrak Karmal.

Meanwhile, the visit to Kabul

Meanwhile, there was a lot of  
talk in Islamabad's diplomatic

### PAKISTANIS SAFE

A message is reported to have  
been received from Pakistan Em-  
bassy in Kabul to the effect that  
Pakistanis in Kabul and their fa-  
milies were completely safe.

rumours about the cancellation of  
Asghar Shahi's visit to Kabul last  
week before he accompanied Pre-  
sident Zia-ul-Haq to Saudi Arabia.  
Asghar Shahi returned this even-  
ing to Islamabad from Tehran  
where he had gone almost straight  
after a visit to Saudi Arabia, leav-  
ing a trail of mystery behind.

### ITTEHAD'S REACTION

The temporary alliance, Pakistan  
Muslim League, Afghanistan, to-  
night announced in Islamabad  
that the change in Kabul will  
make no difference to their strug-  
gle in Afghanistan, which, will  
continue unabated.

# Pakistan's grave concern at Kabul development

## *Military intervention a serious matter*

The Government of Tajikistan cannot but regard the recent occupation of foreign troops in Afghanistan as a serious violation of the norms of peaceful cooperation and the fundamental principles of the sovereignty of States and

14-00000

5. Dawn 30/12/1979

6. 10/01

## Pak concern

(Continued from page 1)

ago, is, however, qualitatively different because of the factor of external military intervention. The Government of Pakistan, therefore, views this development with the gravest concern. Its concern is all the more profound since the country which has been subjected to military intervention is an Islamic country which is its immediate neighbour and is a member of the Islamic conference as well as of the Non-Aligned Movement.

"The people of Afghanistan are passing through a tragic period in their history and are undergoing great suffering in the process of resolving their internal problems. The induction of foreign troops with a view to determining the outcome of the current internal political crisis in Afghanistan constitutes a serious aggravation of the situation and is bound to prolong the agony of the Afghan people, with whom Pakistan is linked by indissoluble ties of history, faith and culture."

"The Government of Pakistan hopes that the far-reaching negative consequences of such foreign intervention would be clearly realised and that the foreign troops would be removed from Afghan soil forthwith".—APF/FP

## AFGHAN SITUATION

### Pakistan's statement at UN Council: text

NEW YORK, Jan 10 (AP)—Pakistan's statement at the Security Council on the situation in Afghanistan on Jan. 10, by Pakistani Representative Mr. Jinnah, was as follows:

Mr. President,

I am grateful to you and the members of the Council for the kind and thoughtful attention given to the situation in Afghanistan. The Government of Pakistan has been deeply concerned about the grave situation in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion of the country in December 1979. The United Nations, Pakistan, and the other member States have been actively engaged in efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Afghanistan. The Government of Pakistan has been actively engaged in efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Afghanistan. The Government of Pakistan has been actively engaged in efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Afghanistan.

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7. Dawn 11/01/1980

## U.N. Council

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8. Dawn 12/01/1980

9.

# Pakistan calls for total pullout of Soviet units

## Shahri slates Moscow's Bid to storm Kabul prison incursion in UN speech

UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 1. Pakistan today urged the United Assembly to call for the "immediate, unconditional and complete" withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, demanding the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.



Shahri, who is the Pakistani ambassador to the United Nations, is seen here during his speech at the assembly.

In his 15-minute speech, Shahri said the United Nations should call for the "immediate, unconditional and complete" withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

He also urged the assembly to call for the "immediate, unconditional and complete" withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

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## Bid to storm Kabul prison

KABUL, Dec. 1. Soviet troops and forces were reported to be preparing to storm a prison in Kabul, where Soviet troops were reported to be preparing to storm a prison in Kabul.

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## Continued from page 1

of an international effort to end the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

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10 Pakistan Times: 14/01/1980

## Steps for national security and defence taken

# Pakistanis will rise as one man: Zia

From Our Pakistan  
Bureau

**ISLAMABAD** The President Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, declared here today that in the hour of crisis "every soldier of the Armed Forces and every member of this nation will stand up to defend his country."

Addressing a grand rally staged at the National Stadium in the Government House on the eve of the 100th anniversary of the Government of Sindh, the President stressed that the Pakistanis had achieved the limited front conditions at the Afghan border, which would have been the starting point of a new Pakistan, he said. Pakistanis had had their soldiers killed in Afghanistan

and the steps for national security and defence taken.

**BASELIS** General Zia-ul-Haq described as a bold and brave act when the Pakistanis gave the country training in the Afghan border, saying that it was a part of a well-planned emergency against Pakistan.

Had Pakistan been the one to the Afghan border and


could it show others to stand

Pakistan, however, could not remain indifferent to what was happening at its door.

Continued on back page on

[illegible]

12 Dawn 02/02/1980



13. Dawn : 28/01/1980

## Zia calls for joint defence of Muslim Umma

ISLAMABAD: The 22 President Zia ul-Haq today asked for collective apology of the Pakistanis for having taken the decision of unilateral withdrawal.

Investigating the cases of  
Black, foreign, military and  
race hate this morning, and  
sent the above information to  
all the members of the  
committee to read and  
consider and to report back  
to the committee.

1. The writer came to the  
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1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the situation.

2. Once the problem is identified, the next step is to define the objectives and goals of the project. This helps to clarify what is to be achieved and provides a clear direction for the work.


3. The third step is to develop a plan or strategy to address the problem. This involves identifying the resources needed, the tasks to be completed, and the timeline for the project.

4. The fourth step is to implement the plan. This involves putting the strategy into action and monitoring progress to ensure that the project is on track.

5. The final step is to evaluate the results of the project. This involves assessing the outcomes against the objectives and goals, and identifying any lessons learned for future projects.





14. 28/01/1980




15. Dawn: 31/12/1979

16. Pakistan Times: 01/01/1980



17. Dawn 11/01/1980



18. Dawn 27/01/1980






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
21. Dawn 16/01/1980




22. Pakistan Times.15/1/80



23. Pakistan Times.28/1/80



24. Pakistan Times.29/1/80



## Appendix B

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### 1-Speech on Afghanistan (January 4, 1980)

Jimmy Carter

I come to you this evening to discuss the extremely important and rapidly changing circumstances in Southwest Asia.

I continue to share with all of you the sense of outrage and impatience because of the kidnaping of innocent American hostages and the holding of them by militant terrorists with the support and the approval of Iranian officials. Our purposes continue to be the protection of the longrange interests of our Nation and the safety of the American hostages.

We are attempting to secure the release of the Americans through the International Court of Justice, through the United Nations, and through public and private diplomatic efforts. We are determined to achieve this goal. We hope to do so without bloodshed and without any further danger to the lives of our 50 fellow Americans. In these efforts, we continue to have the strong support of the world community. The unity and the common sense of the American people under such trying circumstances are essential to the success of our efforts.

Recently, there has been another very serious development which threatens the maintenance of the peace in Southwest Asia. Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, nonaligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan., which had hitherto not been an occupied satellite of the Soviet Union.

Fifty thousand heavily armed Soviet troops have crossed the border and are now dispersed throughout Afghanistan, attempting to conquer the fiercely independent Muslim people of that country.

The Soviets claim, falsely, that they were invited into Afghanistan to help protect that country from some unnamed outside threat. But the President, who had been the leader of Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, was assassinated along with several members of his family after the Soviets gained control of the capital city of Kabul. Only several days later was the new puppet leader even brought into Afghanistan by the Soviets. This invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in Southwest Asia and also because such an aggressive military policy is unsettling to other peoples throughout the world.

This is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter. It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people.

We must recognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan to stability and peace. A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a steppingstone to possible control over much of the world's oil supplies.

The United States wants all nations in the region to be free and to be independent. If the Soviets are encouraged in this invasion by eventual success, and if they maintain their dominance over Afghanistan and then extend their control to adjacent countries, the stable, strategic, and peaceful balance of the entire world will be changed. This would threaten the security of all nations including, of course, the United States, our allies, and our friends.

Therefore, the world simply cannot stand by and permit the Soviet Union to commit this act with impunity. Fifty nations have petitioned the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Soviet Union and to demand the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan. We realize that under the United Nations Charter the Soviet Union and other permanent members may veto action of the Security Council. If the will of the Security Council should be thwarted in this manner, then immediate action would be appropriate in the General Assembly of the United Nations, where no Soviet veto exists.

In the meantime, neither the United States nor any other nation which is committed to world peace and stability can continue to do business as usual with the Soviet Union.

I have already recalled the United States Ambassador from Moscow back to Washington. He's working with me and with my other senior advisers in an immediate and comprehensive evaluation of the whole range of our relations with the Soviet Union.

The successful negotiation of the SALT II treaty has been a major goal and a major achievement of this administration, and we Americans, the people of the Soviet Union, and indeed the entire world will benefit from the successful control of strategic nuclear weapons through the implementation of this carefully negotiated treaty.

However, because of the Soviet aggression, I have asked the United States Senate to defer further consideration of the SALT II treaty so that the Congress and I can assess Soviet actions and intentions and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this crisis. As circumstances change in the future, we will, of course, keep the ratification of SALT II under active review in consultation with the leaders of the Senate.

The Soviets must understand our deep concern. We will delay opening of any new American or Soviet consular facilities, and most of the cultural and economic exchanges currently under consideration will be deferred. Trade with the Soviet Union will be severely restricted.

I have decided to halt or to reduce exports to the Soviet Union in three areas that are particularly important to them. These new policies are being and will be coordinated with those of our allies.

I've directed that no high technology or other strategic items will be licensed for sale to the Soviet Union until further notice, while we revise our licensing policy.

Fishing privileges for the Soviet Union in United States waters will be severely curtailed.

The 17 million tons of grain ordered by the Soviet Union in excess of that amount which we are committed to sell will not be delivered. This grain was not intended for human consumption but was to be used for building up Soviet livestock herds.

I am determined to minimize any adverse impact on the American farmer from this action. The undelivered grain will be removed from the market through storage and price support programs and through purchases at market prices. We will also increase amounts of grain devoted to the alleviation of hunger in poor countries, and we'll have a massive increase of the use of grain for gasohol production here at home.

After consultation with other principal grain-exporting nations, I am confident that they will not replace these quantities of grain by additional shipments on their part to the Soviet Union.

These actions will require some sacrifice on the part of all Americans, but there is absolutely no doubt that these actions are in the interest of world peace and in the interest of the security of our own Nation, and they are also compatible with actions being taken by our own major trading partners and others who share our deep concern about this new Soviet threat to world stability.

Although the United States would prefer not to withdraw from the Olympic games scheduled in Moscow this summer, the Soviet Union must realize that its continued aggressive actions will endanger both the participation of athletes and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend the Olympic games.

Along with other countries, we will provide military equipment, food, and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and its national security against the seriously increased threat it now faces from the north. The United States also stands ready to help other nations in the region in similar ways.

Neither our allies nor our potential adversaries should have the slightest doubt about our willingness, our determination, and our capacity to take the measures I have outlined tonight. I have consulted with leaders of the Congress, and I am confident they will support legislation that may be required to carry out these measures.

History teaches, perhaps, very few clear lessons. But surely one such lesson learned by the world at great cost is that aggression, unopposed, becomes a contagious disease.

The response of the international community to the Soviet attempt to crush Afghanistan must match the gravity of the Soviet action.

With the support of the American people and working with other nations, we will deter aggression, we will protect our Nation's security, and we will preserve the peace. The United States will meet its responsibilities.

Thank you very much (Carter, Speech on Afghanistan , 1980).

**2. The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress.  
January 23, 1980**

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the 96th Congress, fellow citizens:

This last few months has not been an easy time for any of us. As we meet tonight, it has never been more clear that the state of our Union depends on the state of the world. And tonight, as throughout our own generation, freedom and peace in the world depend on the state of our Union.

The 1980's have been born in turmoil, strife, and change. This is a time of challenge to our interests and our values and it's a time that tests our wisdom and our skills.

At this time in Iran, 50 Americans are still held captive, innocent victims of terrorism and anarchy. Also at this moment, massive Soviet troops are attempting to subjugate the fiercely independent and deeply religious people of Afghanistan. These two acts—one of international terrorism and one of military aggression—present a serious challenge to the United States of America and indeed to all the nations of the world. Together, we will meet these threats to peace.

I'm determined that the United States will remain the strongest of all nations, but our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any nation or to the rights of any human being. We seek to be and to remain secure—a nation at peace in a stable world. But to be secure we must face the world as it is.

Three basic developments have helped to shape our challenges: the steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders; the overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and the press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world, exemplified by the revolution in Iran.

Each of these factors is important in its own right. Each interacts with the others. All must be faced together, squarely and courageously. We will face these challenges, and we will meet them with the best that is in us. And we will not fail.

In response to the abhorrent act in Iran, our Nation has never been aroused and unified so greatly in peacetime. Our position is clear. The United States will not yield to blackmail.

We continue to pursue these specific goals: first, to protect the present and long-range interests of the United States; secondly, to preserve the lives of the American hostages and to secure, as quickly as possible, their safe release, if possible, to avoid bloodshed which might further endanger the lives of our fellow citizens; to enlist the help of other nations in condemning this act of violence, which is shocking and violates the moral and the legal standards of a civilized world; and also to convince and to persuade the Iranian leaders that the real danger to their nation lies in the north, in the Soviet Union and from the Soviet troops now in Afghanistan, and that the unwarranted Iranian quarrel with the United States hampers their response to this far greater danger to them.

If the American hostages are harmed, a severe price will be paid. We will never rest until every one of the American hostages are released.

But now we face a broader and more fundamental challenge in this region because of the recent military action of the Soviet Union.

Now, as during the last 3 1/2 decades, the relationship between our country, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union is the most critical factor in determining whether the world will live at peace or be engulfed in global conflict.

Since the end of the Second World War, America has led other nations in meeting the challenge of mounting Soviet power. This has not been a simple or a static relationship. Between us there has been cooperation, there has been competition, and at times there has been confrontation.

In the 1940's we took the lead in creating the Atlantic Alliance in response to the Soviet Union's suppression and then consolidation of its East European empire and the resulting threat of the Warsaw Pact to Western Europe.

In the 1950's we helped to contain further Soviet challenges in Korea and in the Middle East, and we rearmed to assure the continuation of that containment.

In the 1960's we met the Soviet challenges in Berlin, and we faced the Cuban missile crisis. And we sought to engage the Soviet Union in the important task of moving beyond the cold war and away from confrontation.

And in the 1970's three American Presidents negotiated with the Soviet leaders in attempts to halt the growth of the nuclear arms race. We sought to establish rules of behavior that would reduce the risks of conflict, and we searched for areas of cooperation that could make our relations reciprocal and productive, not only for the sake of our two nations but for the security and peace of the entire world.



In all these actions, we have maintained two commitments: to be ready to meet any challenge by Soviet military power, and to develop ways to resolve disputes and to keep the peace.

Preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility of the two superpowers. That's why we've negotiated the strategic arms limitation treaties—SALT I and SALT II. Especially now, in a time of great tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of these treaties will be in the best interest of both countries and will help to preserve world peace. I will consult very closely with the Congress on this matter as we strive to control nuclear weapons. That effort to control nuclear weapons will not be abandoned.

We superpowers also have the responsibility to exercise restraint in the use of our great military force. The integrity and the independence of weaker nations must not be threatened. They must know that in our presence they are secure.

But now the Soviet Union has taken a radical and an aggressive new step. It's using its great military power against a relatively defenseless nation. The implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War.

The vast majority of nations on Earth have condemned this latest Soviet attempt to extend its colonial domination of others and have demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Moslem world is especially and justifiably outraged by this aggression against an Islamic people. No action of a world power has ever been so quickly and so overwhelmingly condemned. But verbal condemnation is not enough. The Soviet Union must pay a concrete price for their aggression.

While this invasion continues, we and the other nations of the world cannot conduct business as usual with the Soviet Union. That's why the United States has imposed stiff economic penalties on the Soviet Union. I will not issue any permits for Soviet ships to fish in the coastal waters of the United States. I've cut Soviet access to high-technology equipment and to agricultural products. I've limited other commerce with the Soviet Union, and I've asked our allies and friends to join with us in restraining their own trade with the Soviets and not to replace our own embargoed items. And I have notified the Olympic Committee that with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, neither the American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow.

The Soviet Union is going to have to answer some basic questions: Will it help promote a more stable international environment in which its own legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, and use that power for colonial conquest? The Soviet Union must realize

that its decision to use military force in Afghanistan will be costly to every political and economic relationship it values.

The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.

This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come. It demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the Persian Gulf and in Southwest Asia. It demands the participation of all those who rely on oil from the Middle East and who are concerned with global peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close cooperation with countries in the area which might be threatened.

Meeting this challenge will take national will, diplomatic and political wisdom, economic sacrifice, and, of course, military capability. We must call on the best that is in us to preserve the security of this crucial region.

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

During the past 3 years, you have joined with me to improve our own security and the prospects for peace, not only in the vital oil-producing area of the Persian Gulf region but around the world. We've increased annually our real commitment for defense, and we will sustain this increase of effort throughout the Five Year Defense Program. It's imperative that Congress approve this strong defense budget for 1981, encompassing a 5-percent real growth in authorizations, without any reduction.

We are also improving our capability to deploy U.S. military forces rapidly to distant areas. We've helped to strengthen NATO and our other alliances, and recently we and other NATO members have decided to develop and to deploy modernized, intermediate-range nuclear forces to meet an unwarranted and increased threat from the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union.

We are working with our allies to prevent conflict in the Middle East. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is a notable achievement which represents a strategic asset for America and which also enhances prospects for regional and world peace. We are now

engaged in further negotiations to provide full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza, to resolve the Palestinian issue in all its aspects, and to preserve the peace and security of Israel. Let no one doubt our commitment to the security of Israel. In a few days we will observe an historic event when Israel makes another major withdrawal from the Sinai and when Ambassadors will be exchanged between Israel and Egypt.

We've also expanded our own sphere of friendship. Our deep commitment to human rights and to meeting human needs has improved our relationship with much of the Third World. Our decision to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China will help to preserve peace and stability in Asia and in the Western Pacific.

We've increased and strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and we are now making arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf.

We've reconfirmed our 1959 agreement to help Pakistan preserve its independence and its integrity. The United States will take action consistent with our own laws to assist Pakistan in resisting any outside aggression. And I'm asking the Congress specifically to reaffirm this agreement. I'm also working, along with the leaders of other nations, to provide additional military and economic aid for Pakistan. That request will come to you in just a few days.

In the weeks ahead, we will further strengthen political and military ties with other nations in the region. We believe that there are no irreconcilable differences between us and any Islamic nation. We respect the faith of Islam, and we are ready to cooperate with all Moslem countries.

Finally, we are prepared to work with other countries in the region to share a cooperative security framework that respects differing values and political beliefs, yet which enhances the independence, security, and prosperity of all.

All these efforts combined emphasize our dedication to defend and preserve the vital interests of the region and of the nation which we represent and those of our allies—in Europe and the Pacific, and also in the parts of the world which have such great strategic importance to us, stretching especially through the Middle East and Southwest Asia. With your help, I will pursue these efforts with vigor and with determination. You and I will act as necessary to protect and to preserve our Nation's security.

The men and women of America's Armed Forces are on duty tonight in many parts of the world. I'm proud of the job they are doing, and I know you share that pride. I believe that our volunteer forces are adequate for current defense needs, and I hope that it will not become necessary to impose a draft. However, we must be prepared for that possibility.

For this reason, I have determined that the Selective Service System must now be revitalized. I will send legislation and budget proposals to the Congress next month so that we can begin registration and then meet future mobilization needs rapidly if they arise.

We also need clear and quick passage of a new charter to define the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies. We will guarantee that abuses do not recur, but we must tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information, and we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence.

The decade ahead will be a time of rapid change, as nations everywhere seek to deal with new problems and age-old tensions. But America need have no fear. We can thrive in a world of change if we remain true to our values and actively engaged in promoting world peace. We will continue to work as we have for peace in the Middle East and southern Africa. We will continue to build our ties with developing nations, respecting and helping to strengthen their national independence which they have struggled so hard to achieve. And we will continue to support the growth of democracy and the protection of human rights.

In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except through violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together through open, democratic methods, the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and far more enduring. That is why our support for human rights in other countries is in our own national interest as well as part of our own national character.

Peace—a peace that preserves freedom—remains America's first goal. In the coming years, as a mighty nation we will continue to pursue peace. But to be strong abroad we must be strong at home. And in order to be strong, we must continue to face up to the difficult issues that confront us as a nation today.

The crises in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized a very important lesson: Our excessive dependence on foreign oil is a clear and present danger to our Nation's security. The need has never been more urgent. At long last, we must have a clear, comprehensive energy policy for the United States.

As you well know, I have been working with the Congress in a concentrated and persistent way over the past 3 years to meet this need. We have made progress together. But Congress must act promptly now to complete final action on this vital energy legislation. Our Nation will then have a major conservation effort, important initiatives to develop solar power, realistic pricing based on the true value of oil, strong incentives for the production of coal and other fossil fuels in the United States, and our Nation's most massive peacetime investment in the development of synthetic fuels.

The American people are making progress in energy conservation. Last year we reduced overall petroleum consumption by 8 percent and gasoline consumption by 5 percent below what it was the year before. Now we must do more.

After consultation with the Governors, we will set gasoline conservation goals for each of the 50 States, and I will make them mandatory if these goals are not met.

I've established an import ceiling for 1980 of 8.2 million barrels a day—well below the level of foreign oil purchases in 1977. I expect our imports to be much lower than this, but the ceiling will be enforced by an oil import fee if necessary. I'm prepared to lower these imports still further if the other oil-consuming countries will join us in a fair and mutual reduction. If we have a serious shortage, I will not hesitate to impose mandatory gasoline rationing immediately.

The single biggest factor in the inflation rate last year, the increase in the inflation rate last year, was from one cause: the skyrocketing prices of OPEC oil. We must take whatever actions are necessary to reduce our dependence on foreign oil—and at the same time reduce inflation.

As individuals and as families, few of us can produce energy by ourselves. But all of us can conserve energy—every one of us, every day of our lives. Tonight I call on you—in fact, all the people of America—to help our Nation. Conserve energy. Eliminate waste. Make 1980 indeed a year of energy conservation.

Of course, we must take other actions to strengthen our Nation's economy.

First, we will continue to reduce the deficit and then to balance the Federal budget.

Second, as we continue to work with business to hold down prices, we'll build also on the historic national accord with organized labor to restrain pay increases in a fair fight against inflation.

Third, we will continue our successful efforts to cut paperwork and to dismantle unnecessary Government regulation.

Fourth, we will continue our progress in providing jobs for America, concentrating on a major new program to provide training and work for our young people, especially minority youth. It has been said that "a mind is a terrible thing to waste." We will give our young people new hope for jobs and a better life in the 1980's.

And fifth, we must use the decade of the 1980's to attack the basic structural weaknesses and problems in our economy through measures to increase productivity, savings, and investment.

With these energy and economic policies, we will make America even stronger at home in this decade—just as our foreign and defense policies will make us stronger and safer throughout the world. We will never abandon our struggle for a just and a decent society here at home. That's the heart of America—and it's the source of our ability to inspire other people to defend their own rights abroad.

Our material resources, great as they are, are limited. Our problems are too complex for simple slogans or for quick solutions. We cannot solve them without effort and sacrifice. Walter Lippmann once reminded us, "You took the good things for granted. Now you must earn them again. For every right that you cherish, you have a duty which you must fulfill. For every good which you wish to preserve, you will have to sacrifice your comfort and your ease. There is nothing for nothing any longer."

Our challenges are formidable. But there's a new spirit of unity and resolve in our country. We move into the 1980's with confidence and hope and a bright vision of the America we want: an America strong and free, an America at peace, an America with equal rights for all citizens—and for women, guaranteed in the United States Constitution—an America with jobs and good health and good education for every citizen, an America with a clean and bountiful life in our cities and on our farms, an America that helps to feed the world, an America secure in filling its own energy needs, an America of justice, tolerance, and compassion. For this vision to come true, we must sacrifice, but this national commitment will be an exciting enterprise that will unify our people.

Together as one people, let us work to build our strength at home, and together as one indivisible union, let us seek peace and security throughout the world.

Together let us make of this time of challenge and danger a decade of national resolve and of brave achievement. Thank you very much.

### 3. Text of Bush's address

<http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text/index.html>

September 11, 2001 Posted: 11:14 PM EDT (0314 GMT)

**(CNN) -- The text of President Bush's address Tuesday night, after terrorist attacks on New York and Washington:**

Good evening.

Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts.

The victims were in airplanes or in their offices -- secretaries, businessmen and women, military and federal workers. Moms and dads. Friends and neighbors.

Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.

The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness and a quiet, unyielding anger.

These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed. Our country is strong. A great people has been moved to defend a great nation.

Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shatter steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve.

America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining.

Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature, and we responded with the best of America, with the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring for strangers and neighbors who came to give blood and help in any way they could.

Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government's emergency response plans. Our military is powerful, and it's prepared. Our emergency teams are working in New York City and Washington, D.C., to help with local rescue efforts.

Our first priority is to get help to those who have been injured and to take every precaution to protect our citizens at home and around the world from further attacks.

The functions of our government continue without interruption. Federal agencies in Washington which had to be evacuated today are reopening for essential personnel tonight and will be open for business tomorrow.

Our financial institutions remain strong, and the American economy will be open for business as well.

The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the full resources for our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.

I appreciate so very much the members of Congress who have joined me in strongly condemning these attacks. And on behalf of the American people, I thank the many world leaders who have called to offer their condolences and assistance.

America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.

Tonight I ask for your prayers for all those who grieve, for the children whose worlds have been shattered, for all whose sense of safety and security has been threatened. And I pray they will be comforted by a power greater than any of us spoken through the ages in Psalm 23: "Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me."

This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time.

None of us will ever forget this day, yet we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world.

Thank you. Good night and God bless America.

President General Pervez Musharraf

#### ***4.Address to People of Pakistan***

delivered 19 September 2001

My dear countrymen, Asslam-o-Alaikum:

The situation confronting the nation today and the international crisis have impelled me to take the nation into confidence. First of all, I would like to express heartfelt sympathies to the United States for the thousands of valuable lives lost in the United States due to horrendous acts of terrorism.

We are all the more grieved because in this incident people from about 45 countries from all over the world lost their lives. People of all ages old, children, women and people from all and every religion lost their lives. Many Pakistanis also lost their lives. These people were capable Pakistanis who had gone to improve their lives. On this loss of lives I express my sympathies with those families. I pray to Allah to rest their souls in peace.

This act of terrorism has raised a wave of deep grief, anger and retaliation in the United States. Their first target from day one is Osama bin Laden's movement Al-Qaida about which they say that it is their first target. The second target are Taliban and that is



because Taliban have given refuge to Osama and his network. This has been their demand for many years. They have been demanding their extradition and presentation before the international court of justice. Taliban have been rejecting this.

The third target is a long war against terrorism at the international level. The thing to ponder is that in these three targets nobody is talking about war against Islam or the people of Afghanistan. Pakistan is being asked to support this campaign. What is this support? Generally speaking, these are three important things in which America is asking for our help. First is intelligence and information exchange, second support is the use of our airspace and the third is that they are asking for logistic support from us.

I would like to tell you now that they do not have any operational plan right now. Therefore we do not have any details on this count but we know that whatever are the United States' intentions they have the support of the UN Security Council and the General Assembly in the form of a resolution. This is a resolution for war against terrorism and this is a resolution for punishing those people who support terrorism. Islamic countries have supported this resolution. This is the situation as it prevailed in the outside world.

Now I would like to inform you about the internal situation. Pakistan is facing a very critical situation and I believe that after 1971, this is the most critical period. The decision we take today can have far-reaching and wide-ranging consequences. The crisis is formidable and unprecedented. If we take wrong decisions in this crisis, it can lead to worst consequences. On the other hand, if we take right decisions, its results will be good. The negative consequences can endanger Pakistan's integrity and solidarity. Our critical concerns, our important concerns can come under threat. When I say critical concerns, I mean our strategic assets and the cause of Kashmir. If these come under threat it would be a worse situation for us.

On the other hand, we can re-emerge politically as a responsible and dignified nation and all our difficulties can be minimized. I have considered all these factors and held consultations with those who hold different opinions. I met the corps commanders, National Security Council and the Federal Cabinet. I interacted with the media. I invited the religious scholars and held discussions with them. I met politicians. I also invited intellectuals. I will be meeting with the tribal chiefs and Kashmiri leaders tomorrow. This is the same process of consultation that I held earlier. I noted that there was difference of opinion but an overwhelming majority favors patience, prudence and wisdom. Some of them, I think about ten percent favored sentimental approach.

Let us now take a look at the designs of our neighboring country. They offered all their military facilities to the United States. They have offered without hesitation, all their

facilities, all their bases and full logistic support. They want to enter into any alliance with the United States and get Pakistan declared a terrorist state. They want to harm our strategic assets and the Kashmir cause. Not only this, recently certain countries met in Dushanbe. India was one of them. Indian representative was there. What do

the Indians want? they do not have common borders with Afghanistan anywhere. It is totally isolated from Afghanistan. In my view, it would not be surprising, that the Indians want to ensure that if and when the government in Afghanistan changes, it shall be an anti-Pakistan government. It is very important that while the entire world is talking about this horrible terrorist attack, our neighboring country instead of talking peace and cooperation, was trying hard to harm Pakistan and defame Islam. If you watch their television, you will find them dishing out propaganda against Pakistan, day in and day out. I would like to tell India "Lay Off".

Pakistan's armed forces and every Pakistani citizen is ready to offer any sacrifice in order to defend Pakistan and secure its strategic assets. Make no mistake and entertain no misunderstanding. At this very moment our Air Force is at high alert; and they are ready for "Do or die" Missions My countrymen! In such a situation, a wrong decision can lead to unbearable losses. What are our critical concerns and priorities? These are four;

1. First of all is the security of the country and external threat.
2. Second is our economy and its revival.
3. Third are our strategic nuclear and missile assets.
4. And Kashmir cause.

The four are our critical concerns. Any wrong judgement on our part can damage all our interests. While taking a decision, we have to keep in mind all these factors. The decision should reflect supremacy of righteousness and it should be in conformity with Islam. Whatever we are doing, it is according to Islam and it upholds the principle of righteousness. I would like to say that decisions about the national interests should be made with wisdom and rational judgement.

At this moment, it is not the question of bravery or cowardice. We are all very brave. My own response in such situations is usually of daring. But bravery without rational judgement tantamount to stupidity. There is no clash between bravery and sound judgement. Allah Almighty says in the holy Quran, "The one bestowed with sagacity is the one who get a big favor from Allah". We have to take recourse to sanity. We have to save our nation from damage. We have to build up; our national respect. "Pakistan comes first, everything else comes later".

Some scholars and religious leaders are inclined towards taking emotional decisions. I would like to remind them the events of the first six years of the history of Islam. The Islamic calendar started from migration. The significance of migration is manifested from the fact that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) went from Makkah to Madinah. He (PBUH) migrated to safeguard Islam. What was migration? God forbid, was it an act of cowardice? The Holy Prophet (PBUH) signed the charter of Madinah (Meesaq-e-Madinah) with the Jewish tribes. It was an act of sagacity. This treaty remained effective for six years. Three battles were fought with non-believers of Makkah during this period - the battle of Badr, Uhud and Khandaq. The Muslims emerged victorious in these battles with the non-believers of Makkah because the Jews had signed a treaty with the Muslims.

After six years, the Jews were visibly disturbed with the progress of Islam, which was getting stronger and stronger. They conspired to forge covert relations with the non-believers of Makkah. Realizing the danger, the Holy Prophet (PBUH) signed the treaty of Hudaibiya with the Makkhans who had been imposing wars on Islam. This was a no war pact. I would like to draw your attention to one significant point of this pact. The last portion of the pact was required to be signed by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) as Muhammad Rasool Allah. The non-believers contested that they did not recognize Muhammad (PBUH) as the Prophet of Allah. They demanded to erase these words from the text of the treaty. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) agreed but Hazrat Umar (R.A) protested against it. He got emotional and asked the Holy Prophet (PBUH) if he was not the messenger of God (God forbid) and whether the Muslims were not on the right path while signing the treaty.

The Holy Prophet (PBUH) advised Hazrat Umar (R.A) not to be led by emotions as the dictates of national thinking demanded signing of the treaty at that time. He (PBUH) said, this was advantageous to Islam and as years would pass by you would come to know of its benefits. "This is exactly what happened. Six months later in the battle of Khyber, Muslims, by the grace of Allah, again became victorious. It should be remembered that this became possible because Makkhans could not attack because of the treaty. On 8 Hijra by the grace of Allah glory of Islam spread to Makkah.

What is the lesson for us in this? The lesson is that when there is a crisis situation, the path of wisdom is better than the path of emotions. Therefore, we have to take a strategic decision. There is no question of weakness of faith or cowardice. For Pakistan, life can be sacrificed and I am sure every Pakistani will give his life for Pakistan. I have fought two wars. I have seen dangers. I faced them and by the grace of Allah never committed a cowardly act. But at this time one should not bring harm to the country. We cannot make the future of a hundred and forty million people bleak. Even otherwise it is said in Shariah that if there are two difficulties at a time and a selection has to be made it is

better to opt for the lesser one. Some of our friends seem to be much worried about Afghanistan.

I must tell them that I and my government are much more worried about Afghanistan and Taliban. I have done everything for Afghanistan and Taliban when the entire world is against them. I have met about twenty to twenty five world leaders and talked to each of them in favor of the Taliban. I have told them that sanctions should not be imposed on Afghanistan and that we should engage them. I have been repeating this stance before all leaders but I am sorry to say that none of our friends accepted this.

Even in this situation, we are trying our best to cooperate with them. I sent Director General ISI with my personal letter to Mullah Umar. He returned after spending two days there. I have informed Mullah Umar about the gravity of the situation. We are trying our best to come out of this critical situation without any damage to Afghanistan and Taliban. This is my earnest endeavor and with the blessings of Allah I will continue to seek such a way out.

We are telling the Americans too that they should be patient. Whatever their plans, they should be cautious and balanced: We are asking them to come up with whatever evidence they have against Osama bin Laden; What I would like to know is how do we save Afghanistan and Taliban. And how do we ensure that they suffer minimum losses: I am sure that you will favor that we do so and bring some improvement by working with the nations of the world. At this juncture, I am worried about Pakistan only.

I am the Supreme Commander of Pakistan and I give top priority to the defense of Pakistan, Defense of any other country comes later. We want to take decisions in the interest of Pakistan. I know that the majority of the people favor our decisions. I also know that some elements are trying to take unfair advantage of the situation and promote their personal agenda and advance the interests of their parties. They are poised to create dissensions and damage the country. There is no reason why this minority should be allowed to hold the sane majority as a hostage. I appeal to all Pakistanis to display unity and solidarity and foil the nefarious designs of such elements who intend to harm the interests of the country.

At this critical juncture, we have to frustrate the evil designs of our enemies and safeguard national interests. Pakistan is considered a fortress of Islam. God forbid, if this fortress is harmed in any way it would cause damage to the cause of Islam. My dear countrymen, Have trust in me the way you reposed trust in me before going to Agra. I did not disappoint the nation there. We have not compromised on national honor and integrity and I shall not disappoint you on this occasion either. This is firm pledge to you. In the end before I take your leave, I would like to end with the prayer of Hazrat Musa

[Prophet Moses] as given in Sura-e-Taha: "May Allah open my chest, make my task easier, untie my tongue so that they may comprehend my intent".

May Allah be with us in our endeavors.

5. Text Of The President's Speech to the Congress  
Sept. 20, 2001

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President pro tempore, Members of Congress, and fellow Americans:

In the normal course of events, Presidents come to this chamber to report on the state of the Union. Tonight, no such report is needed. It has already been delivered by the American people.

We have seen it in the courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save others on the ground - passengers like an exceptional man named Todd Beamer. Please help me to welcome his wife, Lisa Beamer, here tonight.

We have seen the state of our Union in the endurance of rescuers, working past exhaustion. We have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers ? in English, Hebrew, and Arabic. We have seen the decency of a loving and giving people, who have made the grief of strangers their own.

My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire world has seen for itself the state of our Union and it is strong.

Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.

I thank the Congress for its leadership at such an important time. All of America was touched on the evening of the tragedy to see Republicans and Democrats, joined together on the steps of this Capitol, singing "God Bless America." And you did more than sing, you acted, by delivering forty billion dollars to rebuild our communities and meet the needs of our military.

Speaker Hastert and Minority Leader Gephardt Majority Leader Daschle and Senator Lott I thank you for your friendship and your leadership and your service to our country.

And on behalf of the American people, I thank the world for its outpouring of support. America will never forget the sounds of our National Anthem playing at Buckingham Palace, and on the streets of Paris, and at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate. We will not forget South Korean children gathering to pray outside our embassy in Seoul, or the prayers of sympathy offered at a mosque in Cairo. We will not forget moments of silence and days of mourning in Australia and Africa and Latin America.

Nor will we forget the citizens of eighty other nations who died with our own. Dozens of Pakistanis. More than 130 Israelis. More than 250 citizens of India. Men and women from El

Salvador, Iran, Mexico, and Japan. And hundreds of British citizens. America has no truer friend than Great Britain. Once again, we are joined together in a great cause. The British Prime Minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity of purpose with America, and tonight we welcome Tony Blair.

On September the eleventh, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.

Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking: Who attacked our country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al-Qaida. They are the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole.

Al-Qaida is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.

The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists' directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and children.

This group and its leader a person named Usama bin Ladin are linked to many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

There are thousands of these terrorists in more than sixty countries. They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods, and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction.

The leadership of al-Qaida has great influence in Afghanistan, and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al-Qaida's vision for the world.

Afghanistan's people have been brutalized many are starving and many have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough.

The United States respects the people of Afghanistan after all, we are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid but we condemn the Taliban regime. It is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder. And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban:

- Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al-Qaida who hide in your land.
- Release all foreign nationals including American citizens you have unjustly imprisoned, and protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in your country.
- Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities.
- Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.

These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.

I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world: We respect your faith. It is practiced freely by many millions of Americans, and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.

Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.

Americans are asking: Why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.

They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa.

These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way.

We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions by abandoning every value except the will to power ? they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies.

Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law

enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war to the disruption and defeat of the global terror network.

This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with its decisive liberation of territory and its swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat.

Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on television, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.

Our Nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans.

Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security. These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. So tonight I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me the Office of Homeland Security.

These measures are essential. But the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.

Many will be involved in this effort, from FBI agents to intelligence operatives to the reservists we have called to active duty. All deserve our thanks, and all have our prayers. And tonight, a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, I have a message for our military: Be ready. I have called the armed forces to alert, and there is a reason. The hour is coming when America will act, and you will make us proud.

This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.

We ask every nation to join us. We will ask, and we will need, the help of police forces, intelligence services, and banking systems around the world. The United States is grateful that many nations and many international organizations have already responded with sympathy and with support. Nations from Latin America, to Asia, to Africa, to Europe, to the Islamic world. Perhaps the NATO Charter reflects best the attitude of the world: an attack on one is an attack on all.

The civilized world is rallying to America's side. They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, can not only



bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. And we will not allow it.

Americans are asking: What is expected of us? I ask you to live your lives and hug your children. I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat.

I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them. No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background or religious faith.

I ask you to continue to support the victims of this tragedy with your contributions. Those who want to give can go to a central source of information, [libertyunites.org](http://libertyunites.org), to find the names of groups providing direct help in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.

The thousands of FBI agents who are now at work in this investigation may need your cooperation, and I ask you to give it.

I ask for your patience, with the delays and inconveniences that may accompany tighter security? and for your patience in what will be a long struggle.

I ask your continued participation and confidence in the American economy. Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity. They did not touch its source. America is successful because of the hard work, and creativity, and enterprise of our people. These were the true strengths of our economy before September eleventh, and they are our strengths today.

Finally, please continue praying for the victims of terror and their families, for those in uniform, and for our great country. Prayer has comforted us in sorrow, and will help strengthen us for the journey ahead.

Tonight I thank my fellow Americans for what you have already done and for what you will do. And ladies and gentlemen of the Congress, I thank you, their representatives, for what you have already done, and for what we will do together.

Tonight, we face new and sudden national challenges. We will come together to improve air safety, to dramatically expand the number of air marshals on domestic flights, and take new measures to prevent hijacking. We will come together to promote stability and keep our airlines flying with direct assistance during this emergency.

We will come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home. We will come together to strengthen our intelligence capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act, and find them before they strike.

We will come together to take active steps that strengthen America's economy, and put our people back to work.

Tonight we welcome here two leaders who embody the extraordinary spirit of all New Yorkers: Governor George Pataki, and Mayor Rudy Giuliani. As a symbol of America's resolve, my Administration will work with the Congress, and these two leaders, to show the world that we will rebuild New York City.

After all that has just passed ? all the lives taken, and all the possibilities and hopes that died with them it is natural to wonder if America's future is one of fear. Some speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead, and dangers to face. But this country will define our times, not be defined by them. As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world.

Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time now depends on us. Our Nation this generation will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause, by our efforts and by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.

It is my hope that in the months and years ahead, life will return almost to normal. We'll go back to our lives and routines, and that is good. Even grief recedes with time and grace. But our resolve must not pass. Each of us will remember what happened that day, and to whom it happened. We will remember the moment the news came ? where we were and what we were doing. Some will remember an image of fire, or a story of rescue. Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever.

And I will carry this. It is the police shield of a man named George Howard, who died at the World Trade Center trying to save others. It was given to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. This is my reminder of lives that ended, and a task that does not end.

I will not forget this wound to our country, or those who inflicted it. I will not yield I will not rest I will not relent in waging this struggle for the freedom and security of the American people.

The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.

Fellow citizens, we will meet violence with patient justice assured of the rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come. In all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America.

Thank you.

## 6. The News

October 2, 2003

**Pakistan rejects Armitage's criticism**

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan on Wednesday rejected top US envoy Richard Armitage's criticism of its military's cooperation in blocking resurgent Taliban infiltrators into Afghanistan.

The deputy US secretary of state, who will meet President Musharraf on Saturday in Islamabad, said on Tuesday he believed Musharraf was genuinely trying to curb Taliban and al-Qaeda activities in Pakistan's western tribal regions, but that he did not have full support.

"But I do not think that affection for working with us extends up and down the rank-and-file of the Pakistani security community," he told US lawmakers in Washington. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher has said Armitage would press Musharraf on military cooperation in blocking the Taliban during their weekend meeting.

Pakistan's Foreign Ministry retorted that the military is 100 per cent behind General Musharraf. "The president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. All security agencies are answerable to him and they follow his direction faithfully," spokesman Masood Khan told AFP. "Our government is working as one unit," he added.

The spokesman said the al-Qaeda remnants and the Taliban are not being allowed to regroup on the Pakistani side. "They are being fiercely pursued and interdicted," Khan said. He took a swipe at Afghanistan for not doing enough to cooperate in trilateral efforts also engaging the 10,000 US troops hunting the fugitive extremists. "There's a need to improve coordination between the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan especially in the area of intelligence sharing. A greater effort needs to be mounted on the Afghan side," Khan said and added "We feel that all sides should continue to work closely to achieve common objectives."

#### 7. The News September 5, 2003 The Osama game

Two items by our correspondents carry news about the hectic efforts of the government to catch the al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden who also tops US' most wanted list. The first one surmises preparations for a massive 'catch Osama' operation in the tribal belt on the basis of the movement of troops and arrival of two dozen army helicopters in Bannu. The other quotes Federal Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayat as saying that while the 'exact whereabouts of Osama are not known' the noose is tightening around him.

While one refers to the ongoing military operations to catch the elusive billionaire turned Afghan mujahid turned a bete noire for United States, the other by the minister evidently caters to the civilian side of our government's current predominant concern. It is for this reason that the media almost daily carries reports of Osama sightings, Osama tapes and Osama whereabouts. He could be anywhere or nowhere as the federal minister rightly said that though his 'exact whereabouts were not known, time, space and options are becoming limited by the day for Osama and all those linked to him.' This is the right spirit for an interior minister whose duty it is to catch international or home-grown criminals, but one hopes that more of that spirit will be shown on the ground.

There is no doubt the law and order in the country is rapidly deteriorating with the rise of sectarianism and a sudden jump in run of the mill crimes like robbery, murder, rape and a dramatic increase in road accidents. The minister who seems to have kept himself posted on the day to day reports about the Osama game must also direct his attention towards what is happening across Pakistan. The country's intelligence agencies along with the army and para-military forces, aided by American experts, are already fully involved with the national aim which should allow the minister to attend to the immediate problem the people face from the local criminals who appear to be having a field day.

8. Dawn  
October 4, 2003

Troubled Frontier

Two bloody battles on Wednesday and Thursday serve to underline the precarious security situation along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. In Thursday's clash in South Waziristan, the Pakistan Army lost two soldiers while eight Al Qaeda men were killed.

The battle - in a village near Wana - began in the morning and continued well into the evening. The army had also to call in helicopters to flush out the militants. This testifies to Al Qaeda's ability to acquire weapons and challenge the army in the tribal area. More important, the episode serves to underline the fact that Al Qaeda still has sympathizers in the tribal belt. Without support from the local population, it would not have been possible for these militants, all of them said to be foreigners, to challenge Pakistan's security forces. A day earlier, 10 Afghan soldiers were killed when attacked by the Taliban at a place north of Kandahar.

The two clashes make it obvious that Al Qaeda and Taliban are far from being vanquished as they were supposed to have been in December 2001 when Kandahar, the last of the Taliban bastions, fell. The militants are now on both sides of the border, and it is fallacious to assume - as often done by Kabul - that they are solely based in Pakistan's tribal area.

The Taliban are to be found all over Afghanistan. They may be lying low, but they are quite capable of mounting offensives against Afghan security forces when and where they choose. In fact, at places the Taliban are strong enough to claim that they have control over some areas of Afghan territory: the Barmal District, 15 miles from Pakistan, is in their control.

The fight against Al Qaeda is compounded by the kind of terrain and tribal culture the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area has. The hilly terrain is one of the world's most difficult areas for any security force to look after. Military planners in the area must also take into consideration the tribesmen's fierce sense of independence. The vast majority of them may not be Taliban supporters, but they are suspicious of armed intrusions into their territory and guard the traditions of tribal independence jealously.

While this may be the position on the Pakistan side of the border, the situation in entire Afghanistan continues to be chaotic. The writ of the Karzai government is confined to Kabul, and the International Security Assistance Force refuses to venture out of the capital city. A

professional Afghan army which the Karzai government was to raise is nowhere near its planned strength, thus encouraging the warlords in their defiance of Kabul.

Both Islamabad and Kabul need to look into the issue of security more deeply. Pakistan, for instance, should try to ascertain the meaning of US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's claim that not all sections of our establishment are behind the government in the war on Al Qaeda. The Pakistan foreign office spokesman has hotly denied this, but more may need to be done to remove misgivings abroad. As for Afghanistan, it must set its house in order.

The Pakhtoons, Afghanistan's largest ethnic group, feel sidelined, because the Northern Alliance's Tajik group dominates the government. The warlords also refuse to share revenues with Kabul, and often hobnob with the Taliban to blackmail the Karzai government.

Both Islamabad and Kabul should know that the issue needs political handling more than resort to force. The two governments should also better coordinate their efforts against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The misunderstandings between the two have often enabled the Taliban to exploit these differences to their advantage.

9. Dawn  
February 26, 2004

Operations in tribal belt

The military operations against terrorists hiding in the tribal areas seem to be producing results. Even though the security agencies have a long way to go, the reported arrest of foreigners - estimated between 20 and 25 - serves to underline the gravity of the problem.

Mercifully, there were no casualties on either side, and the authorities were able to seize huge quantities of arms and ammunition. The success of the military operations has been possible because of the cooperation extended by the area's tribal maliks and elders. Before the operations, they had handed over 32 wanted terrorists to the security agencies.

About 40 are believed to be still at large. Those arrested on Tuesday are believed to include Saudi, Egyptian and Yemeni nationals, with something of a mystery surrounding some others.

Four women holding Kazakh passports are also stated to have been detained. Given Afghanistan's ethnic mix, one does not know whether they were activists or wives of Afghan nationals. In any case, the entire operations and arrests serve to point out the influence Al Qaeda still commands in Pakistan's tribal belt.

The war on terror is not going to be easy or short. To produce results, it must be sustained and pursued with vigour and pragmatism. More important than military operations is the question who are Al Qaeda's backers and supporters in Pakistan.

Al Qaeda is an international organization, and it goes without saying that it still has money and arms, besides activists who enjoy support in many parts of the Muslim world, including Pakistan. The operations in Pakistan since 9/11 have broken the organization's back, but it still exists.

Two powerful acts of terrorism in the post-9/11 period - the attack on the American consulate in Karachi and the killing of 11 French engineers in 2002 - showed that it was still capable of mounting spectacular acts of terrorism. Since these two events, no major incident on that scale has occurred.

There have been attacks on mosques and churches, but it is still not clear whether those were carried out by Al Qaeda agents or by Pakistani religious fanatics. The latter may have sympathy for Al Qaeda, but they may not necessarily be operating in tandem with that body.

This brings us to a most sensitive issue. There are many religious organizations which are quite puritan and strict in their interpretation of Islam, but they do not have a political agenda.

The focus of the government's attention, thus, must be those extremist and militant outfits which have gone underground after being banned but still have the capacity to strike. The large majority of madrassahs and the organizations which run them concern themselves with producing imams for the community by giving them the traditional Islamic education. This role they have performed for centuries in the Muslim world.

The current operations against Al Qaeda must, therefore, make a clear distinction between these two sets of people. It is the militants, sectarian extremists, and the remnants from the anti-Soviet jihad of the '80s that need to be tackled.

The foreign media claim that the latter category also has supporters in the Pakistani military. One should not be surprised, because, during his 11-year rule, Ziaul Haq unabashedly politicized part of the army and encouraged certain religious political parties to propagate their views even to cadets.

One hopes the armed forces' high command has learnt its lessons, and the Pakistan Army's professionalism will not be eroded by further exposure to the hidebound ideas and notions of any religious party or groups of so-called ideologues.

#### 10. Dawn

March 17, 2004

##### Foreign militants

As the Wana operation continues, Gen Pervez Musharraf has said that about 600 foreign militants are still holed up in South Waziristan. This is a high figure, even though it has not been clarified whether the ~~hunted men include any of the top Al Qaeda or Taliban fighters.~~

Their presence clearly underlines the stakes involved in the operation in terms of Pakistan's own internal security. The cost of failure would also spur accusations abroad that Islamabad is not doing enough to crack down on the Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants who persist in creating trouble for Afghanistan's interim administration. They also add to the reputation of the tribal areas as a sanctuary for all kinds of undesirable and extremist elements.

The problem began some 25 years ago when Pakistan became part of the US-led holy war against the Soviet Union, and the CIA provided overt and covert aid to the mujahideen to enable America to get even with Russia for its own humiliation in Vietnam.

Led by Gen Ziaul Haq, Pakistan played second fiddle to the US and served as a sanctuary and a training and recruitment ground for the fighters. Those who joined this US-led war were not only Afghans and Pakistani tribesmen but also zealots from other Muslim countries.

While some were indeed motivated by religious considerations, many had less than holy reasons for their involvement in it. When the Soviets finally departed, many of the foreign fighters chose to stay on in Afghanistan and took part in the ensuing civil war that practically decimated the country and brought the Taliban to power.

They flourished in Taliban's Afghanistan, which turned itself into a haven for terrorists, leading ultimately to 9/11. While the US attack on Afghanistan in October 2001 brought about a radical change and ousted the Taliban, many Al Qaeda workers, including foreign militants, found shelter in Pakistan's tribal areas where they enjoy a certain undeniable level of sympathy among sections of the local population.

Rooting them out is seen as providing the rationale for the government's operation which has now been going on for almost a month.

The government has asked local tribesmen in South Waziristan to raise a force themselves to pressure those hiding foreign elements to give them up. It has also given a guarantee that any foreigner who surrenders will not be handed over to any foreign country.

However, Islamabad should realize that the local tribes need more than mere exhortations, even if they come from the president, to change age-old habits. There has to be something in it for the tribesmen other than being told that they must now integrate with the rest of the world so that Pakistan's image can improve.

The region is extremely backward. Tribal attitudes have prevented the spread of education - and, ironically, without education and exposure, tribal attitudes will not change.

Tackling this paradox must be the government's priority as it establishes its writ in the region. This must be accompanied by a crash development programme aimed at improving the socio-economic condition of the people.

A package worth Rs7 billion was announced some time back but the funds have yet to be released. Priority should be given to releasing the money and to planning more development projects. The state must be seen as a benefactor and not a hostile and intruding entity, as it has been viewed since colonial times. The Wana operation may have to be assertive, but it must also proceed with the region's sensitivities taken into account.

## 11. The News

May 1, 2004

### Aliens in FATA

The Wana operation was finally ended in a show of heart warming camaraderie between the military and the tribesmen of the area. Misunderstandings were removed, declarations of fealty to the state made, assurances given, amnesty announced and promises held out. One of the pledges from the military was to free those arrested during the operation. This has been fulfilled besides the fresh movements of troops has been stopped. However, the expectation that the aliens who have holed up in the tribal belt will have themselves registered voluntarily has not been fulfilled. None of the foreign al-Qaeda activists has come forward so far for the purpose. One of the reasons given is their distrust of the assurance that they will not be handed to the United States.

Although the aliens quitting the area was not made a part of the agreement reached between the government and the elders of the tribes, it was expected that given their promise of respecting Pakistan's laws the tribesmen will cease to harbour foreigners. This understandably would have forced them to quit the area, and since they had nowhere else to go, they would have to have themselves registered and be helped to settle down and lead normal lives. But the tribal elders have made it known that they are not bound to bring the aliens for registration.

This completely defeats the very purpose of the operation and the subsequent agreement reached to call it off and amounts to reneging on a solemn assurance. Although it was not expected that the aliens will be ferreted out and brought to the political agent's office for registration by force, there was an understanding that the tribals will rid themselves of a problem that has already cost them dearly. The government's reaction to this development is not known but it is expected that it will be considered seriously. It has virtually been made to walk up the garden path by the jirga and the elders and left to contend with a still unresolved problem.

Expelling the al-Qaeda activists from FATA is essential from a security point of view as it is dangerous to allow committed and battle-hardened foreign fighters to live in a sensitive area along the border. This is something no country would have allowed, its sense of hospitality notwithstanding. The government had already offered to settle them and help lead normal lives. This was a humanitarian gesture given the sense of helplessness of the aliens. However, this seems to have been rejected both by the foreigners and their hosts and will certainly force the government to reconsider its strategy.

### 12. The News

May 11, 2004

#### Aliens issue

The government's efforts to get the foreigners living in the South Waziristan Agency as 'guests' of some local tribesmen to register themselves with the authorities has received another setback. The aliens have flatly refused to do so while the tribesmen have declined to get them registered as there was no agreement on this score. An earlier agreement between the army and the concerned tribe had reached an understanding that the aliens will be required by their 'hosts' — a euphemism for those who harboured them — to get the aliens registered and in turn there will be no further interference by the government. A final date was set for registration which continued to



be extended because there was no response either from the foreigners or the local tribesmen. The latest ultimatum expired yesterday without any positive outcome although the government had even pardoned a clutch of locals who were behind the bloody resistance.

Although the government's future course of action is not known, evidently every avenue for resolving the issue through all possible means will be exhausted before opting for resuming the operation. Some of the tribes of the area have started hectic efforts to peacefully settle the problem to avoid another round of destruction and mass displacement of the locals. But given the intractable attitude of some of the concerned tribal leaders, who are described as 'militants', the possibility of a peaceful settlement is remote. This could compel the government to resume the operation with a direction to force a favourable resolution.

However, even a second and probably a tougher round of the operation is not certain to succeed. Much water has flowed under the bridge and it will be difficult to undo the effects of a flawed policy that had been followed for decades. The end result could be more bloodshed and trouble all along the lengthy tribal belt. But at the same time it will not be safe to permit aliens in the sensitive area whose credentials do not omen well. No government with an eye on national security can tolerate the presence of unregistered foreigners.

The government's best bet lies in getting the tribes of the area to exercise their influence and punch if necessary to force the recalcitrant tribal hosts to be more co-operative. Till now the authorities have relied on jirgas, effective or ineffective and honest brokers to thrash out a solution. But the ability of the jirgas is limited as they neither have the capacity to speak from a position of strength nor sufficient backing of the government. Besides solemnly reached agreements tend to lack a means of correctly interpreting the terms and conditions and can be contested once the compulsion is over.

### 13. Dawn

May 20, 2004

#### Wana confusion

The government's campaign to persuade foreign militants hiding in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas to 'register' themselves with the authorities remains mired in confusion and uncertainty.

The facts so far are these: On April 24 a deal was brokered between a local leader of the militants and the government, represented by the Peshawar corps commander. The details of this deal were never made public and in fact doubts about its authenticity or permanence surfaced the next day when the government publicized it as a surrender on the part of the militants while the latter's leader claimed otherwise.

A deadline was then set for foreign fighters hiding in South Waziristan to register themselves with the authorities or face action. The official stand has been that the registration was an integral part of the April 24 deal, a position disputed by the militants' leader.

On Tuesday he told a newspaper from a secret location that the agreement made no mention of registration and threatened to launch attacks against what he called 'government targets'.

A 1,200-strong lashkar raised to trace foreign militants has so far found nothing. The matter, no doubt, is a sensitive one and needs proper handling. If the government believes foreign militants or terrorists are hiding in parts of the tribal areas, it is necessary that such elements are flushed out, apprehended and sent back to their respective countries of origin.

Unfortunately, the sensitivity of the situation has translated into a fumbling government response, characterized by hasty planning, failure of intelligence, tactical errors and policy reversals.

Many of the foreigners, mostly Arabs, have been in the region for years and have married among the locals, with whom they have thus acquired some acceptability. Driving them out or disciplining them can be a problem.

Facts like these underscore lack of political understanding on the part of the administration not just before or during the Wana operation, but over at least a decade and a half.

The local leader of the militants is a man who was first hotly pursued by government forces, then embraced by a senior army commander (on the day of the April 24 agreement, and after his sympathizers had ambushed and killed several troops) and is now again threatening to go on the offensive. The approach to the whole issue needs to be more coherent and unified.

#### 14. The News

June 20, 2004

##### Security interests

The South Waziristan tribal, Nek Mohammad who had become almost legend in the tribal belt as a result of his role during the army operations to round up foreigners was killed in a precision guided missile strike on Friday adding a new dimension to the situation. He was high on the most wanted list but it was not expected that he would be actually eliminated as the government was pursuing a policy of both conducting the operation as well as negotiating a peaceful settlement with the tribal elders. However, at no time did the authorities dilute their determination to flush out the foreign elements — who were suspected to be Al Qaeda activists — from the tribal belt and through out the off and on negotiations the issue of the foreigners was given top priority. Nek Mohammad who had emerged as an opponent of expelling or handing over the aliens to the government was understandably seen as the main driving force of the tribal resistance and was thus likely to be dealt with. But it was not expected that he would actually be physically extirpated.

Killing him was a risky venture as it will not be easily accepted by the people of the tribal belt and will certainly stoke the fires of revenge. Evidently the government has calculated the cost of killing the young tribal militant as a means of sending a tough message to the tribal resistance. But there is every reason to fear that this action will worsen the situation and could have far reaching effect in the future. Nek Mohammad was not just an archetypal young tribal fighter among the many in FATA but was a hugely popular personality. His death has caused apparent

grief among the people as was evident by the large number who attended his funeral, many of them emotionally charged and weeping. Just like coming events cast their shadows, this incident will certainly loom large and formidable in the future.

However, the government cannot be faulted as it had to keep the security of the state uppermost and in pursuit of its policy could not have permitted a few persons to oppose its policy. The government is on record as having offered to register the foreign elements to regularise their stay in Pakistan and enable them to settle down peacefully. This offer had come from President Musharraf himself and was frequently reiterated during the negotiations through jirgas with the those tribals who were harbouring the foreigners. The unwillingness of the aliens to accept the offer and the protection being provided them by their tribal hosts created a situation which led to the missile strike. The killing of Nek Mohammad makes it clear the time for resolving the problem through negotiations is over and more operations can be expected.

The strike itself has also become a source of controversy and many in the area see American hand in the action. Witnesses claim that a US drone was seen overhead and it fired the fatal missile. The ISPR, however, confirms that it was a precision guided missile strike by an army helicopter with the help of satellite.

#### 15. Dawn

June 20, 2004

##### Nek Mohammad's death

Tribal militant Nek Mohammad's death in a missile attack by security forces brings to an end the drama that began with the famous "Shakai embrace" on April 24. Even though the events preceding the surrender at Shakai and the subsequent military operations had a larger dimension, Nek Mohammad was its central figure. On April 24, he had surrendered to the security forces along with five other wanted men and had promised to live in peace. As part of the bargain, the government later released 50 prisoners.

However, immediately after the surrender, differences arose over the terms of the agreement. Nek insisted he never promised to surrender foreign terrorists hiding in the Wana area. He said that foreigners living in South Waziristan were passing normal lives and were not involved in any terrorist activity. The government, then, accused him of a breach of faith and went after him.

Honour and promise have a special place in a tribal society. For that reason, Nek lost the sympathy of many tribal elders. In fact, despite having an array of modern electronic devices - as claimed by the military spokesman - the security forces could not have kept track of his movement without some tribesmen's cooperation. His death in a village on Wana's outskirts may constitute a victory for the security forces, but that does not end the problem for Islamabad.

Terrorists loyal to Al Qaeda are very much there in the tribal area, and only an uninterrupted pursuit of the problem can produce results in the long run. This means that the government should place as much emphasis on political means as on military. Al Qaeda still has sympathizers in the

tribal belt, but the tribesmen's cooperation for getting hold of them can be won by economic and political means.

The tribesmen should be made to realize that Al Qaeda and foreign militants were involved in acts of terror, violence and subversion in Pakistan and that the victims of their terrorist activity were often innocent Pakistanis. They must be told that such criminal offences in no way serve the cause of Islam or contribute to this country's peace, progress and stability.

#### 16. The News July 4, 2007

##### Lal Masjid endgame

The 30th anniversary today of Gen Ziaul Haq's coup d'etat finds a central part of the capital of Pakistan a virtual battlefield. Tuesday, the first day of what is being described as the government's "countdown" to its long-promised operation to end the armed rebellion of the Lal Masjid-Jamia Hafsa clerics, saw ten people dying during exchanges of fire. Residents around the mosque-seminary complex are fleeing their homes and there is a curfew in the area. It is a frightening thought what kind of situation the operation itself would produce. While the death toll so far is most unfortunate, the fact of the matter is that the government seems to have little choice but to act in the manner that it did since Tuesday. It is a sign that the government of President Pervez Musharraf has at last decided to grasp the nettle and started a process it was needlessly putting off. One can only hope that the matter is now resolved without any further loss of life or injury.

Despite the wide welcome the government's reaction has received among ordinary Pakistanis, questions are being raised as to why the basic measures that are being adopted at this late stage were not taken before. If it had been imposed before, the curfew would have prevented the entry of terrorists and their supporters into the complex, with their gadgets and their fearsome weaponry whose very procurement by civilians is a mystery; Maulana Abdul Aziz is a remarkably modern man for someone who is such a strong believer in omens and divinations he bases his jihadi decisions on them. The government has moved only now to disconnect water and electricity to the mosque and seminary. An earlier discontinuation of these would have forced most of those inside to leave sooner or later. It's surprising that the government didn't know that, as is apparent now from the interviews of the bewildered pupils leaving Lal Masjid, a large number of the occupants were virtual prisoners..or at least didn't know exactly why they were there or were being held, more or less, against their will. Their victimisation lends another unfortunate aspect to the authorities' dragging their feet.

Among the critics, there are those who see the delay as part of a government plan to use the operation as a kind of a diversionary tactic -- away from other pressing problems, some of which had been hogging the media spotlight of late. Their argument is that it is not exactly a coincidence that the operation came a day after the government took a severe battering before the Supreme Court's 13-member full court (which also resulted in a blanket ban on intelligence personnel from the superior courts). However, there is no proof really to lend any validity to their standpoint. Other criticisms though, especially those that question how and why the government permitted

the Lal Masjid-Jamia Hafsa students to occupy state-owned property for months on end and how the complex managed to build up a sophisticated weapons arsenal (given that it is situated in the heart of the federal capital and at a stone's throw from the headquarters of the ISI) are valid.

As for Lal Masjid itself, a little bit of a history lesson would help contextualise what has happened. The father of the two brothers who run Lal Masjid, Maulana Abdullah, was close to Gen Zia and many a senior politician and military man. During the time of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, Lal Masjid became a favoured conduit for sending 'mujahideen' to Afghanistan, and also Kashmir. It is also widely believed that he was patron to several sectarian groups such as the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Harkatul Mujahideen. Even now, and as publicly stated by President Musharraf, several members of the banned Jaish-e-Mohammad, for whose leader's (Maulana Masood Azhar) freedom Maulana Abdullah had publicly spoken many a time, were said to be hiding in the compound and helping the two brothers. The question that should be foremost on everyone's minds and which governments past and present need to answer is why the situation was allowed to come to this. Why wasn't the jihadi manufacturing machine fuelled by extremist seminaries and mosques such as Lal Masjid not reined in and kept a tight leash on? Also, the issue of Lal Masjid and what has been happening, especially the revelations that many of the students were not exactly willing residents, should hopefully attract public and media scrutiny on the role played by madressahs towards fostering extremist views in the country. Of course, a solution to this problem is not easy since it involves the decrepit and crumbling mainstream education system, but these are all questions and issues that need answers and introspection.

17. Dawn  
July 5, 2007

An end at last?

THE Lal Masjid drama was not fully over when these lines were written, but at least 16 people had been killed and countless injured in a bloody confrontation that could have been avoided if common sense had prevailed. The Lal Masjid high command and the government both must answer certain questions. First the chiefs of the Lal Masjid rebellion: in what way have the brothers Rasheed and Ghazi advanced the cause of Islam which was supposed to be the aim behind the 'government' and the 'court' they had set up in the sacred precincts of the mosque? Does Islam approve of crime — raids on homes, kidnapping, attacks on shops and defiance of the law of the land — to enforce Sharia? Did the raid by girl commandos on the home of a woman of presumed ill repute abolish prostitution throughout the country? Is asking young boys and girls to take the law into their own hands the best way of teaching them Islam and making them good Muslims? Did not the Holy Prophet (PBUH) say that the best Muslim was one from whose hands and tongues other Muslims were safe? Did the self-deluded clerics of the Lal Masjid conform to this Hadith? Did it not occur to them that no government — Islamic or otherwise, democratic or dictatorial, civilian or military — would tolerate the defiance of its writ for long and that sooner or later the government was bound to act, especially after the nationals of a friendly country like China had been kidnapped?

Now the government. If it had to bare its teeth, should it have waited for six long months to do so? Were not the Lal Masjid militants encouraged in their criminality by the government's kowtowing to the religious right? Did not the invitation to the Imam of Kaaba and the help sought from him for defusing the Lal Masjid crisis betray the government's will to act? Should foreign help be sought for solving domestic problems, no matter how grave? The government must also let the people know about the role of the secret agencies in this case and their incompetence, if not complicity in the affair. Why did the law enforcement agencies fail to prevent the smuggling of arms and stocks of fuel into the mosque? Why were not non-lethal methods — like cutting off supplies and sequestering the mosque — adopted to tire out the brainwashed lot inside?

The Lal Masjid drama has not yet come to an end, though the denouement seems to have begun. But one thing is clear: the government must not offer more talks. Such a move will be misunderstood and encourage the misguided clerics. The Lal Masjid brothers are guilty of blackmail, murder, vandalism, trespass and kidnapping. If they surrender or are captured alive, they must be given the benefit of a fair trial in an open court. The crimes they have committed are a blot on the fair names of the ulema. That is not how the great ulema produced by South Asia — Shah Waliullah, Maulana Maudoodi, Ahmad Raza Khan Bareilvi, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani and others — ever asked their followers to behave. Regrettably, the government found itself isolated because neither the MMA leadership nor the secular parties categorically condemned the Lal Masjid brigade. It is now for the Pakistani people to decide whether they want the kind of Islam that Iqbal and Jinnah stood for or the intolerant, obscurantist brand being preached and practised by bigoted semi-literates.

18. The News  
July 6, 2007

A shameful capture

The government as well as most liberal sections of Pakistani society would presumably be very pleased with the way the khateeb of Lal Masjid, Maulana Abdul Aziz, was captured on Wednesday night. Disguised as a woman wearing a burqa, the Maulana left the mosque complex along with several other students of Jamia Hafsa who had walked out to surrender themselves to the authorities. The intention of Maulana Aziz was clearly to escape through his brother, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, later told TV channels that he had left the complex as part of a pre-planned "strategy". This was in sharp contrast to what one would have thought about Maulana Aziz given that in the past he and his brother had boasted that their students and followers would fight to death against government forces for what they said was a holy struggle to enforce God's law in the country. Besides, the khateeb of Lal Masjid was known for making fiery speeches in the past, which centred mostly on the theme of jihad against infidels and was said to have often played host to many a militant/jihadi outfit leader.

Hence, it is all the more surprising that the maulana should have taken a route that was at best cowardly. In a television interview on Thursday morning (which one has to say was in poor taste -- though the government may think that showing it had some tactical value) Maulana Aziz said that he left the mosque complex and also asked his brother to leave but that the latter refused

because he was busy negotiating with the authorities. If the implication by this is that he left to surrender then one needs to ask him why go through all this? Common sense, however, would suggest that Maulana Aziz simply tried to get out of the mosque complex the only way he thought he could, because the heat laid on by the government's siege was getting too much to bear. In doing so, however, he may have caused a great disservice to those of his own ilk because public discourse is already now -- and justifiably so -- awash with jokes of clerics trying to escape under cover of a burqa.

In all seriousness, Maulana Aziz obviously set a bad example as a leader for his students and followers by going about trying to leave the mosque disguised as a woman wearing a burqa. Keeping in view the fact that the Lal Masjid brigade claimed to fight against all forms of immorality, the maulana's attempt to escape is very hypocritical in itself because he clearly failed to practice what he loved to preach, and enforce through his students. The maulana's capture will reinforce -- and rightly so -- the view among many Pakistanis that most of our religious leaders and clerics seem only too happy to place others in the line of fire but when it comes to them taking the heat, they quietly stand aside or, like Maulana Aziz, slip away. An example of this is how some of these elements have in the past been accused of sending young men -- often from impoverished backgrounds -- to fight their 'jihads' but never did the same with their own sons. In fact, if reports from official sources are to be believed, Maulana Ghazi himself has kept 30 students around him as human shields.

One will hope that the maulana and his brother -- if and when he is captured -- will not be allowed to go scot-free this time. One also hopes that this time no ministers or ruling party chiefs will intervene on their behalf or offer them 'deals' that can only be described as appeasement. As for those who are surrendering, it needs to be ensured that they abide by their understanding given to the government. Apparently, this requires a commitment from them to never visit or enrol at the madressah again but this should be made more encompassing by having some kind of monitoring system to ensure that they do not make a nuisance of themselves elsewhere. Also, once the dust settles, the federal government must ask the various intelligence agencies about the apparent discrepancy in their assessments on what could happen if an operation was carried out against Lal Masjid-Jamia Hafsa and what actually has transpired so far. Those who had been pleading with the government to take decisive and strong action against such elements for a long time seem, till now, proven correct. This strategy should now be put to effective use in other trouble spots in the country, where extremists and obscurantists have tried to enforce their own twisted version of faith on ordinary Pakistanis, in the process making the lives of the latter a living hell. Dawn

19. Dawn

July 6, 2007

No quarter for the militants

EVERYTHING phoney reveals itself to be so sooner or later. The Lal Masjid episode has precisely done this. All noble Islamic concepts have been reduced to a joke by semi-literate fanatics lacking in some of Islam's fundamental virtues. The circumstances of Maulana Abdul

Aziz's arrest, hiding himself in a burqa, shows that behind all that bravado and fiery speeches supposedly infused with the spirit of jihad, was a phoney man who had brainwashed thousands of boys and girls merely to show his power to threaten and blackmail the government and the nation at large. His threat to launch a series of suicide bomb attacks turned out to be the bullying of an inherent blackmailer, and the entire fortress based on propaganda and religious rhetoric collapsed like a house of cards. After two days of tear gas shelling and sporadic fighting, leading to the killing of at least 16 people, the back of the Lal Masjid militancy seemed broken when an estimated 1,200 boys and girls had by Wednesday evening surrendered to the police. This was also the result of President Pervez Musharraf's announcement of a general amnesty for all, except those guilty of criminal acts. The Lal Masjid stand-off is not yet fully over, and Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, the younger brother, had still not given himself up to the authorities when these lines were written. A large number of well-armed militants are still in the mosque, and Ghazi still insisting on negotiations. However, the authorities must not waver and demand his unconditional surrender, because there are criminal charges against the two brothers and Abdul Aziz's wife.

Unless something out of the ordinary happens, the mosque will soon be an open place of worship. But certain lessons must be drawn by the government. First, it waited too long to finally act to flush out the militants. Perhaps it believed that negotiations could lead to a peaceful solution, because it feared that rash action could result in heavy casualties and prove counterproductive. Second, now that the rebellion's phoney character has been revealed, the momentum of the drive against misguided elements masquerading as religious preachers must be carried to its logical end. Characters like the two Lal Masjid brothers are to be found all over the country. They have money and arms and brainwashed followers willing to do their bidding. The followers may sometimes be sincere and sacrifice themselves, but the leaders in most cases operate with impunity. It is, thus, the brains behind them that the government should go after.

The Lal Masjid drama is a symptom of a deeper malaise. It is a disease that has been with us since Pakistan played host to the anti-Soviet mujahideen and turned the entire country into a tribal area. The religious militancy, funded by the CIA and backed by sections of the army, has now become a Frankenstein monster. The leaders of this militancy are indifferent to Pakistan's interests, as seen in the attacks on Pakistan's security forces and suicide-bombings in public places. Unfortunately, such elements enjoy the backing of some mainstream religious parties. That, however, should not deter the government. The war against religious militancy and terrorism is in Pakistan's interest, and the nation expects the government to pursue the terrorists until they cease to be a force.

20. July 8, 2007

While the innocent suffer

THERE are two categories of people who are the worst sufferers in the current standoff at Lal Masjid: to one category belong the hostages. Their exact number is not known, but they are believed to be in their hundreds, and include women, girls and children. They are holed up in the midst of rotting bodies and living between hope and despair. Food supplies and water are either exhausted or are in short supply. Either the terrorists may themselves shoot them in panic and put the blame on the security forces or the hostages may die in the crossfire when the authorities



finally decide to move in. Death could be their fate anytime. Belonging in most cases to the low income groups, they are innocent souls. Their only fault was that they believed in what the two maulanas told them. In the other category are the residents of Islamabad's G-6 Sector where Lal Masjid is located. Barring curfew relaxation hours, when they buy grocery, medicines, etc, they remain home-bound and wonder whether the fighting would spread and hurt them. As mothers told newsmen, children wake up and cry when firing and explosions break the night's silence. They do not know how long they will have to suffer because an end to the standoff does not appear imminent, and Abdul Rasheed Ghazi seems to be determined to hold on. He is detached from reality and is indifferent to death and destruction and to the suffering which his obstinacy may cause to other human beings.

While his elder brother may have invited ridicule because of the way he tried to escape and is now appealing to his younger brother to surrender, Abdul Aziz must nevertheless be credited for making a correct decision, having realised his mistake and acted in a manner that saved hundreds of lives. The younger brother has, however, forfeited the nation's sympathy, including the ulema's. The MMA leaders are in London attending the multi-party conference, while the madressah leadership throughout Pakistan has either criticised Ghazi or maintained silence. His criminality is evident from the way he refused Bilkees Edhi's plea to let her take away the children with her. His acolytes have also fired at parents who were approaching the mosque to secure their children's release. The defiant ones are well armed, and the government must let the people know why and how such quantities of arms and ammunition could be stocked in the mosque. Obviously, this was not done in a day or two and must have taken a long time. Why did the security agencies fail to check this constant movement of arms into the mosque? Are their Aziz-Ghazi brothers' supporters in the agencies?

Ghazi is now enjoying his publicity over the electronic media. While the media must, of course, cover the Lal Masjid confrontation that has its poignant side as well, must a lawbreaker be allowed to monopolise the mini-screen? That may not be the intention of the channels, but many citizens feel that the electronic media's 24-hour focus on the man tends to give an impression as if his acts are being glorified. From a purely professional point of view too, the channels ought to be aware of viewer fatigue. With things so grim — a machine gun and two anti-aircraft guns on a rooftop in Rawalpindi and the terror attacks in Dir, Fata and Swat — the viewers deserve some respite.

## 21. The News July 11, 2007

### A bloody end

Could the end have been any different? Could the lives of those who died have been saved if things had turned out differently -- if the maulana had agreed to surrender (the word itself was apparently anathema to him)? What of the reputation of the federal capital and the image of the country, with a pitched battle fought a stone's throw from many foreign embassies? And also, what will be the fallout of this bloody and violent end to the week-long siege of the Lal Masjid

complex? Should the country brace itself for retaliatory attacks against government installations and security forces?

By his actions, Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi proved to be a very difficult customer. He kept changing his demands and conditions and used the media to further what now seem to be very selfish ends. In the run-up to Tuesday morning's assault by army commandos on the Lal Masjid complex, PML-Q chief Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain was leading efforts to broker a peaceful settlement, to save the lives of the women and children inside the compound. At around 3 pm, several television channels started carrying tickers saying that a deal had been more or less reached, that the government had read out a draft agreement to the maulana over the phone, quoting 'sources' that said that he would be sent to his village along with the rest of his family. At that point in time, this seemed a dramatic turnaround in the crisis, not least because of the potential for controversy, had the deal gone through -- given that the Lal Masjid brothers had been in large part responsible for what has happened to the federal capital in recent months. However, very soon, in a matter of minutes, the ministers accompanying the PML-Q chief began singing a different tune denying any forward movement and in effect saying that this attempt to broker a deal had failed. It then transpired that the maulana wanted safe passage for himself and others inside and with no conditions attached. The government at that point took the only option it had -- not to allow the maulana such concessions. Had the maulana and his family been allowed to shift to their native village, the government would have been accused of caving in and appeasing the extremists and public opinion would have sharply disapproved of any such agreement. Hence, the decision to launch the final assault was not an easy one but given the circumstances there was nothing else that the government could really do.

Once 'Operation Silence' is over, the firing stops, the dust settles down and the bodies are counted, there are bound to be many questions raised. Why didn't the government take action earlier against the clerics because had that been the case so many lives would not have been lost? Why were the Lal Masjid elements allowed so much leeway that the complex became almost like a state within a state, complete with a moral policing force which acted with impunity enforcing a rigid interpretation of Islam on the city's residents? How did so many hardened militants, reportedly some foreigners among them, make their way inside the compound situated in the heart of Islamabad? (Surely this is a disturbing indictment of the failure of the law-enforcement and intelligence agencies to keep track of the movement of such elements). Incidentally, one well known television journalist has recently written in a newspaper column that he was told by a senior government official that Lal Masjid's arms suppliers had been arrested by the police some time back but they were released after intervention from higher authorities. If this claim is true, answers need to be given as to why this was done. As for those who survive the assault, particularly Maulana Ghazi, they will have to be held accountable for all their misdeeds. There is a danger that some of these may become rallying points for the cause of the extremists in the country but this is a route that the government now needs to pursue to its logical end. After all, tackling extremists head on is never an easy task anywhere, more so in Pakistan.

Whatever has happened at Lal Masjid should also give some much-needed warning to the state to permanently disentangle and disengage itself from some of its affiliations and relationships of the past. It offers many lessons to the government and it would be good if some of these were learnt -

- foremost among them is that militancy and extremism is best nipped in the bud and allowing it to fester actually ends up damaging the national interest. Also, the government needs to ask itself why it usually exhibits much less patience for moderate and progressive sections of society, especially when they can help in the fight against extremism. As for Pakistanis generally, Lal Masjid should make some of them think about where their nation is heading and whether the route is that intended by the founding fathers.

## 22. Dawn

July 11, 2007

### A gruesome end

"EIGHTY per cent of the operation," to quote an army spokesman, had been completed to expel the terrorists from the Lal Masjid when these lines were written, and Abdul Rashid Ghazi had been killed, though resistance from hard-core militants was still going on, with the death toll in the vicinity of 150. While no tears will be shed over the death of the well-armed militants gathered around him by Ghazi, our hearts go out to the families of those innocent men, women and children who were killed during Tuesday's operation or in the fighting earlier. The responsibility for the death of the innocents and the trauma of those who have survived rests with the extremists who held hostage those whom they had lured into the mosque for giving them lessons in Islam. Instead, in a most perfidious way and in a way that behoves perhaps hardened criminals, they used men and women as a human shield to save themselves. That was the reason why the late-night talks which had aroused hopes for a peaceful solution failed. The government's mistakes in the entire drama notwithstanding, one has to admit that it exercised the utmost restraint. It kept talking to the Aziz-Rashid brothers for months and used a variety of channels to free the hostages and disarm the militants.

On the Lal Masjid mafia's directives, its militants had raided a home, attacked shops, and kidnapped not only police officials but also seven Chinese nationals. Instead of reciprocating the security forces' restraint, the militants burnt a nearby building, leaving the government with no option but to retaliate, though the security forces' response on July 3 was in low key. Finally, after the fighting escalated and the elder brother was caught and over 1,200 hostages were released, Abdul Rashid Ghazi refused to show any flexibility. Even Maulana Fazlur Rahman accused Ghazi of intransigence. Those who went to negotiate with him included Maulana Abdul Sattar and Bilquees Edhi and some of the country's respected ulema, but Ghazi remained obdurate. He and his militants fired on parents who had gone to the mosque to meet their children. The Ghazi band's isolation from the nation was total, for no madressah leaders anywhere in the country came to their support, and the little bit of support they received came from the politically motivated ulema and those pro-Taliban elements in Fata who are already in a virtual state of war with Pakistan's security forces.

There is no room for complacency, and the government must relentlessly pursue terrorists and criminals masquerading as 'soldiers of Islam'. They are in a position to keep creating trouble for the government every now and then, but as Abdul Aziz's escape bid and the outcome of the Lal Masjid stand-off show, they are cowards because they know their stand lacks a moral basis. The

nation's support for the authorities on the crackdown against the Lal Masjid brigade should strengthen the government's position. The episode also shows that self-proclaimed mujahids committing crime after crime cannot fool the Pakistani people by taking cover under religious slogans. Those arrested should be tried and given every chance to defend themselves in an open trial. The government must also order an inquiry into why and how the intelligence agencies failed to get wind of the goings-on in the Lal Masjid and the stockpiling of arms and ammunition in such large quantities. Talibanism has destroyed Afghanistan. Let it not harm Pakistan.

Dawn

July 12, 2007

Let us know the truth

BARRING a small minority, most sane minds throughout Pakistan have heaved a sigh of relief over the end of the Lal Masjid stand-off that dragged on for a painful six months. That so many people should have been killed while the security forces tried to flush the terrorists out of the mosque's sacred precincts is indeed a tragedy not only for the bereaved families but for the entire nation. The militants fought back with tenacity and preferred death to surrender. This highlights two facts — one, the militants were well indoctrinated and as trained guerillas knew how to take on a professional army; two, they had ample stocks of arms and ammunition, which obviously they had not hoarded in a day or two. The militants were finally overpowered by the use of superior fire power, but they never ran out of ammunition. How did they manage to smuggle arms and ammunition in such huge quantities right in the heart of the capital city? There are many other, more frightful apprehensions that deserve to be addressed.

The Lal Masjid complex today is not what it was when the mosque was built in the sixties. Over the decades, as the mosque became a family concern — father Abdullah and his two sons running the show — the Lal Masjid management began adding more facilities to the mosque. What the security forces raided on July 3 was a complex that included the six-storey Jamia Hafsa building and Ghazi's living quarters. The Capital Development Authority approached the Lal Masjid management and warned them against illegal construction, but the Aziz-Rashid brothers had influence in important government quarters and they continued to add to the complex. This establishes one truth beyond any shadow of doubt: all that has happened in the Lal Masjid could not have been possible without support from some powerful quarters in the administration.

Were the intelligence agencies incompetent or did they know all along what was going on and how the two brothers were gradually turning the mosque into a fortress? And did they merely look the other way or did they actively help them in the growth and expansion of what later became a mini-government well armed and well funded, with brainwashed soldiers going out into the heart of Islamabad to attack and kidnap? Many people are asking whether all this was a drama to divert attention from other, more pressing problems the government was faced with. To link it to the CJ affair is, of course, illogical. The Hafsa girls occupied the library in January, while the reference against the CJ was filed in March, and the misery wrought by the cyclone in Sindh and Balochistan could hardly be called a god-send the government needed to divert attention from the judicial crisis. Nevertheless, the gradual build-up of the Lal Masjid affair into a full-blown crisis

and the authorities' failure to tackle it in time have raised questions among all thinking people in Pakistan. Operation Silence may have ended, but it has raised questions that need to be fully and fairly answered for the benefit of the people of Pakistan. This calls for the government to order a judicial inquiry into the violent Lal Masjid stand-off, make the findings public and punish those found guilty of acts of omission and commission in the discharge of duty or in violation of the law.



2. Date: Dawn 16-09-2001

## Responding to US demands

THERE is no word yet as to what Pakistan's response to America's request for help in the fight against terrorism is. A request from Washington has been finally received by Islamabad and the corps commanders spent the whole day on Friday to give out their recommendations to the government. Now it is the cabinet and the National Security Council that will study the foreign minister's recommendations and formulate Pakistan's response. The American demands have not been made public. But some reports speak of at least four major US requests: one, sharing information on Osama bin Laden; two, sealing off the border with Afghanistan; three, closing off fuel supplies to Afghanistan; and four, allowing the use of air space. As for other demands, Washington and Islamabad would do well to make them clearly known to avoid unnecessary speculation.

The bombing of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, and the subsequent US resolve to retaliate have put Pakistan sharply on the spot. In a hurry to act it may be, the US newspaper is mak-

ing preparations for striking at the objects of its hostility, which are as good as known by now which have not been officially specified. It is already in the process of mobilising a world coalition against terrorism and has already sent NATO's request for backing the strike's air, do it which suggests that any attack on any member will be regarded as an attack against the alliance itself. Other states, including the permanent members of the Security Council, have also expressed support to the US. On its part, Pakistan has already refused to give full support and cooperation to the US in the fight against terrorism. It has also refused to seal off the border with Afghanistan.

Why does Pakistan refuse to do this? The answer is that the US has not given any indication of what it is prepared to do in return for its cooperation. Pakistan's stance is that if the US is not prepared to do this, then it is not worth the trouble. The US has not given any indication of what it is prepared to do in return for its cooperation. Pakistan's stance is that if the US is not prepared to do this, then it is not worth the trouble.

to be the situation at hand. Pakistan's response to the US request for help in the fight against terrorism is a matter of great importance. The US has not given any indication of what it is prepared to do in return for its cooperation. Pakistan's stance is that if the US is not prepared to do this, then it is not worth the trouble. The US has not given any indication of what it is prepared to do in return for its cooperation. Pakistan's stance is that if the US is not prepared to do this, then it is not worth the trouble.

Pakistan's decision to refuse to seal off the border with Afghanistan is a matter of great importance. The US has not given any indication of what it is prepared to do in return for its cooperation. Pakistan's stance is that if the US is not prepared to do this, then it is not worth the trouble. The US has not given any indication of what it is prepared to do in return for its cooperation. Pakistan's stance is that if the US is not prepared to do this, then it is not worth the trouble.

It is not yet known whether the Americans want to use Pakistan as a base and facility for launching ground troops. These are matters that could need careful examination. Pakistan's stance is that if the US is not prepared to do this, then it is not worth the trouble. The US has not given any indication of what it is prepared to do in return for its cooperation. Pakistan's stance is that if the US is not prepared to do this, then it is not worth the trouble.



3. Date: Dawn 18-09-2001

## Developing a consensus

THE military government is doing the right thing by trying to develop a consensus on how to face up to what indeed is a grave international crisis in which Pakistan has become a key player. The meetings which President Musharraf had with the political leaders, ulama and newspaper editors on Sunday were a move in that direction. The issues facing Pakistan are enormous, and the decisions taken are bound to have a far-reaching bearing on the country's future. The decisions concern Pakistan's stance vis-a-vis the world coalition that is in the process of developing to punish the perpetrators and supporters of last Tuesday's terrorist attacks in America. The details of the American request to Pakistan have not been disclosed yet by either side. But Mr Colin Powell said on Saturday that Pakistan had accepted all of them. As confirmed by President Musharraf himself, these include Pakistan providing docking facilities to American naval ships. Press reports have also spoken of American ground and airborne troops seeking logistic help in Pakistan. However, officially neither side has confirmed this.

Looking at it from the point of view of Pakistan's national interests, Islamabad has to take a clear stand in line with the international community's resolve to fight terrorism. Pakistan's positive response in this respect has been appreciated by American leaders including President Bush and Secretary Powell. Of special importance here is a Pakistani delegation's visit to Kandahar. The purpose is to persuade the Taliban leadership to hand over Osama bin Laden. The crisis aspect in the bomb attacks in America is so doubtful if the Afghans will do that since the Taliban leadership stands that Osama is not involved in these attacks. Surprisingly, in their present state of mind, the Taliban not only seem prepared to take on the whole world; they have also threatened action against any neighbouring country which helps America in its military action against Afghanistan.

On the domestic front, too, the situation is not very helpful either. The country has a large number of Taliban supporters. There are also a couple of religious parties which have backed the Taliban to the hilt and agree with their extremist interpretation of Islam. These parties also have armed supporters who are quite capable of stirring up trouble inside the country. In case the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan takes hostile action against Pakistan, it would be difficult to hold their Pakistani supporters in check. In fact, Islamabad may be caught in an extremely difficult situation if, while fending off the Afghan menace on the border, it also has to deal with an internal situation of violence and strife. Surely, no patriot in Pakistan would like to see the country being caught in such a scenario.

It is precisely to guard against such a possibility that President Musharraf called the meeting with the political leaders, ulama and newspaper editors. It is reassuring that, by and large, those who attended the meeting approved of the government's handling of the crisis. Some religious parties, however, reportedly opposed the government's support to America's planned military action. Undoubtedly, it is good that the parties have expressed dissent within the confines of the conference hall. Frankness in such matters is better than uncontrolled anger which may explode in the streets. We no doubt have religious parties that, despite having a salt-tongue for the Taliban, would look at the crisis from the point of view of Pakistan's national interest and realise the hazards of following a policy that goes against the United Nations and the US. The crisis facing Pakistan calls for a hard-headed approach, which alone can see the nation through the coming storm.



**PRESIDENT** Musharraf addressed to the nation on Wednesday came across as a plain and simple message from a leader who believes in the justice of the cause being espousing and the correctness of the policies he is pursuing. The speech was characterized by realism and contained an appeal to the people of Pakistan to look at the present crisis from the point of view of Pakistan's national interests. "Pakistan comes first," he said and declared, "the path of wisdom is better than the path of emotions." The president's speech came against an ominous background. While the US is determined to average itself on the perpetrators of Sept 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the world community, including the Islamic world, is united in its condemnation of terrorism. Pakistan, being one of Afghanistan's closest neighbors having cultural and ethnic ties of a kind which no other nation has with this country, has correctly realized the responsibility it owes to the international community and the United Nations. It has readily agreed to cooperate with the US and the world coalition that is in the process of being formed to deal with the problem of international terror-

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help for logistical support in carrying out operations for the capture of Osama bin Laden, the prime suspect in last week's bombing case from his hideouts in Afghanistan. In fact, even before Washington had asked New Delhi for help, India, in its eagerness to jump on the American bandwagon, went ahead and offered all-out support in such a situation. American and Indian planes would have flown sorties over Pakistan's territory to attack targets in Afghanistan, with the possibility that Pakistan's sensitive installations, including nuclear facilities, could have come under attack. On the other hand, cooperating with the US-led coalition would mean that Pakistan would be in the mainstream of the fight against terrorism.

Quoting from the Holy Quran and referring to Islamic history, especially in the peace treaties which the Holy Prophet signed with the Makkans and with Jewish tribes, the Chief Executive illustrated how wisdom prevailed over emotions and how in the end there was victory for Islam. Similarly, he said, when there was a choice between two difficult options, one must select the one that was less evil. Any thing more, he said, could affect Pakistan's integrity and stability.

Those who listened to President Mubarak with dispassion and calmness of mind and spirit would readily agree that the only sane option before Pakistan was to co-operate with the U.S. and to work towards a better world coalition against terrorism. Anyone who loves Pakistan and believes in the spirit of "Pakistan comes first" would approve of the decision to be taken by the government in the matter. Unfortunately, there are elements in the country who believe that the only way to bring the world to its senses is to show that Pakistan is not a country that would submit to any foreign demand for complete surrender. It is not supported by any sense of the balance of harmony. One only hopes that leaders and citizens that have a soft corner for the Taliban would realize that the same Pakistan would in the long run be of greater help to Afghanistan in the form that a Pakistan isolated or maligned by anti-terrorist coalition action does not stand only a shadow of that. One also hopes that while voicing their dissent against the government's policy, they would choose to remain within the bounds of law. On the other hand, if they take the law into their own hands and start to be seen by the masses, the situation could get pretty messy and Pakistan could suffer immensely. As the west has shown a majority should not be allowed to let the minority know its strength.

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people, especially the Pashtun, Pakistan known Afghans. This was no other country, but for the last ten decades, especially Pakistan and some closely involved with Britain and Afghanistan, Pakistan, early during the Soviet occupation and the Afghan people's anti struggle for freedom in the past Soviet period also, Pakistan not only is the fighting against Afghan factions for power. This chaos has also resulted in the thousands of thousands of the deaths of Afghan. Millions have fled their homes and sought refuge in neighbouring countries, mostly in Pakistan. The Northern Alliance came into being after the Taliban captured Kabul and then imposed a harsh brand of theocracy on their people. The Northern Alliance since then has waged a relentless struggle to recapture Kabul, in the process causing widespread death and destruction.

the Soviets and won and therefore that the real and legitimate rulers of Afghanistan. This one, however, is not shared by all sections of Afghanistan's polity.

A US-supported Northern Alliance back to power would hardly be in a position of being power and stability to the country. At present, it is exercising authority and from a number of countries, including India, even though it has no border with that country. When requested New Delhi to aid the Northern Alliance against Pakistan, that relationship with the Taliban. If the Northern Alliance comes to power, it is unlikely to maintain a neutral posture vis-à-vis its neighbours, especially Pakistan. This could lead to further instability and bloodshed. The US would thus be making a great mistake if it tried to install the revenge-seeking Alliance in power in Kabul.

The best solution for the world community is to have a neutral and peaceful Afghanistan, and this will be possible only when the US renounces its campaign, less a national retaliatory move and more a UN-led international campaign. As Mr Kofi Annan told the UN General Assembly on Monday, any rash action that the world could not understand would be wrong and that only the UN could give global legitimacy to a "long-term struggle against terrorism." The retaliation against the terror attacks, he said, should not make the international community oblivious to its other responsibilities — cooperation and partnership. Placed at Afghanistan is there is no other solution except that the country should have a broad-based government acceptable to all of Afghanistan's factions and tribes and to all of Afghanistan's neighbours. Any government lacking such a broad-based and neutral character would hardly be in a position to make itself acceptable to the people and have friendly relations with Afghanistan's neighbours. The last thing Afghanistan needs is a partisan and factional government in power in Kabul.

6. Date: Pakistan Times 05-10-2001

## Principle of self-esteem

Americans' war mania is at its peak. The cause of intensification of this mania is the frank admission by Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Mulla Zaef that Osama bin Laden has still not left Afghanistan and is in the protection of Afghan militia. Afghanistan's or Taliban's Amirul Momineen Mulla Muhammad Omar who, according to the western media, is ignorant of global affairs, still does not believe that the United States would go for a war with Taliban-led Afghanistan. What makes him think that way, is very crucial to making a forecast of the happenings to follow. Obviously, Mulla Omar and his associates' positive response can avert a catastrophe in the already strife-torn and poverty-stricken Afghanistan. Besides protecting the neighbours like Pakistan from the disastrous fallout that is not difficult to calculate. But what does that positive response actually imply or saving it the other way round what specific response the United States and the so-called coalition is desiring as well as anticipating? Should the Afghans or the dominating Taliban faction succumb forthright to all the demands of the United States and its allies? Does any sovereign nation, whatever its small size, in terms of resources, geography or clout in global politics, respond so slavishly and obsequiously even if its people are not accustomed to an extremely independent lifestyle typical of Afghans? Isn't it naive to expect such subservience from a nation, whatever the grievances against that nation or the offences committed by its rulers or their people? Hasn't the world of today changed considerably from the world of fiefdoms and serfdom of yore at least in the context of peaceful coexistence, every nation being given ample opportunity to survive without any risk of invasion or naked aggression?

No doubt that the world is still controlled by a superpower and its satellites or other lesser powers naturally aligned with the solo superpower, the United States, but doesn't the US and other states of the West claim to be highly civilized and tolerant towards others' existence and advancement. Why then is the United States now expecting of the Taliban government of Afghanistan to behave like a fiefdom and obey the orders issued by Washington? Taliban's claim that the West thinks they have committed by protecting terrorists may be pardonable but what about the violation of the basic principle of self-esteem that forms the axis of international relations. Isn't the United States ignoring the element of self-esteem while trying to interact with or conveying threats to Afghans? And how should the Afghans or on what moral ground they should accept orders from Washington when their self-esteem is at stake and particularly when the Afghans are already known for maintaining a highly independent stance as compared with many other nations? Then, the Afghans have had the experience of success in fighting the then second superpower, the former Soviet Union. That experience is sufficient to know the morals of a nation, whatever their losses or sufferings.

The United States can still take a wiser course by realising these facts. There is no reason to abandon the idea of punishing the Taliban for bringing them to justice but at the same time, there is no reason to overlook the principle of self-esteem and peaceful coexistence in dealing with sensitive issues on the global plane.

7. Date: Pakistan Times 10-10-2001

## Self-restraint is the answer

**T**he more the lapse in the attack on Taliban installations and the so-called 23 or so targets inside the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, the more the intensification of world conscience that calls for larger restraint before going for the war or retaliation attack option. It is, however, a different thing that under the influence of the solo superpower, the United States, other leading states of the world especially the Nato states have announced joining hands with Washington in its war against terrorism. The fact of the matter is that the entire West stands terrified and terrorized. The whole social fabric of the western societies stands unnerved and shaken. Obviously, it is a clash of altogether different lifestyles, if not clash of civilizations as described by majority observers of global events in their analyses while quoting historian Huntington. On one side are the highly advanced societies of the industrialized or economically developed world whereas on the other end there is the rugged territory of Afghanistan. And as regards the conditions prevailing inside Afghanistan majority citizens over there are living in a state of suspension awaiting the return or normalcy and peace in their country but to no avail. Instead, Afghanistan has been entangled in one of the longest battles of human history, previously with the external aggressors and subsequently or presently in the shape of infighting among different Afghan factions, a few of which are backed by western powers. Therefore, quite obviously it is a fight between prosperity and poverty, haves and have-nots and certainly between the people whose faith in the Creator is greater than

their rivals' faith in the worth of power and pelf. For the materialistic world that is the western world, the repeated, avowed reliance of Taliban functionaries on Allah the Almighty alone for their survival in their fight against the powerful alliance led by the United States, appears to be a case of self-deception. In fact, it is not. Despite a large number of people in the western world following a faith preached by a prophet or messenger of God, in this case Christianity, their belief in their own religion has undermined to a considerable extent. As a result of this undermined faith, the West's belief in the power of money and material has heightened manifold. In this particular perspective, the clash of beliefs that is higher in degree and form than the trumpeted or oft-discussed clash of civilizations, has materialized in concrete terms and is likely to take any turn in the foreseeable future. One thing is, however, quite sure that Afghanistan, under the Taliban and even earlier has shown signs of inner strength that the West may not be able to undermine even with the use of all the military might at its disposal. The rough terrain of Afghanistan is going to be another impregnable bulwark against the onslaught of western armies and navies. The best course in the interest of global peace is not going for the tit-for-tat option but for exercising greater restraint besides maintaining the deterrence to forestall any more eventualities and disasters.



## A dangerous idea

The report that the US has informed the Security Council that it could take action against "other organisations and other states" as part of its fight against terrorism has a disturbing note about it. The letter speaks of America's right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. While nobody would disagree with America's right to act under that article following the Sept 11 carnage, one would expect Washington to be mindful of the full implications of opening up a wider front against terrorism simultaneously with the on-going move against Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network, shortly thereafter.

The Sept 11 crime has not only been universally condemned, most states of the world have also called for the support of the move to form a worldwide anti-terrorism coalition. Since evidence has shown Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda group to be the prime suspects in the Sept 11 suicide bombings, the world community has by and large agreed with the American decision to take military action against the Taliban ruled Afghanistan. The international coalition says more because the American and British war aims are limited and specific and the targeting is limited. Also, in his speech to the American people, President Bush made it clear that America's war was not against the Afghan people but against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda network. In keeping with this approach, American planes have been dropping food and medicines for the Afghan people to assure them of America's solicitude for them. So long as Washington sticks to this course of action, there is no reason why the international coalition, including the Muslim component, should not stay united.

However, there is a second possibility of things developing within the world coalition. The US decision to widen the scope of its military action to include all or any of those countries the Muslim world could witness a sweeping wave of anti-American anger and rage it has never experienced before. It may also sweep aside those moderate Muslim regimes which are now on America's side. The end result would not only be war and chaos in the Middle East, the fight against terrorism may degenerate into a worldwide conflict on religious lines. This could throw the world into a new era of global terrorism.

more declared "rogue" by the US, only two — Cuba and North Korea — are not Muslim, all others are. Thus, should the US decide to widen the scope of its military action, it is the Muslim countries which will be targeted on grounds of "terrorism". The country that comes to mind immediately is Iraq, against which the US and UK have continued their air action since the Gulf war. Iraq is also a victim of continued sanctions, and so far a minimum of 200,000 children have died because of lack of medicine. The other Muslim states which America would want to be put on the mat would be Syria and possibly Lebanon (even though it has not been officially declared a "rogue state"), besides Sudan, Libya and possibly Yemen. Should the hawks in the Pentagon prevail, the world coalition would come under severe stress. This will not only disrupt the on-going action against the Taliban but also create an anti-US backlash whose consequences would be deadly and for America's long-term interests in the Middle East would be estimable.

Already, the Muslim world feels deeply hurt by Washington's carte blanche to Israel for its racialist policies against the Palestinian people. Add to it Washington's consistently hostile policies toward such Muslim countries as Syria, Iran, Libya and Sudan and one can once detect a strong anti-Muslim slant in American policies. Should Washington choose to extend its military action to include all or any of those countries the Muslim world could witness a sweeping wave of anti-American anger and rage it has never experienced before. It may also sweep aside those moderate Muslim regimes which are now on America's side. The end result would not only be war and chaos in the Middle East, the fight against terrorism may degenerate into a worldwide conflict on religious lines. This could throw the world into a new era of global terrorism.

9. Date: Pakistan Times 11-10-2001

## Saviour of the world

**W**ashington's official spokesman has stated that the United States would not confine its anti-terrorism operations against Afghanistan only and might go for attacking other states and groups that were found engaged in or sponsoring terrorism. The Americans appear quite serious and determined on this issue as is additionally evident from Washington's letter addressed to the United Nations Security Council in which the American authorities have expressed their intention to hit the terrorism-sponsoring countries other than Afghanistan. Which other states Washington is planning to attack after Afghanistan? This question has given birth to many apprehensions not only in one particular region rather the entire Islamic world that is usually looked upon with contempt and suspicion for harbouring terrorists. In fact, the western perception of Muslims is highly jaundiced. It should rather be termed total misperception about the Muslims living a lifestyle different from the irreligious multitude of people inhabiting the so-called advanced and refined western world.

People especially leaders of the West usually perceive the whole Islamic world a safe haven for extremists notwithstanding the fact that majority Islamic countries are too liberal in the sphere of international relations. Some, rather a large number of rulers of Islamic countries are normally known for their excessive dependence on and tilt towards the West. Actually, it is this wrong perception about the Muslims that is the root cause of the trouble and that has made the United States express its desire to attack other countries that certainly those with majority Muslim population. According to a foreign professor and analyst, Washington leaders certainly have three names in their minds while hurling threats of attacks outside Afghanistan. These three

names are Iran, Iraq and Syria. But how can one rule out the inclusion of some other names particularly when Washington happens to meet success in its anti-Taliban offensive? Can Pakistan remain comfortable in the wake of such threats even though Islamabad has extended full support to the US and the coalition forces that too at the cost of public peace disrupted by angry anti-US demonstrations? What is the United States trying to convey to the world especially the world of Islam? If the US launches attack on other Islamic states purportedly for laying hands on terrorists and for destroying their hideouts, what specific argument it will make use of to convince the Muslims that it is not an attack on Islam? If majority or a large number of Muslims are made to face the grave consequences of attacks launched on their countries for punishing terrorists, what would such an act be known in the annals of history? Will the US thus be able to win a place of honour for itself in the world history by bringing about so much devastation and dividing the world once again on the basis of religion or religious biases?

One cannot say with veracity that bombing of the so-called terrorist camps and similar installations won't end up in losses to civilians' lives and properties especially when the coalition pilots scared of being shot down by Taliban ack ack guns are dropping bombs from excessively high al-

10. Date: Pakistan Times 13-10-2001


## Crime against humanity

**E**xtensive bombing of Afghanistan's cities and towns on the pretext of destroying terrorists' hideouts as well as Taliban installations and headquarters, is an undeniable act particularly it is resulting in civilian casualties, the death toll having crossed the 500 mark. The question arises if the bombing fails to achieve the target of hitting Taliban chief Mulla Omar's and Osama bin Laden's abodes as is evident from American Defence Secretary Rumsfeld's statement that air strikes were not enough, then how many more targets would have to be identified and bombed? Wouldn't the extension of air strikes cause additional civilian casualties and severe damage to innocent people's properties when they are already living in miserable condition? And what are the chances of success of ground operation that is now about to take off any moment? How far this ground operation is likely to succeed to the United States' advantage and when it is going to end? Aren't the western forces at a risk of armed retaliation by Afghan Mujahideen adopting guerrilla warfare? Are the western forces tough and tough enough to fight the Afghan forces that have had the experience of combating adversaries like mighty Russians in harshest conditions? Will the United States keep in view the bitter experience of unsuccessful air raids conducted by chicken-hearted pilots who dare not descend below few kilometres altitude lest they are shot down by Taliban's anti-aircraft guns? The inside story is that the American administration and defence high command considers downing of its aircraft as a clear signal of defeat of the US. This signal will highly demoralize the ordinary Americans who would in turn pressure the government to abandon the

anti-terrorist drive. Donald Rumsfeld has admitted during his latest briefing that Taliban's anti-aircraft structure was still alive and operational. What does all this mean? What next? Has the time come for ground offensive that now seems inevitable? What about the risks while directly exposed to Taliban guerrillas? Or is the American coalition going to launch the ground offensive only after having ensured that maximum losses have been inflicted by air strikes on Taliban forces in all the defence areas and the West-supported Northern Alliance is strengthened further to take on Taliban and thus take over Afghanistan's administration? Even if that option is tried, it would bring more miseries to the forlorn Afghans that is Afghan civilians for whose satisfaction, Washington is repeatedly claiming that it nurses no grudge against them. But why doesn't the American administration and the western leaders interested with power fever understand that all their military options are going to add to Afghan people's sufferings. What more devastation the US is willing to bring to Afghanistan? And how will Washington acknowledge this crime against humanity?

Washington is aware, if not conscious, of these consequences and might also have to face the responsibility of making amends to the world. The respect for human rights, which is the common goal of all, may call for the intervention and lest they invite the wrath of the world, angry and discontented. How long will these regrets remain silent spectators to the horrors and miseries of Afghan civilians continue its swirling with every passing moment?

11. Date:14.10.2001





## Impudent & ostrich-like

If the Americans want to know why there is so much animosity towards their country in many parts of the world, they have only to read a recent statement issued by New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani. The sentiments expressed there perfectly capture the self-righteous arrogance that has long been the hallmark of US foreign policy. Incensed by a statement from a Saudi prince who had donated 10 million dollars for the relief and rehabilitation of the victims of the World Trade Centre attacks, the mayor exploded in a self-righteous rage and refused to accept the cheque. The prince's crime? To inform the US of some bitter truths in a letter accompanying his donation, the prince expressed his deep terror over the September 11 incidents and condemned all forms of terrorism. However, he added that one must also look for the reasons behind such attacks and suggested that the US government re-examine its policies in the Middle East and deal with the Palestinian issue more even-handedly and justly. This fairly innocuous advice, however, proved too much for the mayor's stomach. Mayor Giuliani went on the offensive and dubbed the prince's statement as "highly irresponsible and very, very dangerous" for daring to suggest that the attacks had anything to do with past US injustices. In the view of Mayor Giuliani's thinking, even hinting at such a connection was tantamount to condoning terrorism and encouraging similar acts in the future. For Giuliani and others like him, it is far more comforting to view the perpetrators of such acts as evil barbarians motivated solely by envy for the American way of life and its power and affluence. In this obsessively self-righteous

mindset, no vaguely rational motivation can be allowed. To detach history from events of this nature has the benefit of conveniently denying one's own culpability, direct or indirect, in a crime.

It is this blinkered view of things and more particularly of its own role and responsibility as a world power that has been the enduring theme in post-war American history. This attitude has survived even if the enemy has changed from the communist threat of the 50s and 60s to the Islamic terrorism of today. Islamic terrorism has been classified as an amorphous and pervasive evil without any history or context. The US has steadfastly refused to see any connection between its self-serving policies and actions and the reaction they provoke. It has sponsored despots of every kind, backed thuggish regimes, condoned horrendous massacres and destabilised and overthrown democratically elected governments in countries from Indonesia to Chile, and from Nicaragua to Iran and beyond. Despite all this, it continues to point its accusing finger at the desperate acts its unjust policies produce in response. By pointing out that the unjust and partisan US policy in Palestine or the continuing bleeding of Iraq have fuelled rage against America does not in any sense amount to condoning terrorism. If the US is interested in rooting out terrorism, it must have the vision and maturity to listen to such criticism without becoming overly defensive. If it continues to see itself as blameless and refuses to change its overbearing attitude towards other nations, terrorism will continue to thrive among the desperate and marginalized victims of its unjust policies and actions.

## A meeting of minds

US SECRETARY of State Colin Powell's brief visit to Pakistan ended on a positive note on Tuesday making it clear that Islamabad and Washington have an identity of views on a number of vital questions. A meeting of minds between President Musharraf and Secretary Powell was obvious on two most important issues of the moment, namely Afghanistan and Kashmir. The two agreed that in a post-Taliban scenario "all elements" should form part of the government so as to ensure that it had a broad-based character. This new government, Secretary Powell said, should include the Northern Alliance as well as the moderates among the Taliban. Given Afghanistan's ethnic composition, it is obvious that only a government which commands the loyalty of all segments of the country's multilingual and multi-ethnic population would be effective and stable. In fact, one of the major drawbacks of the current Taliban setup is the virtual exclusion of Afghanistan's non-Pakhtoon elements. Indeed, this has been one of the principal reasons for the protracted strife and violence that has been raging in Afghanistan since the Taliban emerged on the scene in the mid-nineties. It would thus be a big mistake not to take into account the Afghan society's demographic composition in the formation of a future government. From this point of view, the convergence of views between Pakistan and the US shows realism and throws into bold relief the two countries' shared perception of the Afghan situation.

The big question in Afghanistan today is the ongoing Anglo-American military action against the Taliban and the time-frame within which its political objectives can be achieved. Obviously, as President Musharraf said at his Tuesday press conference,

the duration of the operation was linked to the realization of these objectives. Nevertheless, he hoped that the operation would be "short." He appealed to the international community to try to achieve the military objectives as quickly as possible. On his part, Secretary Powell said his government did not wish to extend the military operation "beyond the achievement of goals." More significantly, he said the two sides "shared how to begin the process of reconstruction of Afghanistan."

Another positive outcome of Secretary Powell's visit was his statement that the Kashmir issue was "central" to the relationship between Pakistan and India. By making this declaration, Secretary Powell has upheld Pakistan's position that the continuation of the Kashmir dispute posed a threat to South Asia's peace. In fact, it has the potential to draw Pakistan and India into a military conflict which could escalate into a nuclear encounter. "We, too, believe," said Secretary Powell, "that the Kashmir issue is central to the (Indo-Pakistan) relationship." It is most unfortunate that the realism shown by the American secretary of state should have elicited a negative reaction from the Indian foreign office which tried to dodge the real issue of a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir issue by raising the bogey of "terrorism" in the disputed territory.

The world has recognized what terrorism is. That exactly is the reason why the world coalition has been formed to deal with it. More important, the world coalition has clearly seen the difference between terrorists and freedom fighters, whether in Palestine or in Kashmir. Secretary Powell's statement thus deserves to be welcomed as a realistic assessment of the different nature of the problems at hand — one in Afghanistan and the other in Kashmir.

14. Date 16-10-2001

## Anti-America demonstrations

**A**nti-America demonstrations have now spread throughout the Islamic world and taken an ugly turn, the respective governments known for their pro-US tilt coming under tremendous pressure on this count. It is now much more than ordinary protests, the crowds taking to streets in a violent manner and even ransacking places of worship of the opposite sides. Nigeria in particular is the worst example of Muslim-Christian clashes that have claimed around 200 lives; the tension still not showing any signs of subsiding. Somehow or the other, the situation has assumed the shape of a war of religions, if not strictly war of civilizations, the term being frequently used these days in the international media although this should never have happened. United States and its staunch ally, Britain, having realized the gravity of the situation, given a number of clarifications to convince the Muslims that the strikes on Afghanistan, despite its Muslim majority, ought not to be taken for attack on Islam.

The people at grass roots in most of the Islamic countries are, however, not willing to accept any of these clarifications and have, instead, taken a different position on American operation inside Afghanistan. On one hand, this difference of opinion owes its origin to the concept of Jihad that Muslims of ordinary prudence believe becomes binding on them when any Islamic state or a Muslim community comes under attack from non-believers. There are many interpretations of this religious duty enjoined upon Muslims, most of the scholars suggesting that Jihad becomes obligatory only if a Muslim community or state is attacked by non-believers that mean the pagans having no faith in any of the chief religions. All these interpretations and diversity of views notwithstanding, the popular sentiment is essentially anti-US and is growing in intensity day by day. Pakistan too is faced with almost the same sentiments among the class of people hailing from the lower and middle rung of the society. It is widely believed that most of the people resorting to protest marches and anti-government and anti-American rallies, belong to the religious groups and parties.

But the late news is that even some political parties have voiced their support for these protesters albeit for the sake of tormenting the Musharraf regime for settling some old scores. This would have been enough had the matter not gone beyond that. A recently published report in a national English daily says that now people with a liberal bent, having no affiliation with religious parties, have joined hands with religious elements, in the name of Jihad. They are being enrolled as Jihadis or Mujahideen to fight, along with Taliban, the forces they identify with enemies of Islam. And, according to the same report, even the poor are donating for this holy war, a woman from a low-income household even going to the extent of donating 20 eggs for what she deems a noble cause. The people enrolled in this manner at the private level that is having nothing to do with the government or any of its agencies, have also succeeded once in blocking Karakoram Highway, the main link between China and Pakistan.

These charged emotions are difficult to manage. Here the country needs the support of all the learned people to come forward and guide the masses about the true meaning of Jihad. No doubt, compelling poor and militarily much weaker Afghans under Taliban administration to face the wrath of the superpower and its mighty allies is at a risk of being misunderstood as a war against Muslims. If it is a war imposed on Muslims just for their sin of being Muslims, then the Muslims of the world should sit together to evolve a consensus opinion as to what should be done and how to do it. Once a decision has been arrived at, all the countries of the Islamic world should then stick to it, come what may.

15. Date 26-10-2001

## Reining in the militants

ISLAMABAD has done well to ask the Taliban government not to allow or encourage Pakistanis to join the Afghan forces or acquire training there. This has come in the wake of reports that a number of Pakistanis had been killed in the American air strikes. While the Foreign Office's advice to the Taliban government is welcome, one must ponder the reasons why the situation has reached a point where the concern on this score has to be taken up officially with Kabul. Basically, things have come to this pass over a period of more than two decades, which have seen a gradual erosion of state authority vis-à-vis the activities of elements operating across the Durand Line. This state of affairs proved to be of advantage to the militant parties and groups which had played a key role in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan.

An additional factor in that context was the overwhelming US interest in seeing the Soviets out of Afghanistan and the massive pressure, prodding and material help it pressed into achieving this objective. In the process many lines of distinction and differentiation between state authority and the diverse elements drawn into that conflict got blurred and many others ignored. In any case, it was a zero-sum game, and the ultimate loser has been state authority vis-à-vis religious militants. Helping the people of Afghanistan in their freedom struggle was one thing, letting some religious organisations run the show themselves quite another.

The man who created this Frankenstein was Ziaul Haq. He let these open training camps and recruit Pakistanis for the holy war against the Soviet Union without realising that one day these groups and organisations would become a government within a government. As time passed and the military dictatorship gave way to democratic regimes, the militant outfits went completely out of government control. In fact, at one stage, some religious parties were running their own Afghan policies and were in a position to defy the government because of the strength and self-righteous spirit and

approach of their militias. Whatever little bit of sanity was left in our Afghan policy ended when some intelligence agencies became deeply involved in the Afghan civil war and began sponsoring madrassah students to drive out the warring Mujahideen factions in Afghanistan and capture power themselves. Since then, encouraged by the Taliban victories in Afghanistan, jihadi organisations in Pakistan have attempted to assert their power. This showed in the display of arms, in arming the students of the madrassahs and in using them as militias to browbeat opponents and defy the law enforcement agencies. They also openly collected funds for the Taliban, ran training camps and recruited Pakistani youths to fight the Taliban's war against the Northern Alliance. While doing this they cared little for what the government of the day thought, said or did.

In the present situation, too, Pakistani volunteers have continued to cross into Afghanistan. Obviously, the situation cannot be reversed immediately, especially at this time when emotions are running high over the happenings in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the government has taken some sensible steps and their effect is already visible. For instance, the anti-government rallies have been — barring some exceptions — quite peaceful. Similarly, arms are no more on display at the rallies. This gradual assertion of governmental authority and the process of reining in the militias should continue. Some of the religious parties involved in the anti-Soviet war may be quite well-meaning, but many of them have raised the heady brew of street power and on occasions feel strong enough to defy the government's writ. Faced with such tendencies and the possibilities that they portend in certain configurations of factors and circumstances critically affecting the state of civil society and rule of law, the government has perforce to act and assert its authority. It is a difficult task, but no one should be allowed to entertain the notion that he was above the law and that it is the writ of the government that shall prevail.

