

Socio-Political and Economic Implications of Sit-in Politics

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
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


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Dedication

This humble effort is dedicated to the *disenchanted souls* and my *Queen, Haseena*.

— []

Acknowledgement

“People of fortunes” are rare in this world of appearance and rare is the case of recognition of affection bestowed upon people by the “Great Souls” of the age. Here, I consciously situate myself in the realm of the “*fortune favoured*” where I found my *star* in the form of my supervisor Dr. Manzoor Khan Afridi. He deserves special gratitude, for without him things would have been nowhere.

I would like to extend recognitions to Dr. Husnul Amin for the time we spent together discussing so many things. Due respect to Ms. Sadia Tasleem, my teacher, for where I stand now is due to her constant spur. Recognitions are extended to Mr. Imdad Ullah, my mentor, for his critical discussions during our stay together.

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Abstract

This study focuses on the nature of political and social processes wherein the real social relations are discussed devoid of epistemological abstractionism of the social realities. On one hand, it obscures the social epistemology by dragging it back into complexity, on the other hand, it tries to shaken the foundational nature of epistemology. The political quagmire as understood at present along with the question of change is discarded for much promising critical approaches which not only challenge the "great men of history" approach but also instantiates the human agency its due role. The relations of social positions from a given norm circle provides a framework for a useful explanatory critique which not only enlightens minds but also helps in absenting absences of the becoming.

Where the mainstream philosophy of science stood at the brink in explaining the unexplainable; the relational conceptualisation provided a durable anchor for explaining the sit-in politics. The particular agential behaviour during sit-ins and its implications for other agents (business community and society) and the context (political arena and the general conception of the politics in Pakistan) are rephrased to better understand the logic of complex social processes. The study sorts out to grasp the reality of certain actions like sit-ins and protests at the realm of "the real" (albeit based on anti-foundational epistemology) to understand the generative mechanisms and to situate agency therein so that a dream of eudaimonia is realised.

List of Abbreviations

ANP	Awami National Party
EBDO	Elective Bodies Disqualification Order
IJI	Islami Jamhoori Ittehad
JI	Jammat-e-Islami
JUI	Jamiat Ul Ulama-e-Islam
JUI (F)	Jamiat Ul Ulama-e-Islam (Fazal Rahman Group)
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
MMA	Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal
MQM	Mutahida Quomi Movement
NAP	National Awami Party
NRO	National Reconciliation Ordinance
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PAT	Pakistan Awami Tehrik
PKMAP	Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party
PMLN	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
PMLQ	Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PTI	Pakistan Tehrik Insaf
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Social Republics

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Background

The political history of Pakistan is full of mysteries and uncanny stories with severe implications for the state and society (to use the mainstream dualism). Since its birth, Pakistan is queued in line to receive a stable fortune but the situation remains the troublesome. There is always a “war of positions” among many segments of political significance. More often, it is the civil and the military confronting each other to get the upper hand in deciding the fate of the nation and sometimes, it is the politicians and civil society with specific political objectives that flung in the power game. The institutional nature of Pakistani political behaviour is fuzzy in essence where the people often situate themselves in the apparent game of power based on subjection and domination.

Over history, interest groups and political parties has benefited from many political adventures in Pakistan like the military takeovers, while others have openly opposed such adventures. Such adventures did not come from heavens but were nurtured in the political gaps provided whether deliberately or by mistake. Similarly, the civilian rules also faced certain bizarre situation where the forces of opposition took every step to exploit the situation. Protests, long marches and sit-ins, having its origin to USA civil rights movement of Blacks, have occurred both in military and civilian regimes and have been dealt both peacefully as well as with iron fist (Mutahir, 2014).

But the elections of 2013 and the subsequent allegations of rigging on the newly elected government of Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (henceforth PML-N) spurred a new controversy when Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (henceforth PTI) of Imran Khan and Pakistan Awami Tehrik (henceforth PAT) of Dr. Tahir ul Qadri staged a sit-in in front of the parliament and demanded a probe into the rigging allegations and the resignation of the current PML-N government. This sit-in lasted for months and the question of political change is still hanging in balance. Since there is no structural or systemic change, the incremental change will nip the sit-in legacy in the bud. This is not the first case of sit-ins in protests as the Shia's protests against Zia's Islamisation in 1980s and the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) also protested in 1983, but one is mainly of religious nature and the other did not form any legacy (Khan, 2009), that why these cannot be discussed at length.

The sit-in politics left its imprints all over the country but the capital city suffered the most where the whole drama was evolving around the "centre of power" and the "centre of resistance". In terms of political costs, the gains and losses are somewhat balanced but the economic cost is tremendous; although an articulatory relational method would disapprove any economic cost because loss or gain is relational. Politically, awareness within the masses enhanced their capacity to speak up for themselves and demand their due rights while in terms of foreign relations, uncertainty caused reluctance to co-operate with the government (Ahmad, 2014).

The process of political change in Pakistan has always been proved a mystery to the academia and journalists of the mainstream political analysis. Mostly, the structure (institutions/organization) or agency (political actors/leadership) is blamed for any adventure in the political process (Khan, 2009). The imbroglio of discrediting one force over the other has flung us into deep academic injustices which has been misleading the society and thus

nurturing hatred among the different strata of the society. It has also puzzled the question of political change in the academic and practical realm.

Also, the question of scientific discovery of knowledge is problematic because our conception of science is also the product of discourses and conceptually dependent upon the philosophical framework of knowledge (Bhaskar, 1998a: 4-10). It has immediate implications for epistemology and ontology as well, where different spectres are arranged to define and delimit ontology to the level of understanding, and (or) present a defendable epistemology (ibid.: 29-35). It is therefore, necessary to formulate a philosophical discourse and situate agents in it and then put it to an empirical test to tackle an issue at hand. The Pakistani political disenchantment is hovering around in the same spectre.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The political scenario of Pakistan has haunted many minds over years with claims being made against its ethnically dominant Punjabi phenomena, the military as a “parallel state” or the inability of “civilian institutions” to coup with political issues. The analytical quagmire has dragged us in the realm of appearances and the deeper causation and incentives for actions are neglected to sustain parsimony and the “taken for granted” philosophies of social sciences. The sit-in politics of PTI and PAT has attracted the academia and journalists at the same time in the wake of its tremendous implications for society, politics and economy of Pakistan but its origin is still prone to layperson interpretations where the language often slips past the truth.

The basic problem remains the same; truth is compromised at the cost of language and individualism. The deeper causation of any phenomena and the situating of groups and

individuals in a particular process and its implications for emancipatory transformation remains the core issue.

1.3 Research Questions

1.3.1 Core Question

1: How the political quest identifies itself vis-à-vis different societal forces?

1.3.2 Supporting Questions

1: Why people often protest if the representative government is structuring the will of the nation?

2: What can be implied from such political behaviour and what are its implications for humanity?

1.4 Significance of the Study

The critical reappraisal of the once “taken for granted” realities in the wake of new definition of science and philosophy and its implications on the nature of the political and its knowledge will open up new possibilities for human emancipation. The dominant approaches of knowledge are problematic in its assumptions; maintaining false dualisms and thus sustains *false consciousness* (to use the Marxist term) or ideologies which in turn enslaves humanity and thus liberation becomes a farce. From this lens, the research will look at situating different groups and agents in a mutually constitutive relational way where the disturbance of one relation may have implications for the other; a claim against false dichotomies and individuality.

The case of Pakistani politics is elaborated in detail in the wake of recent sit-ins in the capital city under the same theoretical premises, which, if sustained, would revolutionise the whole agenda of emancipation. The strategic-relational perspective of any action in a given context focuses on the fault lines of human reflexivity vis-à-vis any political process where it (humanity) is not only involved in a process (albeit with false consciousness), but can transform the whole drama if self-realisation takes place. The relational method has implications for economy as well, which denounces the mainstream God-bestowed nature of economy and instead focus on relational wave of exchange, with ills such exploitation and competition being expressed.

1.5 Literature Review

Political analysis has always been a mystery because of its complex nature. Without any prior knowledge of the political, it is almost impossible to conduct a dispassionate scientific research in Political Science (Hay, 2002). Similarly, the question of political change and the formation of a role model are also difficult to establish because of the role of language and discourse in the construction of political agents. In Pakistan, the turbulent political history and the role of different actors is vividly highlighted by many authors and academicians. Ziring is of the view that it is the military that manipulates everything and shapes the political future of the nation (Ziring, 2003). So the transition from military regimes to democracy, argues Aziz (2008: 23), has path dependent behaviour which “generates patterns making it appreciably difficult for polities to change direction. This approach then makes it possible to argue why the transition from a military to a civilian form of government in Pakistan remains problematic and incomplete”. But his ontological premises are wrong because he is convicted of flat/ unstratified ontology and does not mention anything related to path-shaping

tendencies. Iqbal (2011) argues that the elite class of Pakistan has deliberately kept the political culture weak so that they could manipulate the disoriented society for their own vested interests. Talbot (1998) argues that both the military and the civilian regimes profess good values but the operational realities show that they have nothing to do with the common people. This clearly negates the statist approach of Mann (1986; 1993) and Skocpol (1979) where state and society are two different things and state servants are self-transcendent and justifies Poulantzas (1978a) and Jessop (1990; 2008) in claiming that state is social relationship and institutional ensemble and has a self-serving class where services are delivered on resistance or knowledge basis.

The history of Pakistan is full of political upheavals and we have witnessed one such turmoil in August 2014, when PTI and PAT staged a sit-in in Islamabad against the alleged rigging in elections 2013 and demanded probe into the rigging and the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Though, this is not the first case of sit-in and street politics in Pakistan (Ali. M. M, 2014), but this case was deemed to set a legacy. Iqbal (2014) narrates the history of sit-in politics from 1980s to present in which various social, political and religious groups/parties starting with Shias siege of the capital in the wake of Zakat and Ushr Ordinance of 1980, to Nawaz Sharif and Benazir led sit-ins and protests against each other to lawyers' moment of 2009 to the PTI-PAT sit-in.

The systematic study of such events with its deeper process of formation, nurture and rupture needs a comprehensive approach. Events as such have moulded the histories and destinies of many nations, in which such event is termed as a critical juncture of history whose legacy last for years to come (Collier & Collier, 1991). But the institutional characteristics of a given system are too structured that it is very difficult to bring about change without ideational change (Schmidt, 2008). Soifer (2012) is of the view that any such situation in the history needs permissive conditions which can break away the path-dependency of historical

institutionalism and “*change the underlying context to increase the causal power of agency or contingency and thus the prospects for divergence*”. In line with the case study under research, the political decision makers make more sense than the bottom-up approach suitable for a short period of crisis or critical juncture because it can offer one institutional solution or the other. “This offers the theoretical basis for a definition of critical junctures as relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). In this case study, the path-dependency has remained almost intact with a room for incremental changes. But the implications of sit-in politics in the age of globalisation have been wider in scale and intensity. The economic cost and the state credibility at foreign relations suffered a lot, causing tremendous macro-economic cost and delayed so many foreign investment agreements (Malik. A, 2014). Similarly, the social life of Islamabad was haphazard by the prolonged sit-in. The micro-economics were also hung in balance. The joint session of the parliament and the participation of all major political parties except PTI (the sit-in party) proved the willingness of the politicians to tackle the issue at hand peacefully (Ahmad, 2014).

1.6 Research Methodology

In this study relational and articulation methods along with strategic-relational approach has been used to form necessary links and to coup with the complexity of the concrete social life. The abstraction will be grounded in critical philosophy of social science, where the different strata of reality are closely considered and the causal links are substantially formulated. The relational method will consider relations instead of persons and societies; its claims are

argued on the ~~foundational~~ basis of relations where the actors situate themselves and act accordingly.

The articulation method will define the links necessary for the operation of a social process whereas any deliberate or unconscious move from one position or “norm circle” to another in a given relation may not only compromise the ongoing activity but also may have relational implications for other spheres of social life. The structure agency dilemma and its proposed solutions (though the term is dangerous) in strategic-relational approach are of main significance in the wake of either crude individualism or determinism. Overall, the research is grounded in Bhaskarian conception of science as an intuitive groundwork of locating causal mechanisms and empirically testing it.

1.7 Limitations

This research, as grounded in critical realism, accepts the anti-foundational nature of epistemology and the fallibility of knowledge claims in the wake of complexity and the ontic depth of any reality existing independently of our conception of it. Although, it opts for complexity but complexity reduction or abstraction is a necessary condition which forges our knowledge and reality in itself. Thus we must select a point as a launch pad; hence fallibility of knowledge is the ever present condition of any knowledge. Moreover, the analytical symposium elaborated in this project may be conducted with an intuitive bias for emancipation, and the time limitation may have affected the researcher’s efforts to hastily conclude the topic.

Chapter 2:

Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

The life-world is like a mess, it is too complex to be fully and rationally grasped with. Rescher (1998) states that the world manifests fewer overt properties than it actually possesses; in order to avoid epistemic infinity, we must adhere to some sort of selectivity and bias to start our venture of inquiry (cited in Jessop, 2008). As mentioned above, the complexity bares our dispassionate innocent scientific project of the social; therefore we are compelled to do a certain degree of defensible abstraction/generalisation because our truth claims are internal to our “theoretical discourse” (Sayer, 1998: 122). This suggests that theory is not something of an ordering framework or hypothesis which is to be tested and proved (or disproved) but it is understood as a “*conceptualization*,” in which ‘to theorize’ means to prescribe a particular way of conceptualizing something” (Sayer, 2010: 34). Conceptualising the social (and by extension political) ontology includes both the observable and unobservable properties which befit our theory-laden research projects (ibid.: 35).

The discipline of Political Science is married to a lot of theoretical approaches over history. From Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes, Locke and Montesquieu etc. theorists and philosophers were concerned with the formal state institutions and its subsequent impact upon the social behaviour and the structuring of society in order. The study of institutional formation of a state and its subsequent attempts upon the carving of future course of human history is academically called old institutionalism (Peters, 1999: 3-4). Old institutionalism can best

express itself by its two important proto-types; legalism and structuralism (ibid.: 4-11). Legalism focuses on law and constitution and its subsequent implications upon society in terms of ordering chaotic behaviour (ibid.: 6-7). This is quite in line with Foucault who explains the role of punishment as an incentive of legalism in constructing obedient citizens (1995). Similarly, structuralism, a dominant assumption of old institutionalism, is also concerned with role of structure in the prediction of political behaviour which means there is no room for human agency except the "*Great Men of history*" (Peters, 1999: 7). The structuralism of old institutionalism mainly focused on the nature of political systems and its historical orientations and hence "individual behaviour (for the old institutionalists meaning mostly the behavior of political elites) was a function of their collective history and of their understanding of the meaning of their politics influenced by history" (ibid.: 10).

The structuralist nature of old institutionalism was challenged by a new wave of more intentionalist and atomist approach what can be called as "behavioural revolution" in 1950s (Hay, 2002; Peters, 1999; Dahl, 1961b). The study of political conduct and henceforth the search for law-like regularities in the *social* realm was the basic tenet which embraced the discipline in the mid-twentieth century in the form of behaviouralism (Hay, 2002: 10-13; Sayer, 2010: 85-88). In this approach, *the social* and *the political* are subjected to empirical observations and regularities over time and hence it claims to generate a dispassionate knowledge of society and politics as its ontological premises are infringed to the realm of empirical (Hay, 2002: 10-13; Sayer, 2000). Contemporary to this approach is Rational Choice Theory borrowed from economics which focuses on individuals and their actions as utility maximising agents (Hay, 2002: 8-9; Scott, 2000: 126-136). But this approach is alien to the context in which the agents are manipulating rationality and is also prone to collective irrationality and collective action problems (ibid.). Moreover, it is silent about social structures and its contributory powers in the construction of agents' identity and rationality

relative to a given social and political environment. It can be fairly stated that the atomistic nature of both these approaches placed no implicit role for social and political structure and were hence advocating one-sided reality, thus paving the way for new institutionalism.

2.2 New Institutionalism

The obvious failure of *behaviouralism* and *rational choice theory* in explaining group actions compelled political scientists to develop a newer version of institutionalism. Although this approach has many accounts, but some basic tenets are common in all versions that binds them together. The core assumption is that society/polity is structural in nature in the form of constitutional framework or shared values, thus transcending individualism to involve groups having ordered, predictable and stable relationship in a given context (Peters, 1999, 18; Olsen, 2007, 3). Institutions also construct agents' identity and behaviour and thus forming uniform group behaviour (ibid.). But this approach is highly determinist in nature because the structure is shaping group behaviour to a predictable level, which is counterfeited ontologically at the level of the real (Bhaskar, 1998a; 2008a; 2010; Sayer, 2000). A reality can at best be acclaimed at three levels, the empirical, the actual and the real, which includes processes and mechanism that can only be reproduced instead of induction or deduction method of atomism and structuralism (Sayer, 2000, 11).

However, institutionalism provides a very rich framework for analysing group behaviour and collective actions although the group formation mechanism is quite unique, i.e. it is threatening individuality to the level of extinction. It is favouring structures/institutions at the cost of agency which makes it impossible to know about the world of which we, as agents, are ourselves the producers and the product simultaneously (Hay, 2002, 109). Anyhow, these questions can be addressed within the core framework and a way out can be made by

stretching our research to the question of structure and agency. But first the different versions of new institutionalism are worth discussing because of its fulfilling role in political analysis.

2.2.1 Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism, a version of new institutionalism, stress on the diachronic view of (political) life in which life (political) is taken as a process rather than as an alienated event of history with no concern for time/space and that the rules of the game which constrains political actors are itself the very construction of the actors (Sanders, 2006). Seeing the life-world as a process induces us to state that historical institutionalism sets its premises on group theory by accepting that “conflict among rival groups for scarce resources lies at the heart of politics” and from structural-functionalism it borrowed that polity is “an overall system of interacting parts” (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Pablo Ouzeil, n.d.). Institutions in this version are the product of historical interaction of power and interest in a given polity which can be summarised as “they [historical institutionalists] define them [Institutions] as the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Ikenberry systematises this approach into three distinctive points that “range from specific characteristics of government institutions, to the more overarching structures of state, to the nation's normative social order” (cited in Steinmo et al., 1992: 2). This clearly implies the structuralist tendency of historical institutionalism in which power (constitution, law, and both formal and informal control over knowledge and socialisation) shapes the society, political preferences and identities. In this way, the preferences of citizens are not shaped by modernisation but by the interaction of different social, political and economic logics of a given structure in which individuals found themselves (Immergut, 1998: 17).

The central question of behaviour shaping of institutionalism presents the core controversy as it is normally believed that individual behaviour is shaping the course of history. Two approaches are worth-mentioning here. First is the calculus approach, which focuses upon human behaviour as instrumental and strategic to attain maximum utility of the set goals, and institutions as an environment of certainty of outcomes and behaviour in the forms of incentives attached with it (Hall & Taylor, 1996). This implies that political actors will behave in an ordered fashion because the incentives of punishment will affect the utilitarian goals. The other approach is cultural one, which focuses on individuals influenced by their worldview towards a patterned context interpreted in cultural terms in which they act as satisficers and institutions are seen as culture of meaning and images carving interpretations and identities of individuals (ibid.).

Both these approaches are used to define institutional stability over time, with calculus approach focuses on non-compliance as zero-sum game and cultural approach focuses on institutions as *taken for granted* and conventional that any individual cannot change it (ibid.). This incentivises us to state that structure/institutions are having an independent ontology and is leading us towards an analytical as well as ontological dualism. In this vein the question of institutional stability can have another dimension especially when its selectivity in favouring some actors over others is understood (see for example Immergut, 1998; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Sanders, 2006a). From power relations perspective, a reality can be constructed and maintained by the *significant-others* who have leverage over information and the use of force and can thus create knowledge of legitimacy and the perpetual ordering of society as a result (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Jerry Tew, 2002). Although this may lead to Luhmannian autopoietic system with self-producing or path-dependence mechanism, which is analytically as well as ontologically fuzzy, still knowledge/power protocol catches attention.

In addition, the ontological position of historical institutionalism is fuzzy in the wake of two approaches dividing it. The calculus approach is at best a rational choice approach having a foundational ontology and positivist methodology while the cultural approach is sociological based on anti-foundational ontology and interpretive methodology (Marsh et al., 2004; Hay & Wincott, 1998). The path-dependent epistemology associated with historical institutionalism has severe ontological implications for the approach in terms of contingent nature of reality emerging from the social interaction of actors in a given context. As the reality is stratified (cf. Bhaskar, 1998a; 2010), and path-dependency opts for an unstratified reality, the term seems incompatible with the question of change in this approach.

2.2.2 Sociological Institutionalism

The organisational studies of bureaucracy and state totally ignored the cultural aspect of institutional functionalism which provides norms of legitimacy to a given institution in a given context (Finnemore, 1996: 328-29). The alienation of organisations from the rest of society and its placement at the higher echelons of rationality and technicality has ontological implications as they seem to form an autonomous ontology devoid of social relations in given spatio-temporal juncture. Therefore, Institutions are to be seen in the prism of its constitutive agenda as meaning-giving and the construction of individuals within the cultural premises incentivising their apparent resilience to the external stimulus of change (Olsen, 2007). Rationality is not a bad thing as some would dismiss it as a production of organisational theory devoid of time/space and agency rather “rationality is a cultural value” (Finnemore, 1996), which means that bureaucratic organisation based on rational assumption is a *myth* and conformity is a *ceremony* (*ibid*). Hall and Taylor describe sociological institutionalists’ focus on culture as compared to rational choice institutionalism, which claims of transcendent rationality as:

Instead, they [sociological institutionalists] argued that many of these forms and procedures should be seen as culturally specific practices, akin to the myths and ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into organizations, not necessarily to enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but as a result of the kind of processes associated with the transmission of cultural practices more generally. Thus, they argued, even the most seemingly bureaucratic of practices have to be explained in cultural terms (Hall & Taylor, 1996).

Institutions, according to this approach, are beyond formal procedures including meanings, symbols and moral values which transcends the institutional-cultural dichotomy in which the institutional (cultural) behaviour is internalised by individuals and thus conformity-behaviour of individuals is constitutive to the institutions (ibid.). Agents and institutions are mutually constitutive and actors' compliance with the institutional criteria of interaction is the core of the approach in which the role agency is highly undermined and reality is tended too much structuralist (ibid.).

But this approach fails to answer the question of why some institutional arrangements are opted over other. This leads us to the political realm in which power plays a central role in context-shaping and conduct-shaping (see for example Hay, 2002), which will be discussed later. Here, it is convenient to discuss the construction of truth and its institutionalisation. Humans facing natural constraints in a given context are brought into social arrangements by default which punctually interferes at large with the life world (Berger & Luckmann, 1967: 66). This manifestation leads us to claim that humans are the product of their environment which is mediated through some *significant-other*, which creates order and stability. The question of stability is answered by Berger and Luckmann in a way that humans try to externalise themselves in an ongoing activity (ibid.: 70) but this enshrines a separate ontology for the social structures or institutions with clear ontological as well as analytical dualism of structure and agency.

In this approach, (as one would entertain the freedom of putting Berger and Luckmann into this intellectual category because of their methodological premises), the role of individual's compatibility is enticed with habitualisation to a certain social reality, thus making room for a foundationalist ontology, i.e. the claims that society and social institutions are real (1967). It strays this approach from that of constitutive constructionists who explains any reality in anti-realist fashion, or in other words, reality is a state of mind and beyond its representation by language it exists no more (Andrews, 2012; Elder-Vass, 2012).

Contrary to this is critical realist social constructionism which focus on the mechanisms of causal powers embodied in the institutional structures and individual agents whose interaction cause events but that causal powers are tendencies, therefore contingency is the ever present condition that shape empirical irregularities (Elder-Vass, 2012: 10; Bhaskar, 2008). Causal powers are emergent properties acquired by *things*, existing on the basis of the very assemblage of things in a whole, where language and culture too, can be seen as causal powers affecting the interactive outcomes (Elder-Vass, 2012: 10-13). This ends in a critical realist structure-agency debate but before making this point as a framework for research, it would be useful to discuss the role of ideas and the moment of change.

2.2.3 Constructivist Institutionalism

The apparently materialist and structuralist nature of new institutionalism and its focus on path-dependency rather than path-shaping characteristics is quite parsimonious because it provides no room for ideas and the quest of change in post-formative phase of institutions is blurred. The role of agency is almost neglected or is circumscribed to the very material and institutional conditions. The project of restoration of agency is taken by constructivist

institutionalism which tries to breakout from pre-ordained view of agency to a more strategic and responsive one (Hay, 2006a: 61-2).

The common allegations on other institutionalisms especially the historical one is that it is too static to explain the post-formation structural/institutional change because it focuses upon the equilibrium and then a dramatic change after cleavages in a system (Bell, 2011: 885). While critics allege that question of change in historical institutionalism place institutions as independent variables in the time of stability and as dependent variables in the time of crisis (ibid.) which means that institutional analysis is analytically dualistic in nature. The role of agency is enslaved to institutions in a path-dependent manner where history reproduces itself.

Constructivist institutionalism aims to restore agency in the analysis of political change. For this, constructivists like Colin Hay puts agents as strategic, working on perceptions of the context largely motivated by ideas.

Actors are strategic, seeking to realize certain complex, contingent, and constantly changing goals. They do so in a context which favors certain strategies over others and must rely upon perceptions of that context which are at best incomplete and which may very often prove to have been inaccurate after the event. Moreover, ideas in the form of perceptions “matter” in a second sense—for actors are oriented normatively towards their environment. Their desires, preferences, and motivations are not a contextually given fact—a reflection of material or even social circumstance—but are irredeemably ideational, reflecting a normative (indeed moral, ethical, and political) orientation towards the context in which they will have to be realized (Hay, 2006a: 63).

This excerpt manifests that the role given to agency by the constructivists is ideational far away from the context; which clearly means that constructivist are focusing on those who are much learned and well versed in innovative ideas and are having the leverage over the means to propagate ideas and generate opinions. This simply supports those in position of power because it is silent to the role of power in channelling ideas and information on scalar and spatial basis. The institutional path-dependence and path-shaping tendencies are heavily

relied on ideas whose emergent causal powers constrain political actions (ibid.: 65). But here ideas are too much overemphasised by keeping it prior to institutions or in other words, this indirectly implies that institutions are a state of mind which is undermining the ontological nature of structure as having real effect (see also Giddens, 1984: 377). To carve the ideal as institutional, constructivist Institutionalism focus on normalisation of ideas as institutions (Hay, 2006a) but the question of power is not blatantly discussed, which does a great academic injustice to the *oppressed*. The question of power and its mechanisms in regulating the *social* has been ignored in this approach. Indeed, power is manoeuvred by those in position of power interpreting certain realities and producing mechanisms of control in the form of circulars, ordinances or regulatory bodies.

There may be circular and self-reinforcing processes whereby knowledges may legitimate the positions of those already in power, and those in power may have leverage over the means to accredit (or discredit) knowledges, depending on whether they suit their interests. In this way, knowledge may be seen to be constructed in particular social conditions, and may be linked, overtly or covertly, to specific political purposes (Tew, 2002: 86)

This approach tends to cajole with radical constructionism in which individuals come to know of ideas without any instigation from exterior. This is indeed a very innocent depiction of the social life where things are running in themselves with no trade-offs of conflicting agential interests.

Empirically too, this approach has focused on policy makers and their role in propagation of ideas and discourse to ordain a pithy support for a particular political agenda. Schmidt, one of the founders of this approach, has shown in a very innocent way the policy makers shaping the political discourse (2008: 15-16). This is highly marginal view of a polity in which the fate of the masses is decided by the *significant-others* and it is fulfilling the agenda of domination.

2.3 Critical Junctures in Institutionalism

The nature and content of different institutional approaches is highlighted in the above section; the question of political change is still at the heart of the debate. The answer provided by historical institutionalism in this regard is interesting, focusing on particular junctures or moments of history where agency selects a particular strategy or policy option which closes-off other options and thus creating path-dependent institutional setting (Pierson, 2004: 135). Path-dependency is a core attribute of such junctures to study society and politics which “characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties” (Mahoney, 2000: 507). The moment of path-dependency setting is called “critical juncture” in which agency breaks the structural constraints and performs freely.

In institutional analysis critical junctures are characterized by a situation in which the structural (that is, economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on political action are significantly relaxed for a relatively short period, with two main consequences: the range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands substantially and the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest are potentially much more momentous (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007: 343).

Critical junctures are more adequately related with change and its analysis involves the baseline or normal circumstances, the disequilibrium of continuity and the formation of crisis and the change in the form of legacy (Collier & Collier, 1991: 30-1). Junctures always has two preconditions; *permissive* and *productive* conditions making the option of change possible (Soifer, 2012: 1573). Permissive setting reduces the structural constraints because the structure or institution has flung into crisis in which the strategies of actors shape the future course of action which can be the post-formation productive phase (*ibid.*).

The duration of critical junctures is a head-ache for its protagonists. Some would say it is short lived conditions of crisis while some would believe its life revolve around the surfacing

and diminishing of lenient conditions (ibid.: 1574). At moments, there may be favourable conditions but change is not attained and sometime the crisis may be in series which follows one after the other and in this way the legacy of the critical juncture may fade away due the next crisis (ibid.: 1574-5). This approach, however, is silent about the nature of change which is, indeed, irreversible.

Of whatsoever nature is the change; path-dependency and the subsequent critical junctures in the time of equilibrium and disequilibrium focus on stasis and abrupt change. This controversy is raised from the very understanding of politics by mainstream institutionalists, which is seen as a *locus*, as an *arena* rather than as a *social relation* arguing that politics is a process of ever changing aggregations and possibilities (Hay, 2002: 3). That's why the real problem of continuity and change is hinging over to-do list of mainstream institutionalism. Politics is claimed to be discontinuous where change occurs at a cleavage. This suggests that there is a punctuated equilibrium in politics (Collier and Collier, 1991; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992; Jessop, 1990a; Hay, 2002), which bequest alienation to the explanations of incremental change.

But as politics is based on real relations of the social formation, it cannot be static and in equilibrium, rather change must be continuous and evolutionary (as well as structural). Change is at best incremental and continuous which is termed as punctuated evolution; which is beyond the scope of critical juncture approach (Hay, 2002: 163). It focuses on the inter-crisis period in which the complex interplay of institutions and agents is to be assessed. Thus starts structure-agency debate.

2.4: Structure and Agency in institutionalism

Institutional analyses focus on the nature of institutional stability and change, wherein stability is claimed to a structural attribute and change as an agential one. It seems absurd that there is regularity in social life and when this is infringed, then is change possible; rather there are no two similar cases in social life (Sayer, 2010) and attributing one force at the time of regularity and the other at the time of crisis is scandalous. This clearly means that there are two ontologies, the structural and the agential, but their interplay is not spontaneous, rather in a given time/space one is dominated by the other. This polarisation has ended in an endless debate and the problem needs a useful way out in which the polarisation or dualism is transcended and a unified social ontology is accrued where the actors and the context are intermingled in each other to the extent of inseparability (Hay, 2002: 115-6).

Anthony Giddens is amongst the prominent social theorists who have contributed to the structure-agency conundrum. He proposed his theory of structuration in which he claimed to have transcended the ontological dualism of praxis or agency and structure (Giddens, 1984). He defines structure as a channel and the product of any action taking place within its domain and its properties are confined to actions or at best to memory, where actions are structured in a given time/space in a reproducing pattern (ibid.: 374-377). The dualism is thus transcended at ontic level but Giddens is accused of methodological bracketing when analysing structural and agential attributes of any social interaction because of his coin analogy (Hay, 2002: 120), in which only one aspect can be seen at a time. This is ultimately leading to a controversy because the methodological bracketing in itself manifests that Giddens' assumptions are based on false premises of duality (ibid.: 121). The definitional problematic of Giddens is also instantiating his false assumptions of duality of "structure and agency". This can be seen in Giddens agency as "capability of doing things" (1984: 9) and "structure exists only as

memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and as instantiated in action” (ibid.: 377), means that structures are the tributary properties of agency, a radical constructionist approach.

Giddens came under severe criticism from critical realists, especially Margaret Archer, who attacked his conflationist position by stating that structure and agency are emergent strata of reality, ontologically separate and should be “related rather than conflated” (Archer, 1995: 6). She proposed a morphogenetic approach in which structure refers to “human relations among human actors—relations like power, competitions, exploitation, and dependency” (Porpora, 2013: 27). This simply exacerbates that human actors imply certain positions and structure can be defined as “relations among social positions” (ibid). Moreover, this approach believes in dualism of structure and agency but claims that structures are “relations among social positions” (ibid), which drags us to conclude that Archer’s dualism is in fact artificial because social positions are related to human agency in scalar pattern. The ontological dualism is providing structures with separate ontology like any natural structure which means that such reality exist even if there is no life world.

The apparent failure of both structuration theory and morphogenesis approach in transcending the structure-agency dualism kept the issue hanging. Giddens tried to resolve the debate but failed to transcend analytical dualism while Archer fell short in ontological dualism (Hay, 2002: 126). A rather promising approach is introduced by Bob Jessop, termed as “Strategic-Relational Approach” premised on critical realist social ontology (Jessop, 1990a; 2008).

2.5: Strategic-Relational Approach

Jessop starts quite familiar with the fore-mentioned theorists (Giddens and Archer), focusing on duality of structure and agency as Giddens did, and making his ontic base on “critical realist philosophy of social science” (Jessop, 2008: 21-22; 1990a; Hay, 2002: 127). Strategic-relational approach is influenced by various other social theorists who examine the function of society and institutions in terms of social relations based on power, exploitation and interdependence (Jessop, 2008: 118-19; Porpora, 2013). Indeed, Jessop sort out to transcend the conceptual dualism by bringing agency and structure into each other, achieving *structural context* and *situated actors* (Hay, 2002: 128). He repeated the move and brought *situated actors* and *structural context* into each other resulting in a *strategically selective context* and *strategic actors* (ibid.). This shows that the conceptual dualism of structure-agency is transcended.

The notion of *strategically selective context* means that it is favouring certain strategies over other (Jessop, 2008: 20-25; Hay, 2002: 129). Here Archer’s term of “relations among social positions” can be put into play, because those in better position will have more leverage in constituting a context because of unequal power, resources or intellect. The *strategic actors* and the *strategically selective context* are stratified in nature as actors may adopt multiple strategies intentionally or otherwise, and context may be favourable as well as its characteristics prone to change.

This approach is quite useful in analysing structural and processual change because the strategic interaction resulting from actors’ (individual or group) strategy in a given context provides for *strategic learning* on the part of actors and the “*partial transformation of context for future strategy*” (Hay, 2002: 13, emphasis mine). Here the term partial means biased in favour of those who have a better social position, thus keeping the realities of oppression

alive in the academic realm. It would be better if we state that this approach only explains the world but as Jessop has integrated Foucauldian power perspective in this approach (Jessop, 2008: 140-153), this means that resistance within a given context may lead towards its total transformation. But this will require knowledge of the context and the articulatory mechanisms under which the knowledge is shaping strategies (Tew, 2002: 85-86).

Although this approach is very useful in transcending the dualistic nature of social ontology, but the question of collective actions is still at the heart of the debate. This can be best attributed to Elder-Vass who systematically termed groups as *norm circles*, wherein norms are considered as emergent having causal powers of its own upon the actors (2010: 122; 2012: 11-12). These norms are followed by actors having specific interests in observing compliance while non-compliance may be distasteful (Elder-Vass, 2010: 123), if not morally, then materially. This is quite in line with Inglehart's thesis of post-materialism and collective actions (Opp, 1990), but the problem with Inglehart's approach is that "materialist value orientation" also leads to a collective action to preserve the status quo. Therefore, the *norm circles* approach and its causal powers can at best catch a given situation under research.

Norms are originated from the particular social position from where the relational nature of individual interaction takes place. This can be incorporated in *strategic-relational approach* in which stratified nature of *strategically selective context* can bear different normative selectivities because it's very origin has roots in human interacting from different social positions. This will overcome the group question at both analytical and ontological level. Such an approach will be applied to study the political contestations in this research and its subsequent implications for politics, society and economy.

Politics of Pakistan: Instability and Protests

3.1 Introduction

The state of Pakistan, a child of anti-colonialism and communal politics, has overtly and covertly resorted to legacy of colonialism in the affairs of state. The state institutions and constitution are set upon the premises of “British legal and constitutional framework”, which meant to deal with the pressures from the subaltern masses; met a doomed fate as aspirations of the masses could not be drawn upon the text of constitutional law under strong executive (Newberg, 2002: 2-5). The approaches ranging from Marxists to Culturalists focused specific attention on the issue of class formations and norms of society in describing the post-colonial institutional development in Pakistan but their deterministic and parsimonious explanation leads us no further than partial (Jalal, 1995: 29-0).

This clearly overstates the “state as an autonomous entity” operating independently of the society at large, in which the state will have an upper hand in maintaining a discourse of domination because it has a strongest *norm circle* based on coercion and incentives. The exercise of state power is not sole subject to coercive techniques but to incentives and particular *norm circles* which are exercised largely through civil society (Malik, 1997b: 8). This attitude has led some scholars to express the need for common political culture (ibid.: 12) which will indefinitely lead to one common whole where there will be identity among the

social and political happenings. This will lead to regularities in life which is the core of positivism based on flat ontology of closed totality¹ (Norrie, 2010).

The statist approach of “state as an autonomous entity” is challenged on the basis that the forces operating the state are not aliens but the very part of society. This clearly manifests that state is at best a social relationship of social positions where power plays the role of norm setting and behaviour shaping (Jessop, 1990; 2008; Archer, 1995; Hay, 2002). In this view, a unified political culture would mean the destruction of societal plurality and freedom and the social arrangement would viciously form a master-slave relationship. This will render us resist all those catchy approaches of promised glory at the surface that are incredulously inhuman when subjected to critical analysis.

3.2 Political Instability over history

The formation of Pakistan out of its colonial legacy has far reaching consequences for its political roadmap in future. The colonial governmentality based on strong executive was meant to deal with dissidence as law and order problem which, unfortunately, continued after the establishment of Pakistan, where the state power was used to maintain an upper hand in social relationship of positions. This is quite in line with Hegelian dialectics of identity², negativity³ and closed totality, where the present state system is perfect and the trouble makers are the Pakistani politicians, generals and other stakeholders like civil society or religious groups. Although discussing the state in itself at length is not the concern of the

¹ It is a rational concept or a perfect thing totally sufficient to itself and unique.

² It is the negative critique of a rational concept or thing (identity)

³ It is the triumph of rationality or at best the end of history.

study but the way we understand it has seriously undermined our realities. Mostly one force or the other is blamed for any misfortune which is epistemological in nature and is seriously tampering the deeper truth, i.e. it is a negative critique that will bridle the forces responsible and will restore the rational order (Norrie, 2010: 12-13; Bhaskar, 2008b). This is very unrepresentative of the truth because the real is abstracted from the concrete and concrete is reduced to individual or group behaviour without any reference to time-space and the structural constraints or structural shaping of behaviour (see also Hay, 2002).

In this dialectic, the political instability in Pakistan is either blamed on the civilian stakeholders or the bureaucracy and the *Junta* and thus real causal mechanism is reduced to the realm of the actual happening (Bhaskar, 1998a; 2008a; 2008b). In fact, it was the actors' capability to exercise power in a context shaping way which resulted in new rules and constitutions with every strategic interaction at a particular juncture (Newburg, 2002: 22). Although experts conceded that constitutionalism is dependent on spirit and the manner of its working, but this is alienated from time and space, i.e. in the context of Pakistan the unrepresentative nature and overstated executive powers has shown no mercy to constitutional framework of democracy (*ibid.*). The issue can be dealt with by the orienting a "knowledge society" where the reliance upon critical rationality and freedom will lead to resistance against any misadventure. Keeping in view the fore-mentioned thematic framework, a brief history of instable politics of Pakistan is mentioned below.

3.2.1 From Partition to Dismemberment (1947-1971)

The birth of Pakistan yelled a demand for a new state structure to institute mechanisms that will shape the future course of happenings. Subsequently, the "relations of social positions" were wrapped in the cover of vice-regal discourse to have control over "knowledge and

power" and hence the future of humanity in that specific area (Newberg, 2002: 14). The colonial laws were implemented with several minor amendments and the children of colonial discourse were given the task of generating epistemology incompatible with the true nature of ontology (ibid.). Different *norm circles* strived for their own version of social and political structure to have a dominant hand in deciding the fate of humanity, as Newberg puts it as:

Pakistan was truly a product of many imaginations, each with their own visions of political community and state structure. The evolving state was caught between these images, the languages in which they were expressed, and the people who articulated them. For some, Pakistan was the proud culmination of Muslim self-assertion, for others it was the expression of a necessarily Islamic state; for some, it represented successful anti-colonial politics while for others partition meant the failed prospect of a pluralistic, liberal India; for some, independence was the logical outcome of sub-continental politics, for others it was the product of manipulation or historical accident. The state's antecedents, both real and ideal, influenced each attempt to set the strategic and political limits that defined state sovereignty, and also implied judgments about competing political ideals (ibid.: 35-6).

The Gramscian "war of positions" entailed different political choices where the strong tried acquire hegemony and the weak tried to control their own fate in the nascent state. The control over a larger segment of society using different techniques of democratic participation and knowledge-driven fascist tendencies resulted in the triumph of the latter as the *significant-others* had full sway over information, opinions and resources to fulfil their political desires. The result was a strong centralised state where the seeds of autocracy were stolen from the imperial legacy of 1935 Act, whereas the provinces were dominated by traditional oppressors whose name was beautifully encoded as liberators in the modernist language style (ibid.: 37).

The autocratic system was pursued to effectively governmentalise the masses as Iskandar Mirza termed them as "overwhelmingly illiterate", having no taste of politics "bound to act foolishly sometimes" and they need a "controlled democracy" (as quoted in Aziz, 2008: 5). Clearly this was a modernist logic of romanticising the oppression and exclusion and blaming

the victims, of which we are still the slaves and the way-out is not considered yet. This attitude led to the dissolution of first constituent assembly in 1954, where the final source of power was to be attributed to the masses, at least in papers, which was hampering the dominant circle of social position, i.e. the autocratic administration (Khan, 2009: 82-4). This was a critical juncture in the history of Pakistan where the legacy shaped the future course of history till another advent of institutional crisis.

The subsequent court judgements (Tamizuddin Khan Case) and the “doctrine of necessity” paved the way for the powerful to sway the political scene, which nested the constitution of 1956 in lap of strong unrepresentative establishment. In face of strong executive, the subsequent governments found themselves on the slippery ground of power where the strongest *norm circle* intrigued to underestimate the political process and hence pave the way for military interference in politics as a normalised political necessity (Talbot, 1998: 126). Although writers like Jalal (1995) and others (e.g. Siddiqi, 2011) are often naming such intrigues as Punjabi domination which is true at the larger scene but fallacious if we look at the scalar hierarchy of politics (Jessop, 2008), the space providing a lot of “centres of power” will sway the political scene at large. But this is not the true depiction of reality because all social relations are based on subjection and domination and the oppressed are normalised by different levels of socialisation and knowledges, wherein their oppression is romanticised in terms of participation and ownership (see Tew, 2002).⁴

The multifaceted struggle for structuring politics led the state to a fuzzy foundation where the institutionalisation was not well articulated and the masses sway from one choice to the other often favouring those who have greater control over knowledge, i.e. the authoritarian regimes that controlled the biopolitics of society. This is the main theme of Ayub Regime where the

⁴ In fact, the system of representation has evolved over history in which different techniques are used to bring conformity in the behaviour of the masses. Educational institutions, romanticised images of self-representations, police and prisons, and so many other techniques are creating knowledges (both in text and image), which are shaping the minds of individuals in accordance with the wishes of the oppressors. (For details, see Foucault's Knowledge/Power, 1980, Stuart Hall et al. 1980; 1982).

state used different measures to bar prominent opponents. The “Elective Bodies Disqualification Order” (E.B.D.O) and other such acts like “Basic Democracies Order” (BDO) acted to mesmerise the opposition by politically purging them from holding offices and easing the task of the state to deal with few thousand “Basic Democrats” (BDs) then the whole army of society (Wynbrandt, 2009: 184-5). Thus a fuzzy legitimacy was won by Ayub when the Basic Democrats opted for his presidency in a national referendum in 1960 (ibid.: 185). The theory continued in practice and the “punctuated equilibrium” staged by Ayub for not sharing power with other groups and *norm circles* awakened the real mechanisms of “punctuated evolution” which in this case became abrupt because of the denied reflexivity to change and the sharing of power. Opposition to Ayub’s autocracy increased every passing day and new set of agency emerged in the form of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The structure of autocracy favoured only few strategies in the strategic-relational dialectic and the struggle for the transformation of strategic context resulted in the end of Ayub Regime. However, as Marx has remarked that “men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please in circumstances they choose for themselves; rather they make it in present circumstances, given and inherited” (Marx, 1852); the course of history strongly favoured the existing context and another autocratic military regime followed. Thus the political context shaped another context, more or less, its replica which is a near path-dependency if not exactly.

The subsequent political process was that of Martial Law Administration led by General Yahya Khan, who promised fair elections on party basis to end the political deadlock of the country. Now there were two “centres of power” along with the military which interacted on political scene for social position of domination, the Awami League and the PPP (Talbot, 1998: 200-2; Khan, 2009). The elections resulted in clear cut majority of Awami League in the East Pakistan and a subtle majority of Pakistan People’s Party in the Western Wing

(ibid.). However, the state structurally selective context proved resistive to its transformation in the wake of coalition of the two forces benefitting or to-be-benefiting from the context, i.e. the Army and Bhutto. This led to cleavage formation where the choices made has severe implications for the future, which we observed in the form of dismemberment and the transformation of the context in the remaining Pakistan for Bhutto instead of Army.

3.2.2 Post 1971 Era

The cornerstone of transition of power from military to civilian government was the war of 1971 and the subsequent defeat of Pakistan. The strategic interaction which, prior to war and based on the game of trio, was now left with two players in the fuzzy context as the crisis has waned away the structural constraints. The military was in relatively weaker position to run the country because the context was losing its military selectivity. This paved the way for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who led the country as a Civilian Marshal Law Administrator (CMLA). The resuming of power in an autocratic style has its roots in the pre-given structure which was not of Bhutto's choosing but has shaped his conduct by appropriating a strategy favourable in the context. Many scholars have attributed this autocratic attitude as populism, (Jalal, 1995: 77), but it would be better to state that there was lack of "centre of resistance" within the core, i.e. any strong opposition leadership or the military, which proved beneficial for Bhutto.

Bhutto adopted a new power structure named as the constitution of 1973, where the majority party was/is the sole god in shaping the destiny of the society. In fact, such a move was beneficial for him because every possible opposition within or outside the core was dealt tacitly (Newberg, 2002: 137). He was a ruthless tactician who would consider power "beyond good and evil" and demonstrated his ability to kick out opposition in a given political arena.

This can be retroduced from his dismissal of NAP-JUI government in Balochistan and N.W.F.P (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and the provocation of the constitutional framework to victimise the opposition (Khan, 2009: 292-3). The control over information and the use of discourse along with the legal structure made it easier for him to vandalise the opposition parties (ibid.: 293). Many political leaders were detained for longer duration, legalised under third amendment to the constitution and the anti-centrist party National Awami Party of Wali Khan was banned (ibid.; Newberg, 2002: 139-1).

Things continued the same way. The election of 1977 was a turning point when a nine parties' coalition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) was formed to counter PPP (Talbot, 1998: 240). The political context was still favouring the powerful which the PNA wanted to transform into a more favourable way. The power-together approach of PNA bore less fruit when the results of elections were declared. It was widely believed that PPP has rigged the elections to get an absolute majority (ibid.: 241). When the constitutional way of changing the context was blocked, PNA switched to other political techniques of protest and agitation, which lured an unwanted player, the military to intervene and decisively win the war of social positions.

The formation of crisis has its origin in social relations of power and position where new strategies shaped the context accordingly and made it difficult to reverse (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007: 341-5). But it is argued that these processes are self-reinforcing or autopoietic (to use Luhmannian term), where the system reproduces itself independent of the social forces comprising it (ibid.: 341). This can be used to explain the Zia regime of "Constitutional Marshal Law", where the system once set its foot by banning all political parties and detaining opposition political figures provided no room for substantial power-sharing with the opposition forces. But such approach leaves no room for human agency to intervene and effectively shape the course of events, or in other words, this approach is

totally structuralist in nature, where the structure defines political actions and outcomes (cf. Hay, 2002: 102). Thus, the explanation under such approach are problematic because the constant overplay of power relations in the context is skipped. The dialectics of context and conduct and the control over resources made it easier for the already dominant segment to maintain the status-quo, if not always.

Kapur (1991: 118) attributes the loss of balance of forces and “manageable instability” at domestic level to external conditions, wherein the external opportunities offer new norms, which catches both the military as a contesting force and the civilian political elites of substantial value. Foreign opportunities make their alliance possible because the domestic “balance of power” is modelled on external relations and the military gets its social position at the top (ibid.: 119). But when the opportunity ceases, domestic instability emerges as the competing forces like Army finds its way in the structural crisis to rewrite the history (ibid.). This is how Zia took power when the external opportunities faded away and when again it re-emerged during Soviet-Mujahedeen war, Zia was compelled to make alliances because the focus on external conditions would have led to internal instability in a fuzzy structured state.

Zia explicitly used the religious parties and the Islamisation process to weaken the liberal political forces (Wynbrandt, 2009: 216). The Islamisation was impliedly meant to secure electoral support for the religious parties based on shared values. The mainstream liberal PPP was a real troublemaker for Zia; to compete it, Zia preferred the opposite value system, which was focused on gross-root level value transformation from liberal or secular values to Islamic values. But this does not mean political stability based on domination of one particular force, rather it worked as a check against any force trying to dominate the scene or overthrow the status quo. Kapur (1991: 120) summarises the Pakistani case as:

[P]ower-sharing arrangements at the top of the state apparatus are functional temporarily. Checks and balances exist until one or the other participant in an unstable

balance of power situation tries to dominate the polity. The system is unstable because of the continuing jockeying for power. This power system is, however, functional in a way. The energies of the contenders for the dominant position are continually absorbed by ceaseless efforts to maintain the checks and balances (for fear that someone else may dominate and take it all).

However, the maintenance of hegemony was vividly worked out by Zia, whereupon the constitutional arrangements and the control over knowledge made him the master even if some power was attributed to the unorganised (non-party based) civilians. The Article 58-2B was a "Damocles' sword" hanging on the neck of the politicians who had a very fuzzy "norm circle", i.e. they were in no position to stage any organised resistance. Zia's took power in a critical juncture, when the country was flung into crisis, shaped a new course which has path-dependent capabilities based on our understanding of it. Although, the critical examination may challenge the notion of path-dependency if we see politics not as an arena of elite practice but as a process involving the masses (Hay, 2002), but for those in "war of positions" it is a good explanation to control opposition.⁵

Same as Zia was the product of the legacy of Bhutto, whose structural modelling constrained Zia to a particular worldview of power and autocracy (Kapur, 1991: 121), the Zia's legacy haunted the opposition for years to come, when the constitutional machinery revoked the struggling governments in years to come. Although, Zia's death conceded the opposition a good deal of relief, but his *norm circle*, i.e. the Army, was there to fulfil its interests.⁶ The post-Zia Pakistan was in fact a messy arena of power politics where the constitutional and legal documents and the democratic norms of respects were suffocated to death. The Benazir government, the army, the president, the Punjab government and the *Islami Jamhori Ittehad*

⁵ Particularly, in position of power will have more leverage because the reality (totality) of things depends upon our understanding and critique and significant-other (with power and hence legitimacy) may construct discourses of truth best suited their way (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Ghulam Ishaq Khan did the same, the path-dependency set by 8th amendment to the constitution in the form of 58-2B was invoked to dismiss opposition governments in the coming years.

⁶ This clearly manifests that an individual cannot control the course of politics and history without his/her "norms circle", which abides individuals to work collectively for the promotion of their collective norms. There is also a struggle within the circles, that's why the boundaries are flexible.

(IJI) leaders cared less for the democratic mandate and impinged an unwanted confrontation to sway the political scene (Kapur, 1991: 150). The Army was at strategic advantage and the final battle led to the downfall of Benazir government under 58-2B constitutional sword.

If one judges the context, in which the Benazir government was operating, the structural forces are to be blamed a lot because her agency vis-à-vis other was relatively disadvantageous due to structural opportunities and constraints. The constitutional constraints, the interests of the military and public sphere of the Punjab were the main opportunities for opposition and restraints for her. Her strategy in such context was confused; she acceded to Army its due say in eternal affairs, which showed her “strategic learning” of the environment at first phase but her rivalry with the president and the Punjab government proved costly. Although, Kapur (1991: 152) argues that Benazir’s dreams of fulfilling public promises were marginalised by these contingent forces; it can be argued that in fact public promises “catch no fly” because the very nature of politics is based on subjection and domination and the public is enslaved by the bidding of the emergent knowledges of power and discourse and manipulated by politicians (cf. Tew, 2002).

The subsequent struggles waned away the president as player in the state political scene, leaving the military and the political parties to fight for controlling the worldview of the masses. The judicial judgements, the military brokering and absolute majority of Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) in 1997 successfully deprived the President from certain discretionary powers (Khan, 2009: 451-2). But in the wake of Kapur’s thesis, the lack of foreign opportunities compelled the domestic fighters to launch a war of subjection and domination, in which the “men on horseback” succeeded, chastising their political opponents of power-hungry sins. The external involvement with USA in war against terror provided an opportunity to effectively caricature alliances between the elites and the *junta*. A controlled democracy swayed across the country (Akhtar, 2009: 42), but the exit of the military

president from the scene in the wake of massive protests provided an opportunity for democracy to groom.

The “Charter of Democracy” signed by PPP and PMLN stirred a new era of co-operation in the Pakistani politics which was later observed in spirit when a coalition government including all parties was formed but it soon shivered in the wake of PPP delaying tactics to restore the deposed judges and the PMLN want for more share in government forged the co-operative process (Khan, 2009: 533; Nelson, 2009: 19-0). However, the spirit of the charter was observed, the judges were restored after a short impasse and the subsequent eighteenth constitutional amendment to the constitution fulfilled many of the historical demands by the regional political voices and smaller provinces.

3.3 Democratic instability and socio-political movements

Democracy, as its name suggests is the form of political arrangement where there are many contestants, while in Praetorian state, it is only the military which governs with the help of bayonets and civil society (Marx, 1858). The Praetorian government strictly delimits the public and private sphere where the public sphere is the sole domain of the *junta* and other contestants are often barred by decree. Same situation has haunted Pakistan since its independence when the autocratic regimes delimited the opposition by setting an ideology or worldview, against which no toleration was (is) acceptable (Jalal, 1995). Even the so-called democratic regimes, the children of the dictatorial legacy did the same (Weinbaum, 1977). But the benefit of democracy is that at least, all contestant powers are allowed to take part in political process in the central arena.

Democracy means the system where various strata of society including the military (its norm circles) are contesting to have the upper hand in the political process. On the other hand, the authoritarian state allows only certain segments of society (especially the military civil society) to sustain its agenda (cf. Jalal, 1995). However, our concern is with the democratic regimes and its stability in the wake of multiple contestants in a given context which in itself is the product of autocratic politics. In Pakistan, democracy has been prevented from consolidation after short intervals because of the interaction of status quo and anti-status quo forces in a pro- status quo context (because it is the product of the status quo forces' interaction), where there is greater possibility of retaining the status quo.

3.3.1 Protest against Ayub Regime (1969)

The political system of Ayub left no room for the opposition as the Basic Democrats were totally under his control either overpowered or eliminated, while the opposition supported direct elections instead of indirect elections through Electoral College. The presidential elections of 1965 saw a new twist when the opposition nominated Miss Fatima Jinnah to be the contesting candidate, who was defeated by Ayub Khan in the subsequent election, thus ripping his own fate as the people lost faith in his system as fraud and tended to overthrow it (Gauhar, 1985: 111-2). The Tashkent Agreement with India and its subsequent manipulation by Bhutto as a betrayal of the nation made Ayub's position weaker (ibid.: 113).⁷ The near approaching of presidential elections and the strong populism of Sheikh Mujib and Bhutto has signalled the army that their (especially Mujib's) arrival at the helm of affairs after elections would severely restructure the military (ibid.: 114). The struggle for the

⁷ The military and the state had lied to the public about the post-war positions, where in fact, Pakistan was at weaker position. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the mastermind of the guerrilla attacks in Kashmir, saw his position weaker to survive, that's why he, along with the Army (for its own vested interests) allied against Ayub and blamed that he had lost the war at table (Altaf Gauhar: 1985).

restructuring of the context took violent adages of protests, wherein the people were supporting Mujib and Bhutto against Ayub regime, the army was silently playing its game for another takeover. The political deadlock continued; the politicians were buying time and the generals were preparing to march the capital; and the army resorted to force and imposed Martial Law (ibid.: 115).

There can be multiple explanations to Ayub's downfall, but here, strategic-relational approach will be used to explain it. As already explained in theoretical framework, strategic-relational approach tries to overcome the structure-agency dualism and explains events in the form of strategically selective context or causal mechanism, and the respective strategies adopted by contesting actors with regard to that context (Jessop, 2008; Hay, 2002). Also, the context in itself is the emergent property of various contestations for social position from respective position of power and resources. In this way, the abdication of Ayub can be explained where political context was unconsciously transforming in the wake of public resentment. The forces involved in contestation of "shaping the context" were divided; 1: Mujib wanted a totally new context with the exclusion of army, the dominant player from the scene, 2: Ayub wanted to maintain the status-quo, 3: the army wanted the reversal of the context into a more military favourable one, while others like Bhutto and the nationalists leaders have their own agendas. The "strategic selectivity" of the context favoured the later as Ayub was isolated and was losing his "norm circle" and the context possessed the strongest values of military autocracy by it was the very product of the military "norm circle". This inevitably led to the downfall of Ayub Khan Regime, although his legacy haunted the political system of Pakistan for years to come.

3.3.2 PNA Protests against 1977 Electoral Fraud

Bhutto assumed power as a self-professed saviour of the people of Pakistan in 1972, after the forces in struggle disappeared; Mujib's circle was in Bangladesh and the military was weakened by the defeat in war with India in December 1971. The structural context of autocracy and the political background of Bhutto shaped his psychology in an autocratic way. The banning of opposition, the channelling of news and knowledge, the disciplining and punishment techniques sued the opposition public gatherings and ideological machinery (Weinbaum, 1977: 601-2). Thus Bhutto barred the counter discourse and committed the political sin of shaping the society upon his own ideals. From a romanticised vantage point, it is worth-appealing in the wake that there will be a uniform society, but in reality the whole society was enslaved to his ideals, or ideology (worldview) which switches off other alternatives and thus gave the society a close totality as that of Hegel (cf. Norrie, 2010).

The general elections of 1977 were ahead and a struggle ensued for securing upper hand in social relations of subjection and domination. The opposition forged an alliance of nine parties under the banner of PNA to effectively deal with the structurally favoured Bhutto (Weinbaum, 1977: 606). Bhutto was not a lame duck either; he resorted to politics as "the art of possible". The state machinery was used to forge a favourable campaign against the opposition and many opposition candidates were harassed to bar them from filing nomination papers (ibid.: 607-8). The political strategy of Bhutto in candidate nominations ignored key party members and bourgeoisie were given tickets which created so much dissidence and defection from his party (ibid.: 610).

Bhutto switched his support base from one class to another, i.e. from proletariat to bourgeois class and commenced himself on the way of Bonapartism but his approach based on Marxist assumption of having its own value circle vanished because Bonapartism best serves

authoritarianism (Ali, 1983: 131). Still, he managed to have a landslide victory in the General Elections to National Assembly and the ground realities depicted a massive rigging by the government to impose its own value system on the masses. Thus starts agitations. The PNA and the peasantry started protests; PNA on political (or at best on electoral) grounds and the peasantry on survival basis (Ahmad & Sultan, 1977: 14-15). Opposition was arrested and tortured by the non-praetorian Bonapartist government; yet the unrest continued. The opposition comprising of different value circles was not substantially assembled with a unified political vision, and thus the ground was ready for the “praetorian guards” to take the arena and shape the future process. The coup of Zia was a true Bonapartism and the contesting forces were silenced by bayonets. Marx has tacitly remarked about such attitude when explaining the French politics under Louis Bonaparte as:

[T]he rule of the naked sword is proclaimed in most unmistakable terms, and Bonaparte wants France to clearly understand that the imperial rule does rest not on her will but on 600,000 bayonets. . . . Under the second Empire the interest of the army itself is to predominate. The army is no longer to maintain the rule of one part of the people over another part of the people. The army is to maintain its own rule, personated by its own dynasty, over the French people in general. . . . It is to represent the *State* in antagonism to the *society*. It must not be imagined that Bonaparte is not aware of the dangerous character of the experiment he tries. In proclaiming himself the chief of the Pretorians, he declares every Pretorian chief his competitor. (1858: 465).

The sad demise of the immature democracy and the subsequent political process under the military formed a new legacy on the line of the old one, or at best one can say that a punctuated evolution is taking place in which the technology of governmentality is changing but the mode of oppression remains the same. Zia's ascend to power can be attributed to ill political relations where one feeds at the cost of other. The Army is in itself a collective “norms circle” acting for the preservation and promotion of its own values system in the form of incentives and any threat is subsequently dealt with (cf. Elder-Vass, 2010; 2012).

Explaining the coup can be attributed to multiple causes; in Pakistani literature, the agency is blamed, especially the military for all misadventures. This is mainly because one doesn't understand the deeper causal mechanisms and relations, which are responsible for actions and events. The structural forces would fail to answer any change because it opts for path-dependency, in which change is impossible (Hay, 2002; Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). Only change can be a revolution like such, which will disrupt the whole social and political set-up and new norms will emerge, but this approach is problematic in a sense that the ideas and processes are marginalised on behalf of sudden and abrupt changes. Since, all social happening emerge of structure-agency (or at best to avoid dualism, Strategic-Relational) quagmire, our epistemology based on one-sided approach will be fallacious.

The political context as typified in the premises of this research is the emergent property of the struggles over history, which contains some independent driving forces causing something to happen (Elder-Vass, 2010; 2012; Archer, 1995). In Pakistan, the autocratic attitude of Bonapartism, the popular resistance against it and the sentimental and practical support of many among the opposition to the Bonapartism, has swapped the dynamics from class relations to a multiple cross-current and messy social relation (the true nature of any social reality). The given context contained strategic selectivity because its formation phase has seen less representation and more military coups. So, the strategies of Bhutto, the opposition and the army collided and the context communicating the knowledge of the sacredness of the sword over decades made it difficult for the opposition to resist the army.

3.3.3 Lawyers' movements (2009)

The controlled democracy of President Musharraf fomented many dormant political actors. The ill-treatment of judiciary by Musharraf instigated a severe resentment among the general masses and the lawyers' community, which resorted to protests and long marches, especially

in the core of the country (Nelson, 2009: 18; The Pakistani Lawyer's Movement-: 2010). The movement has a political background when the judiciary was politicised as usual and several senior judges were humiliated and fired by Musharraf (Khán, 2009: 510). These events generated in 2007, when Musharraf was all powerful, the Military chief as well as the President of Pakistan conjuring powers under article 58-2B of the constitution to dissolve the legislature if things deemed fit for action (ibid.: 512-3). The orphaned judiciary has to act on its own to save its prestige and to expand its own power struggle to avoid its victimisation. Severe protests against the deposition of the judges started. The elections for national assembly were nearby, but postponed by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the leader of PPP, in December 2007 (ibid.: 526).

The general election of 2008 led PPP a nominal majority and it vowed to form coalition government with all political parties being its part, in order to transform the political context into a more pro-civilian one. But their efforts failed because of PMLN assertive attitude and the failure on PPP side to restore the deposed Chief Justice (Nelson, 2008: 20; Akhtar, 2009: 53-4). PPP has its own reservations regarding the restoration of Chief Justice because he would invalidate National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) which wavered many among those holding powers (ibid.). However, the PPP government made the exit of Musharraf with the stick of 58-2B possible. The failure of PPP in restoring the chief justice after the absence of eminent threat in the form of Musharraf was cashed by political opponents like PMLN, who sided with the lawyers and started long marches and protest and the situation was on the brink of near collapse of the government machinery (Shah, 2014: 222). Then marches the General; who threatened with his minus-one prescription, to get Zardari out of office while keeping the rest of government intact (ibid.: 223). The Praetorian guards made the lawyers won their battle, but reinstated their own position as well, which was seriously haphazard after the successful removal of president Musharraf, the former army chief, from office.

The struggle for the restoration of judges was highly political; it strived for the restoration of institutional supremacy, the removal of the dictatorial legacy of Musharraf and the return of the key political player to the popular base (cf. Fruman, 2011: 12). However, the brokering of deal by the army to make things happen is the reinstatement of the strategic role of the army in politics and it symbolises a warning to all players that the army still sway the struggle for subjection and domination (Shah, 2014: 223). The culture of different images and knowledges portraying the role of *significant-others* in the construction of truth (fallible epistemological claims) made the other contestants realised of their perspective strategic choices with the military dominant state structure, wherein, any incongruence with the context without properly mobilising against it will led to reprimanded consequences. In this way, the brokering of deal by the military reinserted its properties into the emergent properties of the context, wherein, it will be strategically suitable for them (military) in future such interaction.

Chapter 4

Formation of the Cleavage: Elections 2013 and Sit-ins

The tyrannical ruler who is well-versed in power
 builds about himself a fortress made up of edicts;
 while falcon, sharp of claw and swift to seize,
 he takes for his counsellor the silly sparrow
 giving to tyranny its constitution and laws,
 a sightless man giving collyrium to the blind.

What results from the laws and constitutions of kings?
 Fat lords of the manor, peasants lean as spindles!

(Muhammad Iqbal, "Divine Government", cited in Newburg: 2002, 233).

4.1 Pakistan's Electoral history

The romanticised catchword of instrumental democracy can be termed as authoritarianism if critically dislodged from the notion of freedom. In modern democracies, particular ideas are polarised and then segmented into the societies where it acts as a sacred truth and "TINA Formation"⁸ takes place. The instrumental democracy is propounded as the highest social good, where all have a say in power and politics and where all are equal. This instrument is

⁸ There Is No Alternative (TINA), is used as frame of reference where the possibility of difference or the better ethical world is discarded by the victims of false consciousness because they claim to have a perfect knowledge of the world of competition, subjection and domination.

sustained by different knowledges, both consciously and unconsciously, thus discourse plays an important role in shaping the future of humanity.

In the similar vein, democracy is introduced in Pakistan but its fruits are yet to be ripen and the public mandate is often chastised in one way or the other, where the actors situating themselves in a particular position for voting behaviour are overlooked by the dominant position holders. Elections were strangled in the past to maintain a structure favourably selective to the strategies of the 'already in position of dominance' groups. Our history is full of it, where the laws are moulded and remoulded to manipulate certain position holders at the cost of others. A brief history of electoral politics of Pakistan is posited below.

4.1.1 General Elections of 1970, 1977, and 1985

The General Elections in Pakistan are often the scapegoat of a particular system. The electoral system of Pakistan is not properly institutionalised and the rules of the game change with the change of power composition. Prior to 1970, the election to the Constituent Assembly (National Assembly) was indirectly held by the choice of provincial assemblies in the pre-Ayub era and by the Basic Democrats during Ayub era (The Pakistan Election Compendium, 2012a: 28-31). During Ayub era, a rigorous attempt was made to politicise the elections by setting the procedure of voting through "Ballot Box"⁹ where the lack of mark and name of the candidate on the ballot paper would severely reprimand the opposition's electoral outcome (ibid.: 41-42). The general elections of 1970 were to be held in the same fashion, but the change of power centre changed the game drastically and more favourable to ensure fair elections.

⁹ The election mechanism was set such that for each nominated candidate, there a separate ballot box, wherein, a nameless ballot paper was to be put into the box of the respective candidate. The foul play was always hinging and was effectively used by the stronger to capitulate the weaker (The Pakistan Election Compendium, 2012a, 41-42).

The imposition of Martial Law and the banishment of political activity in 1969 led to another landslide victory of the Bonaparte (General Yahya Khan), whereupon he set forth the rules of procedure more favourably to the civilian choice. The subsequent dissolution of one unit into its respective provinces, the promulgation of "Legal Framework Ordinance" (LFO) of 1970 for allowance of free and fair elections and overthrowing of the Ayub's electoral legacy were the key positive aspects of the military regime of Yahya Khan (ibid.: 37-38). The Election Commission, which prior to LFO was divided between the East and West Pakistan Election Commission was organised into a unified single Election Commission and the Election Commissions of the respective provinces (ibid.). The total number of constituencies was delimited to 313; 300 to be directly elected through "universal adult franchise" and 13 reserved for women (ibid.: 38). The constituencies were delimited on population basis where the East Pakistan won the lion share of 162 seats (ibid.). The Election Commission formulated area specific codes of conduct, wherein certain practices were banned during the election campaigns for public safety reasons (ibid.: 45-46). The results shows the landslide victory of Awami League of Sheikh Mujib in the East Pakistan, who won 160 general seats and 7 women seats were allocated to it and Pakistan People's Party won 81 general seats plus 4 women reserve seats (ibid.: 51).

However, the decentralisation as promised by Mujib was the main hurdle which harassed the many Pakistani power-hungry elites of their political future as the sole determiners of the fate of the nation (Jalal, 1995: 62). The stubbornness of the Pakistani autocratic elites due to the fear of losing its position in the wake of dominant Bengali worldview led to crisis which was responded by the use of force, which subsequently led to the dismemberment of Bangladesh (ibid.: 63).

The crisis after crisis continued in the remaining Pakistan until another schedule for general elections was announced in 1977. The quest for new electoral rolls by the government

proceeded with the redistribution of seats in the National Assembly, which were increased from 138 to 200 (Khan, 2009: 308; The Pakistan Election Compendium, 2012a: 212). The right wing parties, after being shamefully defeated in 1970, forged an alliance with the leftist political parties, who were being targeted by the government for their provincial autonomy demands; the objective was to present a joint opposition to Bhutto's PPP in order to favourably transform the structure (The Pakistan Election Compendium, 2012a: 215). However, the state machinery was used in the power politics of modernist norms (elections) in nomination scrutiny and several uncanny tactics of kidnapping were used to bar the opposition for contesting elections (Weinbaum, 1977: 607-8); thus making the sense of "state as a social relationship" clear, where no is divinely ordained servant of the public (cf. Jessop, 1990a; 2008).

The result of election showed a shameful defeat of the opposition parties and it was widely observed that the elections had been massively rigged in favour of PPP. The reports inundated the Election Commission and the Chief Election Commissioner informed Bhutto of the farcical legal remedies unless changes to the legal immunity laws of members and asked for *suo moto* powers to conduct inquiry into malpractices and annul the results if it is satisfied (TPEC, 2012a: 347-48).

The Election Commission was granted such powers by the presidential ordinance; annulling several fraudulent cases of election as well as reprimanded the civil administrators changing the fortune of PPP, but the ordinance was withdrawn in haste (ibid.: 349). Also, election tribunals were set to deal with irregularities issue in the election but the opposition demanded nothing short of fresh polls under neutral government supervised by Judiciary and the Army. However, the PPP position was severely haphazard by the resignation of its own members and Bhutto agreed on holding fresh election on 7 October, 1977, but under his own ruling government (ibid.: 350-1). The last phrase was the major bone of contention, whereas the

opposition wanted fresh election under a neutral government. The deadlock continued until the Army marched the core, getting hold of state power and arresting Bhutto and others; a move which the opposition blamed to be Bhutto's planning to silence them (ibid.: 352).

The military government of General Zia promised fresh elections at the earliest date but subsequently postponed it until he won legitimacy for himself as the president of Pakistan in 1984 (Khan, 2009: 365). After securing his back, Zia announced election to the parliament on non-party basis, a unique experience to deprive the members of their norms circles. Zia added 7 more seats to the general category raising it from 200 to 207, allocated women 20 seats as whole and the non-Muslims got 10 seats share based on separate electorates (TPEC, 2012a: 356-57). A long qualification list was attached to the rolls under which the piousness of a candidate would be scrutinised. The election of non-Muslims was to be held by direct ballot instead of indirect election through party share (TPEC, 2012a: 367).

The government was to be formed by selecting one member by the president who would secure "vote of confidence" in the parliament (Khan, 2009: 373), but it was a fraud as anyone appointed by the president could not lose the censure especially when the president is all powerful in changing the destinies of all. This move favoured the president where the lame-duck parliament could not oppose any presidential move of whatsoever mode (ibid.). The absence of other "norm circles" left the president with his own circles, where his role was not favour one segment of society over the other, but to manipulate the society as well as the bayonets to further expand his power tentacles.

4.1.2 General Elections of 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997

The lame-duck assembly did what Zia wanted and after drastically changing the constitution under eighth amendment in 1985, the Martial Law was lifted from the country. With Martial Law gone, most of the contingent restrictions were lifted and the “right to association” was conditionally restored¹⁰, which incentivised the political parties to resume their practice as a unified political force (Khan, 2009: 376; The Pakistan Election Compendium, 2012b: 24). However, the non-party based government wrangled with the president for power sharing, which was subsequently overturned by the mighty president and the government of Junejo was dismissed under 58-2b provision of the revised constitution of 1973 (Khan, 2009: 384). The dissolution was challenged in Lahore High Court and court ruled the dissolution ultra vires after the death of Zia but no relief was given (Khan, 2009: 389; TPEC, 2012b: 25).

After the death of Zia, Ghulam Ishaq, his constitutional heir, ascended to the presidency and new elections were announced on party basis, where the PPP was jointly opposed by the coalition of nine parties under the banner of “Islami Jamhori Ittehad or IJI” (Islamic Democratic Alliance) (Khan, 2009: 391; TPEC, 2012b: 35). The polling was held on 16th and 19th November 1988 for the National and provincial assemblies respectively, where the PPP emerged out as the leading political force (TPEC: 2012b, 45). Benazir secured government at the centre but could not manage to won the lion to her side, i.e. Punjab went to IJI. The transfer of power from the military to the civilian was not an easy job; the generals secured their role as a major player imposing and promoting its own values as expressed by Shah (2014: 166) as:

However, the military saw no reason to abdicate its role as the exclusive watchdog of the national interest or wholeheartedly embrace the norm of political subordination. It

¹⁰ There was a provision attached with party registration with the Election Commission, wherein any action against the ideology of Pakistan, maintenance of public order, prejudices towards judiciary or disaffection against the armed forces; the party registration is liable to be cancelled (TPEC: 2012b, 33).

was, in fact, the military's belief that civilian parties and politicians were incapable of governing prudently and, especially in the case of the PPP, could not be trusted to handle sensitive national security issues properly.

The PPP government elected Ghulam Ishaq among others as the *de jure* president of the country in 1990. However, the power politics soon ensued and the tussle resulted in the victory of the President and the government of Benazir was dismissed under 58-2b constitutional weapon (Khan, 2009: 402).¹¹

Fresh elections were scheduled in October 1990, where the IJI under Nawaz Sharif emerged victorious against PPP led "Pakistan Democratic Alliance" (PDA); thanks to the high-handedness of ISI in determining the political outcomes (Khan, 2009: 409; Shah, 2014: 161-74). But the Prime Minister Nawaz wanted to toll high the external and internal defence policy, which ended in a messy confrontation between Sharif and the President (and Army by default, over the appointment of its chiefs) in which the Army won the battle and broker the exit of both Sharif and the President despite the court decision of reinstatement of National Assembly (Shah, 2014: 172-5; Khan, 2009: 423, TPEC, 2012b: 408-9). The positivist legal system could entertain the facts in a closed system where only empirical regularities are searched for and the whole social process with multiple causalities is ignored, therefore severely cajoles the truth in a biased way. In fact, legal system is the "technology of power" which codifies social relations over a time/space and thus helps maintaining hegemony.

Fresh elections for were announced and different alliances were formed and broken down. The IJI lost its worth and Sharif led his own faction as PMLN, PPP and PML Junejo shared an electoral understanding, so did Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI-Fazal) and Jamiat Ulama Pakistan (JUP-Noorani) under the banner of "Islami Jamhoori Mahaz" (IJM) and Jamiat

¹¹ The Army has already secured its back by curtailing Benazir's powers in foreign and defence affairs. The Afghan and Kashmir Jihad were still on, that's why there was no need to directly takeover things. (For details see: Aziz, 2008; Shah, 2014).

Ulama-e-Islam (JUI-Sami-ul-Haq) formed a 24 groups' alliance named "Mutahida Deeni Mahaz" (MDN), while Mutahida Quomi Movement (MQM-Altaf) boycotted the elections (TPEC, 2012b: 416-7). The overall arrangement remained the same, except no reserved seats for women infringed under the provision of constitution (article 51(4)) which lapsed after ten years and not renewed thereafter by the subsequent stakeholders (ibid.: 424).

The PPP was able to form government after getting the electoral mandate and carefully carved the situation and allowed the army to pursue its policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan (Shah, 2014: 174). However, having a sheer value difference, PPP was less suitable ally for the Army and different techniques were used alongside the 58-2B via the president to redeem it off power (ibid.). The president acceded and the government of PPP ended in semi-coup manner where the military surrounded all major airports, radio and television stations, and the legislature buildings (ibid.). The election plethora is a stage drama to haunt any contestant force within the juridical sphere of voice; the real mechanism still make events happen and the army has formed an internal relation to the causal mechanisms of stability and instability.

However, the dissolution of national assembly unleashed accountability of the corrupt politicians to bar the contestants from running elections (ibid.: 175). The legal system was enshrined to validate the unconstitutional actions and the supreme first validated the 8th amendment and then the dissolution of the national assembly was held valid after being challenged in the superior court (TPEC, 2012b: 611). The upcoming elections were announced hastily to be held in February 1997 after the army secured its back through "National Security Council", as a governmental institution representing its culture (Shah, 2014: 177). The electoral rolls which the election commission was trying to prepare afresh were abandoned and the existing rolls were updated, which means that the elections are merely smoke screen to vandalise the spirit of public representation (Khan, 2009: 449; TPEC, 2012b: 614). To strengthen the "norm circle" incentives of resignation before defection was

made mandatory by decree; this lowered the risks of defection and fomented the institutionalisation of collectivity.

The results of elections showed lower turnouts which severely damages the representativeness of an elected government. However, PMLN managed to observe an absolute majority and started to dominate the power and ripped the presidential tool (58-2B) off the constitution, staged a favourable supreme court and tried to haunt the military (Shah, 2014: 176-7). However, the context was not favourable to the Prime Minister, because it carried the legacies of the past, and the strategic understanding of the context by the Army due to its past experiences made it easier to overthrow the elected government and impose Martial Law in the country. Thus, for all reasons, the electoral process could not consolidate the democratic norms among the masses to successfully wrestle for their rights.

4.1.3 General Elections of 2002, and 2008

The military government wrapped itself with legal covers and bared the highly potent contenders from the country's political scene under his divine legal rights and set forth himself for the election of the President under referendum and subsequently took the lot of promoting its values under instrumental public voice (The Pakistan Election Compendium, 2012c: 24-25). The LFO announced has undone what the previous elected government of Nawaz Sharif has done to consolidate civilian "norm circles" or political parties to avoid defection and also the ripped presidential powers under 58-2B were restored to effectively enshrine itself into power echelon with civilians being traumatised by the General's "Damocles sword" (ibid.). This was the first time wherein computerised electoral rolls were made, with severe irregularities and the resultant was a low turnout, with a party of defectors called PML(Quaid-e-Azam) led the polls followed by PPP(Parliamentarians), a name change

party of Benazir Bhutto, while **Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA, an alliance of religious parties)** stood third in the contest (ibid.: 55). As the laws of party defections were liquidated, horse-trading was routinised to help the ruling party sway its agenda. The restoration of presidential powers and the subsequent legitimisation of holding the post of the president along with generalship were carved under the seventeenth constitutional amendment and the “vote of confidence” in the president (ibid.: 283-84; Khan, 2009: 490-94). This reincorporated the role of the army in shaping the course of action which, after the subsequent indirect involvement has become weaker comparatively.

The in-between period after election 2002 to the coming elections was a period of strangulations and turmoil in which Musharraf sought re-election for presidency which confronted the legal battles of dual office case; ending in deposition of judges, protests for restoration and subsequent resignation by many parliamentarians (TPEC, 2012c: 286-88). However, he came out victories in his bid and imposed emergency due to the fear of restored chief justice’s legal quagmire against his presidency. During emergency, Musharraf bought time and promulgated a “Provisional Constitutional Order” (PCO), suing for the validity of his election and actions, thus sacking the Chief Justice and appointing another one (ibid.: 291). The PCO judges approved his (Musharraf’s) actions and finally after securing his back, he abandoned the generalship in favour of Ashfaq Pervez Kiani (ibid.).

The upcoming elections were to be held in January, 2008 but the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in a suicide attack and the protests aftermath delayed the results for forty days. However, the state was seriously violating its modernist neutrality, favouring the ruling PMLQ via which, the president was able to promote the values of his own “norm circle” (ibid.: 312). There were serious problems in the electoral rolls and the neutrality of the president remained on paper, forced marking was reported and electronic media gave a new dimension to the election campaigns (ibid.: 314-15). The president also secured its back by

granting waiver to eminent politicians like Benazir and other under the “National Reconciliation Ordinance” (NRO), from all corruption charges, who in turn assured him of his role in the office (ibid, 317).

The religious parties’ alliance MMA failed to fulfil its promise and vanished away, but Jammat Islami, PMLN, PTI and PMAP (Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party) united under “All Pakistan Democratic Movement” (APDM) to boycott elections till the resignation of Musharraf as a president (TPEC, 2012c: 320; Khan, 2009: 525-26). Meanwhile, the eligibility decision of PMLN leadership ruled in its favour and the APDM weakened when the Sharifs opted for elections (TPEC, 2012c: 319). The elections resulted in a mixed situation where the PPP got the larger share comparatively, followed by PMLN, resulting in the formation of coalition government under the premiership of Yousaf Raza Gillani (Khan, 2009: 530).

4.2 General Election 2013 and a “War of Positions”

The PPP government faced serious issues during its tenure, feeling constant insecurity of military takeover, having embittered relations with USA, facing the wrath of Taliban, but it managed to rule for five years, its constitutional mandate, which is a remarkable context-shaping behaviour in Pakistan (Kuennen & Barliyanta, 2013: 16; Shah, 2014: 228-9). The civilian confrontation with the military norms was severely undermined by the later strategic and cultural capabilities to manipulate and exaggerate myths into realities and the civilian opposition thought it to be a political opportunity, which shamefully harassed the civilian coalition government’s attempt to civilianise the context (Shah, 2014: 230). Thus the possibility of re-elections of the same power holders was almost ruled out. However, the PPP led government did some remarkable job by fixing the tenure of election commission

members for five years and their election was made through parliamentary committee to ensure fair elections (Kuennen & Barliyanta, 2013: 17).

The general elections of 2013 opened a new chapter in Pakistani politics, when the powers were smoothly handed over from one elected government to the other. However, this transfer rowed a long controversy over the alleged rigging through which the heir took all. The traditional players were added by a new face, the PTI that turned popular in 2011-12 and claimed to be a contender for power with its own values system. The pre-elections surveys and forecasts has shown PMLN of Nawaz Sharif leading the PTI and PPP, whereas popularity of PTI has been remarkable since 2011-12, the popularity and the higher probability of PMLN being victories is hinging (Political Weather Forecast-, 2013).

Consequently, PMLN won a majority in the National Assembly and Punjab assembly, where she formed the government and allowed the opposition to form governments in their respective majority provinces (Assessment of the Quality of Democracy-(June 2013-Dec 2014), 2015: 27). However, Imran Khan, confident of his stance, alleged the elections, which otherwise were declared relatively fairer, as being rigged in favour of the ruling PMLN and demanded inquiry against as many as 72 constituencies by filing petitions and filling the respective questionnaires providing evidence (GENERAL ELECTIONS-2013INQUIRY COMMISSION “GEIC”, 2015: 16-17).

In a similar vein, Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT henceforth) of Tahir-ul-Qadri posed a new challenge to the elected regimes when it threatened and formulated its own plan for revolution despite the fact that it was not a power contestant. The traditional view of seeing “politics as an arena” devoid of society would blame the PAT move to be abnormal, but since politics has its implications on the society, the society can resist the values imposed on it by other contender who strive for domination (Hay, 2002; Tew, 2002; Jessop, 1990; 2008). As an emancipatory move, the PAT also demanded the systemic change, where the

marginalisation of the majority is a catchphrase. However, Qadri was marginalised by the modern subjects (or more precisely, objects) viewing him as a non-contender and a spoiler because he was hailed from the marginalised society (cf. Yusuf, 2013). This attitude can be attributed to the discourse wherein the rest of the society is consciously or unconsciously marginalised by the generative structures moulded by human interventions over history where the oppressed and to some extent the oppressor don't know the hidden causality of exclusion and oppression (Bhaskar & Collier, 1998b: 386). However, such discourse is normalised into sacredness, which brings the society to the status of instrument where a particular rationality is justified and the rest are abnormal. Or to quote John Dewey (1927: 170):

The words "sacred" and "sanctity" come readily to our lips when such things [aspects of our political and social system] come under discussion. They testify to the religious aureole which protects the institutions. If "holy" means that which is not to be approached nor touched, save with ceremonial precautions and by specially anointed officials, then such things are holy in contemporary political life. As supernatural matters have progressively been left high and dry upon a secluded beach, the actuality of religious taboos has more and more gathered about secular institutions, especially those connected with the nationalistic state.

What Bhaskar and Collier suggested is that "explanatory critiques" would help in emancipation, it would be appropriate to adhere the PAT movement with the notion of "Foucauldian Resistance", where a practical resistance will lead to better-off if not the final emancipation (cf. Bhaskar & Collier, 1998b; Foucault, 1982). The allegations or abnormal behaviour of PAT (the implications of bourgeoisie intellectualism) is seen from the prism of capitalist empirical lens where the observed is the real and there is no concept of deeper "causal structures" and stratifications (Bhaskar, 2011: 2). Disregarding, whatever the motive of Qadri was and whatever PAT has done in the wake of contingent relations of political processes, his move incentivised the public to raise for their self-emancipation.

4.3 Marching the Core: Sit-ins in Islamabad

The critical junctures approach would prescribe the process of prospective change to a period of stability, the dawn of a cleavage due to external necessary relation of events with a system and, its subsequent ending up in a crisis where a major path-shaping activity is realised and shapes the context (Collier & Collier, 1991: 30). This will entail an unstratified social ontology by the truth being related to realm of actuality and the processes involved invigorate a close and open system, during stability and crisis respectively. In addition, this process has marginalised the political activity to an arena of power, or decision making institutions, in which the rest of the society is devoid of the decision-making machinery.

To this Bhaskar disagrees and see societies as aggregate relations wherein individuals and groups are situated and forming necessary relations whether known or unknown (1998a: 28).

In such relations, nothing can be seen as an arena, but as a process or a web of processes conflicting or coordinating with one another in an endogenous essential connection where the internal necessary force or human agency plays a larger role in shaping the would-be autopoietic generative mechanism (Bhaskar, 2008b: 252-5). The reflexive intentional agency is seen as resisting the ills in a given social relation whereas “the intentionality of praxis is shown in the capacity to transform the world in a way which, unless (as in a firing squad) it was freakishly overdetermined, would not otherwise have occurred” (ibid.: 259).

This is where the PTI-PAT struggle can be situated, where the reflexive agency overtly tried to transform the ills of the system where multi-facet relations are operating forming vicious “norm circles” struggling for “context shaping” and “conduct shaping”.¹² In this move,

¹² The “Context Shaping” and “Conduct Shaping” are the terms used by Colin Hay (2002), in which the context shaping is ability of actors to shape the structure to provided possibilities for further transformation, while

ground was levelled by PTI demanding electoral reforms and a fairer inquiry into electoral riggings, while PAT demanded a fair governance system. PTI was involved in the mainstream normalised process of ascendency to higher position in power relationship using all possible means (although often immoral) attached to that process, i.e. electoral or political process rests on frauds, lies and all other immoral practices, while the PAT came out in open resistance, although peaceful. However, things changed when the PTI demands were not met and force was used against PAT (Assessment of Quality of Democracy . . . , 2015).

Thus, away from crude abstractionism, the real concrete process worked against the demirregularity of mainstream conceptions and the PTI and PAT marched the capital city, called for civil disobedience and shutdowns. The whole situation flung in balance when the opposition parties joined hands with the government; because any such move will invoke so many internal necessary relations where the military may intervene to resolve the issue and thus sway the structure. This is one possibility among many. But the true nature of PAT movement can be analysed from repositioning perspective where it charged to climb higher into the system, artificially coercing marginalised humanity. However, this proved to a great innovation and the spectres of politics rose, with economic implications for so many relational actors.

conduct shaping is the direct master-slave type relation. The idea originally goes to Roy Bhaskar, where he used Power₁ and Power₂ to denote the above mentioned power mechanism.

Chapter 5

Socio-Political and Economic Implications

5.1 The Methodological Apprehension of the *Social* and its Ontological Contours

Social reality rests on the suppositions which in turn affect the mode of inquiry and the status of reality, thus making it a controversy. The logic of inquiry has made it amenable that any scientific approach is proposed by cognitive thinking which determines the nature of a social reality which is then regulated by science. The relational lineage of ontology, epistemology and methodology shapes the nature of the subject, which in its true essence is crude reductionism, reducing reality to our knowledge of it obtained through different methods (Hay, 2002; 2006). For instance, the method of empiricism with priori suppositions of social reality as the material outcome of its constituent parts, i.e. individuals, leads to an empiricist ontology where the observable behaviour towards a transcendent ideal is inquired and interpreted (cf. Weber, 1978). This inherently denies any causal mechanisms which generate such events and actions and also confuses the sensual observations with the ideal in thought. It can be inferred from idealistic notion of reality that the intransitive dimension of reality or ontology is a human construct which is highly fictitious (Bhaskar, 2008a: 17).

Contrary to this approach is positivist approach of social sciences where social actions are underlined in the realm of the coercive structural powers and individual behaviour is

circumnavigating around the structure (cf. Durkheim, 1982). Along with this is attached a method where knowledge can only be obtained in a closed system with fix observable and falsifiable properties, thus restricting the ontology to the observable and hence quantifiable phenomena. In a similar vein Berger et al. (Berger & Pullberg, 1965; Berger & Luckmann, 1967) also tried to cope with core philosophical and methodological issue but fell short in alienation and thus limiting the ontology in a closed totality.

An altogether promising approach is that of Bhaskar, where the science question takes new dimension along with philosophical line and the social is explained in relational terms, where the “generative mechanisms” are placed at the realm of “the real”, “the actual” is the process or operation of the social dynamics and “the empirical” lies in the observed phenomena (Bhaskar 2010; 1998a). The question of science and its neutrality is been questioned and a new definition of science based on philosophical assumptions is made, thus providing for open totality and a stratified reality (Bhaskar, 2010). Each is briefly elaborated to make a case for the latter and to locate it empirically.

5.1.1 Methodological Individualism

The basic premise of this approach is that individuals are the sole generators of social phenomena where the action in response to others' actions shapes events and restricts individuals (Arrow, 1994: 3). This approach was first used by Joseph Schumpeter; a pupil of Max Weber's and was later articulated by the later as an approach for *verstehen* (interpretation) to understand the sociology of human behaviour. In fact, Weber reduced all social collectivities to individuals and stated that “for practical ends, it may on the other hand be convenient or even indispensable to treat social collectivities, such as states, associations, business corporations, foundations, as if they were individual persons” (Weber, 1978: 13).

However, these collectivities are systematically reduced to its components when interpreting the world of events mediated through people as Weber puts that “in sociological work these collectivities must be treated as solely the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons, since these alone can be treated as agents in a course of subjectively understandable action” (ibid.).

Weber’s basic assumptions suggests a Platonic *form* or Kantian “*transcendent idealism*” where reason may provide a set of values which incentivises individuals to accordingly, whether knowingly or emotionally; “these concepts of collective entities which are found both in common sense and in juristic and other technical forms of thought have a meaning in the minds of individual persons, partly as of something actually existing partly as something with normative authority” (ibid.: 15). Similar, strands goes in Karl Popper’s thought, in which the social institutional functioning is delimited to individuals which collectivites providing no explanations (Popper, 1947: 98).

This qualifies for a pure descriptive understanding of individual actions taken towards an ideal form (cf. Weber, 1978), in which the freedom of individuals is limited by the rationality towards the *form*. Such explanations have implications for ontological realm where the ideal “anonymous individuals *et al.*,” accompany the methods against which actions are set (Bhaskar, 1998a: 30). The thought object is real for such methodologists where individuals will be mere slaves to the thought and the resultant ontology will be delimited to becoming of our choice, which is fuzzy, or it can be said that there is no real ontology of “methodological individualism”. Once set in such paradigm, it is hardly conceivable that emancipatory trajectory can be set for the people when the ideal form imposes a worldview upon them, which functions as a closed system.

Such approach, when resorted to examine the protests and actors’ behaviours vis-à-vis other actors, would left us with statistical data for ordering rather than explaining social behaviour.

The compassion for relations is still present in such individualistic approaches, where desires, respect for ideal forms and rationality (which is context-driven and a priori supposition) are acceded by the proponents' individualist accounts (ibid.: 32). The priori knowledge of society as it consists of "only individuals" whose actions shapes and reshapes the "material presence of social effects" with the ideal as a model thus resulting in flat ontology (ibid.). This is a crude abstraction where individual is abstracted from the whole society and his/her actions are empirically deduced as the formation of a social group(s).

In so doing, the collective actions are denied heavy-handedly and the individuals are not allowed to situate themselves in any "norm circle" in any particular relationship vis-à-vis other individual and with respect to other relationship. For example, an individual in relation of religious sect is denied of her co-sectarian relation and also of the relation of her sect with other sects or power relations of voting or governance. It clearly manifests that individualism is restricted to the realm of empirical where the observed phenomena can be interpreted *ex-post facto* which provides no clue for emancipation.

5.1.2 Collectivist Determinism

The opposite of voluntarism is collectivism best proposed by Emile Durkheim, who stressed the concept of emergence and declared all individual actions as driven by forces (society and subsequently groups)¹³ existing outside individual domain (Durkheim, 1982: 51). The realism embodied by Durkheim in his approach to the study of sociology can be found in his phrases where the constraints are felt accordingly as:

¹³ Durkheim sees society and groups possessing emergent properties alienated from individuals who in turn bear the society/group constraints via images in their minds. Although such conception is highly prevailed in many conservative societies where the prospects of change are termed as a sin; however, this approach is highly problematique in externalising the social facts from human agency which has produced it over history in a constant interjection of structure and agency or more precisely, context and conduct.

Even when in fact I can struggle free from these rules and successfully break them, it is never without being forced to fight against them. Even if in the end they are overcome, they make their constraining power sufficiently felt in the resistance that they afford. There is no innovator, even a fortunate one, whose ventures do not encounter opposition of this kind (ibid.: 51-52)..

The world Durkheim proposes has its own causal powers which are highly structuralist in determining social events and its reality is impinged in the minds of individuals having images of it, which in turn constrains them. But his (Durkheim's) realist ontology was accompanied by positivist epistemology in which only observable concrete events or actions were considered as facts and thoughts or psychological orientations of individuals were excluded from factual list (ibid.: 54). Facts are to be considered to be tendencies, beliefs, values; the emergent collectivity devoid of individual beliefs, thus resorting to duality in which at any moment of social happening, individuals are tacitly isolated (ibid.).

Although in the aforementioned quotation, the role of agency was stated at a weaker position, but in his method, its role is completely denied where the human agency is totally devoid of the agent-less conception of society. Such case, when applied to an empirical study, will fail in its basic premises and the concept of change, hence the collectivity of some individuals will not transform the collective whole, to which all individuals are mortally attached. In protest behaviour of a particular group, the dominant beliefs or values of the collective whole (in Durkheim's terms) are challenged, since different individuals adhere differently to the social whole, the prospects of change are nearly impossible. The group formation along clear lines is a problematic, wherein the boundaries of a group are fuzzy as individuals always tend to change sides; therefore the problem is not with individual behaviour but in our conception of group formation (cf. Elder-Vass, 2010; 2012). So, using this approach in a particular research will search for regularities in social life to fulfil its positivist agenda, the findings will be limited to explanation (albeit partial), with no study of "generative mechanisms" and henceforth, the prospects for change.

5.1.3 Dialectic of Individuals and Society

Against the individualism and holism of Weber and Durkheim respectively, a third wave emerged starting with a critique of the individualism as the producer of society and of holism as a producer of humans, and then combining the two in a reified form to describe the concrete social processes (Berger & Pullberg, 1965: 196). Their main question was against individualism's claim of making the society and asked "how is it possible that human activity (*Handeln*) should produce a world of things (*choses*)?"(ibid.: 197). The polar division of the two sociologies of Weber and Durkheim incentivised them to find a dialectical solution (though problem-solution language is fallacious in social science) where the society is made by human actions which in turn effect or shapes their horizons for actions (ibid.:197-98).

Berger and Pullberg moved away technically and stated that human agency produces the world and things and signifies it via language which necessitates the alienation or "world three", devoid of human activity once consciousness is achieved (ibid.: 200-207). The practical sociology has shown that such alienated entities have delimited the spectres of further human actions, which they (Berger et al.) have termed as the institutionalisation (1967). Institutionalisation can be achieved by the dialectics of individuals and society as:

Social structure is encountered by the individual as an external facticity. It is there, impervious to his wishes, sovereignly other than himself, an alien thing opaque to his understanding. . . . A social fact can be recognized, as against a purely individual fantasy, by the fact that it resists the individual . . . But through its agencies of socialization, society also penetrates into the consciousness of the individual, molding the latter into a socially desired shape. Thus, for instance, society as law coerces the individual from without, society as conscience coerces him from within. Finally, this pervasive regulative functionality of social structure takes on an almost automatic character (Berger & Pullberg, 1965: 202-3).

However, the last sentence is creating too much confusing when the social structures are alienated and exercise coercive force on individuals, thus limiting or almost diminishing their

role as a human agency which shapes and regulates any social becoming. In any particular case, the dialectics incentivises either the structural forces or the societal forces and thus restricts the spectre of change at secondary level (systemic) or primary level, i.e. individual behaviour. In a similar vein, the agency sometimes overthrows the constraints and bring about change but such change cannot be capitulated in a desired way, or most simply, the contingent outcomes of any struggle necessitates the deeper “causal powers” which makes things and events happen.

However, the dialectic approach of Berger and others (Berger & Pullberg, 1965; Berger & Luckmann, 1967) ends in institutionalisation, which ultimately closes the horizon for transformative actions and the overall reification and internalisation of the structure by individuals alienates itself from the individuals whereupon it can exert an autonomous power in moulding individuals. Here, Berger et al. speak in Durkheimian language, which is still prevalent in many societies including ours. In fact, it is our abstraction from the concrete which led to so much confusion. In order to understand the concrete in its all complexity (still unknowable), it is necessary that we should examine ontology as a stratified multi-layered, which Bhaskar (2008a) has proposed at three levels, (1) the real, (2) the actual, and (3) the empirical. In the real, the “generative mechanisms” are considered, while in actual the process is underlined and the empirical denotes the professed behaviour.

5.1.4 Relational Conceptualisation

As the individualist empiricism of Weber (1978) and the collectivist positivist of Durkheim (1982) implausibly suggested hermeneutics where scientific inquiry of a reality is reduced to subject-subject category because of its transcendental idealist ontological position and actualist positivist trend reduces the causal laws to empirical regularities (Bhaskar, 1998a: 23), which thus shuns complexity at the realm of empirical, and limiting the ontology to our knowledge

of it. Against these approaches was Berger, who failed by delimiting ontology as alienated from human agency and closed the possibility of any transformation, once the reification was consensually developed (Berger & Pullberg, 1965; Berger and Luckmann, 1967).

Contrary to these philosophers and social theorists is Bhaskar, who identifies the role of philosophy and science and makes the case for his relational method. Science and philosophy are interdependent because the complexity of reality compels us to resort to some sort of selectivity or bias while scientifically studying a phenomena or events or social actions. To this Bhaskar argued the compatibility of philosophy and science as all scientific discoveries has tended on some *priori* postulations intuitive to the scientist, which do not necessarily determine the scientific outcomes, but provides necessary conditions for science (Bhaskar, 1998a: 8). This means the deeper understanding of any object of study will ultimately end in a mess if the complexity embodying the natural and social objects of study is not addressed properly, i.e. if philosophy does not provide a necessary framework for understanding deeper conditions.

This assumption is tacitly advocated by Sayer (2010) and Jessop (1990a; 2008) and others.

As Rescher (1998) puts it as:

[E]ntities and their relations in the real world not only have more properties than they ever will overtly manifest, but they have more than they possibly can ever manifest. This is so because the dispositional properties of things always involve what might be characterized as *mutually preemptive* conditions of realization. . . . The perfectly possible realization of various dispositions may fail to be mutually *compossible*, and so the dispositional properties of a thing cannot ever be manifested completely - not just in practice, but in principle. Our objective claims about real things always commit us to more than we can actually ever determine about them (cited in Jessop: 2008, 228).

This leads to anti-foundational claims of knowability (epistemology), where selectivity is the core consideration of launching our research project (Jessop, 2008: 234-35). The concept-

dependence of any social reality thus understood implied to the realistic presence of any truth claims known via consciousness or intuition (Sayer, 2010: 35-40). This ultimately leads to the foundational claims of any reality. In social sciences or at best societies, the causal coercive powers and the pre-givenness of society over individuals forms the real basis for its existence, which can only be seen in a relational way where individuals (and groups) situate themselves (Bhaskar, 1998a: 28). This is against the dialectic constructionist claim where the society is consciously or unconsciously constructed; rather it focuses on the pre-existence of relations in a given time/space whereupon individuals can only reproduce or transform them (ibid.: 36-37). These relations can include any category which is real because agents situating themselves in any of it are often bound intuitively to comply with its contours, i.e. in relations of love; actors are innerly dragged by the relationship. Similarly, relations of power and exploitation can mutually coexist by accommodating actors at the one end or the other or intermediary and relational way to one another.

This approach seems analytically sound because the science adhered with this approach as propounded by Bhaskar is situating the ontology in its right place along with focus on empirical tests that resolves the traditional issue of abstraction to a greater extent. Moreover, the role adhered to philosophy guides scientific knowledge which can be then empirically tested to underline the deeper “generative mechanisms” as Bhaskar puts it plainly:

[O]ne has in science a three-phase schema of development in which, in a continuing dialectic, science identifies a phenomenon (or range of phenomena), constructs explanations for it and empirically tests its explanations, leading to the identification of the generative mechanism at work, which now becomes the phenomenon to be explained, and so on. In this continuing process, as deeper levels or strata of reality are successively unfolded, science must construct and test its explanations with the cognitive resources and physical tools at its disposal, which in this process are themselves progressively transformed, modified and refined (1998a: 13).

Therefore it is necessary to develop an essence of societies and people wherein one can locate the vantage point of scientific inquiry, i.e. what is the nature of society and people to be the

possible topics of science (*ibid.*: 14). It can, therefore, be stated, using critical realism at philosophical disposal, that social structures are relational and the ever-present conditions that pre-supposes human intentionalities, while human are intentional and situate themselves in a particular relationship(s) where intended consequences for their actions may accompany the unintentional outcomes (*ibid.*: 38-9). Such formulation can be fruitful in analysing any event as it will avoid the *taken-for-grantedness* of variable or vantage-point from where we can measure outcomes. Intentionality is attached with human agency, upon which the structure's legitimacy and existence is relying, and the agency can transform the structure, thus paving the way for emancipatory practice.

5.2 Implications for Social and Political Relations

Our limitations in meticulously dealing with the nature of the *social* and the nature of the *science* have reduced our being (ontology) to our understanding of it or *becoming*. This has implications for reality and societal understanding, which, in a particular discourse, situate human agency in a particular knowledge framework, and thus closes its own spectre. The intentionality of human agency, as propounded by Bhaskar (1998a) is infringed by the concepts of sacredness, alienations and heavenly ordained judges of rational activity, which encircles human emancipatory aspirations. In fact, the social life goes on irrespective of our understanding of it, but our intervention as human agency reinvigorates the social forms of whatever nature (*ibid.*).

Regarding the question of understanding, all scientific activity is grounded in philosophy which provides a conceptual background of any reality under scientific corroboration. This unlocks so many “*false consciousnesses*” which we embody; thanks to our understanding on

fictitious basis. Therefore, it will be worthy to make claims about the social structures on philosophical ground, which can be tested by so much empirical data present in the shape of events and actions and a causal link can be established, albeit on anti-foundational epistemological basis. Although, nature necessitates relations and structures, therefore, ontology remains real, foundational and independent of our understanding (cf. Bhaskar, 1998a; 1998b; 2008; 2011).

Now, the empirical case of these propositions in hand can be dealt with accordingly. The sit-in politics of Pakistan and the political division of society among different strata can be enumerated in a *relational* way. As the social world is composed of relations or structures (Porpora, 2013: 25-37; Bhaskar, 1998a; 1998b), the individuals or groups situate themselves accordingly in any particular relationship or set of relationship, which in itself are related with other relations. These relations can be simply explicated as relations of power and politics, of religion, of love, of respect, of exploitations and so on, which are natural necessities and where individuals and groups consciously situate themselves (cf. Bhaskar, 1998a; 1998b).

In the present study, the relations of powers and politics are under consideration, in which different political actors and parties situate themselves and any action pursued henceforth is considered to dominate the relations. In the recent sit-in of PTI and PAT can be analysed from the same perspective, where the PAT and PTI, due the nature of concrete, were very much involved in process of transformation vis-à-vis other dominant stakeholders in a power relationship. Other actors being the Army, the PMLN and PPP along some other mainstream factions all involved to maintain a dominant position in a relationship, which was supplemented by the discourses of legitimacy institutionalised in Bergerian terms, where the already powerful sway the context as a “significant other” and hence legitimate (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).

The relations were consciously manipulated by many actors like the Army, which apparently becomes a blame games or conspiracy theories in the wake of the conscious agency interacting on the other side of the dialectic. It is not only the relation of *per se* structure and agency; rather it would be better understood as the interaction of agency and agency wherein the structure is sustained or transformed. Though, mainstream exigencies sustain the alienation of state and society (for example, Migdal, 2004; Skocpol, 1979) and the society is epistemically under-laboured from the state or isolated from the process and thus abstracting the concrete to the realm of an arena or place, where the fate of humanity is decided.

However, the PAT-PTI sit-in confirms the complexity of a social reality where the human agency was consciously involved in a transformatory process; whether successful or not in the wake of the relational opposition is not an issue of concern. For it may incentivise people to become passive at the lower echelon of relations, a new hope was given to the masses involved in a process by the PAT-PTI sit-ins to raise their fortune. Apparently, it failed to bring about any structural political change *per se*, but in fact, it transformed the relationship to some extent, by incorporating its own properties via resistance against the dominant echelons of relations.

The impacts can be empirically quantified (although quantifying the social is a problematique) by the decisions of the election tribunal against the dominant position holders rose through a particular constructionist setup, called elections. However, the issue at length is not settled by this. The question is still hampering with the domain of knowledge; *why some segments of society opposed the sit-in while some supported it?* The answer is quite altruistic. Because different strata situate themselves in different echelons of power relations, some closely coinciding with the status-quo forces, thus forming a single “norm circle”, while others are situated a bit differently from the status-quo forces that’s why they supports the status-quo but with a bit differences. Some might situate themselves with the reformist

circles, while other may be in close proximity with it. Similarly, the Army has situated itself nearly to the reformist positions in a relational way, but as an agency, it acts relationally against the status-quo and anti-status-quo forces, thus explicitly exploiting the situation.

Taking politics as process, it is very difficult to quantify the moment by moment happening and the balance of forces in political relationship, as it were to be done, has politics been characterised by continuity and change as institutionalists would depict. However, the PAT dimension demystified the sacredness of politics as the game of elites and special procedures, which tacitly alienates the larger humanity from the game of fates; it is attributed mainly to the epistemically fallacious discourse forming the core of modernity. It incentivised the oppressed people to rise for theirself and reposition theirself in a relation of power and politics. As mentioned earlier, different political parties positioned itself in close proximity to the status-quo forces which prior to this were located relationally different. This can be explained by the fuzzy boundaries of “norm circles” where a hierarchy of one circle is disturbed; is extracted usefully by the other circle. This answers dissidence and side-changing dynamics of any individual(s) or group(s).

Socially, the relocation of or strict adherence to, particular positions affect the social arrangements of relations where individuals are located and relocated. This means that a different value system is adopted by some individuals or groups which in gross incompatibility with other value systems, thus any action taken can affect the rivals’ values and hence psychology, which is termed as disturbance of routine. Therefore, it is hard to determine any particular mode of oppression wherein the conscious activity of human agency is in itself the part of the process. However, the whole relation of oppression where the ethical agency finds itself can be transformed when we see the totality as open and the priority of absence over present (Bhaskar, 2008b; Norrie, 2010).

5.3 Economics Implications

Economics posits a challenge to the real world wherein economic models are isolated from the whole social process (Maki, 2011: 3), thus it posits a problematic nature of reality because any such isolation will undermine the relational model and hence will lead to ontological dualism, which critical realism wants to transcend (cf. Hay, 2002). A tendency of situating economics in critical realist philosophy has emerged in the writings of Ingham (1999), where the economic study is conducted in a relational way. Normally, money is taken at a face value as a unit of exchange, but situating its worth in human relations, money can be taken in relational terms (Ingham, 1999: 109-113). However, money is a human construction (Searle, 1995; 2010), it is very difficult to naturalise it or in Bergerian terms to alienate in, because the relational assumption contradicts with critical realist emancipatory project.

Another approach is that inevitable (to use mainstream language) nature of capitalist competition is taken as a social relation wherein money takes the form of value of exchange (Buch-Hansen, 2014: 80-94). However, if competition is a natural necessity, the options for cooperation and the role of ethical agency is undermined because this would imply no difference between the social world and the Darwinian theory of the “survival of the fittest”. Also, it forecloses any totality and the prospects for change are immediately closed. A more promising philosophical consideration would be to instantiate exchange as social relation having tangible (material, money) and intangible (feeling, sentiments etc.) properties and money may take the medium of exchange of tangible (and sometimes intangible) properties. Also, the questions of ills (e.g. exploitation, competition etc) can be instantiated immediately; the *Chimera* against which critical realism acts a *Bellerophon*.

This not only necessitates the exchange relations but can also be used in emancipatory practice for absenting absences (see Bhaskar, 2010), whereas, the money or competition as social relations provides no clue for emancipation; one necessitated money as natural and the other necessitated competition as *taken-for-granted*, thus limiting the spectre of transformation. This is where critical realism parts into classic and dialectical-cum-spiritual realism (Sayer, 2000), where the former hold the explanatory dimension and the latter considers absences and open totalities, where ethical agency can consciously intervene and transform it.

Now, looking at the curiosity of sit-in politics in Pakistan with its severe implications for economics; things can be situated in this philosophical spectre, where the objective of science is to locate ills and consciously override it through ethical agency (cf. Bhaskar, 2010). The generative mechanisms underlined in relational way, the construction of money (Searle, 2010) and its accumulation by the exploitative absence over history shows the guiltiness of economic accumulation and any reversal can be justified by the natural mechanism or mode of operation of any opened relational system. Once situated in a particular position, it is a tendency of the material-oriented ethical agents to retain its positions and in doing so, different discourses and technologies are developed and normalised to maintain the system. The *leitmotif* of any economic imaginary in such value system and relational situation made it necessary to drag the agentness out of the system and the exploitation becomes a naturalised process and thus legitimacy is accrued to it by the discourse stemming from modernity.

Now, it is easier to locate agents of change in any relational system. The relation of exchange *per se* situates agents owing to their material orientation, where relocation takes place every moment and any relational system can be disturbed by this movement. The protesters or revolutionaries situated themselves in an anti-status-quo position in power relations, which is relationally link to that of exchange and this move disturbed the exploitative exchange

relations, with severe losses for some businesses. Although, they have their origins in absences or ills, i.e., exploitation; the change of balance will automatically follow by suffering.

It can be implied that the nature of economics and system of exchange, when takes the form of absences, pays back, where the gains are equalised in a relational system. The relational status of the local businesses trembled in the wake of a new relational position of the consumers, where the ecology of politics subdued the ecology of economics. These are often termed as contingent forces which promotes the unconscious outcomes. Here, an ethical agency can be incorporated which can be used for absenting absences (Bhaskar, 2010; Norrie, 2010). This is a project of *eudaimonia* where the ill-defined processes of knowledge brings about miseries and the semiology of enlightenment can be helpful in refuting ills and framing a better world (Bhaskar, 2000).

Chapter 6

Conclusions

The core premise of this research is the role of structure-agency conundrum, accommodating so many ills, and a better codification of this dynamics to edifice an acceptable analytical tool for the study of social and political mysteries. Relating the science of the politics with the mainstream approaches in a theoretical framework, and its epistemological and hence ontological implications made it gentle to say farewell to such discourse. The implausibility of the mainstream approaches in determining the process where the agents-cum-agents and agent-structure stroke a new debate where the dualism of structure-agency were shaken and new epistemology (anti-foundational one) was grounded in a foundational ontological premise, where the being exists independent of the becoming.

However, this research started with a socio-political dynamic, called the sit-ins, to influence any systemic or evolutionary change. The existing literature on change was in the form of “historical institutionalism” and “critical junctures” propounded by Hall et al. (1996), Steinmo et al. (1992) and Capoccia and Kelemen (2007). However, it was thematised by continuity or relatively stability and change, which implies the search for regularities (or demi-regularities to connote in Lawson’s words), which shows the problem of abstraction. This in turn hampers ontology and restricts it to the realm of observations and regularities by excluding so many processes from the open system.

To overcome this problem, the research focused on strategic-relational approach in study the social dynamics and the perils of change. The strategic-relational approach as propounded by Bob Jessop (1990; 2008) and Colin Hay (2002) promises the conscious human activity in a given context which is the outcome of human interaction over history and hence highly selective in favouring certain strategies over other. This, in turn, invited relational analysis where particular individuals or groups are situated in a natural necessary form in particular relations. This indemnity was assured by Bhaskar (1998a), Archer (1995) and Porpora (2013), which provided the social positions approach and is later used in analysing the outcomes of fluctuations of positions.

This formed the framework of research which was followed by the history of political instability in which the mainstream researchers have tried to find regularities and thus reducing the process to epistemology. Moreover, some sort of regularity was tacitly carved by compromising complexity over parsimony in the articulation of different events. Moreover, legislation and all other methods were used to deliberately contain complexity and dissidence. This was also combined by the general notion of sacredness which haunted so many participants; however, the reality of the real mechanisms was not curtailed even by the so many tyrannical conscious efforts in academic realm. Because the reality stems from real social processes not from our knowledge of it, which, however, has effects in derailing human agents from their true being, which according to Bhaskar (2000) is enlightened and free.

This exposure was followed by the turbulent electoral process where the situated agents always tried to relocate their positions, even outside the dominant ill-procedures of change, in the form of protests and agitations. It also focused on role of the already in position of dominance to maintain the system by using the legal techniques of legitimacy along with coercion in relations of agents and thus framing and reframing the contours of the context to

maintain the status-quo. The mechanisms of domination in political relations are meticulously articulated over history to alienate the rest of society from the process or to use it as a mere instrument. This proved superstitious when the marginalised strata of society tried to entertain itself in relocating political relationship.

The relocation was not innocent; it changed the whole scenario of politics, society and economics. Political unity of the politician was magnificent, resisting other actors' desire to reposition theirself. The society was divided among social positions, with implications for both the revolutionaries and the status-quo forces; a position, which must pay back materially, ethically and culturally. The material relation was disturbed. Although founded on absences, it imposed severe economic losses on all relational subjects. Social and political relocations propounded new images and symbols of action which contradicted with the traditional mainstream culture and thus there was an obvious challenge to the dominant values. It invoked resentment and violence to the newly emerging values; the product of protests and sit-ins.

The overall scenario was an empirical test for the critical realist assumptions about the nature of socio-political process in which human agency constantly intervened to shape the outcomes. Although, it would be hastily to conclude that all human actions are deliberate; however, it can be said that they are conscious and fully underscores themselves in any relations and act accordingly. But what is worrisome is the lack of ethics when it comes to politics, or in best possible words, the ethics of dominant strata are considered as a standard, against which any action is analysed and hence approved and disapproved.

This incentivise us to engage in a dialectical reasoning of "what we are" to "what we could be" as a human agency. This reasoning can be used to circumcise the discourse of hegemony which normalises power discourse as given and helps us finding a ground for a better future.

The logic is simple. Actors must situate themselves in any relationship but as an ethical agency, no one should situate itself with an oppressive "norm circle"; the strength of that circle would vanish away, so will its discourse. Thus a true emancipation and enlightenment is possible, but the problem remains in self-realisation as a human agency; the component of any social process.

This has also implications for strategic-relational approach, which is normally used to describe the structural contours favouring certain strategies over other. Yes, it is so. But it deprives the human agency of an enlightened being in a process, overtly manipulating the structural constraints over human intentionality. Also, the agency-agency relationship is undermined which is resumed once the relational contour, on which agents situate themselves, is understood to exerting no special force of its own. This would imply that structures are human memories which can be consciously transformed or shaded away once self-realisation is accrued. Self-realisation is the only way to emancipation; which humans are but they have to shake away absences via dialectical reason based on non-identity, negativity, open totality and praxis.

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