

**US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH ASIA:
A COMPARISON OF BUSH AND OBAMA ADMINISTRATIONS**




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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the PhD Degree in
the Discipline of Social Sciences with specialization in International
Relations at the Faculty of Social Science

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the outcome of my research and has not been submitted to any other university for grant of a degree. I have produced the work presented in this dissertation during the scheduled period of study.

Abdul Qayoom

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Dedicated
to
My Parents
&
My Country

Abstract

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States foreign policy towards South Asia has changed several times, but its ultimate goal of establishing its dominant role in the region has never changed. From the beginning, Pakistan is a close and frontline ally of the USA. India chooses the Communism block; after the destruction of the Soviet Union, it comes under the Capitalist block's umbrella. President Bush Jr.'s administration has made-up its mind about rectifying its policies towards the South Asian region. The extremist forces, having established their credentials as a global risk, remain a serious threat to global peace and stability. The President Obama administration is especially concentrating on the South Asian region, keeping in mind its immense strategic significance. The US has also convinced India and Pakistan, two central regional stakeholders, about her Afghanistan benefits. According to their socio-political and geostrategic needs, the US must understand Pakistan and India's interests, two unfriendly nuclear neighbors in the region, to resolve the Afghanistan issue. Pakistan is concerned about her relative strategic depth, the unsettled Kashmir issue, and unfair Indian objectives. Indian hegemony in South Asia, anti-Pakistan rhetoric of Indian leaders constituted the discursive factor of Pakistan insecurity. The United States has had a long and, at times, complicated relationship with Pakistan, a country that faces many political, security, and economic challenges. In addition to all this, the American administration has accepted the international community's responsibility for dealing with extremist forces' challenges in the South Asian region. This dissertation aims to compare the US foreign policy of President George W. Bush and President Barack H. Obama Administrations in South Asia, focusing on US-Pakistan and US-India bilateral relations.



FINAL APPROVAL

This is to certify that we gone through and evaluated the dissertation titled "US Foreign Policy Towards South Asia: A Comparison of Bush and Obama Administrations", submitted by Mr. Abdul Qayoom, a student of Ph. D International Relations under University Registration No. 17-FSS/PhD/IR/S16, in partial fulfillment of the award of the degree of Ph. D. This thesis fulfills the requirements in its core and quality for the award of the degree.

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Abstract

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List of Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BIT	Bilateral Investment Treaty
BMS	Ballistic Missile System
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CENTO	Central Treaty Organisation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	Cable News Network
CPEC	China Pakistan Economic Corridor
CRA	Contingent Reserve Arrangement
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
EU	European Union

FATA	Federally Administrative Tribal Areas
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHQ	General Headquarters
GWOT	Global War on Terror
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IGOs	Intergovernmental Organizations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOs	International Organizations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Inter-Service Intelligence
JUI	Jamiat Ulema-e Islam
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LEMOA	Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement
LoC	Line of Control in Kashmir
LoN	League of Nations

MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NAM	Non-Alignment Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDB	New Development Bank
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NMT	Nuclear Missile Technology
NSG	Nuclear Supplier Group
NSS	National Security Strategy
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PCIJ	Permanent Court of International Justice
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PMLN	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
RAND	Research and Development

RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
RSC	Regional Security Complexes
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEATO	Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation
SORT	Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USA	United States America
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WB	World Bank
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTC	World Trade Centre
WTO	World Trade Organization
WW-I	World War I
WW-II	World War II

Introduction

Since the end of World War II, the United States' foreign policy towards South Asia has changed several times. However, its ultimate goal to establish its dominant role over the region has never changed (Chou, 2005). Another critical US interest in South Asia is economically motivated and administrated by the strategic competition with Russia and China (Gojree, 2015). South Asia and its surroundings are also experiencing the effects of emerging international Powers. South Asia has traditionally remained the central focus of global players. In a multi-polar world and bi-polar world, its importance for further increase because the characteristics of the emerging structure bring along a host of opportunities and challenges (Naqvi, 2010).

South Asia is generally considered the most volatile and war-prone region (A. Z. Hilali, 2006). This view emerges from the perpetual instability prevailing in the area since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 (Tellis, 1997). Its two principal states, the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, have an epic rivalry towards each other, deeply embedded in their strategic cultures, mostly influenced by religious/ideological differences and unsettled borders. Kashmir dispute remains central to all peace overtures (Javaid, 2010). Since independence, Pakistan and India have fought three major wars in 1948, 1965, and 1971. The main period of a very close clash with each other is read as 1999, 2002, and 2008, after overt nuclearisation in May 1998. The Kashmir issue has regard to resolve the long-standing Kashmir issues that need to be resolved forthwith.

The United States policies towards South Asia can be firmly divided into three phases (Cookson, 2002). Each one of these phases contributes to Pakistan. The first

engagement took place in the Cold War era. It then came the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) attack on Afghanistan after Pakistan fought a United States proxy war in Afghanistan through Mujahideen (soldiers fighting a holy war) to defeat the Soviet Army. Soviet-Afghan war continued for a decade and finally concluded with the signing of the Geneva Accords¹ (Crews & Tarzi, 2009). The second engagement was termed as the era of disengagement cause of nuclear-sanctioned proliferation in the region. Moreover, the third engagement, a military-styled quasi invasion that took place in the wake of 9/11 (September 11, 2001) attacks, was conventionally linked towards the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) (Wirsing, 2003).

1.1. Cold War

The significant objective of the United States was to utilize South Asian nations, principally Pakistan, to contain or defy Communism. Around then, the US and USSR required an exchange field for was rivalry in Europe, the Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East (A. Z. Hilali, 2006). In fact, South Asia became a focus of American foreign policies when the USSR invaded Afghanistan around 1978.

During the Cold War era, the US regarded South Asia as an area of marginal strategic importance barring to check the communist expansion in the region. However, the recent shifts in global power relationships have made South Asia an important region not to be ignored (Gojree, 2015).

¹ The Geneva Accords, known formally as the agreements on the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan, were signed on 14 April 1988 at the Geneva headquarters of the United Nations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the United States and the Soviet Union serving as guarantors.

It was believed back then that once Pakistan and India were under the control of Communism, the US would lose their foothold in Asia (Sheehan, 1971). Therefore, confronting Communism was the initial point for US foreign policy for South Asia. In achieving this goal, the US saw the benefits of a strong alliance with Pakistan and provided considerable military assistance for joining of US-controlled collations the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and a year later in 1955, Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) (Hasnat, 2014).

Indeed, during the mid-1970s, Pakistan likewise assumed a significant role in US-China rapprochements. Amusingly, even though the US was disappointed with India's non-alignment policy and its resulting close relations with the USSR (Gojree, 2015), during the 1960s, after the border conflict between India and China, the US and the USSR contended with one another to offer weapons to India. Washington perceived the McMahon Line² and gave arms and air assistance.

President Richard Nixon utilized tact instead of military activity by empowering the United Nations (UN) to see the socialist Chinese government and actualized a rapprochement policy to the Soviet Union. His replacement, President Ronald Reagan, accepted that the spread of socialism anywhere threatened freedom all over. His administration furnished Pakistan with significant economic and military help just as arms

² The McMahon Line is the demarcation line between the Tibetan region of China and the North-east region of India proposed by British colonial administrator Henry McMahon at the 1914 Simla Convention signed between British and Tibetan representatives. It is currently the effective boundary between China and India, although its legal status is disputed by the Chinese government. The line is named after Henry McMahon, foreign secretary of British India and the chief negotiator of the convention at Simla. It was signed by McMahon and Lonchen Satra on behalf of the Tibetan Government. It extends for 890 km from Bhutan in the west to 260 km east of the great bend of the Brahmaputra River in the east, largely along the crest of the Himalayas.

to help hostile to Soviet and against socialist groups, such as the Mujahideen in Afghanistan (Crews & Tarzi, 2009).

Afghanistan is a landlocked country, its support was not possible without the help of Pakistan. Stated otherwise, it was a firm belief that Pakistan and Afghanistan's relationship could decide the region's fate. The international community can be benefited in other spheres such as the political and social domain. Therefore, Pakistan got essential to accomplishing Reagan's enemy of socialist desire. In 1985, Pakistan turned into the fourth-biggest beneficiary of US two-sided military aid, after Egypt, Turkey, and Israel. After two years, Pakistan turned into the second-greatest beneficiary of US aid after Israel. Thus, those years were a brilliant period in Pak-US aid relations (M. Ali, 2016).

1.2. Post-Cold War

The Soviet Union self-destructed around three years after its soldiers' withdrawal from Afghanistan, likewise stopped Russia's collations with India (Sen, 2002). With the USSR's disintegration, the US does not need Pakistan collation, but the fact is that during the cold war, Pakistan remained a frontline ally. Pakistan fell into disapproval because of its atomic program that the US had before advantageously overlooked during the entire decade. In 1990, the Pak-centric Pressler Amendment³ became effective, and sanctions were imposed and stop all kinds of assistance to Pakistan and Afghanistan (M. Ali, 2016). At the same time, nuclear proliferation became a vital concern of the US in the region

³ Larry Lee Pressler US Senator was also the sponsor of the Pressler Amendment, which banned most economic and military assistance to Pakistan unless the president certified on an annual basis that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device.

because India and Pakistan successfully tested their atomic bombs in 1998, with neither joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (J. T. White, 2014) nor any obligatory guideline.

The United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) sanctions on different states from 1945 to 1994. It has evaluated and analyzed the politics of sanctions as an essential instrument of super power's foreign policy tactics to change the behaviour of different states unwilling to cooperate to keep the peace, prosperity, and stability in other parts of the world. Domestic and external effects on the targeted countries have been highlighted and discussed in an empirical and comparative style, the realistic approach to understanding the superpower hegemony in World Politics (Bailey, 2016).

Great Powers have purposefully defied state sovereignty rules; they propagate things, create proxies, and do what their national interests dictate them. Superpower itself is doing this inside the western half of the globe since the nineteenth century, and on the other side of the world, great powers like Russia and China are playing a similar role. The leading reason for their continuous function as a great power is their ability to exercise control within their alliance and across the world. It made their hegemony a permanent characteristic of the world system (Modelski, 1972).

The US relations towards India dramatically changed after the Post-Cold War, for the most part, during President Bill Clinton's administration. India denied the US offer during the cold war, yet later on, a change came in the US policy for India (Bajpai, Bertsch, Gahlau, & Srivastava, 1999). In the wake of atomic tests in May 1998, Clinton's administrations' underlying response was to put sanctions on both countries. However, as

India was an emerging power, the Clinton administration re-examined its policy towards India (Stephen P. Cohen, 2002).

In March 2000, President Bill Clinton spent seven days in length visit to India, a significant change of policy towards South Asia. A later year when President George W. Bush Jr. joined the office, the US took considerable measures to improve India's relations, such as joint military activities. Both nations were in explicit agreement with the common issue of nuclear warfare. In this viewpoint, India had been very fruitful in persuading the US to apply pressure on Pakistan to stop cross border penetration on the Indian held Kashmir (H. Malik, 2008).

The United States, as a superpower, has multiple policy objectives and interests throughout the world. It has adopted severe and strict measures against those elements and states that have threatened global peace and US policy interests. Both countries possess a vital part in establishing peace in their respective regions. These states have also posed a great danger to global peace, prosperity, and stability by pursuing their nuclear programs. Nuclear aspirations of both nations have jeopardized the efforts made for the de-nuclearization of South Asia and hence created a significant imbalance of power in their regions (F. H. Khan, Jacobs, & Burke, 2014). The United States has adopted sanctions as a foreign policy instrument towards these states. Still, fruitful results of such coercive diplomacy have not been so encouraging. The study suggests that along with coercive methods, other soft diplomatic means need to be adopted to change the non-complying States' behaviour to maintain regional and global peace savvy.

The politics of sanctions has been used as an essential diplomacy tactic by the superpowers and different international organizations. The imposition of various sanctions by the major states like the US aimed to threaten international politics' targeted countries. The United States' coercive diplomacy has been remained a practice of a powerful state to achieve its determined objectives (Doxey, 1987). The US imposed sanctions on Pakistan and India, and many other States to occasionally pursue its political, economic, military, and geostrategic national interests (Rennack, 2001). A significant parallel challenge was the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan, which prompted mutually reinforcing aggressive behavior and the possibility of an all-out war. According to the US, the security challenges confronting the region lay inside the war of words between these two countries. In this way, for this period's duration, the objective of US policy to South Asia included keeping India-Pakistan relations stable and preventing nuclear proliferation (Gojree, 2015).

1.3. Post 9/11

The watershed event of the 9/11 attack on the US completely transformed the global geopolitical environments; the Taliban regime was accused of harboring the declared perpetrator Osama bin Laden and his organization 'Al-Qaida' (Knightley, 2001). Pakistan has now been confronted with one of the most serious challenges of its living history; the US's decision to side. The sympathy of the entire international community is still being debated in Pakistan, and the radical elements continue to claim it as a great betrayal to the friendly Taliban. The validity of this highly superfluous argument favoring the stubborn Taliban or rationality of Islamabad's decision or even debate on the possibility of an alternative strategy (Sulaiman, 2008).

Nevertheless, the impact of the post 9/11 phenomenon in Afghanistan vis-à-vis Pakistan's policies have been sought. The Government of Pakistan faced American pressure, the obstinate response of the Taliban despite numerous efforts and the excellent set of seven US demands from Islamabad. Former President has also confirmed widely publicized US officials' warnings to Islamabad like, 'You are either with us or against us' (Musharraf, 2006). Notwithstanding agreeing in principle to support the war on terror, note that Islamabad explicitly conveyed its caveats to Washington vis-à-vis prospects of Israel and India on Pakistani soil as part of international military effort in Afghanistan (Buckley & Fawn, 2004).

After the world's most significant terrorist attack on the US, counterterrorism became the primary concern of the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) (Bush, 2002). The United States and its allies started military action in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. President Bush Jr.'s administration gave aid to Pakistan 600 million dollars in September 2001. In 2003, the American President invited the Pakistani President at Camp David⁴, which resulted in a three billion dollars aid package for Pakistan (Boyle, 2008). He vowed to work with Congress to fight terrorism in his country. In the next year, the United States formally designated Pakistan a Major Non-NATO Ally in the Global War on Terror. According to the Pentagon report, the value of the external military trades' agreements with Pakistan came to 5.4 billion dollars for 2002-14 (Kronstadt, 2014).

⁴ Camp David is the country retreat for the president of the United States. It is located in the wooded hills of Catoctin Mountain Park, in Frederick County, Maryland, about 100 km north-northwest of the national capital city of Washington DC, President Bush Welcomes President Musharraf to Camp David in 2003.

However, the speedy recovery of Pak-US relations did not result in a decline of Indo-US ties. While India remained an ally of the USSR in the Cold War era, its geographical size, larger population, market potential, and increased global presence made it a significant US global partner. Since late 2001, Indo-American relations have emphasized bilateral military collaboration as one of the most important aspects of their mutual diplomatic mission (R. Lal & Rajagopalan, 2004). Since early 2002, the US and India have held a series of unparalleled and increasingly substantial mutual workouts involving all army exercises and pursued a strategic partnership based on shared values and convergent geopolitical pursuits. Countless initiatives are underway, including military investments and a plan for civilian nuclear collaboration (A. J. Tellis, 2006).

In June 2005, the US and India signed a ten-year defense pact. A Maritime Security Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2006. In the same year, Indian Prime Minister Singh and US President Bush Jr. signed the most important agreements, one of the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Outlining planned collaboration, multilateral operations, expanded two-way defense trade, increasing opportunities for technology transfers, missile defense, defense procurement and production group, maritime security, including piracy of illegal trafficking of weapons of mass destruction. On the economic side, Microsoft, Dell, Oracle, IBM, and other US-based tech companies have made billion-dollar investments in India (Kronstadt, 2011).

President Obama continued the same foreign policy initiatives of his predecessor. On the one hand, the President needed Pakistan's support in fighting terrorism and extremism in the region, preventing the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), maintaining US goals in Afghanistan, and preserving peace, prosperity, and stability in the

country (Ra'ees, 2010). On the other side, he cooperated with India for its economic growth and India's market benefits to American trade. President Obama visited India twice and ignored Pakistan during his terms in office. However, he tried to balance US relations between Pakistan and India, recognizing their long-simmering conflict's fragile nature. Even then, remarkable mistrust and perceived strategic imbalance for Pakistan-US-India triangular relationship remained the prominent feature during his era (N. S. a. J. T. White, 2011).

In May 2011, Al-Qaeda chief leader Osama bin Laden was killed by US Navy SEALs in Pakistan. After that, again, the United States policy changed in South Asia. President Obama's drawdown plan⁵ started in July 2011, reducing American troops in Afghanistan (Nichols, 2011). In 2012, while campaigning for re-appointment, he repeatedly repeated that Afghanistan's fight would be over in 2014. Despite this promise in July 2016, he halted the withdrawal of military forces from Afghanistan, asserting that the US kept hundreds and hundreds of troops within the nation via the tip of his term in 2017 and indefinitely prolonging the American role in warfare that has already lasted fifteen years (Kruta, 2016).

Consequently, we can summarize the US policies towards South Asia (Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan) have changed many times after WWII. Subsequently, with the shift of global power, the developing countries rapidly start relationships with the USA.

⁵ The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan describes the drawdown of United States Armed Forces in the Afghanistan war and the plans after its post-2014 presence when most combat troops had left Afghanistan at the end of 2014.

Consequently, these changes comprehensive strategy, with the ever-increasing military, diplomatic and economic investments.

2. Rationale of the Study

The study aims to make a comparative analysis of the US South Asian policies under President Bush Jr. and President Obama administrations. In the wake of 9/11, Pakistan, as a 'frontline state' in the War on Terrorism, it's not a new phenomenon for Pakistan because, in the cold war era, Pakistan was also a frontline state against the USSR in South Asia. US-Pakistan relations can be described as a ride on a roller coaster with frequent ups and downs, highs and lows, close cooperation between two states pertaining to economic and military assistance, and then sharp friction, which has created rifts and troubles that clearly reflect that the Pakistan-US relationship has never been on a smooth footing in the last six decades. In contrast, there have been significant improvements in Indo-US relations that have gone relatively unnoticed after the events of 9/11. Pakistan needs to learn how India maintained its sovereignty and detachment in the Cold War and managed to obtain US support in almost all fields. A balanced US foreign policy reflecting a more even treatment of all South Asian nations, US foreign investment would bring positive changes to control in South Asia.

3. Statement of the Problem

The United States and Pakistan have come to be allies because of the region's threatening situation, USA interests after WWII, throughout the Cold War, and following the USSR attack on Afghanistan. In the post-cold war period, the US emerged as the exclusive global power, which, in turn, altered the breadth of United States foreign policy.

Post 9/11, several changes in world politics. Pakistan joined as a coalition partner in the US-led War on Terrorism and other fields such as in the military, economic and political. Earlier, many implications in bilateral relations between Pak-US and ups and downs. India's US policies are closer than Pakistan's, and it's a clear unbalance policy in the region. Despite the fact that both presidents try to overcome these differences, many issues remain unresolved. The growing mistrust and policy of tit for tat response have made South Asia, a region embangled in a long-drawn dispute with no apparent sign of reconciliation in near the future. The absence of confidence-building measures and lack of people to people contact has resulted in establishing a strategic environment in South Asia, damaging the peace process in the region. It is addressed that the US perspective in light of the International Relations' most well-known theory realism. Generally, the US is pursuing an interest-driven policy that is also known as an independent policy.

4. Objective of the Study

- To elaborate on the main features of the US policy and its security implications for Pakistan.
- To compare the US policies towards South Asia under President Bush Jr. and President Obama Administrations.
- To identify the outcomes of US foreign policy towards the South Asia region generally.
- To determine the motives behind Indian significance in US Foreign Policy towards South Asia.

5. Primary Research Question

Did the nature of the Indo-US relationship during President George W. Bush and President Barack H. Obama Administrations, alienated Pakistan towards US Foreign Policy? Secondly, is the increasingly close relations between the US and India affecting the region's foreign policy, especially Pakistan?

6. Secondary Research Questions

1. What is the nature of the relationship between the US-Pakistan and the US-India?
2. What are the commonalities and differences in President Bush and President Obama's policies towards the two key players?
3. How do hostile relations between Indo-Pak affect US foreign policy?
4. How does US foreign Policy impact regional security architecture in South Asia in the post 9/11 period?
5. What would be the likely ultimate consequences and challenges for Pakistan if Afghanistan's conflict is continued for an undefined period?

7. Significance of the Study

The study is an in-depth analysis of US foreign policy towards South Asia. However, many experts and theorists have written on this subject; it has such a relationship that changes on a day-to-day basis, so studying the latest happening makes this study project significant. The students' present theses are also insufficient because most of the research studies have highlighted one aspect of the Pak-US, Indo-US, and Afghan-US

relations. In contrast, I tried to cover all angles pertinent to the relationship. The project would include documents, books, and journal papers conducted mainly to study this complicated relationship's nature. The study focused on diverging interests and recommend workable alternatives that do not affect converging benefits. This study has also discovered ways and means to solidify and extend bilateral relations in the evolving geopolitical backgrounds.

8. Theoretical Framework

A theory is a set of ideas that try to understand, analyze, explain, and calculate worldwide events that upset international politics policies. The theory is often the origin of ideas for empirical research, and a comprehensive approach is of immeasurable value in any field. Foreign relations between two states are principally structured by their aspirations to stimulate their national interests. Henry Kissinger narrated a beautiful translation of foreign policy by saying that “foreign policy consists of action which a state usually takes in its efforts to carry out national objectives beyond the limit of its jurisdiction” (Kissinger, 2002). The importance of geography and outside threats in framing foreign policy, whereas some other writers have also indicated domestic factors as the salient contributors in shaping foreign policy. As per all their research and studies, we may find one familiar narration: diplomacy is a primary and essential tool of employing foreign policy while making alliances, going into war, and establishing global trade is the manifestation of it. Theories help researchers in many ways.

Realistically, regardless of the geographical extent, setting, locality, and power of a state, it would wish to remain independent from any external pressure or dominance. A

state may also want to shelter its identity by standing firm on its territorial integrity (Donnelly, 2000). It would desire to keep the home (society) free from negative international influence; however, a state would also wish to protect and shelter the international community's global commons.

As per the realists, the key doctrines/tenants of their theory are statism, survival, and self-help. In this scenario, a state would undoubtedly try its best to achieve maximum protection and security (Donnelly, 2000). From a theoretical standpoint, the topic on which we are conducting research can be checked under the theory of realism that exerts influence on the topic. The realists' fundamental principle is that a state, whether small or big, tries to attain power by opting for all available means in a move to shelter itself from external attacks. Therefore, this school of thought discards the notion of multilateralism and anything like international cooperation (Jørgensen, 2017).

John Mearsheimer, a prominent theorist for the 'realism' position, argues: the ongoing power struggle between states is a pursuit for security by the global system's anarchistic configuration rather than human nature. When a state finds itself in a position to harm another one, other states feel the necessity of having substantial power to keep itself protected from outside aggression. The pursuit of power and security is voracious or without limits. The international political setting instigates potent enticements for countries to look for likelihoods to attain mastery at the overhead of adversaries and benefit from those circumstances when the bonuses overshadow the costs (Toft, 2005).

Ultimately countries attempt to develop into sovereignty in the international system. Realism appears to visualize more encounters and war as countries are not

gratifying with the present power positions. To shelter, prestige, and extreme power, states embroil in unavoidable conflicts. States are insistently endangered by distress and sequentially assume all footsteps that facilitate their impending security (Kenneth N Waltz, 2000). Mearsheimer points out that states with manifest power competencies over their opponents turn extra belligerently when equated to dominant competitors. Usually, it is due to the ability and the incentives that a powerful state holds. As states collect power, their peripheral costs of additional buildup deteriorate, and fringe profits swell so that forthcoming improvements are dependent on cumulative returns (Wohlforth, 2012).

Mearsheimer considers that the global system is anarchical, and big powers have more offensive competencies. States cannot be sure of other actors' rational, and survival is the core objective (J. J. Mearsheimer, 2009). Big powers will distress one another and uninterruptedly follow to diminish this distress by exploiting their share of global power. States typically think about other states, although the only objective is to remain protected or survive in the world. In other words, great powers are considered as the states that remain in a permanent increase in power, and for this, they entangle themselves inoffensive or aggressive diplomacies (Snyder, 2002). A state cannot always feel comforting and cannot classify itself as a state with substantial power. Because what looks toady as a maximum of power may tomorrow face severing shortfall if a new state with sophisticated technologies or weapons emerges (J. J. Mearsheimer, 2007).

Power seeking and protection for security has no real boundaries. Status quo powers are occasionally detectable in the international arena. The international system creates some robust and attractive incentives for several states that always remain in a process to increase their power, however, at the outflow of their competitors and then later benefit

from the situation that emerges. The eventual outcome also emerges as a system in which a state becomes powerful or hegemon (Korab-Karpowicz, 2010). In offensive realism, states entangle themselves in more conflicts such as wars, and due to their relative power, they outweigh smaller states. Then, in order to secure the grabbed power, states consider conflicts inevitable. But despite that, states remain under continuous threat of being attacked or deterred, so in a move to shelter and secure itself, the state adopts all available means for imminent security (Snyder, 2002).

In this international system, an aggressor generally holds more robust capabilities and incentives that make it easier for her to utilize power and other abilities. States gather power, their marginal costs of further amassing decline, and marginal benefits surge. Hence, upcoming improvements are subject to increasing returns. The global system is anarchic and bigger powers have greater capabilities of offensive Realism (J. J. Mearsheimer, 2007). At the same time, states cannot be certain about others and their actions, so the objective of survival remains at the top of the list. As much as the greater powers have amassed weapons, the fear of skirmishes or even large scale wars enhances, and one may try to get more weapons to lessen the extent of being attacked or harassed. In short, more significant powers are considered as the maximizers of their ability, and they exhibit it by maintaining an aggressive tone in the international arena (Snyder, 2002).

Famous realist's Kenneth Waltz says that there are limits to how much power states struggle to achieve. The global system gives states fewer enticements for seeking extra augmentations in power gaining. International structure pushes states to keep the already existent balance of power. So as per his narrative, preservation of the power is more important than increasing it, and therefore this goal carries more significance for a state.

Further, says security becomes the ultimate goal of a state given in the anarchic condition of the international structure (Kenneth N Waltz, 1979a). If survival is assured, other objectives like peace, trade, and profit can be achieved well. Thus, the state's initial and fundamental cause is not to enhance the power but to secure the existing power capabilities. States are less dreadful but more attentive to specific non-security interests and tend to live in a security that can only guarantee their survival, not such power that enables them to attack others. Practical politicians seek only an appropriate grade of power, given their security (Rose, 1998).

A state's main objective is to maintain the available power possession instead of consuming energies for getting more and more power. A state can occasionally attain more power once it feels that the existing power capabilities are not sufficient and that survival cannot be guaranteed. Because the international arena is a difficult one, and it needs balancing power with the rival. In other words, when a state feels it has substantial power against its rival, there is no absolute need to grab or amassing more power. Realists conclude that the world's political system is anarchic, and more significant powers enjoy some offensive capabilities. They also point out that as soon as big powers started to consider the power of a rival with suspicious looks, the fear decreases as they look to balance the power deficit in the region they exist (Pashakhanlou, 2014).

Ole Waever and Barry Buzan define regional security complexes by narrating that in the neorealist approach, "the great powers define the military and political interactions with the states or regions" (Buzan & Waever, 2003). The US' foreign policy's emphasis in the realist paradigm is to interact with states to chase its military and political aims in regions like South Asia and elsewhere. In the process of interactions with states or regions,

the issue of likeness or hatred also emerges, and the different sections of a region/state act differently, too. Relations of a third world state with the United States can be comprehended realistically in the ongoing age by envisaging the notion of realism and the United States' pursuit of global hegemony (Bohas, 2006).

As mentioned earlier, the realist theory kept on prospering under several theorists and many proponents. The latest research and studies about realism suggest that the US decision to remove the Saddam regime in Iraq was an altered version of Mearsheimer realism, which finds that great powers' motivation is global hegemony (Robinson, 2000). Realism is descriptive and prescriptive simultaneously. Expressive in a way because it narrates how states have acted historically and prescriptive because it exhibits how countries should arrange and conduct foreign policy. However, some critics believe that Realism is not the exclusive theory that can explain great powers' power politics (Ramaprasad, 1986).

As long as the US can utilize its power capabilities to standardize and manipulate regional politics, it can easily dominate international politics with absolute confidence (Robinson, 2001). Internal elements of foreign policy consist of size (territory and population), geography (location, climate, waterways, and masses), culture, social structure, history, economic development, political accountability, public mood, social structure, leadership, technology, and media. External elements include international organizations, power structure, foreign policy, and decision making (Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro, 2009).

Kenneth Waltz believes that every single nation-state wishes to protect and promote interest in survival within international politics. In the world political system, most 'weak' and 'small' states, owing to their small size economies and resources. They cannot build large-size credible military forces to meet their security threats from powerful neighbors (Kenneth N Waltz, 1967). The theory analyzes the structures in the international system. It is relevant for the study as it helps to understand the international system with the distribution of capabilities. It is a systematic clarification of the worldwide political system. The states within the system seek their self-interest and their interest in other countries. The states act according to the logic of self-help to ensure their survival to achieve their goals; lack of trust between the states exists, which creates a security dilemma (Hobson, 2000).

The context naturally leads to an international environment where its units (nation-states) have litigation to use force, get involved in violence for their security, and look after their national interests. According to conventional norms in world politics, the international system's states are the primary actors because they are primary constituent units. In the light of the International Political System, the security of the independent state and survival in the anarchic international system are best served by states' indigenous caution and vigilance for undertaking punitive military operations for enhancing its security. In the great power competition, it is entirely rational to seek power, maximize it, and exercise hegemony to survive (Art & Jervis, 1985).

There is an extensive list of theoretical analyses and research methods to discuss world politics, regional structure, the balance of power, the global distribution of power, and consequent implications for stakeholder nations' security. After every watershed event

in the history of politics, the intellectual debate over the balance of power is reconsidered, re-generalized, and implemented. The normative questions of international relations theory about the state, security, power, and polarity have always been at the center of debates of the world (Wohlforth et al., 2007).

The attainment of national interest by a state largely depends upon the nature of the distribution of power in that specific region. The strategy is related to the delivery of material power like military and economic resources, maintaining a desire for a balance of power approaches, and would usually seek out weaker partners to develop a sphere of influence. The theory basically claims in the anarchical system of the world that their aggressive rising power creates problems in the region and the world. Neighbouring states are more dangerous than those who mistrust each other, geographic proximity, and perceived intentions of the enemy. Therefore, affectation is a serious threat to those states, which are weak, small in economics, and the military (Walt, 1988).

US-Pakistan relations should primarily be based on economic gains and conflict resolution with India. Pakistan should not be looking at short term economic benefits and aid only. The US realizes that Pakistan is ready to play an essential role in the region. Therefore, the US understood that special preferences and importance to India would disturb the balance of power in the region and its surroundings. Since its inception, a confrontation between India and Pakistan has continued, mainly because of the injustices done at the time of partition and India's traditional hegemonic stance on different issues. Due to arch rivalry with India and keep up a balance of power in the region, Pakistan needs to augment its nuclear and conventional military capabilities. Security and stability are intimately linked to the regional balance, the most significant impact on South Asia's

security mosaic in the influence of the world political system. Now the US is the superpower in the world, but a rising China and a resurgence of Russia and other emerging powers promise to realign the world balance of powers (Keohane & Nye, 1987).

From a historical perspective, the US-Pakistan and the US-India have an unbalanced relationship primarily that can be viewed within the context of Realism. Over a while, Pakistan has attained a unique position in South Asia. Its surroundings, then even in the international perspective as well. Pakistan, at the moment, is confronted with a complex security environment. In the interest of security, protection of national interests, economy, and survival. Pakistan joined the war on terror, a US-controlled coalition against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. With regards, the US foreign policy towards South Asia has always maintained the theory of realism is a key focus for this study.

9. Literature Review

This topic covers sixteen years from 2001 to 2016; in this period, two different parties rule in the United States of American (USA). One is republican that supports an aggressive policy; President Bush Jr. belongs to this. Another one is democratic that is supports the peaceful policy, and President Obama belongs to this. In a proposal investigation on US foreign policy towards South Asia: A comparison of Bush and Obama Administrations, a particular focus on South Asian's regional power negotiators, Pakistan and India. Easy to understand the present changing aspects of Pak-US and Indo-US relationships in the wake up of 9/11. It is imperative to recognize the relations in the Cold War era, the post-Cold War era, and the post 9/11 era in the light of significant literature.

Foreign policy performs a critical role in the peace and development of each country. Through the internal/external policies, the nation formulates, approves, and attempts to secure national interest aims. Numerous definitions have been created and offered by various scholars.

As in Christopher Hill's book, *In the changing politics of foreign policy*, He argues that foreign policy can never be disassociated from the domestic context. Considering 'foreign policymaking' as a distinct area should be abandoned. Instead, foreign policy is a purposive action to promote the concern of a state, composed and influenced by domestic compulsions. Further, he says that realists made a mistake when they did not consider domestic sources' role in decision-making and determining the state's international behavior. Furthermore, he substantiates the post-positivist approach, that foreign policy is not some specialized form of conduct, sealed away from the rest of public life. State, its ideology, national interests, geostrategic location, military might, culture, values, economic prowess, etc., all variables contribute to shaping foreign policy and may be shaped by it in turn (Hill, 2003).

In this paper Neoclassical Realism and Theories of foreign policy, Gideon Rose devised three distinct paths followed by analysts to examine the foreign policymaking process. First is known as Innenpolitik theories, comprised of those theories, which stresses domestic factor dominance on foreign policy. Others are all offshoots of Realism, which predominantly emphasized that the international system influence state behavior, such as defensive and offensive Realism. Those theories that give importance to structural constraints over state behavior fall under structural or neo-realism (Rose, 1998).

Kenneth Waltz, the protagonist of structural Realism, had maintained the idea that the international environment or system structure determines foreign policymakers' choices, and state behavior is dependent on the international system structure. As states are unitary actors with few internal differences, they do not influence states' external behavior even if they have differences. He argued that states' behavior is determined by the state's interaction with other states or the problems it confronts in an international environment, not by what occurs inside a state (Baumann, Rittberger, & Wagner, 2001).

Robert D. Putnam, another neoclassical realist, in his article *Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games*, he displayed a causal connection between domestic and international politics and proved his hypothesis by many examples of how domestic and international politics often entangle each other. Further stated that international forces do not suffice to produce any international accord or alliance without domestic resonance. As President Carter said once, "each of us has been careful not to promise more than he can deliver" (Putnam, 1988). Thus governments are supposed to opt for a two-pronged policy; on one side; they are to satisfy domestic pressure by maximizing their gains. On the other hand, they defy international pressure by minimizing international developments' adverse consequences (Putnam, 1988).

In his book, *The making of foreign policy: an analysis of decisionmaking*, Joseph Frankel notes that each state has state-centric foreign policy values and is egoistic about them. When a state interacts with the international system, it is supposed to abide by the supranational values. But states prioritize their national state-centric values over the supranational values. Thus states cannot neglect the international environment when formulating foreign policy because it would lead them toward disaster. He argued that

hostile statements from Indian leadership from the day of Pakistan's inception, Indian superiority in military's statistical and qualitative level, its estimated intentions, and capability raise threat perception among Pakistan leadership (Frankel, 1963).

Abdul Sattar's book *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947-2012: A Concise History* stated that it was a threat from India's military superiority, which encouraged Pakistan to search for foreign cooperation over the Defence in the 1960s. He argued that Pakistan's policy in the Afghan war in 1979 and later in the post 9/11 period of the war on terror was substantially based on its pursuit to preserve Pakistan's security and strategic interests. However, it just fueled elements of violence, extremism, militancy, and terrorism in Pakistan. Pakistan's security concerns remain unsolved. Pakistan participated in the Afghan debacle to secure 'strategic depth.' But its spillover effects infused terrorism, violence, and militancy. It ignited the wave of extremism in society and defamed Pakistan in the international world. Pakistan is being recognized as a state, which sprouts and sponsor terrorism. Despite this that Pakistan suffered more than anyone else in the 'War on Terror.' The US facilitated India to build inroads in Afghanistan over Pakistan's head (Abdul Sattar, 2013).

Predominantly Pakistani scholars' analyses of US–Pakistan relations publicize this perception that the US is not a reliable friend and vice versa. Abdul Sattar notes that the US abandon its support to Pakistan after the USSR withdraw from Afghanistan. US policy in the 1990s strengthened speculations of the Public in Pakistan about US loyalty. 'Public expects a friend to be constant, faithful, selfless and sacrificing' he stated that the public doesn't understand that interest remains permanent in international relations, not friends. The US realized the doubts among Pakistani officials and the people in the post 9/11 period

and ensured that it would remain a friend for life. As Condoleezza Rice said, “at one time in our history we did not maintain and continue deep relations with Pakistan after having shared strategic interests during the cold war,” but now “US will be a friend for life.” As the war on terror came in its last phase, the US has begun to challenge Pakistan’s creditability and loyalty in war (Abdul Sattar, 2013).

Nasir Islam in; *Pakistan, Afghanistan and The United States: A Triangle of Distrust* observed that despite sufficient support in the war against terror, Pakistan had been consistently accused of providing sanctuaries, logistical support, funds, and training to the Taliban. In his speech at West Point, President Obama declared Pakistan as ‘the epicenter of the violent extremism’ and Afghanistan. He stated that Senators had questioned even Pakistan’s aid to fight terrorism in 2008 hearings in Senate. The United States suspected Pakistan of diverting funds to build its military capability against India rather than counterterrorism. Afghanistan and the United States both considered Pakistan responsible for Taliban resurgence (Islam, 2012).

Daniel S. Markey, in the council of foreign relation report No.68, Reorienting US Pakistan’s strategy from Af-Pak to Asia, examines the complex role of Pakistan in United States policies. The United States is anticipating to move away from the current Af-Pak approach to reorient an Asia centric strategy for Pakistan. In its broader strategy of rebalancing South Asia, it is aspiring to prioritize India, Pakistan’s arch-enemy, marginalizing Pakistan. The author portrayed Pakistan as a hostile, weakened, and isolated country, where threats emanate from regional peace and security. He advocated a two-pronged US approach that aims to quarantine threats; it poses to regional security with Indian assistance and simultaneously integrating it in a broader US agenda. But Markey is

more prone to recommending the US to consider options for expanding counterterrorism cooperation with India. He assumes that the US may establish a declared military intelligence presence in India to contain Pakistan based security threats because Pakistan seems unable to counteract the roots of terrorism within its border (Markey, 2014).

Miriam mufti argued in his paper *The influence of domestic politics on the making of US–Pakistan foreign policy*. Pakistan has been supporting the US to pursue its regional interests throughout its history. The US always prioritizes India over Pakistan. US aid in Pakistan is perceived as an inducement to achieve its strategic goals in the region rather than as a genuine effort to promote security, peace, prosperity, and stability in Pakistan and the region and the US need to dispel such perception rather than inciting more anti-American sentiment in Pakistan (Mariam, 2012).

Further, Aparna here justifies in his book *Explaining Pakistan's foreign policy: escaping India*, US policy; she states that most Pakistan partners do not see India from Pakistan's viewpoint. Each country pursues its national interests, and in a new international system, state economic size and strength determine its place. Thus Pakistan should abandon its desire; the US should design its South Asia policy from Pakistan's perspective. She predicted if the US expanded its counterterrorism cooperation with India, directed against Pakistan. It spurs more suspicion and mistrust in Pakistan about US reliability in its future relationship and US commitment to counterterrorism strategy in the region because it aims to target its most eminent ally in the war against terrorism (Pande, 2011).

As Julian Schofield and Usama Butt narrate in his book *Pakistan: The US, geopolitics and grand strategies*, Pakistan and China share the most preeminent strategic

interests to counterbalance rising Indian influence; it runs counter against US interests in South Asia. He stated that Pakistan is resisting US pressure to eliminate Taliban hideouts in its border areas and nuclear arsenal's proliferation because of Chinese backing at its disposal. China is facilitating Pakistan to enhance its defense capability not to combat terrorism but to deter India. There is no doubt that Pakistan and China have signed several agreements to combat terrorism. It highlights the influence of Chinese interests on Pakistan's foreign policy and national security strategy. He argued that despite Pakistan's sufficient collaboration hunting militants in its border area and providing its corridor to the Persian Gulf, it lacks clear Chinese support on its Afghan policy. Because the Chinese have neither compromised their strategic interests at the expense of friendship with Pakistan nor would they do it in the future. A Pakistan concern in Afghanistan is to neutralize it from Indian and Iranian influence (Butt & Schofield, 2012).

Leslie H. Gelb's book *Power Rules, How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy* suggests specific US foreign policy guidelines. He argues that US political leaders have failed to recognize fundamental power realities. Likewise, the world is highly pyramidal in power, inner power pressure based on carrots and sticks' strategic use. Last, the US remains the only world leader without the power to dominate. He further argues the principle of mutual indispensability. He claims that the United States remains a key leader in solving the world's significant problems but needs equally indispensable partners in other major powers (Gelb, 2009).

A British political scientist Barry Buzan's *The United States and the great powers: World politics in the twenty-first century*, said that the US became a superpower in world politics after 9/11. A superpower needs to satisfy two conditions, to be able to move beyond

individual regions and its value in divergence to other major competing superpowers. Buzan further describes a superpower as a country that play dynamic roles in the area and its impact on different regions and international project values. In some regions, a world power basically establishes a part of the traditional balance of power. (Buzan, 2004).

Stephen Cohen is an expert researcher on South Asia, especially Pakistan, defined in paper US-Pakistan Forum: Relations with the Major Power, the US-Pakistan's security relations in the Cold War era. During this period, Pakistan was the frontline state to stop Communism from spreading in the region and delighted in the US's military and financial help. At the same time, India felt the primary security threat caused by Pakistan's close relations with the United States (Cohen, 2005).

Forrest Cookson argued in an article titled United States Foreign Policy in South Asia, the US policies towards South Asia are divided into three phases in sequence cold war, post-cold war, and the wakeup of 9/11. Provided that there is no dramatic change in international politics. Cook's categorization in his mechanism, when sudden dramatic events arise, then this formal policy is of restrained relevance. United States foreign policy is just not made only in the White House, state department, and US military command centers. It also reflects congressional views, public opinion, business interests, NGO views, and many other perspectives (Cookson, 2002).

Ghost War: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, by Steve Coll discusses the difficulties for Pakistan after the USSR collapsed. Undoubtedly the best historical description so far on the backgrounds of al-Qaeda in the post-Soviet wreckage of Afghanistan. Ghost Wars offers

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facts and supports the interest behind numerous vital decisions. Pakistan continued to support the Taliban and its continuous interference in Afghanistan's political system. It was the biggest mistake on Pakistan's part, or Islamabad considered it a vital national interest. In the wake up of 9/11, Pakistan took a U-turn that worsened the situation for themselves because they suddenly received support from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda group. Simultaneously, the lack of trust in Pakistan's capability to contain terrorism (Coll, 2005).

General Pervez Musharraf has written his autobiography *In the Line of Fire: A memoir*. The book launch generated debate in the world. The President's disclosed the Taliban's major attack on the territory of the United States' significant places like the World Trade Center (WTC), the Pentagon, and Washington DC. A serious consequence arose if Pakistan became not a part of ally against the Global War on Terrorism, highly controversial revelations that have had serious adverse consequences for domestic politics and Pakistan's position as again a frontline ally (Musharraf, 2006).

Daniel Markey writes in his book *No Exit from Pakistan: America's Tortured Relationship with Islamabad*, both sides have remained in a complicated relationship; therefore believes that this complexity is no less than sin. Despite the decade long relationship, the level of trust in a minute and even at the highest level, the irritation and disagreement is so deep that a short, medium or long term relationship cannot be developed with absolute freedom. The writer says that the US discomfort with Pakistan is due to terrorism, nuclear weapons, more extensive military interaction with China, and a routine of tensions with India. These issues are incredibly complicated and cannot be resolved suddenly, even if the US takes full interest in it. Still, simultaneously all of them carry such significance that Washington cannot ignore them altogether (Markey, 2013).

Markey points out that in the changing regional scenarios, if the US wants the relationship to be going in a friendly way, it has to pick the three-way approached, for example, defensive insulation safeguarding the US from threats that emanate from Pakistan like terrorism and nuclear proliferation, military-first cooperation giving Pakistani military substantial technical and logistic aid to tackle the security concerns and comprehensive partnership backing civilian and military leadership and the civil society for making a stable and terror-free Pakistan. The writer has provided plenty of suggestions for the book's policymakers and decision-makers (Markey, 2013).

Bruce Riedel's book *Deadly embrace: Pakistan, America, and the future of the global Jihad* can be considered the follow-up book for Markey's ideas. Moreover, it is a book that highlights the history of Pak-US relations is given. Riedel says that already the level of damage between a superpower and a vital South Asian power is too much, and the US can heal the damage by being the more significant state and a state that has more to offer than Pakistan. Bruce Riedel is a key writer on US security as well as his contribution to terrorism, and South Asian security is also laudable. He is the one who crafted President Obama's 2009 speech about Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands in which the president stated the Af-Pak border as the most dangerous region of the world (Riedel, 2012).

Hafez Malik's book *US Relation with Afghanistan and Pakistan* is an analytical observation of Washington's power, which is described as an imperial one against an imperial conquest policy. The imperial system standardizes international affairs economically, politically, and in global trade. The writer says though the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan with the US is a complex one, it has ensured both

countries' security needs. While on the contrary, the US relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan have gained regional interests, so it is a relationship with two folded benefits in many ways. Although the US invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan's security has weakened because so many terrorist outfits have started their activities against the Pakistani government. Still, at the same time, Washington has provided substantial aid to Pakistan for ensuring military actions against new regional and global threats in the shape of Al-Qaeda. By giving assistance and Pakistan's support in a war against terrorism, an alliance has emerged between Washington and Islamabad, which has, by and large, helped shape the security situation of Afghanistan (H. Malik, 2008).

Umbreen said in the publication titled Post-9/11 US Policies and South Asia that the President Obama government had paid proper attention to the region. Increasing US-India relations are related to the energy objectives of both nations and economic development. The US forced India to avoid part of the IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India) pipeline project; it's not a story; it's a reality. Subsequently, the US signed a civil nuclear deal with India, a clear breach of international laws on NPT. Further, in the region, the unresolved Kashmir issue is an utterly unbalanced policy in South Asia (Javaid, 2014).

Existing literature on 'US policy toward South Asia: a comparison of Bush and Obama Administrations' points out that in many respects, India seems a more compatible ally of the US than Pakistan. Because of the United States and Pakistan's divergence on some core issues, like relations with China and India, nuclear proliferation, and US officials' suspicions on Pakistan's allegiance. Being a Muslim country prompted the US to chase Indian loyalty rather than Pakistan for regional interests. Studies indicate that

domestic politics in the US and perception about Pakistan's domestic politics, national character, and value orientation influence the US policies toward South Asia.

10. Research Methodology

This qualitative research compares the US foreign policy towards South Asia: the study is related to President Bush and President Obama Administrations. The information observed through the selected literature relevant to the case study and research had considered policies through research tools. In this study, only a qualitative method is used to elaborate and justify US foreign policy towards South Asian pursuits with regard to governments during the Presidency of President Bush Jr. and President Obama's era.

The analysis draws attention to the emergence of a new foreign policy pattern in the wake of a shift in the regional and global trends. Further, the descriptive comparison is used in the document with a comparative study research design to describe the causes of differences and variations in the US policies compared to its counterparts. By comparison, analyze how the United States got trapped in South Asia, paradigm and could not be anticipated the consequences of its pursuits beforehand.

The methodology is the main structure of this dissertation research methodology, which imitates what variety of data is collected, how and what kind of measurements, indicators, and statistics are used. The organization for steering this project would be descriptive and sometimes analytical as well. The literature connected to this research would be examined and discoursed in detail. Such sources for piloting the study would be picked to develop the research conclusions' trustworthiness and rationality. The methodology engaged in this research would encompass qualitative tools.

The researcher has endeavored to integrate the qualitative approach after being convinced of its significant advantages in undertaking this study. As the study progresses, the method of qualitative data gathering would be more accommodative to variations as well as refinement of research ideas, implying that the data gathering tools offered by this method are significantly adaptable. The qualitative data gathering methods are primarily focused on appreciating the occurring phenomena while remaining within naturally occurring states, manipulating the research setting has not been perceived. Further, qualitative data-gathering tools also offer plentiful and well-acquainted descriptions and explanations besides proffering specific unforeseen findings. In sum, these data collection techniques permit adaptability during the progressions of various research phases of the study, including data gathering, undertaking analysis, and the interpretation of accumulated information. Since the qualitative method is regarded as an all-encompassing and broad approach, it allows the investigation of the phenomenon in a more holistic manner.

Stratified sampling technique is used to ensure an analysis of each population and subgroup is achieved. The sample is divided into the following levels: Academicians, Diplomats, Political leaders, Foreign Policy Experts, and Journalists. These questions have been relied upon to identify relevant policy trends. This study relies on primary and secondary data sources from authentic sources, including peer-reviewed articles. This study accepts the comparative approach, beginning with the exploration of primary sources such as published US documents as well as secondary open sources, including reports and official statements from the US, India, and Pakistan. Secondary sources include books, International journals, national journals, and research articles, various latest and relevant reports published by governmental and non-governmental institutes, newspaper articles,

reports of some renowned, national and international think tanks, conference proceedings, periodicals, monographs, policy documents and documentaries, international media, intellectual deliberations, published interviews of concerned bodies and statements of various academician, diplomats, political leaders, foreign policy experts, and journalists, with the US community, relevant conference reports, and reports together with salient newspaper headlines were also be incorporated in the research.

For concluding, the study employs an experimental research design that takes into its premise the study of the causal relationship between a dependent and independent variable. It explains the reasons behind the variations in the social phenomenon's occurrence in terms of provisional declarations in X, then Y. In other words, the application of the experimental method helped bring about the causal relationship between the dependent and independent variables. According to the thesis, the dependent variable is identified as the US foreign policy, and the independent variables are Pakistan and India's actions in the South Asia region.

11. Scope, Limitation and Delimitation of Study

The scope of this dissertation is to determine the role of institutions in enhancing rapprochement between two states and analyses the arena in which the two nations cooperate and compete. A review of international events and circumstances about the US and Pakistan and the US and India's partnership has been made where necessary and relevant. The breadth of topics researched in this thesis is independent and convergent the US policymaking between Pakistan and India, the US-specific policies it must adopt to tackle this alliance. The policy-making has been analyzed, ranging from the period of 2001

to 2016. This research has encountered a number of methodological hurdles. One of the analytical approaches employed in this research required access to government documents or comprehensive foreign policy decision-making accounts. However, a structured study analysis allowed me to gather the overall trends and specific developments within the theoretical framework.

Every study has its limitations and delimitations, and research for this dissertation research is no exception. The primary and secondary sources referenced inevitably have their limitations and delimitations. For example, sources can be politically biased. Some they were anti-American or anti-Pakistan or Anti-Indian. It's to overcome; it has been essential to find a balance and perform an analysis of sources alongside others with countervailing views. It has also been important to keep in perspective who were the writers of such sources. US policy comparisons of President Bush Jr. and President Obama Administrations are vast subjects with lots to say. However, due to word limits, it is not possible to review all the literature. Therefore, the topic has been narrowed down to focus on US foreign policy towards South Asian countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India).

12. Organization of Study

This dissertation's title is US foreign policy towards South Asia: A Comparison of Bush and Obama Administrations. The purpose of the study compares republican and democratic. It focuses on the two terms of the President Bush Administration (2001-2009) and the two terms of President Obama Administration (2009-2016) from the perspective of the Global War on Terror. More specifically, the assessment focuses on American foreign policy to Pakistan and India.

The thesis is partitioned into six chapters. The presentation put over the important research proposal, consequently understanding what is not as ordinary as the backbone of examination and what technique and strategies were embraced. This writing secured a distinguishing school of thoughts with respect to 'US foreign policy towards South Asia.' This chapter also covers the thesis introduction's foundation to provide the framework, objectives, hypothesis, literature review methodology, scope, and significance of the study. It thus discusses the US policy to India and Pakistan not as a phenomenon of its expansionary history, most importantly, as an outcome of the international system's insecurities. However, the section mostly contains the theoretical framework, research question, and other necessary things fundamentals of the introductory chapter.

The First chapter sets the theoretical framework and deals with the theoretical aspects used to analyze the US Foreign Policy towards South Asia. In contrast, the chapter puts forward the theoretical perspectives of Realism. It analyses the US assertive policy in the South Asia region. The necessary ingredients of the theory of realism focus on timeless wisdom and core elements of realism are figured out judiciously. This portion of the section lays the base of the subject and enables the reader to understand US foreign policies' theoretical dynamics to South Asia. Therefore proves that the US has been more on the defensive rather than offensive realism.

The second chapter US Engagement in South Asia: A Chronology, provides a chronological overview of US policies towards South Asia, especially with Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan, beginning from its independence up to 9/11. This chapter provides a historical perspective and highlights the origins of alliances with the US foreign policies towards South Asia.

The third chapter addresses the impact of President Bush Jr.'s administration's policies in South Asia under his two terms in office. Each term focuses on strategies and strategic objectives for Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan in detail.

The fourth chapter is President Obama's politics in South Asia. This chapter discusses the two terms of the President Obama Administration's policies to South Asia. This chapter also explains how each administration viewed their policy and planning objectives for the region.

The fifth chapter is a comparative analysis of President Bush Jr. and President Obama's policies. Carried the previous two chapters, it is carried out the key indicators of continuity and where there has been changed vis-à-vis, South Asia. In the section, the key issues have been highlighted by which the two countries are now facing challenges. How and to what extent some unhappy events have marred the relationship. The chapter also contains the reservations of Pakistan and the US behavior about these reservations. All relative developments that have shaped the Pak-US and Indo-US ties after 9/11 have been discussed in the chapters with proper analysis and research.

The Sixth and the last chapter concludes with a large portion of analysis, findings, and recommendations. Moreover, after conducting extensive research, a way forward and conclusion have been given based on the writer's viewpoint. The chapter is the crux of the entire research study, and it covers nearly all aspects discussed in the initial chapters. This dissertation summarizes the conclusions, policy recommendations, and significant findings of the study.

Chapter 1:

Theoretical Framework

A theory is a set of ideas used to understand, analyze, explain, and calculate worldwide events, and in this case, that influence international politics. A theory can often trigger empirical research based on ideas in a comprehensive approach and can be of immeasurable value in any field of study. Theories help researchers to delve deeper with various perspectives to proceed further.

Theories in the social sciences typically identify a phenomenon's dynamics under a specific context, focusing on a particular opinion. In other words, it is a broad guideline for the analyst, who, in turn, is required to ascertain how to apply the theoretical reasoning in the real world (Cox, 1981). The rational theory application on a specific issue cannot be identified as 'good' merely based on that particular theory; instead, it may be the pertinent realities about the world that determine its actual value. The entire exercise of applying social science theories may thus be an effort of the analyst to examine an issue through the lenses of any preferred viewpoint (Byrne, 2002). Consequently, precise predictions based on assumptions arrived at under the pretext of a particular theory may not actually transpire as professed. In such a case, when theoretical assumptions do not materialize, 'failure' cannot be attributable to the theory. Instead, there can be a situation when the theoretically predicted course sets in, but it is overwhelmed by other forces.

The formulation of foreign policies is entirely based on the assumption of rationality by an autonomous state actor. The discourse of foreign policy focuses on powers within the state, where the central importance is on the individual or single factor and

internal level. These are the major components for the policymakers to obtain their perceived goals (Breuning, 2007). These goals are strongly interlinked with national interests and foreign policy decisions, and later, these decisions are being used as a tool for the accomplishment of set national interests. In foreign policy, the state's behavior towards other states is an important element because, through this behavior, one state formulates its foreign policy strategy towards other countries to undertake its national interests (Padelford, Lincoln, & Olvey, 1976).

For better understanding the contours of US foreign policies, primarily in President Bush and President Obama's terms, it is pertinent to carry out the comparison and analytical review of its challenges and opportunities. While doing so, the various theoretical branches of International Relations have to be incorporated. The study's focus is foreign policy analysis, President Bush Jr. Administration's foreign policies. On examining President Obama's administration strategies, the theory of realism is best to explain the region's behavior and strategy. Thus the requirement of foreign policy theories subsequently encompassed. Through a foreign policy, political actions in international relations occur, through coordinated strategies. Countries adopt foreign policies to safeguard their national interests. It is for this reason that states formulate strategies from the state-centric and realist paradigm (Hill, 2003).

With this simple premise, the researcher begins this work, selecting a theoretical framework that seems more convincing for the case study and expecting the predicted outcome to be relevant and satisfying. To this end, the researcher has based his work on the directions of 'realism,' as the research US foreign policy towards South Asia: A comparison of Bush and Obama Administrations endeavors to highlight the conflicting

interests of the players concerned while suggesting few viable recommendations. Realism would primarily be persisted with as the theoretical framework of this study; however, various facets or classifications of some realist scholars' theory and relevant views would also be conferred to address numerous queries arising.

1.1 Realism

The realist narrative academically begins with the inter-war period of 1919-1939. However, its earlier roots are found in Thucydides, Niccole Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Historians state that the inception of the realist paradigm and a great debate between realists and idealists took place when several assumptions of idealists proved failed by the Second World War (Donnelly, 2000). Subsequently, after WWII and throughout the Cold War, nation-states that include great powers viewed the world through realist lenses and formed their foreign policies while leaving room for realist perspectives. Realists assume the nation-state is a principal actor in international relations after the treaty of Westphalia. In Thucydides and Machiavelli's writing, the basic units were polis or a city-state (John, Steve, & Patricia, 2011).

Realism stresses the notion of lawlessness 'anarchy' in world politics. In other words, they insist that the basic structure of international politics is anarchic where an independent state never thinks to abide by any authoritative or supreme law but considers its own authority to be supreme and higher than all other existing authorities (Art & Jervis, 1985). By rendering this assumption, realists emphasize that international relations lack a central authority, which could regulate the system within, and is contradictory to that of domestic politics where hierarchical structure exists in which distinct political actors stand

in different political orders. So, in such circumstances, survival becomes the top priority of every individual state.

In anarchy, the survival of a state can never be guaranteed, but a state with a sound military strategic position in terms of power will have more chances to survive than a state who lacks it. Hans J Morgenthau writes, “Universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in the abstract; the circumstances of time and place must be considered. The state must place its survival above all other moral goods” (Morgenthau, 1978). Hence, by acknowledging this, realists warn the leadership of a nation-state to keep a distance from traditional morality while determining a nation's core interest in world politics. Nothing is permanent in international relations for the realist, but only national interest and morality have no place in power politics.

Realists assume that power is a crucial element in international politics. The states possess power; self-interest in such an anarchic world should be survival. The real power in terms of the military will greater the chances of survival and vice-versa. In an anarchic world where dog eats dog, self-help is a necessary factor. No one should depend on any other actor, whether that is a state or an institution like the United Nations Organization (UNO), for security purposes but must strive for self-help. Realists argue that the security of every nation-state is its own responsibility because the structure of international politics lacks a higher authority (John et al., 2011).

A question arises that how and in what term a nation-state can seek self-help? Realist acknowledges that self-help in terms of military build-up is a befitting reply to any aggressor in the system. By strengthening one's military power vis-à-vis, its adversary will

create a balance of power where no one will risk going to war. Further, the balance of power means more than only military build-up. Threatened nation-states or weak states can also join a coalition and make security alliances against the hegemon or aggressor. The formation of NATO and the Warsaw pact is worth considerable and adorable military alliances to be mentioned here while teaching a balance of power.

A prominent realist scholar, Hans J Morgenthau, assumes that humankind's nature is evil, and man is a power hunger, which drags nation-states into the war (Morgenthau, 1978). Whereas Kenneth Waltz contends that the international system's structure lacks supreme authority, it is not human nature, but the structure of the system responsible for chaos and lawlessness. Anyhow, both realist scholars and analysts agree on the assumption that power plays a vital role in international politics, and a state having robust military power can avail more chances of survival (Kenneth N Waltz, 2000).

Waltz explains realism; for instance, success is the detailed assessment of a tactic, and accomplishment of approach is unique as protecting and reinforces the state. Further, Mearsheimer, an offensive realist, expressed his views, the essential goal of the state is its survival in the international framework, and the global framework is much confused. Morgenthau likewise recognized that the principal sign that helps the political authenticity could be thinking that some way or another through the scene of worldwide legislative issues and the idea of investment is decently characterized as a force (Donnelly, 2000).

Foreign policy is often viewed as a 'realist' concept due to its state-centric nature. It is also the bridge between domestic politics and international relations and cannot be separated from the domestic context; without the domestic society, there would be no

foreign policy. Therefore, using outside strategy has its internal foundations; the national strategy has its external effects (Hill, 2003). The predominance of the realist school of thought in foreign strategy formulating is apparent. Despite its considerable impact, many scholars, such as James Rosenau, John Vasquez, and Stanley Hoffman. They claim that a state's actions and practices result from a multifaceted and compound process of connections among national and international dynamics. One of the key components of the internal impact on outside strategy choices is the job of élite perceptions (Herrmann, 1986). Analyzing perceptions is closely related to the field of political psychology, which seeks to examine the role of human thought, emotion, and behavior in politics.

Different political scholars and analysts divide the realist paradigm into three different theoretical frameworks: classical realism, which includes the writing and political thinking of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes; modern realism that includes the writing of twentieth century's realists like Thomas Schelling and Hans J Morgenthau, which entered into realist paradigm from pre-World War Second and lasted till the early 1980s; and structure realism/neo-realism opened a new chapter of realist thinking in late 1970s when Kenneth Walt's publication 'theory of international politics' presented a modified structure of modern realist thinking. Since then, neorealism/structural realism is further divided into defensive realism of Kenneth Waltz, and the offensive realism of John J Mearsheimer is critically evaluated by classical realism theory.

1.1.1. Classical Realism

The classical realism of Morgenthau and other prominent realist scholars were revived after Waltz publicized the theory of world politics in 1979. Although politics

among the nations had a powerful influence on international political scholars' thinking and studies throughout the cold war era, after Waltz stepped into the realist paradigm, a new chapter began in the history of international relations.

There is a natural curiosity among humans to inquire and interpret the unfolding domestic and international events to comprehend politics better. It casts a deep influence on their daily lives. Therefore, social scientists have come up with various designs in the form of theories that can explain the reason behind the events (Byrne, 2002). Thus, a theory aspires to elucidate reality rather than furnishing its audience with the usual picture (Hyde-Price, 2007). A theory is a tool that helps us in differentiating and shifting the important from unimportant information. It can, therefore, be compared with the sun shades of various lenses. Wearing any shade would make the world appear in color, preferred by its viewer. Simultaneously, the world remains the same but looks different from the individual using the sun-shades (John et al., 2011).

Realism has become one of the most prevalent theories for understanding world politics. It rejuvenated with the unleashing of World War II that gave a death blow to Liberalism. Thus, classical realism came to be associated with the phrase of timeless wisdom because it taught the American leadership a concentration on interests rather than ideology and served as a guidebook for the states in maximizing their interests in an unsympathetic atmosphere at the systemic level (Leiter, 2001).

However, the reductionist approach of the classical realist toward understanding international political outcomes, which holds the unit level changes or the domestic maneuvers of a state responsible for the systemic changes such as war, peace, and alliance,

has become one major source of criticism (Devlen & Özdamar, 2009). According to its critics, the reductionist approach fails to take into account the outside pressures on the unit or domestic politics and the fact that state policies rarely affect international outcomes.

The general belief of classical realists, like all other realists, agrees on power struggle as the basis of international politics. But unlike the realists, they do not attribute power struggle as the result of selfish human nature. Instead, they hold the relative distribution of power in the world political system responsible for security competition and inter-state conflicts or power struggles (Behr & Williams, 2017). The world political system structure is based on critical elements; organizing principles, differentiation of units, and distribution of capabilities. The international system's organizing principles rest on anarchy because of international politics' decentralized nature due to the absence of an overarching authority. Whereas at the domestic level, hierarchy is the characteristic attribute of a state (Grieco, 1988).

Accordingly, to classical realists, states are obliged to hedge against the prospects of failure in the quest for maximalist gains, rendering the policy of formulating alliances a viable means to pursue the desired objective. As against the philosophy of classical realism, structural or neo-realism replaces the individual human with that of state (Rose, 1998). Importantly, classical realism believes that whatever behavior each state adopts in the international structure would be influenced by certain constant factors. It may also be appropriate to argue that variants vis-à-vis distribution of capabilities among the structure units significantly affects various actors' actions. The states pursue respective national interests with similar vigor and solemnity, no matter great or small, all behaving alike in the given environments (Leiter, 2001). Hence, it is prudent to say that Pakistan and India

both have justified stakes with Afghanistan's developments. Their pursuit of respective objectives is in line with the prevalent international norms identified by classical realism.

The conditions of anarchy are detrimental to cooperation as anarchy and egoism greatly impede such an initiative. It denotes that in the prevailing international structure, every actor or unit (state) has to be taking care of itself, regardless of what it takes or how other actors refer it to (Donnelly, 2000). Thus, the narrative adequately promotes the Hobbesian notion of 'might is right' or whatever means or cost. The end is what matters, implying that essentially differentiations can be capabilities among states and not the functions. Notwithstanding similar functions, international orders vary owing to the superior capabilities of the actors. It is here that each unit in an anarchic international order seeks to place itself at the comparative gainful position, promoting the notion of balancing. Elaborating further, Robert Gilpin suggests that "the International relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy." Therefore, it indicates that conflict among states ensues when these actors consider that such an event is ultimately favorable to their cause (Gilpin, 1981).

Nevertheless, restricting conflict to armed struggle alone in the prevailing anarchy may not be justifiable. The state of conflict among actors may lead to fierce competition in all realms of International Relations, i.e., political, diplomatic, economic, etcetera. Pakistan-India competition in Afghanistan thus seems like a more relevant case study in this regard where the ensuing armed conflict may remain a far-off proposition despite competitive rivalry in all other aspects. While commenting on the state's behavior towards preserving their interests in anarchy, classical realism introduces certain initiatives these actors of the structure seek to pursue. Whereas the classical realists sought to explain state

behavior by examining assumptions about peoples' motives, the succeeding fraternity of realist philosophers emphasized other determinants, which led to the state of anarchy, promoting a notion of struggle by actors for their survival (Bain, 2000).

Further, it is believed that the concerns of relative gains tend to impede prospects of cooperation among the actors involved dramatically. Thus, actors are concerned about their gains and more anxious about the prospects of outweighing those of others' who are viewed as potential adversaries in anarchy. Consequently, both actors seem prepared to accept the state of 'worse off,' as classical realism puts it (Jahn, 2006). Further explaining the difference between Waltz and Morgenthau has been their contradicting views on the source and content of the country's preferences. According to Morgenthau, leaders of a state are interested in the hunger of their power (human nature). Waltz omits this assumption and contends that the state seeks survival (Anarchy). Moreover, classical realists assume that the state's strategies are selected rationally.

1.1.2. Neorealism

Kenneth Neal Waltz, a renowned American political scientist, developed a comprehensive approach to explaining the international system's complexity. According to Waltz, the structure of the international system determines the behavior as they operate within a system with structural constraints and can only survive by their know-how to deal with these structural constraints. His theory focuses on a state system pattern based on a system-level analysis, which he considers more meaningful than one focused state level. Unlike the theory of realism that lays stress on human nature, neorealism theorizes that

structural constraints influence the states' behavior. To neorealism, the world political system's structure is based on one principle of anarchy (Kenneth Neal Waltz, 1979).

An anarchic system posits a highly decentralized system with no authority to regulate individual states' behavior. The only logic that prevails in this system is self-help, and states follow this logic to pursue their interests. Survival is the prerequisite for every state living in this competitive international system. This quest for survival determines the behavior of the states (Burchill et al., 2013). While the essential anarchy of a world without one central power remains an important theoretical perspective, it must be modified by some of the relationship insights derived from the theory of the complex structure of the world political system.

According to Waltz, anarchy and hierarchy are the two principles that can be termed international politics' ordering principles, relations between the states stand on hierarchy (authority and subordination) or anarchy (lawlessness). Waltz, differentiate between countries based on their abilities or capabilities and not on their functions. If we consider all international orders as anarchic, then the international structure of politics varies based on the countries' differentiation of power capabilities. Global rules diverge according to the number of major powers present in one particular order and their relative hierarchical strength in the world balance of power (Kenneth N Waltz, 1979a).

Survival is the force that drives states to get military power to protect themselves against other states' intervention. This quest for military strength by one state increases the fear of other states and, in turn, also starts behaving like the first state. In this way, states try to gain leverage over each other. A lack of trust among states in the world political

system also contributes to this security dilemma, all the nations' needs are parallel (Lobell et al., 2009). They differ in their competencies of gaining those needs. Their abilities determine the states' position in the international system, and their abilities give them the power to pursue their interests. These abilities also limit cooperation among the states through each nation-state's inevitable competitive instincts prompted by the fear of relative gain (R. H. Wagner, 2010). Every state's desire for relative gain creates a balance of power is an important component of international relations.

Neo-realists claim war as a global phenomenon is normal to continue shortly because of the anarchic structure of the international arena. They further contend that long-term peace is a dream that is hard to achieve because of this anarchic structure. Neo-realists have a very pessimistic view of international relations (R. H. Wagner, 2010). Although the world is changing in a broader range of ways, the chances of war are diminishing because of nuclear deterrence based on the fear of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Yet, the applicability and validity of structural realism cannot be overlooked as it provides important insights into the weaknesses embodied in the theory of the complexity of international relations (Burchill et al., 2013).

It is vital to expand the scope of the research's theoretical framework to seek the explanation of unanswered queries. The researcher intends to find the answers while remaining well within the neo-realistic perspective. Nonetheless, he retains the right to consult other variants of the theory like neo-classic realism. Necessarily, such an initiative does not push the research out of the selected theoretical framework; instead, it would address the voids leftover in the earlier versions of structural realism (Lobell et al., 2009).

Neo-realists and classical realists both dwell upon the conflictual nature of the politics arising primarily due to the anarchic nature of the world. Concerning the causes of conflict, both the neo-realist and classical realists appear to be on the same page. Nevertheless, taking a cue from the earlier version of realism, classic realists explicitly incorporate external and internal variables to support their (Vasquez, 1998). Another major difference between neorealist and classical realist is what states actually aspire for: while neorealist propose that states look for ‘security,’ classical thinkers are of the view states are drawn into responding to uncertain environments created by the anarchic structure. Since structural realism is less explicit in configuring the state’s behavior other than security, classical realism is more prudent in explaining why states pursue external policies in the structure, which are confrontational (Leiter, 2001).

This theory analyses the structures in the international system. It is found relevant for the study as it helps understand the international system with the distribution of capabilities. It conveniently encompasses the regional security paradox of South Asia in the context of transition in terrorism from the end of world war II and 9/11 (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, & Wohlforth, 2009). With anarchy and self-help comes the notion of threat, threat perception, and security dilemma. The feeling of insecurity and desire to defend core values is perpetual characters of nation-states. In the process of mutual competition to have an advantage, states build militaries; develop capabilities leading the world system towards stratification of different capabilities of states.

In the thesis, an effort has been made to identify the type of world political system we are living in, the existing and emerging powers, their influence on each other. How does the power in the international system as per capabilities are distributed, and how does this

distribution shape the relation and preferences of a state within the system. The theory also provides a base for analyzing the capabilities of the existing and emerging power centers and the importance of sound planning for a developing country to opt for their options(Jørgensen, 2017). Since more power centers appear on the world canvas, in such a complex, volatile, and relatively unstable order, a developing country like Pakistan and India both need to adopt a proactive and dynamic approach to accrue maximum benefits by enhancing the capabilities of the state. Exploit the opportunities by adopting a nonlinear approach to formidably address the forthcoming challenges.

1.1.3. Defensive Structural Realism

Defensive structural realism is the sub-branch of structural realism/neorealism. This theory of international relations has the same assumptions regarding neo-realism but has different assumptions about states' motivations and policies. Like structural realism, defensive realism suggests that the world system is anarchic, and the critical threat to a state's security comes from other international systems (Lobell, 2010). The following are the main assumptions of defensive realism: first, according to defensive realism, the behavior of a state trusts exclusively on rational choice as compared to the assumption of neorealism that the result of multiple micro-foundations determines it. Second, defensive realism assumes offense-defense balance as a variable; this complex variable makes conquest harder or easier.

Defensive realism agrees with the notion that the prevailing geographical circumstances and various technologies favor defense, seized resources do not accumulate quickly with those already exists, and power is not easy to project at a distance. Third, the

state should endorse the status quo (Griffiths, 2007). By stating this, defensive realism claim that expansion is basically bestowed, and balancing is an appropriate or befitting response to any menace.

John J. Mearsheimer argues that each state is wary of the other's destructive power in uncertain international environments. Thus States are sophisticated relative power maximizers that try to figure out when to raise and when to fold. The anarchic international structure promotes a trend of advancing against weakness or indecision while recoiling when confronted by strength and determination. Further, ultimate safety comes only from being the most powerful countries in the system; then, the objective is to achieve regional hegemony. Finally, countries try to maximize both their wealth and their military capabilities (J. J. Mearsheimer, 2001).

Waltz argues that the "states estimate threats posed by other states by their relative power, proximity, intentions, and the offense-defense balance" (Walt, 2000). This contention reminds the earlier realist approach wherein Hans Morgenthau claimed that the human's natural craving drives the states' ongoing power struggle for dominating others. While contemporary realist philosophers like Mearsheimer tend to discard Morgenthau's this proclamation as the source of causation, they argue alternative narrative. Hence the common perception among the neo-realists, including Waltz and Mearsheimer, for a power struggle is the states' quest for security, which is enforced upon by an anarchic international system. Thus, it is an environment where the states seek capabilities for inflicting harm to adversaries by accumulating greater relative power. In the study of contemporary international relations undertaken under the neo-realistic perspective, one of the major issues being confronted is the inability to ascertain the threshold of power/dominations

each actor aspires. There is a visible disagreement among key neorealist thinkers wherein Waltz believes that the search for power and security has limits, promoting the concept of defensive realism (Lobell, 2010).

At the same time, Mearsheimer contends that it is insatiable, thus coining the term of offensive realism. While military means are vital to ensure security, a state acquires wealth through exploiting its geo-economics clout; thus, offensive realist's contention of power maximizing strategy gains currency. The military capability and wealth of a nation are interlinked; each supplements the other, thereby escalating competition among the structure actors (J. J. Mearsheimer, 2001).

1.1.4. Offensive Structural Realism

Offensive realism does not abide by the assumption of defensive realism that a state needs to accumulate an appropriate amount of power. Rather, it contends that a state faces uncertainty and an uncertain environment in which any state can inflict serious harm on it. In such circumstances, every nation-state or actor of the international system needs to cumulate as much power as possible to ensure self-security. Mearsheimer, the founder of offensive realism, believes that "it makes a better strategic sense for states to gain as much power as possible and, if the circumstances are right, to pursue hegemony" (Snyder, 2002; Toft, 2005). It further explains why do states compete with each other and why do they quest for power. Mearsheimer, in this regards, pens down five assumptions of his theory:

First, he assumes that great power is the key factor in world politics, and they interact in an anarchic system.

Second, all states possess some offensive military capabilities, and they can harm each other in one way or the other way.

Third, states are never known to the intentions of other states. They do not know whether one's military preparation and build-up have defensive purposes or offensive.

Fourth, the main goal of a state is survival, maintaining territorial integrity, and political autonomy. Although it also pursues prosperity and protects human rights, these take a back seat to survival.

The fifth and final assumption is that states are rational actors. They develop sound strategies to ensure their survival, but it does not mean that states do not fall short in their strategy. However, sometimes they make mistakes because they operate in an imperfect world (Toft, 2005).

By combining all these five assumptions and looking through the lens of offensive realism at world politics, one comes to know about the states' preoccupation with the balance of power and the acquisition of powerful incentives to gain more power at others' expense. So, according to offensive realists, great powers fear each other, or in other words, they do not trust each other in the sense that one might have the intentions or motives to attack the other. In such circumstances, every state should be familiar with self-help and its security because no night guard can come to help one or the other in danger; every state will put forth his interest before any other state or even the so-called international community (Layne, 2002).

The ultimate goal of a state's safety comes only to be strong enough or the most powerful state in the system, where no one can dare to point at you. The second objective of a state is to be a regional hegemon. It means to dominate the area where great power is geographically located. Third, if a state fails to obtain these first two types of hegemony, then a state should endeavor to strengthen both its military and economy to fight land battles in the future (Griffiths, 2007).

The theory distinguishes between different kinds: a continental power, an insular power, and a regional hegemon. A continental power is a work to ensure its hegemony in the region. If it fails to do so, it will extend its relative power as much as possible. An insular state that dominates a large chunk of water will balance against rising states rather than seek its hegemony. The third and final kind of major power is a regional hegemon, like the USA, which aims to maintain the region's status quo and attain the favorable distribution of power (Griffiths, 2007).

Offensive realists deduce that great powers are always striving to increase their relative powers because they think offensively and are inconsistent fear from each other. Mearsheimer argues that what Waltz suggests as an appropriate amount of energy may be a satisfactory factor today but will fall short in the future (Snyder, 2002). In this context, Mearsheimer says that great power consistently enhances its powers until and unless it becomes a hegemon. Further, said surplus power for a state aims to demolish uncertainty, miscalculation, and future surprises. Hence, according to him, the best defense is a good offense in an anarchic world (J. J. Mearsheimer, 2007).

The top priority in this context is survival; in this way, only a country can essentially be self-determined and autonomous to accomplish a country's goal and objectives. Countries are coherent components in the clear perception of the discussion. They consider their foreign incidents and then prefer the technique or process to expand their entire existence. Mearsheimer indicated in his argument that states' dependency towards other states has some soldierly boundary that allows them to harm and possibly demolish to another. Further, suggested that joining these presumptions together means that the states in the future will appreciate that the primary strategy of a state in a time of chaos is to escalate and increase the military power. It ultimately guarantees the survival of a state through the absolute fact of revolving into the robust and durable power, which is known, a hegemon (Toft, 2005).

Four features of realism are state, Anarchy, survival, self-help, and Power. Classical realism speaks about humans' selfish nature, and structural realists spoke about an international structure, shaping states' behaviors. However, neo-realist emphasis on the international structure, which constructs a tangled netting of conditions and countries, must bend to these statuses while keeping in view their national interests. One common thing is national interest and the maximization of power.

1.1.5. Anarchy

As Kenneth Waltz, almost all realists attribute chaos, lawlessness 'anarchy' as one of the constant features of the international system. Neo-realists assert that the existing international structure is the result of interacting units. These units interact in a system where there is no higher authority to govern these units' relationships. In such a system,

each unit is responsible for its survival and security through self-help because no one will come to your help when you are in danger (Oye, 1985).

Such a system is predisposed to war and conflict, even if some states share mutual or common interests. It does not mean that peace and stability are lacking in all parts of the globe or at all, but it means that system is such that every single unit/state should be prepared to confront danger or even a war. Kenneth Waltz asserts that “With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its reason or desire, conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur.” (Mansbach & Taylor, 2013). Additionally, in such circumstances, every state strives to increase its capabilities relative to others and try to thwart others from gaining more. This situation gives birth to a relative gain and hinders cooperation because today’s friend can become tomorrow’s enemy. His modest gain of today can become a severe threat for tomorrow.

In this regard, another realist scholar Mearsheimer assumes that no one knows about the intentions of others; in an anarchic system, states are not inherently aggressive, but they seek to survive. The system's structure forces nation-states to maximize their relative power, vis-à-vis others (J. Mearsheimer, 2011). According to Mearsheimer, if major power does not have sufficient means to establish its hegemony, it still works offensively to amass its capabilities. A state with good power (military power) is always in a better position rather than a state with less power. (Mansbach & Taylor, 2013).

Neorealism also assumes that in anarchy, states ‘balance’ rather than ‘bandwagon.’ By bandwagoning, a state tries to increase its gains or decrease its losses while siding with

a stronger party. But in anarchy, bandwagoning is jeopardy by bolstering someone who may turn on you later to neo-realists. In such an anarchic world, the power of others is merely a threat, when a lack of governance may come for help in times of danger. On the other hand, balancing may reduce the risk by opposing the stronger (Burchill et al., 2013). Further stating neo-realists argue that small and weak powers have little choice of gaining favorable treatment by bandwagoning, while only foolish great powers are adopted such policies. Therefore, states balancing rather than bandwagoning is a better state policy in such an anarchic world. According to Waltz, the Bi-polar world is more stabilizing than the Multi-polar world in a sense, where only two major powers are to focus on each other rather than scattering anywhere else (Kenneth N Waltz, 2010).

1.1.6. Survival

The second principle on which almost all the realists agree is the survival of a state. There is ambiguity among the realists' scholars that whether power is an end in itself or it is a means to an end. Neo-realists scholar Kenneth Waltz believes that power is a means to an end, and the ultimate purpose is the survival and security of a state (Kenneth N Waltz, 2000). Additionally, he pens down that survival is a pre-request of attaining all other goals, whether these are occupation or independence. Now a question arises that whether the state is a security maximizer or power? Defensive realism assumes that a state needs to seek its security first, and for its security, it needs only a required amount of power to ensure its security (Keohane & Nye Jr, 1973).

By this, Waltz points out that the state is a defensive actor who seeks its security and survival in a system. However, offensive realist Mearsheimer holds that a state is a

power maximizer. The ultimate goal of a state is to gain more power to achieve a hegemonic position in global politics. In his view, if a state gets an opportunity to alter the existing distribution power, it will not hesitate to do so even if this action undermines its own security (Telbami, 2002). According to defensive realists, the status quo powers will lessen the competition for power. In contrast, offensive realists argue that revisionist states are eager to take risks to promote their existing position in world politics. The then state secretary of the United States, Henry Kissinger, states that “a nation’s survival is its first and ultimate responsibility; it cannot be compromised or put to risk” (John et al., 2011).

1.1.7. Self-Help

Neorealists are providing a deeper understanding of international politics put forth the idea of self-help. According to Waltz, citizens do not need to secure or protect themselves against other citizens in a domestic polity. Still, in international politics, every nation-state needs to be an eagle eye for its security due to its structure (Waltz Kenneth, 1975). In the former case, there is a higher authority over all citizens to protect them. In the latter case, an overarching authority lacks where self-help becomes the responsibility of every state. In anarchy, self-help is necessarily the principle of action (John et al., 2011).

But in the course of providing security for one’s protection, at the same time, it will be an endeavoring effort for other's insecurity. One state's security is said to be the insecurity of others, or it may be named a security dilemma. According to some scholars, one state's military preparation creates uncertainty in other states regarding whether this preparation is defensive or offensive. In this uncertainty, where no one knows about others'

intentions, an equilibrium among states can reduce the risk of insecurity as the balance of power results irrespective of its choice in such an anarchic system.

For Kenneth Waltz, the world's anarchic structure forces the states to defend themselves as there is a lack of higher authority or the concept of international statesman. For this purpose, assuring security rests on the shoulders of the state, realized through self-help. But in the process of protecting self-defense by the states, a vicious circle of insecurity is set off, among the other states in the system, creating security dilemmas (Kenneth N Waltz, 2010). There is an overall lack of trust among countries, and they can't be sure if the military preparations are for defensive or offensive purposes. Thus, other states view such initiatives pessimistically.

As a result, it unleashes a perpetual fear of insecurity among the states even when the states undertake benign security measures. However, the structural realists propagate that a natural balance comes into play in a self-help situation, irrespective of conscious planning. Alliances, therefore, will be formed that seeks to check and balance the power against threatening states. Thus, self-interest prevails over the general interest of the group. The same is the problem identified with cooperation in the international system since each state is concerned with the primary question of who would gain more than the other in partnership. In other words, it's the issue of relative or comparative gains that cooperation becomes hard to attain under the self-help system (John et al., 2011).

1.1.8. Power

Realists use the term 'power' to determine the behavior of a state in world politics. Arguably, in power politics, they assert that the strength and weaknesses determine an

actor's interests through a comparative analysis of their respective capabilities with one another. Realists regard power as the currency of world politics because, like money, power is a means to achieve goals (Mansbach & Taylor, 2007). Most of the realist scholars assume power in a coercive means. Military capabilities that include tanks, aircraft, missile technology, and naval wherewithal are means of power. However, some other scholars define power in different words.

According to Waltz, the capabilities of a state can be ranked in the following areas: the size of population and territory, the strength of economy and military, natural resources, and political stability and competency. He further explaining power as the capacity to produce an intended effect. But the author of *Politics Among the Nation* feels that power is men's control over other men's minds and actions. For realists like Waltz, hard power in terms of military capabilities and wherewithal is an essential element to survival in a system where chaos, anarchy, and lawlessness are all around (Kenneth Neal Waltz, 2001). For the offensive realist, Mearsheimer, states are power maximizers because they need to accumulate amass power to survive and dominate others. Hence, in realist paradigm power, hard power plays a crucial role in survival and producing hegemony or maintaining world politics's status quo (J. J. Mearsheimer, 2007).

1.2 Application of Theories

After 9/11, it changes the world's responses; they promote a threat to states' security by the international community. The powerful states' interests, security, and logics are countable factors rather than weaker states. Their policies and interests shape the world's order, and their logic and arguments are more authentic (Korab-Karpowicz, 2010). After

the Al-Qaeda attack on the US, she provoked a war on terrorism against terrorists because they have become a hazard to her security. But actually, this continuous war is all about the security of US hegemonic status and influence around the globe. Thus continuous emergence of the Taliban creates a logical space for the powerful in the targeted region in the name of security. However, this strategy compromises the security of other states (Naseer & Amin, 2011).

Globalization blurs the boundaries of the states. It shadows the realistic approach of power too, and something is new in the contemporary world, that is, tactics and means propagated by powers. Nonstate actors like Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Multinational Corporations (MNCs), and even militant groups, etc., are propagated tools of powers, who sponsored them to persuade their interest in the targeted region (Levy & Prakash, 2003).

However, initially, individuals or groups have emerged based on ground realities like poverty, economic inequality, or any other grievances; after that, they are influenced or supported by external factors in an organized way to achieve their goals. They fuel them as much as those containing a vulnerable threat to society and justify external intervention within another state. Al Qaeda's creation as a freedom fighter is the best example of this concept. Soviet Union occupation in Afghanistan was counter by these fighters.

Then all other worlds completely supported them. The propagated on the name of religion and used them as a tactic against USSR influence and dominance. Therefore this technique was not in favor of anybody. It was a war of capitalist bloc against communism (Coll, 2005). Russian policy in Syria is on the same ground. They are supporting Iran and

the Syrian government, who are declared as a terrorist sponsor. They are backing Hezbollah and Hamas counter the US influence in the region. At the time of the Syrian government's use of violence, Russia opposed the USA and her ally Saudi Arabia. It was a propagated Russian policy that wants to capture her lost influence in the region (Nizameddin, 2013).

It would not be wrong if it is stated that sensation of a terrorist is a formation of states, who talked about security on the bases of perceived threat, competing for the balance of power, to meet their national interest and struggling to maintain their influence on others (Tickner, 1995). Powerful states consistently destroy and reshape the international system's rule and regulation according to their national interest. Powers also sponsor even the contemporary phenomenon of a terrorist. According to the above debate, double standard and change patterns show that the globe power's politics is consistently shifting from one paradigm to another. It covers not security issues but the newly emerging phenomenon and its nature. One thing is to assure that the realist perspective on the struggle for balancing the power would lead. A state who has influential power has more opportunities. It might be military exchange with economic strength, political power, or social configuration, but power always would be there (Kenneth N Waltz, 2000).

It is very suitable to apply the theory of Realism in regulating the mood of the United States, India, and Pakistan's relations. In the initial days, Pakistan was a weak state, and it had to bear the big rival on the eastern side, and therefore it was pursuing security from India. Given in the regional scenario, Pakistan felt that its survival might not be possible because India does not easily reconcile with the sub-continent partition. Thus, in this regional (anarchic) background, Pakistan started to maximize its security, bringing

defensive realism into play. For this reason, Pakistan looked towards the US and jumped into the vortex of the US camp as being the weak ally.

However, many would try to name this move as jumping into the Pakistan bandwagon because it attempted to balance the region's power shuffling. Given this drawback, this strategy must be avoided. Since its hopes were shattered in 1965 and 1971 during the wars with arch-rival India, Pakistan continued part of the American camp. Rescuing Pakistan with aid and weapons in the 1950s was mean to sabotage the Soviet march and resist Communism, so assisting Pakistan was a way to contain Communism rather than a genuine help to a weak ally. Moreover, India was not feeling happy to be part of the American block (Toft, 2005).

Realism is the theory that can best describe the complexity of relations among the US, Pakistan, and India. It is the structure of this anarchic international system that compels a small state like Pakistan to have good relationships with one or more big powers for her survival. Survival is the nation-states' primary goal in a system where there is no central authority to govern. A territorially small, politically unstable, institutionally mismanaged, and economically fragile country like Pakistan needs some patronage from one or another big power (Buzan, Rizvi, & Foot, 1986).

It is the reason why Pakistan keeps her foot in both boats at a time (i.e., US and China). The Pak-US undependability relations compelled Pakistan to her foreign policy from unilateralism to multilateralism. In this quest, it found Russia and China as two alliance options that could help her out. Being friendly to India or Russia was not the option that best suited the policymakers of Pakistan. On the other side, China has strained relations

with India suited Pakistan's designs more than Russia. China also needs a possible alliance with Pakistan to contain India and create a new market for its ever-growing economy (Yousaf & Tabassum, 2003).

Survival has been Pakistan's problem from the outset. It has long faced many challenges from inside as well as from outside its borders. Indian enmity was the inborn gift of this nascent state, and it has had to deal with it, as one cannot change one's neighbor in the international arena. Besides Indian enmity, border disputes with Afghanistan have also influenced Pakistan's geopolitical character. A low economy with the burden of millions of starving refugees from Afghanistan has forced Pakistan to look towards a superpower for aid and support (Lieven, 2012).

Moreover, this security dilemma and humanitarian crisis have induced Pakistan to join US-led umbrella organizations like SEATO and CENTO to improve regional security. The Cold War was another factor that forced this vulnerable state to succumb to an alliance with the US for nothing else but her survival. Later the Cold War, Pakistan was ignored by the US, compelling it to align itself with China more closely (Zahab, 2002). However, the world-changing happening of 9/11 forced the United States to fall back on Pakistan because of its geostrategic importance. The alliance with the US after 9/11 was not smooth as both allies came face to face many times as their interests clashed in the region. Its frontline ally, Pakistan, and the US saw many low points in their relations after 9/11 that compelled Pakistan to go to its reliable neighbor, China, who never liked the US presence in the region. In this way, China, indirectly, played the role of a balancer in Pak-US relations. Therefore, smaller states like Pakistan always need third party leverage to create a

negotiating edge in their relationships with big powers like the US. Pakistan has no desire to be a satellite state of a more significant state like the US (Kronstadt, 2014).

Consequently, they go to other major power, preferably potential competitors of the first power, to balance their early, more significant power relations. Pakistan's engagement with two big powers gives it more room to get economic and military support from both or at least one of them. Having hostile neighbors on its Western and Eastern borders was the factor that made Pakistan a security state, rather than a welfare state, from the outset. She was given almost nothing in terms of weapons after the partition. Therefore had to look towards outside alliances to save her territory and sovereignty. Another factor influencing the world political system's structure was the bipolar world when Pakistan came into existence. To overcome its security dilemma, it had to become part of one or other superpower at that time. Again, the international system structure pushed Pakistan to look for more than one ally in the anarchic world (Naqvi, 2010).

Although Pakistan's geo-strategic location gives it importance in world politics, it also works as a constraint for it. Its location makes it a battlefield of major powers like the US, Russia, China, and India. This geostrategic location forces Pakistan to engage with powers like the US and China to survive (Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 1993). Pakistan's example proves that the anarchic structure of the international balance of power determines the behavior of the states and forces them to behave in a manner reflecting geopolitical self-interest. Moreover, Stephan M. Walt's approach to the theory of the balance of threats can shed light on this phenomenon, and it explains the behavior of smaller states.

According to Stephen Walt, small countries are primarily concerned with threats found in close proximity and try to achieve parity of powers with those in their neighborhood. Pakistan's problem has long been its hostile neighbors, inherited from the partition of 1947 (P. R. Chari, Cheema, & Cohen, 2009). To survive its birth pangs, Pakistan aligned with the US, and then China, as Walt asserts smaller states, are expected to seek alliance when threatened by the states having equal capabilities like them. Partnership with big powers is how nation-states balance the threats posed by hostile neighbors with similar capabilities as themselves. Walt also claims that weak states are prone to adopting a bandwagon strategy when threatened by the system's big players (Cohen, 2011). For example, Pakistan also joined hands with the US when threatened by the challenge 'you are either with us or against us.' It was a clear example of bandwagoning, as Pakistan was never able to say no to a superpower like the US.

As the interests of the US and China differ in South Asia, Pakistan has negotiated with both of them to get economic and military support that it could use against its rival India. The support Pakistan got from the US from time to time was short-lived, but Pakistan's economic and military needs never disappeared. That was the reason why Pakistan kept friendly relations with China. Pakistan used both the balance and bandwagoning strategies to stay alive in the international system. It remained under the patronage of one or two big powers for the sake of its survival and used its alliance with China as a balancer in its relations with the US (Walsh & Ahmed, 2014).

It has now become clear that the combination of Waltz's neo-realism and Walt's balance of power theory provides insights into why Pakistan became a small and vulnerable state. The anarchic system directed Pakistan to strive for its survival, and in that quest, it

continues to ally with both the US and China. As mentioned previously, to keep the balance of power in South Asia, Pakistan aligned with China when it faced a low point in relations with the US. Pakistan balanced its smaller rival by aligning itself with the more significant powers when it adopted the bandwagoning strategy while facing the direct threat after 9/11 (A. Sattar, 2017).

Balance of Power is the major approach of neorealism that best describes alliances in the world system. In order to survive, nation-states must increase their power in a world where self-help is the order of the day (Art & Jervis, 1985). States always try to avoid any hegemonic power attack and subdue that hegemonic power to increase its capabilities. It is a national response, as there is no central authority to help her out at the time of attack from a hegemonic power. The balance of power occurs when two criteria are met; first, there must be a state of anarchy in the system and, second, the nation-states must have the will to survive (Rengger, 1999).

States balance in two ways, first, internal balancing and second, external balancing. In internal balancing, states try to increase economic capabilities, strengthen their military muscle, and plot out clever alignment strategies. In contrast, in external balancing, nation-states increase their security by forming a coalition and alliances. Just as balancing has two types, the behavior of nation-states can be divided into two different types. Revisionist states are the states that try to upset the balance of the system so that it turns in their favor while status quo states remain contented with their place in the international system (Claude, 1989).

Stephen M. Walt expanded this theory by defining the concepts of balancing and 'bandwagoning.' Balancing is aligned with the other state or states against the existing threat. In contrast, bandwagoning can be defined as joining hands with the threat source. 'Chain ganging' and 'buck-passing' are two other terms used in his theory (Walt, 1988). Chain ganging is the phenomenon associated with nation-states, especially a small state when it ties itself to big states' security. Any attack on it can be considered an attack on the bigger state or states. This phenomenon drags big powers into the war on behalf of smaller states. On the other hand, in buck-passing, states just try to avoid the hegemon, and instead of facing the menace, they try to buck-pass it. According to Walt, balancing states make alliances against an existing threat that leads to a safer world, while in bandwagoning, the safety of the world can be threatened as the hegemon keeps on accumulating power through intimidation (Kenneth N Waltz, 1967).

Generally, weak states are more prone to adopt the bandwagon strategy than balancing extremely asymmetrical power balances favoring the hegemon. Instead, they can become the victim of more threatening states in this way. As weaker nation-states have little military standing, their best option from a survival standpoint is to select the winning option (Baugh, 1978). If their choice of alignment can positively affect the strength of the multi nation-state alignment, they should align with a weaker coalition if it throws the aggressor nation off balance.

A strong nation-state alliance can change a losing alliance into a winning one. Therefore, these big states want to maximize the reward of their involvement. Weak states are always susceptible to any outsized power that lies close to them. Strong states have international interests and abilities, while weak states' major concern is their proximity to

any outsized aggressor. These weak states are expected to make alliances when threatened by states having equal capabilities to their own, but they will, most probably, bandwagon when threatened by the outsized aggressors of the system. Therefore, small states are most concerned with the change in the system's balance of power as their survival is delicately attached to this balance. The system's anarchy makes weaker states more concerned with their security and, therefore, either seek the patronage of big power or an equally strong counter alliance (Walt, 1988).

From a historical perspective, the US-Pakistan and the US-India have an unbalanced relationship strongly influenced by the principles outlined in the complex interdependence. The rise of a world governed by the principle of complex interdependence rise in 1950 is associated with industrialized states' rapid growth. It was meant to secure its national interests even though its alliance with the US has created some internal dysfunctions (Art & Jervis, 1985).

In this regard, the US foreign policy towards South Asia can best be viewed through the theory of realism, as described in this study. The US is the only superpower in the world; the rising of China and, a resurgent Russia, and many other rising powers are dramatically altering the interdependencies that existed before World War II. China's role has also had 'skin the game' of Pakistan-US relations. The need for an alliance with the big powers is an outgrowth of Pakistan's limited political standing as a South Asian power (Hilali, 2002).

This condition continues to bring Pakistan closer to China as its relations with the US deteriorated. One must keep in mind that China also needs Pakistan for its own regional

and international interests. China's economic and strategic interests ensure it will continue to view Pakistan's affections and remain engaged. Although China has good economic relations with the US, it does not like its presence in South Asia (Guohong, 2003). Similarly, the US keeps a check on China through its alliance with India. The result is that these superpowers tend to exacerbate the historical fault line created by the 1947 partition.

Pakistan's political agenda can only be understood through the ever-fluctuating political dynamics of the superpower chess game. Pakistan serves as the pawn in a more massive battle for world hegemony (Guohong, 2003). Like its eastern border, Pakistan does not enjoy good relations with Afghanistan, and its relations with Iran are problematic. China remains the only neighbor with exemplary relations with Pakistan, and a weak state like Pakistan can ill afford to deteriorate these relations. Pakistan's challenge is to improve these relations and to maintain a reliable ally in the immediate vicinity. The war on terrorism tore at the fabric of some of these relations, particularly those with Afghanistan, which led the nation to develop a stronger relationship with China (N. Li, 2002). Pakistan knows the US will desert Pakistan after fulfilling its interests in this region, a behavior seen on previous occasions. Therefore, Pakistan's China Connection tells the US to keep its options open and remain engaged. In this way, China plays the role of balancer in Pakistan-US relations.

A general overview of US foreign policy towards South Asia disposition reflects structural realism as a most useful theory to comprehend and explain the rationale of its foreign policy choices. Most United States policies towards South Asia pursuits, for instance, its quest for security and survival, determination to withstand Pakistan and India's security pressure, 'seeking parity,' or 'strategic balance,' based on the dictates of structural

realism. Structural realism is an approach that predominantly emphasized that the international system and structural constraints over state behavior determine external state conduct (Rose, 1998).

The structural realism protagonist maintained that the international environment or system structure determines foreign policymakers' choices, and state behavior depends on the international system structure. He argued that states' behavior is determined by the state's interaction with other states or the problems it confronts in a global environment, not by what occurs inside a state (Kenneth Neal Waltz, 1979). Suppose the structural realism approach is applied to comprehend the factors that determined US foreign policy towards South Asia pursuits. We came to know that hostile statements from Indian leadership from the day of Pakistan inception, protracted conflict over Kashmir with India, Indian military's numerical and qualitative superiority, its estimated intentions and capability were structural constraints in determining Pakistan's external conduct.

Later on, revision and reorientation in US foreign policy at the beginning of the new millennium was also driven by changes in the international system cause of the Global War on Terror. Structural realism succeeds in providing answers to a good number of US foreign and security policy choices; however, it still left a gap in addressing some of US foreign policy towards South Asia pursuits (Lavoy, 2006). Hence, there is one other approach that explains some unanswered questions.

According to offensive realism, there are three kinds of great powers in a system: a great continental power, a great insular power, and a regional hegemon. If we view India as a great power through offensive realist perspectives, neither can we feature it with great

insular power or a regional hegemon (Baumann et al., 2001). Because neither it controls all parts of the Indian Ocean nor it has a complete hegemony in the region. Somehow, we can attribute it with great continental power not in the sense that it has a complete hegemony on the region of Asia or even South Asia, but in a view that it endeavors to pursue its power to the extent.

Accordingly, the United States adopted Mearshemier's policy (offensive Realism) in a bid to contain Communism. At the same time, Pakistan, on the other hand, opted for Waltz's strategy (defensive Realism) to counter the threat posed by India. Washington's strategy worked well in favor of the US, while Islamabad's policy remained under several ups and downs and didn't work well (Snyder, 2002). Pakistan is still finding a better place against India, which has now reflexed its mussels and is an active part of international political developments. Several events mar the US decision to assist Pakistan after 9/11, and now the nature of the US-Pakistan relationship is changing with every state of affairs. The Afghanistan situation is also under continuous alteration, and the US is ready to pull off its military forces. In this scenario, Pakistan's need may decrease; however, Pakistan's essentials for the US are still there as per the sensible theorists and experts. Without Pakistan, permanent peace in Afghanistan seems nearly impossible.

Indian military and civilian leadership have been in quest of sophisticated technology and military build-up for decades; their intentions have always been to pursue offensive strategies in the region. The lust for power of Indian strategists and policymakers in the late 1960s restrained the Indian government from signing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty because they worked on their nuclear program from the mid-1970s.

They intended to build an atomic bomb to have a cutting edge in the military realm over its neighboring region and earn a name of incredible India in the world (Westervelt, 1998).

Anyhow, their quest for becoming a nuclear power ultimately fulfilled in 1998, when India second time tested five nuclear devices in Pokhran military range. Some Indians assert that the promulgation of Indian nuclear tests was to deter a nuclear China. Still, others believe that the collapse of the Soviet Union, an Indian cold war military ally, pushed New Delhi to conduct nuclear tests (Keck, 2013). Whatever their claims may be, their ultimate goal of making the bomb was to gain a military edge over its neighbors and become a crucial player in global politics. After Islamabad conducted successful nuclear tests in response to Indian tests, New Delhi soon stopped dreaming anymore to be the sole nuclear power of the region and became eagle-eyed for other alternatives that could give it the military advantage.

Although India has a conventional arms advantage over Pakistan, such an advantage under a nuclear threshold is fruitless. Some scholars and military warfare strategists believe that fighting conventional warfare under a nuclear umbrella is foolhardy. In circumstances where there is a balance of power, and both states party to the conflict possess nuclear weapons, the possibility of conventional war escalating to nuclear exchange is extremely high (R. Lal & Rajagopalan, 2004).

Thus, such scholars have put the region of South Asia in a state of risk as they contend that the region's strategic stability is fragile and very thin. New Delhi seeks to find the possibility of limited warfare under the nuclear threshold to sustain its conventional advantage over Islamabad. Seeking an alternative to New Delhi's 'Cold Start Doctrine'

went for tactical nuclear weapons procurement, which again subdued the former's offensive military incitement (Ladwig III, 2008). Additionally, Indian civilian leadership signed the so-called civil-nuclear deal with the USA to pursue her offensive military means. The deal was intended to lead the former to rapidly expand the number of its nuclear arsenals (A. J. Tellis, 2006).

Apart from the above Indian military and civilian development, New Delhi now quests for sophisticated nuclear technology. They aim to acquire a ballistic missile defense system against nuclear incursion. This acquisition will not merely intensify the arms race in the region, but it will also provide New Delhi with a false perception of defending her cities in nuclear escalation, which is, in fact, contrary to the fact (Latif, 2014).

Pursuing the strategy of introducing a Ballistic Missile System (BMS) in the region is likely to affect three factors of the region: arms race stability, deterrence stability, and crisis stability. First, both sides New Delhi and Islamabad will maximize their second-strike capability, which none of them currently possesses, and both of them will remain mutually vulnerable. Second, both the parties will work to attain more sophisticated weapons overwhelmingly. Third, neither side will perceive an advantage in the escalating crisis. Hence, the acquisition of India's missile defense system will only upset the strategic stability of the region rather than provide a defensive shield (F. H. Khan et al., 2014).

Likewise, Indian military strategists also seek to introduce a submarine launch ballistic missile system. It will also leave a negative effect on the fragile strategic stability of the region. It will incite Islamabad to build its version of submarine launch ballistic missile in the long run, but it will increase its missiles in the short run. Reviving the

offensive military infrastructure and development of the Indian military and civilian portfolio, one anticipates Indian policy-makers and analysts (Davis, 2011).

They pursue extreme military offensive contours, which could give them a clear military advantage in the region. They work tooth and nail to fold all feasible opportunities of gaining power in coercive means to become a great military power in the region. The tactics and strategies they pursue can be better viewed through the prism of offensive realism, which contends that a state in an anarchic system needs to gain as much power as possible to achieve the ultimate goal of survival, of course, to dominate others. For that reason, Indian policy-making and military strategies should be viewed as offensive endeavors rather than defensive.

Powerful states consistently destroy and reshape the international system's rule and regulation according to their national interest (Kenneth N Waltz, 2000). Powers also sponsor even the contemporary phenomenon of a terrorist. Militant's group's survival and long term existence are impossible without sponsorship or support of external factors. It is to counter the influence of other powers as President Obama stated in his speech about Russian aggressive behavior toward the Soviet States and China's economic and military rise, creating tension and mentioned that from Brazil to India, growing middle classes contest with them. It shows that they are very conscious about their hegemonic status, and they can't bear any other to get power as much as they have. And she also wants to eliminate the other's influence based on her perceived fear (Room, 2014).

Thus far, neorealism and its classical variant realism adequately delineate a unit's competing mode's rationale in a structure. Nonetheless, it is essential to understand how

and why these actors cooperate in a state of anarchy. In this regard, the Regional Security Complexes (RSC) approach by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver appeared most relevant to the researcher. Though lately considered part of English School, initially Barry Buzan has been accepted as an 'enlightened realist' by Martin Griffiths (1999 & 2009).

Griffiths believes that until the mid-1990s, much of Buzan's work focused on the limits of neorealism and the broad parameters of structural realism. Whereas Buzan's concept of regional security has gained currency in international relations, concurrently, a note of dissent also appeared. Great powers have always influenced global geopolitics in the era of Nation-states. They retained the capacity to remain relevant in their traditional areas of interests despite not falling in the regional complex's member units (Lake & Morgan, 1997).

Pakistan-India rivalry over Afghanistan, the explanation of amity or enmity may not appear relevant as the US is not a South Asian security complex member. Much needed explanation in this regard is provided by some international conflict studies that support the significance of geographical proximity, importantly, the territorial contiguity as a major cause of conflicts. As regional security complex basic assumption suggests that geographic proximity matters for security, meaning states (or other referent actors) adjacent to each other do not have the option of disengagement, the need to cooperate becomes decisively vital. Thus, it can be conveniently assumed that Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan's geographical proximity places these neighbors in a situation where conflict of interests or prospects of interdependence becomes a natural phenomenon (Geller & Singer, 1998).

The geographical proximity of Pakistan and India, despite being categorized in different security complexes in the sense that the former being part of South Asia, is the most important reason to suggest cooperation between both states in Afghanistan, the insular state in the region. While offering the value of interdependence, it implies that by implication, regions are seen as mutually exclusive; however, Afghanistan, in this case, carries a distinct identity. Besides being termed an insular state, the country can be viewed as part of the South Asia regional security complex. While establishing the essence of interdependence within the South Asian regional security complex, the connotation that it may be lesser outside the complex may not appropriately identify Indian interests in Afghanistan (M. S. Malik & Khan, 2018).

The interdependence between Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan may be seen in the context of geographical proximity and the fact that before the membership of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Afghanistan was considered part of the broader Middle East or West Asia. Therefore, in the case of Afghanistan, Lake's view that one unit may be a member of several regions appears more tempting. Consequently, security relationships in a regional security complex are considered more durable, an assumption essentially linked with the other two aspects, i.e., geographical proximity and interdependence. For Pakistan, Afghanistan's security relationships within the South Asian regional security complex with an adversary like India and a competitor like Iran in the geographical proximity must be of concern. Thus, it is apparent that in an environment characterized by a mutual lack of trust, each unit of the structure would pursue its interests, primarily focusing on absolute gains.

It is explicitly evident from the attributes of a region that Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India can have numerous divergences and convergences for being so visibly intertwined. This commonality of interests can either promote greater interdependence and cooperation between all three regional actors. Conversely, the prospects of adverse rivalry and conflict can also become a real challenge. According to the definition in international relations, cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to others' actual or anticipated preferences through a process of policy coordination. (Milner, 1992).

As neo-realists identified, the uncertainty engulfing the rival's motives and intentions influences the behavior of a state. Since the choices are considered incomprehensible and, even if known, subject to alter, the ensuing uncertainty works against cooperation. As the existing international structure lacks an overarching mechanism, remains devoid of an authoritative intermediary, states tend to concentrate on rival's capabilities instead of intentions. Consequently, such an environment leads to what Waltz termed a 'self-help' world without an international authority, prompting each actor of the structure to look out for itself. Notwithstanding the prospects of competition when ambiguities prevail regarding rival's intentions, it can also create powerful incentives for states to cooperate (Grieco, 1990).

In the sarcastic hegemonic competition, the status of hegemon will only be granted to a state, and once there is no other state as a superpower in its constituency. But in that case, where a state or constituency encompasses more than one superpower, then the hegemonic structure cannot be established (Glaser, 2010). That state is considered a regional hegemon; that state has the potential and capability to control and govern the region by overpowering its adjacent power, for instance, John. J. Mearsheimer reviews that

supremacy is exceptional, as the outlays of growth and development generally outpace the welfares before supremacy is accomplished' (J. J. Mearsheimer, 2001). Subsequently, impending hegemon merely pursues supremacy when the projected expenses are little.

The impression of supremacy significantly adds to the friendly cooperation of current worldwide relatives and power relatives. Antonio Gramsci has notably donated to the manifestation of this notion, signifying that power is reliant on force and 'agreement.' Rendering, hegemony characterizes the vertical of the most powerful state in the transnational structure or a primary state's point in a particular constituency. A supporter of Gramsci, the Canadian scholar Robert W. Cox developed Gramsci's work to denounce other international relations theories. According to Cox, theories like Realism and Neo-realism were instituted to save parameters helping the premiums of unlikely predominant Western nations, and they are elite (Cox, 1981).

Those assumptions meant to make the global order look common and constant. Authority empowered the prevailing state to spread its ethical, political, and social values around the public and sub-groups. All were brought out in a well-planned and controlled manner by civilian society associations. These civilian societies are connected with establishments, and their practices are authorized relatively independently by the state. Sovereignty is to deliver shared and dogmatic frameworks that are to be related to the country's national interests. There are numerous considerations and predominating thoughts regarding the relationship between supremacy and colonization. Colonialism is characterized as expanding the strength of one state over the other by utilizing the technique for open political and financial instruments (Yilmaz, 2010).

For the broad spectrum of knowledge regarding power relations and security policies, theories of IR enfold an elite foundation to advance our larger understanding. Overall, these philosophies to elucidate transnational affairs through three basic conceptions; authority, construction, and supremacy (Griffiths, O'callaghan, & Roach, 2008). Joseph Nye believes that a superior force turns into a hegemonic power by influencing others to collaborate. Influence would need to be guaranteed using soft power that makes different nations believe in the common interest s (Nye Jr, 2004). Nevertheless, rendering to hegemonic stability philosophy, superpowers accomplish their positions individually with political power arrangement but holding their consensus and conviction (Cox, 1981).

In an alternate meaning of supremacy, it is the point of taking the ability and authority to transform the principles and standards of worldwide frameworks focused around one's inspiration and desire. If you do not have adequate supremacy to influence worldwide occasions, by your guide, that future is an unsafe hallucination. Strange anticipates that hegemony entails two sorts of power; social and operational base. The relationally based force has the power to influence and strengthen the other players individually or in clusters. The active force has the critical ability to implement the preferred policy, standards, and procedures in the domain of a worldwide framework (Yilmaz, 2010).

Superpowers construct or sustain decisive systems to collaborate in the future and reduce uncertainty while other states are questing their interests. The general determination in affairs to the formation of hegemon authority such as; active currency component in the global world, a strong army position with the coalitions and centers in each portion of the

domain, management in regional crisis and conflicts, retentive nuclear arms, persuasion capacity over the other nations, legitimating and imposing status by spreading one's living standard, culture, and values around the world (Tomja, 2014).

All the fundamental concepts of realism have been applied in the thesis. As far as anarchy is concerned, there is no central government to govern the international system. Though the US is playing a dominant role in world affairs, it cannot be assumed that the US is the international system's governing body. Other power centers have also been identified as the ones who have their say in world affairs one way or the other. Each country in the world system acts according to their capabilities and according to their national interest, which has been identified, keeping in view their territorial, economic, and military capabilities and the international system's constraints. The states are different from each other as per their capacities to act; however, they are an essential part of any international order.

Structural distribution of capabilities limits cooperation amongst states because of fear of relative gains and the possibility of their dependence on one another (Kenneth N Waltz, 1979b). Almost all major powers have their presence in Afghanistan one way or the other. The reality makes them natural players of regional politics as far as South Asia is concerned. This change of influence from the sole policy impact of US dominance to the variety of states being involved in Afghanistan. The situation also assumes that subsequent alliances and counter alliances will eventually influence South Asia and its neighbors' foreign policies and internal politics.

Chapter 2:

US Engagement in South Asia: A Chronology

This analysis begins with a chronological outline of US engagement in South Asia. After independence in the sub-continent, significant economies such as India and Pakistan, South Asia is one of the most volatile regions of the planet. Political dissension and rivalry amongst the states have given birth to ongoing conflicts (Javaid, 2010). The challenge is enormous because of competing cultures and contradictory thought processes that have brought this region into the imbroglio of security conflicts in 1947, incomplete partition in the era of decolonization rendered South Asia into an unseemly array of unpleasant events. This colonial legacy divided the borders in favor of one. It sidelined the other laying the foundation of a tug of war between the two largest nation-states of South Asia: India and Pakistan (Butt & Schofield, 2012).

The world powers have reshaped the world orders since ancient times. Their principal goal is survival. As the world consists of more than one major power, their interests clash, and they try to maximize their influence to achieve their goals. Wars and conflicts arise for the perseverance of their power. They oppose each other in a power struggle centered on resources and territory (Kronstadt, 2014). According to Gilpin, yesterday's major authorities, which are the superpowers of today, have achieved this status through cooperation with each other (Gilpin, 2016).

Characteristics of major powers can be divided into three parts: influential competencies, altitudinal features, and eminence (Danilovic, 2002). For many, power capabilities were the only benchmark. Power has a vibrant abode even when it comes to

the most extensive trials. This feature has been given diversified conduct with a misperception towards the nature of the power (Saddiki, 2006). The regional power is restrained in a specific region, whereas great power should comprise definite impetus throughout the global system. International power may be defined as a radical power applying an outcome, which works with the widest variety of the world of its functions. (Toynbee, 1947). Other suggestions are that major power should be involved in regional and International affairs and interests. These two intentions are often closely connected. The major power can apply in regional and international matters, and it must be obsessed with regional and international benefits (Corbetta, Volgy, Grant, & Baird, 2009).

When we talk about International affairs, it is natural that there is competition. Superpowers seek regional governance and domains of inspiration, which is their very nature (Kagan, 2015). Besides the occupation of lands, they also control the natural resources to maintain their dominance over the world. These resources help keep them at their high stature. So to get access to natural resources, they are capturing the lands around the globe. (Gorshkov, 1977). These powers use different tactics to fulfill their objectives in the targeted region.

Sometimes, the Powers sway their interest by creating conflicts or turbulence between the focused regions' states and societies. As a result of such misunderstanding and eco-political unequal conditions, sectarianism in the regions is promoted that raises many other conflicts (J. J. Mearsheimer, 2001). Leading powers have linked confrontational organizations in the world. They give them backup support and fight against them at the same time. The following examples show such involvement and the double standard strategy, which develops according to each's interest (Luttwak, 1994). According to Henry

Kissinger, the United States has no everlasting friends or enemies. It has interests only (Kissinger, 1994). For all those who are in power or like this, it's not just about America. Major Powers enter a region for her interest, persuading people, and states (Cornell, 2005).

2.1 US Engagement with Pakistan

Pakistan's connection to the War on Terror has been exceedingly irresolute. From one perspective, Pakistan assumes a major part in encouraging the US to drive mediation in Afghanistan from not long after 9/11 up to the present. It has allowed the travel of material crosswise over the Pakistani region to US powers in Afghanistan. Likewise, Pakistan has endured American rocket assaults propelled from Afghanistan against the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda focuses on Pakistan's untamed outskirts locale with that nation. Then again, Pakistan has given a place of refuge not only to radical Islamist developments focusing on its adversary Indian.

Additionally, for the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda pioneers Osama Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri, among others, are likewise accepted to be stowing away in Pakistan. Whether to what degree and by whom they are being secured inside the Pakistani government is indistinct; however, Pakistan has not helped the United States spot and catch them. There have likewise been press reports that Pakistan has obstructed some Taliban pioneers' endeavors to look for peace with the US-sponsored Karzai government in Kabul. US-Pakistan relations have become progressively strained over how to arraign the War on Terror, yet collaboration between them also proceeds (Katz, 2012).

President General Musharraf made the right choice, and the US was grateful for his leadership. Following its alliance with the US, Pakistan has the opportunity to write a new

chapter in its history, which was to be built as a lasting strategic partnership between the two nations. They are working together in global cooperation on the war on terrorism, enhance regional stability, strengthening Pakistan in economic, social, political, and democratic fields, and finally increasing mutual understanding between the people of both countries. We have seen that the US had specific long-term goals that were overridden by its short-term security concerns after September 11, 2001. The long term goals were to promote democracy and civil rights through elections, both domestically and internationally, socio-economic development with an emphasis on health care, environmental protection, stable economies, and security. Before 2001, the US wanted a safe world without nuclear proliferation. Though this remains a concern in foreign policy, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has taken precedence over all other matters. All priorities were reflected in President Bush Jr. Administration's dealings with Pakistan.

A large number of about 450,000 Pakistanis and more than two million Muslims resided in the US. They are there only for the reason to gain money and improve their living standard. But after 9/11, these people in the US were abused. Against Al-Qaeda and Taliban, Pakistan has launched various military operations in the tribal territories, which have incited them to convey their insufficient exercises inside Pakistan. In comparison to the 9/11 assaults, more number of people had lost their lives in these operations. Pakistan's backing to the United States is more of NATO's strengths against banned organizations, which have a broad suggestion as it keeps on suffering because of war (N. Ali, 2016).

The end of the Cold war and the event of 9/11 have brought numerous difficult doors open for the US. Pak-US arrangement creators comprehend and understand Pakistan's key significance in the locale, where the US has key financial and vital interests.

At present, the US has a long haul territorial strategy. Its principal concern is to counteract terrorist exercises and their spread (Gojee, 2015). In short unequal organizations are support the length of the shared trait of investments win. As a weaker accomplice, Pakistan usually is eager to stay faithful to the United States if, consequently, the US as a more robust accomplice satisfies the more fragile accomplice requests identifying with its provincial and neighborhood needs (T. Hussain, 2005).

On the other hand, history shows us that incredible powers barely ever give up their hobbies. Pakistan had paid a considerable cost in attempting to help the global war against terrorism. Despite all these endeavors, Pakistan has been reprimanded for not doing much in the war against terrorism. Besides, the US should treat Pakistan as a free element furthermore regarding the power of Pakistan. Just such an approach can reinforce the validity of the organization that dubious methods can jeopardize. The trust between the two countries can be strengthened just if the US approach towards Pakistan stays steady. US needs Pakistan to turn into its colonized state, to serve the diversions of US. They meddle excessively in the inner undertakings of Pakistan (Butt & Schofield, 2012).

Their local nations did not acknowledge the vast majority of the outside jihadists who battled in Afghanistan and FATA. However, they cleared out with no other decision to forever settle in Afghanistan, where they built up closeness and amiability with Afghans and the tribesmen. Pakistan helped a great deal the Afghans and other outside jihadists in defeating the impacts of war. The FATA significantly influenced and merit childhood in social, financial, and training fields (Javaid, 2011). Afghanistan gave the picture of unique and gigantic contortion, and demolition obliged the modifying and recovery on the enormous level, yet in no way like that happened. In the Afghan war, Pakistan endured a

great deal and still keeps on suffering because of the garbage left by the Soviet powers and intermediary war. Pakistani society had been scorned due to free weapons and medications from Afghanistan, and the onset of the equipped uprising involved Kashmir.

After 9/11, the US picked Pakistan as a cutting edge state to battle the Global War against Terrorism because Pakistan was seen as a capable and esteemed nation and not an unsafe country. Yet, Pakistan was an imperfection to Israel, India, and the US as an atomic force. The go-getters and the villain organizers had made up their personalities to make Pakistan's anarchic conditions and portray Pakistan's pessimistic picture to the worldwide group that it was an unsteady nation and couldn't be trusted whatsoever. Arranged and maintained endeavors were made to destabilized FATA and Baluchistan, and another sink Pakistan in the ocean of terrorism (Shuja Nawaz & de Borchgrave, 2009).

A considerable measure of intelligence offices in Kabul puts their energies and endeavors to make religious fanaticism, sectarianism, and ethnic clashes with the fake thought of jihad in Pakistan. As an aftereffect of US skewed strategies with clouded intentions, Pakistan is going up against the evil presence of terrorism, fanaticism. Our nation has been isolated into partisan ghettos, and the wrong and twisted picture of jihad is exceptionally utilized in Pakistani society. Political gatherings have their aggressor wings, and furnished mafias are effectively included in the target killings.

As the question in the US-Pakistan relationship extends, Washington's dissatisfaction with Islamabad has additionally developed. Over the recent months, persuasive voices have started to suggest that the US take a more merciless and forceful way to Pakistan by playing up Pakistan's thoughtful military gap: prop up regular citizens

while managing cruelly with the military and its spy office, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), mainly, perspectives range from moving to a more unfriendly control approach that would confine the Pakistan military; to seeing dynamic regular people as accomplices and proclaiming the military as a foe; to marking particular individuals from the army and ISI discovered to be included in supporting aggressors as terrorists (Wirsing, 2003).

Throughout history, there have been four major US engagements with Pakistan. During the Cold War, Pakistan was considered one of the closest American allies during the first engagement. The second engagement was during the Afghan jihad and frontline states. The third engagement occurred through the post-cold war era. However, once the US lost its strategic interest in this region, relations between the two ultimately deteriorated, resulting in a discontinuation of aid and sanctions on Pakistan. Lastly, the fourth engagement is the Global War on Terror (GWOT) from September 2001 to 2016 (T. Hussain, 2005).

2.1.1 First Engagement: Cold War Era (1947-1979)

When Pakistan came into being, global politics was taking sharp turns and twists all together. A very costly Second World War had ended, and the British Empire had given liberation to many states. Like many other states, Pakistan also got freedom in this process and emerged on the world map with inadequate infrastructure, government, state machinery, and administration (Arif, 1984). The start for a newer nation in the presence of a strong enemy at one end was undoubtedly a difficult task ahead for the government. Soon after a year, Pakistan went into war with India over the Kashmir dispute. So the threat of

continuous attack loomed over the Pakistani government, and therefore, it sought a place from where it can at least secure survival.

In the absence of resources, Pakistan had to safeguard its security by joining a security block or being an ally to the newly shaping bipolar (communism and capitalism) global system of that time (Cohen, 2005). Like the Americans, Pakistan's leaders, such as Fazal Ur Rehman, asserted that Muslims were also anti-communist; he made it clear that Pakistan can never go communist (Choudhury, 1975). In these hasty settings, Pakistan decided to be part of the United States.

Pakistan's friendly relations with the US took place in 1949-50. In 1949, the USSR invited First Prime of Pakistan Minister Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, to visit the country, but Pakistani leaders showed little interest in the invitation. The Soviet invitation was followed by a similar US invitation in May 1950 (A. Hilali, 2006). The Prime Minister of Pakistan flew to the USA instead of visiting the Soviet Union (Burki, 2015). His visit got mixed responses from different segments of the society, vesting Washington instead of Moscow is regarded as a strategic blunder by many critics, which provided an opportunity for the Pakistani leaders to clarify the goals and targets of the newly born Muslim country to the political leaders and the people of the world's most powerful state (McMahon, 1994).

The initial years of Pak-US relations are described well by former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Abdul Sattar. He says that by 1947 when WW-II was over, the US was the only nation to have an abundance of resources and economy intact. It was by then the wealthiest nation, having 40% of the global production under its belt. The democratic system and institutions were well integrated. However, the stern challenge was from the

Soviet Union, which had expanded its march in Eastern Europe while the US had balancing Western Europe economically and militarily. The US to South Asian interests were cursory, but the strategic location of Pakistan (just next to the Middle East) was a solid reason to come to cooperation with Pakistan (A. Sattar, 2007).

In the sharply changing international scenarios, the United States was arranging its policies to counter the Soviet advance and deter communism, which had the capacity and extent to attract the newly born states. Thus, a few years later, Pakistan became a US-led SEATO and CENTO defense agreement member. The agreements were formed to assist the members against any aggression of the Soviet Union or any other state. Hence, being part of these two defense/security related agreements, Pakistan felt its position secured enough against startling Indian attack (R. M. Khan, 2012b).

Pakistan supported US-sponsored resolutions regarding the United Nations Military action in Korea, knowing that the Soviet Union and communist China were against all these resolutions (S. Burke, 1973). The Americans were concerned. They thought at first that India would lead the non-communist Asian nation to preserve their freedom; the US began to look towards Pakistan to promote its interests in South Asian regions and the Middle East's adjoining regions and Southeast Asia (A. Hilali, 2006).

In April 1953, Secretary Dulles visited India and Pakistan to support the proposed collective security systems. Determined to follow a non-aligned policy, Nehru refused to provide such support; on the other hand, Pakistan enthusiastically endorsed the idea of the collective defense system. After his return from Pakistan, Dulles stated that “the strong spiritual faith and aggressive spirit of the people make them a faithful fortification against

communism and that his party had met with a feeling of the sincere relationship on the part of the people of Pakistan towards the United States.” The US Vice president Richard Nixon visited India and Pakistan in December 1953. The results of his visit were the same as Dulles had reported (S. Burke, 1973).

Pakistani leadership thought that after it enters into US-sponsored alliances, western powers would actively support Pakistan in her disputes with India, especially the Kashmir dispute. They also believed that Western powers would be far more generous to Pakistan than non-aligned countries like India after Pakistan entered into western partnerships. However, the US continues to provide far greater economic aid to South Asia. The US also denied providing clear support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue (Javaid, 2014). Pakistan’s alliance relationship with the US had annoyed the USSR and the communist powers. The Soviet Union abandoned its neutral stance on the Kashmir issue and began to side with India, although India was not aligned with it. The USSR was prepared to veto any resolution on the Kashmir dispute if India desired it (A. Hilali, 2006).

In the wake of the Sino-India war 1962, in which the US, UK, and other western countries extended massive military aid to India, Pakistan’s lack of expectation with its western allies increased immensely. They ignored Pakistan’s strong protests, and they were apprehensive that the arms being supplied to India would ultimately be used against Pakistan. President Ayub also maintained that President Kennedy would consult Pakistan before any military aid was given to India (Mohammad Ayub Khan, 1970).

Moreover, Pakistan thought that the American decision to provide massive military assistance to India would shift the South Asian balance of power decisively in India’s favor.

Therefore, Pakistan was searching for new friends who would help prevent the balance of power in South Asia. With this objective in mind, a complete reappraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy took place, and Pakistan develops a close friendly relationship with China. Relations with the USSR also improved. In reaction to Pakistan's China policy, the US also curtailed its aid to Pakistan. (T. Hussain, 2005). In August 1963, the United States' decision to postpone the airport loan (the suspension of a promised \$4.3 million loan to Pakistan for the improvement of Dacca airport) was an attempt to show Pakistan that its tactics would backfire and bring a harsh response from Washington (Cohen, 2004).

The US-Pakistan relationship took a new turn in 1965 when Pakistan and India fought a war over Kashmir. When the war started in September 1965, the US banned arms aid to both countries, but the ban hit Pakistan hardest, as it was dependent on the US for arms, whereas India was receiving arms from several sources. As the world witnessed sharp fluctuations, and the appearance of international relations was also transformed, the US interests in third world countries, including Pakistan, also faced dramatic shifts. Many newly decolonized states materialized in Africa and Asia, with feeble administrations and infrastructures, making the global display more diverse and challenging (Javaid, 2014).

The coming years endorsed this conception when, in 1967, a sheer difference came between Pakistan and the US. The United States declared that it is readjusting the arms sale/aid policy, and thus, the relationship would depend only on the parameters of the newly crafted policy. The 1959 defense-related agreement remained intact; however, the utility of the pact was a question mark (T. Hussain, 2005). In April 1967, Washington announced that it would not resume the military aid to Pakistan and India. India was not the state that would have suffered too much with this decision, but Pakistan felt its security

endangered again. Thus, Pakistan's foreign office stated in April 1967 that said, "It is apparent that the American decision to ban military supplies to Pakistan has emboldened India to become more intransigent in her attitude towards Pakistan" (Z. Hasan, 1967). Pakistan had felt the lack of utility of CENTO and SEATO and therefore detached itself from the agreements, but despite gradual disengagement with the organizations, Pakistan kept some relations with the United States. There emerged strong anti-Americanism inside Pakistan due to Washington's no help to Pakistan in wars with India and cutting off military aid (Soherwordi, 2010).

In 1971, when American public opinion was opposed to the Vietnam war, the US and China were in a confrontation on Vietnam, and Pakistan was neutral on the Vietnam war. The US did not feel well about Pakistan's behavior (Hasnat, 2014). This situation made Pakistan increasingly hostile to major involvement abroad. Meanwhile, India invaded Pakistan to transform Pakistan's eastern wing into the independent state of Bangladesh. The US did nothing to save East Pakistan. It accepted its secession as inevitable. As Henry Kissinger described it in the White House years: "there was no question of 'saving' East Pakistan. Both Nixon and I had recognized for months that its independence was inevitable" (Kissinger, 2011).

After the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, significant shifts also took place in the US South Asia policy. The United States now accepted India as the dominant power in the South Asian region. This policy aligned with the Nixon Doctrine, which sought to advance US interests in the world's various areas through regional influence. During 1972-77, the US tried to avoid any major involvement in South Asia. The embargo on the US weapons supplies to Pakistan was maintained up to 1975.

In 1972, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was a Prime Minister of Pakistan, he made serious efforts to convince the US policymakers of the shortcomings of their strategy (Arif, 1984). Symington Amendment (Act, 1976)⁶ to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 put pressure on Pakistan to change its stance on the nuclear issue (Rennack, 2001). Simultaneously, the US continued to provide aid to India, which, unlike Pakistan, had conducted a nuclear explosion in 1974. This duality in US policy was severely criticized in Pakistan. Several reasons were given to explain American opposition to Pakistan's nuclear program (Hasnat, 2014).

Meanwhile, Pakistan's relation with northern neighbor China became pleasant enough due to Beijing's support to Pakistan in the 1965 war and Kashmir's question. However, the United States had serious reservations and confrontation with China because of the Vietnam issue, while Pakistan's neutral standpoint regarding Vietnam was considered an irritating point in the US. Pakistani officials' policy and statements about Vietnam were evaluated as a serious blow to the US and Islamabad's vivid dissatisfaction with SEATO and CENTO. Pakistan also showed reservations about the membership in these pacts, and the move was well observed by the socialist countries, particularly China, which applauded Pakistan's role (Choudhury, 1975).

After the Pakistan and India wars of 1965 and 1971, the US put a kind of sanctions on both the countries and stopped giving military aid while Pakistan and India were going

⁶ The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was amended by the Symington Amendment (Section 669 of the FAA) in 1976. It banned US economic, and military assistance, and export credits to countries that deliver or receive, acquire or transfer nuclear enrichment technology when they do not comply with IAEA regulations and inspections. This provision, as amended, is now contained in Section 101 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).

into a smooth relationship with China. The then foreign minister of Pakistan, ZA Bhutto (who was also a key man to establish ties with PRC), felt that this move by the US is aimed to sabotage Pakistan and India's relations with China (Bhutto, 1969). He also said that the US is badly entangled in Vietnam. Therefore, it provided military aid only to those states that would not use the assistance for their conflicts; rather, the use must be carried out by US aspirations (against Vietnam). Bhutto had given such statements once after examining Robert McNamara, the US secretary of defense, who had announced that only Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, and South Korea would be the recipient of US military aid. Mr. Bhutto said that these countries' lists are involved in the Vietnam conflict and cooperating with the United States' armed forces in one form or the other (Bhutto, 1969).

Islamabad's policy towards China that had irked the United States witnessed a sharp turn when the President Nixon administration decided to change the nature of engagement with China and to construct diplomatic relations with Beijing. In his 1969 trip to Pakistan, President Nixon asked President Yahya Khan to lay down a platform for the betterment of Sino-US relations, which he accepted and started trying to bring the two countries closer. Later, it was Pakistan, which enabled both China and the US to come to cordial terms (Gilani, 2006).

After the Arab-Israel war in 1973, the Arab states employed the oil embargo. The embargo again irked the United States, but Pakistan backed this policy. Some other regional factors also marked a shift in the US South Asian policy, particularly against Pakistan. It became evident when Henry Kissinger started to back up India for regional dominance. In his 1974 visit to India, Mr. Henery stated that "the size and position of India give it a special role of leadership in South Asia and world affairs" (Kissinger, 2002). This

policy of the US and the statement made by Mr. Henery was felt in Pakistan with anxiety because it came just when India had played its significant role in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. Moreover, India also had tested its first nuclear devices at that time, and the welcoming statement by the US president was also a matter of serious consideration in Islamabad. The message was nearly clear that Washington will not support Pakistan at India's expense; instead, it has its India strategies (Kissinger, 2002).

As the US kept intentional calm on the Indian nuclear maneuvering, Pakistan felt the survival in danger again. Bhutto's quest for nuclear weapons to balance India's power was seen in America as a move that can proliferate nuclear weapons and activities alike (S. Hasan, 1988). However, the US policy in nuclear non-proliferation had dual standards. It had blind eyes towards Israeli, South African, and Indian nuclear programs/activities but had reservations over Pakistan's nuclear program. Keeping the scenario and nuclear development in mind, Pakistan denied signing the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) by asserting that it could only be an NPT signatory if India does the same. With little hope and support from the US in the nuclear field, Pakistan changed the course and asked France for help. France provided Pakistan fuel reprocessing plant on March 18, 1976. But France was forced to cancel the deal by the United States, so it discontinued the export of reprocessing facilities to Pakistan (Tahir-Kheli, 1982).

Additionally, the US also suspended its development aid to Pakistan by 1979 (Hasnat, 2014). The policymakers inside Washington failed to preempt that Pakistan has to build nuclear weapons if it wants protection against India. In the quest for nukes, Pakistan can utilize all available resources and means. Therefore, the US policy towards Pakistan created serious anxiety and a trust deficit between the two sides (A. Hilali, 2006).

The Pak-US relations witnessed several swings in their relationship. The nature of these relations mainly depended on the nature of the United States' relations with its archrivals, namely the Soviet Union and China. Fluctuation in US-soviet, Sino-US, and Sino-Soviet relations had a decisive impact on American policy towards Pakistan (Jabeen, Mazhar, & Goraya, 2010). On the other hand, Pakistan's economic and security concerns, especially the need to maintain a military balance with India, were the major determining factors shaping Pakistan's policy towards the great powers, including the United States.

2.1.2 Second Engagement: Pakistan as a Frontline State (1979-1989)

Pak-US relations underwent severe mistrust and diplomatic isolation in the late 1970s due to Pakistan's nuclear program; however, Afghanistan's Soviet invasion changed the relationship's complexion at ninety degrees. By December 1979, the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, while we perceived the invasion to expand communist ideology and bring an underdeveloped nation under the vortex of the Soviet Union. As the Cold War clouds were still dark, the US was not ready to let the Soviet's invasion unchecked (Arif, 1984).

Thus, a policy framework was crafted, and Pakistan, being the neighbor state of Afghanistan, again became a blue eye state for the United States (H. Malik, 1987). The US had lost its important regional ally, Iran, because of the Islamic revolution there, and Washington could not have allowed the Asian ground to slip from its hands. The geographical changes brought Washington closer to Pakistan, and the time was ripe to reexamine the Pakistani perception of the Indian threat. President Jimmy Carter, who always gave preference to human rights values and democracy, was changing his stance by

supporting a military regime in Pakistan. President General Zia Ul Haq showed his full commitment and presented himself as a replacement to the Shah of Iran for US interests. He willingly announced to help the US to whatever extent and level he could (Burki, 1988).

At the same time, before that, he was very vocal about the US' negligence in rescuing their friend, Shah. In an interview with the TV channel in 1979, President Zia said, "I think it is the result of the American policies in this region which we are now seeing. The American administration has not been able to realize what is going on. They have been too late in all instances" (Mumtaz Ahmad, 1996). The policies of Pakistan and the US started to meet when both could have refreshed their relationship. In 1982, President Zia visited the USA and held lengthy consultations with the Regan administration. After the meeting, a joint statement was issued "an identity or a similarity of approach to such problems as those in Iran and the Middle East" (Mumtaz Ahmad, 1996). The Pakistani military had shown deep reservations over increasing Soviet military endeavors in Afghanistan just ahead of the full-scale Soviet invasion and called for American assistance.

Agha Shahi, the then foreign affairs advisors, in his meetings with American officials, explained that any development inside Afghanistan ultimately affects Pakistan. Afghanistan is a buffer state that has nearly vanished, and Pakistan considers itself ill-prepared and ill-equipped to face any military adventure in the neighborhood. Mr. Shahi stressed that if Washington wants to do something, it is an accurate time now. However, Mr. Shahi's long plea was not taken into serious accounts until Soviet tanks and troops became a reality in Kabul (Shahi, 1988). Pakistan's security threats of the 1980s were based on a communist threat from the eastern border instead of the danger that used to emanate from the eastern border in the shape of India. In the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars, the US

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security commitment with Pakistan was based on a concept that it will assist Pakistan only if a communist threat knocks at Pakistani borders. However, since the Soviets made inroads in Kabul, the US was hesitant to refresh any such commitment. With the effort of President Regan, Pakistan was exempted from the Symington Amendment. Not only this, but the Regan administration also announced US\$3.2 billion for military and economic aid to Pakistan from the period of 1982-1987 (Hasnat, 2014).

In the US, there was a reconsideration of Pakistan's position as the immediate neighbor of Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, which was the source of the new international crisis. As a result, more than 3 million Afghan refugees immigrated to Pakistan. President Carter declared that "Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens the security of all nations, including the United States." Pakistan was now described as a front-line state (Hilali, 2002). It was essential for the United States to establish cordial relations with Pakistan to provide a substantial quantity of arms to the Mujahideen fighting against Soviet troops in Afghanistan that was not possible without the Pakistan government's active cooperation (D. T. Hagerty, 1995).

In January 1980, President Jimmy Carter offered \$200 million in economic and military aid over two years, plus a \$5 million paltry in assistance for Afghan refugees. After strong urging, Carter increased his offer to \$400 million over several years. This offer was divided equally between economic and military aid. (Tahir-Kheli, 1982). President Zia, however, rejected the US\$ 400 million aid calling it a peanut for revamping military and economic fabric (Burki, 1988). The US government, carefully probing the regional security environment, resumed the military aid of Pakistan. President Carter, on January 21, 1980, in his State of the Union address, stated, "I am asking Congress, as the first order of

business, to pass an economic and military aid package designed to assist Pakistan to defend itself.” (Goldman, 1986) Further, Stephen Cohen clearly defined it:

During this time, the US has ignored the breakdown of Pakistan’s educational system, its uneven economic development, and the growing Islamic radicalism. When it came to radical Islamists, the Reagan Administration did not appear to be worried since they were known to be the best fighters in Afghanistan and were considered to be a threat to the USSR but not to the US. This engagement was a great contribution to ending the Cold War, yet it prospered in the darkening shadow of looming forces that would later come to threaten not only the security of Pakistan and the United States but also the world (Cohen, 2005).

President Zia continued his effort to influence American policy. He tried to change the American attitude by threatening that the United States failed to respond positively to Pakistan’s defense needs. Pakistan had to seek accommodation with the USSR on the Afghan issue.

President Zia said that Afghanistan's invasion brought the Soviet Union to our doorstep. He warned that in the absence of active participation by the US, Pakistan might have to adapt to the new reality. He added: “if you live in the sea, you have to learn to swim with the whales.” Referring to the fact that “History has taught us not to harbor any illusions” regarding US participation, he looked toward China and the Muslim World for support (Tahir-Kheli, 1982). Pakistani attitude created a sense of fear in the United States that, without the active diplomatic efforts on the part of the US, Pakistan might seek accommodation with the Soviet Union at the expense of the United States (Burki, 1988).

The nuclear issue was relegated to a secondary position in the face of Soviet expansionism. A senior State Department official said, 'Nuclear proliferation is now in the background.' When the Reagan administration came to office, the Zia regime had reason to be optimistic. During his election campaign, President Reagan promised to check the Soviet expansion and expressed his determination on Afghanistan's issue. President Reagan recognized that "Pakistan is in a very strategic position now given what has happened to Afghanistan. It is the US interests to support Pakistan" (Arif, 1984; A. Hilali, 2006).

Besides exhibiting a greater understanding of Pakistan's strategic location and its defense needs, the Reagan administration was less inclined than the Carter administration to entertain Indian objections to a possible US Pakistan military aid deal. Being aware of its potential role in American strategy in the region, Pakistan was able to draw several advantages from the US. Islamabad was able to obtain large-scale military and economic aid from the US under a six-year \$3.2 billion package deal, divided almost equally between military and financial assistance. Pakistan also obtained 40 high-performance F-16 fighter aircraft. In September 1987, after successfully implementing a \$3.2 billion aid deal, the US promised to provide further aid under a new \$4.02 billion package deal (Arif, 1984). When Washington resumed economic and military aid to Pakistan, the strained relationship witnessed a refresher start again. Pakistan's stand over the Afghan issue received two side anger. Moreover, Pakistan also suffered badly soon after the Soviet invasion because millions of Afghans came to Pakistan and put an unprecedented burden on the Pakistani economy (Burki, 1988).

The most significant development in Pak-US relations in the 80s was the American readiness to equip Pakistan with F-16 Jet Fighters. The F-16 was given Pakistan to take a better look at aerial violations from the Afghan side but the inclusion of fighter planes as a means to amplify the security and defense against India. The aircraft was urbane and technically so sound that their entry to a fleet of PAF was a matter of serious protection against any aggression emanating from the eastern side. The first batch was given to Pakistan in 1982, while the rest took some time (Baxter, 1993).

However, Pakistan received the rest of the aircraft also, then Pakistan's Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo also visited Washington in 1986. He held talks with President Regan. The center point of discussion was the situation of Afghanistan and the nuclear program of Pakistan. Mr. Regan praised Pakistani role in providing shelter to millions of Afghans and taking a firm stand against the Soviet Union. The meeting was on a positive note declaring the US-Pak Alliance would continue to play an enhanced role in bringing peace to Afghanistan and making it free from foreign aggression (Anwer, Ismail, & Hasan, 1986). One side of the talks was very optimistic; however, the US had serious questions on Pakistan's nuclear program. Moreover, narcotics smuggling to other parts of the world from Afghanistan was also a matter of concern for the United States. The diplomatic discussions were pleasant, but simultaneously, a joint statement reflected Washington's concerns even (Burki, 1988).

2.1.3 Third Engagement: The Post-Cold War Era (Sanctions) (1989-2001)

On 14th April 1988, the Geneva Accord and the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. President Gen. Muhammad Zia ul Haq died in a plane crash

on 17 August 1988 and elected Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto as the first female Prime Minister of Pakistan and the Muslim World. The restoration of democracy in Pakistan, the fall of the communist regime in the region, and the Soviet withdrawal reduced Pakistan's importance as a frontline state (Kux, 2001).

In January 1989, President George H. Bush came into power, and the Cold War was winding down. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev brought a change in Soviet domestic as well as foreign policy and normalized relations with the US. In February 1989, the Soviet Union urged Pakistan to support a political compromise to establish a Kabul government (Hilali, 2002). Despite Benazir's willingness for a political settlement, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, ISI, and the Pakistan army turned down the proposal because they thought that after Soviet withdrawal, the Najibullah communist regime would collapse inevitably. President Bush's administration rejected the idea of a political settlement because conservative Mujahideen supporters in Congress strongly backed this position, urging no ceasefire with the communists (Kux, 2001).

Since the Soviets had landed in Afghanistan, the convergence of interests or needs kept the US and Pakistan in a cordial relationship. It was such a romantic season that several irritant issues (Pakistani nuclear program, US aid to Pakistan) were intentionally put aside or were given less space to deter the friendship. However, as soon as the Soviets were defeated and as per Geneva accord, they left Afghanistan, Pakistan became irrelevant to US strategic calculations in the region. The trust deficit increased, and US President Bush Senior refused to present a certificate before Congress, ensuring Pakistan is not making the nuclear bomb, irked the relationship more than ever (Azmi, 1994).

Meanwhile, he also tabled the Pressler Amendment, and resultantly, some new kinds of military and economic sanctions were enforced on Pakistan. The stern diplomatic tone of the US was badly felt in Pakistan, mostly when the US halted the release of US\$ 1.2 billion worth of weapons to Pakistan for which Pakistan had already paid. Pakistani officials and ambassadors to the United States on several occasions and several forums raised the issue, but it went in vain (Rennack, 2001).

Pakistan repeatedly narrated that NPT or any other agreement by which nuclear activities can be reduced can only be put into force. It can get the desired outcomes if unbiased and applicable to the country initiated the nuclear race in the region. Already Pakistan is facing severe security and defense problems vis-à-vis India, which has an abundance of weapons and has too many conventional weapons (Bennet, 1998). The United States was also busy formulating New World Order after the defeat of the Soviets and the bipolar system's termination. So in the given scenario, Pakistan was given less attention except in the matters where it could have come under sanctions. The country was on the course of bringing diplomatic changes and governments, but the process was so feeble that by 1994, only six years after Zia, three governments came and gone. At that critical time, with the changing international structure and active work of the Indian lobby, the US threatened to declare Pakistan a terror-supporting country. This declaration added further miseries. A fresh bunch of sanctions under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was enforced on Pakistan for activates regarding Chinese missiles (Mann, 1998).

In Washington, policymakers realized that bringing Pakistan under sanctions is a counterproductive exercise. Subsequent developments like the US Defense visit to Pakistan. After that meeting between US President Clinton and Pakistani Prime Minister

Benazir Bhutto. Mr. Clinton “signaled a shift away from the punitive approach that had been pursued thus far by the Washington” (Clinton, 1995). After the meeting, President Clinton pointed out some commonalities between the two states, which can become a reason to control the damage to the relationship between the two sides (Khanna, 1995).

Prime Minister Bhutto for Pakistan’s role in UNO Peacekeeping missions and the sweats in tackling communist threat in Afghanistan. Mr. Clinton also said that the US had discussed several issues, including economic up-gradation and privatization programs, that can transform Pakistani society. With some diplomatic efforts by Pakistan and some damage control efforts by Clinton Administration, the US Congress eased some of the Pressler Amendment sanctions. The amendment resulted in the resumption of non-military aid to Pakistan, a one-time waiver, and military equipment release (Khanna, 1995).

A wide range of issues affected US Pakistan relations during the Clinton administration, including Pakistan’s nuclear development and support for Kashmir uprising, the controversy over F-16’s delivery, drug control, ISI ties with Taliban, and Arab fundamentalists, Pakistan’s atomic explosions in 1998 (Rehman, 2011). The CIA reported that the ISI was involved in cross-border terrorism and provided weapons and training to Arabs and Pakistani fundamentalists who fought against communists in Afghanistan and Indians in Kashmir and maintained close links with international terrorist organizations in the Islamic world (Gargan, 1993). To counter this threat, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif undertook intensive diplomatic efforts to convince the US regarding the Pakistani position concerning a crackdown on Arab and Pakistani extremists, and replacement of Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir as head of the ISI (Kux, 2001). The government also positively responded to the US and UN plans to curb drug production and exports from Pakistan.

Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto was re-elected as Prime Minister of Pakistan on October 6, 1993. She initiated new diplomatic efforts to establish good relations with the US. In 1994, the Clinton administration announced “its willingness to seek congressional approval to deliver the banned F-16 to Pakistan if it agreed to cap its nuclear program”. Further, the India lobby put pressure on the Clinton administration not to release F-16’s delivery to Pakistan (Soofi, 1997).

Pakistan declared that it would not accept nonproliferation measures unless India also accepted them. The other sensitive area of US Pakistan relations was the Afghanistan problem. Pakistani government supported the Taliban movement, a rising force based upon fighters from religious schools and from Afghanistan and Pakistan to establish a pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan. Taliban captured the capital Kabul with little military resistance, with Pakistan's help on September 26, 1996 (Peterson, 2001). The US government's initial reaction to Kabul's capture was positive, later the hardline policies of the Taliban and its establishment of a fundamentalist regime (forcing a woman to stay at home, harboring terrorists, etc.) damaged US Afghanistan relations. Only Pakistan and Saudi Arabia recognized and supported the Taliban regime (A. Z. Hilali, 2006).

In February 1997 elections, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif won a landslide victory and became Prime Minister for the second time. In 1998, missile exports to Pakistan once again had become a cause of disagreement between the US and Pakistan. This time US intelligence declared South Korea, not China, as a culprit. On April 6, 1998, Pakistan fired a medium-range missile ‘Ghauri’ with a range of nine hundred kilometers, to show its military strength in India (Westervelt, 1998). India conducted three underground nuclear tests on May 11, 1998. These explosions had drawn the attention of the world towards

South Asia. Clinton declared it a terrible mistake and a threat to regional stability and imposed sanctions on India (S. Ahmed, 1998).

On the other hand, the Clinton administration tried to stop Pakistan from doing nuclear tests. Despite the US pressure, Pakistan exploded five nuclear devices on May 28, 1998, to maintain nuclear deterrence in the region. Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif maintained, “Today we have settled a score and maintained the regional balance” (S. Ahmed, 1998). The Pakistani nuclear explosion deteriorated US Pakistan relations. The Clinton administration put pressure on both India and Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and normalize relations on Kashmir. The October 1999, a military coup by Musharraf further increased tension between the two nations. (T. Hussain, 2005).

Pakistan had has been the victim of UN and US sanctions sporadically. Though Pakistan bears close ties with the US throughout history, it had to face severe types of sanctions. The US Congress approved the ‘Pressler Amendment’ during the decade of 1980, adopting the stance that Pakistan is trying to develop nuclear weapons (Bennet, 1998). According to this sanctions regime, Pakistan was deprived of the US assistance package. After the Pakistani authorities' assurance, America waived some of its provisions and provided military and economic support to Pakistan. The nuclear explosions of May 1998 were taken as a threat to global peace and a step to create an imbalance of power in the region (Rennack, 2001). In this context, sanctions were reconsidered against India and Pakistan by the US.

Sanction diplomacy in International Politics. Sanctions are supposed to change behavior by the mightier states on the dissident forms. The sanctions phenomenon

represents a synonym of punishment or revenge at some times. The sanctions are related to an International political consensus regarding their application; sanctions work more effectively when there exists a worldwide political understanding. The work also reveals that sanctions diplomacy thoroughly deals with the bilateral behavior and response of both the core and periphery states in international politics (Doxey, 1987).

The economic sanctions forced by a State to punish a nation for being sacrilegious to international law and breaching peace and stability. In such cases of sanctions, trade, business, investments, buying, or selling goods in the global market becomes difficult and impossible for the targeted country. The imposition of sanctions through morality, ethics, or force leaves a serious setback to the targeted States. The economic sanctions are an important and influential tool to change the identified State's behavior for the compliance of International law, maintenance of the balance of power, peace, and stability (Daoudi & Dajani, 1983). The US sanctions have been used to justify repression and excuse incompetence against Pakistan, particularly (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 1999).

The politics of sanctions is a crucial element of the foreign policy of different major international powers. It is a policy perspective of the core states to threaten distant periphery and weaker states to develop a substantial influence, pressure, and acquire determined foreign policy objectives in world politics. Coercive diplomacy had remained the practice of powerful actors to achieve their goals by imposing various sanctions (Nossal, 1989). Therefore, the United States has used this strategy as an essential part of its foreign policy to suppress the target states to acquire the United States' formulated regional and global interests (Doxey, 1987).

Furthermore, the comparison based analysis is also reflected to reveal how the policy of sanctions has been successful against both these states (Mistry, 1999). How far the sanctions affected the states and forced them to change their behavior is also the project's focal point. The study also emphasizes the Politics of Sanctions as a key device of US foreign policy as the sole superpower in the contemporary international environment.

2.2 US Engagement with India

Even though India had stayed a partner of the Soviet Union in the Cold War period, yet because of its land size, enormous populace, market potential, and expanded worldwide presence, India stayed the most favorite US (Azmi, 1983). India has been viewed as a critical player in the rising multi-polar world. Indian populace is about multiple times more significant than the US and is expected to cross China by 2025. Indian Diaspora is spread the whole way across the world. India also has a substantial rising white collar class, which speaks to American corporations' tremendous market (Stephen P. Cohen, 2002).

The Indian data ventures and mainstream society are gaining acceptable ground at extending their worldwide markets and have even developed a space program (Nye, 2010). India sees itself as the dominant power of South Asia because of its size, populace, industrial and innovative development, and military may (Shahi, 1988). Besides, India conveys a prevailing individual from the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). India accepts her usual spot as one of Asia's three significant states, even as it stays underdeveloped, with countless its populace despite everything living in a state of poverty (T. Ahmad, 2015).

In spite of being an atomic force, a rising economy, and a noteworthy nation as far as soft power, the country can't be viewed as a worldwide force to a great extent on account of awkward governments and an absence of capacity to wander past South Asia even on significant global issues (Manzoor Ahmad, Yousaf, & Shah, 2016). Her ascent could then sabotage Asian dependability, as the balance of power is influenced, particularly in her relations with Pakistan. With the changing world order, India is reluctant to defy, nor does it need to be a union pioneer to counter the US by an Indo-China or Russian coalition since its international strategy is planned for fortifying multilateral establishments. Impossible that India represents a danger to the US sooner rather than later. Nonetheless, it has adequate assets to turn into a working alliance with China, despite significant contrasts despite everything between India and China (Nye, 2010).

Relations between the world's two most significant majority rule governments, India and the US, have experienced numerous hindrances throughout the years. As of not long ago, the two nations had constrained associations and a couple of agreeable undertakings. Be that as it may, the relationship has improved significantly in recent years, and today is better than at any past point ever. Through exchange on various issues, at different degrees of government, the scholarly community, and the press, the current relationship has accomplished extraordinary profundity and development (R. Lal & Rajagopalan, 2004). Nicholas Burns states:

As we Americans consider our future role in the world, the rise of a democratic and increasingly powerful India represents a singularly positive opportunity to advance our global interests. There is a tremendous strategic upside to our growing

engagement with India. That is why building a close US India partnership should be one of the United States' highest priorities for the future (Burns, 2007).

2.2.1 First Engagement: Carter's Urge to be Friendly with India

The improvement of United States relations with India was also significant on Carter's list of South Asia priorities (Kux, 1992). After the emergence of Bangladesh because of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, the US recognized India as the dominant power in South Asia. Under the Carter Administration, American officials became much more outspoken in emphasizing their need to identify Indian hegemony in the region and assign India a leading role in South Asia. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher publicly stated in New Delhi in July 1977 that Washington expected India to play a leading role in South Asia (Tahir-Kheli, 1982). From the Pakistani standpoint, this statement was no different from the strategy the Soviets had been pressing on Pakistan since 1965. Pakistanis saw his announcement as conclusive proof that the United States had abandoned Pakistan to the wolves.

In December 1978, Carter visited both Iran and India but ignored Pakistan. Pakistani officials saw this as a downgrading of the US's earlier pledge of Pakistan and a corollary of Brzezinski's regional influential concept. India and Iran were regarded as regional leaders. It was expected that these two states' preeminence would lead to a general pacification of the region (Manzoor Ahmad et al., 2016). Whatever the American intentions were behind making India the regional leader, this policy negatively affected the Pakistani leadership and nation. Despite Pakistan's relative weakness vis-à-vis India, it rejected outright the American idea of assigning India the leadership role in South Asia (Arif, 1984).

2.2.2 Second Engagement: Clinton's Visit to India: the Turning Point

President Clinton spent seven days in length visit to India in March 2000, flagging a significant international strategy change. By June 2001, the US took substantial measures to improve India's relations, including joint military activities (Malik, 2008). Notwithstanding, the genuine defining moment came in mid-1999 when Clinton powerfully interceded to get Pakistan to pull back the powers it had sent over the Line of Control in Kashmir (LoC) close to the town of Kargil. In March 2000, Clinton caught up with a profoundly fruitful five-day outing to India and afterward went on to a spur of the moment five-hour visit in Pakistan. Clinton's help of India in the 1999 Kargil episode was against Pakistan. His open communication sees that the United States has no enthusiasm for Balkanizing India facilitated, if not deleted, the conventional Indian discernments about US antagonistic vibe (C. R. Mohan, 2007a).

Despite the fact that Clinton carried new warmth to Indian US relations and effectively evacuated a significant part of the toxic substance that had amassed during the Cold War, India's struggle to adjust to world order adjustments proceeded. In the first-since forever meaningful and continued political and security exchange among Washington and New Delhi from 1998 to 2000, the Clinton organization looked for Indian help for an activity to advance vote based system around the world (Talbott, 2010).

In 1998, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee proclaimed that India and the United States, as the world's biggest and popular democracies, were natural allies, a term in this manner received by presidents Clinton and Bush (Jayapalan, 2001). Lately, we have seen what may end up being a basic reordering of Indo-US relations. Clinton generally asserted

his visit spoke to the first presidential outing to the subcontinent in over two decades. The genuine defining moment, be that as it may, came in mid-1999 when Clinton commandingly mediated to get Pakistan to pull back its powers sent over the Line of Control in Kashmir close to the town of Kargil (Manzoor Ahmad et al., 2016). In March 2000, as recently referenced, Clinton caught up with a profoundly fruitful five days outing to India and afterward went on to a shallow five-hour visit in Pakistan. A half-year later, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee encountered all the trappings of an official state visit to Washington. He was feted by the US political, financial, and diversion first-class welcomed to address Congress's joint meeting (Hathaway, 2001).

2.3 Afghanistan: A Historical Context and Contemporary Geopolitical Dynamics

Rosanne Klass quotes Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India (1899-1905), to highlight the geopolitical significance of Afghanistan: “Turkistan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia are the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the dominance of the world” (Klass, 1990). Consequently, Afghanistan's borders were drawn to suit these two imperial neighboring powers; a state comprising of diverse ethnic groups was thus established. Besides ethnic diversity, the country is also divided geographically by a Mountain Range known as the Hindu Kush, running almost through Afghanistan's central parts from northeast to southwest (Kaplan, 2010).

Ethnic groups in northern Afghanistan like Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen are indistinguishable from those living in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (The central Asian States sharing common borders with Afghanistan). While Eastern, Southern, and Central Afghanistan are inhabited by Pashtuns (the largest ethnic group), sizeable

Hazaras, and some Balochs who have their co-ethnics in Pakistan and Iran (Klass, 1990). Thus Afghanistan has cultural, linguistic, and ethnic linkages with its Muslim neighbors, Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian states and has been called a ‘nation at the crossroads’ because of its central location among these countries. Attacks by external powers have been a threat to Afghanistan for centuries because of the trade routes traversing through the land; Afghanistan's geographical position adjacent to strategically pivotal Central Asia has made the country vital to all interested stakeholders in the region (Gregorian, 1969).

Afghanistan can also be regarded as the converging point of diverging geopolitical regions, inhabiting many civilizations, towards South, predominantly Muslim Pakistan barricades Hindu India's Northward access. While in the North and North East, the energy-rich Central Asian region, home to a mostly Muslim populace along with sizeable Orthodox Christian civilization, is crisscrossed by the ‘Amu Darya’ and ‘Syr Darya rivers.’ In the East is the Confucius civilization of China, whereas, towards the West, it lays Shia majority of Iran, adjacent to the Sunni populated Arabian Peninsula (Gregorian, 1969). Afghanistan thus is not merely a corridor; located at the crossroad of routes in Asia, and it draws geopolitical influence from the regions around.

From 1793, a prolonged period of disunity heralded in Afghanistan, which growing competition between the British empires and USSR. Each sought to stop the other from gaining a hold over the area (Gregorian, 1969). In the 20th century, Afghanistan witnessed another rivalry shaping its soil between two superpowers of the era, the USSR and the USA, as the USSR considered Afghanistan well under its sphere of influence for being in the neighborhood. With the soviet military incursion of Afghanistan as a direct threat to American national benefits, President Carter's doctrine is stimulating the response. At the

regional level, Afghanistan is located at the confluence of some declared nuclear powers, such as China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and aspirants like Iran.

Notwithstanding the Russian empire's apparent reluctance towards occupying Afghanistan, the geopolitical significance of the country was such that each belligerent viewed with suspicion any move of the adversary in the immediate region. However, there was a strong element within the Russian military that was enthused with the geopolitical value of Afghanistan for realizing the ultimate objective of occupying the 'Indian Subcontinent.' Russian plan to invade India through Afghanistan was formulated in 1891 but not implemented as Moscow did not want to antagonize the British Empire (Wyatt, 2011). As appreciated by the Russians, the occupation of Afghanistan was imperative for any southward expansion; the country's importance for such ventures was never lost to the British. Anyhow the geopolitical significance of Afghanistan for both the competing powers of the era; the country's buffer status continued to be respected by Great Britain and the Soviet Union (Jervis & Snyder, 1991). In the era of the 'Great Game,' the Russian leadership has not been overly inclined towards southward expansion; the competition, however, underlined the significance of Afghanistan as a neutral state to ensure peace and stability. (Shahrani, 2008).

The assertion is relevant in Europe's context, where greater interdependence has facilitated the economic integration of the region. Notwithstanding the increasing awareness of the essence of economic interdependence even in the periphery, the superior powers' geopolitical aspirations did not allow the concept to prevail in conformity with its manifestation in the center (Klass, 1990). Consequently, the hydrocarbon-rich Central Asian states also became victims of a global contest for influence, plummeting regional

economic integration prospects. The appearance of Independent Central Asian states in Afghanistan's neighborhood following the defeat of the USSR brought into the limelight renewed debates on the geopolitical significance of the region. Being at the doorstep of Southward transit of the Central Asian energy resources, Afghanistan continued to face external meddling through local proxies, fueling an air of mistrust and suspicion in the entire region (McCauley, 2002).

Increasing inclination towards the concepts of 'interdependence,' the proposals of the greater economic integration of the region through plans such as the revival of the Silk Road flourished. As global and regional actors desired a greater share in the pie, there was the beginning of a new round of the great game. Whereas the American led Western block intended the emancipation of Central Asia from the Russian sphere of influence by opening toward the south, regional players also undertook respective alignments to safeguard their interests (Dorronsoro, 2005). American Silk Road proposal contemplated Central and South Asia's linkage, primarily incorporating its new strategic India; China responded with the plan to revive the ancient Chinese version of Silk Road. With Afghanistan assuming a center stage in the new great game to benefit from the energy transit and trade potential of the region, the geopolitical contest has been accelerating (Weinbaum, 2006).

The contemporary geopolitical contest is not restricted between the superior powers; the regional players like Pakistan, Iran, India, and Afghanistan are also vying for maximum gains. The emergence of new states amid the demise erstwhile Soviet Union in 1991 invited interest of now 'Global Hegemon,' the triumphant US. The desire to control Central Asian energy resources was facilitated with Afghanistan's occupation, initiating a new round of 'Great Game' (Scott & Alcenat, 2008).

It is no more secret that the post 9/11 American invasion of Afghanistan was not merely an effort against the terrorists involved in the incident; the presence in Afghanistan served the US's geostrategic interests as well (C. Wagner, 2010). Thus, it is apparent that the US interests in Eurasia are focused on the control of Central Asian natural resources to contain emerging powers like Russia or China; occupation or presence in Afghanistan facilitates American objectives in the region. In the process, the manipulation of Afghan natural resources, which is quite significant, is obtained by default (Brzezinski, 2016).

The Eurasian energy issues are of vital importance from a global geo-commercial as well as a geopolitical perspective. Given Europe's growing dependence on Russian energy resources, the political awakening in the Middle East, and the West's differences with Iran over its nuclear program, strategic challenges to the US-led transatlantic alliance are ever-increasing. The continued instability in Afghanistan, the resurgence of Vladimir Putin's Russia in the global arena, and China's thrust for energy have profound geopolitical implications (Brzezinski, 2016). Afghanistan's geographical significance as an energy transit route and potential to facilitate the quest of global powers in controlling Central Asian hydrocarbon resources has long been recognized. In the regional milieu, Afghanistan assumes a significant role in connecting the Central Asian energy resources with energy-starved South Asia as a 'transit' corridor.

The contest over controlling the supply of Central Asian gas has been intensifying among various players; the US has been a major proponent of the pipeline project proposed to move Turkmen gas to Pakistan through Afghanistan. According to analysts, the global contest over energy will be "a pivotal, if not central, a feature of world affairs for the remainder of the century" (Klare, 2009). Notwithstanding diverse US objectives in the

region, transforming Afghanistan as an energy transit hub has been one of the priority goals. Former US Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, Richard Boucher said in September 2008:

One of our goals is to stabilize Afghanistan, so it can become a conduit and a hub between South and Central Asia so that energy can flow to the south and so that the countries of Central Asia are no longer bottled up between two enormous powers of China and Russia, but rather they have outlets to the south as well as to the north and the east and the west (Boucher, 2008).

2.3.1 Cold War Era

Before the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan, the geopolitical milieu was distinguished by the contest between the residents and foreign powers in Eurasian Rimland. In contrast, the Soviet Union had a geographical and conventional military advantage, and the US sought to offset this imbalance with nuclear weapons. In the 1970s, however, in the face of a massive Soviet build-up, US strategic nuclear superiority receded into a parity position; it emboldened a more aggressive Soviet foreign policy, expressed in the invasion of Afghanistan (Sempa, 2002). As mentioned earlier, the Russo-Britain agreement on maintaining Afghanistan's status as a buffer between the two empires shaped the regional ambiance until the early 20th century.

It is, though, generally accepted that Moscow has been receptive to the idea of Afghanistan continuing as the buffer between Marxist and Capitalist worlds throughout the cold war (Saull, 2007). Consequently, it is being argued that USSR leadership did not invade Afghanistan in 1979 to challenge American sway in the region or expand its

influence southward to access warm water ports at the Indian Ocean (Trenin & Trenin, 2002). The development would have been catastrophic for the Soviet Union as until then, and the Marxist USSR was globally in advance while the US-led capitalist block was continuously on the retreat, receiving one set back after others. In the region, the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan and revolution in Iran raised fears of a strategic threat. They engendered the belief among many that the US was not tough enough in its world posture (Jervis & Snyder, 1991). As the stakes for both the superpowers were enormous, the Soviets invaded and removed its neighborhood's perceived threat. At the same time, the US response was articulated based on the 'Carter Doctrine.' As a consequence, President Jimmy Carter underlined the geopolitical significance of Afghanistan in these words:

The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position; therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil (J. Carter, 1980).

As the Russian invasion of Afghanistan during the cold war arrived at a time when globally, the US was envisaged to be on the retreat; with the growing sway of nationalist movements in many parts of the world, American vulnerabilities in the geopolitical contest with its adversary were displaying an upward trend. Against this backdrop, the Islamic revolution in Iran vis-à-vis dependence of the US on Middle Eastern oil was perceived as a major blow to American international economic and political standing (Jervis & Snyder, 1991).

Consequently, the signs of American weariness were neither lost to the allies globally, Moscow remained indifferent; the US's domestic concerns had also been visible. These developments were plentiful to infuse a 'deep sensitivity' among American policymakers against Soviet advances.

Though global geopolitical environments prior to the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR seemed immensely favorable to Moscow, the Soviet leaders regarded the regional environments slightly differently. The Soviets viewed the fall of the pro-US regime in Iran as a constructive event; nonetheless, the Sino-US rapprochement did cause anxiety in Moscow (Sempa, 2002). While apprehensive of potential American efforts to topple the revolutionary government in Iran, the Soviet Union was wary of the US regaining foothold prospects in the region was a realistic proposition, necessitating an adequate response. The Saur revolution in Afghanistan, resulting in the seizure of power by the Khalq party in Kabul, was seen in Moscow as a natural event. In contrast, the American response was viewed surprisingly (Dorronsoro, 2005). There has been a perception among policymakers in Moscow. The US did not respond to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; instead, Washington was already trying to regain influence in the region after the fall of Shah Iran.

According to some analysts, anxiety created by the oil crisis exacerbated American reaction: Soviet 'aid' to Afghanistan 'was interpreted by the majority of US organs of mass information as a step allegedly directed toward an exit to the Persian Gulf to establish control over the main supplies of oil for the 'free world (Jervis & Snyder, 1991).' The Soviet policies regarding the developments in Afghanistan were mainly driven by geopolitical considerations than the motivation to support a regime that was ideologically

aligned with Moscow. If, on the one hand, the collapse of the pro-American regime near the Soviet Union was a retort, conversely, Moscow was apprehensive with Sino-US collusion. Consequently, Soviet leadership was loath to allow the US an opportunity to re-establish itself in the region, Afghanistan being the perceptible alternative (Trenin & Trenin, 2002).

It is evident that as long as the ‘buffer or insular’ status of a geopolitically important area of Afghanistan remained intact and respected by the belligerents, Afghans enjoyed peace and stability. The significance of Afghanistan has been such that its occupation by the adversary or even mere indication of serious intent in this regard, has been viewed as a crossing of the red line. The inception of the cold war witnessed the ideological contest between the Western and Eastern blocks; the American strategy against the Soviet challenge during this period has revolved around the famous Truman, Nixon, and Carter doctrines, named after the three presidents. After World War II, the US policy was essentially based upon the Truman Doctrine: Truman held that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” (Overholt, 2007).

The reports that the Afghan expert Communist pioneer at that point, Hafizulla Amin, was purportedly going to change sides and, as a token of his new devotion, was prepared to invite the US missile launch observing stations that progressive Iran had quite recently shut down (Trenin & Trenin, 2002). The development would have been catastrophic for the Soviet Union until then. The Marxist USSR was globally advancing while the US-led capitalist block was continuously retreating, receiving one setback after another. As the stakes for both the superpowers were enormous, the Soviets invaded and

removed the immediate neighborhood's perceived threat. Simultaneously, the US response was articulated based on the 'Carter Doctrine' (Jervis & Snyder, 1991). Consequently, Soviet leadership was reluctant to allow the US an opportunity to re-establish itself in the region, Afghanistan being the pawn in the geopolitical battle for leverage over south Asia. It is evident that as long as the 'buffer or insular' status of the geopolitically important area of Afghanistan remained intact and respected by the belligerents, Afghans enjoyed peace and stability (Saull, 2007).

2.3.2 Post-Cold War Era

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the emergence of six independent Muslim states in Central Asia. Successive Pakistan governments were desperately keen to open up direct land routes for trade with the Central Asian states (Fitzgerald, Vira, & Cordesman, 2011). The major hindrance was the continuing civil war in Afghanistan among the Mujahedeen factions in the power struggle. It's noteworthy to mention Afghanistan's socio-political situation before the emergence of the Taliban to comprehend the factors, which led to the rise of this movement (Buckley & Fawn, 2004). At this time, Afghanistan was acutely suffering from a leadership crisis and a vacuum of trusted government. There was no central rule, no state mechanism, and no security. Kabul and the area to its Northeast were under the control of Burhanuddin Rabbani (Leader of Jamiat-e Islami and 10th President of Afghanistan), and Ahmad Shah Massud (Leader of Jamiat-e Islami), Herat under the control of Ismail Khan (Governer of Herat), Mazar-e-sharif under General Abdul Rashid Dostum (Vice President of Afghanistan), the South Easter districts were controlled by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Leader of Hezb-e Islami and Prime Minister of Afghanistan) and so on (B. Shah, 2000).

Pakistan was faced with a dilemma. Either Pakistan should continue supporting Hekmatyar to bring a Pashtun gathering to control in Kabul, or inclination for a force sharing understanding between all the Afghan groups with the goal that a steady Afghan government could open the ways to central Asia (S. A. A. Shah, 2006). In any case, given the way that somewhere in the range of 20% of the Pakistani military was comprised of Pakistani Pashtuns and the ace Pashtun and Islamic fundamentalist anteroom inside the ISI and the military was robust, they stayed resolved to accomplish a Pashtun triumph in Afghanistan. Be that as it may, by 1994, Hikmatyar had fizzled, losing ground militarily, and his radicalism isolated the Pashtuns. Pakistan was becoming weary of sponsorship a failure and was searching for other potential Pashtun proxies (Rashid, 2002).

The proceeding with a civil war in Afghanistan corresponded with the rise of the Taliban development. Intrigued by their accomplishment in stifling rowdy Mujahedeen officers and forcing harmony in and around Kandahar, Islamabad's pioneers chose to support the Taliban as an option to the irksome Rabbabi government, which had built up close connections with the Indians (R. Hussain, 2002). As ethnic Pashtun, the Taliban have nearest interfaces with Pakistan where large numbers of them grown up and concentrated in madrassas run by Maulana Fazlur Rehman and his Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam a strict gathering, which had impressive help among the Pashtuns in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) presently called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). All the more fundamentally, Fazlur Rehman was a political partner of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. He approached the legislature, the military, and the ISI, who bought into this recently developing power (R. Hussain, 2002).

To the arrange with the Taliban, an Afghan exchange improvement cell was set up in the inside service headed by General Naseerullah Babar, which had the errand of building up an exchange course to central Asia, even though its chief undertaking was to provide strategic support to the Taliban (Rashid, 2002). Under General Naseerullah Babar's direction, the ISI provided transportation, fuel, and interchanges gear and exhortation to the Taliban development. The inquiry concerning whether Pakistani components likewise offered dynamic battle backing to the Taliban stays questioned, yet examiners point to some fortuitous proof to show that such help was to be sure offered in certain significant fights (R. Hussain, 2002).

In the battle for Kandahar in November 1994, the Taliban were joined by hordes of fighters described by observers as militarily trained JUI madrassas in Baluchistan, a Sunni Deobandi political party in Pakistan (Islam, 2012). However unverified, there are repetitive reports that these students included proficient armed force fighters sent in by Pakistan to free an exchange escort held up by neighborhood administrators close to Kandahar. The fall of Herat to the Taliban in September 1995 also owed its success to the role played by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, where they supplied arms, ammunition, and vehicles to the Taliban (Jessica, 2000). The Saudi Intelligence boss Prince Turki Al-Faisal visited Islamabad and Kandahar in July 1996 to talk about with the ISI another arrangement to take Kabul, and the two nations ventured up provisions to the Taliban (Mahendarajah, 2015). Pakistan provided another phone and remote system for the Taliban, restored the Kandahar air terminal, and assisted with saving parts and combat hardware for the Taliban's Air Force while providing food, fuel, and ammo, including rockets. The Saudis gave fuel,

cash, and many new pickups to the Taliban. Quite a bit of this guide was flown into Kandahar air terminal from the Gulf port city of Dubai (Rashid, 2002).

Many volunteers showed up from Pakistan, where some Ulema (Muslim researchers) had shut down their madrassas. Consequently, the understudies would have no real option except to enroll with the Taliban. A large number of Pakistani understudies and Afghans from refugee camps started to show up day by day in Kandahar on transports employed by Pakistan's Islamic gatherings, in this fight for Kabul in September 1996 and that for Mazar-e-Sharif in August 1998, on the two events, believable reports affirm the nearness of Pakistani military counselors in the Taliban positions (Rubin, 2013).

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto portrayed the fall of Kabul as an invite advancement. At the same time, Naseerullah Babar merrily expressed that the ascent of the Taliban is of extraordinary preferred position to Pakistan since this is the first run through an administration, which has no connections with India or any other person (Griffin, 2001). The sudden capture of Kabul by the Taliban in September 1996 prompted many people to speculate that Americans supported the Taliban either directly or indirectly through UNOCAL (this petroleum company was also known as Union Oil Company of California) or their allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Richard Mackenzie, Editor-in-head of Global News Services and a customary guest to Afghanistan had revealed a few US goals in giving the full apparatus backing to the Taliban. Two of those goals were significant; the Taliban was filling in as a defense against Russian and Iranian interests in Afghanistan and encouraging the development of oil and gas pipelines for US oil organizations bypassing Iran (Knightley, 2001). The Unocal consortium in 1996 had plans to extend the pipeline from the focal Asian province of Turkmenistan to Pakistan, and the United States and the

oil consortium needed the vast majority of Afghanistan to be under the steady control of one government to guarantee the pipeline's security (Rashid, 2002).

Between 1994 and 1996, the US bolstered the Taliban politically through its partners Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Because Washington saw the Taliban as hostile to Iranian, against Shia, and genius Western. The US helpfully overlooked the Taliban's Islamic fundamentalist plan and its concealment of ladies. There was no expression of US analysis after the Taliban caught Herat in 1995 and tossed out many young ladies from schools. When the Taliban captured Kabul, the US was likewise quiet on the Taliban's suppression of Kabul's ladies. Encouraged all states to draw in the Taliban and not disengage them "The Taliban control more than two-thirds of the country, they are Afghan, and they are indigenous, they have demonstrated staying power." (Rubin, 2013).

The genuine wellsprings of their prosperity have been numerous Afghans' readiness, mostly Pashtuns, to implicitly exchange constant battling and disorder for a proportion of harmony and security even with extreme social limitations. It isn't in light of a legitimate concern for Afghanistan or any of us in Pakistan that the Taliban be disengaged (S. Ahmed, 2002). One key explanation behind US enthusiasm for Afghanistan was the four-five billion dollars oil and gas pipeline the US-drove oil consortium wanted to work across war-desolated Afghanistan. The Unocal consortium dreaded there could be no pipeline as long as Afghanistan was in a civil war condition between rival warlords. In this way, the US empowered Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to help the Taliban, positively straight up to Kabul's catch (Knightley, 2001).

The Clinton administration was thoughtful to the Taliban as they were by Washington's enemy of Iran strategy and were significant for accomplishing any southern pipeline from Central Asia. From the get-go in 1997, Unocal carried a Taliban designation to Washington, campaigning for US acknowledgment (Knightley, 2001). By late 1997, be that as it may, world assessment was insulted by updates on the very abusive strategies of the Taliban, particularly as to ladies. US women's activist gatherings mounted weight against both the Unocal and Clinton administration, requesting an adjustment in strategy towards the Taliban (Harpviken, 1999). The US strategy turnaround from late 1997 was driven only by American women's activists against the Taliban. The ladies' vote was critical for Bill Clinton in the 1996 races, and he was unable to disregard this current ladies' gathering. As usual, with Clinton's plan, local political concerns exceeded remote policymaking and allies' desires (Rubin, 2013).

In 1998-99, the Taliban's help of Osama Bin Laden provided extra motivations to the US to get extreme with the Taliban. The US besieging of Bin Laden's camps in Afghanistan in August 1998 constrained Unocal to pull out its staff from Islamabad and Kandahar. Lastly, in December 1998, it officially pulled back from the Gas consortium, which it had battled so challengingly to set up (S. Zaidi, 2001).

2.4 Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda is a revolutionary organization which was founded by Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. These militants were organized in the Middle East and Asia to support thousands of followers in the world (J. Burke, 2004). They are involved in the most brutal attacks in the name of Islam. Several groups of splinter

militants have snatched the attention of the world and are creating global issues for the sake of jihad and Shariah. Al-Qaeda was not able to control the world due to the influence of militant organizations. Al-Qaeda was very difficult to control due to the unknown and mysterious, and hidden operations. They were producing violence in the name of jihad. They kept the world in their terror due to their violence and cruelty (Bergen, 2002b).

Jamal Al Fadl Jamal Al Fadl provided the information to American authorities with this grim picture of how this militant organization was formed. The founder's rigidity was obvious through his brutal acts, and the full information was based on the evidence of Jamal Al Fadl (Gray, 2015). The organization leader is a commander historically; moreover, he was the Senior Operations Chief of al-Qaeda before his assassination on May 1, 2011, by US forces. On the other hand, Ayman al-Zawahiri was the Deputy Operation chief of AL Qaeda before the death of bin Laden. He played the role of commander successfully, as Al-Qaeda announced it on the 16th of June 2011. Saif al-Adel took charge after him as an interim commander. It was recommended to Osama ben Laden to estimate the western officials to consist of 20–30 people by the Shura Council. AtiyaAbd al Rehman was the second in command, and he died on the 22nd of August 2011. Pakistan Intelligence officials declared on 5th June 2012 that Abu Yahya al-Libi, the alleged successor of Al-Rehman had been executed in Pakistan (Gray, 2015).

The major objective of Al-Qaeda is to get rid of the Muslims from western sovereignty and their dominance. Their idea is to implement the system of an Islamic caliphate that imposed the Sunni interpretation of Shariah law strictly and will urge people to follow those constitutions. Keeping in mind the central goal to accomplish these objectives, they chose the way of violence by using force known as global jihad. They

carried out the attacks against the Western world because Al-Qaeda considered Western's opponents and the most significant hurdle for their target. Al-Qaeda is contradicted to all non-Sunni elucidations of Islam. It legitimizes violence against Muslim citizens, ladies, and children on the rule that their translation of Islam is not the correct one and has executed those people because of it as a true consideration as per the global jihad aspect (Atwan, 2008).

The actual mean of the term Al-Qaeda is base on the Arabic language (Naim, 2003). The name 'Al Qaeda' originates from the word for one of the mujahedeen preparing camps built up amid the Afghan insurrection against the Soviet attack in the 1980s. Laden described it in a taped interview with Al Jazeera in October 2001. The name was brainstormed by Abu Ebeida El-Banashiri about one of these camps and signified the establishment of the base (Griffin, 2003). The size evaluations for center Al Qaeda individuals are moderately low. In any case, the association has a tight-knit core leadership group. Generally, it uses agents from militant partner groups. The financial resources at the initial level consisted of Laden's personal property and finance in the fight of the Soviet Union. Al-Qaeda is growing more significant; the central funding resource is the drug trade that firmly supports the militant organization (Suchan, 2010).

Afghanistan is the vast market of heroin globally; a significant part of this profit comes from the wealth of Al-Qaeda for the support and the growth of Al-Qaeda. Another finance resource is Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) that donates to financially support the organization (J. Burke, 2004). Several wealthy supporters were staying in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Islamic Countries. The Taliban, both while the official legislature of the

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996-2001) and as a guerilla group, gave the place of refuge to Al Qaeda pioneers and aggressors alike (Chhabra, 2010).

Militarily, their particular contenders and center initiative, Al-Qaeda, draws on many activist associations' strengths. Most remarkable among these are the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and Lashkar-e-Taiba. As Al Qaeda endures setbacks in individual and ability, the association has become progressively more dependent on these affiliated organizations' backing and agents (Chhabra, 2010). Al-Qaeda has a strong influence throughout the world. Al Qaeda was founded in 100 countries of the world and produced suspected cells there. These cells were shifted in the UK, the US, Italy, Uganda, France, Somalia, Albania, Spain, and many other parts of the world. The headquarters of this militant organization was in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda has its allied groups in Somalia, Uzbekistan, Mali, Egypt, the Philippines, Iraq, and Yemen (Bergen, 2002a).

Al-Qaeda uses different strategies to achieve its goals. They have been using many ways to get their objectives by hook or crook. They introduced the technique of suicide bombings, grenades, rocket & small arms attacks, kidnapping & hostage-taking, hijackings, and propaganda, ransom (Atwan, 2008). They used these techniques against various countries, including the Middle East and all western states. The organization was the threat to the peace of the world because they used to target foreign forces and the civilian without any discrimination. The Western countries and their inhabitants were their prime targets (Bergen, 2002a). It was confirmed in the September 11, 2001 assaults that the objective was not just to bring about death and obliteration to the United States and its allied groups or incite the West but also to demolish the residence universal economies.

The assaults were expected on the whole to accomplish more than \$1 trillion in harm to New York City and the worldwide economy (Bergen, 2002a).

It was not a political organization, and it had no concern with politics and politicians worldwide. Laden bolstered that adherents concentrate on training and inducing others to join, instead of political engagement with Islamic political groups. The degree of Al-Qaeda's political alliance was with the Taliban in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, when the procurement of a place of refuge and broad work between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda proposes that Al-Qaeda utilized developmental impact on the Taliban as a political arm for their development. As the two organizations started to become separated and straightforwardly contradicted one another in the 2000s, this became less practical for receptacle Laden's association (Wright, 2006).

Al Qaida is famous for the mission to get maximum profit for organizational purposes. They have the ability to make the membership benefits as per their objectives and the prominently efficient structure of commands. Selecting learners and militants generally happen through engagement with neighboring tribes in Pakistan and Afghanistan, with offers to pay newcomers between \$1,000-\$1,500 every month in addition to various advantages and get in return for the sworn dependability and mystery. When they get to be prepared individuals from Al-Qaeda, pay ranges from \$300-500 every month for activists, and incorporates extra advantages (Wright, 2006).

2.5 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the epicenter of this militant organization. Baitullah Mehsud founded this organization in December 2007; He died on

August 23, 2009. They grew bigger and extended their fighting force of 3000-10000 men. Some noteworthy commanders were Dr. Ismail, Wali ur Rehman Mehsud, Saeed ur Rehman, Omar Khalid, Shah Sahib, Haji Sahib Turangzai, Hamza Afridi, Momin Afridi, Mufti Ilyas, Hakim Ullah Mehsud, and some others (Abbas, 2008). The initial target of these militants was some political elements of the government of Pakistan. They have written their name in the most brutal and cowardly people of history by attacking a military school in Peshawar and killing the children with cruelty (Valentine, 2009).

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan's administration units were separated along with their tribal loyalties. Driving the warriors from the Ahmadzai Wazirs, Maulvi Nazeer was unpredictable in his backing to TTP contenders of the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan organization. He was agreeable with the Pakistan Army and Pakistani state resources, even when the TTP went under assault. Another critical Taliban pioneer who has wanted to stay nonpartisan in battle, including the Pakistan Army, is Mullah Sadiq Noor. Hafiz Gulbahadar of the North Waziristan Agency likewise had contrasted with Baitullah Mehsud and has a working peace accord with the Pakistan Army (Yusufzai, 2008). Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan has a rigid Sunni ideology. They wanted to impose the Shariah and the laws of Islam in Pakistan and the whole world forcefully. They tried to impose jihad on the world as a whole. They were aimed to battle forces of imperialist fighting against Muslims in Afghanistan and around the globe, to fight against the people who are not believing in Jihad against the Pakistani state and Pakistan Army. (Weiser & Moynihan, 2010).

The collaboration of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan with Al-Qaeda was very strong. They started their activities as per the missions and lines of the Al Qaeda. Baitullah Mehsud openly accepted in an interview with Al-Jazeera that Al-Qaeda has a strong influence on

TTP (Z. A. Khan, 2011). The US State Department, in its appraisal of Al Qaeda-TTP relations. The shared participation gives TTP access to both, the Al-Qaeda worldwide terrorist system and its individuals' operational experience. TTP is a power multiplier for Al Qaeda (Joscelyn, 2013). Foreign intelligence agencies are the primary source of funds other than Al-Qaeda. The knowledge about their resources is not very obvious, but it is opened that foreign intelligence agencies such as RAW are the real financial mean of this militant organization (Zeb & Ahmed, 2019).

TTP has also been involved in kidnapping for ransom and extortion to raise funds. It also raises money through donations and involvement in the drug trade. The organization's other financial resources are the illegal and criminal activities included in Kidnapping and blackmail to raise funds. It likewise raises cash through gifts and is included in the medication exchange (Yusufzai, 2008). There are three sections on which the TTP is influenced, the influence of their ideology, intelligence agencies, and Al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan (Grare, 2009).

Baitullah Mashood accepted that Al-Qaeda highly influences the TTP. The formation of the organization got delayed due to the hurdles in local militias and the requirement of assistance from Uzbek fighters and Arabs. Tehrik-i-Taliban's main training base in tribal agencies; they were recruited from the madrassas in South Punjab and Karachi, and several local groups, including Islami Taliban, Jaish-e-Islami, and Al Hizb, and Tehreek-e-Islami has merged in TTP. The militant organization's major target on the assets of NATO/ISAF, the Pakistani state, Pakistan Army, and US citizens. They committed crimes for fulfilling their objectives like bombing attacks, grenade and small arms attacks, IED attacks, suicide attacks, and kidnapping (Markovic, 2009).

The TTP has some political objectives and is supported by some groups related to politics in Pakistan. The famous and mainstream religious, political party Jamat-e-Ulema Islami (JUI-F), has a close link Tehrik-i-Taliban. The prominent leaders of JUI-F and jirga leaders Noor Mohammad have strong ties with TTP. JUI-F offered the government of Pakistan to play the role of intermediary for negotiation with TTP (R. M. Khan, 2013). Pakistan Muslim League-N supported an affiliated TTP party that is known as Sipahe Sahaba (SSP) in the election. PML-N, a right-wing political party, the second biggest in Pakistan, has been supported by Sipah-e-Sahaba, an affiliate of TTP, in local elections. The Tehrik-i-Taliban is on the list of Terrorist Organizations (Beck & Miner, 2013).

2.6 US Reservations on Haqqani Network

A relationship that was founded mainly on US interests underwent several ups and downs in history. Sometimes, it witnessed too much closeness, and occasionally it endured bitterness. Immediately after 9/11, Islamabad and Washington came much closer due to the commonality of interests and convergence of policies (Cookson, 2002). The closeness witnessed nearly a decade of trust and friendship; however, the US misperception against Pakistan and anti-Americanism inside Pakistan has twisted the ties once more in a sort of complexity although some events led to the mistrust between both the countries, however, following reasons are the salient ones which totally put the relationship on the back foot.

Ever since America landed in Afghanistan, it has been pushing the Pakistani establishment for commencing operations in the restive province, i.e., KPK. The Americans believed that several terrorist groups in the northern belt of Pakistan are also a reason for unrest in Afghanistan (Haqqani, 2010). The thinktank also considers that

Pakistan has been playing hide and seek with the US, and in this way, it has also assisted militant outfits by several means. Pakistan's reluctance/delay in the commencement of operation in South and North Waziristan was considered a deliberate move to endanger American interests and stakes in Afghanistan. The US officials have several times spoke against the ambiguous policy and strategy of Pakistan. In 2011, while visiting Islamabad, Hillary Clinton said that the Pakistani government should work closely with the US to wipe out terrorists. She said, "You can't keep snakes in your back yard and expect them only to bite your neighbors" (Rehman, 2011). Admiral Mike Mullen, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while addressing a think-tank, criticized the role of Pakistani spy agency ISI. He said that ISI should disengage itself from the Haqqani Network (N. Ahmed, 2016).

The US strongly believes that the FATA region is the hub of terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was clearly said that the Taliban would not have emerged again if they would have no safe sanctuaries in the FATA region. While on the other side, Pakistan has always neglected any such reports and narrations. Islamabad had a different frame of mind in launching a military operation in Waziristan. Pakistan stood on a point that the military is already engaged in several assignments, and starting a full fledged operation was difficult at that time (Kronstadt, Kerr, Martin, & Vaughn, 2011).

Moreover, Pakistan also perceives the Haqqani network as a strategic asset, and it has opted for a vigilant strategy. Pakistan was hesitant in launching operations against the Taliban as the Army was involved in agreements with some factions that they will not be attacked if the army or government installations will remain safe from their attacks. The political and military establishment was also not able to open a new front (Siddiqua, 2011). Later, Sirajuddin Haqqani, who was commander of Haqqani Network, issued a statement

that reflected the existence of a peace deal between the Army and Shura-e-Murakeba. As per the deal, the militants will attack the ISAF/NATO forces in Afghanistan instead of attacking the Pakistani troops or security personals. Some analysts narrated that the Pakistani decision to come to a peace deal with the Haqqani network was aimed at keeping a strategic asset safe once the United States would leave Afghanistan because the US will leave Pakistan on its fate, so having a strategic connection with a wing operative in Afghanistan also would possibly serve as to meet the strategic goals (Dressler, 2012).

Chapter 3

Impact of President Bush in South Asia

The purpose of this chapter is to explore US foreign policy towards South Asia during President George W. Bush's both Administrations. Before 9/11, South Asia was not important in the US foreign policies. President Bush Jr. asserted that the US had been over-involved abroad and promised to work on national building projects. At that time, the President also opposed considerable increases in military spending. Indeed, in the first nine months of his office period, President Bush's foreign policy approach was isolation-oriented, with relatively minimal emphasis on terrorist threats found abroad (Tellis, 1997).

However, the catastrophic event shifts the relationship once more in South Asia. Prior to the tragic incident, the relationship was strained because of several misperceptions (Kean, 2011). September 11, 2001, stands as a watershed in US history; nearly 3,000 civilians died in these attacks on the American homeland. The attacks raised an important national debate that questioned why some foreigners could hate the US so much as to want to kill its innocent people not involved in foreign policy or affairs of state? This perplexing debate made Americans aware of America's homeland defense's vulnerable nature and the limited ability of its intelligence agencies to warn the nation of additional threats (Kean, 2011), resulting in the sad demise of innocent civilians.

The 9/11 attacks were unprecedented in American history. The only possible similarities were to the British burning of the American Capitol in 1814 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The 9/11 attacks have left a scar on the American psyche

that may never fully heal. The brutality of these attacks brought the American people to a shocking awareness of the threats posed by highly organized terrorist cells operating under the radar of military intelligence. Americans now live in a hostile world that is no longer limited to confrontations posed by nation-states and find themselves vulnerable to adversaries who not only reject their way of life but also want to destroy it (LaFeber, 2002). President Bush Jr. hailed the country's response to these attacks in his first State of the Union address. He said on January 29, 2002:

It was as if the entire country looked into a mirror and saw our better selves. For too long, our culture has said, if it feels good, do it now, America is embracing a new ethic and a new creed. We have glimpsed what a new culture of responsibility could look like we have been offered a unique opportunity, and we must not let this moment pass (Bovard, 2015).

This statement was President Bush's attempt at a national moral rebirth. Both the 9/11 attacks and the Pearl Harbor attack by Japan in 1941 had an important commonality. They prepared new grand strategies in foreign policy and a vastly increased and militarized US role in world affairs. In both cases, the US saw the world as an anarchic international security environment and assumed the role of a global police force for itself (Javaid, 2014). The choices of policymakers depended on their view of how the world works. In choosing the grand strategy, the US defined its interests and objectives, identified threats to its interests, and decided to respond to the world's geopolitical trends by the most appropriate political, military and economic means suitable to protect its interests (Sloan, 2003).

After the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, the US viewed the emerging Soviet bloc as its adversary; after the 2001 World Trade Centre (WTC) and Pentagon attacks, the US conflated terrorism with the Islamic world and made Muslim nations its presumed enemies. Both attacks led to increased US military envelopment abroad in World War II and the Global War on Terror (Bovard, 2015). President Bush Jr. linked terrorists with tyrants (Saddam Hussein being a case in point) and asserted that past containment strategies had not worked against such dangers. President Bush Jr.'s administration assumed that it had just to find out "the existence of identifiable regimes led by identifiable leaders operating by identifiable means by an identifiable terrorist" (Sloan, 2003).

The US could next form an international coalition to contain these regimes. NATO requested such a coalition both after the Second World War and after 9/11. Based on its military intelligence, some of which was fabricated, the US-led coalition threatened to attack identified enemy states governed by dictators presumed to be sponsoring terrorist activities against Americana and its allies. The only difference between the Cold War and War on Terrorism was US military engagement and the level of hostility operating under the sponsorship of nation-states versus independent sleeper cells (Friedman, 2004).

The shock of the 9/11 attacks catapulted American foreign policy into a war room strategy. Neither the UN and other allies' approval nor disapproval had any bearing on the US government's policies. In 2001, soon after the 9/11 attacks, announced a National Security Strategy that reserved the right to attack any country that the US labeled a threat.

3.1. The National Security Strategy (NSS)

The US National Security Committee members were few close advisors to the President. The most powerful national committee in world history because it had more resources, more powers, more license to act, and a more remarkable ability to use military force than in any previous period since the cold war (Gaddis, 2002). President Bush's NSS represented the most sweeping shift in the United States military strategy since the Cold War. Then its success trusted the willingness of the rest of the world to accept the terms of US military and foreign policy declarations (Bush, 2009).

President Bush Jr.'s administration released its NSS for the US in September 2002, about a year after the 9/11 attacks. It was given the name of the 'Bush Doctrine.' The three tasks for NSS committee members; In the future, the US must anticipate unconventional attacks; it must be prepared for the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) like nuclear, biological, radiological, and chemical weapons; and be prepared for attacks against critical US infrastructure. National Security Strategy presented President Bush Jr. administration's resolve to act unilaterally if necessary (Bush, 2009).

President Bush Jr. emphasized that unilateralism is different from Clinton's NSS. It was mentioned in Clinton's NSS that: "International cooperation will be vital for building security in the next century because many of the challenges we face cannot be addressed by a single nation" (Izumikawa, 2004). President Bush Jr. was willing to go to war alone if NATO, the UN, and other coalition forces hesitated to wage war. While much of his statement may have been bluster, he eventually brought his allies into the war on terror.

His approach was aimed at merging American resolve and impressing the adversaries of his military resolve.

In NSS emphasized great power politics and peaceful competition among the great powers. He said: "Great powers compete in peace instead of continuously preparing for war" (George W Bush, 2001b). Bush Jr.'s administration improved relations with regional powers like India, a difference from the Clinton administration that simply believed in cooperative relations with great powers. These relations depended on a technique of augmentation and commitment. NATO and the two-sided unions in Asia are the key parts of US security in Europe and Asia, separately. While all was growing collaboration with Russia and China to keep them from turning out to be foes (Guohong, 2003).

The National Security Strategy stated that: "expanding a circle of democracy is a moral imperative and promises to increase US foreign aid by 50% through the millennium challenge account" (Sloan, 2003). This strategy was similar to Clinton's, who asserted that US foreign policy not only enhances America's security, it bolsters America's economic prosperity, promotes democracy and human rights abroad. As a result, US aid abroad increased vastly during Bush Jr.'s administration, especially in Pakistan (Sloan, 2003).

President Bush Jr. tried to promote liberal democracy in two ways; first, he emphasized the importance of social and economic institution building. It had been part of his election agenda for his domestic policies (LaFeber, 2002). The reason was that it would reflect people's strong confidence in the American political and economic system because the principles of the US would guide the character of the country's foreign assistance and allocation of resources; finally, a decade of massive development assistance

failed. President Bush's strategy also dismissed conventional assistance as a means to prop up failed policies, relieving the pressure for reform and perpetuating misery (Sloan, 2003).

President Bush's NSS called for linking aid to the recipient state's performance. This step was taken to improve the efficiency of foreign assistance. The NSS recommended increasing foreign assistance because it would benefit those states that follow US aid guidelines. The NSS assumed that it was right on target concerning the new circumstances in the wake of the 9/11 attacks since the US believed the terrorist attacks had their roots in Afghanistan's miserable socio-economic and political conditions under the Taliban. President Bush Jr. NSS did not deviate from Cold War assumptions that it was sufficient to contain without seeking to reform authoritarian regimes. As he put it, "we left it to the Soviet Union to change that" (Sloan, 2003). No one, however, knows if this strategy would work or not. Carl Von Clausewitz, the great theorist of strategy, rightly once said, "Theory can never really predict what's going to happen. It's only a matter of chance" (Leffler, 2004). In contrast, Condoleezza Rice said: "The Bush administration strategy rested on three pillars. First, engaging in confrontations with terrorist and rogue state regimes. Second, harmonizing relations among the great powers. Third, nurturing prosperity and democracy across the globe". However, analysts like Melvyn Leffler hold that

The Bush administration's efforts to crush terrorists and destroy rogue regimes through preemption, hegemony, unilateralism, and neo-conservatism shattered great power harmony and diverted resources and attention from the development agenda. An effective strategy cannot be sustained when the methods employed to erect one pillar drastically alter the others (Leffler, 2004).

3.1.1. New Political Concepts

Afterward the 9/11 attacks, the US redefined its foreign policy as articulated in its NSS, also known as the Bush Doctrine. This Doctrine set forth a pre-emption strategy, meaning that under President Bush Jr., the US would go after both terrorists and states harboring them before becoming aggressive, thus pre-empting any security threats (LaFeber, 2002). According to conventional wisdom, governments typically punish individuals only after they commit a crime. One clear evidence of wrongdoing should lead to punishment, so the innocent do not suffer. President Bush Jr. also made it clear in his doctrine that: “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed this act and those who harbor them” (LaFeber, 2002). In this statement, he made both criminals and their supporters equally liable to punishment. The Doctrine further argued that:

Attacks America would have to launch periodic preventive wars to defend it against rogue states and terrorists with weapons of mass destruction; that it would do this alone, if necessary; and that it would work to democratize the greater Middle East as a long-term solution to the terrorist’s problem. But successful pre-emption depends on the ability to predict the future accurately and on good intelligence, which was not forthcoming, while America’s perceived unilateralism has isolated it as never before (Fukuyama, 2006).

Thus the Bush Doctrine enunciated the new pre-emption concepts through preventive war and unilateral action against its perceived enemies. Bush Doctrine's ultimate target was a decentralized terrorist organization lead by Osama Bin Laden, a high that took

responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. Al-Qaeda is not a state-based organization and does not abide by the rules of nation-states. It has its own rules, which place extreme importance on covert action, decentralized authority, and minimal digital communications (Bob, 2002). Under the Bush Doctrine, the president called for the massive use of US military force to destroy an individual and his stateless organization. President Bush Jr. vastly expanded pre-emptive strikes, unilateral military response, and a new conservative agenda, which are detailed below.

3.1.2. Pre-emption

The Bush doctrine called for offensive operations against terrorists and regimes that had supported them. Afghanistan and the Taliban government were the first victims of the new doctrine. President Bush said:

The USA is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism-premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocent people. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, by pre-emptive strikes against such terrorists, to prevent them from harming our people and our country (George W Bush, 2001a).

President Bush called Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, an ‘Axis of Evil’ and claimed they supported terrorism. He also accused these states of having WMD, which threatened the US and the world community (Bush, 2002). President Bush's address to the UN General Assembly talked about the right to take pre-emptive action against Iraq in 2004. He said:

“The first time we may be completely certain that Saddam has a nuclear weapon, God forbid, he uses one; we owe it to all our citizens to do everything to stop that day from coming.” (Buckley & Singh, 2006).

The Pentagon and White House asserted a right to use military force against any hostile state or states that move to acquire nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The preemption doctrine assumes the US cannot wait for the proof of a fully established physical threat when the risks of nuclear strikes have escalated in an era of proliferating WMDs. These weapons were perceived as accessible to terrorist groups. It was necessary to cut short the threats before a sudden attack could be launched against the United States (R. S. Singh, 2006).

3.1.3. Unilateralism

Unilateral action was preferred over the multilateral action of the Bush Doctrine because of the urgency of action. Unilateralism meant that foreign livelihoods or military actions were backed by the coalition of like-minded governments or a coalition of the willing when a question about American interests and allies would arise. The Bush doctrine made a dangerous assumption that the world was divided into either ‘with us or against us;’ under this doctrine, there would be no third option for any nation (Bush, 2002).

Consequently, the UN's role was reduced under this doctrine, and international laws, which enabled governments to act collectively and decisively, were ignored. President Bush made it clear that: “We will not hesitate to act alone” (Baloch, 2006). In other words, President Bush Doctrine polarized foreign policy into friends or foes abroad. His Doctrine placed US foreign policy above international law. According to this Doctrine,

“the US will take whatever measures are necessary to ensure its supremacy over any other country or combination of countries, especially in military terms. It makes no distinction between the terrorists who committed this act and those who harbor them.” (Jervis, 2003). The Doctrine gave the US the right to violate the principle of sovereignty, central to the UN character. While the UN Charter is a non-binding document on US foreign policy, its violation raised exact concerns about American imperialism (R. G. Carter, 2003).

The Bush Doctrine, coupled with the US Patriot Act, also authorized US authorities to use the term enemy combatants in a broad sense, even when an individual may or may not have acted against the US. The result was that many were imprisoned without a fair trial (Buckley & Singh, 2006). For the American military, enemy combatants replaced the category of prisoners of war whose rights are protected by the Geneva Convention. The costs of unilateral choices are high; while unilateral military action may play well back home, it smacked of imperialism for many people worldwide. Rather than crushing terrorism, the unilateral use of force has resulted in a backlash; ordinary citizens in Pakistan and other terrorist havens, not to mention terrorists themselves, undoubtedly feel angry at American supremacy. When the US took unilateral action against its perceived Muslim terrorists, it should expect to suffer retaliation from Muslims (R. G. Carter, 2003).

3.1.4. New-Conservatism

Wilsonian idealists believe that United States foreign policy should be guided by promoting American ideals. Neo-conservatism believes that the US should use force when necessary to promote its principles and interests. The influence of neo-conservatism on foreign policy comes, in part, from individuals working within the US government (Jervis,

2003). Some of the founders of this concept Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Lewis Scooter Libby, Elliott Abrams, and Richard Perle. These men openly spoke in favor of aggressive and unilateral accomplishments by the US to promote democracy, free markets, and human rights to maintain US supremacy in the world. After the 9/11 attacks, President Bush stated that the US could no longer afford a humble foreign policy. According to Max Boot:

The ambitious NSS that the administration issued in September 2002 with its call for US primacy, the promotion of democracy, vigorous action, pre-emptive if necessary, to stop terrorism and WMD was a quintessentially new conservative action (Boot, 2004).

President Bush's doctrine also included the "Initiation of a worldwide crusade for liberty and western style of democracy through regime change" (Bush, 2002). Unlike Neo-Cons, he found value in a friendly relation with communist China because, after the September 11, 2001 attacks, China assured Bush of its support in the Global War on Terror. As President Bush Jr. put it: "America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one" (Huberman, 2003). Despite Bush's faith-based rhetoric, a Pew poll indicated a significant percentage of Americans say that the US should mind its own business. President Bush's efforts to promote democracy and human rights abroad, a non-military strategy, second-term strategy to promote democracy in South Asia. (Huberman, 2003).

US Policy remains vulnerable to attacks by both sides of the political spectrum when it engages in faith-based imperialism. President Bush Jr.'s administration may have conducted billions of dollars' worth of military sorties against terrorists over his eight years in office. It failed to eradicate the roots of terrorism or achieve justice for the victims of the

9/11 attacks (R. S. Singh, 2006). Many people in America today feel more insecure in the world than ever before.

3.2. War in Afghanistan

The 9/11 event changed everything in Afghanistan, as the War on Terror began with attacks on this country. According to the US, the master of the attacks ‘Osama Bin Laden’ was in Afghanistan, heading Al Qaeda, and being supported by the Taliban (Bob, 2002). The attacks brought Afghanistan to the central stage of international politics. On October 7, 2001, President Bush declared war with military attacks against Al-Qaeda terrorist camps and Taliban military installations.

The US President described these attacks as carefully targeted because only terrorists, not the civilian population, would be targeted. On the first day of military attacks on Afghanistan to demonstrate its humanitarian role, two US Air Force C-17 aircraft started airdrops of daily rations for 37,500 people in Afghanistan. Some 30,000 people in Kabul were dependent on UN food aid (Gasper, 2001). President Bush announced \$320 million of assistance for the Afghan people. On October 11, 2001, George W. Bush declared three objectives to the US policies in Afghanistan:

One, we have got to make sure that all parties, all interested, have an opportunity to be part of a new government. We should not play favorites between one group and another within Afghanistan. Second, we have got to work for a stable Afghanistan. Third, it would be helpful to eradicate narcotics-trafficking out of Afghanistan as well (George W. Bush, 2001).

The US mission was to help make it possible for them to do that. In other words, we can say that the President Bush Doctrine was a way to demonstrate his policies to others across the globe. The available research indicates that the most important factor for Bush's Doctrine was US national security. The war in Afghanistan and Iraq was an effort to remove terrorist threats and provide US citizens safety and pursue such efforts elsewhere to prevent another attack on the homeland (Bush, 2002).

If the US were to perceive such a threat originating in Pakistan, it might not refrain from waging war against its once most allied ally. Another goal of US foreign policy that President Bush actively pursued was to promote democracy in other countries. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, after destroying the regime of Saddam Hussein and debilitating the Taliban, respectively, President Bush Jr. Administration attempted nation-building through support for democratic initiatives, particularly open elections. Pakistan did well to plan for its 2008 election (Bovard, 2015). However, it is not clear how much the Bush Doctrine influenced internal Pakistani initiatives toward democratically held elections.

3.3. Pakistan Support to Global War on Terror (GWOT)

President Bush Jr. decided to begin his war against terrorism with Afghanistan because he believed that Osama Bin Laden lived there, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. However, before beginning the GWOT, he built a coalition against terrorism, and Pakistan became the most important country in this coalition (Madsen, 2002). Pakistan's strategic location and 2500 km border with Afghanistan made its cooperation and support critical and crucial to the United States. As Zahid Hussain writes:

Pakistan's support was important for the United States. Its geographic proximity and its vast intelligence information on Afghanistan were seen as crucial for any military action against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Pakistan was one of the three countries; the other was the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which had formally recognized the conservative Afghan Islamic government and the only country which had maintained diplomatic relations with Kabul (Z. Hussain, 2008).

Without the support of Pakistan, the US could not pursue its interests in Afghanistan. President Bush Jr. approached President Musharraf to use his facilities, including the use of airspace and logistic support for military action against Afghanistan. Without Pakistan's active and sincere participation, the US could not have waged war against Al-Qaeda (Rahman, 2003). The real focus of US Pakistan relations was the eradication of extremism and terrorism. Iran's nuclear proliferation was another area of concern for the US as Iran is next to Afghanistan. As one American journalist wrote: "The United States knew it could not proceed without Pakistan's assistance" (T. Hussain, 2005).

Pakistan's government has never been very close to that of Afghanistan. Indeed, its foreign policy towards Afghanistan matched those of the US. An alliance with Pakistan was the best option for the US in the war on terror. Although India offered its full support in the war on terrorism, its support was not taken by the US because it had no political or geographical links with Afghanistan. The same was the case with central Asian states, which fell under Russian influence and offered little military advantage to the US. China offered its full support to the war on terror, but the Chinese leadership was against the American approach that made it a military presence in Afghanistan (N. Li, 2002).

American Ambassador in Pakistan Ryan Crocker said: “Pakistan had been strategically very important for the US right from the end of the cold war era, to prevent war on terror”. Pakistan has a long seacoast close to the Afghan border. By using Pakistani ports, American forces could easily reach Afghanistan relying on naval support. Besides the seacoast, American troops could quickly enter Afghan soil through the border area of Northwest Frontier Province. In American eyes, the road to reach the Taliban went through Pakistan (Yousaf & Tabassum, 2003).

A military plan against the Taliban required cooperation from Pakistan, the most crucial and strategic neighbor of Afghanistan. While not generally known to most Americans, Pakistan had a close association with the Taliban (Powell, 2003). A large number of Pashtun population live in Pakistan, especially in the NWFP and Baluchistan. The Taliban are also from the same ethnic group as the Pashtun. They moved easily from Afghanistan to Pakistan, with many of their leaders educated in the Pakistani Madaris and developed relations with the Pakistani religious parties.

Pakistan supported the Taliban government in Afghanistan after the Soviet departure. The main reason for the support was the Kashmir insurgency in the 1990s. The Taliban got their training from Pakistan, and Afghanistan provided a base of operations (S. M. Burke & Ziring, 1990). The American administration knew how deep Pakistan’s association with the Taliban regime was convinced the Taliban’s support and power came from Pakistan; therefore, by ending this support to the Taliban, America could achieve its Afghanistan targets (Bob, 2002). The problem with Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan dates back to 1947 on the Durand line. Pakistan’s role in the Soviet invasion and the Afghan refugee problem created within Pakistan. For the last 54 years, Pakistan has been dealing

with Afghanistan daily on difficult refugee settlement, social services, and other domestic challenges (Arif, 1984). These past challenges had a significant impact on the US when it attempted to get Pakistan's support for the GWOT.

George Tenet, head of CIA, exemplified the President Bush Jr. Administration's policies; he insisted on getting the cooperation of Pakistan's intelligence because of his firm belief that Pakistan nurtured the Taliban (Schaffer, 2002). He also believed that the top rank officers of Pakistan's army and intelligence services had long been hesitant about confronting Islamist extremists. They pointed out that Musharraf had maintained good relations with the Taliban before 9/11 (Kean, 2011). The power of Taliban militants and their cooperation with the Pakistan army was another factor that influenced the United States to focus on strengthening its Pakistan alliance. Another area of US concern in seeking Pakistan's support was that both countries had developed military relationships since the 1950s when Pakistan joined Mutual Defense Agreement, SEATO, and CENTO; occasionally, the US provided military aid to Pakistan. Colin Powell preferred the cooperation of the Musharraf regime. He was aware that Musharraf was an experienced army man and knew the military-to-military links between both countries. Due to all the factors mentioned above, Pakistan became necessary for the US in the post 9/11 era, shifting US policy toward Pakistan (Powell, 2003).

President Bush Jr. divided the world into two camps after the attacks: The first camp was 'with us.' This group was led by the US and consisted of 'good guys' and democratic guys. The second group consisted of dictators with nuclear technology. They were called Rogue regimes, which could not be trusted because they may sell their technology to the highest bidding terrorist organization (N. S. a. J. T. White, 2011).

Pakistan joined the US coalition because there was no other option left. President Musharraf took a bold and historic decision to join the multinational alliance for the war against terrorism. In order to obtain Pakistan's support, the CIA Chief met President Musharraf to urge him to go further in cracking down on the militant and religious figures and other extremists. While describing the matter of Pakistan's security in the war on terror, the President said: "Where national interests are at stake, the decision should be taken with wisdom and sagacity, and it is not the questions of courage or bravery, Pakistan comes first, and everything else is secondary" (N. S. a. J. T. White, 2011).

Terrorism was the issue on which President Bush talked to the Pakistani regime before the 9/11 attacks. On 4th August 2001, he urged General Musharraf to engage actively against Al Qaeda (Kean, 2011). The chief of ISI, Lt. Gen Mehmood Ahmad, was in the US on September 11, 2001. After the attacks on WTC and Pentagon, General Mehmood got a call from US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage on 12th September 2001. Richard Armitage informed him that "Pakistan faced a stark choice. We want to know whether you are with us or not. It is black and white, with no grey." He further said that "we need your country's full support and cooperation. We will tell you tomorrow the specifics about the cooperation that is required" (Richard Lee Armitage, 2010).

Secretary of state Colin Powell mentioned to Musharraf: "The American people would not understand if Pakistan was not in this fight with the US." (Bob, 2002). On 13 September 2001, Armitage handed over the list of US demands to General Mehmood. On that same day, US ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlain, met with President Musharraf and conveyed the same list of demands from President George W. Bush. The US demands it included: "1) Stop Al Qaeda operations on the Pakistani border, intercept

arms shipments through Pakistan, and all logistical support to Bin Laden. 2) Blanket cover for flight and landing rights for US planes. 3) Access to Pakistan's naval bases, air bases, and borders. 4) Immediate intelligence and immigration information. 5) Curb all domestic expressions of support for terrorism against the US, its friends, and allies. 6) Cut off the fuel supply to the Taliban and Support Pakistani volunteers going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban. 7) Pakistan to break diplomatic ties with the Taliban and assist the US in destroying Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network" (R. P. Rajagopalan, 2001).

On the same day, President Musharraf gave a statement and assured that Pakistan would promise the coordination of its efforts with America. They would punish those who committed this horrific act. President Musharraf addressed the nation and said: "there are three important things in which America asks for our help. First is the intelligence and information exchange, second is the support in the airspace, and the third is logistic support from us" (Musharraf, 2006). After accepting all demands, Pakistan negotiated with the US, while Pakistan showed its willingness to break diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime. However, Washington requested them not to do this at this time. Christina Rocca, Assistant Secretary of State, said: "Breaking off diplomatic relations at that point would have given a clear indication to the Taliban about the exact timing of an impending US attack." President Musharraf justified his act, indicating Pakistan itself was a victim of internal and external terrorism. It was the Taliban regime that provided refuge to extremists in sectarian killings in Pakistan (Richard Lee Armitage, 2010).

On September 17, 2001, President Musharraf sent General Mehmood to Kandahar. This visit attempts to convince Mullah Omar to hand over Osama Bin Laden to the USA, indicating that this action would be the only way the American attack on Afghanistan could

be put off. General Mehmood met with the Taliban leader and reported to President Musharraf that Mullah Omar's reaction empowered him. In any case, this consolation was insufficient to satisfy the US need to give up Osama Bin Laden. Rather, Omar consented to shape a court containing strict Islamic researchers to attempt him, showing that America was set up to introduce proof of his association in the fear monger assaults. Be that as it may, the preliminary never occurred (Rashid, 2001). After this failure, American forces made final preparations to launch an attack on Afghanistan. They had already acquired three Pakistani airbases close to the Afghan border. According to one academician:

The first ground combat strike made by the Americans in Afghanistan after the attacks on the twin towers of WTC in New York on September 11, 2001, had taken place on the night of Friday, October 19 and on the morning of, October 20, 96 km South-West of Kandahar, more than 200 US army rangers from the 75th Air-bone rangers, commanded by colonel Joe Votel, jumped on to a dessert airstrip code-named 'Objective Rhino.' The attack on the airfield was intended to show the Taliban regime, Al Qaeda, and the world at large that the Americans were able and willing to launch retaliatory strikes in the opening assault of their war on terror (Jennings, 2010).

The Taliban system crumbled in the second week of November. They initially lost Mazar-I-Sharif to the Afghan's North Alliance, which held a large number of their troopers as detainees. An enormous number of them were Pakistani. Within a couple of days, Taliban powers fled Kabul. The following day, the Northern Alliance entered Kabul (Knightley, 2001). The US and Pakistani leaders then placed a representative government in Kabul and declared it a demilitarized city.

In December 2001, at a conference in Bonn, Germany, the rival Afghan factions agreed to set up an interim government headed by Hamid Karzai, a Pakhtun leader. This act diminished the Northern Alliance's role as an independent force within Afghanistan (Kayani, 2011). This interim government declared war on the Taliban and pursued the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Osama Bin Laden. No one knew when this war would come to an end. President Bush Jr. himself stated: "This war will not come to an end until they eliminate threats coming from terrorists" (Bush, 2009).

According to some Pakistani analysts, Musharraf embarked on "an extraordinarily bold and risky mission, facing opposition not only of Jihadi militants inflamed by the Taliban's defeat in Afghanistan but also his military generals" (Bhatty, 2002). General Musharraf did not appear to face any sharp objections from his civilian cabinet because he had handpicked them to include loyalists to his administration. However, his military and top commandants soon defected with at least four top commanders, opposed to his policies; General Mehmood, chief of ISI, Lt. Gen M. Aziz, Corps Commander Lahore, and Lt. Gen. Muzaffar Usmani. These men were against pulling out the support of the Taliban government. All four also played a key role in General Musharraf's military coup on October 12, 1999. The result was that nearly two years later, some major changes took place in the top positions of the Pakistan Army (T. Hussain, 2005).

Reacting to this opposition to his policies, he sacked General Mehmood and sidelined the three other top Generals known for their hardline Islamic views. General Mehmood refused to accept the designation of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and this post instead went to General Aziz. General Usmani simply resigned when Gen. Mohammad Yousaf was appointed the new Vice Chief of Army Staff and Gen Kiani, the

new Quartermaster General (T. Hussain, 2005). Strong moral support came from pro-west political parties like PPP and MQM, but Swift and adverse reaction came from the religious parties. In October 2001, a radical Islamic leader, Sufi Mohammad, crossed the border with 10,000 volunteers and Madaris students to fight against the US Army (S. Zaidi, 2001). In Quetta, thousands of people protested against Pakistan's coalition with the US Army and destroyed several Banks and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). Islamic zealots were blamed for seeking revenge for the American bombing in Afghanistan, which inadvertently also massacred 18 innocent Christians worshipping in a Bahawalpur church (Z. Hussain, 2008). These events triggered strong domestic opposition to Musharraf and US policies towards the Taliban.

The war in Afghanistan also affected the popularity of its leaders. According to a public opinion poll, Bin Laden had a 46% approval rating that exceeds Musharraf at 38%, who was linked with Bush Jr., whose approval rating scraped the bottom at 7%. The international community's reaction was quite encouraging, and Pakistan became the central point of focus for the international community (A. Cordesman, 2009). Never before had so many heads of state traveled to Pakistan as they did in the first few weeks after September 11, 2001. Pakistan once again became the backyard of America's war in Afghanistan. The Global War on Terrorism replaced the War against communism (1979-1989).

3.3.1. Causes of Cooperation

The US needed Pakistan's support because of its geography, strategic importance, military-to-military links, and expertise in dealing with terrorists in general and the Taliban in particular. Here, Pakistan offered its full support to the United States of America

(Sheikh, 2001). President Musharraf declared his cooperation with the US in his address to the nation on 19 September 2001. He said:

We in Pakistan are facing a critical situation perhaps as critical as the events in 1971. If we make the wrong decisions, our vital interests will be harmed. Our critical concerns are our sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets, and the fourth Kashmir issue. All four will be harmed if we make the wrong decisions (Hashmi, 2005).

In the light of the President's priorities and his fear of being a rogue state, Pakistan had no other options.

3.3.1.1. Military Cause

United States military aid to Pakistan was a significant impetus in its cooperation in the War on Terror. Pakistan had been facing military vulnerabilities since 1947 when India failed to offer a just division of military assets after independence (Schaffer, 2002). Military equipment was given to Pakistan; much of it was not useable because outdated from the war of independence and some from the 19th century. Due to the obsolete nature of the military equipment, Pakistan's security was at stake. Right from its first day, the Pakistani leadership tried to establish military pacts and military aid from the powerful countries, especially the US. Pakistan signed three military pacts with the US in the 1950s, making it the third-largest recipient of military aid in the world (Rahman, 2003).

One thing is notable, despite restrictions on military support, Pakistan cooperated with the US on United Nations Peacekeeping operations in Congo, Bosnia, and East-Timor.

Pakistan connected itself with the US in away as an olive branch to repair its relations. Pakistan's dependency on US military aid was a factor leading to Musharraf's support for the war. By cooperating with the United States, Pakistan believed it could replace pathetic military equipment (Gilani, 2006).

3.3.1.2. Economic Cause

Pakistan supported the US in the war on terror on the assumption that its failure to help would lead the United States to impose economic sanctions on the nation. Pakistan's leadership recalled how its infrastructure was affected when US sanctions were imposed in the 1990s (Mistry, 1999). The ex-governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, Mr. Ishrat Hussain, summed up Pakistan's economic position as follows:

The Government in 1999 had inherited some adverse features, which include serious payments crisis, threatening imminent default, falling revenues, growing debt burden, the poor state of social indicators, and deterioration in governance. It urgently needed US economic support (Husain, 2004).

Ever since independence, Pakistan has been a weak country with little economic vitality in the world marketplace, the possible exception of its narcotics trade. Corruption, the low value of money, its massive dependency on agriculture, and above all, low literacy rates contribute to its stagnant economy (Amin, 2003). The wars with India in 1947, 1965, and 1971 shifted resources to military and defense instead of better economic opportunities for its people. Pakistan is dependent on China, the US, and financial institutions such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Asian Development Bank (ADB),

and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It received \$53 billion aid between 1960 to 2000, and this aid came from agencies closely aligned with US financial and business interests.

US policy to Pakistan has always been aid-based. The US's basic objective was to improve the military capabilities and economic assistance the federal government provides to other governments of Pakistan. The Cold war years are the best examples of how US aid was tied to economic development objectives. The term foreign aid is defined as "The money that one country voluntarily transfers to another, which can take the form of a gift, a grant, or a loan." (Ali, 2009). The 9/11 incident was a pivot point for US military planners triggering a world war against terrorists. Pakistan also tried its best to combat terrorism, and in turn, the US granted aid to Pakistan to tackle terrorism, which unfortunately was not beneficial for Pakistan's socio-political system. The US considered terrorist organizations in FATA to have links with Middle East groups like ISIS and Al-Qaida. Former President Pervez Musharraf clearly stated, "Wherever there is a threat to Pakistan, we will use the US's equipment there. If the threat comes from al-Qaida or the Taliban, it will be used there. If the threats come from India, we will most surely use it there" (S. A. Zaidi, 2011). Despite concerns with the misuse of US military investments, they were prompting enormous financial assets in the post 9/11 era. About 9 billion US dollars were given to Pakistan for the military operations in FATA and other border areas, while 3.6 billion dollars were given to strengthen the economy (M. Ali, 2016).

3.3.1.3. Protection of Strategic Assets

Pakistan's leadership strongly believed that India's hostility toward its neighbor endangered Pakistan's nuclear assets after 9/11. Pakistan's security concerns with India's atomic bomb tests of the 1970s gave its leadership pause for concern. In response, Pakistan also worked on its nuclear capability under PM Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who authorized Dr. Qadeer Khan to develop Pakistan's nuclear program (Zahra, 1999). The emergence of Pakistan's nuclear technology prompted the US to impose sanctions on Pakistan in the 1990s during President George Herbert Walker Bush's administration. On 13 May 1998, India once again tested its nuclear capability. In response, Pakistan detonated a nuclear bomb on 28 May 1998, which also subjected Pakistan to US sanctions.

The US continues to restrict Pakistan's efforts to create a nuclear program. It has many reasons. First, in South Asia, two rivals with nuclear capability were considered a recipe for destroying a large part of the globe. Second, Pakistan might export nuclear technology to rogue states. Dr. Qadeer Khan was blamed for selling nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea using his black market in nuclear technology (A. Wagner, 2001). In response to this embarrassment, Pakistan repositioned its atomic assets from insecure laboratories to a well-managed establishment that would meet international atomic energy standards. Musharraf extended his support for revamping Pakistan's nuclear program with the notion that it would remove the negative image regarding Pakistan's program held by many nations.

3.3.1.4. Fear of Being a Rogue State

It was quite challenging for Pakistan to side with the US against the Taliban, as it could go against the public opinion of a large number of Pashtoon people living in the NWFP and Baluchistan regions of Pakistan. It was also difficult because the Taliban government was pro-Pakistan, and a large number of Pakistani's are anti-American and supporters of the Taliban. Another reason for Pakistan's hesitation to support the US was that it was already facing economic problems. War in Afghanistan would inevitably place further burden by expanding Afghans seeking refuge (Kayani, 2011). The Musharraf government believed an isolationist approach to terrorism could give Pakistan the status of a rogue state, prompting the US to launch pre-emptive strikes in Pakistan for supporting terrorism and the Taliban. Thus, fear of being called a rogue state pushed Pakistan into the multinational US-led coalition against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Riedel, 2011).

3.3.1.5. No Third Option for Pakistan

A very interesting observation is that there was no third option or middle-way of escape for Pakistan. There were only two options, as President Bush Jr. put it, "be with us or against us." President Bush talked to President Musharraf and left no third choice by saying that he could either be an ally in the war or become the enemy. On September 11, 2001, President Bush Jr. addressed his nation and clearly stated: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make either you are with us, or you are with terrorists" (Kean, 2011). Similarly, Condoleezza Rice said at a meeting on 13 September 2001: "If Pakistan decides not to help the United States, it too would be at risk" (Kean, 2011). Deputy Secretary of State Armitage sent the same kind of message when he threatened that

Pakistan would be “bombed back to the Stone Age.” With American rage at a peak, almost every nation around the world provided its full support to the US in the global war on terror. President Musharraf wrote in his book, *In the Line of Fire*:

I was chairing an important meeting in the Governor’s House when my military secretary told me that the US secretary of state, Colin Powell, was on the phone. I said I would call back later, but he insisted, I came out of the meeting and took the call. Powell was quite candid: ‘you are either with us or against us.’ I took it as blatant ultimatum (Musharraf, 2006).

President Bush Jr. deemphasized the promotion of democracy in Pakistan after 9/11. Due to its fragmented social and political structures, especially discord among its political actors, Pakistan was not in a position to deviate from the President Bush Jr. Administration’s GWOT. We found that Pakistan had no option but to withdraw from the support from the Taliban and preempt India’s attempt to convince the US into believing it was an ally of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan (Gasper, 2001). The government of Pakistan could not afford to offend the US; otherwise, it might have lost economic aid that came as part of the US-led coalition against terrorism.

3.4. US-Indian Strategic Partnership

Post 9/11, remarkable development between US and Indian relationships in both countries has concluded significant agreements on civil nuclear energy, missile technology, and civilian space programs. The US has designed its strategic partnership with India as one of the highest future priorities in foreign policy (R. Lal & Rajagopalan, 2004). The US

comprehends it is a unique opportunity to maintain a global balance of power because the US shares many military, economic, and political interests with India.

The United States' quest to preserve its global hegemony in an environment characterized by interdependence and the Chinese rise propelled it to pursue new partnerships in the indo-pacific region. Many countries in the region value the US and aspire to have its protective presence because it serves their national security interests (Tellis, 2014a). The US and its allies are in an awkward position as they contribute to enhancing the material capabilities of the countries that can become its rival. One among them is particularly china. US economic intercourse with its competitors provides economic gains and underpins its economy while reducing the US quest for absolute gains into relative gains. The US's guardian of liberal economic order gained less than the cohort of its competitors like China. China used these relative gains to improve its material capabilities due to a new global rival, making the US vulnerable. The rise of China has ruptured the United States' sense of exceptionalism by declining its capability of global underwriting order (Kapur & Ganguly, 2007).

In the wake of this scenario, the US rushed to build close ties with India in Asia because both countries share similar strategic interests. India's emerging material capability, increasing national power, and extent rivalry with china made it an appropriate country for United States strategic partnership (A. Singh et al., 2018). The United States first requires overcoming certain obstacles to attain a global partnership with India. Despite having common experiences of historical colonialism, the similar demographic composition of multiethnic and multi-religious communities, and commitment to

democracy, missed opportunities of forging durable and friendly bilateral ties in the postwar period (McMahon, 1994).

Though the United States provided sufficient economic aid to India after its independence and extended adequate military assistance during its war over border conflict with China in 1962. But it cannot bridge the abyss of the cold war. Indian first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's tilt toward the Soviet Union, his policy of non-alignment, and enthusiasm for autarkic socialist economic policies prevented the emergence of close ties between the United States and India. Further, President Nixon's more inclination toward Pakistan in 1971 and Indian nuclear detonations in 1974 increased the gulf between the two countries (Burns, 2007).

Over the past 15 years, three signifying developments in the post-cold war era gradually converged India and the United States' interests, which helped them mend fences and improve relations. First, the end of the cold war ended US-Soviet enmity as a principal focus in US foreign policy and rational of non-alignment in Indian foreign policy (Fani, 2009). Second, India's economic reforms in the early 1990s to open up its economy, introduced by Manmohan Singh, who first was finance minister and later served as a prime minister, catalyzed a new boom and surge in trade investments. Third, India's emergence as a power in a new shifted global order and the American need for like-minded allies directed the United States' attention toward India (Feinstein, 2002).

So President Bush Jr., in 2001, when he entered office, acknowledged the prominence of India as a newly emerging power in global politics. He took an initiative to double the US strategic bet on India by sidelining the complex issue of nuclear

nonproliferation, perturbing the relations between two countries (A. Wagner, 2001). Both countries took a jumpstart in their relationships in four strategic areas: commerce, high-tech, missile defense, civil nuclear energy, and civilian space programs. The United States is assisting India is rising on the global stage with a well-calculated strategy. It is not doing with the expectation that India would repay in some specific way. It expects India to maintain a regional balance of power by constraining China's capacity to dominate Asia (Feinstein, 2002). India would constrain Chinese influence in its periphery for its strategic success, thereby advancing US interests in the process.

The United States, in the President Bush Jr. Era, took a bold step to rejuvenate the relationship with India. US offers India cooperation in its civil nuclear energy program besides lifting sanctions imposed in the 1970s for developing nuclear programs outside the NPT regime (Bennet, 1998). By December 2006, Congress approved the US initiative of investment in India's civil nuclear energy program through passing the Hyde Act. The civil nuclear agreement is considered a centerpiece of the new US-Indian friendship and is a source of respect for the US in India. As a result of this deal, India is obliged to separate its civil nuclear program from its military nuclear program and open the civilian program for international monitoring agencies. The Military program and nuclear stockpiles are exempted from these stipulations (Lo, 2003).

In the wake of this agreement, India acquired legitimacy for its nuclear program. It also achieved both acknowledgments for being a responsible nuclear state and recognition for its stature to come into the nuclear club. The deal made India an exception for attaining de-facto nuclear status without being part of the non-proliferation regime. It also provided

India with an opportunity to proceed and strengthen its controversial nuclear weapon program under cover of de-facto legitimacy with relative ease (M. Yusuf, 2007).

The indo-US strategic partnership entirely changed the US outlook towards India and fulfilled three US objectives; one, it provided the US with a reliable ally in south Asia. Second, it can bolster India economically and militarily to counterweight China in the longer run. Third, it also gave the US massive economic opportunities in India (Weiss, 2007).

The deal left Pakistan alone in the way to find legitimacy for entrance into the nuclear club. It also gave leverage to India with Pakistan on the issues of terrorism and its conflict over Kashmir. The applicability of civil nuclear technology to nuclear weapon programs would enable India to develop a more sophisticated nuclear weapon than Pakistan while placing Pakistan's military assets at stake in armed conflict. Pakistan's reaction in the pretext of its apprehensions against India may prompt it to maintain second-strike capability, either by quantitative growth in delivery systems and warheads or by a sea-based capability (Pant, 2011).

Though the US intended to throw away a zero-sum relationship with India and Pakistan, the US-India strategic partnership led by the civil nuclear deal cemented the fact that the US has more tilt toward India than Pakistan in its South Asian policy.

3.4.1. Indo-US Nuclear Deal

After becoming a front line ally in the global war on terror, Pakistan had expected that it would get a handful of American aid and bring civil nuclear technology (Verma,

2002). However, the US didn't provide Pakistan civil nuclear technology but signed a nuclear deal with India. Both Islamabad and Washington have a different point of view regarding the US-India nuclear deal. When President Bush was finally signing the US-India nuclear deal bill after Congress ratified it, he called India and the US as the natural democratic partners, which have emerged from the colonial past. President Bush Jr. and successive governments have declined any such deal with Pakistan by mentioning Pakistan's bleak record regarding nuclear activities (Basrur & Rizvi, 2003).

Pakistan considers the Indo-US deal, not less than nexus, to offset Pakistan. Islamabad perceives that the deal has put tons of pressure on Pakistan and the region alike. It also has damaged the regional balance of power, which was already in a hanging situation (A. J. Tellis, 2006). Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yousaf Raza Gillani, while visiting the USA in 2008 said: "There should be no discrimination. If they (USA) want to give such nuclear status to India, we expect the same for Pakistan" (Z. I. Cheema, 2010).

Pakistan sees that the transfer of such technology only to India would put the regional security under the dark clouds of nuclear war, and it could also lead to the arms race between the two neighbors, and China could again jump in the race. Despite the Pakistani diplomatic efforts and reservations, the US is not ready to make any such deal with Islamabad any time soon. Pakistan has demanded such a deal even in the strategic dialogues between the two countries, but the US rejects it on a note that the deal was India specific and therefore no other can be part of it neither it can be replicated (Chakma, 2013).

Curiously, while much of this literature has thus focused on the political activity of highly mobilized, well-resourced groups, surprisingly little has been written on the

influence of the Indian lobby and its influence on US policy towards New Delhi and South Asia at large (Joeck, 2013). This absence is noteworthy because the US-Indo relationship blossomed as leading Indian-American interest groups emerged in Washington DC. In particular, the relationship emerged from five decades of mutual distrust, distance, and estrangement into a close alliance, marked by the passage of the landmark US-Indo Civilian Nuclear Agreement in 2008 (Talbott, 2010). The selection of this historic accord, which granted New Delhi access to the nuclear energy market despite its long-standing refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

During President Bush's second term, the watershed agreement was marginally responsible for securing the passage of the nuclear deal and the progressive evolution of the bilateral relationship (Kirk, 2008). Alternatively, I contend that a combination of systemic, domestic, and individual factors facilitated rapprochement between the two nations since the Cold War. India played a decisive role in advancing the US-Indo relationship from 2001-2009, its fundraising efforts on behalf of congressional candidates, and the group's methods to influence policy outcomes on Capitol Hill (Pant, 2011). Its public claims to demonstrate that its political power is not as strong as the organization itself. While not fool-proof, demystifying its alleged role in influencing Congressional races and legislative outcomes, all interest groups' principal tactics are one way of contrasting the organization's centrality in the consolidation of the bilateral relationship.

After making the case, India has not been as decisive as influencing Washington's South Asia policies, which holds greater explanatory power in explaining how the United States and India managed to consolidate its alliance in the aftermath of the Cold War (Westervelt, 1998). Instead of arguing that one factor outweighs all others in explaining

the alliance's evolution, my alternative argument underscores the importance of systemic, domestic, and individual determinants that facilitated a rapprochement between the two democracies. This attempts to plug in the United States by more closely scrutinizing the role of the Indian-American diaspora more generally in the passage of the civilian nuclear agreement and Indo-US rapprochement (F. H. Khan, 2003). Besides, it attempts to offer a more nuanced understanding of ethnic lobbies and the way they may or may not have a decisive impact on influencing US policy towards a particular country or region.

India is on its way to acquire a leading role in South Asia and is desirous of radiating regional but global effects. India has made good progress in many fields, including civil nuclear programs. India is aspiring to become a permanent member of the UNSC, thereby enhancing its stature on the regional and global stage. India has traditionally close ties with Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan; however, her relations with China have never been on a smooth track (Basrur & Rizvi, 2003). There is a long list of disputes between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, Siachin, Sir Creek and water, etc. India has strained relations with most of its neighbours and always displayed hegemonic designs to dominate others one way or the other.

The new BJP government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi is likely to pursue a regional leadership role vigorously. While following the Chinese model, India is trying to focus on developing its economy to facilitate the achievement of its geopolitical ambitions (Yamin, 2014). Concerning Pakistan's relations, the new Indian government enjoys enhanced political space compared to its predecessor; however, they are reluctant to manifest any flexibility. Political rhetoric is likely to continue in the future on the Mumbai trial and other terrorism-related matters. The end of 'Composite Dialogue' seems

to be in limbo with little prospect of picking any momentum due to stubbornness in the Indian political leadership (Tehsin, Ali, & Qumber, 2019).

The United States, India, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Israel, have started to enhance its nuclear and conventional military capabilities. The landmark Indo-US Civil Nuclear cooperation is a case in point. India faces a diverse threat environment ranging from sub-conventional militant groups to nuclear weapons, thereby enhancing its nuclear but conventional capabilities. India has configured its nuclear posture on a perception of threat from both China and Pakistan and is continuing its technological advancement as such (Tehsin et al., 2019). US-Indian strategic cooperation is expected to improve the Indian investment in the nuclear field alongside various other areas. Furthermore, after striking a deal with the US, Indians have started a similar dialogue with other countries where similar technology is available at cheaper rates with a little oversight. Therefore, the dilution of Indian investment will significantly reduce US attraction in the whole process (Tehsin et al., 2019).

India continues to depend on Russia for military hardware due to their close cooperation. India and Japan are also coming close to each other; both the countries are willingly available to the western powers. The strategic relationship between Japan and India is more economics-based than the military one. Indo-Israel defense cooperation is not a strategic challenge for Pakistan and is likely to remain under limits to the extent of not annoying Pakistan. The relationship between the two countries may be good for each other but not necessarily bad for Pakistan.

3.4.2. Nuclear Tension in South Asia

South Asian region, in the views of some other analysts, is now in a state of security/insecurity paradox. The control of nuclear weapons constrained both parties to the conflict from escalating the crisis into the nuclear exchange and confining their targets (Fareed, 2019). The Indian government, during the 2001-02 crisis, mobilized a large number of forces along the border but did not push them for physical confrontation. The Indian policymakers and strategists argue that nuclear weapons provided Pakistan with an umbrella to support the insurgency inside Kashmir and other parts of the Indian Territory (Joeck, 2013). However, the belief at New Delhi can abruptly respond to any threat, a serious menace to their sovereignty and integrity. It shows that under the security/insecurity paradox, nuclear weapons provide Pakistan to launch the incursion. At the same time, it restrained the two arch-rivals from escalating to a nuclear exchange.

According to some other US officials, Indians sought an excuse to withdraw his forces during the twin peak crisis 2001-02, when the US deputy secretary announced that Pervez Musharraf reaffirmed to stop permanently cross border infiltration. In addition to this, an Indian official revealed that “we do not envision striking in a way that would lead them to use their nuclear weapons” (Fareed, 2019). But the Indians are more optimistic when they contend that the Indian nuclear weapons much more deter Pakistan as New Delhi can survive and bounce back after any nuclear attack by the Pakistani military, but Islamabad cannot. To be clear about this, yet neither Pakistan nor India has the second strike capability to respond; this all as mere political rhetoric (Joshi, 2019).

In the views of another nuclear strategist and analyst, P R Chari, the nuclear history of early American-Soviet Union relations resembled Pakistan-India's nuclear tension that rose after South Asia's nuclearization. In his study, he has mentioned that Indian authorities repeatedly planned to attack Pakistan's nascent nuclear program in the 1980s and 90s. However, the possibility of an adverse consequence of nuclear radiation would have inflicted serious damages on some populated Indian areas if Indians had attacked Pakistani nuclear reactors; hence India refrained from doing so (P. Chari, 2003). Furthermore, Chari and his co-authors have contended that Indian policymakers are optimistic about the possibility of limited warfare under the umbrella of nuclear weapons. Also determined that four crises, brass-tracks, 1990, 1999, and 2001-2002, made both the countries realize that further escalation was self-defeating (P. R. Chari et al., 2009).

Three of the crises, except 1990, would have led to open war. They further indicate that nuclear rhetoric became more intense after the nuclearization of the two regional states. However, nuclear weapons have not made the region more stable or conflict less likely. Also, crises showed that nuclear weapons have deterred escalation but did not thwart limited warfare; the situation will exacerbate in years to come because India upgrades its conventional infrastructure while Pakistan is prone to enhance its nuclear safeguards. The US close ties with India has dramatically made the strategic future of the region more problematic and uncertain (P. R. Chari et al., 2009). The US nuclear deal with the Indian government is an illustration of widening the mistrust gap between Washington and Islamabad and a witness of close ties between New Delhi and Washington. Looking at these ground realities, the strategic future of the region will be more problematic and deterrence stability fragile and challenging (R. M. Khan, 2012a).

According to Tugral Yamin, a retired Pakistani brigadier, the tension between the two neighbors Pakistan and India, has certainly increased after the nuclearization of South Asia. The two have refrained from physical confrontation. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Indian forces were deployed along the border for aggression but did not do so due to the Pakistani government's nuclear and military threats. Pakistan assured the Indian government that it would never hesitate to go for a nuclear strike if its sovereignty was threatened. However, he points out that after experiencing two close nuclear incidents of 1999 and 2001-02, the two sides abruptly embarked on the resumption of composite dialogue to reduce tensions through several agreements and nuclear-related CBMs in the year 2004 (Yamin, 2014). He states that two nuclear giants of the region were meant to move through a nuclear learning curve and a stable nuclear deterrence.

Retired Pakistani brigadier, Feroz Hassan Khan, believes that the South Asian region's position is not like that of the Cold war era. He puts forth the challenges faced by the strategic stability of South Asia. For him, a stable nuclear deterrence should meet the following three criteria: first, the credibility of the nuclear system; second, neither side should assume that it can destroy the enemy's nuclear capabilities in a defensive or pre-emptive strike; and third is the assurance of these weapons from all kind of human and technical errors. He argues that the first criteria of a stable nuclear deterrence were achieved by the two neighbors India and Pakistan when the two sides overtly tested their capabilities in the year 1998 (F. H. Khan, 2003).

However, the remaining two criteria are a bit complex due to the prevailing uncertainty in the region. The second condition of stable nuclear deterrence in South Asia remained problematic as there had been speculation of Indian preventive strikes on

Pakistani nascent nuclear capabilities in the 1980s. Since the Kargil episode, New Delhi fears that Pakistani military elements may act without consulting its political leadership. Similarly, the third condition is also lacking in the region as there is always uncertainty about the safety of nuclear arsenals in the region (F. H. Khan, 2003). Although both India and Pakistan have always shown their nuclear discipline in peacetime and during crises.

Furthermore, he also emphasizes that until and unless there is a uniform regional structure framework, sustained conflict-resolution process, and strategic restraint regime for conventional and nuclear forces, there will remain a risk of nuclear escalation. The main crux of his study eventually draws the attention of policymakers in both nations towards forming an organism where both nuclear and conventional restraint measures are pondered (Mian, Nayyar, Rajaraman, & Ramana, 2006).

Indian scientists are not satisfied with their current development, and rather they strive for further acquisition, which shows that their military interest has not yet been met. Islamabad's and New Delhi's limited nuclear capabilities have not eliminated their mutual fear of the first-strike option. So, the available limited nuclear armaments of both are more than enough to deprive each other of their nuclear weapons in their first strike option (F. H. Khan, 2003). New Delhi and Islamabad have been involved in the nuclear arms race since 1998, and the Pakistan fastest-growing nuclear program in the world. Their nuclear programs are too secret, which makes the situation opaque for the outside observers. The contemporary world's strategic stability faces several challenges: security trilemma, technological development, and, more particularly, growing tension in South Asia (Koblentz, 2014).

Washington has not had a simple time dealing with the US-Pakistan relationship, to underestimate the obvious. For quite a long time, the United States has tried to change Pakistan's key center from contending with India and looking for more impact in Afghanistan to ensuring its particular inward steadiness and monetary improvement. Anyhow despite the fact that Pakistan has kept on relying upon the US military and financial help, it has not transformed its conduct much. Every nation blames the other for being a frightful partner, and maybe both are correct (Haqqani, 2013).

3.4.3. US-India Diaspora and Lobbies

The Indian diaspora's maturation within the United States is three important historical developments that underpin the need to more closely scrutinize the Indian diaspora and its lobbying arm (Dargan, 2011). The Indian-American diaspora, a group that first migrated to the United States in the late 19th Century, has remained limited in scope. While the period they assess is before the creation of the United States India Political Action Committee (USINPAC), their quantitative-based conclusions remain relevant, especially if one seeks to disprove the claim that the outcome of Indian-American lobbying has historically been marginal. The relationship between corporate interests and the development of US policy towards India is the scope of the important light on the Indian government's efforts to encourage non-resident Indians (NRIs) in efforts to project Indian culture in the United States and also deconstruct the various immigration waves to show a general trend of increased NRI visibility over the past two decades while he focuses on a unique angle of the immigrant settlement experience in the United States (Dargan, 2011).

An Indian counterpart took advantage of the political climate in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to stress areas of common interest between New Delhi and Washington in combating Islamic extremism. USINPAC opened an office with full-time staff in the nation's capital three years later and quickly emerged as a leading voice on Congressional Hill in support of the US India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement from the bill's introduction in 2005 to its passage in 2008. The organization publicly boasts its role in advancing the US-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, marking its notable legislative victory, while making other claims about its role in influencing the outcomes of different Congressional races (Freedman, 2009).

For over a decade, analysts and commentators have made broad claims about Indian-Americans' influence on particular electoral outcomes. Samuel Huntington claimed that the 1996 Senate race that led to the defeat of incumbent Senator Larry Pressler (R-ND) was a contest between Indians and Pakistanis as the outcome of the race, given the Pressler Amendment's ban on economic and military assistance to Pakistan, had direct implications for New Delhi and Islamabad. While not mentioning a specific case of Indian-American lobbying success, Mearsheimer and Walt cited Indian-Americans' efforts to shift US foreign policy in a pro-India direction in their 2006 text (Farees, 2004). The central conclusion that Kirk reaches in his assessment of USINPAC is that "Indian-American mobilization was the critical factor behind overwhelming congressional support for the controversial President Bush Jr.-Singh nuclear agreement in 2008" (Freedman, 2009). USINPAC claims broad credit for the passage of the nuclear accord and points to its influence in shaping outcomes of various electoral races as an index of its organizational strength. Yet relevant questions remain: to what degree has Indian American voter

mobilization occurred over the past two decades? More specifically, to what extent should USINPAC be credited electoral and policy success (Dargan, 2011)?

As Mearsheimer and Walt note, the lobbies have many avenues to influence the policy process in a democratic system. A principal method is for a lobby or interest group to raise and direct campaign contributions towards candidates who hold sympathetic views on issues of concern while working to “defeat candidates whose views are suspect” (J. J. Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). This has been a primary strategy of all the major lobbies, including USINPAC. While a group’s ability to shape an electoral race’s outcome is one measure of its effectiveness, proving a counterfactual, which an outcome would not have occurred absent organizational involvement, is not scientifically possible. As mentioned in Section II, there is no fool-proof way of ascertaining the complete causality of interest-group influence on a policy processor determining the counterfactual, namely, whether an electoral outcome would have been had a lobbying group not campaigned on behalf of a candidate or raised funds in a race. While mindful of this limitation, it’s still useful to more closely scrutinize the three electoral races for which USINPAC and commentators have attributed success to the lobby. Making the case that USINPAC may be a relatively weak organization helps add credence to the three levels of analysis perspective, the alternative rationale in explaining the passage of the agreement and the alliance’s consolidation (Dargan, 2011). USINPAC-inspired mobilization of the Indian-American community is the critical factor behind the 2008 US-Indo Civilian Nuclear Agreement?

Contrary to this claim, available evidence does not suggest that USINPAC was the critical or even a major factor behind the passage of this legislation. The activities USINPAC utilized to marshal support of the bill on Capitol Hill (Kamdar, 2007). The

different lobbying strategies the organization used (from fundraisers on behalf of elected officials to the use of electronic media to rally the community on behalf of lawmakers), his analysis fails to meet the key threshold in assessing the interest group effectiveness: namely, what “the outcome would have been had interest group pressure been absent” (Kamdar, 2007).

In other words, a Senator or Representative’s floor statement congratulating USINPAC and the Indian-American community may have simply amounted to good politics. Likewise, USINPAC’s lobbying efforts may have been tailored towards simply creating a political cover or the perception thereof to stymie opposition to the agreement (Dargan, 2011). Moreover, American nuclear corporations and other relevant companies had in securing the passage of this deal. India’s nuclear energy market has been estimated to be worth roughly \$150 billion, a market that remained outside the reach of US corporations before the passage of this agreement. New Delhi recently tendered a deal to two US corporations, GE-Hitachi and Westinghouse Electric, to construct two nuclear plants in India, a deal worth about \$10 billion. It is significant, not least because formal nuclear exchanges between Washington and New Delhi have yet to occur, on account of a dispute over India’s Civil Liability legislation. Given the significant financial interests at stake with the passage of this bill, it is hard to claim that the political influence of the lobby amounted to the ‘decisive’ factor in the legislation’s passage (Farees, 2004).

In short, it overstates USINPAC’s role in corralling support for the legislation while failing to acknowledge the confluence of material and financial interests that drove the agreement’s passage. Since the lobby, the centered hypothesis does not fully explain the deal’s introduction and the consolidation of the bilateral relationship, an assessment that

underscores the centrality of systemic, state, and individual-level factors in shaping international politics (Farees, 2004). Since USINPAC-inspired mobilization of the Indian-American community is insufficient in explaining the nuclear accord's passage, I argue that this agreement consolidated a gradual, nearly two-decade rapprochement between New Delhi and Washington, should instead be analyzed. Indeed, this framework is significantly more robust, and therefore accurate, in explaining the multiple factors that drove the introduction and passage of this legislation, as it recognizes the numerous necessary conditions that paved the way for the Henry Hyde Act (Kimbball, 2007).

As Kenneth Waltz outlined in his seminal text, *Man, The State, and War* (1959), the three levels of analysis (or images) are an important window into examining international politics, and specifically, the causes of war (Kenneth, 1959). The international, domestic, and individual levels are the critical thresholds for examining international conflict. This section addresses these three levels, starting with a discussion of systemic changes in the international environment (third level), followed by a discussion of state-level factors that enhanced rapprochement (second level), concluding with a discussion of the role of individuals in shaping the US-Indo alliance (first level).

3.4.3.1. Third Level: Shifts in the International Security System

According to Waltz, the anarchic nature of the international system is the key driver of international politics. Without a higher authority to govern the behavior of individual states, nations are forced to reconcile competing interests among themselves, a reality that drives uncertainty and, thus, conflicts (Kenneth N Waltz, 1979b). The third level of analysis, therefore, captures dynamics within the domain of the international system.

Indeed, the structure of the international security environment in the Cold War's aftermath made US-Indo rapprochement possible over the next two decades. While formally a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the Cold War, New Delhi benefited from Moscow's patronage from India's inception in 1947. Post-Partition South Asia quickly became a proxy theatre for influence between Washington and Moscow, with the United States formally cementing a bilateral relationship with Islamabad through the Central Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1955. Throughout much of this period, relations between India and the United States remained distant, not just because of Washington's formal relationship with Pakistan, but also because of Moscow's economic and military assistance to New Delhi (Talbott, 2010).

The United States was a key driver behind the military's ascendancy in Pakistan; between 1954 and 1961, US military assistance to Pakistan totaled \$508 million, while granting the military regime of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq \$2.5 billion from 1978-1988, the decade in which Washington covertly offered arms to the Afghan mujahedeen (H. Yusuf, 2011). The backdrop of sustained ideological divides in South Asia helps explain why the breakup of the Soviet Union and Washington's shunting of Pakistan in the immediate post-Cold War period removed the key obstacle to US-Indo rapprochement. The Cold War was one of the principal barriers to India's realization of its grand strategic ambitions, which became apparent with India's rapid economic growth and military modernization in the ensuing years. The Soviet collapse "forced India's policymakers to recalculate their strategy options," which entailed finding ways to enhance their regional security. New Delhi, the authors point out, moved to strengthen relations with China while

also abandoning what they call a “reflexive opposition to American strategic, economic, and diplomatic policies.” (Kapur & Ganguly, 2007).

Another shift at the international level occurred in 1990 when President George H.W. Bush reasserted Washington’s nuclear nonproliferation objectives at the expense of Pakistan’s strategic relationship. As Christine Fair has noted, Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan sustained Congressional funding to Pakistan from 1979-1989 despite Executive Branch knowledge of Islamabad’s active nuclear program (Fair, 2009). Indeed, Congress’s passage of the Pressler Amendment in 1985 conditioned US aid to Pakistan on an annual Presidential certification that Islamabad did not retain nuclear weapons. While President Reagan certified this stipulation during his second term, in 1990, President Bush declined to assent, as US geopolitical interests in South Asia receded with the Soviet extrication from Afghanistan, a move that triggered sanctions against Pakistan. A further consequence of President Bush’s certification was Washington’s denial of 28 F-16 combat fighters for which Pakistan had made payments until 1993 (Fair, 2009).

The 1999 Kargil War further strained the US-Pakistan relationship while deepening Washington’s strategic preference for New Delhi. The Clinton Administration “acted decisively” in India’s favour by persuading Islamabad to “unconditionally and unambiguously” curtail its aggression across the disputed Line of Control (LoC). The Clinton administration’s pressure against Pakistan secured India’s trust of US intentions on the Subcontinent (C. R. Mohan, 2007a). Building on the nascent, diplomatic goodwill, the US and Indian governments agreed to conduct a joint case study of the Kargil Crisis, aimed in part as a ‘confidence-building measure,’ which continued under the President Bush Jr. Administration (Stephen Philip Cohen, 2002). During the Kargil event, diplomatic

maneuvers marked a significant break in the diplomatic history of these two nations, paving the way for rapprochement over the next decade.

3.4.3.2. Second Level: Economic, Democratic, and Institutional Reform

Whereas the third level of analysis captures structural dynamics that impact state behavior, Waltz's second level looks towards states' internal character as determinants for peace and conflict. Structural changes in the international security environment were closely related to state-level reforms that India undertook in 1990. The loss of the Soviet Union as a nominal patron forced India to look for other security sources, but it underscored the futility of socialist economic planning. A foreign exchange crisis that occurred after New Delhi purchased an oil on the global market before the Gulf War outbreak directly led to a series of state economic reforms launched under the guise of then-Finance Minister Manmohan Singh. Reforms within India's regulatory system, its over-reliance on industrial imports, led to the abatement of decades-long economic stagnation, as growth rates averaged 6% per year during the 1990s and far surpassed the growth of Pakistan's economy (C. R. Mohan, 2007b). Comprehensive deregulation, in addition to reforms in the financial sector and the removal of barriers to foreign trade and investment, creating opportunities for foreign capital investment. Many US corporations quickly recognized; the South Indian cities of Bangalore and Hyderabad emerged as major business process outsourcing (BPO) centers after economic liberalization (Martin & Kronstadt, 2007). Likewise, by 2006, the United States became India's largest export market and its third-largest import source. India's rapid economic growth throughout the 1990s facilitated New Delhi's increased military spending and plans for substantive military modernization in 2001 and 2002 (C. R. Mohan, 2007b).

3.4.3.3. First Level: The Power of Individuals

While the third and second levels of analysis stress the relationship between the Soviet Union's collapse and necessary changes that facilitated rapprochement, the first level underscores the power of individual decision-makers in allowing this alliance to come to fruition (Chou, 2005). Principally, and much of the President Bush Jr. Administration's success in consolidating the partnership in the first decade of the 21st Century is attributable to the leadership of President Bill Clinton. He made several moves in the last few years of his Administration, which paved the way for the subsequent civilian nuclear deal. In particular, the authors recognize Clinton's actions during the 1999 Kargil conflict, including the President's tough diplomacy with then Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, as signaling to the Indian's that it would not 'reflexively' side with a historical ally. Clinton's castigation of Pakistan in breaching the Line of Control (LoC) that triggered the conflict signaled America's good faith to the Indians while atoning for US-imposed economic sanctions in the wake of India and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests. Besides, Former Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and then-Finance Minister Manmohan Singh with significant credit for ensuring the early 90s economic reforms despite stiff political opposition (Sumit Ganguly, 2001).

Few other individuals deserve considerable credit for advancing the Indo-US alliance as well for securing the passage of the nuclear agreement. First, former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who served as Prime Minister from 1998-2004, played a key role by signaling India's outstanding support to the United States after the Bush Administration decided to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in December of 2001.

Three years later, Bush announced the Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership (NSSP) with the Vajpayee government (Tellis, 2005a).

The Henry Hyde Act would not have even come to fruition, let alone conception if it were not for the presence of Ashley Tellis on the National Security Council during the President Bush Jr. Administration. Tellis is the principal architect of the US-Indo Civilian Nuclear Agreement. Tellis served as a Special Assistant on the National Security Staff in the early years of the Bush Administration and then served as a Senior Advisor to US Ambassador to India (Kapur & Ganguly, 2007).

The Bush Administration tapped Tellis because he knew more about India's nuclear program than any other living American and was thus instrumental in securing the deal's passage. Well before the introduction of the Henry Hyde Act, Tellis was a vocal supporter of redefining Washington's relationship with a nuclear-armed New Delhi (A. J. Tellis, 2006). In 2001, Tellis wrote of the need for the US to abandon the traditional policy of "resolving nonproliferation issues as a precondition to deepened bilateral relations" towards India, instead urging Washington to adopt a reorientation in its strategic attitude by accepting the fact that India will maintain a nuclear deterrent of some sort for some time to come. (A. J. Tellis, 2006).

The idea of embracing a nuclear-armed state that had not signed the NPT was anathema to the US nonproliferation policy since the treaty's inception over three decades earlier (Weiss, 2010). Four years later, and one month before the historic meeting between President Bush Jr. and Prime Minister Singh, Tellis squarely addressed the tension between engaging India at the expense of the nonproliferation regime, writing:

Washington ought to support New Delhi simply because India's continued presence outside the global nonproliferation architecture will be increasingly dangerous for US interests, given India's vast and growing indigenous capabilities. The US ought to increase India's access to controlled technologies as an incentive for New Delhi despite its currently impeccable record to scrupulously control outward proliferation in perpetuity. The solution cannot consist of jettisoning the regime; instead, the regime should be selectively applied in practice (Tellis, 2005b).

This vision would ultimately become the basis for President Bush Jr. Administration's nuclear engagement strategy with India, a strategy that Tellis would frequently defend while testifying on behalf of Capitol Hill's nuclear accord (A. Tellis, 2006).

A combination of systemic, domestic, and individual-level factors has played in facilitating the US-Indo alliance formation since 1990. By casting doubt on USINPAC's perceived role in influencing Congressional races, I have attempted to undermine the organization's argument that it is an instrumental political organization and its claims that it represents the broader Indian diaspora (Dargan, 2011). The necessary international, domestic, and individual factors paved the way for Indo-US rapprochement, and ultimately, the passage of the landmark civilian nuclear cooperation agreement in 2008. The latter view is far more thorough in explaining the factors that drove the formation of this alliance and, ultimately, the civilian nuclear agreement determinants, a policy that stood in stark contrast to four decades of US nonproliferation strategy (Weiss, 2010).

In addition, lobbying suggesting that time is a key determinant for lobby success, a variable that does not appear to be directly addressed. The American lobby, in particular, has been in existence in some form since after World War I; the Israeli lobby (and AIPAC, in particular) emerged shortly after World War II, while Cuban migrants and exiles to the United States mobilized in opposition to Cuban President Fidel Castro during the Cold War (J. J. Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). In short, preexisting studies all deal with Diasporas that have well established lobbying arms. For interest groups, the perception of success matters as much as an ability to effectively influence outcomes, and longevity can often help strengthen such perceptions. Thus, while USINPAC does satisfy criteria for interest group success, its relative infancy appears to be a missing variable. Its continued presence on Capitol Hill, as well as its organizational durability, can only help bolster its lobbying activities in the short and long term (Kamdar, 2007).

For policy-makers and observers, this argument strongly suggests that elected officials should not axiomatically believe the claims that a particular lobbying group broaches about the degree to which it represents a specific community. USINPAC's questionable impact of domestic Congressional races buttresses the point that while an Indian lobby may try to deter legislators from voting against their interests through the threat of electoral punishment, these threats may often be hollow. Second, this analysis should also lend a degree of skepticism to claims that lobbies are uniquely powerful and positioned to influence US foreign policy (Farees, 2004).

3.4.4. Indian's Regional Hegemonic

Pakistan expressed serious reservations over the Indian assertions and efforts of commanding leadership role in South Asia. India asserts itself as a natural regional hegemon in South Asia while displaying imperialistic tendencies toward its smaller neighbor states (Flemes & Wojczewski, 2011). The roots of this long-cherished idea can be traced to Nehruvanism's idea as India inherited abundant material and ideational resources, which make it dominate the regional power hierarchy. Despite Indian supremacy in conceptual and material resources, Pakistan is a secondary power in a region that contested Indian regional leadership claims in response to the threat emanating from a potential regional hegemon.

Pakistan picked foreign policy preferences, which are automatically conflictive in the Indian designed security structure's nature. Indian designed regional security structure highlights that only a strong and powerful India can ensure regional security and stability (Pardesi, 2005). The opposition of Indian hegemonic ambitions in South Asia as a Pakistan strategic priority is based on Pakistan's intentions of preserving its relative position in the regional policy area.

Pakistan believes that the New Delhi managed security model cannot bring harmony and durable peace in South Asia. It is contrary to the national aspirations of the rest of the South Asian states. Such a power arrangement lacks flexibility and does not accommodate smaller states' divergent views regarding peace and security. Pakistan contends a pluralistic power model that includes; the principle of sovereign equality of all states, respect for each other's national sensitivities, and respect of the right of each state's

independence in conducting its domestic and foreign affairs (Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 1993). One state cannot impose its own designed regional security model without developing a mutual consensus with other states. The other states are not obliged to abide by the security model, which is not in line with their national interests and strategic priorities. Indian leaders discard security apprehensions of other states and argue that their assumptions are baseless. They accuse a non-cooperative attitude of other states, especially Pakistan, and the problem causes their reluctance to accept India's status in the region. India asserts that the region's security situation can only be improved if regional states, especially Pakistan, abandon their efforts of seeking support from outside of the region to solve regional disputes (Destradi, 2010). The question arises, why Pakistan detested and opposed Indian regional ambitions because historical experiences have ingrained distrust to a great extent in Pakistan's strategic culture. It is unlikely to negate this culturally constructed reality in the making of foreign policy disposition.

Comparative military capability *vis-a-vis* India is a central theme of Pakistan's foreign policy orientation. India had a comparative military advantage over Pakistan in terms of its size, resources, technology, weapons, etc., from the day of inception. It inherited a colossal defense structure and most of the British Indian army's assets that had taken the British over a hundred years to construct (Hewitt, 1992). India denied to handover Pakistan's share in support following the outbreak of the Kashmir dispute. Nehru said that Pakistan, as a dissident province of British India that seceded from the union, had no right of shares in Raj's assets. Pakistan developed its defense system from scratch as it inherited a weak, poorly organized, and ill-equipped army with most of Raj's problematic frontiers (Fair, 2014). Pakistan's military was to not only defend its most troubled borders but to

hold on to Indian expansion in Kashmir. Pakistan's security paranoia over India forced it to focus excessively on its military buildup and its armed forces at the expense of economic development. Despite an excessive focus on defense capabilities, Pakistan could not catch up in India because of a huge military imbalance (Inkster, 2012).

Indian duplicity and highhandedness over the Kashmir dispute and its efforts of integrating Kashmir into the Indian union forcefully generated an acute sense of insecurity in Pakistan and forced Pakistan to find means to overcome it. It made Pakistan pursue such a policy, which can offset its military imbalance against India. Pakistan turns toward external help and gained considerable assistance from the US and west (Pardesi, 2005). But both parties had divergent views; the west extended military aid to Pakistan ostensibly to make it a hedge against the expansion of the Soviet Union in South Asia, but Pakistan sought assistance to strengthen its position to counterbalance the Indian military threat and fetch diplomatic support to wrest control over Kashmir. Pakistan misperceived the US even though Pakistan's broad role in US containment policy against Russia India has a more high profile than Pakistan in the US South Asian strategy. It declined to help Pakistan against the Indian threat. The US underestimated Pakistan's threat perception (R. Rajagopalan, 2000).

Pakistan was afraid of India because it had the potential and capability to mount an offensive against Pakistan and to dictate Pakistan on its terms. Pakistan refused to acknowledge its inferior status and stood to defy Indian military prowess. Indian military clout and superiority enabled it to become more resolute on its stance over the Kashmir dispute, a principal source of hostility, pushing Pakistan into a corner. It also succeeded in inflicting the most significant damage by downsizing Pakistan in the East Pakistan debacle.

Pakistan got setbacks with each subsequent episode of conflict, such as Siachen in 1984, Kargil conflict in 1999. The Pakistan military remained determined not to subdue before Indian military superiority and resolve to live for another fight (Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 2002).

With growing military might, India has amplified its canvassing for permanent seats in the UN Security Council. A desire to obtain global power status in the international arena and an undisputed military power in the region has become an obsession and paramount driver of Indian military strategy. India spends extravagantly to bolster its military capability because it considered that its military superiority in the region is essential to assert its dominance in the region and attract the world's attention (Hali, 2013).

India's quest for great power status gradually deteriorated the security environment and triggered the arms race in the region. The military balance has tilted overwhelmingly in favor of India because Pakistan could not keep pace with India in a race of modernization of military equipment due to lack of finances and its entanglement in a war of terror. The spillover effects of war badly deteriorated Pakistan's economy and internal stability by pushing it into new security paranoia. On the other side, India utilized its massive economic growth rate to build its conventional military capability (Oswald, 2011).

It argues that Pakistan jeopardizes Indian security and strategic interests, and China's procurement of weapons, unresolved territorial disputes with India, kept locked Pakistan into a web of old and new security risks and entangled it in its arms race in the region (C. Wagner, 2014). Both decided to remain in their regional cobweb and impede the way of normalization. India enjoys conventional military superiority over Pakistan in terms of weapons, resources, technology, and human resources. "Indian Army is twice the

size of Pakistan Army. Indian armour and artillery strength are about three times that of Pakistan. IAF is twice as large in combat aircraft but five times larger in state of the art strike aircraft. IN is five times larger than the PN, except that PN's submarine fleet is more modern" (C. Wagner, 2014). India's military expenditure outspent Pakistan by 5:1 in 2005. Military asymmetry in conventional arms induced a wave of uncertainty among Pakistani decision-makers and forced them to pursue deterrence policy. However, some assume that despite Indian numerical superiority in its military capability, its military advantage is overestimated in an armed confrontation between nascent neighbors (Gill, 2005). India's antipathy toward external mediation in regional conflicts prolonged the resolution of the Kashmir dispute and prevented its fair solution. India determined to resolve the dispute based on bilateral relations.

There is no doubt that no other south Asian state can compete with India regarding its size, economy, and resources. Its gradual success in tapping its demographic and geographic size for its economic growth provided its economic boom and global prominence over its neighbors (Tellis, 1997). After the Cold War, liberalization of the economy accentuated India's economic growth rate and propelled it toward global prominence from political obscurity. According to the BRICs report, it is estimated that India would surpass Japan's economy if it maintains, which is likely to, a real GDP growth rate above 5 percent. As The Economist stated, 'Bigger economies mean bigger armies.' Its economic growth made it uphold its military expenditures, which accounts for 2.6 percent of its GDP, and sustain its military superiority in the region, placing it among the world's top 5 military powers (Writers, 2013). Being the largest and powerful state in the region, no other country can risk earning Indian wrath unnecessarily. India has been

successful to some extent in bringing south Asian states under its hegemony except Pakistan, as the security policies of all south Asian states reflect that Indian sensitivities are given full attention. Once, India even prevented Sri Lanka from acquiring weapons from Pakistan. India aims to dictate its neighbors to impose its policy pursuits upon the other regional countries. It is common to extend advice to other friends or neighbor states in international affairs. It cannot be implied as an attempt of dictation, but to prevent other states from their legitimate right of trade with other states reflects hegemonic tendencies (Williams, Lobell, & Jesse, 2012).

The glaring peculiarity of the South Asian region is that it is an India centric region. All states of the region share border with India and none of them has physical borders. India naturally enjoys a significant position in the region. The Indian policy objective is to strengthen its already overriding position and prevent outside power from encouraging small states to challenge Indian hegemony. Indira doctrine, named after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, directed India's foreign policy toward South Asia until 1990. The doctrine, enunciated in 1983, states that India will not interfere in any state's internal affairs until a state requests to do so, as Sri Lanka called Indian helps to quell the insurgency. But the other provision of doctrine is intolerable as it states that India will not tolerate outside power intervention. If anybody needs assistance to control internal crises, it must resort to help in the region first. India even showed biases in applying its own designed doctrine of regional security as it objected to Sri Lanka for the acquisition of weapons from Pakistan because India wants to confine regional states not to seek help even from each other in order to uphold its monopoly and centrality in regional affairs (Bhasin, 2008).

Pakistan and India hold divergent views on the regional power structure. India considered Pakistan as an obstacle in its way to grand strategic goals. Pakistan strongly opposes the Indian designed doctrine of regional security and countered Indian hegemonic pursuits to maintain its independent existence and sovereignty. Pakistan stresses that sovereign equality of all states is a prerequisite for regional peace and stability (Davis, 2011). And it seeks to balance Indian hegemony by floating a pluralistic model of regional security that can accommodate the divergent sensitivities and perceptions of smaller states about peace and security. Pakistan holds that regional security must be rest on shared doctrine, which is concluded by dialogue among all South Asian countries. Pakistan opposes Indian supremacy in the region because Pakistan has been a victim of Several Indian hegemonic designs (Davis, 2011). India, many times resorted to coercive diplomacy to set things according to its likings. Indian occupation in Kashmir, invasion in East Pakistan, diversion of water from Pakistan allotted river reflects Indian hegemonic mindset.

One principal objective of Pakistan's foreign policy has been to defy Indian hegemony in the region in order to preserve its sovereign identity. It seeks to eliminate power disparity with India by allocating a huge portion of the budget to defense expenditure, aligning with the west, or developing nuclear arsenals (Bhasin, 2008).

3.5. The Mumbai Attack

On November 26, 2008, some terrorists attacked public places inside India. According to Indian sources, the attacker split into four groups and attacked civilians in a train station, café, and some hotels in Mumbai. These terrorists attacked last for 60 hours and resulted in the deaths of 172 lives across the city (Kronstadt, 2008). The Indian security

forces launched an operation against them and shot dead nine terrorists out of ten and arrested one alive. During the crisis, the President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, received a threatening call from someone claiming himself Pranab Mukherjee, the then Indian minister of foreign affairs. However, a few days, the later Indian ministry of foreign affairs, while making a press conference, denied making such a call to the Pakistani president. While commenting on the terrorist attack on Mumbai, he said that “preliminary evidence, *prima facie* evidence, indicates elements with links to Pakistan are involved” (Oh, Agrawal, & Rao, 2011).

The crisis this time, unlike before, did not escalate to any misperception, miscalculation, or military deployment. Despite the fact, the Pakistani high commissioner was summoned to New Delhi and was told that the Mumbai attack left a serious setback on bilateral relations (Kronstadt, 2008). Furthermore, some days later, Mukherjee, an external affairs ministry, stated that Islamabad was acquiring an increasingly dangerous dimension and threatened peace and stability in this region and beyond, and urged that New Delhi was not closing any options. (Hasan-Ashari Rizvi, 2011). In response, Pakistan’s officials remained sympathetic to their neighbors on this sad incident and offered a joint investigation to identify the intruders. Anyhow, the crisis winded up in a concise period without escalation. On December 14, Pakistan’s ministry of information claimed that Indian Jets breached Pakistan’s air space a day before (Kronstadt, 2008).

Chapter 4:

President Obama's Policies for South Asia

The triangular relationship among the US, India, and Pakistan has been of great importance for defining the relations of two major countries in the region. During the cold war era, India was aligned with the Soviet Union, and Pakistan a US ally. United States-Pakistan were allies on anti-Soviet military pacts like SEATO in 1954 and 1955 (CENTO), both led by the US (Hasnat, 2014). In 1971, India and the Soviet Union's relations were at a peak when both countries signed a 20-year defense pact. As it is a natural phenomenon that with the passage of time, the alliance and interest charges in global politics competition, so the triangular relations also went through many ups and downs.

Since independence, United States relations with South Asian countries (India and Pakistan) have been changing many national and international events, their impact on the region. After the cold war, incidents like 9/11 generated tension in South Asia, and national security, defense, and economic cooperation were brought to focus in many recent studies. For a long time, Afghanistan played a key role in reducing Chinese and Russian influence in the region, which created a great challenge for the US. However, after 9/11, the US benefits in South Asia to that of national security and terrorism. US foreign policy towards South Asia always swings between Pakistan and India and how to create balance and equilibrium between these two neighbouring countries of the region (C. R. Mohan, 2009).

The relations between these three countries have undergone different phases in a cyclic mode. The two countries' long-term issues created great mistrust and suspicions between the two countries with various socio-political vicissitudes. After 9/11, the bilateral

relations between the US and India were increased and marked by mutual understanding then greater cooperation. Considerably, the US and India improved their relations on political and military grounds and took every possible step to strengthen their ties (Renshon, 2009).

4.1. President Obama Policy towards Pakistan

President Obama policy's primary objectives were to make Pakistan a strong and stable country capable of controlling its territory and nuclear weapons and fighting against the terrorists in the region (Goswami, 2009). President Obama also wanted Pakistan to eliminate its differences with its rival India to bring socio-economic development to both countries. In a broader sense, the US interests in Pakistan during the President Obama administration supported a democratic and secular government in Pakistan with a pro-US outlook as follows:-

- i. The US's major interest in Pakistan was to save the country from becoming the hub of terrorist Organizations.
- ii. The US wanted to make safe the nuclear weapons of Pakistan from the hands of terrorists.
- iii. The US wanted to counter al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations operating in Pakistan.
- iv. The US needed to support Pakistan in order to bring stability, prosperity, and peace in Afghanistan (Goswami, 2009).

No doubt, as a neighbour of Afghanistan, Pakistan played a key role in the United States' War on Terror, but its economy and military suffered by assuming this burden. Thousands of innocent civilians and soldiers were killed in suicide attacks and other terrorist activities in the region (Kfir, 2009). The 9/11 incident was the first time terrorists challenged US homeland security. This incident triggered the 'war on terror' and forced the US to engage with the world to eliminate the scourge of terrorism. The US gave countries two stark options to support the US in the war on terrorism or align with the terrorist (Ondrejcsák, 2009). It was a difficult option to decide because Pakistan had relations with the Taliban when they took power in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Pakistan agreed to align with the US-led war, thereby shifting its policy towards the Taliban. After Pakistan became a US ally in War against Terror, it got a large amount of US funds flowed freely to improve the military capabilities as well as the economic structure of Pakistan (Renshon, 2009).

The friends of democratic Pakistan were recognized in September 2008, and its first official meeting was held on 24 September 2009 during the President Obama administration. Along with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari, other senior legislatures of other states also joined in the meeting under the chairmanship of President Barack H. Obama. The meeting members congratulated the President of Pakistan for bringing stability, recognizing democratic values, and accepting the nation's sacrifices in countering the militants. Promises were made to support Pakistan's efforts to achieve these objectives (Obama, 2010).

They also encouraged the United Nations, financial institutions, and other Pakistan partners to mobilize support for Pakistan in its developmental agenda. Trade-not-Aid

policy is beneficial for developing countries as it is the long-run profit for a developing nation to remain independent in the future to get a chance to have trade with rich and wealthy states. This trade strategy minimized dependency on foreign aid and the lifestyle of the nation. While this strategy offers benefits, they can only be realized if the wealthy countries reduce tariffs for exported goods of developing nations.

Similarly, Pakistan should also participate in the global market to profit from trade with the world. By promoting long-term trade, national savings would increase, which would, in turn, create more opportunities for wealth creation (Mitchell, 2011). However, this ‘trade aid’ policy is not an immediate solution for Pakistan because foreign aid, over the long-term, will be essential to modernize the technological, engineering, and educational systems of the nation, so the nation is capable of competing in a highly sophisticated world economy. During the President Obama administration, the non-security support fund was given to Pakistan so it could grow as the US was interested in making Pakistan a stable, developed, and peaceful nation (Mehrish, 2012). The US gave a lot of assistance to improve its various fields of health, education, energy, etc.

As Pakistan did its best to eradicate terrorism, it was given a significant position in the US war on terror. Instability in Afghanistan was not merely a domestic issue. Other factors responsible for the mess include America’s role and the instability caused by its neighbour Afghanistan. There were few positive developments in US-Pakistan relations during President Obama’s administration, as can be judged from President Obama’s failure to visit Pakistan during his term. Some have observed that the relations between Pakistan and the US will remain the same in the future if the US does not change its policy from

security cooperation to economic cooperation, which will have a profound and wide-ranging effect on the bilateral relation of the two nations (Obama, 2010).

Both Pakistan and India were very important allies throughout in Cold war for the US and Russia, respectively. These strategic locations and nuclear capabilities also make them increasingly important as facilitators of world peace. These two major states' importance could never be ignored through the Cold war era, and the two major powers did their level best to maximize their influence in this geopolitical arena. US policies' main objectives were to secure their own interests rather than reduce the tensions between India and Pakistan.

India was not happy with SEATO and CENTO pacts and the closeness of Pakistan with the US. The Sino-India war of 1962 also awakened India to the growing threat from China. India's meddling role during the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan made it more aggressive towards India, and the negative bond of enmity became stronger. During that time, the US keep good relations with India and Pakistan. Relations between the United States of America and India improved after the cold war at Pakistan's expense. However, US policy towards Pakistan was reassessed, especially after the nuclear test of 1998 and the revelations from Dr. AQ Khan network.

As mentioned earlier, the 9/11 terrorist attacks much shocked the US sense of homeland security and launched military operations against terrorists worldwide. Once again, the US felt the alliance with Pakistan should be strengthened to aid its fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan. With little choice, it's renewed the old strategic partnership between the United States and Pakistan. Therefore, because of its strategic geopolitical

location, Pakistan played an extraordinary role in the war on terror, especially in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The relations took an even more remarkable turn when Obama became the US president and strengthened its partnership with India (Parmar, Miller, & Ledwidge, 2014).

4.1.1. Kerry Lugar Bill

On October 15, 2010, during the President Obama administration, another bill was passed by congress called ‘Kerry Lugar Bill’ that authorized 1.5 billion US dollars for Pakistan annually as a non-military aid, special clauses were given regarding where fund could be used. Pakistan could not use this money against India or deal with the Taliban for its own interests (S. A. Zaidi, 2011).

The main objectives of the Kerry Lugar Bill were to improve the bilateral relations between Pakistan and the US and to increase US aid and cooperation in various fields. The bill was designed to eradicate terrorism and preserving international interests and security. The bill also provided 7.5 billion dollars of US aid to Pakistan to uproot terrorist bases and strengthen democracy for the betterment and well-being of the ordinary people (Minhas, Reyes Irizarry, & Al-Rawashdeh, 2011). President Obama promised to devote its military power and diplomatic energies to a region that now threatened US interests in the borderlands between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

However, the destroyed homes and killing of innocent civilians by the terrorists and military forces in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) and other tribal areas of Pakistan have a very negative impact on the hearts and minds of the Pakistani people. The result was that the US and its security agencies were viewed with deep suspicion. Pakistan

took the steps, and the US collectively in these tribal areas negatively impacted public perceptions of Pakistan and US military initiatives. In fact, Pakistan's role in the war on terror cannot be unnoticed. For gaining the US favour internationally, including Drone attacks in the tribal areas of Pakistan irrevocably turned. The majority of its population were against these military joint ventures (Kronstadt, 2011).

4.1.2. The Raymond Davis Case

On January 27, 2011, Raymond Allen Davis, an American national and covered CIA operative, killed two Pakistanis in Lahore. Raymond stated that he killed the guys because they were approaching with the intent to loot him. However, Pakistani authorities said that he killed two men without any reason. He was arrested soon on the charge of killing innocent Pakistani citizens, and his release was put on hold following a hard decision of the court despite too much pressure from the US (Kronstadt, 2011). Additionally, Mr. Davis had connections with some organizations that were working against Pakistan (Iqtidar, 2016).

As he was involved in covert activities, his network was also found involved in espionage activities. His arrest sent a shock wave to the US. The Pakistani public was against the release of Raymond Davis. Although he was released (it is said that the US government reached a deal with the family of the two persons that were killed by Raymond. Moreover, the US government also gave them ample money and visas), but the episode turned the Pak-US relations once more in a complex scenario. It was such an important case that diverse opinions arose in the Pakistani government, and even the foreign minister of that time, Mr. Shah Mahmood resigned, calling the release of Raymond Davis is above

the law and against public opinion. The US President also got involved in the case and pressed the Pakistani authorities to release him at the earliest, calling Raymond Davis as ‘our diplomat’ (Crilly, 2011).

The US lifted the case urging the diplomatic immunity for Raymond Davis as per Vienna Convention; however, in reality, the exemption was not applicable in that case. Mr. Raymond was released, and he went back to the home country on a special plane, the episode unveiled that there are so many covert spies working in Pakistan under the directives of Black Water, a notorious organization working to eliminate specified targets and the functions of the organization are similar to mercenaries. This case was very important as it seriously damaged the relations between the United States and Pakistan's governments (Iqtidar, 2016). Besides, the military establishment and the secret agencies of Pakistan were also unhappy with such acts of the US. They asked the civilian government to intimate US not to do such actions again.

4.1.3. The Killing of Osama Bin Laden

On May 2, 2011, the US Navy SEALs entered Pakistan and killed the most wanted terrorist of the world, Osama Bin Laden, in Abbottabad, a city of KPK (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Osama was the founder of Al-Qaeda, the Islamist organization that was considered responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11 in the US, and many other mass casualties in the world (Wilson, Whitlock, & Branigin, 2011). US Special Forces killed Osama, and this incident adversely affected the relations between the two countries. Widely divergent media about the Osama bin Laden killing led the public of both countries

into partisan conceptions of the events that precipitated this strike when, in fact, no one knew the reality behind the scene.

This incident created great mistrust between the two nations. The US believed that if Pakistan was playing its due role in the war on terror, how could it give refuge to an international terrorist inside its own land? In contrast, the people in Pakistan considered the killing of Osama bin Laden on its land by the US forces directly a threat to its sovereignty and foreign interference in its own land. The US justified its interference based on liberal intervention theory (Sanger, 2012). The American public strongly lauded the destruction of terrorist bases in the Northwest region of Pakistan and the killing of Osama bin Laden. The bin laden death was considered an end kneel to Al-Qaeda.

Before that operation, conducting an operation on Pakistani soil without taking the relevant authorities into confidence or at least informing them was nearly impossible. However, the action carried out by the US was considered a serious blow to relations between Islamabad and Washington as prior to Osama Bin Laden's episode, it is said that the US officials used to inform Pakistani security establishment about hot pursuit or even about drone strike. Initially, the public and international community felt that this action was taken on Pakistan's behest and information; however, repeated denial of Pakistani officials eventually convinced that the action was a unilateral one (Islam, 2012).

The United States President Barack Obama stated after the successful completion of Osama Bin Laden's operation that it is “the most significant achievement to date in our nation’s effort to defeat Al-Qaeda” (Bentley & Holland, 2013). However, critics still say that the war on terror ended with this achievement; the US's risks and dangers have

decreased? They found the answer is no, together with an assertion that Pakistan has been providing intelligence information to the US and the best outcomes of the military operation of US/NATO forces could not have been produced without Pakistani assistance. Besides, the killing of Osama Bin Laden is still questioned at the international level, whether he is really terminated or not. This ambiguity is because of how the US adopted to eliminate him and an equivocal way to dispose of Osama's body into the sea. While actions are taken with Pakistani support have never been questioned, there was no ambiguity (Parmar et al., 2014).

After the killing of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, there came a sharp twist in Pak-US relations because this operation was not conducted with Pakistan's help either authorities inside Pakistan was informed about the operation. Pakistani security establishment felt that the US's action is a serious violation of sovereignty and international norms. Moreover, it was more like a subject of disrespect to Pakistan. Certainly, Pakistan's vague and untrusted image had emerged after the Osama Bin Laden episode, and the international community had questioned the role, commitment, and competence of Pakistan and its intelligence in GWOT (Soherwordi, 2010).

Further, the old rival of Pakistan, India, appealed to the US that Pakistan is not helping the GWOT with commitment and seriousness; thus, the US must scrutinize its terms of engagement with Islamabad. Policymakers inside the US also had diverse opinions after the Osama Bin Laden episode. Somewhere in favour of continuing the relationship with the same genial tone, calling the need of Pakistan still there in fighting against the Taliban and war on terror. Simultaneously, few became very vocal against Pakistan on a note that Pakistan has opted for dual standards. The latter group also demanded a serious

check to Pakistan's commitment and a more profound look at the aid that is given to Pakistan in the past and more clinical action on the assistance that will be given in the future (Gul, 2012).

It is said that since the independence of Pakistan, the US-Pakistan relations have never been as delicate as they became after the Osama Bin Laden episode. Pakistani civilian leadership, but the military establishment showed deep reservations over such unilateral acts of the US. The killing of Osama bin laden and the conclusion of military efforts in Iraq were events that satisfied Americans concerned with the ongoing war on terrorism. Overall, these developments greatly impacted US security interests and promote stability in South Asia (Mitchell, 2011).

4.1.4. The Salala Check Post Incident

The US relations were already strained after Raymond Davis's affairs and the killing of Al-Qaeda supreme leader in Pakistani territory without consent. In 2011, when the US/NATO forces attack a Pakistani, the Salala check post on Afghanistan's border, in that twenty-seven Pakistani soldiers died, does not fall in that category (A. R. Malik, 2012).

The 2011 incident was more or less a deliberate act of ISAF forces, probably to give a coercive signal to Pakistan. Pakistan, which was safeguarding the western frontier from militant infiltration from Afghanistan and was assisting the US forces in executing their combat mission in the border area of Afghanistan, was deeply perturbed by this act of the US/NATO. The attack came with F-15 aircraft, in which 14 soldiers were also wounded. The check post was also completely demolished. The air assault was carried out

deep into Pakistani territory (approximately one mile). It lasted for nearly two hours, so it cannot be said that it was a misjudgment or mistake (A. R. Malik, 2012).

Additionally, there are several Border Coordination Centers operative in the region and by which NATO and Pakistani troops coordinate, so the two hours long attack does not justify that it was being carried out on misunderstanding. Moreover, there was a 'Mutual Agreed Mechanism for Operations Close to Border Areas' between Pakistan and ISAF, and thus the mechanism was ignored. All pieces of evidence show that this was an intentional attack carried out against the Pakistani army (Bergen & Rothenberg, 2014).

This attack on Pakistan's security check post was considered a threat to its land and sovereignty. It had a harmful impact on the minds of the masses and created a negative image of the United States among the nations. The incident further spoiled the relationships between the two states, which were already at a low level of trust. Drone attacks also have had a very negative impact on the bilateral relations of the two countries. These were also considered a direct attack on national security and the sovereignty of Pakistan (Muhammad Ashraf Khan & Zaheen, 2011).

Similarly, India and the US's growing military relations were also a matter of great concern for Pakistan because it had been at odds with India in the past. A strong India could be harmful to its security in the future. Pakistan was live a front-line state role to eliminate terrorism, yet the US asked it to do more on the issue. Improving cooperation between the US and India on defense matters also forced Pakistan to ask for membership in the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). However, its request was rejected, and the US justified its rejection based on terrorism and security, claiming it would be unable to provide security to its

nuclear weapons. Therefore, it would not be a safe strategy for the world (Pirzada, 2011). This situation pushed Pakistan to closer ties with China.

Militants from the Afghan side carried out the attack, but the Afghan authorities, like ISAF, didn't listen to Pakistani protests and continued business as usual. Pakistan officially called for a stricter response and more Afghanistan response, but the appeal went unheard (J. Hussain, 2012). After the Salala incident, several meetings were witnessed in Islamabad, including the one emergency meeting called by Prime Minister. Pakistan immediately blocked the ISAF supply line from its soil, which increased the operational complexities of the ISAF forces (R. M. Khan, 2014). Meanwhile, the attacks to bordering check posts of Pakistan were also increased. The Pakistani parliament and the public opinion turned violent against the ISAF attack, and the closure of the supply line was thus considered a reply to the US (J. Hussain, 2012).

The year 2011 turned into a tragic one for Pakistan and the US because before the Raymond Davis episode, Osama Bin Laden's operation and Salala attack had already sent the relationship into the dark street. This incident added fuel to the fire (Mohanty, 2013). The two sides were trying to repair the damage done, but unwanted incidents, but the Salala raid turned out to be the most stunning of all. Pakistan had bearded Raymond Davis, Osama Bin Laden, and drone strikes and never responded with such coercive tone after the Salala attack.

4.1.5. Pathankot Incident

On 2nd January 2016, a heavily armed terrorist group stormed the Indian Air Force base, Pathankot (Wolf, 2016). According to Indian sources, the intruders had infiltrated a

day before the attack into the Indian Punjab area. They exchanged fire with security personnel inside the Airbase around 3:30 am early on Saturday. The attackers were suspected to be from the Jaish-i-Mohammed group, which had planned to destroy Indian military assets and inflict massive damage to the Indian Air force. However, soon after the attack, India's special commandos were deployed, and they secured the area after 14 hours while killing the four intruders (Wolf, 2016).

The senior police chief for the Punjab region, Mr. H. S. Dhillon told that “We have recovered four dead bodies and are searching for more. Our men are sanitizing the area, and the base will not be declared completely secured until the entire area is thoroughly checked by troops” (Mittal & Ranjan, 2016). So, the hunt for more terrorists continued in the area, and finally, the deployed military forces cleared the area while killing two other terrorists. Later on Tuesday, New Delhi claimed that it had killed all six militants. In the attack, India escaped a massive loss of its military assets but lost its seven security personnel in a gun battle with militants.

Islamabad condemned the terrorist attack on the Pathankot airbase and set up a Joint Investigation Team to help India probe the attack. However, the attack on the Indian Airbase left a negative repercussion on the fragile India-Pakistan relations. The foreign secretary talks between Islamabad and New Delhi, which were scheduled later in the month of January delayed. Moreover, the Indian defense minister responded to the attack on the IAF base that “Pakistan's inaction against the perpetrators of Mumbai attacks, and the Pathankot Air Force base attack has exhausted India's patience and the world will see its results in next one year” (Shamsa Nawaz, 2016).

He, while addressing army officers, warned that those “who have harmed us would also feel the pain.” Clarifying his remarks, the defense minister said, “History tells you that those who damage you, if they don’t realize what pain they inflict, then don’t change.” Moreover, India also remained short of using its strong military muscle under the Cold Start Doctrine to attack Pakistan. It shows that nuclear parity between India and Pakistan is still intact and has helped stabilize the region (Sathasivam, 2017).

4.2. President Obama Policy towards India

During the Cold war years, the US interests towards India were not that significant. India's weak economy did not get any proper value in the international market, and its nonaligned foreign policy created periodic tensions with the US. However, with time the circumstance changed, and India, with its huge population, emerging economy, and democratic institutions, was representing itself as a partner of great significance (Kumar, 2009). Soon it would become one of the world's largest economies and a significant factor to bring security and stability in South Asia. Therefore, the key interests of President Obama in India were:

- i. We are supporting India to make it a pro-western regional power.
- ii. We are supporting India to counter China by making strategic partnerships with it.
- iii. They are gaining India's support for the US presence in South Asia.
- iv. To get more access and all sectors to Indian markets as well (Mayer, 2009).

Soon after his inaugural ceremony, President Barack H. Obama said that relations with India would be a priority for his administration. A rapidly growing and deepening

friendship with India would be beneficial for the citizens of the whole world (Kumar, 2009).

Radha Kumar further described that Pakistan had already used military aid by the President Bush Jr. administration's 'War on Terror' to strengthen its conventional weapons against India, so again it would continue to develop its nuclear program and would successfully extract very large military aid from the President Obama administration in order to move its troops from the Indian border to counter the Pakistani Taliban in its northwest frontier. President Obama's administration's policies to India were based on the realist approach, and it greatly focused on securing the US interests across its land (Sikri, 2009).

The US-India bilateral relations during the President Obama term of office were considered one of the most important partnerships of the century. President Obama stated that "US-India relationship as one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century, guided by convergent national interest" (Obama, 2010). President Obama visited India in 2010 and thanked Manmohan Singh, the Indian Prime Minister, for keeping excellent and bilateral issues with the neighbouring country. Pakistan, and to overcome the challenges and issues the tussles and hostilities face between the two countries. The visit was successful in improving the economic and security relations between the US and India (Obama, 2010).

The second visit of President Obama to India during his administration was in 2015. It was a fruitful visit because several agreements were signed, and discussions were made

to counter-terrorism. Afghanistan was considered as an important negotiation factor since India could be brought in to play a role in the war on terrorism (Sikri, 2009).

The US wanted to contain China through its alliance with India, a strategy aimed at cutting off Chinese markets. Therefore, with the hope of building a strong India, President Obama started meetings with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. During the administration of Narendra Modi, the relations between the US and India were at their peak. Narendra Modi is a popular politician, and he was determined to make India a prosperous and powerful country. China remained very confident and aggressive over the years about the land disputes with its neighbour countries (Kumar, 2009).

As the US was trying hard to achieve its anti-terrorism goals, India also showed its commitment to eliminating terrorism in some parts of India and wipe out the roots of terrorism, an issue affecting the stability of the country? Modi's visit to America was a clear message he wished for close ties with the US so that India could achieve its targets. He also showed great interest in strengthening his nation's military and nuclear programs. Modi's positive response created a pleasant atmosphere for cooperation between the two countries, and the friendly relations became deeper than ever in the past (Weiss, 2007).

In contrast, Pakistan was treated differently soon after 9/11. When the US got a serious threat on its land, it felt a strong need for bilateral relations with Pakistan to counter-terrorism and homeland security. Yet Pakistan played a front role in combating the war against terrorism, suffering the deaths of many innocent civilians and soldiers. The homes of poor civilians were destroyed by the Pak Army's military operations and the US drone

attacks against the terrorists, and they were forced to be displaced to other areas (Sumit Ganguly & Kapur, 2010).

Defense and trade cooperation is of great importance in the relationship between the US and India, and the value of naval contacts cannot be underestimated. The joint forces of the two countries conducted many military operations like YUDH and ABYAS in 2015. President Obama's strong engagement was proof of the fact that the US wanted to work in a joint association with India. The LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement) pact signed in New Delhi on 30 August 2016 is a component of three agreements. It provides access to both countries to share its military-to-military cooperation (Chandra, Joshi, Negi, & Roy, 2017).

US policy towards India under President Obama indicates that it has kept India on a global perspective for getting its objective done. In contrast, Pakistan has been managed as a regional partner, and this prevailing opinion is found everywhere from a high rank US official to a low-level media journalist. Several observers view Pakistan as a short term partner and India as a long term partner to foster America's long term global aims and interests. Pakistan finds this categorization of US interests as a disturbing trend. Pakistan and India have a long history of conflicts over security issues (Muscat, 2013). The US already supports India its self-interests, including as a means to counter China. In contrast, Pakistan is only relevant at a regional level to address issues such as terrorism issues.

President Obama has repeatedly mentioned that India has the capabilities to become the most valuable strategic partner of America. A robust bilateral friendship between the US and India would play an important role in managing rising power China and counter its

influence in Asia (Tellis, 2014b). The search for ways to eliminate terrorism aligned US and India interests to institutionalize intelligence sharing and anti-terrorist coordination.

While Pakistan's role in combating the global war on terror could never be ignored, it was stigmatized as supporting non-state terrorist actors operating outside its borders. The lack of cooperation in tackling terrorists created mistrust of President Barack Obama within Pakistan. A common view found in the US was that terrorism is an international issue with its origin in South Asia and other Middle Eastern countries. As a close US ally, India was considered the best partner to fight terrorism, while Pakistan was blamed for aggravating problems. These misunderstandings only made it worse for Pakistan in its efforts to heal sore wounds (R. M. Khan, 2012a).

Soon after President Obama took office in Washington DC, the Mumbai attacks took place in November 2008 in which 166 people died, and hundreds were injured; three among the dead were American citizens. India alleged that terrorists were using Pakistan's soil for the terrorist attacks and should be considered responsible for the Mumbai incident. Pakistan completely denied these allegations, but India's assertions damaged Pakistan's capability to counter the GWOT. India tried to spread the propaganda that Pakistan supported terrorism, and these assertions fed into US tendencies to favour India as its chief partner in the war on terrorism. During President Obama's second term, Pakistan was again considered responsible for many attacks across the border. Therefore, it appears India got President Obama's sympathies in combating terrorism while Pakistan was shown in a negative light (Muscat, 2013).

The relations between India and the US have developed from a close partnership to a bilateral relationship based on mutual understanding and common goals. Positive steps were taken by the heads of both governments to increase awareness and strengthen relations, initiatives strongly supported by India's Prime Minister. US foreign policy towards India must be understood from a regional framework (i.e., the Asia Pacific and West Asia) (Shafiq, 2018).

The President Obama administration had the view that India was beneficial for the US for two important reasons. The first reasons are that India is a model democratic country as well as the rising superpower of South Asia. The second and most important reasons are that the US needs a powerful friend in the region to counter Chinese supremacy. India minimizes the Chinese threat, protecting sea routes free and securing for international trade in the Asia Pacific, all of which are corollaries of the US-India alliance (Fareed, 2019).

In January 2015, the United States and India signed a joint strategic vision regarding the Indian Ocean and the Asia Pacific for naval security. In fact, it has great importance for safeguarding US interests in South Asia. The US-India relations are also followed by securing its economic goals to make a trade with each other, as both are large economies of the world. US secretary of State recommended that the US handle both India and Pakistan based on its merits and interests. President Obama also opened refused Pakistan's former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during his visit to the United States to make the same nuclear deal with Pakistan as earlier done with India in 2005 (Jain, 2016).

President Obama said in 'India today' that Pakistan should take a serious step against Lashkar-e-Taliban for its role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks and destroy the bases of

terrorists inside Pakistan. His speech favoured India and considered Pakistan responsible for the various events. A senior Pakistani politician stated that the US and the other states in the West think that Pakistan is responsible for the terrorists' bases in FATA and other tribal regions should never ignore where these terrorists came from (S. Hanif & Khan, 2018).

In fact, it was in the Cold war era when the US-supported these Mujahedeen to counter the Soviet Forces in Afghanistan. Later, after the 9/11 attacks, these militants moved into FATA and other tribal areas for the sake of taking asylum and safety. Therefore, according to this Pakistani position, the west is equally responsible for the unfavourable terrorist climate in South Asia. Yet settling scores fails to recognize President Obama's strategic convergence and tilt towards India as a means to counter China. The US also saw the economic benefits of trade with the huge Indian economy, the world's largest democratic country. If the US withdraws its military from Afghanistan, it has India available to influence military insurgencies that might re-emerge (Shafiq, 2018).

President Obama's administration was likely in favour of minimizing the Chinese role in Sri Lanka as well. However, the US vital interests could be achieved by making strong strategic relationships with India, and the US could not neglect the importance of Pakistan as it has key strategic importance when it thinks about the Middle East and Central Asia and Pakistan can play an important role in stabilizing Afghanistan (Parmar et al., 2014).

Pakistan was highly upset over the US remarks about India's Uri attack, asserting it was a clear case of cross border terrorism. Pakistan did not like the favourable comments

made about India. One of the US envoys to South Asia said that the two largest democratic countries in the world have strong relations with each other, and we share a concern with India for stopping the future attacks on Indian soil (A. Singh et al., 2018). The Senate Chairman of Pakistan, Raza Rabbani, clearly stated that Pakistan's upper house has serious reservations regarding the withdrawal of the F-16 jets subsidy sale to Pakistan. He further asserted that the US does not care about Pakistan's laws and courts, claiming the examples of Dr. Shakeel Afridi and Raymond Davis as cases where the US interfered in domestic affairs.

4.2.1. US-India Trade Dynamics

US support has a major role in increasing the strength of the Indian economy, a measure that benefits the US as well. This trade deal also counters China's emergence as a world superpower, giving India's military and economic advantages. Through this, India is the only option through which it could achieve its objective. At the same time, India wants to get the economic and military advantages to forming its friendship with the US. It wants to make itself a powerful nation to gain dominance over South Asia (Destler, 2005).

President Obama visited India two times and welcomed the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh three times and PM Narendra Modi two times. The Press Secretary of White House Josh Earnest once said that "Obama has invested deeply in strengthening the relations between the US and the world's largest democracy in India and the President believes that there is profound national security, diplomatic and economic benefits for strengthening those ties" (Nath, Liu, & Tochkov, 2015).

The US wants India to be a powerful state, and a strong democracy can bring peace and stability in South Asia. The US has the view that only a strong democratic India can bring peace and stability to the region. Both the nations are valued as stepping stones for improving India's global economic power and membership in APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation) and UN Security council. Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) consists of more than forty countries and provides a vehicle for international investment in India (Nath et al., 2015).

If we study the economic relations between the US and South Asia, we come to know that the nature of US interests has varied with time and geostrategic changes. The US and India's economic relations are largely driven by trade, as India has a strong democracy and a big economy (Martin & Kronstadt, 2007). In contrast, US relations with Pakistan are based on security considerations and more basic developmental aid. India has shown great interest in investment in US markets and encourages US products in its country. The bilateral relations between the US and India are increasing at every level, whether technology, trade, or investment, with gaining an essential position in the international monetary system (Husain, 2012).

The US is facilitating India's hegemonic standing in South Asia because it is the only way to counter China and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan. Pakistan's role in the war terror could not be denied, but still, it did not result in trade deals in US markets. The US has not signed any trade and economic agreements with Pakistan. The previous Pakistan Peoples Party and PMLN governments tried to make such trade negotiations, but no fruitful results ever emerged. Economic projects like CPEC are a matter of great concern for the US, and it looked upon CPEC with great suspicion (Kugelman, 2013). The policies of the US and

the aid-based relations between the US and Pakistan forced Pakistan to seek economic cooperation from China to bolster its trade relations (Nath et al., 2015).

4.2.2. US Policy to counter China through Trade

We know that China's security and economic development capabilities are far greater than those of India. However, the bilateral trade between the US and India is much larger than that with China, a consideration that is not likely to last more than another ten years in the short term (Nath et al., 2015). However, the security and economic relations between the US and India do serve to contain China in a short time. The US is obviously worried about China's emerging power and global status. India is also aware of its enviable role as a broker between these two world superpowers, which gives it leverage in trade negotiations (Panda & Reddy, 2016).

India and the United States are devoted to boosting the Indian economy and increasing cooperation with advanced technology and skills development programs. The growing partnership between the US and India is expected to create many job opportunities for the people of both countries. It is likely to have a very positive impact on US investment in India. Strengthening relationships in the fields of health, technology, education, tourism, etc., would bring advantages to both nations. Increasing cooperation also required more flexible visa policies that enabled Indian citizens to work and study in America and President Obama administration policy priority (Chandra et al., 2017).

4.4. India's Increasing Bid in Afghanistan and Iran

After the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, India rapidly expanded its influence in Afghanistan through multidimensional aspects. These multifaceted aspects

include cooperation in political, economic, and security dynamics. India established full diplomatic relations with the new government by reopening its old consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar but established new ones in Mazare-e-Sharif and Herat. Maintenance of cordial bilateral ties with Afghanistan was not based on altruistic designs, but India aimed to advance its national security objectives. It is to minimize Islamabad's role by sidelining the Pashtun community in the decision-making process, projecting its regional power, and having access to Central Asian states (Pardesi, 2005).

India pursued a 'soft power' approach and extended enormous humanitarian and economic aid to Afghanistan during this period, which is almost worth two billion dollars. Therefore India became the most significant regional donor for Afghanistan's reconstruction and development. Economic assistance helped India to increase its political influence in Afghanistan (Pardesi, 2005).

By virtue of the aid, it emerged as a paramount stakeholder in the future of Afghanistan. Afghanistan, with vast reserves of iron, copper, cobalt, and gold, has much captivation. Indian companies are interested in tapping these resources and intending to overdo China in this race. India has also concluded a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan in 2011, which makes India cooperate with Afghanistan in military services, i.e., training army officers and providing light military weapons for counterinsurgency measures.

Till now, 350 Afghan army officers got training per year from the Indian military academy. Indian footholds in Afghanistan were never as prominent as they are now. Hamid Karzai's government took explicit steps to embrace Indian cooperation and assistance

while making distance with Pakistan. India now contends to secure its core interests in Afghanistan besides its investment in the course of US departure. It opines that the departure of US-led forces from Afghanistan may lead to a surge in Taliban insurgency, which would jeopardize its interests (C. R. Mohan, Wadhams, John, & Bhatnagar, 2013).

Some even recommend an Indian strong presence for assistance to Afghan security forces in the event of American withdrawal. But it cannot be executed because of regional sensitivities and complexities (Purushothaman, 2012). So the US has to confine India's role in providing less controversial support to afghan national security forces, such as training to the Afghan army and police personnel, and selling of arms equipment, etc.

On the political front, India always opposes the Taliban's inclusion in the reconciliation process because it has natural hatred for the Taliban due to their inclination toward Pakistan. Rather it supported the government, incorporated by Northern Alliance, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other non-Pashtuns whose inclination is more toward Iran and Russia. India requires engagement with any of Afghanistan's neighbours in order to have physical access to Afghanistan. It is only Iran, provides India with the easiest entry to Afghanistan and beyond in Central Asia (Wirsing, 2007).

That's why India has developed amicable relations with Iran to get access to Afghanistan in case tensions remain high with Pakistan. Though Iran has contentions with the United States and west over its nuclear proliferation issue, this could not perturb Indian engagement with Iran. India publically emphasizes that India- Iran ties are driven by their historical and civilizational link, but this factor is often overstated. Other factors drive India

close to Iran; India's increasing energy needs at home, attractive corridor to Central Asia and Afghanistan (M. Hanif, 2009).

Iran's other concern was to secure its eastern flank and halt the flow of drugs and illegal migrants as well. Hence, both have common interests in opposing Pakistan backed the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Iran is an opponent of the Taliban because they seized the Iranian consulate in 1998 during the fall of Mazare-Sharif and executed eleven Iranian diplomats. Taliban ruthlessly massacred thousands of Shia Hazara community, among whom Iran had strong cultural and religious influence. The fallout of Mazare- Sharif instilled Iran with animosity against the Taliban and created friction between Iran and Pakistan. The orientation of the 'look east' strategy in Iran's foreign policy further increased consistency between Iran and India's interests (Brewster, 2014).

After the revolution of the Taliban regime, Iran facilitated holding negotiations with the northern alliance and played a constructive role in the formulation of a new government. New government centers around the northern alliance increased Iran's reach in Afghanistan despite Iran's conflict with the US. Iran's influence over the northern alliance and its antipathy toward the Taliban grasped Indian attention and brought them both on the same page against Pakistan (Fitzgerald et al., 2011).

Both join hands to counter and contain Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan. India's compatibility of interest with Iran over the Afghanistan issue made it use Iran as a transit corridor. In this scenario's backdrop, Iran and India coordinated to minimize Pakistan's dominance over the Afghan trade route. India constructed "a 220-kilometer road from Delaram in Nimroz to Zaranj in Iran to connect Iran Chabahar port with Afghanistan".

India financed the construction of roads entirely and planned to invest \$100 million to upgrade the Iranian port of Chabahar.

Reports depict that India has provided assistance to Iran in its satellite and space programs. It is also considering transferring civil nuclear technology to Iran. India's relation with Iran even created friction between the United States and India. In order to mitigate US concerns, India voted several times against Iran on IAEA resolutions regarding Iran's nuclear program. India also backed out of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project to hold US pressure (Fitzgerald et al., 2011).

The United States vehemently opposes the pipeline's construction because it contended with Iran over the nuclear program. Though India's relation with Iran remains the subject of considerable constraints as of Iran's contentious relations with the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, it has been successful in balancing its relationship with all of them, the United States, Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia as well (Fitzgerald et al., 2011).

In the initial period of war, the US promoted the Indian role because it assumed that India, as a rising power, has more to offer than Pakistan. Later on, realizing the importance of Pakistan's cooperation in combating terrorism, the US decided to constrain Indian activities in Afghanistan due to Pakistan's sensitivities. But India has made a long road in Afghanistan and using it now as a base to transport terrorism in Pakistan tribal belt and Baluchistan. India's policy in Afghanistan and Iran has been explained in the context of Indian Machiavelli: Kautilya's sayings Indian policy purists in Afghanistan reflect its two-pronged approach; one aims to isolate Pakistan and undercut its regional and international standing, and the other is to project itself as a responsible regional power.

India's internal stability, growing economy, and convergence of its interests with Iran and Russia keep it a far more palatable partner for Afghanistan. With Russia and Iran, India is striving hard to play a crucial role in post-2014 Afghanistan (Petre, 2014).

The three countries constituted a bloc in post-soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan to back the northern alliance. When a new government was formed after the fall of the Taliban, all three reunited to underpin its viability. Now they have joined up to protect their stacks in future Afghanistan through diplomatic maneuvering. India has begun to engage the Afghan government, particularly with Iran's collaboration in trilateral initiatives, to discuss its future (Manzoor Ahmad et al., 2016).

4.3. US 'Pivot' towards the Asia Pacific

The US has maintained its hegemony over the Asia Pacific for the past four decades. In this way, a stable regional order has been created, which has enabled the region's economic growth. This economic and social transformation has been a global phenomenon forcing all nations to outcompete their neighbours for a world trade share (Manyin et al., 2012). Soon after President Barack Hussein Obama became president, he ordered a review of the United States' global strategy and military preparedness initiatives. After the discussion, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spearheaded US policy to demonstrate the US role in Asia pacific. The main objective of US foreign policy during the President Obama administration was to do more to develop norms and rules in the Asia Pacific region to counter China's expansive military and economic initiatives (Muni, 2012).

The US policy consisted of enhancing relations with the emerging power to strengthening the security alliances, engaging with regional multilateral institutions making more investments to facilitate trade, expanding the role of the military, and promoting democratic systems and human rights. However, many officials in the Obama administration failed to support these concerns, declaring that the initial US policy was broad-based on the Asia Pacific. In reality, the term Indo Pacific better explained India's status and the Indian Ocean in the US foreign policy objectives within the Asia Pacific (Muni, 2012).

The rise of China forced the President Obama administration to make immediate policy changes because its economic growth and military capabilities were expanding rapidly and threatened the region's security and stability. The ever-increasing role of China has a significant effect on making the policy shift towards the Asia Pacific. The availability of China to drive the Asia Pacific with full strength could never be ignored. In fact, it is a matter of great concern for the US (Manyin et al., 2012).

The United States was determined to control the Asia Pacific with the purpose of increased military security. In November 2011, Hillary Clinton declared that the US should withdraw its attention from Iraq and Afghanistan and focus on the Asia Pacific, reflecting the changing geopolitical developments in the circumstances of the world. The US pivot towards the Asia Pacific fostered American investments with America's military strength as insurance. Later, in January 2012, the US administration declared: "we will strengthen our presence in the Asia Pacific, and a budget reduction will not come at the expense of that critical region." However, the pivot toward Asia also reflects a countermeasure against China's economic rise to power. Asia's share of global trade has doubled from 1973 until

2010. Similarly, China has surpassed the US and has become the world's largest exporter, and is soon expected to become the world's largest economy (Dian, 2015).

Soon after President Obama declared his new Asia Pacific strategy, the Secretary of Defense Panetta stated, "There are two regions where the Pentagon could secure its interests; one is the Middle East, and the other is the Asia Pacific and in these two areas we could get the greatest challenges in the forthcoming future." Late in 2009, President Obama stated, "the fortunes of America and the Asia Pacific have become more closely linked than ever before. The US looks to strengthen old alliances and build new partnerships with the nations of this region he considered himself America's first Pacific President". The focus on rising China and its implications has become apparent by the followers of traditionally neorealist thought. Neorealism portrays China as a destabilizer of the region that would challenge the hegemony of the US, an issue of global concern. In response, the US is transferring its resources to places where it already has enough control to remain competitive with China (Parmar et al., 2014).

The US was the dominant power in the Asia Pacific at the end of the world war, even though its supremacy was incomplete. Today Washington continues to play a significant role in protecting the security and economic development of the region. US influence in the region has dramatically declined with China's rise and its commitment to a 'good neighbour' diplomacy. Many other Asian economies have also developed into undeniable economic powers in the world today (Oehler-Sincai, 2016).

With a flourishing Asian market, the President Obama administration's biggest challenge was to refresh traditional alliances and trusts before America lost all of its power

in the region. The President Obama administration emphasized its willingness to participate in multilateral organizations focused on development in the Asia Pacific. While the US has pivoted to the Asia Pacific, it still needs to build a more effective partnership with key countries such as China, Russia, India, and Indonesia, enhancing the cooperation of global issues. US national security strategy also points out that the country needs to save its economy from handling the threat of terrorism and natural disasters. The US must also recognize that no country can respond to worldwide challenges alone. Terrorism remained a focus of the President Obama administration even as China challenged America's economic hegemony during his years in office (Oehler-Sincai, 2016).

In the new century, a major change was seen in US policy towards India. Bill Clinton tilted towards India during his second term in office, and subsequently, President Bush Jr.'s administration also changed its policy to enhance relations with India. The President Obama administration followed the same path. The presidencies of both Presidents Bush and Obama showed great respect for India's democratic values and cherished the strategic economic advantages of the US-India alliance. There is little doubt that this alliance had adverse consequences for America's relations with China (Silove, 2016).

Chapter 5

A Comparative Analysis of President Bush Jr. and President Obama's Administrations in South Asia

The era of 1947 witnesses that the British government withdrew from the Indian sub-continent, erstwhile sub-continent was divided into two parts, a secular India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. With India's partition, migrations started from one part of the country to another, and many other problems of riots and violence also arose across both sides (Sayeed, 1964).

The Indian subcontinent's partition, some unresolved issues like Kashmir, and the later incidents created much hatred between the two countries. This hatred and rivalry paved the way for many wars like the Indo-Pak were of 1947/1948, 1965, 1971, and the Kargil war of 1999. India and Pakistan's mutual relationship has been of great importance to the US interests in maintaining a balance of power between the two states. About a decade after independence, Pakistan became a supporter of SEATO and CENTO (Z. Hasan, 1967); later on, the US-supported Pakistan in the containment of the Soviet Union while India was unwilling to support the US and it jumped on the Communist side. While during the war of 1962, when China defeated India, it got attracted to the US to gain support against China (Bhutto, 1964).

In the later years of the cold war, the US once again felt an intense need to improve relations with Pakistan to contain the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Pakistan played a key role in being an integral player in the fight against communists. US-funded Pakistan to support Mujahedeen to combat the Soviet forces (Tahir & Khalid, 1986). In 1989, with the

withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, the US ended its assistance to Pakistan, a politically short-sighted measure. After the Cold War, Pakistan was neglected once again without any compelling reasons, while India became a more blue-eyed nation for the US. Pakistan's nuclear program remained a matter of core concern in its relations with the US until 2001 (Sheikh, 2001).

However, later we see the US policy towards India and Pakistan changed during the Bush administration. President Bush Jr. declared that "India and Pakistan are two different countries with different histories and needs during his visit to India." His stay in India was for six days, while only a few hours in Pakistan, a clear identification of the changing dynamics. The US government thought Pakistan wanted to play a dual game. This is why it continues to face more difficulties in military operations against terrorists as US military command remains hesitant to share intelligence. India also exploited the situation and claimed the attacks on India's land were initiated on Pakistan's soil. By this calculus, Pakistan was responsible for many terrorist attacks in India.

South Asia remains a hotbed after the 9/11 episode. George W. Bush took his oath in January 2001; President Bush Jr. was unable to formulate any policy statement when the event takes place. However, the policy statement was vividly clear after some time. President Bush Jr.'s administration was well aware that they should have been bound in firm different stances against the Taliban to obtain reasonable assistance from their allies. This renders President Bush Jr. to get a fix with Pakistan and India (Feinstein, 2002).

Pakistan enjoyed a cordial relationship with the US in the fifties and eighties. Differences of interests were there, but both countries remained in touch since the creation

of Pakistan. So, in the presence of different approaches, the ups and downs were inevitable. 9/11 opened a new window for both the countries, especially for Pakistan, to a significant recipient of US aid and assistance and was also entitled to a non-NATO ally. The policymakers realized that keeping Afghanistan as a strategic asset on the coast of Washington is no more viable, so joining hands with International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is the need of the hour. So, in this limited strategic setting, Pakistan had no choice but to support Afghanistan's US invasion (R. M. Khan, 2014).

Meanwhile, India had also opened her arms to assist the US without any pre-conditions, and this offer certainly reduced the Pakistani option of denial. However, the US picked the right option, i.e., Pakistan, but simultaneously assured Indian leadership that aid and support to Pakistan are not for India. Rather, it is given to get maximum of Pakistani help in the war against terrorism (C. R. Mohan, 2002). India's significance for the United States was not overshadowed by the GWOT, but the US kept Indian options open and available for any difficult times. Considering India as a strategic partner, the US perception remained as an enticement to develop additional security collaboration (Hathaway, 2001).

The issue was not that what would be Indian importance given Pakistan's closeness to the US; rather, the problem was that how the US has engaged India during the GWOT and how it balances the Indian reservations. So in this delicate condition, Pakistan also thought that if India still has the strategic engagement and shares several objectives with the US, how Pakistan should arrange its position to be the recipient of more US closeness. The challenge was certainly a big one. Another challenge that Pakistan faced in 9/11 was the Islamic militancy (Z. Hussain, 2008).

The liberal and enlightened approach of president Musharraf resulted in the ban of several sectarian outfits and some salient figures' arrest. Other than the arrest of troublemaker clergies and clerics, president Musharraf also ordered the ban on troublemaker Madrassas and advised the rest to opt for modern, sophisticated curriculum techniques. The government of that time tried its best to pass some laws in this regard; however, the pressure of Islamic parties kept the government at bay all the time (Schaffer, 2002). Here Washington and Islamabad have departed interests, as the gadget of the state cannot be entirely engaged against extremist Islamic and sectarian groups. The Islamic organizations and parties came up with a view that when the Soviet Union was in Afghanistan, the US was supporting Islamic Jihad, but when ISAF landed here, how can the same jihad be called null and void (R. M. Khan, 2014).

The third challenge was the US wish to track and hunt down significant Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan's northern areas. However, Pakistan was not ready to give any such permission to the US because of the fear of Pashtun tribes (Minhas et al., 2011). But, the FBI carried several operations with the help of Pakistan in northern areas since then. In the initial years of the US combat mission in Afghanistan, the ISAF forces used to take Pakistan's permission for hot pursuit and any other activity inside Pakistani territory (A. H. Cordesman, 2009). Thousands were arrested in these operations. Some detentions also got media attention and controversy later on. The political parties of Pakistan raised questions about FIA activities and their investigations from the detainees. Such acts made the Islamic militant violent, and they started targeting Pakistani officials and foreign notables. The abduction and killing of Daniel Pearl is one such example who was a reporter of the Wall Street Journal (Shahrani, 2008). The militants also targeted

Pakistani security officials; thus, a wave of panic sworn through, and to date, it has its roots in the society.

After 2001, when America demanded all kinds of Pakistani help in commencing Afghanistan operations, Pakistan was fractionally hesitant to give airbases to the US. It was also reluctant to allow the troops were stationed on Pakistani soil. However, Islamabad granted permission in no time. Pakistan allowed the Baluchistan and Sindh airbases for US forces and provided logistic support against Afghanistan's Taliban (T. Hussain, 2005; Rahman, 2003). Just after Pakistan's permission, the American troops started to gather at Jacobabad and Pasni airfields and commenced the combat missions in Afghanistan to a full extent. It was expected that the war in Afghanistan might take substantial time, so is the deployment of ISAF troops there or in Pakistan (J. Singh, 2003).

As the ISAF operations were started in Afghanistan, Pakistan was either asked or personally decided to deploy troops in the northern belt, particularly in the Mohmand agency. The public did not endorse the decision to deploy forces in Wana, and it was not appreciated by any segment of the society calling it against the tribal norms (Kulesa, 2008).

Furthermore, the stationing of troops there could have made Americans happy, as Washington had (and it still has) firm belief the hilly terrain is a complex one, so it is a haven for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders, but it had a negative impact to the tribal chiefs of the entire region. The coming years witnessed a sharp increase in the resistance from tribal areas of Pakistan. The region had special privileges and nearly a separate system to run the administrative matters. Therefore, the army's deployment in the region was not a welcoming strategy for the tribal chiefs and their tribal ethics. Drone strikes also added fuel

to the fire as some media houses claimed that the strikes have tacit recognition of Pakistan. Innocent deaths in drone attacks have further unleashed a wave of Anti-Americanism and an anti-state atmosphere (A. H. Cordesman, 2009).

The Indian parliament was attacked in 2001, and India claimed the attack is made on the behest of Pakistan; thus, it deployed a massive army on the borders (Paul & Paul, 2005). The relationship between New Delhi and Islamabad reached at lowest ebb as India called back its High Commissioner from Islamabad for the first time after 1971. Further, it started to project Pakistan as a more prone to terrorism and sponsors terrorism in other countries, particularly in India. India also nurtured propaganda on Kashmir's cause and tried its best to label the Kashmiri freedom movement as a movement with the intent of terrorism. The tensions became high, and both countries came to the edge of war (Sumit Ganguly, 2001).

Pakistan rejected all New Delhi allegations and offered a third-party investigation of the issues; however, India refused any such offer. The growing tensions were not in favor of Washington. It had just landed in Afghanistan and sought larger Pakistani (intelligence and logistic) support and Indian (political and moral) support in executing important combat missions. Richard Armitage, the US deputy secretary, visited Islamabad and New Delhi in 2002 to defuse the tensions and to avert the panic of a nuclear war in South Asia (Naqvi, 2010)

Being settled on Avery's keen geostrategic location, both countries could shed a very meticulous role in the US fight. President Bush Jr.'s administration devised a policy in which India and Pakistan were to be treated amicably. States were entitled to ensure their

loyalties towards the US. There was a need to formulate an active foreign policy statement that could strongly regard the whole world to pay their part in demolishing Al-Qaida and Haqqani network. Since then, the politics went a tug of war, and different strategies were formulated to contain the foothold of non-state actors in Afghanistan (T. Hussain, 2005). In retrospect, President Bush and President Obama's policy statements are not aloof in their subject matters. Still, the patterns of executing a harsh and soft or a partial and impartial foreign policy make a difference.

When we look at the President Obama administration's framework to South Asia, the increasing trade between India and the United States clearly shows how the US changed its policy and influenced South Asia's balance of power (Goswami, 2009). The US collaboration with Pakistan was minimal and focused on counter-terrorism as its primary objective. US made the F16 deal with Pakistan, but it was an 'on again off again' agreement. US-supported Pakistan to fight against the terrorists in border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas, but the assistance was much questioned in the United States, eventually as Pakistan was not thought capable of spending it against the terrorists and perhaps might use it against India in the future.

India also did its utmost to boost this concern to the American public by suggesting Pakistan was responsible for the Mumbai terrorist attack. Pakistan will need to improve its international reputation and relations with the US in the future. It is very clear that President Obama's collaboration with Pakistan was a short-term policy to counter-terrorism, while the policy adopted by the US towards India was a long-term strategic partnership (Javaid, 2010). US defense industry investors highly appreciated India's strategic approach with no objection to specific uses, restrictions, and precautionary measures imposed on Pakistan's

military arsenal aimed to control abuse. Pakistan registered its worries regarding the increasing friendship of the US and India, but no proper response was given till after, and it is very clear from the eight years of friendship during President Obama's administration that both countries are expected to continue the same policies in the future (Butt & Schofield, 2012).

Former President Clinton showed a tilt towards India during the second term of his administration, and President Bush Jr.'s administration continued this pro-India posture. The relations with India were enhanced further during the President Obama era. Many observers hardly see any difference between President Obama and President Bush Jr. Presidency because both had very warm relations with India and were happy with India's strong democratic values and economic development opportunities, especially as they rebounded to America's advantage.

5.1. President Bush Jr. Policy towards Pakistan

After Pakistan avowed that she is standing aside with the US and is do everything to eradicate Taliban perpetration, the US bestowed Pakistan with all her abetment. Pakistan was emancipated from all sanctions levied after the 1999 coup detat by Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf. Pakistan was Persistent to enrich her uranium assortments, and this was cracking in the USA's eyes. After some time, Pakistan was accused of ditching in her Nuclear Missile Technology (NMT) with Libya, North Korea, and Iran (LaFeber, 2002).

However, Pakistan negated all those allegations in President Clinton's era. Now Pakistan was liberated to enrich her defense sphere. Infect was granted \$ 3 billion, half for

the development sector and a half to enhance her defensive capabilities. Further, she forgives the payable bailout of \$1 billion. Yet it was another setback that Pakistan was not provided with her ordered F-16s 10 years back, which were hampered in delivering in the wake of Pakistan's nuclear enrichment (Hilali, 2002).

Besides all, the USA granted Pakistan aid, yet there wasn't any substantial step in fostering the trade relation. It could be quoted as a President Bush Jr. stratagem to switch their cynosure of dependency towards India, after abstracting all benefit of war from Pakistan. This point in history was truly deplorable that President Bush Jr.'s administration directed Pakistan with the 'DO MORE' policy (Z. Hussain, 2008).

Still, after a plausible demonstration against 9/11 attackers. Pakistan provided her airbases to execute surgical strikes on a bordering country like bigram airbase, despite the fact that such strikes except a long-standing war and awkwardness amongst nations. Yet, the curtailing distance of long Pakistan was aroused to threats. The relation between both countries was well-oriented and well-to-do unless Pakistan acts according to the USA's suggested trajectory. But anything else was aberrant in the President Bush Jr. Policy statement. Pakistan may have enjoyed the fruit of the time being, but she hasn't seen any long term strategic partnership or a kind of durable trade relation in the President Bush Jr. era (Powell, 2003).

Although Pakistan has jeopardized its peace, economy, and social environment in an attempt to be an ally to the US and the political dynamics situation of Pakistan had also affected foreign relations with other states. Most US agreements were military-centric

based on coordination by the military in the long run, and all assistance/objectives by the US were designed prior to interest-based relations (T. Hussain, 2005).

Despite an important stakeholder of every major transformation in South Asia, the US still seeks an alluring role over the region. Expectations of both states from each other in every dynamic situation have remained very high. This is the basic reason for conflicts over time. US international violation in Pakistan through drone strikes has created great chaos for the past decade. Another strained element is the coalition and varied narratives of both countries in counter-terrorism action (Sulaiman, 2008). However, taking bilateral dialogue off the table is not in favor of a peaceful region.

5.2. President Bush Jr. Policy towards India

In the start, the policy of the US was to switch from Pak-centric relation to Indo-centric. This was the need of the hour for the US to oblige Pakistan's pursuance of eradicating US foes. However, India also renders her services to the US. She was willing to provide surgical points and stock dumping of USA's ammo. The relation between both was getting stronger as both counties kept on bounding in different accords on military and trade relations (Hathaway, 2001). The 1978 Nonproliferation sanctions were also lifted, permission to accretion in its uranium stock.

Along with that, she was provided with several accords in which the USA was a partner to enhance India's nuclear capabilities. Under the US civilian and military nuclear program, over the next eight years, India was to be provided with all capabilities in the nuclear sphere, which were held by the US at that time. India was allowed to produce a

maximum of 8 missiles per year, but she was seeking to keep enriched with a stock of uranium that was enough for 50 warheads (Squassoni, 2006).

India was eased in the Export-Import Bank Act and was rendered a high level of non-taxed import facility in the US. The trade deal was signed under the USA-India civil and military program, caring for huge exemptions and trade benefits for India (A. Tellis, 2006). The first and very prominent lord among all was Mangoes for Motorcycle Deal. Under this, the Indian mangos arrived in the US after eight years, erupting the ban of 8 years of fruits. In this response, India pledged to ease the restrictions over Harley-Davidson motorcycles. This bilateral trade and services totalled around \$45 billion in 2006, and then onward, it was around \$70 billion in 2010, according to the US Bureau of economic analysis (Martin & Kronstadt, 2007).

India and US relations were not circumscribed in trading and military enhancement, but both the countries ascended in exchange for space research technology. Indian spacecraft landed over the moon in 2008. The mission chandrayaan-1 was carried out under the cumbersome abetment of the USA (Curtis, 2008). Although this was dated back in 1963, however, in the President Bush Jr. Era, the first craft was launched, and work was foster than ever before. In the unwarranted attack on the Taj Mahal hotel, the USA granted every assistance with regards to FBI and intelligence sharing. Other than that, she assured me to pursue everything needed to bring the culprits in contempt of court.

5.3. President Obama Policy towards Pakistan

As President Obama holds the administration of the country, he has firmly adhered to the policy of cooperation among all, including Pakistan. It was due to the war-centered

approach of the USA in Afghanistan. President Obama comprehends the endeavours, not suffice, taken by President Bush Jr.'s administration. President Obama's administration prepared a policy statement, mainly security concerned, and Pakistan was deemed to play the protagonist role (C. R. Mohan, 2009).

The USA was a bit keen to provide economic assistance. President Obama ratified Kerry-luger-bill, prompted to provide \$7.5 billion civilian assistance for the next five years. In 9 years of military rule, Pakistan well-devised a strategic conscience with the US. In 2009, the US state secretary adduced the inception of the 'New era of partnership' between both countries (Mehrish, 2012). While in office, President Obama has not gone to Pakistan. His choice to set out to India maddened nervousness among Pakistani authorities who view the indications of a 'master India' tilt in US strategy as destabilizing for the area. Pakistani pioneers and natives saw the US-Pak organization together suspicious when the United States avoided engagement in the Kashmir debate and making headway to have the common atomic manage India without making any comparable offer to Pakistan (Mehrish, 2012).

Additionally, Afghanistan, in October 2011, when secured the nearby ties with India, which is Pakistan's essential adversary, is a danger for Pakistan security Institutions who view that Pakistan progressively is at risk by the outside strengths that try to debilitate and maybe smother the country. In January 2011, the relations started taking a sour turn when Raymond Davis, an American working at the US office in Lahore, killed two people in Pakistan and needed without a trail. Raymond fights to act in self-preservation when the men attempted to victimize him at gunpoint (Mitchell, 2011).

Pakistani powers charged Raymond with homicide, and the court controlled the administration from discharging him notwithstanding weight from top US authorities that conciliatory insusceptibility secured him from indictment. President Obama depicted Raymond as being ‘our representative.’ Anyhow, later on, it was conceded by the American authorities that Raymond was a CIA foreman and an individual from an incognito group that was a vocation to track the activist gatherings inside Pakistan (Lieven, 2012).

In February, Senator Kerry travelled to Islamabad in an effort to reduce escalating tensions, taking the opportunity to express the ‘deepest sorrow’ felt by top US leaders at the loss of life (Krasner, 2012). In late February, the CIA had direct negotiations with ISI to secure Raymond’s discharge. On March 16, 2011, Pakistani authorities’ political pressure on the courts lastly a vow of \$2.3 million in ‘*diyat*’ or ‘Blood Money,’ for the exploited people’s families, Raymond was liberated and flown out of the nation (Q. Alam, 2019).

On May 2, 2011, Al-Qaeda founding chief Osama Bin Laden was found and murdered in the average-sized Pakistani city of Abbottabad, a military cantonment in the northwest Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region, in a compound which is one-half mile from the nation’s chief military institute (Wilson et al., 2011). The commission which was working to inquiry the Abbottabad operation, its report is yet not public. The confusion is in the mind of every individual that whether Osama Bin Laden was there or not but honestly speaking Osama Bin Laden was not there because if Osama (the most wanted extremist figure) were there, then the American officials would definitely release his snaps or even his dead body which according to them, they had buried in the Arabian sea, what a joke

the Americans had made with Pakistan and the rest of the world even to their own people who were waiting for the moment that when Osama will be hanged in front of them (Wilson et al., 2011).

So, a fundamental question comes to every mind that pinches a lot that, for what America had made the adventure of Abbottabad operation (Neptune spear)? Fuel was further added when the USA perpetrated a surgical strike in the Abbottabad district of KPK and claimed to kill Osama bin laden. This highly arouses the stance that the US had purposely sabotaged Pakistan's sovereignty (Deeks, 2011). The area was fraught with the civilian population, and despite the UN strict stance over sovereignty, Pakistan was liable to assist the US in caring for this surgical strike if she has been asked. After this episode, Pakistan closed its borders for NATO aid to pass, and the apology of the USA ended this.

Yet, afterward, there weren't any sustainable steps taken in order to make good relations among both countries. From a few onlookers' perspectives, the organization choice was more prone to evoke more prominent hatred than more prominent participation from Pakistani pioneers. It could be taken as acceptance by common Pakistani's who see the US as a whimsical and questionable associate (Deeks, 2011). A Pakistani military representative released the advancement as having no impact on his association's capacity to lead future battle operations. He rehashed the Army boss's proposal that more US security support is reinvented to Pakistan's advancement ventures.

In October 2011, 'Memogate' outrage makes the Domestic Civil-Military strain at its peak. The outrage cost *Haqqani* his occupation and brought extreme weight to President *Asif Zardari*. Both *Haqqani* and Zardari deny any association in the update's outrage.

Executive *Gilani* reacted with an open cautioning that “connivances are being incubated to pack up the chose government” and said that the military “can’t be a state inside a state” and is “responsible to Parliament.” Some prominent experts required another US arrangement to move to a more ill-disposed carriage towards Pakistan on the suspicion that President Obama's engagement arrangements have fizzled. One senior analyst recommends a “centered threatening vibe” towards Pakistan that would consider it's military and insight administrations responsible while not hurting the Pakistani individuals all the more for the most part. It could involve focusing on people for assents and pointedly cutting military help (Obama, 2010).

An alternate goes further, battling that Pakistan ought to be viewed as a foe of the United States, at any rate, the extent that Afghanistan arrangement is concerned, the rationale being that open affirmation of center contradiction on the issue would profit both nations. A third contends that just valid dangers to end all aid to Islamabad and counter if Pakistan neglects to consent to US requests will persuade Pakistani pioneers that real collaboration is their most significant advantage (Riedel, 2011).

In line with of events, The *Salala* outskirt episode on November 26, 2011, demonstrated the breakdown of the relations between the two states, when Pakistan reported the NATO helicopters and Jets had assaulted a Pakistani military office along the fringe with Afghanistan, executing no less than 27 Pakistani warriors and harming 14 more (Pirzada, 2011). Pakistan proclaimed the strike to be totally unmerited and instantly reassess its relations with the trans-Atlantic union and the United States. Along these lines, Pakistan shut the outskirt crossing in the Khyber Pass to NATO supply escorts and requested the US to empty Shamsi Air Base. Shamsi was accepted to be utilized by the

United States to propel hits within Pakistan using crewless ethereal vehicles (A. H. Cordesman, 2009).

Afghan authorities later blamed Pakistani strengths for inciting the assault by terminating Coalition constraints in Afghanistan, a charge that Pakistani officials denied. The US said that it would direct an investigation into the circumstances of the assault and assigned US headquarters (CENTCOM) as the lead substance for the examination on 28 November 2011. Pakistan requested a conciliatory sentiment from the US. The US declined to put forth such an expression until the investigation into the assault had been closed. As an aftereffect of the November 26, 2011 assault, Pakistan reported that it would blacklist the gathering on Afghanistan's fate to be held in Bonn, Germany, on December 20 (Haqqani, 2013).

The outside arrangement of Pakistan totally neglected to handle the issue of Baluchistan and FATA legitimately. Our knowledge organizations have the complete, accurate proof and data of Indian, Afghan, and Iran association and their exercises that incredibly make the revolt, militancy, and fanaticism in these areas and its belongings are seen in whatever remains of the nation parts. The administration does not have the best possible methodology to experience the political and financial destabilization in Pakistan. It is one of our remote arrangement disappointment for which we are paying in the gigantic expense from the most recent 14 years to date. The April 2012 Pentagon Report to Congress noticed some positive patterns yet straight expressed that "The Taliban rebellion and its al-Qaeda members still work with debasement from asylums in Pakistan," which remains the most basic risk to the US-drove endeavours in Afghanistan (Defense, 2012).

The report fought that the security circumstance in eastern Afghanistan “stays unpredictable,” and the city of Kabul keeps on confronting tireless security dangers, vast numbers of which are “arranged in and controlled from Pakistan.” Pentagon pioneers, and US government pioneers, as a rule, accept that Pakistan’s longing to see on Afghan government “with essential for the Pashtuns, and constrained Indian impacts,” propels its authority to allow insurgent sanctuaries to persist on its soil (Defense, 2012).

President Obama’s administration was started with a good initiative, but all these events mounted to a high level of animosity among Pakistani people. The survey was carried out to avow popularity and following of President Obama. Pakistan voted him 7% lower in all 44 countries. Despite military assistance, Pakistan was unable to dishalt the hampered delivery of F-16. No significant trade relations and bilateral agreements were made during this time. Yet regular trade was swift. President Obama highly complied with a lift of tariff barriers and trade halts in the President Bush administration (Walt, 2017). However, aid was provided to Pakistan in all circumstances.

5.4. President Obama Policy towards India

In November 2009, President Obama visited India to yield an erect productive relationship amongst both countries. US and India enjoyed comparatively good relations than Pakistan again in the President Obama administration. India was supported on all levels. In 2010, the US finance secretary made his visit to India, in order to kick off a new financial and economic partnership trade line. His initial meeting was to institutionalize the framework with Indian finance minister Pranab Mukherjee and his task force to seek the finance sector setbacks (Z. Li, 2010).

Again in the same year, the Indian high officials meet President Obama in the white house to discuss the first US strategic dialogues. President Obama says the relation will be defining twenty first century part of his administration secretary Clinton lauds India as an indispensable partner of the US. The consequent interchanges track year after year (Z. Li, 2010).

Further, President Obama backs Indian bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. It was an unwelcomed gesture for Pakistan and regretted. Yet this was ensuring the fraternity US India relations. The same trip also highlighted the economic ties, with President Obama announcing \$14.9 billion in trade. Furthermore, US-India inks a cyber-security memorandum, which was to promote closer relations with New Delhi. It was designed to fulfill the sharing response of both countries (A. Q. Khan, 2014).

In 2012, the US defense secretary visited India to boosted military ties in the wake of a pivot of Asia slogan, chanted by President Obama. It followed with several military joint pieces of training and collaboration over the portal of shared security interests. In 2013, Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, paid the last visit to the USA prior to his retirement. This visit owes numerous security, trade, immigration reforms, along with many alters in civilian nuclear deal tracked enhancement (Mistry, 2013).

In all these episodes, relation gets soured when the US embassy in India announces the resignation of Nancy Powell. It was in the wake of a dispute that erupted in Network due to the arrest of an Indian diplomat. The statement was amid of run-up to general elections. After BJP run over the ballots with high numbers of votes, Modi was elected PM. The USA intently invited Mr. Modi to visit. This offer was made by lifting the visa

ban as Modi led Government was entitled to massacre Muslims in the state of Gujarat. After being a PM, the President Obama administration was more intended to create a good relation with India. Modi in 2014 paid a high profile visit to the US, aiming to attract investment and US strategic partnerships. President Obama's administration and Modi ended up compiling a memorandum to help India develop low carbon energy alternatives up to \$1 billion (Burgess, 2015).

The second visit of President Obama was held in 2015. He celebrated Indian republic day with PM Modi and presented the desire to approach herald's relationship among both countries. PM Modi announced a breakthrough on nuclear to implement. Six months later, consigned documents to renew the ten-year US-India defense framework agreement between US secretary of defense and Indian defense minister meeting. Likewise, both countries engaged in many mutual accords and were regarded to play a strong role in the President Obama era (A. Singh et al., 2018).

5.5. Comparison of Both President's Policies

Both presidents devised their policy statements in accordance with the flow of time. However, both policies were distinct on fewer points. But a number of things were the same as both presidents were trying to cure their relations with India. The enthusiasm that could be glanced over India centered policy was not this intense on the card of Pakistan. Yet, on another angle, the President Obama administration was trying to evacuate their troops from Afghanistan, so they need a strong Pakistani presence over the Afghan border (C. R. Mohan, 2009).

early in the morning For Pakistan, the stance was not too different. Both presidents adhered to the agreement of 'DO MORE,' and Pakistan wasn't invited to be a part of any substantial trade program, or it would be better to say that Pakistan was never attended by the USA for long-lasting relations (Javaid, 2014).

South Asia, a consortium of eight countries, has always been pivotal in global politics. The Region is extremely important as it is home to about 1.6 billion populations, which is $\frac{1}{4}$ of the total population on the globe (Baxter et al., 2005). Additionally, two nuclear-armed arch-rivals sit on this very region, which makes it all the more important for world politics. Region's proximity with the Indian Ocean is no less important, which provides access to Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. It connects oil-rich Middle East with oil-starved south East Asia. Historically, the USA has used its south Asian allies to counter its rivals like Russia and China. From operating Budda Bair airbase for spy operations, to oversee communist Russia during the cold war to assist India in keeping a check on ascendant China, the region is of great significance for the US (Cookson, 2002).

With the West's comparative decline and the rise of Asian powers like China, the region is generally at the center stage for world affairs, particularly for the USA. US south Asian policies are mainly driven by the war on terror and enhancing Indian capacity and capability to counter the Chinese rise. Countries including India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are the direct recipient of these policies. Bangladesh and other south Asian nations are almost insignificant for a strategic relationship. No incumbent president has yet Bhutan (which has no formal relations with the US), the Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and US interests in the region. Nonetheless, Bangladesh's contribution to peacekeeping missions

across the world has earned her praised and trade concessions from the global leader, the USA (Baxter et al., 2005).

9/11, early in the morning, two of the jetliner hit the world trade center, a skyscraper, and other fell upon Pentagon, the headquarters building of the United States Department of Defense. The plan to attack the USA was hatched on Afghan soil. Though it was an attack on American soil, the effects of it ripple across the globe. The attack jolted the global superpower to its core (Rocca, 2005).

Soon after the attack, President contemplated the options and invited his national security team at Camp David to start developing the battle plan for Afghanistan, widely known as the graveyard of empires. The national security team includes vice president Dick Cheney, Secretary of state Colin Powell, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and other top officials. Together they had decades of crisis management experience. It was decided to crush al Qaeda operatives but by not acting individually but collectively. Colin Powell had done an impressive job rallying countries to the US coalition (Rocca, 2005). Great Britain, Australia, Japan, South Korea pledge their support.

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, key Arab partners of the USA, shared sensitive intelligence on al Qaeda's operations. Despite the support from these countries, the USA's most pivotal and vital nation was Pakistan. No country wielded more influence in Afghanistan than its eastern neighbors, Pakistan. It is important to note here that Pakistan was one of the three states that recognized the Taliban regime, the other two being UAE and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan had a troubled history with the United States (Rocca, 2005). After the close cooperation in the cold war, Congress suspended aid to Pakistan, including

coveted F-16 America had promised to sell them out of concern over the government's nuclear weapons program. In 1998, Pakistan had conducted a nuclear test, incurring further sanctions. By 2001, America had virtually cut off all aid to Pakistan.

Collin called President Musharraf as later on; it turned out to be the famous phrase 'Either you're with us or against us.' Demands presented before Musharraf were condemning the attack, denying al-Qaeda has a safe haven in Pakistan, sharing intelligence, granting overflight rights, and breaking diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime. Musharraf responded to the US call in positive, and why not because he had been left with only the choice to cooperate with the US (Buckley & Fawn, 2004). What if Pakistan denied its support to the USA? India's possible scenario would have been replacing Pakistan for overflight rights that wouldn't have been acceptable to Pakistan for its violation of airspace by its arch-rival India. Additionally, Pakistan had to choose between the Taliban and the US. The latter being the obvious choice with the Taliban regime, had no support from the international community while, on the other hand, the US was a global superpower (Wright, 2006). The cost-benefit analysis pointed out that it was the right decision to side with the US.

Washington decided to take al-Qaeda head-on. Three options were tabled to President. The first one, namely the contingency plan, called for cruise missile strikes on al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. The plan could be executed immediately, with no risk to American troops. The second option was to combine cruise missile strikes with bomber attacks. This would allow the USA to hit more targets while exposing their pilots to risk. The third and most aggressive option was to employ cruise missiles, bombers, and boots on the ground (Wright, 2006). President Bush opted for the third option because expensive

dropping weapons on the sparsely populated area without inflicting major defeat would yield no result. But without the logistical cooperation from neighbors, American ground troops would not be able to move into Afghanistan. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are the most important countries to get American troops on Afghan soil. But the problem with these countries was that their leaders were unknown to the US president (Rizwan, 2010).

However, Russian President Vladimir Putin was a person well known to President Bush Jr. After intense negotiation with Putin, he agreed to open Russian airspace to American military planes and used his influence with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the former Soviet republics, to help get American troops on Afghan soil (Naqvi, 2010). The American warplane under codename operation enduring freedom was ready. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) included four phases. The first was to clear the way for the conventional troops. The second was the massive air campaign on al Qaeda targets. The third phase was mainly related to ground troops to wipe out the remaining fighters. The fourth and final phase was to help stabilize the country and help the Afghan people to rebuild a free society.

The initial reports were positive, but getting ground troops on Afghan soil proved difficult. Nonetheless, twelve days after the start of the war, ground troops touched down in northern Afghanistan. In the north, American forces linked up with the CIA and Northern Alliance fighters. It is worth mentioning here that Osama Bin Laden's operatives assassinated northern alliance beloved leader, Ahmed Shah Masood (Bergen, 2002b).

His murder galvanized the Alliance to cooperate with America. With Northern Afghanistan liberated, troops turned southwards and found Karzai, a key man against the region's American enemy. Fighters were driven out of their strongholds, and remaining

fled to neighboring Pakistan. Americans who were expecting a quick victory trapped in Afghanistan for the next couple of decades thus ‘graveyard of empires’ title for Afghanistan proved true for yet another time (R. M. Khan & Abbasi, 2016).

Soon after, American political and defense analysts began to draw a comparison between Afghanistan and Vietnam, which showed a nightmare for American troops and lasted about twenty years. Operation Anaconda was launched to wipe out terror camps. American troops crawled through the caves, calling in airstrikes on terrorist hideouts and putting a severe dent in al-Qaeda’s army (Atwan, 2008).

As explained above, the OEF, the fourth phase, was to help Afghan people stabilize economically, socially, and politically. The socio-economic indicators of the country presented a bleak scenario at that time. Its annual economic output was in ruin. Public health facilities weren’t satisfactory at all. Life expectancy relative to other south Asian nations was on the lower side too. In short, the country had nothing to offer anything, if at all, to its citizens (Saikal, 2004).

The way out to all of these problems was to empower a leader in Afghanistan. Colin Powell worked with the UN on a process for the Afghan people to select an interim government. Hamid Karzai was sworn in as the new leader of the Afghan people. For the government, he would have needed funds. The international community chipped in and assisted him in helping rebuild Afghanistan. Japan, Germany, and other European nations, including the United Kingdom, supported the government in Afghan through donations and funds (Buckley & Fawn, 2004). In addition to that, Germany focused on training the national police. Great Britain adopted a counternarcotic mission. Italy worked to reform

the judicial system. Japan launched an initiative to disarm and demobilize warlords and their militias. Security was the necessary precondition for political and economic gains. Therefore, a force was erected under the auspices of the UN. It, ISAF, contained troops from around 22 countries. NATO took command of this force (Buckley & Fawn, 2004).

Pakistan has never been a US strategic partner. Relations were always transactional and on a bumpy road. During President Bush Sr. presidency, relations took a great turn from the past. Pakistan was under sanctions because of the nuclear test. With the attack of 9/11, when America was hit hard, it needed support from Pakistan. From being on the sanction list to one of the key allies on war one terror, soar relations turned into a marriage of convenience.

In Pakistan, President Musharraf responded to the US call in the affirmative and agreed to lend a helping hand to Americans. Airbases in Jacobabad & Sibi were given under US control to oversee flight operations as well as intelligence operations into Afghanistan. Drones, pilotless predators, were allowed to operate in the tribal belt in Pakistan. In return, Pakistan was supported financially for its fragile economy. But the problem lay is. Eastern neighbor, India, which was given highhanded influence in Afghanistan with its investments in infrastructure in the Parliament building in Afghanistan, is a prominent example in this regard and increased political relations. India enjoyed a great influence upon the government in Afghanistan, which repeatedly accused Pakistan of harboring and abetting terrorism inside Afghanistan and military influence in terms of RAW-NDS nexus. Pakistan cannot afford to be squeezed in from either side, with India on the eastern side and Afghanistan on the western side (A. Q. Khan, 2014).

Moreover, the USA always accused Pakistan of supporting certain factions of the Taliban, namely the Haqqani network, which proved the last nail in the coffin of the Soviet Union, and it inflicted major blows to the Soviet Union. Ironically, the USA supported this faction during Afghan Jihad. Pakistan and the USA both see its bilateral relations through the lens of India.

President Obama Administration witnessed no immediate change in President Bush Jr.'s policies on South Asia. It continued to tread in a manner similar to that of the President Bush Jr. era. The objective was to destroy al Qaeda. To achieve that goal, President Obama's administration to pump in more troops in Afghanistan (Goswami, 2009). The policy outlined by then was to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda; deny al Qaeda a safe haven; reverse the Taliban momentum and its ability to over government, and strengthen the Afghan security forces to protect better and serve the Afghan population. President Obama, like his neocon predecessor, pursued an aggressive posture towards fighters in Afghanistan. The rapid expansion and surge in troops, increased drone attacks, pursuing fighters deep into Pakistan were the most prominent undertakings of the President Obama administration to cite here. As far as India is concerned, President Obama visited India twice to enhance military cooperation, bilateral trade, and India's investment opportunities. As mentioned earlier, the goal was to help India rise to an extent where it can keep a check on the Chinese rise. President Obama also endorsed Indian aspirations to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (Muni, 2012).

From President Bush to President Obama, their policies towards south Asia were more or less the same: to win a victory in Afghanistan, carrot and stick policy towards Pakistan, and help India rise. All these policies were somewhat flawed, but having said

that, hindsight is always 20/20. Now I turn to outline the flaws in their policies. First being: Afghan Quagmire.

The bilateral relations between Pakistan and India can never be ignored while discussing the South Asian region. Both countries have nuclear weapons and play a major role in the balance of power in South Asia (Kaplan, 2010). Yet, these two counties also have conflicts with each other. India occupies a stronger place in the region, both economically and militarily, compared to Pakistan. In this tumult, the US has played a significant role in disturbing South Asia's regional balance by tilting its allegiance towards India (Pant, 2011).

Responding to Indo-US bilateral friendship, Pakistan cemented its Sino-Pak bilateral relationship as a measure aimed to counter the Indian hegemony over the region. It also institutionalized close ties with Russia creating a triangular relationship placing India on the short side of the triangle. There are three components to the balance of power in South Asia. One is the Indo-Pak rivalry reflecting the nuclear capability of both nations. The second is the unequal distribution of power in the region. The third is the increasing emphasis on security concerns-largely determined by exogenous interest factors (A. Q. Khan, 2014). The US attitude towards South Asia has been one-sided in favor of India. In contrast, Pakistan was not content with President Obama's policies since they made India stronger and reinforced its dominance over South Asia.

The United States cannot ignore the Indo-Pak rivalry. By doing so, the US is disturbing the balance of power in South Asia. There are big differences between the military capabilities and conventional arsenals of these two nations. These differences are

expected to create problems since Pakistan has nuclear capabilities but for limited conventional weaponry. Nuclear war serves as an uneasy countermeasure for Pakistan with no real deterrence value in disturbing the conventional military balance in South Asia (T. Ahmad, 2015).

The close relations between the US and India have been disturbed by the personal visa tribulations of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who was banned from entering the US because of his affiliation with the 2002 anti-Muslim riots in Indian Gujarat. Yet twelve years later, he was welcomed to Washington as Prime Minister in 2014 (Jain, 2016). Getting Modi off the visa ban list reveals the degree to which the US has bent over backward to secure US interests in India. The defense framework agreement, which was signed in 2005, was renewed for ten years by the President Obama administration. The agreement elevated India's global exposure by allowing Modi to participate in roundtable conferences with US multinational companies' CEOs and to invite them to India for investment opportunities. Modi put India on such an ambitious track that it attracted foreign investors and helped in improving the nation's old infrastructure (Malone, 2011).

Modi's government skillfully showed the benefits of investment opportunities for foreigners interested in India. President Obama was a sophisticated and charismatic leader who recognized the changing global trade pattern and saw a chance to develop more significant American investment in India and Pakistan. In the past, the US had short term interests in the region, leaving whenever it felt that its interests had been achieved. With increasing global interdependencies, US interests have been changed, and it is unwise for it to give up on a region completely (Sharma, 2016).

War in the first place should and would never have been an option. But Uncle Sam was angry with attacks on WTC and started the campaign in Afghanistan rightly so. The solution could have been political instead of the military one. In order to hunt down Osama Bin Ladin, the USA spent billions of dollars by using military might in Afghanistan only to end up negotiating with the Taliban after two decades of gruesome fighting (LaFeber, 2002). On top of it, tens of thousands have been killed and countless others wounded. Mass displacement, refugee crises, starvation, and hunger are among other evils. However, even if the USA had decided to go hard, with full-scale military options, on Afghanistan, a place where the plan was hatched against the USA, it should have been a well concerted and well-coordinated effort, which was missing. Countries that pledged support withdrew their support (Muzaffar, Hanif, & Khan, 2018).

The Afghan national armed force that America prepared had improved. All things considered, trying to shield the Afghan government from taking on an unreasonable cost, we had kept the order excessively little. The multilateral military crucial a mistake too. Many parliaments imposed heavy restrictions on their troops. Some were not allowed to patrol at night. Others couldn't engage in combat (Gasper, 2001). The result was a disorganized and ineffective force. Failures in the Afghan government contributed to the problem. Widespread corruption, poor governance led to the loss of faith in government. And lastly, regional countries were not on the same page as well. Every country had different goals and objectives and, in pursuance of that, resort to strategies opposite to winning the war. Indian influence in Afghanistan was never acceptable to Pakistan. Pakistan also didn't want to completely lose influence in Afghanistan and supported factions with cultural, historical ties with Pakistan (Muzaffar et al., 2018).

Moreover, the US's past experience in Jihad against the Soviet Union during the cold war Era laid bare the fact that the US could, at any time, pack their bags and leave Afghanistan (Dorronsoro, 2005). There, Pakistan definitely wouldn't have wanted to become a sandwich between hostile India and volatile Afghanistan with much Indian influence. This flawed and disorganized effort led to the defeat of one of the most sophisticated and powerful military hardware. President Bush & President Obama's policies are somehow being challenged in academics and India, which had historically at loggerheads with the USA during the cold war and US insistence that India relinquish its nuclear weapons. Bill Clinton visited India during March 2000 (Chou, 2005).

President Bush's visit was the most important one in bilateral relations. But here again, the USA has overinvested in India, and the favors accorded have not been worth the return. Indian nuclear capacity has been increased. Massive enrichment of uranium provided it with the opportunity to export to Japan, Canada & Australia (Renshon, 2009). Defense collaboration includes the provision of airborne helicopters having stealth technology, naval warships, and fighter planes. US Defense giant to move its production facility to India soon. Indian Asymmetric war capacities have been enhanced, for instance, drone technology for surveillance purposes & laser-guided artillery, to name a few. India's interests were served to strengthen its defense capabilities and to modernize its defense system. It has also expanded its naval power in the Indian Ocean (Chunyan, 2010). Despite the fact that the USA primarily on a path to contain China. With the USA increasing Indian air, naval & defense capacities, it has a negative impact in South Asia as the balance of power is tilted towards India. Its conventional capabilities are no match to any other South Asian nation.

The apparent consequences of this increase in India's capacity have repercussions that could be proved fatal & catastrophic not only for these two countries but also for the world. Pakistan, India's natural enemy, has not conventional compatibility with Indian might; therefore, Pakistan's only option is to nuke. The nuclear threshold in South Asia is lowered than ever before with the provision of US military assistance to India (Shivaji Ganguly, 2019). But for the US policymakers, they must understand that India's fractious democracy, institutional weaknesses, and passive strategic culture impede its accumulation of national power that, in return, would be of any match to that of China, which seems not to happen in the near future. Sanity should prevail in the state department because every decision has an impact, negative or positive, across the world (E. Ahmad, 2019).

In a nutshell, American policies in South Asia were mainly driven and centered upon Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. It was the confluence of strategic blunders, inept decision making & disorganized and disjointed efforts in Afghanistan where American military hardware failed miserably. India was supported, but negative impacts outnumbered and outpaced positive ones, which the USA considers positive for its long-term strategic ties. As long as Pakistan is concerned, carrot & stick has been pursued. All in all, USA policies in South Asia during President Bush Jr. & President Obama's presidency seemed confused. It must be served as a lesson to future presidents.

5.6. Afghanistan: Present and Future

Afghanistan is a diverse and fascinating country with respect to its people, culture, and geography. Afghanistan, over the years, has remained in the limelight one way or the other. Afghanistan has historically remained a trouble spot in the region and served as a

source of instability and turmoil (Gregorian, 1995). All foreign intrusions in Afghanistan have remained successful for a brief period only. Resistance by Afghans has always followed suit resulting in the expulsion of foreign occupation forces. However, due to repeated invasions, the country serves as a heaven for intelligence operatives. Resultantly, a number of intelligence agencies are operating in the country pursuing divergent interests. The dynamics of Afghan culture and its socio-economic fiber profoundly impact those who operate in Afghanistan. The country's political system and other institutions are not fully developed and suffer from incompetence, corruption, and lack of trust (Birkle, O'Hanlon, & SHERJAN, 2011).

Currently, Afghanistan's law enforcement agencies can be considered in their novices' stage and not capable of taking control of the country. There is a lot of room for investment in Afghanistan as the country has suffered severe damages over decades. The whole state machinery needs to be revived including infrastructure. Historically, Afghanistan has remained a center of unrest and is considered the epicenter of GWOT. Afghanistan is sharing mixed relations with its neighbors. Many regional states can positively or negatively impact the course of development in Afghanistan. Without any doubt, Iran is one of the most important players in Afghanistan because of the structure of government and the role of extremely successful intelligence agencies (Weinbaum, 2006).

Alongside Iran, Pakistan also has more influence. The presence of NATO troops inside Afghanistan is a major destabilizing factor for Pakistan and the complete region. No other country is more affected by the unstable situation of Afghanistan than Pakistan. Pakistan has already started feeling the backlash of Afghan instability in the form of refugees. In the absence of stability in Afghanistan, the figure of refugees in Pakistan will

substantially increase, accentuating Pakistan's already stressed economic capacity. Afghanistan's trade system is extensively criminalized. Afghan transit trade is an element that should be skillfully employed by Pakistan as in the past, there have been policy errors, and therefore, this trade shifted to Bandar Abbas (Morelli, 2009).

Russia also has significant influence in Afghanistan. Former communists in Afghanistan still align themselves with Russia. It's an invisible influence; it is there and long-lasting, ever since the Soviet invasion, highlighting its robust nature. Similarly, India influences Afghanistan. Partially it is supported by the influence of Russians over there. West also helped cultivate Indian influence in the last twenty years, which they now realize was wrong. India is controversial in Afghanistan because of Pakistan, and Pakistan is controversial in Afghanistan because of the people's apprehensions there. NATO, spending almost ten years in Afghanistan, has only achieved limited success and is planning to withdraw from Afghanistan, leaving behind a vacuum, which will provide sanctuaries to the terrorist groups in Afghanistan (Kulesa, 2008).

Like everything else in Afghanistan, this drawdown, at best, is very confusing, even misleading. It is not sure if drawdown is taking place; if it means the withdrawal of uniformed troops, yes, that's correct, but if it means a drawdown of US presence or influence, it is questionable. What is happening is that the number of troops is decreasing, which will come down to an agreed number, but probably the US influence is not going to decrease. So even with this drawdown, Afghanistan's people are probably worst off (Khalid, 2011). With the departure of NATO troops from Afghanistan and a depleted economic condition, the people of the country will face a worsening security situation and lack of development. Keeping in view the efficacy of Afghanistan law enforcement

agencies, it is quite evident that the drawdown neither brings peace in Afghanistan nor the people better off in any way (Kulesa, 2008).

As far as insurgency is concerned, it will be more or less the status quo. An essential and appropriate arrangement of power-sharing by stakeholders of Afghanistan general elections may prove extremely beneficial in saving the country from more internal divides and setting the course for prosperity and development. Historically, Afghanistan has figured prominently in the geopolitical calculus of regional and global actors of the international structure; given its significance, the pattern is expected to remain consistent in the predictable future. Since the contest for influence in the region around Afghanistan is ever intensifying, greater rivalries between various stakeholders can be envisaged (McCauley, 2002).

With resurgent Russia, ever progressing and ambitious China, emerging India, and global hegemon US, all vying for maximum gains, the geopolitical significance of Afghanistan continues to influence regional dynamics. In a power contest between major actors in the region, Pakistan and Iran cannot be regarded as minor players, owing to their geographical proximity and historical influence in Afghanistan (Kaplan, 2010). Consequently, Afghanistan's boundaries were drawn to suit these two imperial neighboring powers; a state comprising diverse ethnic groups was thus established. Besides ethnic diversity, the country is also divided geographically by a Mountain Range known as the Hindu Kush, running almost through Afghanistan's central parts from northeast to southwest (Weinbaum, 2006).

Afghanistan has cultural, linguistic, and ethnic linkages with its Muslim neighbors, Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian states. It has been called a nation at the crossroads' because of its central location among these countries. Afghanistan has occupied a strategic position as a historic buffer state between east and west for hundreds of years (R. M. Khan & Abbasi, 2016).

5.7. Kashmir Dispute

The dispute over Kashmir reactivated the historical tensions between two newborn states and institutionalized the hostility and animosity between them. Each state has its arguments to justify its claim over the state of Kashmir. Pakistan claims that Kashmir's annexation with India is a repudiation of principles underlying India's partition (R. M. Khan, 2011). According to the partition plan of 1947, the states were to must accede one of the Dominions, keeping in view their geographical contiguity and communal population. Mountbatten stated, "normally geographical situation and communal interests and so forth will be the factors to be considered" for partition (R. Ganguly, 1998).

States do not have the option of independence as Lord Listowel declared, "We do not, of course, propose to recognize any state as a separate international entity" (Burke, 1973). Thus Kashmir has more than seventy-five percent Muslim population, and geographical contiguity with Pakistan would have acceded to Pakistan irrespective of the wish of the ruler. But the Dogra ruler of Kashmir defied the principle of partition and first sought to exploit the option of having common frontiers with both states, India and Pakistan. Being a Hindu, he did not incline to annex with Pakistan but, at the same time, with a significant Muslim population, could not accede to India (R. Ganguly, 1998). He

delayed accession to any state shrewdly and made a standstill agreement with Pakistan. Simultaneously situation deteriorated in the state. The Muslim subjects, oppressed by the maharaja, revolted against him.

Tribesmen from Northwest Frontier Province joined them to free from the nasty Dogra ruler. Maharaja appealed to India for assistance. India scrupulously exploited the situation and asked maharaja first accedes to Kashmir with India if he wanted Indian military assistance. In desperation, Maharaja signed the document of accession with India and fled to Jammu (A. Khan, 1993).

After the accession, India deployed its troops in Srinagar and quelled the rebellion. By the time ceasefire was enforced, India had controlled two-thirds of Jammu and Kashmir, and freedom fighters only left with one third. The national conference established its government in that part, which is called Azad Kashmir. India propagated that it was Pakistani ‘aggression,’ which compelled India for the intrusion (N. N. Khan, 1994).

Lord Mountbatten stressed that in “a state where the issue of accession has become the subject of dispute, the question of accession would be decided according to the wishes of people.” So in the disputed state, the issue of accession was left with the people’s aspiration. Indian Prime minister Nehru also vowed to hold the plebiscite in Kashmir as soon as peace is restored. He stated in a telegram to Pakistani prime minister Liaquat Ali khan dated 30th October “our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision about the future of the state to the people of the state is not merely a pledge to your government but also to the people of Kashmir and the world” (A. Mohan, 1992).

But later on, India began to drag the issue, making one excuse to others. Even Nehru had promised that plebiscite would be held under the auspices of the United Nations. But India vehemently denied every effort of holding plebiscite by the UN-appointed representative's Sir Owen Dixon, Dr. Frank Graham, and Gunner Jarring. India opted for a strategy to delay the plebiscite to a possible extent and buy time for future maneuvering (P. R. Chari et al., 2009).

India was determined to hold on to Kashmir, so it evolved a shrewd Kashmir policy meticulously. India first filed a complaint against Pakistan in the United Nations on 1st January 1948 under section 35 of chapter VI and accused Pakistan of encouraging rebellion through tribesmen in Kashmir (Shakoor, 1998). It argued that Pakistan had committed an act of 'aggression' against India. Dr. Cheema reasoned that if India considered Pakistan as an aggressor, then it did file its case under chapter VI, "deals with pacific settlement of disputes" rather than under chapter VII because it is chapter VII that deals with the threats of war and act of aggression. It is assumed that it was done with a calculated policy to buy time to consolidate the Indian position in Kashmir (P. I. Cheema, 1994).

Thus, it opted for the most generalized and mildest article 35 of chapter VI. By taking the case in the UN and then under chapter VI implies that the UN would try to secure a ceasefire and then would take time to put the case in the right perspective. During time India may complicate the issue more (R. M. Khan, 2015). During the case prosecution, Indian emphasis remained only on invaders' withdrawal and declaring Pakistan as an aggressor. But it did not make any urgency to resolve the dispute. Both parties consumed sufficient time to explain their position on the dispute (Stephen Philip Cohen, 2002).

India changed its stance over Kashmir with time and made the world community believe that Kashmir has become an integral part of India, and the dispute no longer exists (A. Mohan, 1992). India justified its possession based on the maharaja's instrument of accession. Pakistan argued that the maharaja had lost popular support in his state, and his government had been ousted by his subjects successfully. He had no authority to execute the instrument of accession. According to the partition principles, the issue of acquisition in the disputed territory must be decided by the people's desires. Thus, maharaja violated the principles of partition and desecrated the standstill agreement, which he made with Pakistan. Legally maharaja was obliged to renounce that agreement publically before signing an instrument of accession with India. Pakistan's stand is that the partition principles should be executed in Kashmir that was announced by Mountbatten in a gathering of the rulers of the state. And India must fulfill its commitments of holding a plebiscite in Kashmir, which it has made not only to the Kashmir people but with Pakistan and the united nation (P. R. Chari et al., 2009).

When sufficient time had elapsed, India began to integrate the state into India to change dynamics in its favor. Hindu nationalists also run an agitation to pressurize the government for complete integration of Kashmir with India. Officially Indian government denounced the agitation but actually devised a whole plan to materialize the idea. This was gradually followed, and sheikh Abdullah was sacked. Sheikh Abdullah was a pro-Indian Kashmiri leader, but he had been found in purporting independence of the valley. Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad substituted him to use constituent assembly for the ratification of the instrument of accession. So the constituent assembly of Kashmir approved the accession to India in November 1956. Premier Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad stated that assembly gave

only the final shape to maharaja's decision, and no one can challenge this decision on earth (M. B. Lal, 1965).

Since then, India has openly retreated from its commitment to holding a plebiscite. India maintained that UN resolution calling for people's will could not be observed because Pakistan did not withdraw its troops from Azad Kashmir (R. M. Khan, 2015). India further argued that the option of Plebiscite has become obsolete. It is not the only means to ascertain the people's will. Kashmiri people have cemented the accession by expressing their support in various elections in favour of India (Hussain, 2005).

But veteran Hurriyet leader Syed Ali Gilani claims that elections had been manipulated through secret funds, provided by the central Indian government to local politicians. Even Indian Army Chief V. K Singh affirmed that the Indian army has been paying a huge amount to ministers to maintain stability in Kashmir (Iqbal, 2013). At the same time, the resistance in Kashmir was propagated as Pakistan sponsored terrorism. Despite the Indian government's tremendous efforts, it remains unable to bring Kashmir into the fold of the Indian union.

Pakistan was so weak, surrounded by many other problems, could not make India fulfill its commitments. With time, UN reluctance and inability to resolve the dispute also became apparent. Pakistan turned toward the western and Islamic world to strengthen its position (Shakoor, 1998). But western countries like the United States and Britain remain passive because the fear of antagonizing India prevented them from going far ahead in support of Pakistan. Islamic countries extended their moral support to Pakistan's stand over Kashmir, but their weakness could not make any difference. Pakistan's efforts of seeking

international help on the Kashmir issue or its efforts were propagated as its efforts to pursue parity with India. In contrast, Pakistan's perception was that if balance tilted in India's favor, the window of opportunity of resolving the conflict would be closed forever (R. M. Khan, 2015).

Stalemate in Kashmir continued to be a major source of conflict between Pakistan and India. Some argue that the entanglement of the Kashmir dispute with domestic politics and ideologies of Pakistan and India turned this territorial dispute into an endless source of hostility and conflict and made it a predominant determinate of both states' foreign policy (R. Ganguly, 1998). As Josef Korbel contends, "the Kashmir dispute is the uncompromisable struggle of two ways of life, two concepts of political organization that find themselves locked in a deadly conflict in which Kashmir has become both a symbol and a battleground" (Korbel, 1953).

It had sparked off several armed clashes and border skirmishes between Pakistan and India. The issue has been embedded in domestic politics of both stats to attract huge political baggage in domestic politics. There are hardliner groups on both sides, cast serious doubts on the other party's effort to resolve the dispute, and prevented the government from giving other parties many concessions. Governments show a more rigid stance to deflect domestic pressure because they are not strong enough to override the opposition. The usage of highly inflammatory remarks against the adversary party is considered a symbol of patriotism (Mangrio, 2012).

India has simultaneously changed its policy over Kashmir. Now it opted for two-pronged policies. One of its official policy is that Kashmir is its integral part and discards

the Kashmir dispute as an international dispute. It persisted that it is its internal issue of an Indian state. Any solution to conflict or crises must be according to the Indian constitution (R. M. Khan, 2015).

Kashmiris's freedom struggle against occupying Indian forces Kashmir is projected as 'Pakistan proxy war' and Freedom fighters coalesced under the banner of All Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC) are painted as Islamic fundamentalists. India extensively invoked anti-Pakistan propaganda, labelling Pakistan as a revisionist state, which is not satisfied with the status quo. It accuses Pakistan of using irregular means, i.e., supporting insurgents in Kashmir to change the status quo in its favour.

At the same time, it accepts Kashmir as a territorial dispute and seeks its solution. India wants to make Pakistan accept LoC as an international border. The idea is extensively advocated in academia and by non-official sources (Raza, 1996). But Pakistan argues that LoC is a ceasefire line, and it only freezes the military situation of the 1971 war. It could not be turned down into a permanent solution.

Both countries have squandered huge amounts of resources and human lives in three wars over the last sixty years. The insurgency in occupied Kashmir has aroused a militant mindset among young Muslims. A fair resolution of the dispute would help end militant thinking among the youth in the region and reduce GWOT's need (D. Hagerty, 2003). A positive side of this issue is that the world acknowledges the Kashmir dispute as an unresolved issue among South Asia's nuclear powers. The President Bush Jr. administration blamed Pakistan for the continued cross border terrorism and said the Musharraf government must stop infiltration across the disputed border. In response,

President Musharraf clarified that the Kashmiri people were fighting for their independence, and Pakistani territory was not being used for cross border terrorism (Yasmeen, 2002).

President Musharraf visited the US in June 2003. Both heads of state held a meeting at Camp David and discussed issues of mutual cooperation. President Bush Jr. emphasized the friendly Pak-India relations and resolution of all issues, including the core issue of Kashmir. He stated: "I am hopeful that two countries will reopen their engagement on all issues, including Kashmir." The US has focused on a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue because both countries possessed nuclear capability, and any conflict could cause great damage. US Secretary of State Colin Powell, while talking about the will of the Kashmiri people, said in March 2004: "I am sure both sides will take into account the needs, desires, aspirations, and concerns of the people of the region." (D. Hagerty, 2003).

In 2006, President Musharraf's visit to the US, President Bush referred to Kashmir by saying: "The best way for Kashmir to be resolved is for the leaders of both countries to step ahead and lead," pointing out that Kashmir was a bilateral issue that should be resolved by both the countries without US mediation. Pakistan's government impressed upon the Bush administration that Kashmir has a large Muslim population, and it should be free from Indian control. The government's position has been that Kashmiris should have the right to decide their destiny (R. M. Khan, 2011).

The changing geopolitical situation in the late 1980s and internal developments in Kashmir provided Pakistan with a new opportunity to pursue its policy on its own terms (P. I. Cheema, 1986). This upsurge of freedom struggle in Kashmir against Indian forces'

atrocities and Pakistan's support brought vibrant implications for her internal security. Various Islamic organizations/groups and indigenous Kashmiri freedom fighters got enthusiastically motivated towards extreme combat spirit against Indian security forces (Usmani, 2009).

They developed a belligerent mindset that kept on expanding. A stage was set in Pakistan, wherein these groups were provoking the youth through open rhetoric against the Indian insurgency in Kashmir. These developments augmented the element of militancy and extremism in Pakistan, which also took parallel strength from the outstanding legacy of unsettled Kashmir issue and natural affiliation of the people with Kashmiris (M. S. Alam, ali Guler, & Hasan, 2016).

Pakistan faced security over Kashmir after 9/11. It feared India's cooperation with the US would be at its own expense. Not surprisingly, both are rivals with unending border disputes over the years (R. Ganguly, 1998). Because India is far more significant than Pakistan in size and population, Pakistan's priority has been its security resulting in its efforts to join different military pacts with the US to hold India at bay. Pakistan believed it had to cooperate with the US in the war on terror; otherwise, India could justify Pakistan's preemptive strikes, declaring Pakistan harmful for India's security.

The Indians saw what happened on September 11 as further evidence of what they had been telling the US for years. Pakistan should be dealt with as a rogue state since it was the main principle sponsor and protector of the Taliban (Kasuri, 2015). Another Pakistan concern has been its conflict over Kashmir. Pakistan fought two wars with India, who rightfully should possess Kashmir; however, it may be defined geographically. It

could be said that Kashmir is the ever-present bone of contention between India and Pakistan since India holds possession of most of Kashmir while Pakistan believes the only way to determine the will of the Kashmiri people is to have a plebiscite (Stephen Philip Cohen, 2002).

There are three major reasons for the importance of the Kashmir issue in Pakistan's foreign policy. First, the religious and brotherly relations between Pakistan and the citizens of Kashmir. Second, Water rights are associated with three rivers with two dams (Mangla & Terbela) located in Northern Pakistan shared with India. The third one, the railway system of the Western part of Pakistan, which runs parallel to the Kashmir border.

President Musharraf raised the Kashmir problem on the international level on October 16, 2001, in a joint press conference with the Secretary of state Colin Powell. He said: "Normalization of relations between India and Pakistan would require that the wishes of the Kashmiri people resolve the Kashmir dispute" (Baxter et al., 2005). It was important for Pakistan to align with the War on Terror to provide leverage for its solution to the Kashmir issue. By cooperating with the US, Pakistan hoped that it could successfully draw the US into a broker's role to solve the Kashmir dispute.

5.8. Regional Challenges

Pakistan shares a border with India, Afghanistan, Iran, and China. The first three countries have territorial or social/political confrontational issues with Pakistan (Tellis, 1997). Although Pakistan enjoys reasonable relations with Iran, the relationships are not that of a great tested friend. Pakistan also has to keep a close eye on the US-Iran rivalry rapprochement because either case has implications for Pakistan. Further, the situation in

Afghanistan is fast changing. The situation is creating space for non-state actors to benefit but for neighboring countries and the world players (Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 2002).

Pakistan has to guard against the fallouts of the situation in Afghanistan. With India, Pakistan has to face stern relations while dealing with her hegemonic designs of dominance. India has always tried to malign Pakistan on the issue of terrorism. India has ever attempted to create problems for Pakistan over the issues of Kashmir, water, and through involvement in Baluchistan and tribal areas. Regarding China, the country has a strong perception that the US presence in the Indian Ocean, Afghanistan, and Pakistan intends to encircle her (Kaplan, 2010). Therefore Pakistan has to guard against the perception of becoming a reality because it will affect the Chinese continued and assured support to Pakistan.

This policy is crafted soon after India has started its diplomatic and strategic maneuvering in Afghanistan. Pakistan feels that if India comes in Afghanistan and establishes a cordial relationship with the new Afghan government, Pakistan's Afghanistan options would be squeezed. Pakistan's reach to Central Asia would also be endangered as India already has good connections with CARs, but it lacks a link (Kukeeva, 2013). Having a strong foothold in Afghanistan would enable India to enlarge its foot in CARs. Given this entire scenario, Islamabad does not want it to become a sandwich in the region. Afghanistan's political future is heavily related to the withdrawal of US/NATO troops, so having some connections with groups of Afghanistan is a strategic policy of Pakistan (Akbar, 2015).

Chapter 6:

Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion

6. Conclusion

This study aimed to investigate the US foreign policy trends towards South Asia, especially Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Historically, various trends have been observed in US foreign policy. There was a time when Pakistan was the most allied ally, and then there was a phase when we were the most sanctioned and neglected nation of the world.

The United States is also among those powers that have a strategic position in the global scenario and political and economic interests. One view is to get hegemony and containment of China's growing influence is the sole purpose of US presence in this region. The attraction for a presence neighbouring to rising power and resources besides reaching warm water is one aspect that one cannot easily neglect concerning US presence in this region. On the curtain of China's containment, keeping terrorist networks in this region is under strict surveillance and monitoring. However, Iran's nuclear ambitions are equally important. In many ways, the American strategy has been mainly ambitious during the last two decades by its fight against terrorism. It has been equally active in countering threats of maritime terrorism.

The politics of South Asia between major powers are complicated due to China's rise in the relative decline of the US. Rising China wants to counter the US's dominance in the region and assert itself as the regional hegemon. An emerging India seeks to balance

China. The region is the crucial energy route, is the center stage of world politics. The regional states and the external powers want to get the maximum share of energy resources, fisheries, and freshwater resources. A

Apart from the power politics mentioned above, there is also cooperation and engagement policy among the regional states because of having shared economic interests. The recognition of common interests can enhance cooperation among the states and decrease terrorism and other regional issues. As the US is closer to India, Pakistan is developing its long term strategic relations with China, leading regional politics to a new quadrilateral structure.

US President George W. Bush had different domestic and foreign policies and the agenda of his government. The thesis examined the nature of the foreign policy of President Bush in both his term of office. President Bush Jr. became US President when momentous events were waiting for him. Just after nine months in government, terrorists attacked US soil, and almost three thousand people were killed. President Bush's foreign policy, before 9/11, he had a full isolationist approach towards international affairs, but after 9/11, the situation was completely changed. He introduced new concepts in his foreign policy, e.g., preemption, unilateralism. Few nations like India tried to take advantage of these concepts by declaring Pakistan a rogue state like Iraq. After this declaration, India could attack Pakistan, but the US refused to act upon the Indian desire.

In his first term, especially in the pre-9/11 era, foreign policy was formed to advance domestic policy. In contrast, in President Bush's second term, policies took a U-turn, and the intention was diverted towards the international events, so foreign policy

became the base of domestic policy. It is observed that George W. Bush is severely criticized for his attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan. He justified the attack on Iraq with the promotion of democracy. As Iraq continues to disintegrate, the US troops are needed to die there for decades. So, US authorities need to recall the reasons why they got into this bloody mess?

The justification for the Afghanistan war should be to punish those who have committed any sin. The Taliban in Afghanistan have sinned by killing Americans in the terrible attacks of 9/11. President Bush Jr.'s government exploited the 9/11 attacks by justifying Iraq and Afghanistan. If we look at these reasons neutrally, Pakistan fulfills both reasons without any iota of doubt because it has WMD and the Taliban are also present in Pakistan's tribal areas. In other words, President Bush Jr. is wrong in his justification because the war in Iraq was simply to ouster Saddam's regime and in Afghanistan to have a government of its liking. President Bush Jr. also imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear program.

After September 11, 2001, attacks, the foreign policy of Bush Jr. took a 180-degree turn towards Pakistan, and after that, a honeymoon period started in Pak-US relations. The reason for this event, both states came closer to each other like the cold war era. On the one hand, Pakistan offered full logistics, airbase, and intelligence support to the US, which caused anti-Americanism and extremism in the country. On the other hand, President Bush and his administration rewarded Pakistan by resuming economic, political, and military support to Pakistan's most sanctioned ally.

Before September 11, 2001, Pakistan was the most sanctioned country by the United States. Still, after Pakistan's support in GWOT, all sanctioned were removed, and Pakistan became the 'once most sanctioned ally' of the US. Washington DC immediately restored its old-style relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan decided to join the US-led war coalition because of predictable economic incentives, the need to save its strategic assets, and the solution to the Kashmir problem. By having insight into the causes, there is no hesitation to proclaim that Pakistan did the right thing at the right time.

After Pakistan's support, the US again showed its full support to Pakistan in all society sections. The USAID once again became the tool for the development of different sections of Pakistani society. USAID postponed its activities in Pakistan after the 28 May 1998 atomic explosions. A considerable amount of US aid is spent through USAID. In social sector development, President Bush Jr.'s administration helped out Pakistan a lot. As it has been in education standards and literacy rates have increased, healthcare facilities are now available in all remote areas of the country. Besides the positive steps, negativities are equally there. Media and Education are becoming more liberal and western. Because of it, society is forgetting and losing its identity. Due to the war in Muslim countries, Anti-Americanism and extremism is increasing.

In the political sector, Pakistan is getting benefits but paying the cost as well. As far as interests are concerned, the Kashmir issue has gained the attention of the world as it has been declared a disputed issue between two rivals of South Asia. The negative factor is more in this aspect because, after General Musharraf's support, Bush Jr.'s government did nothing special for Pakistan's democratic civilian government. President Bush Jr. is very well conscious that a Pakistani civilian government may not support the US in the

WoT because of the Muslim brotherhood in Pakistan. President Bush Jr. has failed to broaden his relationship with Pakistan much beyond GHQ. In the matter of nuclear proliferation, President Bush Jr. is once again showing his Pro-Indian support. India is allowed to perform any nuclear activity but not Pakistan. The case of AQ Khan is also a US conspiracy for letting down Pakistan's nuclear program.

If Pakistan did not support the US in the war coalition, what might have been the consequences, and was it possible that Bush's policies pushed the Musharraf country back into the Stone Age? President Bush Jr. Administration pushed back the democracy issue in Pakistan in response to the military government's support in the GWOT. President Bush Jr. waged the GWOT for the American people's security, particularly and the world generally. Nuclear proliferation is also a threat to world peace. If Pakistan's nuclear program becomes a threat to US peace and stability, Pakistan could become a US GWOT victim.

As President Bush Jr. has stated in the Bush Doctrine, 'With us or against us,' the nuclear program could go against Pakistan if it went 'against us.' One element is crystal clear in President Bush's foreign policy that any step could be taken for assuring the US security interests. Pak-US relations have seen many ups and downs, and there is no guarantee of a future relationship. Although many statements are made from Washington and Islamabad about his strong future relationship, the strength of the relationship will be contingent on the convergence of the national interests of the two countries.

Thus public behaviour, ideology, and opinion towards Pakistan US relations are observed keenly to be negative. The perception that prevails in public is influenced by the nature of this relationship, which is promoted and limited to US benefits are needs only. It

is usually said that beyond the help in empowering socio-economic sectors in Pakistan, the US has done no favor to improve Pakistan's image around the globe. Pakistan is facing criticism for not doing enough to eradicate terrorism from its state. This narrative is promoted by the US, stating that Pakistan discriminates against terrorists operating from its land in other countries. The India-US coalition has come out with the same allegations on Pakistan. With the chain of development and progressive economic growth, it has become quite evident that Pakistan is no more solely dependent on US aid money.

Although Pakistan cannot deny the military and economic support it gained from the United States. Still, the considering element is to analyze if it was worth playing the ally game when the US's role in South Asia is of a potential partner and powerful influencer at the same time. The US's sustenance in investment opportunities in the development and technology sector has proved to be a step forward in better policy and bilateral dialogue. In the present, Pakistan's logistic and interest-based importance intends to be rare in the US foreign outline. Nevertheless, US officials in strategic talks recognize the worth of Pakistan for future deliberate partnership. President Bush Jr. took some positive steps in the Energy and Environment sectors. He asked for solutions to improve air quality, e.g., the Clean Air Act. He favoured the opening and drilling for gas and oil exploration and proposed \$1.7 billion to develop hydrogen powerful fuel cells. The President's health policy supported the reduction of drug costs for low-income patients. The people on this step praised him because good health and medicines were in reach of every person.

The US foreign policy demonstrated some aspects of change and continuity vis-à-vis India and Pakistan, as happened in past presidential terms. India and Pakistan reacted to US actions, statements, and declarations keeping their regional and domestic interest in

view. The US also took into account global and regional goals and objectives while engaging India and Pakistan. Since Independence, the relationship among the three countries, the US, India, and Pakistan, has been an essential sphere of concern for all the three nations' foreign policies. For a better understanding of the topic, relations of the three countries have been studied historically. Still, the main focus of the study is on the US foreign policy towards South Asia.

The US's foreign policy towards India and Pakistan witnessed the key transformation in sixteen years of the President Obama Administration. Domestic opinions and interests also weighed considerably to shape the foreign policies of the three countries. The internal pressure in the US developed the actions of the President Obama Administration about Pakistan. Focusing on India, commercial lobbies in the US drove, to some extent, the policies of the President Obama administration. In Pakistan, anti-US sentiments disturbed the government to increase the unconditional support to the United States in its war against terrorism. In India, a segment of the domestic audience expressed displeasure at the incumbent government to make the country a puppet in the US global game. At the same time, domestic forces in all three countries played a role in bringing the relations to the best working level.

Pakistan's strategic location has been of most importance for the US to fix the problems in Afghanistan. The key figures of the US Congress kept pushing the Executive to squeeze the aid to Pakistan to extract more cooperation on Afghanistan. On this account, Pakistan asked to help the US in its war against terrorism, which became an issue in Pakistan. Pakistan's situation was made worse by India, which kept censuring Pakistan for terrorist attacks on its soil. Some of the traces of terrorism led to Pakistan, causing the

country to be on the wrong side of the debates and actions on countering and eliminating terrorism. The long-standing rivalry between India and the US plays out in international forums. Therefore, India lobbied actively with the President Obama Administration to treat Pakistan terrorist-sponsoring states. The US was not ready to pressurize Pakistan to the extent that it almost abandons Pakistan, consequently complicating Afghanistan's already messy business.

The trade and commercial linkages were used to a reasonable extent by the US to pursue its objectives regarding Pakistan and India. The focus of the United States on Pakistan remained on providing aid for the country's social uplift. Here the emphasis was to remove social conditions, which breed extremism and militancy. In terms of trade, Pakistan could not get the US's desired treatment as access to the US market is still restrictive. The US improved trade ties with India to a considerable extent, although the set targets could not be met under the President Obama Administration. However, the US's vision is apparent that India's commercial relations need to be improved due to the growing affluent middle class in the country. Even with India, the trade ties have a defense component as the US sees India as the best bet against rising China.

China has emerged as a key player in South Asia, affecting the United States' role in the region regarding its engagement with Pakistan and India. The US desire to make India a full-time partner to prevent China from becoming regional is far from realization. India and China have their mutual binding factors along with points of conflict.

On the other hand, Pakistan has understood the US to shift towards India in clear terms, so it has decided to alter its focus to seek greater understanding with China and

Russia. In response, both China and Russia have favorably responded to Pakistan, thus encouraging it to take bold, innovative foreign policy measures. China's grand project dubbed as China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a test case of China's growing strategic focus on South Asia as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India and the US have objected to the Chinese regional push in south Asia. It could extend to the Middle East and Europe via Pakistan. This question is the outcome of South Asia's shifting strategic balance resulting from the growing US India relations.

President Obama's tilt towards India has anxious the regional balance in South Asia. The US wants India, an influential nation in the region, to counter the emerging Chinese threat and get its stronghold. The Indo-US strong partnership would force Pakistan to look at China and Russia to strengthen their bonds more tightly because the history of 70 years of Indo-Pak rivalry could also never be ignored. India wants to create its hegemony in South Asia, while Pakistan would try its utmost to counter its hegemony. As Pakistan reflects asymmetry with India in terms of its military capabilities and economy, both countries still have nuclear weapons, creating problems in the future. The US has shown serious concern about the safety of the thermonuclear weapons of Pakistan. Indeed, this would further deteriorate the tense relations in both states and further accelerate the arms race between India and Pakistan.

President Barack Obama completed his two terms, and his foreign policy is all set to witness a change in conception and execution. It is like things that with the new president in office, the US's foreign relations change. Still, to some degree, he would act to undo specific actions of his predecessor and embark on a course of action that was not conceived previously. There would be continuity in the US engagement in South Asia. To bring

stability in Afghanistan, Strategic relations with Pakistan are of key significance for the US. While to want access to Indian markets and counter China's role in the Asia Pacific, India is more important for the US. Therefore, the triangular relationship among the US, India, and Pakistan as it unfolded during the President Obama Administration may continue into the new administration with a change in tone and tenor.

The world we inhabit today is one of continual change and rapid development. The complex problems confronting one nation are continually becoming problems shared by many, necessitating international participation, cooperation, particularly among allies, and a deeper, more nuanced appreciation of the inescapable realities that policymakers must contend with when trying to affect change. The work encompassed in this portfolio has been an attempt at constructing a framework for how to administer or implement foreign policy, particularly US foreign policy moving forward into the twenty-first century.

Frustration at home, as well as internationally with the GWOT, worsened by misguided and misinformed policy, a general disconnect between national objectives and ease of achievement at operational and tactical levels, and the cost in both blood and treasure led to a shift in national stance at least by our estimate. We would opine that this shift was extreme, at least in the short-term, and can be partially attributed to problems plaguing US foreign policy's implementation since the close of the Cold War. Following the Cold War, the nation experienced a period of relative peace, which was abruptly and tragically shattered on 9/11. With no international policy in place, the US had to prepare one hastily. However, over that decade, mission creeps set in, and the scope of the purpose was widened drastically. With few clear, truly attainable objectives for which the military

was suited to pursue, extensive resources were spent to offset poor strategy, all direct products of inadequate policy formulation administration.

In the backdrop of the US-led ‘war on terrorism,’ each state and region repositioned itself to maneuver more room in a new transformed global security paradigm. Some saw it as a hard drive to dominate the world, and some showers appreciation and praise by interpreting it as a cause of maintaining peace and eradicating terrorism. Each state has stakes in outlawing and combating terrorist groups, threatening their national security while simultaneously abetting, aiding, and sponsoring the terrorist groups in the rival state.

India, on one side, outlaws Kashmiri resistant groups and demands Pakistan to rein in pro-Kashmiri jihadi groups. Sometimes threatened Pakistan to take stern punitive measures it continues to ‘harbouring anti-India terrorist,’ but on another side, it abets Baloch insurgent and TTP militants. Afghanistan raises concerns that Pakistan provides sanctuaries to the Afghan Taliban and fuels insurgency in Afghanistan besides giving an open hand to Afghan national intelligence in assisting the Pakistani Taliban for violent acts on Pakistan soil.

Pakistan's segmented response to different terrorist groups was mainly based upon its security and geopolitical calculations. Terrorism in Pakistan neither has only an internal dimension nor only an external dimension. Some terrorist groups are mutated from insurgent groups, some from sectarian outfits, and the Afghan Taliban, who have taken shelter in Pakistan. Pakistan ruthlessly launched military operations against some Taliban groups and militants who were insurgents and openly challenged its writ. But two types of groups remain immune from the country's wrath, one which conflated their ideology with

the lexicon of jihad and demanded imposition of sharia. Second, some Afghan Taliban groups whom the Pakistani state considered a strategic asset and intended to maneuver in the Afghanistan reconciliation process. Distrust between civilian government and military, disagreement among political parties over combating Islamic militants consumed a hell of a time, and the government could not draw a comprehensive counterterrorism policy.

Moreover, Pakistan's geographical position has grown more complicated by wrapping up the US trajectory of the 'war on terror' in Afghanistan. With the changing of regional dynamics, Pakistan found itself in an ongoing complex regional security paradigm. The government's inability to tackle the menace of terrorism tarnished Pakistan's internal security and deteriorated its relations with its neighbours Iran, Afghanistan, and India, and damaged its international standing. Dysfunctional ties with Iran and Afghanistan over abetting and aiding terrorist groups against each other isolated Pakistan and heightened its security concerns on its eastern border. Additionally, it provided India with a golden opportunity to deepen its presence in Afghanistan and consolidate its ties with Iran. Indian gains in Afghanistan and Iran and the US bid to court India during war added loss for Pakistan because of Persistent Imbroglio and fierce antipathy for each other.

The study's goal has been to identify the primary element in US foreign policy towards South Asia and the qualities essential for the best chance of successfully applying a foreign policy aimed at keeping violent terrorist organizations intent on harming American citizens and attacking the US homeland. By determining that the President maintains the most power as it pertains to foreign policy administration. It contained major steps, identified and defined the national interest, identified and classified threats to the

national interest based upon realistic threat assessments, and applied the qualities identified towards completing the policy implementation process.

By arguing for the defense of the American homeland as the top national interest and presenting the threat of a terrorist attack as the top threat to that interest, we formed a policy for how to address the threat. We determined that a nuclear weapon in a terrorist organization's hands would pose the single greatest threat to the American homeland through our threat assessment. While not the easiest to procure and deploy, in the hands of a violent terrorist organization dedicated to an apocalyptic charter, a nuclear device would provide them with an accurate terror tool and serve as a political instrument that could be used to leverage considerable concessions. It is also important to note that while a low-probability event, the probability is undoubtedly growing as nuclear energy production grows across the planet and dual-use technologies become more accessible.

Moving forward, this research could be followed on with the continued analysis of how the US president could utilize the formula developed here and the threat analyses presented to deliver a sustainable foreign policy aimed at curtailing terrorist access to nuclear weapons. The building of the preceding works, this new analysis could include how one would introduce conservative geopolitical principles in an effort to establish a baseline or foundational approach to US foreign policy that could be followed by proceeding presidents, which in theory could yield a more straightforward approach to the implementation of US foreign policy towards South Asia.

6.1. Findings

In light of facts educed from the research, the researcher came to the following findings:

- Most of the scholarly study has been done on Pak-US relations till 2016 and lacking a holistic approach towards the US-Pakistan relationship contours to find the causes of mistrust and divergence in a relationship. This research is an effort to highlight significant events in US-Pakistan relations that shaped their bilateral ties upward and downward during 2001-2016 and pointed out the level and causes of mistrust and significant implications for US Pakistan relations. Different factors have been highlighted between US-Pakistan relations, which contributed to mistrust and suspicions, implications.
- Dimensions of United States policy had been straightened during the President Bush Jr. administration, and it had made south Asian regions protect the challenges of international terrorism.
- The strategy to advance US-Pakistan mutual interests mainly influences the endurances of relations between the two states. Inconsistency in interest aggregation strategy is a problem because it has been observed in many instances that the event of mutual concern is there. Mutual interest is present, but stress still exists between US-Pakistan relations. The reason is inconsistency in interest aggregation strategy that develop distrust between US-Pakistan relations.
- With the start of the 20th century, world politics changed, especially in security policy.
- The role of the United States in the development of a bilateral relationship in South Asian countries has brought a paradigm shift. Now the US believes in good relations with its allied countries.

- Given Pakistan's unresolved issues with India, policymakers in Islamabad have always been concerned with the prospects of the two-front war scenario. Rising Indian clout in Afghanistan has been a key sensitivity and deemed a direct challenge to Pakistan.
- It may be said that President Bush's policies as practical and pragmatic approaches to position the United States' national security interest and President Obama understandably had taken many moves for the betterment of peace. He did this through solid foreign policy.
- In the contemporary globalized world, the protracted turmoil and conflict in Afghanistan are unlikely to be impeded from further escalation; consequently, immunizing adjoining regions in particular and the world from its noxious fallout is an unrealistic expectation.
- Afghanistan has enormous geopolitical and geo-economic significance for the regional actors; immediate neighbors like Pakistan and Iran and distant players such as India and the US have been vying for influence in the country for varying interests, promoting huge rivalry in the region while fueling instability on Afghan soil during the damaging contest.
- Post 9/11 developments in the region, especially increasing Indian clout with the Afghan government and a resurgence of Taliban resistance, put Islamabad-Kabul relations at the confrontational course. Nevertheless, factors like ethnolinguistic affinity, the commonality of religious traditions, shared cultural values, and economic interdependence would always thwart a total breakdown of the bilateral relations.

- Pakistan has been an easy scapegoat for the failure of international effort at defeating the Afghan Taliban and often implicated in protecting them for counterbalancing Indian influence in Afghanistan; the assumption is based on a false premise as military means alone have never been a sure recipe for success on Afghan soil, a reality often highlighted by Islamabad. Islamabad should adroitly preserve its legitimate interests in Afghanistan through constructive engagement at all levels. Pakistan should not offer any vacuum to its rivals, mitigate negative perceptions about its role, and seek broader acceptance among all Afghan communities.
- The policy of ‘strategic restraint’ should outline Pakistan’s response towards Afghanistan, ignoring obstructive and at times offensive Afghan rhetoric; Islamabad should aim at winning over saner elements amongst Afghans by displaying an elderly and polite demeanour. Islamabad should resist the temptation of getting involved in Afghanistan’s internal affairs and renounce the strategy of backing any particular community or group; Islamabad should aim at winning over the confidence of all Afghan ethnicities by adopting a neutral posture.
- Islamabad and New Delhi should accept that policy of ‘zero-sum’ gains vis-à-vis the economic potential of Afghanistan have not served anyone’s interests; besides promoting the regional contest and trust deficit, the competition between the two has provided space to other stakeholders. Both need to acknowledge the legitimate interests of each other in Afghanistan and develop consensus through frequent as well as significant interactions on the way forward while involving all apparatus of the state, i.e., political, diplomatic, and military.

- The fallout of clinging to US-driven war brought a widespread disaster in the shape of terrorism, a non-traditional security threat, and worldwide loss of credibility while augmenting Pakistan's political and strategic predicament. Pakistan shifted its focus from the western to the eastern border and positioned more than eighty thousand troops along the Afghan border region. The strategy backfired, and the Taliban took a turn against Pakistan itself while bringing it on the verge of civil war. Other states like Iran, Central Asian states, European countries, the United States, even China began to look at Pakistan as an epicentre of terrorism. Its negative image in the world community limited its policy options and complicated things more.
- Pakistan's role as a frontline state brings irreparable losses both at home and abroad in terms of violence, instability, economic stagnation, a flight of foreign investment, protracted conflict in its border, low international standing, and a negative image in the world community.
- In the pretext of Pakistan's negative image, India staged propaganda against Pakistan in academia and on international forums. It projected that Pakistan is exporting terrorism and extremism in Kashmir and Afghanistan and fanning insurgent elements there. Further, it floated a new idea that Pakistani nuclear weapons are not safe and may fall into the hands of terrorists. Pakistan's already tainted image in the world community paved the Indian way to project itself as the world's largest democracy and emerging global power dedicated to peace, whereas Pakistan source of all tribulations and instability in the region.
- India got a double edge out of Pakistan's negative image in the world. It weakened Pakistan's position on Kashmir by convincing the world community and catching all

sympathies that Pakistan is an aggressor state and never let its neighbours live in peace by aiding and abetting terrorism and jihadi organizations.

- India clearly denied the United States offer throughout the cold war, but a shift came in the US foreign policy towards India.
- United States countersignature of India's position on terrorism in the world community not only strengthened its position on Kashmir but make it a favourite country for trade and investment and diplomatic ties.
- The international community's response is dismissive regarding Pakistan's concerns over Indian involvement in parallel mischiefs in Baluchistan and Pakistan tribal belt from the bases it has acquired in Afghanistan. Pakistan believes that Indian consulates in Afghanistan are fomenting troubles in Pakistani tribal areas alongside the Afghan border with Afghan intelligence agencies' cooperation and secure connection with TTP.
- Pakistan is being alienated from emerging regional realities. The US is moving to embrace India as a partner because of its convergence with India over two national credential interests, containing china in the Asia Pacific and fighting Islamic terrorism. The US has offered India military training and intelligence cooperation, nuclear cooperation, nuclear reactor sales, and advanced American defence equipment. In its efforts to secure India's partnership, the US entirely bypassed the Kashmir conflict and Indian violations of Kashmir's human rights. However, besides accepting all benefits of a strategic alliance with the US, India did not relinquish and compromise. US tilt toward India would destabilize the critical balance of power in the region and reinforce Pakistan's observations about US insensitivity toward Pakistan's security concern.

- Pakistan is an untrusted partner who abused the money gave through AID and redirected it to propel her particular territorial premiums and threatening association with India encroaches on short and long haul American interests, an untrusted strategy associate versus India, which is a developing regional hegemon.
- It is usually perceived that United States officials view the Pakistani government as incompetent and incapable of properly handling the critical security situation. Pakistanis tend to imagine that the United States had given continuously a solid once again to despots and military administrations. They accept that the United States arms and military had contorted setbacks on the democracy in Pakistan.
- Pakistan likewise held the US mindful when they abused its sway by directing a military operation inside Pakistan to execute Osama Bin Laden. The picture of Pakistan's military to its populace arrived at its least ebb.
- The trust shortage continues expanding because of the occasions like ceaseless automaton assaults with a great deal of inadvertent blowback and different operations inside Pakistan.

6.2. Recommendations

The study has covered all factors and questions on proposed topics. In the light of analyses and conclusion, the following recommendations have been made:

- To eliminate terrorism from Pakistan, the support of tribal leaders is a must. So, the Pakistan army and leadership required at least 3 to 5 years of tribal backing to stabilize the tribal region. Pakistan can use China and the US's assistance to eliminate terrorism from

border areas by keeping a strong stance on national sovereignty. Pakistan's army can cooperate on intelligence information through the CIA and ISI as both states' essential purpose is to counter the re-emergence of terrorist groups in the region. Still, operations within Pakistan have been done by the Pak army or jointly by the CIA with the state's establishment's permission. It will improve cooperation with the US and creates an environment of trust.

- On the Indian role to sabotage Pakistan's image in regional and international forums, Pakistan can fight back by highlighting India's violent and abusive face on these forums. Pakistan has to form a strong lobby on international forums to highlight the human rights crisis in Kashmir, violence against Muslims and other minorities in India, and India and its agencies in support of terrorism or violence in Pakistan.
- India should also realize that without bringing a certain tranquillity level, it cannot cherish its idea of becoming a regional or global power. If tensions continue between India and Pakistan, it will influence US policies in South Asia. India cannot fulfill its ambition of putting India into the big league until it kept on violating human rights in Kashmir and continue its low cast warfare via proxies with Pakistan.
- To deal with Pakistan's negative, the Pakistani leadership, civil and military departments, and social community have to make joint efforts. Pakistan can share its efforts to curb terrorism from the region to safe human rights, promote minority's position, supportive policies, and warm, welcoming behavior towards international tourists; on international forums to show Pakistan's real and positive image.

- As the frontline State in the GWOT, Pakistan has rendered an immense expense, which had genuine outcomes for its economy. If the US considered Pakistan as the strategic key ally in the GWOT, so it should give Pakistan the military and financial help that incorporates the most modern and advanced instruments for Armed forces.
- The United States does a lot to control the people's sound minds, and it creates a mess for the US. Cultural exchange programs and Fulbright scholarships to gain sympathy have started for Pakistani students, but the United States should understand that Pakistan's younger generation is becoming more educated. Such practices of the US seem to be discouraged, and through this, they are becoming more Anti-American. So the United States should avoid such tactics and practices.
- The United States' pro-Indian position also creates Anti-American sentiments in Pakistan. So the United States should effectively assume it partly to pressurize and stifle India for its vicious and viral state of mind towards Pakistan. It must consider Pakistan's position on Indian exercises in Afghanistan and effectively include or pressurize it for a quiet determination to the long-standing Kashmir Dispute.
- Pakistan is confronting extreme monetary difficulties and America. Thus, it needs to focus its help and put resources into the super vast scale advancement projects. Pakistan is presently facing the most exceedingly terrible energy crisis. Washington's top need is to provide help and give Pakistan financial support in building large Dams and energy projects instead of contradicting the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project. These endeavors will upgrade the American deceivability among the Pakistani people.

- The drone strikes inside Pakistan create resentment in the general public as it resulted in civilian casualties. So the US must understand the need to cooperate with Pakistan either by providing drone technology to Pakistan or by mutual intelligence sharing and cooperation. There should be no or fewer civilian casualties, and it should not violate Pakistan's sovereignty if the drone strikes should be halted entirely.
- Anti-Americanism is based on the mindset created by religious elites. It can be minimized by promoting liberal values, particularly in the media. Awareness is equally essential. Drone policy, though, kills terrorists, but they create Anti-American sentiments in Pakistani society.
- Pakistan should increase its economic strength. It should be independent in Energy, infrastructure, and agriculture sector to maximize its exports and reduce its dependence on the US for Aids and grants.
- Pakistan should prioritize its interests, not the US interests. To secure our national interests, its relations with the US must be conditional and need to know itself and change its vital profundity approach towards Afghanistan. It must quit meddling in Afghanistan by supporting the Taliban to upgrade its own particular key strategic objectives.
- The government of Pakistan should make keen efforts to bring reforms in the Madrassa curriculum, and modern education should also be introduced. These activities should be observed with proper checks and balances by the Government. Pakistan should heartlessly find the fanatics who execute the demonstrations of terrorism and radicalism in the nation. All Madrassas working in Pakistan must be enlisted. Their syllabus ought to be analyzed by the well-known and eminent researchers of the nation to acquire them the

standard to assume its part to bring the National and religious amicability and reconciliation in the country.

- Pakistan's internal weaknesses, including economic stagnation and political breakdowns, military takeover, social malaises, the culture of violence and extremism, rampant crime, and corruption, have been driving Pakistan to seek outside support and make difficult foreign policy choices. Pakistan should come out of its syndrome of external dependence through nurturing the culture of 'self-help' and crafting indigenous solutions to an internal mess because it has eroded the nation's self-esteem and vitality of the governing elite. Taking external financing as a substitute to underpin domestic budget deficits has retarded Pakistan's economic progress.
- Pakistan's relations with India may get normalized only when they would terminate wars in the shadows against each other and abandon the policy of abetting, aiding, and exporting terrorism in other states. Pakistan must require the Indians to end their covert support for elements of the TTP and the Baluchistan Liberation Army from Afghan territory by bringing proves of Indian liability in front of the international community.
- US pivot to Asia and its ties with India are manifestly aimed to contain china and see an upswing in the future. Still, the US should realize that weaker states' vital national interests must be considered and accommodated. Pakistan's unease regarding the US tilt toward India is deep-seated. Pakistan desires to have some fruit, like it has offered to India, other than symbolic benefits and photo shots, out of its role as a 'frontline state' in the American war.

- Pakistan's relations with China will remain high-security agenda because of the changing regional and geo-strategic environment and heavy dependence of Pakistan's defence sector on China for supply and procurement. But Pakistan would need to balance its relations with the US and China.
- The rapid economic growth of countries like China also meant that players in the arena of global influence now have a voice in determining international affairs. China's rise is often considered a symbol of significant threat and suspicion, challenging the traditional hegemony of the US. As a valuable player in world politics, China emphasizes soft power, and its commitment to domestic issues to fulfill the needs of its citizens is espoused as a higher virtue than its international political strategies. However, China's peaceful rise remains controversial because of its widespread perception that China is a threat to international order.

6.3. Research Gap and Future Area of Study

The Dissertation topic “US Foreign Policy towards South Asia: A Comparison of Bush and Obama Administrations” is extensive as South Asia's alliance formation is facing a change. India has come closer to the US, and Pakistan has shifted its focus towards other regional and global powers, e.g., China and Russia. This study is likely to broaden the spectrum of wide scope for anticipated studies on the role of changing alliance formation in ‘US Foreign Policy towards South Asia.’ The debate between the dominance of the United States as the single superpower and the rise of the multipolar international order has been going on quite frequently in the recent past. However, its effects on an important geostrategic region like South Asia and especially on Pakistan has not been discussed

threadbare. Having the entire study allows me to propose that future scholars also see the impact of US policies on Pakistan's socio-economic and cultural facets. It is time to invite the youth bulge of Pakistan to provide ample opportunities to Pakistan's young scholars to evaluate a cross-cultural study on the subject matter. It would further provide a brief, concise, and authenticate opinion based on the study in both countries for devising transactional and transformational policies by both countries to meet the local, regional and international parameters *inter alia* UN's SDGs.

After identifying the gap in the existing literature regarding the effects of change in global order on the strategically important region like South Asia, it is significant to discuss the theoretical framework and research methodology. The theoretical framework provides the lens to identify the issue in its real perspective. Various theoretical frameworks dealing with world orders are discussed. The most suitable one has been applied to analyze the global power and understand the distribution of capabilities and its implications. On the other hand, the most appropriate research methodology is to set the tone for concluding appropriate research

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