

COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY OF PAKISTAN

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
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
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Acronyms

ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, & U.S
AQ	Al-Qeada
ATA	Anti-Terrorism Act
ATC	Anti-Terrorism Court
BLA	Baloch Liberation Army
BLF	Baloch Liberation Front
BRA	Baloch Republican Army
CDP	Comprehensive Deterrence Plan
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CRP	Comprehensive Response Plan
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CTS	Counter-Terrorism Strategy
DCG	Defense Co-operation Group
DIS	Directorate of Internal Security
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HuJI	Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami
HuM	Harkatul Mujahideen
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IRI	Irish Republic of Ireland
JiM	Jaish-i-Mohammad
JuD	Jamaatud Dawa
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
MMA	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
NACTA	National Counter-Terrorism Authority
NADRA	National Database registration Authority
NAP	National Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations

NISA	National Internal Security Apparatus
NISP	National Internal Security Policy
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
OICC	Overseas Investors Chambers of Commerce and Industry
PAFO	Pakistan Armed Forces Ordinance
PPO	Pakistan Protection Ordinance
SC	Supreme Court
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organization
SSP	Sipa-i-Sahaba Pakistan
TIF	Tanzeem-ul-Islam-ul-Furqan
TNSM	Tehreek-e-Nifaz-i-Shariat Mohammadi
TPP	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
U.K	United Kingdom
U.S	United States
U.S.A	United States of America

UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade & Development
UNO	United Nations Organization
WHO	World Health Organization

Plagiarism Disclaimer

None of the material (except expressed) are of the thesis writer, material has been extracted from citations in foot notes and Bibliography.

Dedications

To my beloved Parents

Acknowledgement

In the Name of Allah, the most Beneficent, the most Merciful. Innumerable thanks to ALMIGHTY ALLAH, for giving me the courage to accomplish the assigned task. Also thankful to our Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW) for enabling us to recognize our Lord and Creator.

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Abstract

Since its independence, Pakistan faced numerous internal and external security challenges. In the entire history, Pakistan suffered the most terrible shock in 1971 when East Pakistan got independence from Pakistan. Later, Zia's islamization policy badly affected the security of Pakistan. Pakistan's contribution to U.S war on terror further aggravated the internal security of the country. Pakistan fully supported the U.S by providing air, naval, intelligence and logistical support, but its law and order situation, economic and social security were badly affected by the war on terror. Pakistan devised its Counter-terrorism strategy by adopting both military and non-military means. Military operations were designed to destroy the terrorists and their networks. Legislative means were used to deal with the threat of terrorism. The National Internal Security Policy and the twenty points of National Action Plan were designed to counter the threat of terrorism. The study mainly focuses on the Counter-Terrorism strategy of Pakistan which was adopted after the event of 9/11. It identifies military and non-military means to deal with the threat of terrorism. The study concludes that lack of implementation showed the counter-terrorism strategy as flawed and ineffective to root out terrorism.

COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY OF PAKISTAN

Chapter: 1

1.1 Introduction:

Since its formation Pakistan had faced many internal and external security threats. Some of the threats were linked with Pakistan's internal security because of historical boundary disputes, dispersion of religious groups across the border, weak economic system, and difficulty in nation building. These internal threats have led to interference of external powers into its internal affairs. (Isphani, 1990)

Because of its strategic location Pakistan had been engaged in partnership with the big powers especially with the U.S. Martin stated that Pakistan may be vital alliance partner in U.S. war on terror because of its longest border and easy access to Afghanistan. (Martin, 2002). Ayaz Mir claimed that "the road to the Taliban, in American eyes, goes through Pakistan." (Hussain, 2005). Pakistan's partnership with the U.S. had affected Pakistan's internal security. For example, its support to the U.S. against the former Soviet Union further added to its internal security problems. Similarly, Pakistan's commitment with the U.S. to support war on terror intensified the internal situation. (Malik, 2008).

Pakistan's internal security had been descended to a point that in his policy speech on 14th August 2012 General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani the Chief of Army Staff declared "internal threat" bigger than that of "external threat". (ISPR, 2012). Pakistan became a frontline state in the war on terror. (Corera, 2006). The September 11 attacks have changed the world politics and increased severe internal security concerns for Pakistan. (Junaid, 2005). Pakistan had faced

insecurity; political violence and instability by joining war on terror and paid huge loss in this war, in 2010 there were 1,986 terrorist incidents, (Ahmed, 2010). More than 24,000 people had been attacked together with civilians, law enforcing agency personnel and army between 2002-2013. These increased challenges put \$ 107 billion loss to its economy. It had horrific social impacts. Militant activities, crimes, sectarian violence and targeted killings had increased across Pakistan which had impacted psychological peril among the society. (Nadia, n.d). Still United States is pressurizing Pakistan to "Do More" and not satisfied with Pakistan. (Khan, 2013). Education in Pakistan is threatened by the terrorists who have conservative and ideological state of mind. In Swat the Talibans shoted Malala due to her efforts for education. In December 2014, an army public school in Peshawar was attacked and approximately 130 school children were killed by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. (Ijaz, 2015).

Although the United States conducted operation against the Taliban in Afghanistan in October 2001, it spread out into Pakistan's tribal region nearby Afghanistan. In the beginning they took refuge in South Waziristan later extended their foot in other regions of FATA. In 2003 Pakistani Taliban emerged in South Waziristan, they were having links with Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda and conducted guerrilla operations not just in opposition with the Western troops in Afghanistan, but also the security forces and citizens of Pakistan, not only in the tribal areas but also in other big cities. Previously, the tribal armed men protected the western border and Pakistan had never disposed its armed forces on it. Currently, it's not possible; Pakistan had not only set up its army on Pakistan and Afghan border but had also commenced military action against the terrorists in FATA and Swat. (Foley, 2009).

To deal with the law and order situation of the country Pakistan had devised its counter-terrorism strategy to curb the terrorists using both the military and non military means. Weighty

security operations come under the category of military option against the militants in the tribal regions. (Pakistan Defence, 12 August 2014). Recently Operation Zarb-e-Azb is going on in North Waziristan and the commander of this operation declared that the Pak-army had cleared 90 % of NWA which is a big accomplishment of the army but the difficulty of displacement of the IDP's still exists. (Ehsan, 23 November 2014). The low intensity operations include operations in the developed areas especially in the major cities of Pakistan to detain Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Non-military options included legal measures to confront terrorism. After the 9/11 incident, Pakistan had amended the previously existed Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997 along with the introduction of new legislation and amendments to make the ATA more strong. National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) bill was passed in March 2013 to effectively counter the threat of terrorism. (International Crisis Group, 2015).

NISP 2014-2018 was a development by the interior Ministry in early 2014, implemented by NACTA, addressed critical security issues to eradicate terrorism and extremism. (NACTA.gov.pk, 37-38). The framework of NISP was based on soft and hard intercession to deal with the whole range of issues based on the internal security situation of Pakistan. In response to terrorist attack on 16th December 2014 a new CTS the twenty point national action plan was designed by the government and the army to contradict the threat of terrorism which lifted ban on death penalty and granted special military courts to curb the terrorists without discrimination. But on many NAP targets there are little evidence of progress. (International Crisis Group, 2015).

Pakistan had signed a number of peace agreements as part of dialogue process with the militants, used legislative means, made parliamentary laws to counter the threat of terrorism, banned militant groups and launched numerous military operations in its tribal regions, but Pakistan's

CTS proved inefficient to dislodge the terrorist factions in the region. (Ahmad, 2014). Pakistan should promote its socio-economic condition, (Siddiq, 2010) focus on education and social reform so that the threat of terrorism could be minimized. Education would reduce the evils from Pakistan and people will be aware of nuisance of sectarianism and terrorism. (Malik, 2008).

1.2 Problem Statement:

The September 11 event had changed the dynamics of Pakistan's internal security. The U.S. provided economic and military assistance to Pakistan. On the other hand, it had to borne economic costs, social unrest, political instability, militancy, and terrorism, which had affected the overall internal security situation of the whole country. Pakistan had devised its CTS to effectively deal with the terrorists by applying military operations and adopting legislative means. But, this CTS may not confront the risk of terrorism and need major reforms that could improve the internal security dynamics.

1.3 Objective of the study:

The aim of the study is

- To examine Pakistan's counter terrorism strategies.
- To investigate the causes behind the failure of Pakistan's counter terrorism strategy.
- To give recommendations to policy makers to effectively deal with the terrorists.

1.4 Significance of the Study:

Internal security has a major role in any country's national security policy so it sticks with Pakistan as well. National security policy is designed to materialize the domestic threats. Pakistan had faced many internal security challenges i.e. sectarianism, ethnic violence, terrorism,

and militancy. But the most perilous threat Pakistan had suffered is from the terrorism. Pakistan paid heavy price because of its severe economic, social and human loss in joining the war on terror. Pakistan had developed its CTS to reduce the threat of terrorism. But it had some flaws and should be dealt with multiple approaches which could deter the terrorist threat and stabilize its internal security. This study will be helpful for the students of politics and international relations in their upcoming research programs; it will guide policy makers and analysts to improve their policy objectives to counter the threat of terrorism and growth of the nation.

1.5 Research Questions:

- i. What is Pakistan's counter terrorism strategy and its loopholes?
- ii. What measures can be taken to improve the counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan?
- iii. What are economic, social, and political challenges Pakistan had faced after 9/11?

1.6 Literature Review:

Umbreen Javaid (2013) in her book surveyed extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, the challenges and opportunities for Pakistan after 9/11, politics of religious extremism and the effects of War on Terror on Pakistan's internal security. The writer pointed out Zia's Islamization policy which led to extremism and sectarian violence by supporting U.S against USSR with the help of Saudi Arabia. The writer stated that Afghan jihad and the militarization of Islam damaged the civil society and Pakistan's institutions. Pakistan became forefront state after 9/11. The WOT brought many economic, social, and military problems for Pakistan. The writer declared religious militancy and terrorism as the most exigent threat to Pakistan's security. She proclaimed the TTP as the main terrorist group in Pakistan responsible for terrorist acts. Since the WOT, Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban entered into NWFP and FATA by joining hands with

local Taliban militia. The book fascinatingly discussed terrorism and extremism, and the challenges posed by the WOT.

Gunaratna and Khuram Iqbal (2010) in their book connoted that Pakistan had a major role in fighting against terrorism. When the U.S. coalition forces targeted the Afghan terrorist groups, they fled into Pakistan's FATA region, planned many attacks from there and supported revolts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia. The book inspected the militant groups operating in Pakistan. The writer evaluated the nature and structure of the terrorist groups and their linkage to other terrorist groups in Iran and India. He explained the difficulty to counter terrorism in the world. His work was based on extensive field work which resulted that Pakistan had faced many internal challenges and these could not be countered without persistent foreign assistance.

Emon Murphy (2013) in his book examined the basis of terrorism in Pakistan. He analyzed the socio-economic and political factors that contributed the rise of terrorism in the state. The writer viewed that ideology had played minute role in the formation of Pakistan. He erred that originally many Pakistanis were irreligious. He accurately deviated violence in the teachings of Islam because Pakistani Sufi Islam is peaceful. He viewed Wahabi Islam promoted by Saudi Arabia as most dangerous. He rejected the U.S. observation that Madrassahs were promoting extremism. He advocated that Afghan Jihad and Zia's Islamization policy increased terrorism and sectarian violence. He viewed the U.S. withdrawal policy from Afghanistan a blunder which had undermined U.S. ability to fight against the Taliban. He addressed three main factors which increased terrorism in Pakistan namely, Kashmir Struggle, Zia's Islamization policy, Soviet's and U.S.'s invasion of Afghanistan and weak governance. In his view these factors had no link with Islam. This is an interesting book on the history of Pakistan and the origin of terrorism in Pakistan.

Daniel S. Markey (2013) in his book featured Pak-U.S. relationship as conflicting; both the countries mistreated each other. The controversial relation was shown over the issue of U.S. assistance while Pakistan was supporting U.S. against Soviet Union. In 1980's when both the countries assisted Afghan Mujahedeen against Soviet, U.S. opposed Pakistan's nuclear program and their relations became adverse. U.S. didn't help Pakistan in its wars with India; instead U.S. put sanctions on its nuclear program. The writer stated that there was a little cause in Pakistan's complains that the U.S. had used Pakistan for its own purposes. The writer inspected that America was also used by Pakistan, frequently because of corrupt leaders and usually due to its conflicting relations with India. Shortly, America was also a volatile ally, deviating greatly over the years. In sum the book explored conflictual relationship between Pak-U.S after 9/11 and examined China's rise in shaping Pak-U.S. relations.

Hilary Synnott (2009) in his book portrayed the nature of Pakistan, the failure of consecutive government and the weak institutions to address the country's problems. After 9/11 U.S funded Pakistan for its support to U.S. war on terror. Synnott pointed out the internal challenges that Pakistan had faced after 9/11. Synnott illustrated the developments in Pakistan's tribal region and the hatred that Pakistanis had towards the U.S. In the last Synnott had given prospects and policies for the problems faced by Pakistan.

Nikolas J. Koppel in his book (2010) explained that the growing militancy and terrorist activities in Pakistan's western border posed threat to Pakistan's sovereignty, danger of attack to U.S. and barrier to U.S. for stabilizing Afghanistan. Pak-U.S. relations of cooperation and non-cooperation were discussed. Pakistan got the status of frontline state in U.S. counter-terrorism endeavors. Some U.S. officials of top rank admired Pakistan for its cooperation though suspicions exist to U.S. interest. (Koppel, 2010).

Safdar Hussain and Muhammad Ijaz Latif (2012) in their article pointed out Pak-Afghan relations and the issues which appeared after 9/11. The article inspected that the political and economic security of both the countries depended upon their mutual cooperation. But lack of trust and WOT had instill main anxiety among them. The Indian involvement in Afghanistan's domestic issues exaggerated its relations with Pakistan. Their relations have more deteriorated after the 9/11. Pakistan had always desired a secure and friendly relation with Afghanistan so that India could never get benefit from their violent relations. Durand line had remained the cause of hostility between them. In 1980's, when Mujahideen emerged to fight against the Soviet existence in Afghanistan that resulted civil war, caused devastation and in 1990's Taliban came out and took control of the country. In 2001 the U.S. overthrew the Taliban regime. The militant's aptitude to utilize Pakistan for their terrorist activities made the fighting mission harder. The writer suggested that both the countries should cooperate with each other to fight extremism and drug trafficking.

Ehsan Mehmood Khan (2011) in his article explored internal security threats to Pakistan, caused by the intolerance, extremism, militancy, and terrorism. Due to terrorism Pakistan had suffered economic, social and human cost. Pakistan is regarded as most dangerous place in the world by the international media. The writer addressed the challenges like corruption, crimes, sectarianism, and ethnicity. However, the writer declared the U.S. war against Afghanistan had increased the level of terrorism in Pakistan. There is a need of a comprehensive strategy which can stabilize the internal security situation.

Mukhtar Paras Shah (2011) in his article contoured that the war on terror had deteriorated the social structure of Pakistan; indicators of poverty had increased due to WOT. Economically, the country had loss of around \$ 60 billion that had poorly altered the macroeconomic condition of

the country. The country had faced buoyancy due to continuous suicide attacks which have damaged infrastructure and expenditure for law and order had affected the economy of the country. Health and education sector had also affected by the WOT. The society had faced with religious terrorism and frustration. The economists have not yet calculated the total loss that Pakistan had suffered due to its participation in the WOT. The civil government had to re-examine and recheck its strategic policies and needs.

Muhammad Waqas Chughtai (2013) viewed that Pakistan had a major role in fighting terrorism in FATA as the conflict worsened due to the 9/11 incident. Pakistan army with the assistance of KPK government and the people of FATA is trying to bring change in FATA. The militant activities and the military operations had affected the social and economic condition of FATA. The study explored that how terrorism had affected the socio-economic and political structure of FATA. It discusses the effects of both the military operations and militancy on FATA. The paper addressed policy implications for peace in the society. The writer had captivatingly written on the social political and economic conditions affected by the WOT, but he hadn't focus on historical events.

Rehana Saeed Hadhmi (2007) in her article outlines Pakistan's policies towards U.S. Musharraf supported the U.S. WOT by saving Pakistan's national interest, which was based on security, safety of its nuclear assets, resolution of Kashmir dispute and the long term economic development. The study examines Pak-U.S. relationship which was based on mistrust. The September, 11 gave a new stride in U.S- Pak relations. U.S provided assistance to Pakistan, sanctions were lifted and additional loans were announced but, Pakistan's social, economic and political problems were not improved. In the end the writer had given some policy options for the development of Pakistan's economy.

Fazal Rabbi (2012) viewed that Pakistan had faced long and short term repercussions by joining war against terror. The writer discussed political, economic and social repercussions. By supporting the U.S., Pakistan received economic and military assistance, Non-NATO status, restored its Commonwealth membership, and ended its isolation. On the contrary, Pakistan faced heavy cost in socio-economic sector. Pakistan had suffered unfathomable cost in the WOT. It found foreign policy problems, revised its Afghan policy, faced complexity in supporting the freedom struggle of Kashmir. The institutions inside the country faced instability because of counter-terrorism against the terrorists. Thus, Pakistan is an economic and strategic loser in the world that is evolving since 9/11. The writer recommended that Pakistan should realize its security challenges and not allow any other state to gain tactical benefit of the current situation.

Naeem Ahmed (2014) in his article denoted that after the 9/11 incident, Pakistan had faced terrorism and sectarian violence by the terrorist and extremist factions and outlines militant groups and sectarian factions functioning in Pakistan. Pakistan's internal security had been collapsed by the WOT, and its counter-terrorism strategy (CTS) had shown unproductive to destroy the terrorist organizations, even though it had espoused both military and non-military means. The inefficient counter-terrorism strategy had affected domestic regional and international security and needed shift in Pakistan's national security policy from military determined Indian centric to civilian run paradigm. The writer suggested that an effective counter-terrorism strategy is needed for the security of Pakistan.

Ayesha Siddiqa (2010) in her article surveyed Pakistan's Counter terrorism policy as vague and had defects in it, as Pakistan had to fight with the terrorists, continue its support to U.S., and to deter India's presence in Afghanistan. It was made and operated by the military. The writer stated that the use of military option was simple than to change the socio-economic condition

that propel militancy that is difficult. The writer stated that the drone attacks have increased militancy. He suggested that Pakistan should promote its socio-economic conditions and develop its religious account. The writer pointed out flaws in Pakistan's counter terrorism strategy but, she had not mentioned various other means to counter terrorism which I will discuss in my work.

The International Crisis Group (2015) discussed Pakistan's new counter-terrorism strategy after the December 2014 attack on Army school in Peshawar to target the terrorist groups. The militarization of the strategy had undermined the civilian rule and political leaders are also responsible for this. It discussed counter-terrorism strategy and gave recommendations to provincial and federal government to counter-terrorism. The national action plan lifted the previous government's ban on death penalty and granted special military courts and through provincial apex committees military had a direct role in governance. It suggests a strengthened police force and a renewed justice system to counter terrorism.

In his article Naeem Ahmed had pointed out Anti-terrorism legislation after 9/11. He assessed the legislation as unproductive to deal with terrorism. He stated that anti-terrorism is not a new phenomena. Several legal frameworks were designed to since independence to deal with criminal procedures. After the sectarian violence in 1990s the government proclaimed Anti-terrorism Act for speedy trial of the terrorists. After 9/11 the threat was changed, several amendments were introduced in the ATA and new legislations were also made. The writer had identified many flaws in the existing anti-terrorism laws and focus on effectual performance.

1.7 Theoretical Framework:

Before the end of the Cold War, the concept of security was traditionally focused. After the end of the Cold War, the concept of security changed and new approaches to analyze international

politics were grown. (Katzenstein, 1996). The dynamic character of security was examined in five sectors: military, political, economic, environmental and societal. It rejected the traditional concept of security for limiting security to one sector. It argued that security is applicable to a wide range of issues. (Buzan, Waever, Wilde, 1998). The conception of economic and environmental security was build up by the military and political security from traditional approach. Military and political security focused on state. State is a vital player and referent object by securitizing. The concept of economic security had focused on military and political dominance among East and West after the cold war. (Smith, 2005). Societal security had focused on maintaining the evolution of traditional patterns of language, religion, culture, customs and national identity within acceptable conditions. (Buzan, Waever, Wilde, 1998). Environmental security involved issues such as climate, nature, resources, and biodiversity.

Buzan defined four categories of security study such as traditionalists, wideners, critical, and Copenhagen school. (1997).

The Traditionalist school took security as a narrow agenda based on military and political, like in the cold war. According to Wideners the concept of security should be broadened and issues like pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recessions could all be viewed as threats to security". (1991:213). According to Critical school, security can play an important role to better the human circumstance than earlier, hence the broadness in security issue is important. (Stamnes, 2004). This approach rather than to broaden them deepens the security concept. (Smith, 2005). Critical security labeled the nonconventional weapons and terrorism as security threat, and states tyranny, huge inequality of wealth, capitalism, as threats to people's security.

Theory of “Securitization” was amongst the most dominant and most renowned of the new approaches which date back to late 1980’s formulated by Ole Waever a researcher of the Copenhagen School (Rita & Stuart, 2011) and worked out more thoroughly in Buzan 1988. The Securitization theory is now called the “Copenhagen School.” (Waever, 1995 & Buzan, 1998). The traditional concept of security was broadened and deepened by the Copenhagen School and new concepts i.e. individual, economic, social, and environmental security were identified. The theory focused on individuals, state actors, and group of individuals as human security threat in the securitization. (Buzan, 1998:24).

Securitization theory’s main argument was that securitization is a speech act. ‘It was by labeling something a security issue that it became one’. It argued that a particular referent object is threatened in its existence and to ensure its survival a securitizing actor claimed extraordinary measures. The problem is then shifted into emergency politics from normal politics and dealt swiftly. (Taureck, 2006).

A successful securitization is based on three levels: “1. Identification of existential threat: 2. Emergency action and 3. Effects on inter –unit relations by breaking free of rules” (Buzan, 1998:6). Buzan stated that “if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant” (1998: 24).

After the 9/11 incident Pakistan had faced political, economic and human challenges which is the focus of the Securitization theory. These new security threats demand a modified concept of security rather than traditional notion of security. The concept of national security had shifted into internal security. Moreover, the Copenhagen School had emphasized “whether the key decision makers, e.g. politicians or the media, succeed in convincing a specific target group

through a discursive ‘speech act’, i.e. speeches, declarations, articles, and concrete political measures” (Acharya, 2006: 247), “that a certain danger posed an existential threat to a specific referent object” (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998; Emmers, 2007). The Pakistan army had taken terrorism as a biggest threat to its internal security through statements and Pakistan had devised counter terrorism strategy by applying military and non-military means for the stability of the state. This strategy needed to be reformed to better improve the internal security situation of the country.

1.8 Research Methodology

The present study is qualitative in nature. Qualitative research is based on exploratory research, concerned about developing explanation of social phenomena which is the focus of the present study. The research is based on content analysis that is a method for summarizing any form of content by counting various aspects of the content. In the end the research would be summarized by analyzing different contents, primary and secondary sources will be used for this purpose. The primary sources will include government websites, press releases, official statements and interviews of policy makers given in public. Secondary sources will contain books and articles from local and international journals. Libraries of International Islamic University Islamabad Quaid-e-Azam University, Fatima Jinnah Women University and National Defense University will be viewed.

1.9 Organization of the Thesis

Chapter one will be about the whole discussion of the thesis. It will describe the historical background of Pakistan’s internal security issues before 9/11.

Chapter two will outline Pakistan's role in war on terror after 9/11 by emphasizing how Pakistan supported U.S. to fight against terrorism.

Chapter three will describe the challenges Pakistan had faced by joining the war on terror. How war and terror affected the law and order situation, economic and social stability of the country.

Chapter four will outline Pakistan's counter-terrorism strategy and its loopholes, will discuss Military operations and legislative measures to counter the menace of terrorism. The last chapter would include conclusion and recommendations to improve the counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan.

Chapter: 2

Historical Background

After the independence Pakistan had to face several new challenges. As a new born state numerous internal and external challenges were attached to Pakistan together with foreign policy regarding major powers. (Pakistan defense, February 2013). Due to partition process it faced grave management and administrative troubles, i.e. the division of military and civil assets of the British Indian government between Pakistan and India, the population movement to and from Pakistan, language issue, communal riots and anxious relations with India, together with the first Kashmir war of 1947-48. At the time when Pakistan lacked experienced military officers and civil servants it had to establish provincial government in Dhaka and a federal government in Karachi. (Rizvi, Democracy-asia.org).

Sectarian violence and communal rights exploded in Pakistan and India. The newly independent Muslims in Pakistan which were ignited by religious and nationalist passion assailed the people in minority. The first census in Pakistan in 1951 concluded that some 14 million people shifted across the border, 8 million Muslims came to Pakistan from India and 6 million Hindus left Pakistan for India. About estimation 1 million people were killed. (Menu and Bhadin, 1998: 70). The property and infrastructure was destroyed by sectarian strife and riots. Pakistan had to feed a vast sea of refugees. As the civil service was dominated by the Hindus, Pakistan had no real administration. Furthermore, most of the assets were turned to India by the Britishers.

The issue of state language created a rift between East and West Pakistan. Many in East Pakistan wanted Bengali as the State language of East Pakistan while, the West Pakistanis who were powerful politically planned to make Urdu alone as the state language. The issue reached on its height in the months after independence. When Muhammad Ali Jinnah visited East Pakistan in

March, in his speech on 21 March he asserted that Urdu alone would be the state language of Pakistan, further provoked the people.

As a new born state Pakistan was economically weak and had little industry. Cash assets which belonged to the subcontinent were to be divided. But the division of assets supported India. Furthermore, the payments and hold up of Pakistan's share were controlled by India, concerning that the money would be used in backing the Kashmir cause.

Water supply was another major challenge which was disturbed by East Punjab in India. The upper basin of the Indus River in Kashmir had been in Muslims control, but after partition the British granted the area to India. As an upshot of partition, negotiators from both the nations were unable to decide their share in Indus Water. On 1st April 1948, in a unilateral action the East Punjab government cut off the surge of water to each canal whose source was in its command. The risk of the dispute grew, escalating into a major conflict, as situation toughened. India sustained to block access to the water until Pakistan signed an agreement on the distribution of water.

The future of the Princely States which were independent historically had yet to be determined. At the time of independence some 560 of these semiautonomous principalities were presented, some in India and some in Pakistan and they had to decide for themselves to join either Pakistan or India. But four had yet to make their choice, at the time of independence, Junagadh and Jodhpur in northwest India, Kashmir in the north, and Hyderabad in the southeast. Kashmir had Muslim majority and Hindu ruler while, the first three had Hindu majority and Muslim ruler. Under Mountbatten's pressure and the deployment of troops by India in Junagadh, Jodhpur and Hyderabad India forcefully took control of these zones. (Wynbrandt, 2009)

Kashmir was the most contested and the last of the proffered Princely States. Maharaja Hari Singh ruled over Kashmir, a Muslim majority of some 78%. Mountbatten urges him to join one of the new states in mid August 1947 while, Maharaja supported to maintain independence. Indian leaders viewed that some Pushtun Afridi tribesmen attacked Kashmir in October 1947. These tribesmen came to assist their Kashmiri brothers who were worried that their ruler would hand over Kashmir to India. With the help of the tribesmen, Kashmiri forces declared a libration war in opposition to Maharaja and move forward to Srinagar. Hari Singh run away Delhi and openly requested the Indian government for military assistance. Mountbatten and the Governor General of India agreed to Hari Singh's appeal with the provision that to decide their future Kashmiri people would be offered a referendum. Indian PM Nehru flew troops to the state. (Johnson, 2005).

When high level talks to resolve the Kashmir crisis failed between Pakistan and India during the final months of 1947, Indian troops got their own grip over Srinagar and broken the support of the tribal charge. Simultaneously, Gilgit region threw Dogra rule and declared for Pakistan on 3rd November 1947. During the 1948 fighting in Kashmir happened between the Indian army and the forces of the Government of Azad Kashmir which officially declared its independence from Maharaja's government on October 24, 1947 just before the Indian airlift in Srinagar which resulted in a short armed conflict between India and Pakistan in 1948. (Lamb, 2002).

Kashmir is the longest unresolved dispute in the world. Many Kashmiris have been fighting for their self determination right, acknowledged by the United Nations for many decades. The region had been witnessed lots of violence that had stressed the relations between Pakistan and India. Several talks have been made on Kashmir involving the governments of Pakistan and India but there is no significant optimistic outcome to resolve the dispute. (Sehgal, 2011).

The leaders and political parties of Pakistan faced difficulty to seek a coherent approach to deal with the issues of the early years. Pakistan adopted the Government of India Act, 1935 with some reforms as a provisional constitution. (Rizvi, Democracy-asia.org). Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the first Governor General of Pakistan. (Barech, 2014).

Quaid-e-Azam and Muslim League assigned Liaquat Ali Khan as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. In the early years Liaquat Ali Khan had to face many difficulties. Under his leadership Pakistan took its first pace in constitution building and foreign policy. Liaquat Ali Khan, in May 1950's visited the United States, invited by the then President Truman. This posture asserted Pakistan's alignment with the United States. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950). The prime motive of Pakistan in aligning with the U.S. was to protect economic and military assistance to deter the threat of India. (Hadani, 1960). Military assistance and economic support were vital necessity for Pakistan in the consequences of the 1948 War with India over Kashmir. The expansion of close relations with the United States in that situation was out looked as equally advantageous and natural. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950).

In 1950's Pakistan was the most allied ally for U.S. against the Soviet expansionism. (Robert, 2003). Hence a Mutual Defense Agreement was signed in February 1954 to assist Pakistan by giving equipment, materials, and transfer of technical information for defense purposes. Pakistan gained \$ 1.5 billion as a military assistance and economic assistance in reward of the treaty. Moreover, to more strengthen Pakistan and U.S relations, Pakistan joined SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization) in September 1954 and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) in 1958. (Aziz, 2011). From 1947 to 30 June 1965 the grants in other type of agriculture products, technical assistance, and economic development was about \$ 3 billion. (The

Washington post, 12th August, 1965). Although during the Cold War both the state's strategic interests were dissimilar. For U.S it was containment of Communism and for Pakistan it was India. (Aziz, 2011).

However, Pakistan also endured by joining U.S. supported alliances. The Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India decided in a joint communiqué to settle an impartial plebiscite about Kashmir issue in August 1953 and the administrator of the plebiscite ought to be assigned by the end of April, 1954. Even as Nehru got to know that preliminary negotiations were engaged between Pakistan and U.S., concerning an alliance in December 1953, Nehru warned Pakistan that the joint communiqué would not be accomplished if Pakistan receives any military aid from alliances. In May 1995 Pakistani and Indian Prime Ministers met again but Pakistan was not succeeded to convince India on plebiscite.

In the same way, Soviet Union had a neutral position on Kashmir dispute. Soviet alleged Pakistan for emerging as a part of an aggressive Western alliance in 1995 and supported India on Kashmir issue and rejected every UNO resolution on Kashmir against India. The Arab world also not supported Pakistan on Kashmir issue because of Pakistan's moving connection with Western powers. (The New York Times, 1953).

The death of the father of the nation in September 1948 impelled such political trends that destabilized the feeble political institutions and political development got fragmented. (Rizvi, Democracy-asia.org). The constituent Assembly of Pakistan was formed to write down the constitution of Pakistan and served as its first parliament. Until his death Quaid-e-Azam was the first elected President of the Assembly. (Barech, 2014). To frame its own constitution it took 8 ½ years which did not seek the unqualified support of all the leaders, major parties and regions.

(Rizvi, Democracy-asia.org). The first constituent assembly could not produce a constitution for Pakistan. (Barech, 2014). A strong tradition of violation of parliamentary norms was begun by the time the constitution was introduced on 23 March 1956. The political parties were divided and the assembly was not able to assert its dominance and the effective power was shifted to the Governor General/President. (Rizvi, Democracy-asia.org). In 1959, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaqat Ali Khan was murdered in a public meeting in Rawalpindi and Khawaja Nizamuddin as a Prime Minister tried to frame a constitution for the country but he was terminated by the then Governor General Ghulam Muhammad and Muhammad Ali Bogra was appointed as Prime Minister. Bogra was the ambassador of Pakistan in USA, he offered a constitutional formula but the first constitutional assembly was dissolved. On 28th May 1955 the Constitutional Assembly was reformed and lasted till 23rd March 1956 when the new constitution took place and Pakistan was developed into a Republic. (Barech, 2014). Iskandar Mirza the last Governor General became first President. (Vivapakistan.wordpress, n.d). But Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra resigned. President Iskandar Mirza resigned on 27 October, 1958 the Martial Law administrator Muhammad Ayub Khan took control of the country and Ayub Khan was elected as President. To justify his government he proclaimed reforms that comprise of economic and social reforms, Land reforms, Elective bodies disqualification ordinance, Public offices disqualification ordinance. (Barech, 2014).

In Ayub's rule Pakistan's relations with the United States developed strong (vivapakistan.wordpress.com, n.d) which showed that Ayub Khan was pro-west. Pakistan faced two major problems at that time: the unsettled Kashmir issue and threat from India. On the other hand, the U.S intended to assist Pakistan and to sustain her independence by communism. (Mahmood, 1991).

In 1959, Ayub Khan signed the Executive Agreement of Co-operation with the U.S. In this agreement the United States vowed to preserve the territorial integrity and independence of Pakistan to consider its national interest imperative to the world peace, if it would face aggression. In exchange for the treaty the U.S was granted ten years free access to the Peshawar Air Base. From this air base the U-2 inspection plane of U.S took off to the USSR and consequently shot down over Soviet land. (Feldman, 1972). On this incident the international reaction was adverse. The Soviet leader Khrushchev threatened Pakistan with stern action if the U.S military operations were not stopped from Peshawar. (Khan, 2013). India opted aggressive position to the Pak-U.S pact and considered this a threat. So, the U.S government came close to the Indian authority to clear their viewpoint that the pact would not be used against India. (Mehmood, 1991).

The situation altered in 1962 during India and China war. The U.S. supported India by supplying heavy military aid and that support carried military insecurity in South Asia. Moreover, in 1965 and 1971 wars U.S. granted no military support to Pakistan as a member of SEATO and CENTO. Pakistan quit from SEATO in 1972 and CENTO in 1979 and joined Non-Aligned movement. (Aziz, 2011). The relationships became tense between Pak-U.S when U.S. embassy and a number of information hubs were destroyed in bomb blasts, and because of the development of Nuclear program Carter government imposed sanctions on Pakistan in 1979. (Kheli, 1997). Ultimately, the U.S dumped Pakistan with its sacrifices and re-oriented its strategic interests in the region. (Sattat, 2007).

Ayub's power declined. Subsequent economic and political grievances started demonstration which impelled his resignation in March 1969. General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan became President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. (Barech, 2014). He rejected the 1962

constitution of Ayub Khan and Martial law was imposed in the country. It was another difficult time in the politics of Pakistan. The military government was not able to meet the requirements from East Pakistan for political participation and socio-economic justice. The military involved in war with India in 1971. (Rizvi, Democracy-asia.org). In its entire history Pakistan suffered the most terrible shock in 1971. (Iqbal, 2008). On 16th December 1971, Pakistan army surrendered before the Indian army due to poor management of military rule of West Pakistan. East Pakistan got independence on the same day from West Pakistan and developed into Bangladesh. (Khan, 2012). This major military and political defeat forced General Yahya Khan to relinquish and give away power on 20th December 1971 to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a civilian leader. During his rule civilian was dominated over military because of the serious damage to the military's standing after the 1971 military debacle. In the beginning, several senior officers were retired and the military's command structure was altered by Bhutto.

Under his rule, Bhutto introduced socialist reforms. He adopted the process of Nationalization in early 1970 to reform the economic system of Pakistan. The main reforms were land reforms, labour and education reforms, financial corporations, and banking system. By adopting reforms, Bhutto made efforts to limit feudalism and inequality. (Historypak.com, n.d.). But the nationalization process was not proved successful; the economy and private investor confidence was disrupted. The industrial development, export expansion, and the quality of education had been negatively impacted by socialism. (Ishrathusain.iba.edu.pk).

In 1974, India conducted nuclear test, and in consequence, Bhutto also promised to develop a nuclear program "even if we have to eat grass and leaves." (Viva Pakistan's blog, n.d). Pak-U.S. relations became down because of nuclear program. (Olevel-answers-cie.blogspot.com, 2012). To deal with domestic opposition, Bhutto adopted authoritarian means. The opposition launched

agitation against Bhutto on the reason that the 1977 general elections had been rigged by the government, the Chief of the Army Staff; General Zia-ul-Haq displaced Bhutto and assumed power on July 5, 1977. By guarantying the conservative and orthodox Islamic groups, Zia hunted political support for his ruling. He supported Afghan-Islamic resistance to prevent Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan; his partnership with the U.S helped his rule. (Rizvi, Democracy-asia.org).

The December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed a security challenge for Pakistan. The Afghan crisis spectacularly altered the U.S policy towards Pakistan and Pakistan came out as a major player in the game and a 'front-line' through which Afghan mujahidin were provided assistance. (Hilali, Khyber.org, n.d.).

The Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan granted a new chance to Pak-U.S to bring the two countries once more together on the excuse of containing communism. Nonetheless, while the Soviet's departure from Afghanistan, collapse of USSR and the end of Cold War, their relations once again were outbreak by disparity. (Burke, 1994). Congress authorized \$ 3 billion assistance to Pakistan in 1981 for five years together with 40 F-16 aircrafts and promised to grant \$ 4 billion more aid in next five years on the other hand Pakistan would supply assistance to Mujahedeen combating in opposition to Soviet Union. Pakistan was freed from Symington and Glen Amendments. (Azmi, 1994). As a result, Pakistan provided transit route to the Afghan resistance for arms supply and hosted above 3.5 million Afghan refugees, lots of whom have to return home. (Baloch, Qurtuba.edu.pk).

Taliban emerged in Afghanistan in opposition to the Soviet Union under the guidance of Mullah Omer to enforce sharia law, restore peace, disarm the population, and protect Islam in Afghanistan. (Ahmed, 2002 & Sail, 2009). Osama bin Laden also shifted his headquarter in

Kandahar along with the foreign militants from Pakistan, where the Taliban initiated their movement. Harkatul Mujahideen (HuM), Harkatul Jihad-e-Islammi (HuJI) and the mujahidin of Jalaluddin Haqqani also joined in the region of Kandahar. Mullah Omer allotted the Pakistani groups to recruit students from seminaries in Pakistan, whereas the responsibility of new recruits from Pakistan on a short term basis was taken on by the Haqqani network, and huge funds were donated by Osama bin Laden for this purpose. (Rana & Gunaratna, 2007).

ISI of Pakistan and CIA of U.S. offered military training to the religious extremists of the Taliban and United States also granted military equipment for their training. (Ahmed, 2002). A combined effort was made by the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Britain, Egypt, China, and Pakistan to guide and support the mujahidin. The government of Saudi Arabia decided to share the charge of this operation with the United States in 1980. (Ostermann, 2003). To oust the Soviet army from Afghanistan, Pakistan and U.S cooperated and ultimately the Soviet empire was dismantled. (Baloch, Qurtuba.edu.pk). Finally, the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996. The emergence of the Afghan Taliban had a surging outcome in the tribal areas of Pakistan where several Taliban groups emerged to follow the same plan. Militant groups from central Asia, Arab and Pakistan who had scuffled the anti-Soviet jihad turned more active and established in Pakistan and Afghanistan border regions throughout this period. (Stephen, 2003: 93). In August 1988 Al-Qaeda was formed by Osama bin Laden. (The guardian.com, 2008). And Al-Qaeda trained approximately 30,000 militants in Afghanistan around the world between 1996 and 2001. (Rashid, 2008).

With Soviet's withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 United States' interest was also absent in Pakistan. Because of Pakistan having nuclear explosive devices economic and military aid was ended by Pressler amendment on 1st October 1990. All economic and military assistance was

ceased by the U.S. as a result of the imposition of Glen and Symington amendments on Pakistan on May 1998. Glen amendment appoints sanctions on non-nuclear states that indicate nuclear detonations. Symington amendment bans every type of support that could convey or obtain nuclear weapons. United States' pressure on Pakistan was to sign CTBT. The military coup in Pakistan on 12th October 1999 asked sanctions by the U.S on Pakistan. United States forbade every kind of military and economic assistance to Pakistan under the Section 508 of Foreign Assistance Act. (Ahmed, 2001). That had worsened the institutional structure of Pakistan, massive arrears collected and the number of radicals and Islamists was increased. (Hussain, 2005). Following Soviet Union depart from Afghanistan, Taliban acknowledged its government and Pakistan also approved the Taliban government. (Christine, 2004).

To solve the Afghan problem negotiations started in June 1982 that endured till 1988. Pakistan and Afghanistan signed Geneva accord on 15th April 1988, whereas the Soviet and the United States signed the similar as international guarantors. In line with Geneva accord Soviet forces left Afghanistan on February 15th 1989. (Arif, 1995).

The democratic process in Pakistan was damaged by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Public attention was focused on defense and solidarity of the country; on which pretext the military government build its brawny grip in Pakistan's politics. Pakistan received and accommodated a huge influx of Afghan refugees that resulted in economic, social and security problems. The business of Narcotics was expanded in the county and Pakistan became the biggest exporter of heroine to America. The Kalashnikov culture was propelled in this period. Because of U.S assistance to Pakistan the relations between Pakistan and Soviet further soared. (Talbot, 2012).

After the Soviet withdrawal a very large number of Pakistani mujahidin who had contributed in this jihad came back to Pakistan. (Javaid, 2013). Religious organizations were increased with sectarian and jihadist agendas in 1980s, primarily due to the state support of the Afghan jihad. HuJI and HuM the Pakistani jihad leaders set up good relations with their Afghan and overseas counterparts in Afghanistan. They fought together in Afghanistan and shared their training camps. The tribal areas and Peshawar was a hub of Afghan, Arab and local militants and their foot camps. (Grare, 2006). Some of these groups were pampered in the Kashmir struggle. Several religious groups were engaged in drug trafficking business in Pakistan to finance the militancy since the Afghan jihad. The civil society and state institutions of Pakistan confronted permanent damage by the Jihad and consequent militarization of Islam. Pakistan's good will among the society of nations was poorly influenced and the Islamic concept of jihad was demoralized. (Arif, 1995).

Pakistan is still facing the significant repercussions of Afghan Jihad and Zia's Afghan policy. (Talbot, 2012). Religious extremism had originated the present security threats to the very existence of Pakistan, which had stained the very image of the nation and placed the security of the country at stake. In the past the militant activities were limited to the tribal areas which have now arrived at districts, cities and towns and as a result the powerless sections of society are yet supporting them. (Javaid, 2013).

Chapter: 3

Pakistan's support to U.S on War on Terror

3.1: Background

When the event of 9/11 occurred, Pakistan was under sanctions and the United States was more close to India. Pakistan was in worst economic disaster at that time. Pakistan was extremely vulnerable at that occasion according to World Bank. Poor economic and literacy rate and increased debt caused extremism in Pakistan. (Philip, 2005).

The United States blamed Taliban for September 11, 2001 attacks. Taliban refused the U.S demands to hand over Osama Bin Ladin. Bin Ladin was a worst antagonist of U.S after Soviet withdrawal, he joined Taliban network in 1996. He started Jihad against Saudi Arabia and U.S followers and had close relations with Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban's refusal to hand over Bin Ladin resulted in U.S attack on Afghanistan. The United States passed UN resolution for use of force in opposition to Afghanistan within twenty four hours. (Akhtar, 2012). NATO invoked article 5 (an attack against one ally is regarded as an attack against all allies) for the first time in its history. (NATO Int, 2015). Pakistan's geographical location was much appropriate for U.S and United States was greatly needed the support of Pakistan than any other neighboring country, as Afghanistan was a landlocked country and U.S needed logistics, airspace and bases support for adjacent countries. The U.S demanded support for airspace, logistics and intelligence, after a number of talks between the two government officials and Head of the States, Pakistan provided all these supports. Pakistan faced domestic tension in opposition to joining the alliance. Pakistan's support was confirmed by the coercive diplomacy of USA.

The United States provided economic assistance to Pakistan and sanctions were put aside. Pakistan was fully involved in this war at that time. The aid provided by the U.S affected thousands of civilians, deteriorated several institutions, and threatened Pakistan's sovereignty. (Akhtar, 2012).

3.2: September 11 Attacks & U.S Response

9/11 was the most terrible incident in the U.S history. That event was contrasted with the Pearl Harbour incident which hit massive amount of people. Due to the outrageous September 11 incidents there were 3000 human loss and hundred billion dollars economic loss. That poignant news advanced very quickly into the whole world and particularly in the U.S. The U.S longed for vengeance of that unpleasant incident. (Sattar, 2009). Instantly following the 9/11 episode, the American policy makers and the media pointed fingers at Al-Qaeda. Without any investigation, they believed with confidence that only Al-Qaeda could be the aggressor. Hence the U.S yearned to punish Al-Qaeda and its affiliates for the assault over its citizens. It was confidently stated that since Al-Qaeda was engaged in bombings of American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and before September 11 it was also involved in small attack on world trade centre. (Hadnat, 2008).

President Bush on 15th September 2001 expressed that,

I am going to describe to our leadership what I saw; the wreckage of New York City... we will trace those who did it; we will smoke them out of their holes; we will not only deal with those who dare to attack America, we will deal those who harbour, feed and house them. (Hadnat, 2008: 261).

After the 9/11 incident U.S. entered into armed conflict and decided to secure itself militarily. (Heritage.org, n.d.). The U.S and its coalition forces expelled the Taliban from power by invading Afghanistan. To save U.S from another 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom was launched by America and its partners. In OEF Pakistan cooperated and supported the U.S. and the coalition forces. (Khan, 2013).

The United States launched military strikes on 7 October 2001 against the Taliban. (Encyclopedia.com, 2004). The aim to invade Afghanistan was to displace the Taliban and to destroy Al-Qaeda's functioning. The United States got success in eliminating the Taliban however; they resurfaced like a main force especially in the Pashtun regions of Pakistan. A huge number of troops were installed by Pakistan with the Afghan border to support the OEF. To shore up the coalition Pakistan also employed a large part of its logistical reserves. (IPRI, 2006).

On the contrary, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda affiliates directed to regroup in the tribal areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan detained and killed several top Taliban and AL-Qaeda leaders in this war. The economy of Pakistan was affected by the terrorist activities and Foreign Direct Investment fell. (IPRI, 2010).

3.3: The United Nations and World Community Reaction

The UN played a critical role in opposition to terrorism internationally. (Anti-Defamation League, October, 2004). The distressing event of 9/11 shocked all the members of the United Nations which killed many people. They shore up American actions against the terrorist and denounced the terrorist acts. (Rizvi, 2005).

The UN Security Council as a major international forum on security and peace had passed a number of resolutions on counter-terrorism after 9/11.

The UN resolution 1368 was passed on 12th September 2001 which announced to fight all forms of terrorism, in agreement with its responsibilities under UN Charter. Resolution 1373 was passed on 28th September 2001 which declared the acts, methods, practices and financing of terrorist acts intentionally as opposed to the principles of the UN. The member states were called to prevent and restrain terrorist financing, criminalize terrorist financing, freeze their assets, prevent terrorist's movements, support the international community and other governments against terrorism and be a part of all protocols and conventions related to terrorism. (Anti-Defamation League, October, 2004).

On September 28, 2001 the third resolution as 1377 came, for cooperation at international level, peace and security and to combat the threats posed by terrorist activities. Besides these various resolutions have been passed by the UN on peace and security and issues related to terrorism. (United Nations Organization, n.d.).

The General Assembly adopted many conventions to restrain terrorism financing, access to nuclear material and bombings. Member states worked to reinforce coordination to counter terrorism on practical actions led to the adoption of Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in September 2006 for the first time. (UN, Organization, n.d.). All member states of the UN with a common strategic and operational framework have agreed to fight terrorism. This strategy promoted a summit in September 2005 to denounce terrorism in all its manifestation and forms. (United Nations Organization, n.d.).

NATO invoked article 5 for the first time in its history which avowed that an attack against one ally is viewed an attack against all allies. Article 4 of the ANZUS Treaty (Collective Security

Agreement between Australia, New Zealand and U.S) was also invoked by Australia to prop up the danger. (Hadnat, 2008).

Australia, Germany, France, U.K, and Japan decided to support United States to punish Al-Qaeda. The region of South Asia was also with the U.S; India was determined to provide all types of assistance to the coalition forces. Afghanistan, the hideout of the masterminds of the September 11 attacks was not with the U.S. (Hadnat, 2008).

Australia provided its military assistance to the coalition forces under the treaty of ANZUS which included its regular army troops in Afghanistan, aircraft and amphibious troopship to the coalition forces. (Return Services League, n.d.).

Germany provided its military assistance, naval, air and humanitarian assistance in the global war on terrorism and took steps at national level to counter the threat of terrorism. France provided its air, naval, harbor access, over flight rights, shared intelligence and humanitarian assistance. The United Kingdom provided the largest task force and sent military personnel. Japan also provided its military personnel, supply ships and transport aircraft. India provided 1 frigate, shipyards and ports, aerial refueling assistance if necessary, allowed equipments and troops on contemporary basis. (Heritage Organization, 24 October, 2002). Thus Australia, Germany, France, U.K, Japan and India collaborated in the Global war on terror by providing military, naval, intelligence and humanitarian support.

3.4: War on terror and Pakistan's engagement: Choices & Limitations

Pakistan faced the worst dilemma on the historic incident of September 11, 2001. It did not know where to go and where not, and had limited and bleak options. The world had transformed its

global relations at once. Terrorism became a primary challenge to the world that exceeded all other concerns with problems of security, peace and development. (Ahmed, 2013).

U.S, the sole super power of the world was engulfed by fury and took no time to determine the scale and nature of its response. The U.S president Bush intimidated strong action against the terrorists and promised to do “whatever it takes” to punish the terrorists. He notified other states that there can be “no neutral ground in the fight between civilization and terror.” Severe penalizing measures would be taken in opposition to those who “harboured” terrorists. (CNN.com, 11 September 2001.) Pakistan was bound to face painful choices due to the only supporter of the Taliban and its geographic position. (Sattar, 2007).

Following were the seven famous demands by the U.S.

- Block Al-Qaeda functioning coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, cut off arms shipments throughout Pakistan, and stop Osama Bin Laden’s logistical support.
- Give landing rights to U.S. aircrafts and complete over flight right.
- Provide access to naval and air bases of Pakistan and to the bordering areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- Grant all immigration and intelligence information.
- Restrain every domestic expressions of support for terrorism and denounce the 11 September attacks.
- Stop volunteers of Pakistan from moving into Afghanistan to join the Taliban and cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban.
- Break diplomatic relations and support for the Taliban regime, and support the U.S to wipeout Osama and his network. (Harrison, 2009).

Pakistan's security was in imminent danger. (Fani, 2004). Pakistan was under enormous pressure of United States to join the war on terror. (Sattar, 2007). President Bush asserted that "either you are with us, or with the terrorists. Either you stand with civilization and good (U.S.) or with barbarianism and evil (Them)." (Fani, 2004).

These demands needed cooperation from Pakistan under the risk of awful repercussions. (Khan, 2005:494). Musharraf had already broken the diplomatic relations with the Taliban government because of mounting instability in Afghanistan and agreed to all U.S demands without any hesitancy. (Rashid, 2008). He was so fully complied that without any consultation, he instantly agreed to all the U.S demands. He accepted the policy of U.S on Afghanistan and completely discarded Taliban rule. (Khan, 2005:494; Hussain, 2007:40). Without Pakistan's assistance it was not likely that the United States would have been able to follow its concern in the area, as the entire world was at that time looking towards Pakistan. (Rehman, 2003).

Musharraf negotiated with the services ex-chiefs, ex-foreign ministers and politicians. (Hussian, 2007: 35). The situation of emergency was pronounced and Pakistan army was put on "High Alert". (The Frontier Post, 2001). Musharraf declared that besides sharing information and enlarging logistical support for the movement, Pakistan was ready to allow its use of air space for military action against the Taliban and Osama Bin Ladin in Afghanistan. (Musharraf, 2001).

Musharraf in his address to the nation said that the nation was passing through the most vital phase of history. The Air Force of Pakistan was completely attentive for "do or die" task. He informed the nation in opposition to the wrong decision and said, "the choice is between saving Pakistan or the Taliban and I am going for Pakistan. Pakistan comes first everything else comes

later.... A wrong move at this phade can jeopardize the very existence of Pakistan". (Pervaiz Musharraf Address to Nation, 2001).

The question whether Pakistan had any other options but to join the global coalition against terrorism is very important and complicated. The people of Pakistan and the government were shocked on the 9/11 incident. Tahmina Rashid and Syed Farooq Hadnat in "Implications of the 9/11: A Pakistani Perspective", explained that "in response to the American demands Pakistani military regime had left with no choice but to join the international coalition against terrorism." (Hadnat & Tehmina, 2004). Because of its geographical position and its associations with major players like China, Iran, Afghanistan and India, the U.S required the support of Pakistan. Pakistan granted various kinds of support stipulated by the U.S. (Malik, 2008).

The U.S was keen to get Pakistan's support in the war against terrorism because of diplomatic relations between Pakistan and the Taliban. To pursue U.S political and military interest in the region, the association of Pakistan and Taliban rule was very important. The Pashtuns run Taliban regime had the similar traditions and culture like the Pashtuns in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Taliban leaders had good relations with the right wing Pakistani religious and political leadership, most of them graduated in Pakistani religious organizations. (Hussain, 2005). Thus Pakistan was the most helpful supporter of U.S in its war on terror. (Kronstadt, 2004).

The role of Pakistan in "war on terror" was crucial and it was in general admitted that, "without the active and sincere participation of Pakistan, the desired results in terms of breaking the Al-Qaeda network could not be achieved." (Rehman, 2003). The Americans also realized this fact and an intensive cooperative relationship was drawn between both the countries. In place of

India, Iran, Central Asia and China, Pakistan came to be the frontline ally in eradicating Al-Qaeda and its network; as Ayaz Mir stated “the road to the Taliban, in American eyes, goes through Pakistan.” (Hadnat & Tehmina, 2004). Thus because of its diplomatic relations with Taliban and its strategic location America needed the support of Pakistan. Musharraf fully accepted the American demands and supported the U.S to curb Taliban and its networks.

3.5: Pakistan's Support to U.S after September 11

Pakistan assisted all the UN resolutions to prevent terrorism. Pakistan was a member to ten out of twelve anti-terrorism conventions of UN on containment of terrorism. Pakistan had also signed the OIC convention on repressing international terrorism. (Cheema, August 6, 2011).

Pakistan provided assistance to United States by following ways:

3.5.1: Supply of Air Bases

Pakistan permitted the use of airfields in Jacobabad, Shamsi, Pasni and Dalbadin to U.S and its allied forces. Pakistan also allowed America to land planes wherever in Pakistan in case of urgent situation and also provided access to Zhob and Kohat air bases. (Press TV, 9 July, 2011). According to U.S. Central Command report which covered the five years of offensive in Afghanistan disclosed that in this phase, U.S and its allied forces were provided five air fields and air bases by Pakistan. In operation against the Taliban, allied planes reportedly flew as many as 57,800 raids into Afghanistan – either from Pakistani air base or crossing Pakistani air space. According to the report, the Pakistan Navy also provided major support at Pasni. Pakistan also “deployed a total of 60,000 regular troops and 55,000 paramilitary personnel to seal off the Western border, for internal security duties and protection of various bases being used by U.S. and coalition forces.” in spite of domestic sensitivities. “On the average of, 0.4 million liters of

fuel per day was provided to U.S. forces as well as all other services on the bases used by them.” (United Press International, 19 May, 2003).

3.5.2: Provision of Air Corridor

Because it was difficult for the United States to launch air strikes into Afghanistan, air corridor was provided by Pakistan for the use of the U.S and its allied forces. As a result the government of Pakistan had to redirect and reschedule several commercial flights. Pakistan granted 2/3 of its airspace to the U.S forces for OEF and allocated about 7,000 air force personnel for the task. (Information Clearing House, 6 August, 2011).

On 26th November 2011, 24 Pakistani security personnel were killed and 12 soldiers were injured by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) helicopters on Salala check post in Mohmand agency of Pakistan. (Express Tribune, 26 November, 2011). The government of Pakistan gave ultimatum to CIA to leave the Shamsi Air base within 15 days, from where it ran drone operations. It also sealed two major supply routes into Afghanistan, together with Torkham, from where NATO forces receive around 40 % of their supply. (New York Times, 26, November 2011). The base was used by the CIA to attack against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan’s northwest tribal areas, which connects Afghanistan. In a statement Pakistan military said that the last flight carrying U.S. equipment and personnel had departed Shamsi airbase. The statement said, “The control of the base had been taken over by the Army”. (Dawn News, 11, December 2011).

Now the U.S had left Shamsi. But according to a Pakistani source with widespread knowledge of U.S-Pakistani Intelligence and military cooperation, the United States will maintain to have

admission to at the minimum 5 other military facilities of Pakistan. (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 15 December, 2011).

3.5.3: Presenting Naval Services

At Pasni, Pakistan provided naval support to U.S and its partners in landing ships. In order to provide accommodation to U.S and coalition navies, Pakistan's naval forces even restricted its training processes. (Information Clearing House, 6 August, 2011). In line with June 2002 U.S Marine Corps Gazette, the naval operations of coalition forces at Pasni were the biggest amphibious operation in its duration, size and depth which the Marine Corps had planned since the Korean War. In sum, 330 vehicles, 8000 Marines and more than 1350 tons of logistics/equipments were carried away at the seashore and later on took off to Kandhar from Pasni.

Reportedly, 25,000 Pakistan Navy personnel, 2,000 coalition military personnel, and 50 aircrafts were attached in these areas, employing equal to 100,000 gallons of fuel a day. The Amphibious task force of U.S (TF 58) was engaged in hundred days of surface operations and for offloading landed 275 crafts. C-130 and 400 C-17 of American helicopters were employed in different raids. (Fair, n.d.).

3.5.4: Approval of Logistic Supply by Road

Pakistan permitted the United States and NATO forces to utilize its supply routes for about 75% of its food, gas and military apparatus needed for logistic support by road. (Defence.pk, 6 August, 2011). The NATO shipments left Afghanistan through the Torkham border crossing in KPK. Torkham was a major transit route for the U.S and its allied forces to supply goods in Afghanistan. Around half of the cargo of U.S took away through Pakistan. The U.S had

alternative ways accessible to the north of Afghanistan through Central Asia, besides Chaman and Torkham. However, these routes were more expensive and longer. (Express Tribune, 4 December, 2013). By this supply route operation in Afghanistan made a momentous success. However, many of supply routes were damaged or destroyed by the militants. (Defence.pk, 6 August, 2011).

3.5.5: Supporting Intelligence-based Information

Pakistan offered central information to U.S about different extremists and terrorists factions. Pakistan facilitated the U.S in preventing terrorist attacks and assisted arrests that destroyed the potency of key terrorist associations. Pakistan provided intelligence information to UK in August 2006 and had an essential role in preventing attack. It allowed them to take pre-emptive actions against the terrorists that made plan to employ chemical explosives on a civil airplane. (Cheema, n.d.).

3.5.6: Supporting Operation Enduring Freedom

Pakistan expanded its assistance to the OEF. The Jacobabad and Dalbadin air fields were adjacent to Afghanistan, and when the U.S launched its key military operations these airbases were vital to the U.S. From these bases more than 57,000 attacks were launched. The U.S military was allowed to install radar at three airfields by Pakistan, enabled the U.S to cover up the whole airspace of Pakistan.

Furthermore, more than 183,000 troops were installed beside Pak-Afghan border to seize the Taliban and Al-Qaeda activists attempting to cross the border. As part of U.S OEF, more than 3500 Al-Qaeda members were grabbed, seeking to flee into Pakistan. In September 2002 the foundational meeting of the Defense Cooperation Group (DCG) took place, in which security

assistance, military cooperation and anti-terrorism were discussed. In October 2002 joint U.S-Pak Military Exercises were instigated, following the meeting. 120 soldiers from every state took part in this meeting. A joint working group on law enforcement and counter-terrorism was founded between Pakistan and the U.S to put into effect the issues like counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, money laundering, human trafficking, extradition, drug union and drug abuse control, legal system and police reforms, and concerns about the recovery of Pakistani nationals arrested in the U.S. (Akram, 2009). Intelligence agencies collaboration also showed large achievement to wash out the militants of Taliban and the Al-Qaeda from the entire Pakistan. (IPRI Fact file, 2006).

3.5.7 Banning Militant Organizations

The militant organizations were banned by Musharraf in January 2002. Pakistan adopted measures to avoid the development of the militants under new names, and gather open funding for their movements. (IRS, n.d.). The models of disturbing events continued unabated, despite government's initiatives to restrain religious extremism. In the Northern region of Pakistan some 9 schools were burned down in February 2004. The motive behind these attacks was the opposition of religious extremists to the government of Pakistan for its support to U.S led war on terror and the decline in enrollment of madrasas. (Shahid, 2004). No restrictions were placed on the admission of foreign Jihadi elements in Pakistan in 1980s Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. However, Musharraf disposed that unless madrasas had a permission certificate from their countries and appropriately registered with Pakistan's interior ministry, no madrasa should accept foreign students. Furthermore, madrasas were forced to transport modernization in their teachings and include scientific subjects in their curriculum by Musharraf. (Hilali, 2009).

President Musharraf announced measures against the extreme religious factions. (Abbas, 2005). He arranged a nation-wide crackdown of sectarian militants on 14 August, 2001, as a result of a series of attacks on Christian churches and Shia mosques. Furthermore, the attacks on Indian parliament in December 2001 acted as a mean for outlawing militant organizations. The 8 militant groups were banned by Musharraf: Sipa-i-Sahaba, Jaish-i-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Tehreek-e-Nifaz-i-Shariat Mohammadi, Tehrik-Fiqqa Jafriya, Sipha Mohammad, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and Harkat-ul-Mujahedin. (Dawn, 12 January 2002).

According to a research of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, there were 63 banned organizations in the country, from which 23 of them were operating with different names. (Express Tribune, 29, December, 2014). Pakistan had formally declared 212 outfits as forbidden organizations. The ministry of interior banned 60 organizations while foreign ministry banned 171 organizations. In the interim, Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) (a front for LeJ) had been put on the watch list by interior ministry. (Firdous, 2014).

a) Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

It was a violent Sunni Muslim militant faction in Pakistan. (Farooq, January, 2013). It was an offshoot of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, an anti-Shia and Deobandi group emerged in 1980s after the Iranian revolution and domestic revival of Shia in Pakistan, LeJ was founded in 1996, by Malik Ishaq, Riaz Basra and Akram Lahori, wanted to convert Pakistan into a Deobandi influenced Sunni state, targeted Shia and other religious minorities. (National Counter-Terrorism Centre, September 2003, & Stanford University Education July 7, 2015). It took its name from Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, a Sunni cleric and originating member of SSP. SSP was responsible for

commencing sectarian violence in Pakistan. The 1980s Zia's Islamization policy permitted the development of SSP and sectarian violence was increased. (Farooq, January, 2013).

The group was involved in kidnapping, armed assaults, bombings and murder of Shia minority to promote its violent agenda. (US Department of State, May 20, 2013 & National Counter-Terrorism Centre, September, 2013). In 1997 the group attacked an Iranian Centre in Multan, was its first attack, which killed 2 Iranian diplomats and 2 dozen others. (GTD, 2014).

In 1998 and 1999 Nawaz government started crackdown of Sunni militants which was not proved effective. (Arif, 30 June, 2015). However sectarian violence in the country turned down when Musharraf came into power. The mounting tension between leaders of LeJ divided the group and the faction in Punjab militant majority was led by Basra while Abdul Hai in Karachi. Basra remained the leader of LeJ. (SATP, 21 February 2015).

In 2001 Musharraf banned LeJ but some of the members left to Afghanistan to utilize the area as a place for charting attacks in Pakistan and for the protection of the Taliban. (U.S State Department, 24 June 2015 & Arif, 5 November 2014). Pakistani media reported that LeJ was consisted of 8 cells coordinated loosely, having independent chiefs for each cell and extended across Pakistan. At least 7 of these units were active in Karachi, the largest city of Pakistan. (National Counter-Terrorism Centre, September 2003).

In early 2000, LeJ had relations with Al Qaeda (AQ) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). (BBC, 20 February 2015). LeJ shared its relationship with both the groups during 2000, and AQ and LeJ shared their membership, especially high level leaders. (National Counter-Terrorism Centre, 22 June 2015 & Arif, 30 June 2015). In 2002 two of LeJ leaders Basra and Lahori were died by the security forces of Pakistan. (Rory, 17 May 2002). The group concealed its leadership structure after the death of Lahori. (Daud, 14 January 2013).

The authorities of Pakistan suspected that the LeJ with the collaboration of these groups was involved in attacks on Pak-Army General Headquarters in 2009 and numerous other attacks in 2010 targeted the Criminal Investigation Department of Pakistan. (National Counter-Terrorism Centre, September 2003). It planned a failed attempt in 2003 to kill President Musharraf of Pakistan and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the Pakistani Prime Minister 4 years later. (Web Cache, 22 June 2015).

The year 2012 in Pakistan was the start of heavy attacks led by LeJ against the Shia community. (Daud, 14 January, 2013). Pakistani authorities executed Lahori in January 2015. (Hadsan 18 January 2015 & Daily Times 18 January 2015). Malik Ishaq, the head of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was killed by the police of Pakistan in July 2015, had stayed in jail for 14 years and was freed in 2011 on bail. (Aljazeera News, 29 July 2015). This group is still operational in Pakistan. (Hadsan 18 January 2015).

b) **Jaish-e-Muhammad**

It was an extremist Islamist faction in Pakistan, founded by Masood Azhar after his release from prison in India. The aim of the group was to undermine the Indian influence on the Indian Administered Kashmir, to unite Kashmir with Pakistan and to oust foreign troops from Afghanistan. The group had declared war against the U.S openly. In 2002 Pakistan proscribed JeM. In 2003 the group had fragmented into Khudam ul-Islam (KuI) leaded by Azhar and Jamaat-ul-Furqan (JuF) headed by Abdul Jabbar. Jabbar was arrested by the Pakistani authorities for his suspected participation in assassination attempts of President Pervaiz Musharraf in December 2003. But in August 2004 he was released. In November 2003 Pakistan banned KuI and JuF. [FAS Organization, February 10, 2015 & National Counter-Terrorism Centre, n.d.).

The JeM and LeT was publicly implicated by the Indian government for the attack on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. Pakistan cracked down on Islamic extremists since December 2001. The authorities of Pakistan suspected that the executors of deadly attacks against Christian in Islamabad, Taxila and Murree in 2002 were associated with JeM. The militant group had its basis in Peshawar and Muzaffarabad, however the terrorist activities are conducted mainly in Kashmir. The group had close relations with the Taliban and the Afghan Arabs. The JeM collected funds through donation appeals and was suspected of providing financial support by Usama Bin Ladin. (Global Security Organization, n.d.).

Pakistan had arrested the chief of Jaish-e-Mohammad on 13 January 2016 in suspicion of organizing Pathankot air base attack on 2nd January 2016, accused by India. (Express Tribune, 14 January, 2016). On 14th January 2016 a mosque and seminary, run by defunct JeM were sealed in Sialkot by the Counter-Terrorism Department. (Dawn News, 15 January 2016).

c) Lakhar-e-Taeba (LeT)

It was formed in Kunar province of Afghanistan in 1990 and was based near Lahore later. The LeT was leaded by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. (SATP, n.d.). First, the LeT was active in Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet forces, later on its focus changed into disputed Jammu and Kashmir region when in early 1990s the people of Kashmir revolted in opposition to the Indian control. (Jayshree, 10 November, 2015). The LeT supported use of force consistently and declared that it would lodge the flag of Islam in New Delhi, Washington and Tel Aviv. Musharraf banned the group on 12 January 2002. It was also banned by the UN, U.S. and India. (SATP, n.d.).

Experts stated that the LeT was received funding and instructions to train Muslim extremists on Indian soil and to target Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir from the Inter-Services Intelligence, an intelligence agency of Pakistan. The government of Pakistan had frequently rejected accusations of holding terrorism. The LeJ had claimed responsibility for several attacks in India but, after the ban on 14 January 2002 it had not admitted attacks. In spite of Indian government's assertions, the LeT denied the blame for the attack on Mumbai commuter on July 2006, and the November 2008 attack in Mumbai. (Bajoria, January 14, 2010). The LeJ is still active in Quetta, Karachi and Gilgit Baltistan. (Jamal, 2012). After an encounter in Karachi on 21 January 2016 the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) of Police claimed to have arrested 11 suspected militants related to LeJ and Al-Qaeda. (Ali, 21 January 2016).

d) Sipah-i-Sahaba

It was an anti-Shia and a Sunni based sectarian group that carried out terrorist activities against Shia in Pakistan. (Dawn News, 6 August 2009). The SSP aimed at reinstating the Khilafat system, protect the Sunnis and their Shariat (law). The group had declared Shiites as non-Muslims. It was formed as a response to the Iranian Revolution and increased Shia militancy in Pakistan. (SATP, 13 March 2016). SSP had operated as a political party. Their leader had been elected into the National Assembly. It was one of the most dominant militant organizations that carried out attack in May 2004 on Shia worshipers, killing at least 50 people. In January 2002 the organization was banned by President Musharraf. It changed its name as Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan; however in September 2003 it was banned again. (Dawn News, 6 August 2009).

The SSP had links with multiple militant organizations, such as LeT, JeM, HuM, Al-Qaeda and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. (Abbas, 2009). The SSP and LeJ became a foundation of Al-

Qaeda planning in Pakistan since 9/11. (Rashid, 2001). It maintained mosques, training camps and madrassahs across Pakistan as a channel to provide funds, food and arms from Punjab to other parts of the country, comprising NWFP and FATA. (ICG, 2009). The group is still active in Pakistan. On February 12, 2016, Army Chief Gen Raheel Sharif endorsed death penalty to 12 terrorists that belonged to TTP, Al-Qaeda and the SSP by special military courts. (Dawn News, 12 Feb 2016).

e) Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan notably called as Pakistani Taliban was the most lethal militant outfit among all local militant organizations. It was originated in post 9/11 NATO operations in Afghanistan. To support the Taliban, a segment of radicals initiated a movement in Pakistan after the U.S intervention in Afghanistan. The TTP officially announced their existence in December 2007, with Baitullah Mehsud as their leader. Under his leadership, 13 groups united to form the TTP in an unrevealed location in South Waziristan Agency of FATA. The main purpose of the TTP was to bring together the small militant groups under TTP against NATO forces in Afghanistan and to carry out a defensive jihad against the Pakistani forces. (SATP, n.d.).

In December 2007, the TTP was accused by the Pakistani government for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, but the group denied the charge. TTP was banned by Pakistan on August 25, 2008, its assets were frozen, and was also banned for coming into media, as it was labeled as a terrorist organization. (Dawn News, 19, January 2012)

The TTP is still active in Pakistan. The group had claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks in Peshawar school in December 2014 that killed 140 students, Bacha Khan University attack on 20 January 2016 died 21, and recently the attack on Public Park in Lahore killed at least 70.

(Dawn News, January 21, 2016, & Pakistan Today, 28 March 2016). At least 18 fighters of the TTP were killed by drone strikes on 1st February 2016. According to ISPR, Pakistan's 1st indigenous armed drone killed 3 high profile militants in Shawal in September 2015. (Express Tribune, 3 February 2016). Operation Zarb-e-Azb was started after the terrorist attack on Jinnah International Airport, Karachi on 8th June 2014 by TTP and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan that killed 28 people involved security personnel and wounded at least 18. (Pakistan Times, 13 December 2015).

f) Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad (TNSM)

It was a militant Wahabi faction, originated in 1992 with the intention to enforce radical Sharia (Islamic Law) in Pakistan. In his speech in Peshawar on August 1998, the leader of TNSM Maulana Sufi Mohammad declared those wajib-ul-qatl (worthy of death) who opposed the imposition of Sharia in Pakistan. The TNSM operated mainly in tribal areas like Sawat and adjacent districts of the NWFP. The group rejected democracy as un-Islamic and called all political and religious parties as pro-Western. (SATP, n.d.). While the imprisonment of Sufi Mohammad in early 2002 and after prohibition in 14 January 2002 the group had been non-operational. Conversely, after the earthquake of 2005 the outfit began to revitalize. (SATP, n.d.).

g) Al-Qaeda

It was formed in 1989 when the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden and his partners started seeking new jihads. The organization was expanded out of the network of Arab volunteers who fought against the Soviet Communism in Afghanistan in 1990s. In this war against the Soviet, Bin Laden and his partners received Saudi and American support. Bin Laden himself had security training from the CIA, according to some analysts.

Al-Qaeda operated in Sudan in the early 1990s. Its headquarters and a dozen of training camps shifted to Afghanistan after 1996 where Bin Laden built a close association with the Taliban. The organization is believed to operate in 40 to 50 states, not only in the Middle East and Asia but also in Europe and North America. (BBC News, 20 July 2004). Its objective included the creation of a new Islamic caliphate and the end of foreign influence in Muslim countries. (Dawn News, 6 August 2009).

The militant group attacked civilian and military targets in many countries. They used concurrent bombings and suicide attacks as their technique. The September 11, 2001 attacks on World Trade Centre in U.S were the most prominent of its attacks. The U.S launched War on Terror against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, as a result many foreign militants shifted to Pakistan from Afghanistan. (Hayes, Brunner & Rowen, n.d.). Since the killing of top Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden in a U.S raid in Pakistan in 2011, the presence of Al-Qaeda remained in Pakistan, although the group was banned in Pakistan on 17th March 2003. (Dawn News, January 1, 2015 & Express Tribune, 24, October 2012).

Al-Qaeda maintained a strong hold in the tribal areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It had long term ties with militant Islamist groups in Pakistan. Their leadership had personal contacts with tribal people by intermarrying with tribal women and by setting strong ties with the tribal men. Following the U.S invasion of Afghanistan, Al-Zawahiri was believed to be married to tribal women after settling there. (The nation, June 18, 2011).

Following the attacks Al-Qaeda came out as the world's most notorious terrorist organization after the Irish Republic of Ireland (IRI) and the Hizbollah. Osama bin Laden was murdered in a joint US operation in May 2011. (Hayes, Brunner & Rowen, n.d.). The U.S diffused the

organization by attacking its training camps, bases and its personnel. The recent research of Oxford Research Group on Iraq and the war on terror Stated that Al-Qaeda “remains vibrant and active” despite the detention of many of its members. (BBC News, 20 July 2004).

Despite banning, the militant outfits are reappearing under different names. The security agency and the Federal government are working on a new mechanism to stop the banned outfits to reappear in any way. But no mechanism presently is available to prevent banned groups from re-emerging. (Express Tribune, 29, December, 2014).

The National Action Plan revealed that no banned outfit will be allowed to operate under a different name. But these outfits are still functioning with different names due to lack of operational mechanism. In addition to ban outfits, countering hate literature and alternate Jihadi media are another major challenge in the lack of such mechanism. The number of publications of militant had crossed 50 and majority of these had per week a 2000-6000 circulation according to a rough estimation. The outfits had supposedly deformed into charities and their publication could not be outlawed in existing law until these charities declared obsolete. (Express Tribune, 29, December 2014).

3.5.8: Disposing Army at Afghan Border

Pakistan had installed 183,000 troops along the Pakistan and Afghanistan border in addition to increased aerial inspection and border safeguarding to prevent cross border penetration. (Dispatch News Desk, January 21, 2016). Rapid response forces were also deployed with Pak-Afghan border. 250 new check posts were settled by Pakistan army in the border areas, supported by aerial surveillance and other patrols a number of small rapid response force and sub-units were also deployed during presidential election in Afghanistan. (The International

Relations & Security Network, October 6, 2004). In border security systems local tribesmen were also integrated by activating local 'Lashkars' and 'Amman' committees. Levies, Khadadars and FC were also incorporated in guarding irregular paths, re-investigating intelligence activity and dominating critical spaces. (Dispatch News Desk, 21 January 2016). Prior to this Pakistan had never experienced such deployments in the rocky tribal areas. With its inadequate infrastructure and the regular peril from 7 major tribal agencies, the deployment of troops in such an inhospitable territory is not an easy task. (Cheema, n.d.). In his inaugural address former President Musharraf stated that "We have attacked the terrorists in our mountains. That was not simple job to go into a region where even the British did not go in the colonial period of over centuries.... And we dared to launch an operation there in one of the Agencies...." (IRS & HSF, 2005).

In the post 9/11 scenario Pakistan became a front line ally of U.S and United States was dependent on Pakistan's support in its campaign against the terrorists, because of its strategic location and its ties with the Taliban regime. Pakistan fully supported United States in its war on terror by supplying air, naval, and intelligence support, banning militant organizations and deploying troops at Afghan border. But Pakistan's contribution in war on terror had bad repercussions as its own domestic peace and development is at stake, its economy and social condition is badly affected.

Chapter: 4

Internal Security Challenges to Pakistan: Post 9/11

Internal security had an essential role in national security of any country. Pakistan faced widespread security, economic and social challenges due to terrorism, militancy, sectarianism, ethnic and separatist terrorism which had slow down the progress and created insecurity in the country. (Khan, 2011). The September 11 was the one incident of terrorism on American land but numerous such incidents had been observed within Pakistan which had worsened the law and order situation of the country. Due to bombings and suicide attacks of terrorism no part of the country is safe. The economic, social and security situation of the country is challenged by terrorism. (Askari, 2008). The country is regarded similar to Afghanistan and Iraq about internal order. Pakistan is considered the most dangerous place in the world by the international media. (Khan, 2011).

The law and order situation of the country became worse due to militancy, sectarianism and ethnic violence. Ethnic violence was noticed in Karachi, sectarian violence was seen in Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, KPK and Gilgit Baltistan which created unrest in the society. Though the number of terrorist attacks decreased but sectarian related attacks had been increased overall. The separatist factions in Balochistan attacked government officials and civilians. Foreign involvement especially Indian involvement in Balochistan increased instability. The militant groups like JeM, LeT and TTP emerged in Pakistan after the U.S military operation in Afghanistan and the war hit areas became unstable. These militant organizations were active except banning.

The war on terror produced challenges to the economy of Pakistan in terms of low investment and production, unemployment, decline in GDP and FDI. The huge number of IDPs produced economic burden on the economy. Pakistan had never faced such social and economic loss in its history.

On social front, educational institutions were targeted and innocent students were brutally killed by the militants mainly in KPK, Balochistan and Peshawar. The ongoing terrorist attacks badly hit the tourism industry increased unemployment and decreased revenue. The soft image of Pakistan was stained that affected sports activities in Pakistan and foreign players felt insecure to visit Pakistan. Suicide attacks and drone strikes affected health and sports activities and made the security situation worse.

4.1: Impact on Law and Order situation

In the wake of war on terror terrorist incidents, sectarian violence, militancy suicide bombings and drone attacks had been increased mainly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchistan which deteriorated the law and order situation of the country. (Askari, 2008). Terrorist attacks, sectarianism and ethnic violence created unrest in KPK, Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and Gilgit Baltistan. After the U.S military operation in Afghanistan various militant wings were emerged and threatened the security situation of the country. Pakistan lost many lives in this war. The terrorist attacks killed above 24,000 civilians and security personnel between 2001-2008. (Raja, March 2013). The government of Pakistan carried out numerous military operations in FATA to remove militancy, extremism and eliminate the network of Al-Qaeda. The government faced security problems inside the country due to these operations. (Lunn, Taylor & Youngs, 2007).

4.1.1: Terrorism

The basis of terrorism in Pakistan traced back to two main incidents. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution sectarian militants came out in Pakistan which transformed the magnitude and nature of sectarian violence in Pakistan. In addition, militant activities spread after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which changed the very character of society in Pakistan. However, after the Soviet withdrawal the actual destruction emerged in Pakistan in the shape of violence and weaponization. Recently, terrorism and extremism had risen following the American attack on Afghanistan and Pakistan's collaboration in war on terror. (Sodhar, n.d.). Pakistan had faced the most complex, unique and shocking countenance of terrorism, no other country in the world was entrapped in the world as Pakistan.

It had faced the threat of terrorism in various shapes. The 1971 ethnic strife led to the dissection of Pakistan. In some parts of the country ethnic conflict reemerged again on the matter of linguistic differences but was controlled with the ethnic political parties. Balochistan and KPK experienced separatist terrorism. Sectarianism and militancy emerged as a result of Afghan jihad and Zia's Islamization policy. (Javeed, n.d.).

a. Ethnicity

Pakistan had first experienced ethnicity when its eastern part started agitation on the issue of national language, Urdu. Due to discontent political movement was launched and the ill-fated incidents of 1971 resulted in dismemberment of the state. When Mukti Bahni, a militant organization, began eradicating Punjabis and the West Pakistanis, the political struggle arranged on ethnic terms alarmed ethnic terrorism. (Javeed, n.d.).

Lately, ethnicity arose in Sindh province (Irshad, 2011) where Urdu speaking urban people of Karachi and Hyderabad fought with local Sindhis. (Javeed, n.d.). The pursuit of Mohajirs who migrated after the partition for an equivalent political identity as the fifth sub nationality together with the local Sindhi, Balochs, Punjabi and Pashtuns led to large degree of terrorist activities and bloodshed. (Javeed, n.d.). They constituted the largest section in the urban population of Sindh and violence had always remained political activity of the outfit. (SATP, MQM, n.d.). This ethnic terrorism was set in Hyderabad and Karachi in late 80s and 90s. But due to economic revival and mainstreaming of the ethnic group for the time being ethnic terrorism was collapsed. (Irshad, 2011). Arms, drugs and heavy population was flown to Karachi in the wake of Afghan Jihad and the war against terrorism in Pakistan's northwestern part which generated a culture of violence in Karachi. (Goodson, 2002). The ethnic conflict in Karachi was succeeded into sectarian conflict. (Ali, 2012).

b. Sectarianism

Pakistan had experienced rebirth of sectarian violence, involved conflict between Shias and Sunnis, two main sects of Islam and brutal incidents between Deobandi and Barelvi sub sects of Islam were also on the mount. This increased violence between Sunni and Shia sects intimidated internal security of Pakistan.

The rise of Pakistani Taliban led to revival of sectarian violence in Pakistan in 2000. The growing ties of Pakistani Taliban with sectarian militant organizations like LeJ were the most perilous repercussion of Pakistan's participation in the U.S war on terror. (yousaf, 2012). Sectarian violence was extended across Pakistan and attacked Pakistan's major cities such as Quetta, Peshawar, Karachi, Islamabad, Lahore KPK and Gilgit Baltistan (GB). The extremist

factions of Shia and Sunni attacked each other everywhere in Pakistan since long. But, scholars viewed that violent incidents happened in recent times by Sunni extremists were motivated by Al-Qaeda. (Afzal, Iqba, & Inayat, 2012).

Punjab was considered the breeding ground of sectarianism. The cities of Jhang, Lahore, Sahiwal, Multan, Sargodha, Shorkot and Vehari were threatened by sectarian violence which endangered the ability of law enforcement agencies. The Pakistani Taliban had an alliance with the local sectarian groups. During 2009 and 2010 these sectarian groups had begun terrorist attacks in Punjab. Madrassas in South Punjab had been engaged to guide fighters for militant factions. Militant groups like JeM and LeT had strong existence in South Punjab. (Lieven, 2012:291).

In Jhang severe sectarian militancy was seen due to mounting Deobandi influence. Haq Nawaz Jhangvi and his descendants condemned Shia as non-Muslims. They preached hatred, originated violence and functioned liberally in Jhang. As a byproduct of the SSP, LeJ emerged in Jhang in 1996. The SSP increased its influence in sectarian hostility in Jhang and organized itself at tehsil and district level amazingly well. The SSP commanded 225 tehsil and 74 districts when it was banned in January 2000. Additionally, 17 foreign branches in Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and UK were run by the SSP. (The Express Tribune, 2012).

In Balochistan people of different sects lived peacefully. But the peace of the province was disturbed because of Iranian Revolution and War in Afghanistan and the province became a place where different sects felt insecure. The capital city of Balochistan, Quetta had the largest Shia inhabitants. As a result of sectarian conflict the Shia population was a prey of suicide attacks, terrorist acts and bomb blasts. (Ramzan, 2015).

More than 50 people were died in an attack on Shia mosque in July 2003. In many years it was the most terrible incident of sectarian violence in Balochistan. (The News, 6 July 2003). In the tenth Muharram procession about 48 Shias were assassinated in Quetta in March 2004. In the same way, 26 Shia pilgrims were killed when gunmen stopped a bus in the course of Mastung and forwarded to Iran. (Dawn, 20 September 2011). A lethal attack in a snooker club in Hazara region resulted in 90 deaths. (Dawn, 13 January 2013). In 2012 more than 320 Shia communities were killed in targeted attacks in Pakistan in reference to New York Human Rights Watch. (Express Tribune, 31 December 2012). Likewise in KPK, Gilgit Baltistan and Karachi recurrent waves of sectarian violence was observed which had damaged the law and order situation of the country. (Afzal, Iqba, & Inayat, 2012).

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa bordered with Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Afghanistan was a hub of sectarianism. Sectarian violence rose in 1992 after 15 people were murdered in Peshawar during Ashura procession. In response to this incident the Shia harmed public property, robbed banks and burnt up tires of vehicles. The Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria (a shia political party) proclaimed it as an anti-Islamic act. (Haleem, 2003).

Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (a Deobandi political party) obtained irresistible victory in 2002 election. (Nasr, 2000). Few sectarian incidents were observed in MMA rule. The party had taken up cautious style for Shia and intra Sunni conflicts between Barelvis and Deobandis were also dealt best. (Khan, 2007). The minority groups appreciated the efforts of the government to manage the Islamists. Conversely, they were also disturbed by the Deobandi norms. Shia population was large in certain divisions of Pakistan, as in Kurram agency constituted 80% of total people, in northern areas, Gilgit 60% of the people formed Shia. These areas were a victim of sectarian violence. (Ahmed, 2011).

KPK became a hotspot of sectarian attacks of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2013 together with a suicide attack in February 2013 in Hangu outside imambargah or mosque, Akhun Salaq baba bombing of Shrine in Peshawar in February, in March Jamia Hanafia Chishtia mosque in Peshawar was blasted by a remote control bomb, in June a Shia Hussaini madrasa was attacked in suicide bombings in Peshawar. It pointed out an operational and mounting connection between the Sunni sectarian groups and the Taliban including LeJ in KPK and in Karachi, Punjab and Quetta. The LeJ had strong ties with Al-Qaeda as well. Parachinar and twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi were also witnessed sectarian violence and subsequent targets. Regardless of the ban on sectarian militant groups by the government, the militant groups are more actively operating in Pakistan, especially in South Punjab, Quetta and Karachi. (PIPS, n.d.).

Since 1990s the largest city of Pakistan, Karachi was the breeding ground of different types of sectarian based groups. (Mehmood, Akbar, 2015). After 9/11 Karachi became the shelter for Al-Qaeda leaders and the sectarian groups like SSP and JeM were harboured in Karachi. (Mcgirk, 2003). In Sunni and Shia Madrassahs sectarian extremists were trained. There were only 5 Madrassahs in Karachi which numbered into 20 in 1971, and 1 Shia and 4 Deobandi Madrassahs. (ICG, 2005, & Ahmed, 1979). At present from 2,012 Madrassahs 979 are operating in Karachi, according to an estimation. The Deobandi argued that they had 3000 religious organizations in Sindh out of which half were in Karachi. It was also stated that 791 religious institutions of Barelvi were there in Sindh amid them 550 were in Hyderabad and Karachi. From 121 Shia religious institutions in Sindh 36 were in Karachi. Ahle Hadith had 56 Madrassahs out of which 30 were in Karachi. 75 people were died because of attacks on mosques in 2004 belonged to Deobandi and Shia sects. In response to Shia killing top leaders of SSP were killed. In such

retributions violence and strikes heightened which led to more casualties of both the groups. (Monthly Wafaq al Madaris, 2004).

In the first 10 months of 2012, 54 sectarian murders were recorded in Karachi which belonged to Shia and Deobandi sects. In the first two weeks of November the sectarian violence blazed up and reached 40 by gunfire. In a current wave of tit for tat based sectarian killings religious leaders, campaigners, teachers and students were the targets. (Rehman, November 2011). Because of the pronouncement of National Action Plan, the killing of key violent and sectarian based leaders by the law enforcing agencies and Rangers operation in Karachi the Shia-Sunni groups in Karachi had declined. (Rehman,n.d.).

In Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) 4 major sectarian groups were found, Shia 39%, Sunni 27%, Nurbakhshi 16% and Ismaili 18% (Hunzai, 2013:2). For centuries the local people of GB had coincided. (Sakhawat, 2011). However, after partition in 1947 sectarian conflict in GB developed into rife. (Muhammad, 2011: 13).

At the start Sectarian conflict was restricted to Gilgit involved clashes between Sunni and Shia youth mainly in Muharram procession, bellowing insults by the clerics from their relevant mosques at each other, suppressed by home elders later. A Shia Muharram procession in Gilgit was flamed by a Sunni mosque resulted loss of life in 1975, was the first case of sectarian violence. Subsequently the capture of Sunni leader identified as Qazi prompted riots in Sunni majority areas, Sunnis intimidated to attack Gilgit. (Hunzai, 2013).

An alarmed sectarian attack was occurred on 28 February 2012 when 16 men in which 15 were Shias pulled off from bus, checked identity cards by the gunmen and shot dead in Kohistan. The responsibility of the attack was claimed by Jundallah. (The Express Tribune, 2012). In another

case 9 passengers were killed near Chilas by a mob on 3 April 2012 in response to a sectarian incident in Gilgit which was the reaction of hand grenade attack that led to 50 injured and 7 Sunni protestors dead. The administration and the police could not control the mob, curfew was enforced in Gilgit and adjacent locale and for months the service of cell phones was postponed. (Muhammad, n.d.). 4 terrorist attacks were occurred in Gilgit-Baltistan in 2015, one extra in 2014. (PIPS, 2015).

The annual report of Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies on Pakistan's national security in 2010 showed that the terrorist incidents were declined in Pakistan in 2010 however, sectarian and ethnic violence were increased in 2010. (PIPS, 2011). The incidents of sectarian violence overall was increased by 53% in 2012 in comparison to 2011, 68% of such killings and 85% of the attacks were focused in Quetta, Karachi, Kurram Agency and Gilgit. (PIPS, January 2013).

In 2015, 625 terrorist attacks were launched in 76 areas across Pakistan by the violent sectarian groups, nationalists and militants that was reduced to 48% from 2014, 1,443 people were injured and 1,069 died in these assaults. The number of people injured or killed in terrorist attacks was also decreased by 54 and 38% as compare to 2014 apart from Gilgit Baltistan, where such attacks were enhanced in 2015 to some extent. But, sectarian based attacks were increased in Pakistan in 2015 to about 7% from 2014. (PIPS, 2015).

c. Separatist Terrorism

The 1979 Russian attack of Afghanistan and the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan brought economic, social and political challenges to Pakistan, and brought conflict trends in FATA and Balochistan. (Jabeen, n.d.). The Afghan crisis carried huge incursion of Afghan refugees as a result terrorism, extremism, militancy, lawlessness, narcotics, drug and Kalashnikov culture

spread out in Pakistan. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan created ethno-political crisis and Talibanization of the society in Balochistan and Karachi. (Dotani, 2011). Hence, the onset of Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives in post September 11 instigated insurgency of Taliban in tribal areas and the secessionist movement initiated by the sub-national Balochs created danger for Pakistan. (Dotani, 2011).

Additionally, the strategic location of Balochistan increased foreign interest which benefited the separatists in their financial and moral support. It was believed that RAW (India), MOSSAD (Israel), Afghan Intelligence agencies and CIA (U.S.) sent anti-state elements to Balochistan and were equipped, trained, and financed from Afghanistan to cause unrest and weaken Pakistan. (Baig, 2011).

The underdeveloped and the largest areas of Balochistan was the hub of separatist terrorism. It was the ethno-nationalistic clash between the separatists and the government for a long time. These separatist groups comprised of tribal militants adopted different brutal means to damage the system and had been involved in vicious acts for more economic and political power in Balochistan. (Javed, n.d.).

Balochistan is the largest but the least developed area of Pakistan. The federal interior ministry of Pakistan reported Balochistan as the most volatile area. As per report by the federal interior ministry from 1st January 2004 to 15th May 2008, 832 bomb blasts were occurred in Pakistan 435 were proofed in Balochistan. The training camps of Baloch militants existed throughout Balochistan and the number of militant groups too increased radically. There were 5 militant groups in Balochistan, among them Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) was the most eminent among them, wanted to separate Balochistan from Pakistan. In addition to BLA other militant

organizations came out to challenge the writ of the government, i.e. Baloch Republican Army (BRA), Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Jhalawan Baloch Tigers and Lashkar-e-Balochistan. These groups were responsible for periodic attacks on government properties, civilians, security forces and those tribesmen who were in favor of government. Among the lately appeared Baloch militant groups Baloch Republican Army was the most noted group which came into view on August 21, 2007. The economy, infrastructure, and development plans were poorly harmed by the constant insurgency, insecurity remained the biggest cause to turn down tourism sector of the province. (Iqbal, 2008). Pakistan adopted measures against the separatists and the insurgents and launched several military operations in tribal areas against the terrorists in which many terrorists had been killed; the Pakistani government had initiated economic and social developmental movements in Balochistan and FATA. (Dotani, 2011).

d. Militancy

Islamic militancy was a threat to Pakistan in the post 2001 phase. In 1980 Pakistan provided its support to U.S against the Soviet forces and the ground of FATA was used for employing soldiers. The politics, history and economy of the citizens of NWFP, FATA and Balochistan impacted greatly by the Afghan crisis. (Sultana & Alqama, 2012).

Pakistan's collaboration with the U.S in war on terror deteriorated the security situation of Pakistan and brought more militancy in the country. The Pakistani Taliban, other religious militant groups and their sponsors extensively denounced the Afghan policy of Musharraf. (Kronstadt, n.d.). A number of Al-Qaeda elements were escaped into the territory of Pakistan, before the Pakistan military operation in the tribal belt, during intelligence and military operations majority of them were killed, whereas several of them fled to other areas of Pakistan

and created severe threat to the security of Pakistan, targeted government organizations and government officials, harmed infrastructure and foreign interest, (Musharraf, 2006) mounted extremism, increased foreign intervention in FATA and Balochistan, damaged law and order, (Kronstadt, n.d.) Hundreds of security personnel lost their lives in military operations against the militants and terrorists. (Musharraf, 2006). To show its strong association with the war against terrorism, Pakistan banned numerous Jihadi groups under foreign pressure and also faced difficulty for continuing the freedom struggle in Kashmir. (ICG, 2003). Hence terrorism and militancy rose in Pakistan which had stern security problems for Pakistan that contributed to political instability. (Kronstadt, n.d.). The Taliban, AL-Qaeda, Gulbaddin Hekmat Yar, Haqqani Network and other associated factions were operating collectively in the tribal areas of Pakistan, according to U.S. Secretary of Defense. (Kronstdt, 2009).

FATA was deprived region with high unemployment and poverty, reliant on smuggling, with 17.42% literacy rate as contrasted to 56% nationwide. The Pakistani Taliban which controlled large parts of FATA and parts of NWFP consisted of many militant groups under the Deobandi Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) with a loose knot. (International Crisis Group Asia, 2005).

When the remnants of Al-Qaeda and Taliban infiltrated to FATA, the terrorist movements multiplied, 157 training camps and 400 prop up places were established. (Roggio, 2008). As a result many militant groups extended their power. TNSM directed by Moulana Fazal Ullah operated in NWFP, Bajaur and Swat. In 2008 the group attempted to enforce Shariah law. Many militant factions expanded to move with them. (BBC News, June 18, 2002). SSP enlarged its existence in Orakzai agency whereas it was created in Jhang and targeted the Shia community. Thus the militant groups had increased, widened their areas and enlarged their operation which had deteriorated the law and order situation of the country. (The Nation, 16th October 2008).

4.2: Economic Cost of War on Terror

The War on terror intensified the economic pressure on Pakistan. The war affected security personnel, civilians and infrastructure, decreased the climate of investment and production, increased unemployment, and especially brought economic decline to the country. Even after the dismemberment of the country by direct war, Pakistan had never seen such upheavals on socio-economic levels. As the cost of trading rose significantly, since the higher insurance cover, the normal trading activities were disrupted by the onset of the war. Resultantly, the demands for imports decreased by decline in tax collection and foreign investment inflow were badly affected naturally. (Ministry of Finance, n.d.). To address the security challenges a large part of national resources both material and men had been redirected. Due to instability in Afghanistan, terrorism and violent extremism were increased in Pakistan that seriously damaged the economy of Pakistan and extensive human suffered because of indiscriminate attacks opposed to the civilian people. (Ministry of Finance, Anex III, n.d.).

The security environment of the country worsened by the events of 9/11. Resultantly, the Western governments together with U.S imposed travel ban on the entrepreneurs to visit Pakistan which affected its exports, imports, privatization program, inflows of foreign investment, tax collection, infrastructure and household tourism industry. Due to loss of domestic tourism industry many jobs were lost and security spending was increased, thousands of people migrated from war affected areas. The GDP ratio dropped to 13.4% in 2010-11 from 22.5 % in 2006-07. (Ministry of Finance, n.d.).

Due to war on terror Pakistan suffered more than any other country. The war on terror and the restoration of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) damaged the financial resources of Pakistan

that expanded the fiscal deficit and halted growth of the economy. Furthermore, the writ of the government was challenged by the terrorists, created chaos and uncertainty that had deteriorated the soft image of Pakistan. (Ali, n.d.) . Revenue and annual budgets had suffered due to uncertain condition and continued war against militancy. Government was unable to spent money in social sectors mainly in health, education and roads. Unemployment, inflation and power shortage had increased. The foreign direct investment was threatened by the political disorder. . (Teslik, 2008).

Terrorism had both direct and indirect costs to economy. The direct costs contained human victims, disruption of economic activities, and “collateral destruction” to the factories, standing corps and infrastructure, while the indirect costs involved increase in unemployment, decrease in investment, the high price of assisting and restoring the displaced persons, lack of ability to carry on development work and waste of time for production. (Ali, n.d.).

According to economic survey of Pakistan, total cost (direct & indirect) to economy of Pakistan from 2001-14 was \$ 102.5 billion due to war on terror. (Express Tribune, 2 June 2014). The cost for fiscal year 2014-15 was increased to \$ 107 billion. While, the yearly loss was declined in fiscal year 2014-15 as \$ 4.53 billion from \$ 6.63 billion in fiscal year 2013-14 because of military operations against the militants in tribal areas of Pakistan and Karachi. (Express Tribune, 4 June 2015).

Table :1 Estimated Total Economic Cost to Pakistan (2001-15)

Year	Billion \$
2001-2002	2.67
2002-2003	2.75
2003-2004	2.93
2004-2005	3.41
2005-2006	3.99
2006-2007	4.67
2007-2008	6.94
2008-2009	9.18
2009-2010	13.56
2010-2011	23.77
2011-2012	11.98
2012-2013	9.97
2013-2014	6.63
2014-2015	4.53
Total	106.98

Source: Ministry of Interior, Finance, Foreign Affairs Joint Ministerial group.

4.2.1: Decline in Foreign Direct Investment

Foreign direct investment is mainly the inflow of capital or investment from outside country, in the form of aid or multinational operations. The war on terror pervaded uncertainty which

contributed to capital flight along with slow down economic activity by making foreign investors edgy. It was perceived that the military operations in FATA and other tribal areas badly affected the FDI, which was observed a sharp rise for some years. Pakistan's role in the war on terror prevented the inflow of foreign investment, affected export and affected the speed of privatization sector. The increased security expenditure meant larger financial deficit along with decreased development and social expenditures. The energy pipelines were blown up by the militant organizations, Chinese engineers were targeted, (Alston, 28 May 2010) NATO containers were burnt down and various other violent incidents and terrorist activities on daily basis demonstrated on media increased risk perceptions and harmed the confidence of the investors for many years. In sum, terrorism and security concerns created a sense of drift and lessen confidence led to decline investment rate and low economic development. (Abbasi, June, 2014).

Table 2: (2001-12) FDI inflows to Pakistan

Year	FDI (Million \$)
2001	383
2002	823
2003	534
2004	1,118
2005	2,201
2006	4,273
2007	5,590

2008	5,438
2009	2,338
2010	2,018
2011	1,308
2012	853

Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey, Board of Investment, UN Conference on Trade & Development (UNCTAD), World Bank Country Reports statistics.

From 2005-2008, the FDI inflows to Pakistan rose, and saw a spiky decline after launching of the military operations against the militants as the terrorist attacks were increased in major cities caused intense insecurity. (Abbasi, June, 2014).

The U.S, UAE and UK remained the major source of FDI inflows in Pakistan, in spite of significant ebb and flow in their FDI shares. The share of FDI from U.S fluctuated between 67.34 % in 2001-02 to 14.67 % in 2005-06, the UK between 28.07 % in 2001-01 to 6.25 % in 2001-02, UAE between 1.61 % in 2000—01 to 40.46 % in 2005-06. (Board of investment, Pakistan, n.d.).

The report of UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on FDI in Pakistan declared that in international ranking to fascinate FDI Pakistan had gone from number 110 in 2010, 100 in 2009 and 74 in 2008. (World Investment Report, 2012). The growth rate of GDP in Pakistan was seen high 2004-07 and fell after 2007 as shown in the following table.

Table # 3: GDP Growth (%) Annually

Year	GDP
2001	2.0
2002	3.2
2003	4.8
2004	7.4
2005	7.7
2006	6.2
2007	5.7
2008	1.6
2009	3.6
2010	3.5
2011	3.0
2012	4.2
2013	4.4
2014	4.7

Sources: Economic Survey of Pakistan, Board of Investment, World Bank.

Migrant remittances were the only financial source of stability for the economy of Pakistan that helped sustain the economy of Pakistan. The migrant remittances increased from \$ 3.554 billion in 2002 to \$ 18.45 billion in 2015. (UNCTAD & Dawn News, 23 December 2013).

Table 4: Overseas Pakistanis Remittances (2002-12)

year	Migrant remittances (\$ Billions)
2002	3.554
2003	3.964
2004	3.945
2005	4.280
2006	5.121
2007	5.998
2008	7.039
2009	8.717
2010	9.690
2011	12.263
2012	14.010
2013	14.9
2014	15.84
2015	18.45

Sources:Dawn News, 23 December 2013 & UNCTAD

Because of the enduring war against terror and the slow down economic movements, inflation increased and Pakistani rupee downgraded that affected the standard of life very poorly and one of the causes of increasing poverty in Pakistan. . (Farooq, & Khan, January 2014). Inflation

raised disturbingly to 21 % in 2008-2009 from 10.3 % in 2007-2008, that was more than 100% increase in inflation. (Economic Survey 2006-7 & 2011-12).

4.2.2: Impact on Unemployment

There were massive economic impacts of terrorism, causing poverty, joblessness, social and economic ailing and homelessness. In accordance with the Ministry of Finance, Pakistan's involvement in the anti-terrorism operation led to immense unemployment in the areas affected by war, which had increased rural poverty eventually. (Ali, n.d). Poverty rate was reached to 37.5% from 23.9% in 2007-08. (Siddiqui, 2012).

The issue of IDPs and numerous incidents of terrorism affected the economic and social condition of the country severely, mainly in FATA and NWFP. The World Bank blocked the lending of market based loans at the minimum \$ 834 million because of the mounted uncertainty and unrest in the country which increased social and economic troubles in the country.

The war in Swat increased unemployment, halted education of youth, destroyed the most important source of income for the region – tourism, poorly harmed infrastructure and sparked violence in other parts of the county. It dislocated 2 million residents and prevented the delivery of crucial raw materials from Swat similar to jewelry and furniture industries, gems and marbles as well as fresh vegetables, fruits and other mountainous food items to other parts of the country. Recurrent bombings deteriorated law and order situation, displaced local population, and increased unemployment. (Ali, n.d).

The anti-terrorism campaigns also led to enormous unemployment in the areas affected by terrorism. Social affects seemed adverse in terms of rising poverty, unemployment and underemployment. Numerous developmental projects which were set up earlier in the tribal areas

and the NWFP badly affected with setbacks and resulted in huge cost. (Zain, December 2008). Thus war on terror damaged the affected areas badly.

4.2.3: Internally Displaced Persons

Pakistan joined the U.S led war on terror by fighting against the militants within its borders. The September 11 events forced many Afghan refugees to take shelter in nearby countries however; a large number of Pakistani nationals were also displaced within the country. These internally displaced persons fled to take shelter in other peaceful areas of the country from their homes. In the history of Pakistan it was one of the biggest displacements of people when a violent fight started between militant groups and Pakistan army in FATA and PATA. (Mehsud & Wazir, January 2014).

Since 2007 KPK, FATA and Balochistan were adversely affected by the intense armed conflict between the militant groups and the state, caused mass dislodgment of civilians. Almost 3 million people were dislocated in Pakistan since 2007. (Ferris & Winthrop, 2010). There were about 1 million IDPs who was either living on their own, with their expanded families, in IDPs camps or in different cities. (OCHA, 2013). From 2007-09 only, more than 550,000 people were displace from FATA by the armed conflict. Pak-army operation in South Waziristan against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2008 resulted displacement of virtually 200,000 people to Dera Ismail Khan and Tank. (Khan, 2012). About 1.9 million IDPs were registered by National Database Registration Authority (NADRA) from which 96% were registered in KPK. (IDMC, 2010). There had been 3 million citizens from KPK and FATA by the end of 2009 that shifted to take refuge In IDP camps. (Khan, 2012). In the year 2012, 415,000 people were newly displaced and since March 2013, 131,000 people were displaced, according to June 2013 report of Internal

Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 2013). 179,269 families were displaced from Kurram, Oragzai, Khyber and Bajaour Agencies, according to Provincial Disaster Management Authority KPK. (PEMDA).

This massive ceaseless influx of IDPs from conflicting areas of Pakistan generated crisis to deal with their basic needs in IDP camps, resettlement, rehabilitation and repatriation. (Mehsud & Wazir, January 2014). The military operations and terrorism destroyed the internal peace of the country and disturbed the lives of the people of FATA. (Chughtai, 2013).

IDPs started to return to their localities that were cleared from militancy by the security forces and the government. (Huq, 2009; Khan 2010). 1.6 million IDPs went back to their homes by September 2009 and 1.1 million stayed dislocated. (IDMC, 2010). In 2012 a sum of 12,594 families were returned to their homes. To tackle the condition of IDPs the government lacked long term vision. Large number of IDPs by the military operation in FATA created many economic, social and psychological challenges. (Huq, 2009; Khan 2010).

The IDPs posed economic burden on the government. Together with economic losses and psychological distress of leaving their families and homes, it would have an extensive outcome on the society in the long run. Their displacement and hatred against the state and military was severe and provided hot bed for more terrorism and easy recruitment for militant groups. (Abbasi, 2014). The relocation of IDPs caused huge economic cost and took a big toll on the budget of the state. Giving out special budget for IDPs might halt key development projects. (Fahad, n.d.).

Both the rehabilitation of IDPs and the war on terror consumed the financial resources of the government, widened the fiscal deficit and halted the growth of the economy. Normal business

affected and additional security required for their transactions. Thus, terrorism led to restrain economic activity. (Hali, May 2012).

4.3: Social Insecurity

Pakistan's social fabric was terribly affected by the protracted war on terror. The suicide bombings damaged the physical infrastructure of the country. The awful law and order situation diverted public expenditure to security. The efforts for poverty reduction were influenced by the bad social and economic condition. (Abbasi, 2014). The educational institutions, tourists sectors, health and sports badly damaged by the war on terror.

4.3.1: Education

Education is the most powerful weapon for any society. It is very imperative for Pakistan. But educational institutions were demolished by the terrorists in the country (Ali, 24 April 2015) and were badly affected by the war on terror. The militants targeted students and schools and killed many in FATA, KPK and Balochistan. Numerous educational institutions were exploded. (Hussain, March, 2015).

The people of FATA were fired directly and killed by the callous militants and the extremists including children and women. Tribal elders were indiscriminately targeted and schools were destroyed. The destruction of education system in FATA was the critical aspect of the fight against militancy besides the efforts of armed forces to deal with the threat. The region was surrounded by the Taliban who were opposed to education, mainly against women education on the pretext of religion. Another cause for devastating educational institutions was the use of educational institutions by the armed forces as their campsite.

Bajaur agency was the main target of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) headed by Moulana Faqeer Muhammad. As part of their strategy the militant outfit targeted schools both male and female to damage the infrastructure of the government on the pretext that these schools taught secular education. Bajaur was one of the tribal areas most affected by the blasts on educational institutions, had the highest number of blast losses. (Naqvi, Khan, & Ahmed, December, 2012).

In 2008 119 schools were attacked by the militants, 129 in 2010, 142 in 2011 and in 2012, 121 educational institutions were targeted. Whereas 282 schools were blown up in KPK by the militants, that influenced 18,000 male and 13,000 female students. From 2003 to 2013, 1,030 schools, mostly girls' schools were destroyed in KPK and FATA by the militants in accordance with the report of law enforcing agencies. (Naqvi, Khan, & Ahmed, December, 2012). The dropout rate was increased by the continuous danger of targeting the educational institutions in FATA. (Central Asia online, 2011). On 20 October 2009 double suicide bombings hit the International Islamic University left 17 and 1 employee dead. (Dawn, 14 November 2009).

In swat the TNSM banned girl's education. 170-200 schools of girls had been bombed or set on fire. (IRIN, 2009). On 9th October 2012, Malala Yousafzai due to her voice for education was shot by the Talibans which increased dropout rate in the area. Western education was considered as immoral, unethical and haram by these militants. Anti-west movement was started in Panjgur district of Baluchistan in 2014 by Tanzeem-ul-Islam-ul-Furqan (TIF). The group warned all western style private schools and coeducation to shut down in the said district. Another catastrophic event of Army public school attack was held on 16 December 2014 in Peshawar which was the deadliest terrorist attack in the history of Pakistan claimed by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). (Ijaz, March 2015). Around 151 people were killed with 125 children and 147

injured. (ISPR, 13, August 2015). On 20 January 2016 Bacha Khan University in Charsadda was attacked and killed 21 people, the attack was declared by the TTP. (The News, 5 February 2016).

The situation created barriers for the government to maintain peace and stability in the country which was unattainable without providing sufficient education. Militancy disposed children of their basic right of education. (Naqvi, Khan, & Ahmed, December, 2012).

4.3.2: Impact on Tourism

Tourism is an imperative source of employment, foreign exchange, poverty diminution and cross cultural collaboration. (Hussain, May, 2004). Pakistan had great prospective for tourism because of its strategic location, long history, cultural diversity and charming scenery. But the tourism sector of Pakistan was no longer attractive for foreign and local tourists. The down fall of tourism caused loss of employment and revenue. (Shah, 4 February 2011). The events of September 11 had affected the tourism industry of Pakistan as well. The global perception of Pakistan as safe destination for tourist had rapidly transformed into worse. (Awan, n.d.). The escalating terrorist attacks in Pakistan damaged the status of Pakistan in the world; Pakistan became insecure place for the tourists which resulted in decline to tourism sector. (Mojo Travel, 2011).

The disaster of 9/11 and the earthquakes in 2005 and 2010 collapsed the tourism industry. After the earth quack Taliban captured the stunning Swat valley. Due to presence of some radical organizations the tourism in Swat, Chitral, and other northern areas were shut down. NWFP and Gilgit-Baltistan were important destinations in Pakistan. But most of the NWFP and northern site of Pakistan fell into the terrorist hands. (Awan, n.d.). The control of Swat valley by the TTP in 2007 (Rehman, 21 September 2014) and the subsequent operation by the military was a major

obstacle to its tourism sector. On 15 June 2013 Ziarat residency was bombed by the militant wing, Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). Some parts of the monument were completely destroyed by the militants. (Awan, n.d.). On 22 June 2013, 10 foreign climbers and 1 local guide were killed in an unparalleled attack in the peaceful region of Himalayan in Pakistan. (Mir, 23, June 2013). The income of millions of people was affected by the death of tourism. The attack increased security concerns for the foreign tourists. (Awan, n.d.). However, according to the report of Overseas Investors Chambers of Commerce and Industry (OICCI) the comfort level of foreign investors had increased because of the improved security environment. (PKKH, 26, July 2016).

4.3.3: Impact on Sports

By joining war on terror Pakistan cricket had also endured. The Pakistan Cricket Team bore huge financial loss due to attack on Sri-Lankan team in Lahore in 2009. (Shah, 4, February 2011). The attack detached the country in sports activities and was echoed that Pakistan was not an appropriate site for sports activities. (Awan, n.d.). The soft image of Pakistan which attracted foreign players, foreign investment and employment opportunities was harmed by the ongoing terrorist activities. (Sheikh, 2015). Since terrorists attacked the Sri Lankan cricket team bus in Lahore in 2009 no major foreign test player visited Pakistan. Zimbabwe played a short 1 day series in Lahore last year. Following the suicide bombings in Lahore on 27 March 2016 in which 70 people were killed, Pakistan cancelled its plans to host the Afghan team in April 2016 because of overall security situation of Pakistan. (NDTV Sports, 31, March 2016).

4.3.4: Impact on Health Services

The health service was also worsened by the ongoing bombings and terrorist activities. Insufficient funds for health care by the government caused the health condition bad. Because of war on terror the people of war stricken areas were dubious about the program of immunization by the government and the International NGOs and believed health programs as international plan to make them weak. (Shah, 4 February 2011). The Taliban banned polio vaccinations in tribal areas by saying the movement was a wrap for spying like the hepatitis vaccination agenda by a Pakistani Dr. Shakeel Afridi, who was involved in finding Osama bin Laden. (Shamil, n.d.).

In accordance with health professionals, the numbers of people undergo from mental health problems and depression was increased in Pakistan. Experts of mental health stated that due to aggravate emotional and mental health Pakistanis became violent and intolerant and felt insecure about their future. People became miserable because of the constant insurgency, suicide bombings and lawlessness. Unemployment and inflation made things worse. (DW, n.d.).

According to UN health agency, Pakistan was also believed as an unsafe place for health workers for the first time. The health agency offered complete statistics on health workers and other healthcare facilities in main conflict regions over the past two years. The results were miserable: almost 600 attacks were launched at medical organizations, ambulances and workers were carried out in 19 countries integrated in the study in 2014 and 2015. About 1,000 people were killed together with patients, health workers and onlookers, reported by the WHO. In this period 45 health workers were killed in 16 attacks in Pakistan. Most of the attacks were carried out against Polio workers in Pakistan: many security officials who were the defenders of polio workers also suffered. (The Nation, May 27, 2016).

4.3.5: Suicide Attacks

In 2007 suicide attacks were increased sharply and kept on growing. In 2002 only 2 suicide bombings were accounted in Pakistan while in 2009 it raised to 80. (Sultana & Alqama, 2012). Security forces, armed forces, check posts, and police and civic places were targeted by the suicide attackers, government infrastructure was also hit by the rocket and bomb attacks. The writ of the government was challenged by the militants not just in tribal regions but also the settled regions of KPK and across the entire state. The bomb blasts and suicide attacks created fear in the people but also deteriorated the situation of law and order in the country. (U.S. House of Representatives, 11 October 2007).

Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was targeted in bomb attack on 18th October 2007, 139 people were killed in Karachi. On December 2007 she was assassinated in gun and suicide attack. Major arms factory of Pakistan in Wah was attacked on 21 August 2008 in twin suicide attacks killed 64. Sixty people were killed in suicide truck bomb in Mariot hotel Islamabad. 125 people were killed in a car bomb on 28 October 2009 in Peshawar, destroyed a market. 82 people were killed in gun and suicide attack on Ahmadi mosque in Lahore on 28th May 2010. 20 Shias were dragged off and shot in a bus in Mansehra on 16 August 2012. (Express Tribune, 28 March, 2016).

4.3.6: Drone Attacks

The United States utilized drone technology in 2004 killed a dominant militant. Numerous drone strikes were launched since then. (Wazir, n.d.). The Drones strikes disrupted the ability of militant factions in FATA to carry out and plan cross-border attacks in opposition to the U.S and the NATO forces. However, they could not resolve the basic issue. The capacity of militant

groups to rearm, reform and employ remained unbroken as long as they had safe havens in Pakistan. There were as a minimum 350 drone strikes in FATA mainly in South Waziristan, North Waziristan and Kurram agencies. The drone strikes killed many leaders and senior military chiefs of Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban. Innocent lives were also lost in the strikes. (ICG Asia, 21 May 2013). Media reported that 140 civilians had to die for every AL-Qaeda operative and only 11% of these attacks succeeded that denoted 89 innocent people killed out of 100 attacks, every month 58 die, only 14 could hit the target out of 44 drone strikes. (Dawn, 2 January 2010). Amir Mir reported that 14 Al-Qaeda operatives and 678 civilians were killed from 14th January 2006 to 8th April 2009. (The News, 10 April 2009). The former senior counter insurgency advisor of U.S Army David Killcullen admitted the dreadful reality of rising civilian target. He disclosed that “using drone attacks we had killed 14 senior Al-Qaeda leaders and 700 Pakistani civilians at the same time.” (Kantar, n.d.). On 23 June 2009, a funeral gathering in district Makeen of South Waziristan was attacked by the drones, 80 innocent people were killed left behind. It was believed the most lethal drone attack. (BBC, 24 June 2009).

Drone strikes violated the sovereignty of Pakistan and created issues for Pakistan to handle the problem, anti-U.S sentiments generated in the society. Pakistan faced reprisal to the drone strikes as an ally of the U.S war on terror; as a result not a single city of Pakistan was protected. (Mehmood, June 2010). These strikes incited the angry youth from the targeted areas to take vengeance from Pakistan for its contribution to war on terror, for its material and human loss and turned them into terrorists, provided opportunity to anti-Pakistan forces (TTP) to spread hatred against America and Pakistan. (Heart of the issue, 17th April 2011). The killing of Osama bin Laden in direct American operation with lacking prior permission harmed the status of Pakistan on domestic and international levels. (Abbasi, 2014).

By joining war on terror the internal security of the country was badly hit. Militancy, Sectarian and ethnic violence created insecurity and affected the law and order situation of KPK, Sindh, Punjab, and Gilgit Baltistan. Separatist elements and foreign hands created instability in Balochistan. Newly emerged groups challenged the writ of the state especially in tribal areas which were operating beyond the country instead of banning. Unemployment increased, GDP and FDI decreased and the influx of a huge number of IDPs posed economic burden to the country. Schools, infrastructure, civilians and security forces were targeted and killed. Health and sports activities were also affected by the war on terror. Thus, WOT deteriorated the economic, social and security condition of Pakistan. The number of terrorist attacks had been decreased by the military operations in tribal areas and search operations in Karachi. But, Sectarian violence had been increased. There is a need of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy which led to peace and progress in the country.

Chapter: 5

Counter-Terrorism Strategy of Pakistan

Following the U.S and NATO forces attack on Afghanistan on October 2001 the Taliban government was overthrown. As a result, many Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders fled to tribal regions of Pakistan and militants expanded their hold in the tribal areas with the support of the locals against the U.S and its supporters in Afghanistan. (Khattak, 2014). Militancy spread out not only in the tribal areas of Pakistan but also into other provinces of Pakistan i.e. Sindh, Balochistan and Punjab. (Siddiq, 2011).

To counter the threat of terrorism Pakistan adopted its counter-terrorism strategy which was based on military and non-military means. Military option comprised of heavy military operation in tribal areas against the militants, and low intensity speedy operations in the settled areas, especially in the main cities of Pakistan to capture diverse Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders. Besides, non-military options contained both engagement and legislative aspects. Pakistan had signed various peace deals with the militants as part of its engagement policy. A variety of Anti-terrorism legislations had been set up since 9/11 under legislative aspect in the form of parliamentary laws and presidential acts with proscribed militant groups in different periods. (Ahmed, Jan 2014). But still terrorism could not be eliminated from the country and there are some flaws in its anti-terrorism policy which should be dealt by joining social and economic reforms.

5.1: Military Operations

Since September 11, the security forces of Pakistan carried out a number of large and small military operations in tribal areas against the militants: (Pakarmy, 12 July 2013). First, army

launched operation in South Waziristan in June 2002 known as Operation Al-Mizan to destroy the networks of Al-Qaeda and Taliban. The operation was ended with an accord with the militants due to increased fatalities. In 2007 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was formed to enforce Sharia'h. A number of militant groups were united under TTP. The early operations of army were not proved successful. The army conducted three operations in Swat from November 2007-January 2009. In May 2009 operation Rah-e-Rast was instigated as the militants were returned to Swat. This operation was a success as compare to previous operations. Operation in South Waziristan was launched in October 2009. Most of the areas of South Waziristan, Kurram and Khyber agency were regained by the military and TTP was expelled to North Waziristan. In North Waziristan Operation Zarb-e-Azb was started in June 2014. The ongoing operation killed a number of militants and their hideouts were destroyed. Karachi operation also proved successful as it had reduced terrorist attacks and target killings in the city.

a) Operation Al-Mizan

Operation Al-Mizan was the first major military operation by the security forces in June 2002 against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants in South Waziristan. (Jones & Fair, 2010: 46). The operation was consists of smaller operations such as operation Kaloosha in March 2004. Between 70,000 and 80,000 forces were deployed in FATA. A major 13 day cordon and search operation was conducted by the army across a 36 km area west of Wana controlled by numerous Pakistani militants who provided shelter to foreign fighters including Nek Muhammad, a local Jihadi leader. (Khan, March 2004). Due to increased casualties on both sides the operation was ended on Shakai agreement with Naik Muhammad. (Sehgal, 2003). Under the agreement the militants were supposed to stop the support of foreign militants and register them in South Waziristan, to cease attacks on government officials and cross border attacks into Afghanistan.

In response the government agreed to compensate for the property harmed by the operation and release of Taliban prisoners. (Khan, 16 May 2016). The peace agreement was failed due to controversy over registration of foreigners with the authorities. The military operation was launched again on 11 June 2004. (Mehsud, 18 March 2004). Nek Muhammad was targeted in a U.S. drone attack on 17 June 2004. (The Bureau of investigative Journalism, n.d.).

Baitullah Mehsud came out as the leader of the militants in South Waziristan after the death of Nek Muhammad. A peace deal was signed between the government of Pakistan and Baitullah Mehsud on 22 February 2005 at Sararogha. According to the contract, the army agreed to recompense the militants for material and human sufferers, take out troops from Mehsud's area and set out Frontier Corps persons to the 5 forts there. The accord almost renounced the command of the area to Mehsud. (Ali, 24 February 2007). But, the peace lived shortly. In early 2006 Mehsud started to organize a suicide bombing campaign in Pakistan, which continued till his death in August 2009. (Warrick, 18 January 2008).

In December 2007, a range of local Taliban groups were united to form the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. (BBC, 17 January 2008). The aim of the TTP was to impose Sharia'h law, to integrate small militant groups under TTP against NATO forces in Afghanistan and to wage a defensive jihad against the forces of Pakistan. (SATP, TTP, n.d.). In January 2008, Sararogha fort was captured by the Mehsud's men in South Waziristan and many security forces of Pakistan were killed. (BBC, 17 January 2008).

b) Operation Zalzala

The Pak-army launched 3 major operations against the Pakistani Taliban in FATA in 2007. Operation Zalzala was a primary part of that operation. By this operation army cleared most of

the Spinkai area, the iron grip of Mehsud and took up some small towns and villages. (Abbas, 19 May 2008). The operation suspended some planned suicide attacks, seized weapons and cleared most part of South Waziristan. In reference to a report, more than 4,000 houses were destroyed in the operation in South Waziristan in January only. Additionally, 200,000 locals were displaced by the operation, caused significant hostility among the locals. (Ali, 8 November 2008).

c) Operation Sher Dil

After a series of attacks on government agencies, including Frontier Corps, army, and ISI (Khan, 28 March 2007) the Frontier Corps and army initiated Operation Sher Dil. (Khan, 19 March 2009: 1). Ultimately, 63 security personnel and above 1,000 militants were killed. (Lloyd, 11 November 2008). The Frontier Corps units and the army shifted their operation to Mohmand Agency after completed Operation Sher Dill. (Amin, 21 July 2008).

d) Operation Rah-e-Haq

The operation was carried out against the militant group, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) by the army. (Amin, 19 October 2007). The first stage of Operation Rah-e-Haq was initiated against the TNSM in November 2007 in cooperation with local police in Swat Valley. Though, the militants slowly penetrated into the main cities. In July 2008 the second phase of operation was begun and persisted the whole year. As a result 9 civilians, 36 security personnel and 615 militants were died. In January 2009 third phase of the operation was instigated. (Sheikh, 15 June 2014). In response the TNSM destroyed schools and attacked security forces. (Khan, 21 May 2009). The operation was concluded after a peace deal signed between TNSM and the government recognized as the Malakand Accord for the enforcement of Sharia'h. (Sheikh, 15 June 2014). In April 2009, nevertheless, Shops and government buildings

were occupied by the militants in Mingora, the Capital city of Swat and moved ahead to adjoining districts of Buner and Shangla, attacked FC personnel, police stations, NGOs, schools and disposed their own checkpoints. (Khan, 21 May 2009).

e) Operation Rah-e-Rast

It was launched in May 2009 as the militants of TNSM led by Mullah Fazlullah were returned to Swat. Military started a new operation in the valley to clear the stronghold of the militants. (Qureshi, 7 January 2016). A key invasion occurred in Mingora where the military recaptured the control of Mingora on 30 May, seized ammunition and arms and destroyed concrete bunkers. (Khan, 21 May 2009). The military personnel were still positioned in different parts of Swat to check the revival of militants after four military operations. (Qureshi, 7 January 2016).

This Operation was notably a success in Pakistan's counter terrorism campaign. More than 52,000 troops, including two wings of FC and special service commandos were installed in the operation. 3,000,000 people were displaced prior to launching the operation. The army supported in relocating displaced people. (Nawaz, n.d.).

f) Operation Rah-e-Nijat

It was launched to destroy the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and its allies. On 19th October 2009 army launched a full scale attack in South Waziristan after three months of blockade and minor skirmishes with the Taliban. 28,000 troops and 500 special commandos were deployed by the army. Whereas, Taliban had 10 to 15,000 troops and 1500 foreign fighters. The fighting was intense. (Global Voices Online, 2009).

The ground forces of Pakistan controlled most of Makin, Sararogha and Ladha in December 2009 disrupted the command of TTP in key Mehsud areas. The forces of Pakistan seized heavy weapons from the militants and cleared a number of villages in South Waziristan from militants. (Dawn, December 28, 2009 & January 2, 2010). By June 2013 the military took over South Waziristan and expelled the TTP to North Waziristan. (*The News International*, 21 June 2013).

g) Operation Koh-e-Sufaid

This operation was launched on 4 July 2011 in Kurram Agency against the Taliban militants where the Taliban occupied the main Thall-Parachinar route that connected the Agency to Peshawar, to siege the local Shia people of Kurram. In this operation 4,000 troops, air power and heavy artillery were employed. On June 2013 the operation was terminated and the military recaptured the control of the area. (*The News International*, 2 July 2013). Besides, after a full blown operation against the TTP in April 2013 the military also cleared the Maidan area of Tirah Valley where TTP had stronghold and took over Khyber Agency by June. (*Daily Times*, 21 June 2013). In Khyber Agency the military also launched several minor operations against the militants for instance Darghalam, Bia-Darghalam, Sirat-e-Mustaqeem and Kwakhbadesham. (PIPS, January 2010).

h) Operation Zar-e-Azb

Operation Zar-e-Azb was launched by the military on 15 June 2014 in North Waziristan and still going on, involving 180,000 security forces. (*Express Tribune*, June 15, 2016 & *Raja*, May 08, 2015). 3,600sq km area in North Waziristan was cleared from 900 terrorists of Lashkar-e-Islam over a period of two years, included Shawal. 253 tons of explosives and 7,500 bomb making

factories were sealed in Shawal. A sum of 3,500 terrorists and 49 soldiers were killed and 992 sanctuaries were annihilated. (Express Tribune, June 15, 2016).

i) Karachi Operation

Rangers-led operation in Karachi was launched in September 2013. (Dawn News, 3 November 2015). During the continuing operation in Karachi rangers carried out 7,950 raids, 6,362 were arrested among them 848 were target killers, 1,236 terrorists, 143 kidnappers and 403 were extortionists. Further 1,200 terrorists were arrested which improved the security situation of Karachi. Target killing in the city had fallen significantly by more than 80% and attacks had reduced to 10 in June 2015 from 73 in December 2013. (Khan, 10 August 2015).

The military operations in FATA proved successful because military regained the control of almost all of the tribal areas from the militants. But militants still carried out attacks not only in the tribal areas but also in other parts of the country. (Khan, 2012).

On the other hand, the counter-terrorism strategy of Pakistan raised questions among tribal people. Following military operations hundreds of tribal people fled from their homes to safer areas. In 2009, estimated 2.5 million people were displaced in Swat. Majority of the IDPs are still suffering in the camps due to insecurity back home. During the decade long war between the security establishment and the Taliban the people of FATA suffered huge material losses beside human losses. The IDPs of FATA faced many troubles together with health, education, food, security threats and repatriation. The people who returned to their homes still lacked basic human needs for instance education, health, infrastructure etc. (FATA Research Centre, January 2014).

5.2: Legislative Means

Since the September 11 events, numerous amendments were disseminated in the previously presented Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997 to deal with terrorism, in addition to new legislations. (Dawn, 1 February, 2002). On 15th August 2001 the government issued Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, which inserted more powers to Anti-Terrorism Courts, together with banning militant sectarian organizations and freezing their financing. The government of Pakistan banned numerous sectarian militant organizations and arrested their activists. (Bokhari, October, 2013).

The Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) 2002 increased the number of judges from one to three, with one judge from the military for speedy trial. Moreover, it claimed for targeting the whole network of terrorists with rigorous punishment, with death penalty who were involved in supporting terrorism. (Dawn, 1 February 2002). The November 2002 amendment enhanced the power of police. It granted the police to hold a suspect equal to 12 months without filing any criminal charges. (ATA (Amendment) Ordinance 2002, 16 November 2002). Only by presenting one or more sureties to confirm his innocence the accused could be freed, if not the accused would be presented before the court within 24 hours. The November 2004 amendment to the 1997 ATA offered right of appeal to legal heirs of victims in opposition to the verdict of the ATC in the High Court in 30 days of the decision of the ATC. (Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2004, Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, 30th November 2004). In addition, (the second Amendment) Act 2004 was announced in January 2005 for further changes in the 1997 ATA. This amendment extended the jail term for the supporters of militants from 14 years to life imprisonment. The Act also demanded to set up 'Special Benches' of High Courts composed of two judges to hear the appeals of the victims or heirs of the victims. The Act boosted the control

of ATCs to try offences concerning the use of explosives or fire-arms by any device in court premises or worship place and kidnapping for ransom. (Anti-Terrorism (Second Amendment) Act, 2004, Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part II, 11 January 2005).

The Swat and South Waziristan military operations in May and October 2009 correspondingly, forced the government to revisit the infrastructure of ATC. The Pakistani Taliban reacted brutally and attacked the law enforcing agencies and Armed Forces. To deter terrorism more strict laws were required to guarantee relentless punishment for the terrorists which entailed additional amendments in the 1997 ATA. The government issued Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance on 1st October 2009. It authorized the extra-judicial confession before the responsible investigative security personnel in the ATCs. Furthermore, the remand period was increased from 30-90 days and the burden of proof was transferred to the accused. (The News International, 6 November 2009). The Ordinance was also expanded to PATA and new ATCs were set up in the areas of Malakand and Peshawar, through a special presidential order. (Yusuf, 2010:23).

The regulation Action in Aid of Civil Powers 2011 for FATA and PATA was announced after the deteriorating security situation. It allowed armed forces to detain a suspect till the extension of action in aid of the civil power. It offered that any statement by any armed forces would be enough for convicting an accused. (*Dawn*, 12 July 2011). Section 14 granted the establishment of oversight board comprised of 2 military and 2 civilian officers to review cases of anyone imprisoned within time of 4 months from the issuance of imprisonment order. It also allowed the authority to form notified detention centers. To detain accused persons a detention centre was set up in Landi Kotal close to Afghan border. (*Dawn*, 26 March 2013).

The National Assembly of Pakistan passed “Investigation for Fair Trial Bill, 2012. The bill allowed the government to cut off personal communications of the person who was supposed to be involved in arrangement to do an act of terror or crime. (The Business Recorder, 21 December 2012). The Parliament passed Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill 2013. The bill authorized the government to take property of the person who is involved in funding terrorism. (Dawn, 5 March 2013). Through an amendment in Section 6, ATA of 1997, the definition of terrorism was also expanded. In accordance with this the menace of terrorism included, “threatening and terrorizing the people, social segments, business community, and planning or attacking the civilians, government officials, security forces or law enforcing agencies, media persons and installations. (*Pakistan Today*, 14 March 2013). The government was also empowered to arrest the suspect for three months with no challenge in a court. Moreover, it prohibits the heads of proscribed factions from travelling in a foreign country and forbids the issuance of arms licenses, passport and credit cards to the campaigners of banned groups. (*The News International*, 13 March 2013).

The National Assembly of Pakistan passed the National Counter-Terrorism Authority Bill in 2013. The bill revived the nonfunctional NACTA which was devised in 2010. (*The Express Tribune*, August 05, 2015). The National Counter-Terrorism Act (2013) increased the power of NACTA, an autonomous body accountable to the Prime Minister of Pakistan directly. Its role is to collect and disseminate information/data to relevant stakeholders for co-ordination, threat assessment and develop action plans and counter-terrorism strategies, review and research of legal reforms, most prominently co-operation with international entities for sharing intelligence. (*The Nation*, February 27, 2015).

But, NACTA remained inactive as terrorism still persists in the country. The meeting of Board of Governors was not took place under PM Nawaz Sharif in last thirteen months which seems no cooperation between department. (Dunya News, 23 January, 2016).

Pakistan Protection Ordinance (PPO) was promulgated on 20 October 2013 by President Mamnoon Hussain and on 7 April 2014 National Assembly passed this bill. The bill allowed the security forces to shoot suspects with the authorization of a 15 grade official, (*Express Tribune*, April 11, 2014) search any premises and made non-bail able arrest, without any warrant, anyone who had committed and is expected to commit a scheduled offence, is liable to be punished for equal to ten year. The law enforcing agencies were empowered to keep a suspect under preventive detention without presenting him before the court for trial for up to three months. The PPO authorized the government to set up a parallel judiciary and a new force of prosecutors to speed up the trial of terrorists. (*Express Tribune*, April 11, 2014). The appeal in opposition to the last decision of a special court lied to the Supreme Court. (PPO, 2013). The bill was criticized by Human Rights watch and opposition parties by saying that it was against the freedom and basic human rights. (*Express Tribune*, April 11, 2014).

National Internal Security Policy was launched on 25 February 2014 by the government of Pakistan to counter extremism and terrorism and to dismantle terrorist networks. (NACTA, n.d.). It was a unique document of its kind. (Haider, 2014). The NISP was a key step in the search of internal security in Pakistan. It is the first strategy document to deal with terrorism and extremism. (Jilani, 2009).

The policy had three main aspects: dialogue with all stakeholders, cut off terrorists' network, and enhance capacity building of security apparatus to counter the internal security threats.

(Rana, n.d.).

It had two main parts based on hard and soft plans. (Haider, 2014). The Comprehensive Response Plan (CRP) was the soft component of the policy planned for public support and participative political procedures against terrorism. This policy was organized against terrorism through economic and social reforms and development programs, rehabilitation of temporary displaced persons and dialogue. It suggested incorporating madrassas into mainstream education system, and employing healthy activities for youth. It stressed the reconciliation among societal forces, formulation of a national de-radicalization programme, a national narrative against extremism and terrorism.

Comprehensive Deterrence Plan (CDP) was the hard module of the approach. It focused on capacity building of National Internal Security Apparatus (NISA), together with an arms control regime at the heart. It recommended with effectual measures to protect against cyber crimes and developing a national database. Moreover, steps were being adopted to formulate a Directorate of Internal Security (DIS) to deal with intelligence based operations and to regulate Afghan refugees. In addition, the policy proposed the formation of a Counter-Terrorism Department and a Rapid Response Force, innovation of law enforcing agencies. (The News, 27 February 2015). Both of these components were implemented by NACTA. But, monitoring and implementation mechanism of NACTA were missing in addition to capability limitations. (Rana, n.d.). The actual check of the proposed NISP was its implementation. (*Daily Times*, 2014). Grave questions were raised about how a body of counter-terrorism would work. (Rana, n.d.).

Following the distressing attack of TTP on Army Public school in Peshawar in December 2014, an All Parties' Conference was chaired by PM Nawaz Sharif and National Action Plan (NAP) was inaugurated in January 2015 to clean-up terrorism. (The kooza, 9 January 2016). In essence

the NAP redesigned the objectives and goals of the NISP apart from formation of special military courts and the execution of convicted terrorists. (Kaphle, 24 December 2014). To accelerate the trial of military courts twenty first Amendment was passed by the parliament on 7th January 2015. (The kooza, 9 January 2016). The Pakistan Army Act 1952 was amended which extended the power of military courts to try terrorists which remain in effect for two years. (The News, January 04, 2015). The NAP further included dismantling terrorist networks, stop their finances, actions against sectarianism and hate literature, registration of madrassahs, activation of NACTA and FATA reforms. (The kooza, 9 January 2016).

Incidents of terrorism were diminished and the security situation of the country was improved under NAP. (Ahmed, 25 January 2016). Under NAP more than 6,000 terrorists and about 1,50,000 suspected people were detained until now, 211 terrorists were executed, 498 cases were registered against the supporters of the terrorists, 2,380 people were arrested for conveying hate speeches and 1,342 were registered, about 90% of madrassahs were registered to date, 182 religious institutions were closed down by law enforcement agencies for spreading extreme religious views, 140 SIMS were verified, and above 1 billion rupees were frozen from 126 accounts. (Radio Pakistan, 15 August 2016).

But the recent bloody attack in Quetta hospital showed the failure of intelligence. Over the implementation of NAP General Raheel Sharif on 12 August 2016 viewed that "The NAP is central to achievements of our goals and its lack of improvement is affecting the consolidation phase of Operation Zarb-e-Azb." To monitor the execution of the NAP PM Nawaz Sharif pronounced the establishment of a high level task force. But the formation of task force to monitor the implementation of NAP is not productive way to eradicate terrorism. (Jaspal, 18, August 2016).

The military operation in FATA on the one hand proved successful to capture the areas formally gained by the terrorists and many terrorists were targeted and attacked and decreased the number of terrorist attacks. On the other hand, terrorism still persists. The tribal people of FATA faced many challenges; they were fled from their homes to safer places, faced problems in food, health, education, security and repatriation.

Though the anti-terrorism legislation in Pakistan is a “gallant depart from the normal legal system”, (Kennedy: 390), it had not played a significant role to avoid terrorism, failed to carry out speedy trial of the suspect terrorists, remained less successful to make sure the implementation of the outlawed militant factions which have reemerged with new names and challenged the writ of the state.

The broad definition of ‘terrorism’ in the ATA is the main weakness in anti terrorism legal system of Pakistan which had increased the burden of ATC, and slowed down the prosecution process of terrorists. The range of criminal activities have been increased by constant amendments in the ATA, for instance, attack on schools, hospitals, government buildings, gang rape, and kidnapping for ransom while, these crimes could be tried in the regular courts and dealt with the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). As a result, the burden of ATC increased more and the prosecution process delayed. (Soofi, 2013).

The anti-terrorism legal system of Pakistan had been criticized by human rights organizations. In their view these laws breach the universal right of ‘innocence until proven guilty’ of the suspect. Such as, in the 2009 amendment to the ATA the suspect had to prove his innocence before the court otherwise he would declare guilty which oppress the suspect. The ‘extrajudicial confessions’ in the 2009 amendment grants extensive powers to security agencies without accountability. (Yusuf, n.d.). The powers of on-sight shooting to police under Pakistan

Protection Act increased the chances of misuse. (Imtiaz, n.d.). Lack of co-ordination among intelligence agencies is another main flaw. The anti-terrorism legal system lacks efficient mechanism to make sure the ban on militant and extremist groups which have re-emerged with new names. An effective anti-terrorism regime is required to address the flaws in the anti-terrorism laws to deter terrorism. (Ahmed, 2015). The government of Pakistan should address the social and economic conditions and focus on education, social reforms, and greater employment opportunities for youth so that they could not engage in any form of terrorism.

Chapter: 6 Conclusions

Since its existence Pakistan faced many internal and external security challenges, i.e. division of assets, communal unrest, language and water issue and Kashmir dispute. Initially, Pakistan was the most associated supporter of U.S. against the expansionism of Soviet and joined a number of treaties with the U.S. But, in 1965 and 1971 wars with India America gave no military assistance to Pakistan. The separation of East Pakistan shocked Pakistan. After Pakistan decided to develop nuclear program its relations with the U.S were not good. Russian invasion of Afghanistan changed the U.S policy regarding Pakistan. U.S policy shifted again after the departure of Russia. The Afghan Jihad and the Islamization policy of Zia damaged the security of Pakistan. After 9/11 settings Pakistan was the front ally of United States. The U.S blamed Taliban for the attack and decided to invade Afghanistan. Because of its strategic position and its links with the Taliban, the U.S. required the support of Pakistan in its war against terror policy. U.S launched Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001 and removed the Taliban but they fled into the tribal areas of Pakistan regrouped there. The United Nations Organization supported the U.S by passing resolution against terrorism and other countries supported by granting military and intelligence assistance. Pakistan provided its full support to U.S by giving naval, air, and intelligence assistance, deployed troops at Afghan border, banned militant organizations and conducted military operations in FATA. It's economic, social and development condition was badly hit by war on terror.

The internal security of the country was hit badly. Sectarian, militant and ethnic violence produced insecurity and affected law and order condition of the country. Foreign powers and separatist groups undermined Balochistan. In spite of banning, new militant groups emerged in tribal areas and operated within the country. FDI and GDP reduced and unemployment

heightened. The flood of IDPs created burden on the economy. Schools and infrastructure were targeted; security forces and civilians were killed. Sports and health programs affected as well. Hence, the war on terror worsened the socio-economic and security situation of the country. The Pakistani military conducted operations in FATA to eliminate the terrorists and their networks. As a result the terrorist attacks were diminished and sectarian violence was expanded. But terrorism still continues. The people in tribal areas left their homes and were displaced to protected areas, bore health, food, education rehabilitation and security problems.

Pakistan adopted its counter-terrorism strategy by employing both military and non-military options. Initially military operations in tribal areas were not proved successful. Because of increased sufferings on both sides a number of peace accords were signed between the government and the militants. But peace didn't sustain and Pak-military launched operations against the militants. A number of militants and their hideouts were abolished, vacated and regained by the military. The ongoing military operation in North Waziristan and the rangers led Karachi operation reduced terrorism. But, terrorism still exists so far.

Use of Military is the major flaw of its strategy to counter terrorism. To address the socio-economic condition is far more difficult than military option. Drone attacks increased militancy and people joined militancy in reaction of the death of their beloved ones. Fluctuations exist in Pakistan's policy to counter-terrorism. On the one hand, Pakistan fights with militancy on the other hand support some groups to prevent Indian and Afghanistan threat.

The legal measures for anti-terrorism could not play a major part to evade terrorism and not succeeded to do speedy trial of the suspect terrorists. The implementation of the outlawed militant groups was proved less successful as they resurfaced with newer names. The wide definition of terrorism in the ATA was the major flaw in anti-terrorism legal setup that slowed

down the trial process of the terrorists and raised the responsibility of ATC. The extra-judicial confession was condemned by human rights organization. Absence of co-ordination amongst intelligence agencies is another weakness. To address the weaknesses in anti-terrorism laws an effective anti-terrorism regime is required. Economic and social reforms should be introduced to eradicate terrorism and promote better opportunities for the citizens so that they could not join hands with the terrorists.

Recommendations

Terrorism cannot be dealt with single approach. Multifaceted approach should be adopted to curb terrorism. Lack of education, poverty, bad law and order situation, terrorism, sectarianism, delayed justice system fueled extremism and militancy in the people. By addressing these problems militancy can be eradicated. (Irshad, 2011).

- For restraining terrorism in Pakistan, peace in Afghanistan is a pre-condition. Instability in Afghanistan directly affects Pakistan. But, as long as the U.S forces didn't exit from Afghanistan peace is not attainable and terrorist organizations maintain their existence. A stable Afghanistan led to peace in Pakistan which cannot be achieved easily. (Irshad, 2011).
- Education is a key step to root out terrorism. Quality education in schools and renovating Madrassah education should be adopted. (Sultana & Alqama 2012). The education system should contain both modern and religious education at equal proportion and should be uniform and free from sectarian violence and prejudices to clear the minds of young generation regarding the intense plans of terrorist groups.
- Reinforcing democratic institutions and empowering the people in tribal areas are the most significant ways to curb militancy. (Sultana & Alqama 2012). The troubled areas

must be developed with the cooperation of local citizens. Social and economic inequality led to increase in employment of terrorists. Economic reforms must be on top priority especially in the weak areas. Widespread programs should be developed to spur up industrial revival to produce employment opportunities. The international society should assist Pakistan not just in the shape of monetary support but, through investment in economic sectors. (Irshad,n.d.)

- The intelligence agencies should be reinforced in training, coordination and equipment. It must be free from external involvement. A mandated and expert intelligence community can better handle the risk of terrorism.
- Media can play an effective role to develop public opinion, to educate and inform people about the challenges faced by Pakistan and propose to respond to them. Media must air responsible reporting keeping in view the national interest of the country in place of their own interests. A well organized media effort can eliminate militancy. (Irshad, 2011).
- By only issuing executive orders violence and extremism cannot be restrained. It requires monitoring of the supporters of militant groups in military and civil administration, strict actions against the vigorous militants and limiting social basis of support for the militants. (Rizvi, n.d.).
- Scholars and religious heads should play their constructive part through peaceful preaching. (Irshad,n.d.). Militant organizations not merely outlawed formally, however should be wiped out from the whole country. The law enforcing agencies should be practical rather than acting in response to terrorist attacks. (Jaspal, n.d.). There is a need to provide reasonable and immediate justice to poor masses. (Irshad, n.d.).

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