

**Electoral Politics of Religious Political Parties
of Pakistan: The Case of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam
(JUI-F) - 1988-2008**



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2013





Accession No

TH 1269

MS
324-7
EJE

Elections - Pakistan

Religious political parties - Pakistan

Election campaigns

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for Master of Studies degree in the discipline of Politics and International Relations at the Department of Politics & International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences, International Islamic University, Islamabad.

**Department of Politics and International Relations
Faculty of Social Sciences
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2013**

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

*"IN THE NAME OF ALMIGHTY ALLAH THE MOST
GRACIOUS THE MOST MERCIFUL"*

Certification

Certified that contents and form of thesis entitled **"Electoral Politics of Religious Political Parties of Pakistan: The Case of Jamiat Ulma Islam (JUI-F) 1988-2008"** submitted by **Ejaz Ahmad Reg # 83-FSS/MSPSIR/F10**, have been found satisfactory for the requirements of the degree of M.S/M.Phil Politics and International Relation.

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DEDICATED TO MY PARENTS

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my individual research and that it has not been submitted concurrently to any other University for any degree.

Ejaz Ahmed

Table of Contents

<i>Table of Contents</i>	i
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	1
<i>List of Tables and Appendices</i>	vii
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	viii
<i>Abstract</i>	ix
Chapter One	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Background.....	1
1.2. Literature Review.....	5
1.3. Theoretical Framework.....	11
1.4. Justification for the Study.....	13
1.5. Scope of Thesis.....	14
1.6. Research Question.....	15
1.7. Research Methodology.....	15
1.8. Organization of the Study.....	17
Chapter Two	19
PAKISTAN: A RELIGIO-POLITICAL LANDSCAPE	19
2.1. Introduction.....	19
2.2. Pakistan: A Colonial Legacy.....	20
2.2.1. The Pakistan Movement.....	20
2.2.2. The Muslim Rule Over the Sub-Continent.....	21
2.2.3. The War of Independence (1857) and its Consequences on the Muslim.....	24
2.2.4. The Role of Political and Religious Parties in the Pakistan Movement.....	26
2.2.5. Pakistan and the Colonial Legacy.....	29
2.3. History of General Elections in Pakistan.....	32
2.4. Political Parties of Pakistan – An Overview.....	36
2.4.1. Secular Political Parties.....	37

2.4.2. Religious Political Parties of Pakistan.....	4
2.5. Conclusion.....	52
Chapter Three.....	53
JUI (F): EVOLUTION, ORGANIZATION, IDEOLOGY.....	53
3.1. Introduction.....	53
3.2. From JUH to JUI (F) – <i>A History of Struggle and Transformation</i>	53
3.2.1. The Establishment of JUH and Pakistan Movement.....	53
3.2.2. JUI after Creation of Pakistan.....	56
3.2.3. General Ayub Khan's Era.....	57
3.2.4. The General Elections 1970.....	58
3.2.5. JUI after 1971 Debacle.....	57
3.2.6. Framing of Constitution of 1973.....	61
3.2.7. The General Elections of 1977 and Afterwards.....	62
3.3. Organizational Structure of JUI (F)	65
3.3.1. Majlis-e-Amoomi.....	66
3.3.2. Majlis-e-Shura.....	67
3.3.3. Majlis-e-Amla.....	67
3.4. Ideology of JUI (F)	68
3.4.1. Aims and Objectives of JUI (F)	71
3.4.2. Manifesto of JUI (F)	71
3.4.3. Mosques and Madrasah Network.....	77
3.5. Conclusion.....	80
Chapter Four.....	82
COMPARASION OF ELECTORAL POLITICS OF JUI (F) WITH OTHER RELIGIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES – 1988 TO 2008.....	82

4.1.	Introduction.....	82
4.2.	The General Elections 1988.....	83
4.3.	The General Elections 1990.....	88
4.4.	The General Elections 1993.....	92
4.5.	The General Elections 1997.....	96
4.6.	The General Elections 2002.....	99
4.7.	The General Elections 2008.....	106
4.8.	Conclusion.....	114
Chapter Five.....		116
JUI (F): BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM.....		116
5.1.	Introduction.....	116
5.1.1.	Ideology.....	116
5.1.2.	Ideology and Political Parties.....	117
5.1.3.	Pragmatism.....	119
5.2.	Ideological Basis of JUI (F)	119
5.3.	Electoral Strategies of JUI (F) – A Comparison with other Religious Political Parties.....	122
5.4.	Role of Leadership of JUI (F)	127
5.5.	JUI (F) between Ideology and Pragmatism.....	135
5.6.	Conclusion.....	136
Chapter Six.....		138
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION.....		138
Glossary.....		142
Bibliography.....		145
Appendix I.....		149

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIML	All India Muslim League
ANP	Awami National Party
APJUI	All Pakistan Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam
APKNAC	All Pakistan Khtam-i-Nabowat Action Committee
BNA	Baluchistan National Party
CAP	Constituent Assembly of Pakistan
CII	Council of Islamic Ideology
CM	Chief Minister
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
IJI	Islami Jamhoori Itehad
IJM	Islami Jamhoori Mahad
IJT	Islamic Jamhoori Mahad
ITP	Islami Tehrik-e-Pakistan
JI	Jama'at-e-Islami
JM	Jamiat-e-Mashayikh
JUH	Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind
JUIP	Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan
JUI (F)	Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Fazal ur Rehman)
JUI (S)	Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Sami ul Haq)
JUP	Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan
KPK	Khyber Pakhtoon Khwa
MA	Master of Arts
MDM	MutahidaDeeni Mahad
MJUI	Markazi Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam
MJUIWP	Markazi Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam West Pakistan
ML	Muslim League

MMA	Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal
MNA	Member National Assembly
MPA	Member Provincial Assembly
MQM	Mutahida Qoumi Movement
MRD	Movement for Restoration of Democracy
MWM	Majlis-e-Wahdutul Muslimeen
NA	National Assembly
NAP	National Awami Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	National Democratic Party
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIP	Nizamul Islam Party
NP	National Party
NPP	National Peoples Party
NRO	National Reconciliation Order
NUP	Nizamul Ulema Pakistan
PCO	Provisional Constitutional Order
PDA	Pakistan Democratic Alliance
PIF	Pakistan Islamic Front
PKMAP	Pakhtoon Khwa Milli Awami Party
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PML (J)	Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo)
PML (N)	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif)
PML (Q)	Pakistan Muslim League (Quid-e-Azam)
PPP	Pakistan Peoples Party
PTI	Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf
SIC	Sunni Itehad Council

SSP	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
TI	Tehrik-e-Istiqlal
TIP	Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan
TNEI	Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqqah-e-Jafaria
TNSM	Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shari'at-e-Mohammadi
UDF	United Democratic Front
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

LIST OF TABLES & APPENDICES

TABLES

Table No.	Description	Page No.
1	The List of General Elections in Pakistan and JUI/JUI (F)	33
2	Party Position in the General Elections 2002	98
3	Percentage Share of Votes Polled for MMA, General Elections 2002	99
4	Party Position in Provincial Assemblies, General Elections 2008	106

APPENDICES

Appendix No.	Description	Page No.
Appendix I	Interview of Professor Muhammad Waqas Khan	135
Appendix II	Manifesto of MMA	139

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I express my deepest sense of gratitude to Almighty Allah, Who enabled me to complete this research work. In completing this dissertation, I acknowledge the support of the institutions and individuals, without whose valuable cooperation it would have been difficult for me to undertake this study. First of all, I am deeply indebted to my supervisor Dr. Husnul Amin, Department of Politics and International Relations, International Islamic University, Islamabad. His guidance, constant encouragement and keen interest in my work have been a source of inspiration for me. His perceptive comments and suggestions enabled me to improve this work a lot. He generously spent his time and energy in critically examining both contents and style of the work.

I owe a special gratitude to all my respected teachers at IIUI, especially, Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gillani, Dr. Akhtar Hussain, Dr. Qandeel Abbass, Dr. Noor Fatima, Dr. Manzoor Afridi, Aamir Rizwan (late) and Zubair Khan Baloch, who have always been remained sources of learning and inspiration for me. The overall caring and educational environment at IIU is another important factor behind my achievements. I am also thankful to the staff of Central Library IIUI, Hamidullah Library and Shar'iah Library both at Faisal Masjid Campus, the National Library Islamabad and NIPS Library at Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad.

I owe a great debt of gratitude and thanks to my officers and office colleagues, who extended their full cooperation to facilitate me in my study and research. Especially, Madam Shagufta Haroon, the Director (Academics) at IIU, Mr. Mahmood ur Rehman, Additional Director, Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed, Assistant Director and other staff members mainly Mr. Farhan Mateen Khan, Mr. Rafique Abbasi, Mr. Qaiser Khan, Mr. Kashif Rana, Mr. Turab Ali, Mr. Ghulam Ali and others. I also would like to express my heartiest thanks to all my friends and class fellows, especially, Mr. Daud Tanoli and Raja Mohsin Ali, who always encouraged, appreciated and motivated me as well as materially support me during different phases of my research.

I would like to express my profound appreciation and love to my parents, who are presently not in this world. However, my parents, especially my mother have always been a source of inspiration for me. I think that the successes and achievements, whatsoever in my life are the reward of Almighty Allah and the result of prayers of my parents. I would also like to express profound love and respect to my family members, especially my wife Nabeela, daughter Amna Kiran and son Muhammad Ali, my Uncles Mr. Hafeez ur Rehman and Mr. Muhammad Farid who generously spared me for this work as well as facilitated me to complete this assignment.

At the end, I am thankful to all those people whose names could not be mentioned here but their cooperation and support enabled me to complete my thesis.

Ejaz Ahmed

December 20, 2103

ABSTRACT

In Pakistan there are various kinds of diversities and divisions on the basis of ethnicity, languages, religion, sectarianism and provincialism etc. These diversities and divisions are reflected in the form of a number of political parties both secular and religious. Some are mainstream political parties like PPP, PML (N), some are regional and ethnic parties mainly popular in one or two provinces like ANP, and some have representation in only one province like BNP, JWP, NP, and PKAMP in Baluchistan and MQM in the urban areas of Sindh. Besides these, there are some religious parties, out of which JUI (F), JUI (S), JI, JUP, Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith as well as some smaller Shia political parties are prominent. In the electoral politics of Pakistan, the religious parties could not inspire much and their share of votes polled and representation in the National and Provincial Assemblies had been on gradual decline since the general elections of 1970 to 1997. The religious parties performed poorly in the general elections of 1997, when only JUI (F) won two seats of the National Assembly. However, in the next general elections of 2002 held under Musharraf's regime, the performance of MMA, an electoral alliance of six religious parties, was extra ordinary in the electoral history of Pakistan, which surprised many experts both at home and abroad. MMA was the third largest party in National Assembly after PML (Q) and PPP. MMA formed its government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and was a coalition partner in Baluchistan government. In the general elections of 2008, the performance of the religious parties was again not satisfactory. Jama'at-i-Islami boycotted these general elections, however, JUI (F) the only major and leading party in

MMA succeeded to win six general seats of National Assembly along with eight seats of Khyber Paktunkhwa and five seats of Baluchistan Assemblies.

The religious parties have limited vote bank mostly concentrated in some specific geographic regions of Pakistan. JI is popular in the middle class of urban areas and some Northern districts of Khyber Paktunkhwa. JUI (F), whose leadership is mostly from Pashtoon clerics, is mainly popular in the Southern districts of Khyber Paktunkhwa and Pashtoon belt of Baluchistan. JUP has lost its vote bank with the passage of time and due to lack of organizational and leadership crises, it could not perform well after the general elections of 1970. The other religious political parties have scattered vote bank, hence, unable to contest general elections without the support of mainstream political parties or by entering into any electoral alliance.

Both factions of JUI (JUI-F & JUI-S) and JI are considered more active and comparatively successful in electoral politics than other religious political parties. However, overall electoral performance of JUI (F), the largest and powerful faction of JUI, is comparatively better than all other religious parties. JUI (F) contested all the general elections; however, JI boycotted the general elections of 1997 and 2008. Furthermore, JUI (F) always played an important role in the politics of Pakistan, whether as a part of government or opposition. Maulana Fazal ur Rehman, the son of Mufti Mahmud has been leading JUI (F) since 1980. Due to his political strategies, maneuverings, balanced political behaviour and ability to make alliances with religious as well as secular political parties, enabled JUI (F) to enjoy some key positions. During second tenure of Benazir Bhutto (1993-1996), Maulana Fazal ur Rehman was the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. From 2002 to 2007, JUI (F) led the Khyber

Paktunkhwa government, it was a coalitional partner of Baluchistan government and its *Amir* Maulana Fazal ur Rehman was the Opposition Leader at National Assembly. During 2008 to 2013, JUI (F) was the coalitional partner of PPP, both at federal government as well as Baluchistan government. Maulana Fazal ur Rehman was the Chairman of Kashmir Committee, Maulana Sherani was the Chairman IIC (2010-2013) and Senator Talha of JUI (F) was the Chairman Interior Committee of Senate.

The analysis of results of elections and the role of JUI (F) in the national politics as well as in the provinces of Khyber Paktunkhwa and Baluchistan proved that the leadership of this party uses pragmatic approaches and never ignores the ground realities of politics. It has the ability to behave democratically and believes in the electoral politics, hence, considered as 'the party of masses'. Its main source of support lies in the vast mosque and *madrasah* network of Deobandi sect. It is vocal of its religious discourse; however, keeping in mind the political culture of Pakistan, acts pragmatically. It is, therefore, comparatively more successful than other religious political parties of Pakistan.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

In democracies, general elections provide an opportunity in which masses elect their representatives according to their preferences with the expectations that in return these elected representatives will form public policies which will be helpful to minimize their problems ultimately¹. Political parties are the main agents of political representation in democratic systems of governance². In Pakistan, there are prominent ethnic, religious and political divisions, which further resulted in the formation of a numerous nationalist, socialist, religious and regional political parties. These political parties try to attract voters through their ideologies and future preferences in the policy spheres. These political parties struggle to win majority seats of National and Provincial Assemblies to form governments at Federal and Provincial levels, enabling them to fulfill their agenda as well as aspirations of their voters.

Through electoral politics, the political parties manage to win seats, as maximum as possible, enabling them to hold public offices to control the administration and resources of the state to enhance their agendas as well as fulfillment of their commitments to the masses. In case of Pakistan, the military and civil bureaucracies have a strong hold on

¹Norman Schofield, and Itai Sened, *Multiparty Democracy: Elections and Legislative Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5.

²Frances Hagopian, *Parties and Voters in Emerging Democracies: The Oxford Hand Book of Comparative Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 582.

politics and public policy processes³. Furthermore, elections are also a source for legitimacy of ruling regimes in the form of mass mandate⁴. In sum, the results of general elections generally depend upon a number of factors which may be voter's preferences and trends, rules and regulations of elections, behavior of ruling regimes and establishment, ideologies, manifestos and previous practices of political parties etc.

Religious political parties mainly use religion as an instrument to attract the masses. It is a well-known fact that religion plays an important role in the personal lives of public as well as in politics. During the Pakistan movement, most of the Islamic political parties were opposing the idea of Pakistan. However, after the independence of Pakistan, these Islamic political parties re-emerged on the scene of politics with the agenda to establish the newly born state of Pakistan into an Islamic state. Since then, these parties have been struggling to enhance their agenda through constitutional means as well as through the modes of agitation. Presently, around 25 Islamic parties participate in the politics but their success has been depended less on electoral victories and more on support from military regimes. Their influence also lies in their ability to pressure governments from outside parliament or by entering into politically expedient alliances with the two largest mainstream political parties which are moderate on religious issues; the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim Leagues (PMLs)⁵. Out of these parties, the most significant Islamic political parties are Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) representing Deobandis in Pakistan, Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) representing Bralevi and Jama'at-e-Islami (JI) believes in Islamic revivalism. These parties adopted different

³ Muhammad Waseem, *Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 4.

⁴ Ibid., 3.

⁵ International Crises Group Asia Report No. 216, *Islamic Parties in Pakistan* (Islamabad/Brussels: 2011), 1.

political strategies during general elections to contest elections; however, the one common similarity lies in their support base from the mosques and *madrasah* networks to influence their voters in the name of Islam. The military and civilian establishments as well as the religious political parties have been succeeded to use ideological power bases in the election campaigns in terms of two nation theory, the ideology of Pakistan and mainly the Islam⁶.

Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) has been existed in the politics since the creation of Pakistan. Before the partition of India, there was Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind (JUH) on the political scene. JUH was mainly supporter of All India National Congress and opposed the demand of Pakistan. However, a faction of JUH, led by Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, favored All India Muslim League (AIML). After the creation of Pakistan, these *Ulema* named their group as JUI and started struggle to make the newly born state into an Islamic state, along with other religious parties.

The JUI gained a remarkable victory in the first general elections of Pakistan in 1970 and formed coalition governments in NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Baluchistan. In the mid of 1980s, JUI disintegrated into two factions; JUI (F) and JUI (S). JUI (S) was more pro-Zia regime than JUI (F).

The most powerful faction of JUI is JUI (F) led by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman. JUI (F) is a significant political entity who believes in electoral politics having sizeable pockets of support in some Pashtoon-majority districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan⁷. Its organizational structure and support relies heavily on a large *madrasah* network. Unlikely JI, the JUI (F) has functioned primarily as a "party of masses" for which electoral success

⁶ Waseem, Op.cit., 49.

⁷ Ibid., 2.

is critical⁸. Although, its electoral success is limited but it mostly remains successful to become coalition partner with other political parties to form federal as well as provincial governments of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan.

Religious political parties did not perform comparatively well in the general elections held during 1988-1997. However, in the general elections of 2002, six religious political parties of Pakistan, having different and rival ideologies, formed an electoral alliance named *Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal* (MMA). For the first time in the electoral history of Pakistan, this alliance of religious political parties won a remarkable victory. MMA was the third largest party in the National Assembly of Pakistan with 59 seats out of 342, and become a major opposition party. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, MMA formed its government by having 68 seats in the house of 124. In Baluchistan, MMA had 18 seats out of 65, adding with independents and formed coalition government with Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam), the PML (Q)⁹.

As compare to other member parties of MMA, JUI (F) and Jama'at-e-Islamic (JI) were the main beneficiaries of 2002 general elections. However, JUI (F) was more successful, having a largest share of seats won from the platform of MMA and leading the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government. In Baluchistan, JUI (F) was sharing coalition governments alone, as all the seats of MMA form Baluchistan, were won by JUI (F) candidates.

In the general elections of 2008, MMA was not effective due to JI's decision of boycotting the election; however, JUI (F) succeeded to win 7 seats in National Assembly and become a part of coalition government with PPP, ANP and MQM. JUI (F) is also a coalition partner in Baluchistan government with 7 seats. Hence, it can be concluded that

⁸ Ibid., 10.

⁹ Kamran Aziz Khan, "2002 Election in Pakistan: A Reappraisal," *Journal of Political Studies* (Lahore, Punjab University, vol. 18, Issue 1, 2011), 93-108.

JUI (F), irrespective of its limited vote bank, succeeded to survive in the present political system of Pakistan due to its political maneuverings and strategies according to ground realities at the time of general elections.

During most of the history, Pakistan has been under military rule of Gen Ayub Khan (1958-69), Gen Yahya Khan (1969-71), Gen Zia ul Haq (1977-88) and Gen Pervaiz Musharraf (1999-2007). The common threat for military regimes as well as the religious political parties is the mainstream political parties. Hence, both military regimes and the religious political parties are natural ally to each other. JUI had favored the Islamization process of General Zia in Pakistan as well as an active cooperation with military/ISI during the Afghan war (1979-88). During 1990s Taliban movement started from JUI *Maddariss* which further captured Kabul and set their government in Afghanistan. These Taliban were educated in *maddariss* of JUI. Although, Amir of JUI (S) Maulana Sami ul Haq openly claims that his party launched the Taliban into Afghanistan¹⁰; however, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, the *Amir* of JUI (F) has not made any such claim openly. Hence, he keeps his party at a distance from the Taliban, although JUI (F) is running the largest network of *Maddariss* in Pakistan where Afghan refugees have also been studying since 1980s.

1.2. Literature Review

The role of religion to shape the results of general elections is as old as the ballot box¹¹. 'Islamism' is simply meant a set of political and social movement whose aim is to 'bring Islam back' into politics and society. For this purpose Islamists struggle for Islamization of state and society by demanding changes in law, changes in political leadership and

¹⁰ ICG Asia Report No. 49, *The Mullahs and the Military* (Islamabad/Brussels: 2003), 13.

¹¹ Esmer Yilmaz, and Petterson Thorleif, *The Effects of Religion and Religiosity on Voting Behavior: The Oxford Hand Book of Political Behavior* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 481.

foreign policy along with other aspects of social life¹². The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran marked a trend in the ideological discourse throughout the Islamic world¹³.

The ideological position of Islamic parties and movements cover a wide range from the conservative application of *Shar'iat* to more liberal interpretation of religion¹⁴. By entering into a democratic process, the religious parties have accepted the norms of democracy and integrated into social and spiritual life through their political activities¹⁵. Some scholars argue that some Islamic parties are labeled moderate due to their partial acceptance of democratic norms. However, the long term agenda of these Islamic parties is to move forward for Islamization of state and society, has generally been ignored¹⁶. It is a well-known fact that majority of Muslims does not favor extremism and are more desirous for democracy¹⁷.

To uphold the importance of Islam, the modern Muslim intellectuals have been searching and seeking the ways of making Islam compatible with the challenges of the modern age¹⁸. On the other hand the role of Muslim *Ulema* cannot be ignored who are an active part of the Muslim societies¹⁹. These *Ulema* are continuously and self-consciously claiming to represent millennium old tradition of Islamic learning. These mobilization efforts are helpful for *Ulema* to attain authority in the public spheres²⁰.

¹² Andrea Teti, and Andrea Mura, *Islam and Islamism: Rutledge Hand Book of Religion and Politics* (Oxen/New York: Rutledge, 2009), 102-103.

¹³ Payam Mohseni and Clyde Wilcox, *Religion and Political Parties: Rutledge Hand Book of Religion and Politics* (Oxen/New York, Rutledge, 2009), 222.

¹⁴ Ibid., 223.

¹⁵ Ibid., 215.

¹⁶ Ibid., 223.

¹⁷ Teti, and Mura, *Islam and Islamism*, Op.c t., 104.

¹⁸ Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *Contemporary Ulema in Islam: Custodian of Change* (Princeton University Press, 2007), 7.

¹⁹ Ibid., 1.

²⁰ Ibid., 10.

In Pakistan, soon after independence, the religious parties started playing the role of pressure groups. In the general elections of 1970, due to the defeat of PML, the religious parties (JUP, JUI & JI) filled the gap of opposition parties to PPP government inside and outside the parliament. JUI also formed coalition governments in two provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. In 1977, the secular parties accepted the religious leadership who was capable to mobilize their madrasah students agitating against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. General Zia ul Haq also successfully used religious political parties in his favor against the demand of democracy by the mainstream political parties²¹. The religious political parties gained remarkable victory in the general elections of 1970 (21.5% vote) but gradually came on decline by gaining 6.7% votes in the general elections of 1993. In the general elections of 1997, two seats won by JUI (F) only.

Furthermore, the religious political parties keep on mounting pressure on every government, whether military or civilian, to enhance their agenda of Islamization and non-acceptance of *madrasah* reforms initiated by any government²². On the other hand, Pakistani governments generally used Islamic ideology to counter the demand of autonomy from the provinces and for keeping the national unity intact²³. In this way, all the civilian as well as military governments have been adopting compromising policies towards the religious parties.

In the general elections of 2002, the remarkable victory of MMA was a surprise for all. MMA's victory was mainly based on their campaign on the basis of anti US and anti

²¹ Muhammad Waseem, "Origins and Growth Patterns of Islamic Organizations in Pakistan" (2004), 22-23 available from <http://apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsiach2.pdf>

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

Musharraf stance. After electoral success, contradictory practices of MMA emerged in the shape that in National Assembly, MMA was playing the role of opposition party against PML (Q), a pro-Musharraf party, whereas, in Baluchistan, MMA was a coalition partner of PML (Q). Due to MMA's poor performance in the governments of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, the alliance of MMA was not much effective in 2008 elections which further resulted loss of its earlier position of 2002 victories²⁴. Irrespective of contradicting ideologies of MMA's member parties, it tried to bring *Shar'iat* and impose Islamic values in the society of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa²⁵. With the support of military, MMA propagated for the dual issues of enforcement of *Shar'iat* and opposition to US-led intervention in Afghanistan. The third motive was to defuse the strength of mainstream political parties i.e. PML (N) and PPP. MMA provided cover to General Musharraf by favoring the 17th Constitutional Amendment²⁶.

JI and JUI are considered moderate political parties who often entered into alliances to contest elections²⁷. Even as the Islamist landscape evolves, the JUI (F) and the JI remain the two most influential Islamic parties, representing the two main strands of Pakistani religious politics, Deobandi orthodoxy and Islamic revivalism respectively.

The JUI (F) is a major national level player by depending on electoral success²⁸. Unlike the JI, the JUI (F) has functioned primarily as a "party of the masses" for which electoral success is critical. Successes in the general elections, no matter how limited, have

²⁴Kamran Aziz, *2002 Election in Pakistan: A Reappraisal*, Op.cit., 104-105.

²⁵Shireen Mazari, *Ethnicity & Political Process: The Pakistani Experience*, a paper presented at the Conference on "South and South East Asia in Perspective – 20th and 21st Centuries" held at the Institute of Political and Social Studies, Lisbon, Portugal on Nov 12-14, 2002.

²⁶ICG Asia Report No. 216, Op.cit., 5.

²⁷Neha Sahgal, *Divided We Stand, But Undivided We Oppose? Opposition Alliances in Egypt and Pakistan*, a PhD Dissertation, (University of Maryland, 2008), 29-30.

²⁸ICG Asia Report No. 216, Op.cit., 2.

provided the opportunities to JUI (F) to form governments at the provincial level as well as a presence in federal cabinets, and hence access to resources and power²⁹.

Both factions of JUI were members of MMA; however, JUI (F) was the main beneficiary of MMA's victory of the general elections 2002³⁰. JUI (F) is the only party in the MMA with previous experience of running a provincial administration during 1970s³¹. JI boycotted the general elections of 2008 on the plea that the general elections would be rigged; however, JUI (F) was confident about its electoral politics. Although, JUI (F) succeeded to win 7 seats of National Assembly, 8 seats of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 7 seats of Baluchistan Assemblies respectively; however, largely it failed to maintain its previous victory of 2002 general elections³². Before the formation of MMA, there is a history of relations of religious political parties and Taliban, as Taliban were the graduates of large *madrasah* network of mainly the JUIs³³. The Taliban has close relations with both factions of JUI which was the main concern of the Kabul government during JUI's tenure of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan governments (2002-07)³⁴. The Afghan refugees who have Pakistani National Identity cards supported JUI, hence, becomes an important electorate vote bank³⁵.

JUI has been active in the politics of Pakistan soon after independence to enhance its agenda of Islamization of the state. JUI also took part in general elections and emerged as a prominent religious party in NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Baluchistan. It

²⁹ Ibid., 10.

³⁰ Ibid., 11.

³¹ ICG Asia Report No. 49, Op.cit., 12.

³² ICG Asia Report No. 216, Op.cit., 6.

³³ Kamran Aziz, *2002 Election in Pakistan: A Reappraisal*, Op.cit., 95.

³⁴ ICG Asia Report No. 49, Op.cit., 13.

³⁵ Wang Lian, "Talibanization in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan," *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)* (Volume 4, No. 1, 2010), 83.

shared coalition governments in both provinces with NAP in 1970s. Later on, JUI (F) also kept on entering in electoral alliances and coalition governments with such political parties having ideological differences with it. JUI (F) has been allegedly remarked as an opportunists party like other religious political parties which usually revolved around the nexus of power³⁶.

The literature on political learning has pointed out that different actors can learn to work together through their exposure and experience with each other even in non-democratic settings³⁷. The opposition activism in Pakistan has always accompanied by high level alliance building even among opposition groups despite their ideological differences. Their alliances may be formed and functioned through bargainings and tit-for-tat strategies³⁸. The theory of coalition formation considers two incentives responsible for coalescence of political parties to join cabinet. First, it is office-related payoffs, and the second is policy-related payoffs³⁹.

In spite of number of arguments, the ground realities have been ignored in above explained literature review, like Pakistan's political culture which has not been so rich and polluted by a number of factors e.g. constant military interventions, feudalism, bureaucratic hold on the resources of state and public policy process, ethnic and sectarian divisions in the society etc. Hence, sometimes a smaller political party is compelled to negotiate and accommodate other opponent forces through mutual cooperation and by concealing their conflicts. It is more important for smaller political parties to use political

³⁶ Sayyid A.S. Pirzada, *The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam 1970-77* (Karach: Oxford University Press, 2000), 232.

³⁷ Sahgal, *Divided We Stand*, *Op.cit.*, 26.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 13 & 23.

³⁹ Muhammad Mushtaq, Muhammad Ayaz, and Aqlama Syed Khawja, "Politics of Power Sharing in post 1971 Pakistan," *Journal of Politics and Law* (March 2011), 255; available from <http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/issue/view/282>; accessed 5 April 2012.

strategies through electoral politics to safeguard their voter's interests either socio-economic or ideological.

1.3. Theoretical Framework

There are different models to study elections like spatial studies, alignment studies and party organizational studies. According to spatial model, the issue position of political parties and voters converges at certain points. Political parties try to establish contacts with voter's viewpoints to control the dimensionality of a campaign's issue space⁴⁰. In Pakistan, this model could be applied to the study of the general elections 1970 and to some extent the general elections of 1977, as these elections demonstrated a high level of issue salience.

The alignment model of electoral politics is typically based on party identification at the national or provincial level. This model elaborates about voter's entrenched partisanship based on short term factors. The party alignment, de-alignment and re-alignment are persistent features of electoral politics in Pakistan. A stable pattern of party voter alignment is the norm in the medium to long-term perspective in Pakistan. PML, PPP, MQM, ANP, JI, JUP, JUI; all have enjoyed stable constituencies over decades⁴¹. This is so because party and party leadership provides the ultimate and all-encompassing identity framework for voters⁴². This model is more suitable to study the electoral politics of JUI (F) which has a concentrated vote bank in the traditional and tribal societies of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan.

⁴⁰ A. Westholm, "Distance versus Direction: The Illusory Defeat of the Proximity Theory of Electoral Choice," *American Political Science Review*, (1997, 91), cited by Waseem, *Democratization in Pakistan*, 38.

⁴¹ Waseem, *Democratization in Pakistan*, 38.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 52.

The party organizational model is based on the growing organizational fluidity of political parties. In case of Pakistan, the political parties have not been found such growing opportunities due to constant military interventions in politics which further resulted bans on political parties or military's preferences of holding non-party general elections like those of 1962 and 1985. Due to these constraints, political parties tend to struggle for their survival and rights instead of leaning towards organizational growth⁴³.

Gellner emphasized that scholarly analysis of political Islam has been dominated by two different conceptual approaches. The first approach emphasized on discursive, behavioral and ideological analysis, essentializing and presenting Islam as antithetical to Western concepts like democracy⁴⁴. Within this group, some further argue that Islamic values are incompatible with modernity and predict an inevitable clash of civilizations⁴⁵. The second approach corresponds that participation of Islamic parties in the democratic process may moderate their positions by accepting the democratic norms. In this perspective, democratization arises through the strategic interaction of key actors; and ideology and norms may be altered by democratic politics⁴⁶. Democratic political process can emerge even among those elements that lack commitment to democratic norms⁴⁷.

Vali Nasr concluded that Muslim democracy rests not on an abstract, carefully thought-out theological and ideological accommodation between Islam and democracy, but rather on a practical synthesis that is emerging in much of the Muslim world in response to the

⁴³ Ibid., 39.

⁴⁴ Gellner E. "Civil society in historical context", *International Social Science Journal*, (1991) 129, 495-510, cited by Mohsni and Wilcox, *Religion and Political Parties*, 222.

⁴⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, "The clash of civilizations" *Foreign Affairs*, (summer 1993), 72, 3, 22-49.

⁴⁶ O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986) *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, cited by Mohsni and Wilcox, *Religion and Political Parties*, 222.

⁴⁷ Ghassan Salamè, *Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World* (London: I. B. Taurus, 1994).

opportunities and demands created by the ballot box⁴⁸. Ideological commitments setting the boundaries of justifiable action need to be considered as an important dimension in addition to political opportunity structures and the internal group structures and organizations of parties⁴⁹.

1.4. Justification for the Study

The justification of this research lies in generating a better understanding of driving forces behind the electoral politics of religious political parties of Pakistan. This research will add more value to the existing literature on the subject. Mostly scholars have debated the extremist approach of religious political parties posing the probable future threats of Islamic extremism. This study will reveal that if the Islamic political parties will continuously take part in the elections; two possible outcomes will be expected. First, the religious parties like JUI (F), which have been part of federal and provincial governments, will better able to understand the real problems of society and state. Secondly, the masses can also evaluate the performance of the religious political parties in the forthcoming general elections.

An analysis of political strategies of leadership, organizational structure and achievements of JUI (F) in the context of electoral politics will also be fruitful for other religious political parties and groups to play their role in the mainstream politics of Pakistan. This research will also be valuable for policy makers, academicians, scholars and students in their respective fields of study who are concerned with the understanding of electoral politics of JUI (F) in the perspective of Islamic political parties.

⁴⁸Vali Reza Nasr "The Rise of Muslim Democracy", *Journal of Democracy*, (April 2005, 16, 2), 13-27; available from <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jod/summary/v016/16.2nasr.html> ; accessed 5 April 2012.

⁴⁹Mohsni, and Wilcox, *Religion and Political Parties*, Op.cit., 223.

1.5. Scope of Thesis

The results of general elections reveal that the vote share of religious political parties has been less than the mainstream political parties, however, these religious political parties continuously taking part in general elections. These religious political parties, more organized than secular political parties, consider general elections as a vehicle to reach in the federal and provincial assemblies and cabinets. To ensure their success in the general elections, these parties, on one hand, attract the voters through their Islamic ideologies and programmes and on the other hand make electoral alliances and seat adjustments with such political parties having conflicting agendas.

In the political history of Pakistan, the military has always played an extensive role in the politics of country through its regular and direct interventions. The military has been involved in shaping of national interest and foreign policy of Pakistan. To enhance their particular agendas, both military and religious political parties consider the mainstream political parties of Pakistan as a threat for them; hence, become natural ally to support each other.⁵⁰ In this way, the religious political parties enhance their agenda of Islamization as well as seeking power and authority in administering the public offices through electoral politics.

JUI (F) has comparatively been more successful than other religious political parties by adopting such political strategies and maneuverings during general elections by her moderate leadership, especially the *Amir* of JUI (F) Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, enabling the party to survive in the political system of Pakistan. Furthermore, by exploiting the domestic and regional political landscape, the party has been successful to win general

⁵⁰ ICG Asia Report No. 49, Op.cit., 2.

elections mainly in the Pashtoon areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provinces. The electoral politics of JUI (F) transformed the party into an important coalition partner of federal as well as provincial governments of these two provinces.

The rationale to take the period of 1988 to 2008 is that since 1988, a new era of democracy was started in Pakistan, when general elections were held on party basis after a long dictatorial regime of General Zia ul Haq. From 1988 to 1997, four general elections were held and four democratic governments were dismissed, hence, no government could complete its tenure. In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf took over the charge of government and a new phase of military regime started. The last two elections i.e. 2002 and 2008 were held under Musharraf's military regime as well as a new changing world after the events of 9/11. Hence, this is a study and analysis of six elections, which will elaborate preferences and politics of religious political parties under civilian and military regimes along with new circumstances of post-cold war and 9/11.

1.6. Research Question

How and why, JUI-F has been able to perform comparatively better than other religious political parties in the electoral politics of Pakistan?

1.7. Research Methodology

This research will be conducted by using following research methods and sources:-

- Comparative historical approach is inherently a field in which researchers concentrate for a great deal of over time data to infer causation. The analysis of process over time is the central basis for causal inference. By process mechanism through which an independent variable exerts an effect on a dependent variable. The analyst starts with an observed

association and then explores whether the association reflects causation by looking for mechanisms that link cause and effect in practical cases⁵¹. This approach addresses a wide range of issues concerning descriptive and causal inferences which are of general importance to the social sciences. Comparative historical methodology offers tools well adapted to the analysis of necessary and sufficient causes. In this study, mainly quantitative research, based on election results will be carried out by using comparative historical approach. However, qualitative analysis is also a part of research where necessary.

- At the end of each election, election reports are generally published by the governments and other national and international agencies and organizations covering the nature of legal and institutional framework, historical growth of constituencies and electoral role, the judicial and military involvement (where applicable). These reports will be consulted for analysis.
- Interviews and view points of leaders of religious political parties will be analyzed for better understanding of the phenomena of electoral politics of the religious political parties of Pakistan.

⁵¹James Mohoney, "Comparative-Historical Methodology", *Annual Review of Sociology* (2004, 30), 88; available from <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110507>; accessed 10 April 2012.

1.8. Organization of the Study

Chapter One: Introduction

This chapter provides a back ground of thesis, literature review, theoretical framework, models of study and objectives of thesis, research question as well as research methodology.

Chapter Two: Pakistan: A Religio-Political Landscape

In section-I, the focus is made on the role of *Ulema* and religious political parties in British India with a precise background of colonial period, important moments of Pakistan Movement and the colonial legacy of Pakistan. This history based struggle is helpful to understand the ideologies of the religious political parties and their sources of inspiration. In section-II, a precise history of general elections has been mentioned with a glimpse on the performance and role of JUI/JUI (F). In section-III, there is a short overview of the political parties of Pakistan – both secular and religious, which will be helpful to understand the electoral politics of Pakistan.

Chapter Three: JUI (F): Evolution, Organization, Ideology

In section-I, the establishment of JUH and its role in Pakistan Movement, the disintegration of JUH and establishment of JUI in 1945, and the role of JUI in Pakistan Movement as well as after the creation of Pakistan its role in different phases has been mentioned in details. Furthermore, the creation of JUI (F) along with its participation in the general elections has also been explained. Section-II contains the organizational structure of JUI (F) and role of its Amir, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman. In section-III, the origin of ideology of JUI (F), its ideological discourse, aims and objectives, manifestoes, and role of mosques and Maddariss in the electoral politics of JUI (F) has been described.

Chapter Four: Comparison of Electoral Politics of JUI (F) and Other Religious Political Parties – 1988 to 2008

In this chapter, a comprehensive analysis of six general elections held from 1988 to 2008 has been carried out. A short overview of pre-election scenario, electoral alliances and election campaign, election results and post-election developments and formation of governments associated with each general election separately, by focusing on the successes and failures of the religious political parties especially the performance of JUI (F) and its comparison with other religious political parties.

Chapter Five: JUI (F): Between Ideology and Pragmatism

In the start of this chapter the concepts of ideology and its importance, the relation of ideology with the political parties, the ideological discourse of the religious political parties of Pakistan and pragmatism has been clarified. In section-I, the ideological basis of JUI (F) has been mentioned in details. In section-II, the pragmatic approaches of JUI (F) along with its political strategies and its stance on issue based politics and its comparison with other religious political parties, mainly, the JI and the JUP, has been carried out.

Chapter Six: Findings and Conclusion

This chapter contains findings and conclusion of the study.

Chapter Two

PSKISTAN: A RELGIO-POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

2.1. Introduction

This chapter mainly relates to the electoral history of religious political parties of Pakistan, however, some other topics are indispensable to touch in a precise manner. Firstly, to discuss the ideological basis of the religious political parties, some particular moments of the history of Muslim period of the sub-continent and Pakistan Movement are quite essential to mention, from where, these parties take inspiration. This is also necessary to highlight the ideologies and viewpoints, about creation of Pakistan and partition of India, of such religious political parties which have been existed in the United India before partition.

Secondly, as this thesis is specifically related to the period 1988 to 2008 (to cover six general elections held during this period i.e. 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002 and 2008), however, for development of a better understanding of electoral politics, a short political history of Pakistan will prove to be quite facilitative and justified. Similarly, the main subject matter to be discussed in this thesis relates to the religious political parties in general and JUI (F) in particular, however, a short overview of the mainstream political parties like PML and PPP and regional/ethnic political parties of the Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan will be valuable as these all parties are important, being actors of the political system of Pakistan. Moreover, as compare to the mainstream political parties, the religious parties have limited and concentrated vote bank and sometimes the mainstream political parties are in dire need of political support from

religious parties and vice versa. Similarly, the role of regional and ethnic political parties is also very crucial, which may be rival or partner of religious political parties in formation of provincial governments or playing the role of opposition therein. So overall, this chapter will serve a concrete background for further study and analysis in next chapters.

2.2. Pakistan: A Colonial Legacy

Pakistan came into being on 14 August 1947 after a long political struggle to get independence from the British rule and a tough opposition from Hindu majority over the partition of India. The British, during their rule over the Sub-Continent developed a bureaucratic structure to strengthen their regime. Like other colonial states, both Pakistan and India also inherited the colonial legacy of bureaucratic administration trained on British style of governance. Hereunder is a short background of colonial legacy along with some important moments of Pakistan Movement as well as the role of political and religious parties.

2.2.1. The Pakistan Movement

There is a long history of Pakistan Movement starting from 1857 to 1947. However, this is not the purview of this thesis to narrate the Pakistan Movement in details. Hence, to highlight the ideology of Pakistan as well as the stance of religious political parties upon creation of Pakistan, only some important milestones will be touched to provide a background for electoral study of Pakistan in the perspective of religious political parties.

2.2.2. The Muslim Rule over the Sub-Continent

Pakistan came into being on August 14, 1947 after a long political struggle of the Muslims of the Sub-Continent. This political struggle had its links with history of the

Sub-Continent, where minority Muslims ruled over the majority Hindus for many centuries. The birth of Pakistan is the result of the demand of the Muslims for separate Muslim nationalism, for which, a territorial base was found in the Muslim majority areas¹.

Although, Muslims had been ruling the Sub-Continent partially or wholly since 712 AD, when the first Arab conqueror Muhammad bin Qasim attacked Sindh. In later centuries, great Muslim conquerors invaded through the North-Western Passes of the Sub-Continent e.g. Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (998-1030 AD) annexed Lahore and until 1020 AD, the northern part of the Sub-Continent (which later constitute the West Pakistan) were under the Muslim rule. The Southern India was conquered by Muhammad Ghauri (d. 1206). Iltutmash (1211-1236 AD) built the original fabric of the Delhi Sultanate. The great administrator Balban dominated Northern India first as an all-powerful Noble (1246-1265 AD) and later as king (1265-1287 AD)².

The great Mughals had occupied the throne of Delhi in 1526 AD and established a strong empire. The Mughals were the strongest rulers of the Sub-Continent. However, with the death of Aurangzeb (1707 AD), the empire was on the path of decline and disintegration. Finally, the British, a colonial power, occupied the Sub-Continent in 1857 AD.

The Muslim ruled over the Sub-Continent for almost one thousand years. During this period, they introduced their patterns in the spheres of politics, administration, culture etc. The Muslim conquests of the Sub-Continent paved the way for large number of Muslims, especially the saints, scholars and missionaries from the Central Asia, who not only spread Islam in the Sub-Continent but with their general piety and humanitarian

¹ Sikandar Hayat, and Shandana Zahid (editors), *Genesis of Pakistan Movement*, (Ferozsons (pvt) Ltd and Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad, 1988), 3.

² Ibid., 4.

approaches, provided a meeting ground between Muslims and other religious entities³. Although, the Muslims were in minority but they were ruling over a large majority of non-Muslims, mainly the Hindus, for about one thousand years. In this scenario, followers of both the religions i.e. Islam and Hinduism were struggling to preserve their religious, cultural and political identities. During the whole Muslim period, the Hindus were appointed on key positions of government. The Muslim rulers, especially, the Mughals, tried to consolidate both the religions to maintain peace and harmony in the society as well as to sustain and strengthen their rule, by gaining the cooperation of native population. Akbar, a great Mughal emperor, who ruled for fifty years (1556-1606), launched vigorous and sustained efforts to bring the Muslims and Hindus together. He was advancing in such a great pace that the identity of Muslims was at the brink of danger and the *Ulema* and saints of his time raised the resistance against his un-Islamic practices and struggled for the preservation of Muslim identity and spirit of the teachings of Islam.

Politically, the eighteenth century remained a period of defeat and disintegration for Muslims but in cultural and religious spheres, it was the time of reconstruction. The Muslim education system was standardized on the basis of popular curriculum of *Dars-i-Nizamiyah*, established by Aurangzeb, who supported the Muslim educational institutions during his long reign of fifty years. The earlier Muslims rulers as well as the Mughals promoted "Persian" as a government language, however, during eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Urdu was progressing towards replacing Persian and other

³ Ibid., 5

languages in the Sub-Continent. These developments were helpful for the unification and consolidation of the Muslim society⁴.

The period from 1707 to 1857 was a history of decline of the Mughal Empire, strengthening of the British political control over the sub-continent and widening of gulf between the Muslim and the Hindu communities. A number of attempts were made by different personalities and sections of society to regain the strength and stability against a regular penetration of the British colonialism. Some Muslim rulers of princely states like Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan of Massure resisted militarily against the British. Due to weak political center at Delhi, non-cooperation of other neighboring princely states, less modern and developed military equipments as compare to the British army, these expeditions had not become fruitful overall. On scholarly level, the religious clergy tried their best to preserve the identity of their fellow Muslims through revival of Islamic teachings as well as to culminate the efforts of Christian missionaries who were trying to convert the inhabitants of Sub-Continent into Christians. Shah Wali Ullah (1703-1761), contributed a lot for the revival of Islamic teachings. For the first time, he translated the Holy Quran into Persian, enabling the masses to understand the contents and teachings of the sacred Book. He spent whole of his life for the spiritual regeneration and consolidation among different sects of Muslims. After his death, his four sons, most notably, Shah Abdul Aziz, continued his mission.

Some *Ulema* also waged armed struggle (*Jihad*) against those forces which were responsible to weaken the Muslim political rule. Syed Ahmed Brelvi and Shah Ismail Shaheed toured all over Sub-Continent and prepared the Muslims for *Jihad*, especially, against the Sikhs in Northern India. Although, *Jihad* was ended unsuccessful, however,

⁴ Ibid., 7

this movement promoted the spiritual awareness and guidance for the Muslims of Sub-Continent. After the battle of Plassy (1757), the Bengal was politically cut off from the rest of India and was under the direct control of East India Company (the British). The *Jihad* movement of Syed Ahmed Brelvi and his companions re-established the links of Muslim Bengal with the Islamic centers of Northern India. This phenomena provided a cohesion in the Muslim community which resulted a century later that these two areas (Muslim Bengal and Northern India) grouped together to shape a newly independent state of Pakistan⁵.

2.2.3. The War of Independence (1857) and its Consequences on the Muslims

Until 1857, the British East India Company had taken over the control of major parts of the Sub-Continent. The writ of the last Mughal ruler, Bahadar Shah Zafer, was confined to Delhi. At this critical time, a war of independence was launched against the foreign rule. Both the Hindus and the Muslims took part in the war of independence; however, the Muslims, which were the rulers of India, were more prominent and active. The war of independence failed and the British forces occupied Delhi, arrested the last Mughal king and sent him to exile in Rangoon. In this way, the Muslim rule of one thousand years over the sub-continent came into an end in 1857.

Although, the war of independence was a joint effort of the Hindus and the Muslims along with other sections of the society, however, the Muslims were the main targets of new rulers of the Sub-Continent. For the Hindus, it was mere a change of masters i.e. from the Muslims to the British. By finding a suitable opportunity, the Hindus and other nations and religious entities of the Sub-Continent advanced forward towards cooperation

⁵ Ibid., 8

and integration with the new rules to secure their interests. However, the Muslims, whose position has now been changed from ruler to subjects, were in a state of confusion and mistrust and keep themselves at a considerable distance from the new rulers as well as from the new avenues of education and modernization. Instead they were trying to preserve their particular identity both religiously and culturally. At this critical juncture, some Muslim intellectuals and scholars tried to fill the gap to make the remedy of losses being occurred for the Muslims. Two streams of struggle were prominent as well as important in this regard.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was the leader of the first stream who believed in modern education and technology and cooperation with new rulers. He believed that in this way, the Muslims of Sub-Continent not only can secure their economic interests but also able to watch their political rights in the new setup of governance. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan established Aligarh College in 1875, which was later upgraded as Aligarh Muslim University. This institute provided a base for ideology of Muslim nationalism and leadership which played an important role in the Pakistan Movement⁶.

The leaders of second stream were the Muslim clergy i.e. the *Ulema*, who were leading the Muslim *Ummah* in religious matters since centuries. In Sub-Continent, when the Muslim rule had abolished and Islamic values and Muslim identities were under attack by other religious movements mainly from Christian missionaries, the Muslim *Ulema* initiated the efforts for the revival of Islamic teachings and practices. These efforts were mostly focused on reforms in the Muslim society along with preservation and purification of the Islamic teachings, faith and values. With the passage of time, a number of Islamic institutes of learning and *madariss* were established across the Sub-Continent for this

⁶ Ibid., 23

purpose. The most important and notable institute of that time was Dar ul Ulum Deoband, established in 1867. The other prominent institutes were Nadwatul *Ulema* (estb: 1891), Farangi Mahall (estb: at the end of eighteenth century at Lucknow), *Madrassa-yi-Rahimiyyah* of Shah Wali Ullah at Delhi (estb: in seventeenth century by the father of Shah Wali Ullah) and many others.

2.2.4. Role of Political and Religious Parties in the Pakistan Movement

The British Parliament passed "The Government of India Act, 1858". Under this Act, the Indian Territory was declared a colony to the British Crown. This Act was mostly relevant to administer the India and business of government⁷. To provide an internal framework for the administrative set up in India and to incorporate the local population in the administration, "The Indian Council Act, 1861" was introduced. In order to amend this Act, another Act was introduced in 1892 to expand the participation of native population in the administration. Due to these constitutional developments, the native population of India felt the necessity of their own political organization which may serve as a platform. For this purpose, The All India National Congress (the Congress) was established in 1885, which claimed for representation of all native people of India, irrespective of their religious affiliations. The notable Muslim leaders and scholars joined the Congress. However, these Muslims felt soon that the Congress is struggling for the interests of Hindu majority only, hence; serving as a Hindu dominated party. Due to harmful practices of Congress, the Muslims of India decided to establish their separate political party; hence, All India Muslim League (AIML) was established in 1906 at Dacca. Although, Muslims were also taking part in the activities of the Congress,

⁷⁷ Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2009), 6.

however, for Muslims, AIML provided more attractive platform for political activities than the Congress. Quid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was an active member of the Congress and the strong vocal of Hindu-Muslim unity. He also become disappointed from the behavior of Hindu leaders towards rights of the Muslims of India and joined AIML.

The *Ulema* have always been respected in the Muslim society. Their role was remained significant in the political and social realms of Muslim period of rule in the Sub-Continent. After the tragic end of Muslim rule in 1857, the *Ulema* struggled to preserve the Islamic teachings, values and cultural identities of the Muslims of India. These *Ulema* resisted against the imperialistic practices of the British. The *Ulema* politically organized themselves at the time of establishment of *Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba* (1913), when the holy places of Islam in Arabia were threatened by the West⁸. In 1919, this movement developed into Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind (JUH). JUH turned into a political spokes body of the Deoband School. After creation of Pakistan, the JUH continues its activities under the new name of Jamiat-i-Ulema-Islam Pakistan (JUI). During the independence movement, the *Ulema* joined JUH, the Congress and the AIML, which represents their different viewpoints to each other.

An important milestone in the history of Pakistan Movement was the historical address of Allama Muhammad Iqbal at Allahabad at the occasion of annual meeting of AIML in 1930. He presented the idea of a separate Muslim state in the Muslim majority areas of British India, where, the Muslims of India can live peacefully according to teachings of Islam. In this way, the Muslims of India can manage the threats of Hindu majority after

⁸ Pirzada, *The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam 1970-77*, Op.cit., 1.

the withdrawal of the British from India. This address of Allama Iqbal laid the intellectual and ideological foundations of Muslim nationalism in the sub-continent⁹. On March 23, 1940, after analyzing the circumstances and keeping in view the threats to Muslim rights in India, AIML presented and passed the Lahore Resolution, later known as the Pakistan Resolution. Now the Muslims of India has a clear target to achieve a separate homeland, where they can spend their lives according to Islamic values. There was a massive opposition to idea of Pakistan and partition of India; most notable were the British, the Congress and the JUH. The majority of Muslims of India along with *Ulema*, *Pirs*, *Sajjadahnasheens* etc. were favoring AIML for the achievement of Pakistan but JUH opposed the creation of Pakistan and joined hands with the Congress which was struggling for independence from the British but desired to keep the India united as one state. Earlier both JUH and the Congress co-operated each other at the time of Khilafat Movement in 1919 and successfully mobilized the masses. This Movement attained massive support and disturbed the British government but it was ended in a tragic mode when the fate of Khilafat was sealed by Mustafa Kamal Atatürk on March 3, 1924¹⁰. JUH clearly opposed the creation of Pakistan on the basis of their plea that as a result of partition of India into Hindu and Muslim states, there would be a mass migration of Muslims from Hindu state to Muslim state. In this way, they have to leave behind millions of Muslims as well as historical monuments at the mercy of Hindus. In their opinion, the best solution to problem lay in embracing composite nationalism and a nation state, where the Muslims along with Hindus and other communities would enjoy

⁹⁹ Sikandar and Shandana, Op.cit., xxii.

¹⁰ Ibid., xx.

equal opportunities¹¹. At last, AIML succeeded to achieve her target to create Pakistan on the map of the world on August 14, 1947, irrespective of severe opposition from a number of powerful elements of India.

2.2.5. Pakistan and the Colonial Legacy

Pakistan did not physically exist on the map of world before colonialism. The final shape and borders were determined at the time of creation and independence from the British. The post independent society of Pakistan reflects the deep impact of colonialism, as the machinery of government displays uncanny similarities to that of the colonial era¹². The British adopted the policy of indirect rule over North-West India through their intermediaries to establish their control. They succeeded to manage the society of India through social divisions; horizontally between the masses and elite, and vertically between tribes, races and ethnic groups. Pakistan inherited a powerful oligarchy in the form of feudal and tribal elite, and civil bureaucracy and military from British India, which were well trained and well versed with British mindset, culture and values. The British considered the Muslims as aggressive, invaders, prone to waging holy wars, intractable, resistant to change and modernity, fanatical, despotic and devoted to backward views and practices. They were hard to rule over and always considered as a threat for the British Raj. To reduce the intensity of this treat, the British developed close relations with Muslim landlords and tribal leaders of North-West India. This attitude of British Raj also shaped the mentality and practices of later generation of Pakistani leaders towards Islam and society, who were trained in the British military and civil academies¹³.

¹¹Pirzada, *The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam 1970-77*, Op.cit., x.

¹²Syed Vali Reza Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan, Islam and the Making of State Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 31.

¹³Ibid., 42.

According to Vali Reza Nasr, during the colonial period, the British legal system made everyone equal before the law as property owner but the British also implemented Muslim Personal Law to reinforce group identity. Through these arrangements, there was observed a clear relationship between the British (ruler) and the Muslims (subjects). In this way, the British succeeded to give authority to Islamic laws in modern legal settings. In North-West India, the society was mostly based on feudalism and tribal affiliations. Here, the British Raj supported the customary laws instead of Islamic laws, because the British observed that the tribal laws are more fundamental essence of indigenous life than the Islamic law. This resulted that the politics in these areas, especially in Punjab, revolved around tribal affiliations¹⁴.

The feudal and tribal elites were tied to rural Islam. Islam in rural Punjab and Sindh is closely tied to shrines and their hereditary keepers (*Pirs* and *Sajjadahnishines*). The Indian *Ulema* played their socio-religious role as interpreters of the faith under the Muslim rule, which has no place in British rule now. Therefore, these *Ulema* did not become the part of new arrangements of the British and initiated reform movements in the society. From Shah Waliullah to the Dar-ul-Ulum Deoband, Ahl-i-Hadith, and Jama'at Islami, Islamic actors and movements tried to give awareness to Muslims regarding *Shar'iat* based realms of political and social lives and to roll back the British order. These *Ulema* were naturally inimical to tribal and customary laws and rural Islam. This vision was latterly helpful and facilitative for great role of Islam as a force in politics at the end of the colonial era¹⁵.

¹⁴ Ibid., 43.

¹⁵ Ibid., 44.

After the World War I, during the Khilafat Movement (1919-1924), Islam had been recognized as a tool for political mobilization and quickly become central to Muslim politics in India. This tool was later used successfully by AIML during the Pakistan Movement to achieve her target of creation of Pakistan. As stated earlier that in North-West India, customary and tribal laws were dominating over the Islamic laws, however, by generating Islamic sentiments in Muslims of these areas, their tribal difference were settled to some extent. Islam as a central force galvanized localized Muslim communities into a large unit capable of competing in the broader political arena. After creation of Pakistan, Islam's triumph over tribal and customary laws continued and become the foundation of state building¹⁶. Pakistan was vested the future of state with both colonial system of administration and intermediaries of power, and Islamic universalism. The first would ensure the use of the latter, just as had been the case on the eve of partition. In this way, the fundamental characteristics of the state of Pakistan and the role of Islam that would play in state and society are a legacy of the colonial era.

2.3. History of General Elections in Pakistan

Since the creation in 1947, the state of Pakistan has been indulged in such circumstances that neither a constitution could be framed until 1956 nor the general elections could be held until 1970. Hence, Pakistan could not start its journey with a democratic system on the basis of which it came into being (the British compelled to partition India into two states on the basis of the results of elections of 1946). In the elections of 1946, AIML succeeded in the Muslim majority areas on the slogan, '*lay kay rahain gay Pakistan, bun kay rahay ga Pakistan*' (Pakistan might be taken, Pakistan might become into existence).

¹⁶ Ibid., 45.

Soon after creation, the Kashmir issue becomes a permanent bone of contention between India and Pakistan which resulted hostile relations between these two neighboring countries throughout their history. Pakistan deprived off the strong leadership of Quid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1948. Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan and a close companion of Quid-e-Azam during Pakistan Movement, assassinated in 1951. The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (whose members were elected in the elections of 1946) was assigned the responsibility to frame a new constitution. In the meanwhile, The Government of India Act, 1935 was adopted to run the business of government. The Constituent Assembly passed the Objective Resolutions in 1949 which determined the 'Aims and Objectives' of the future Constitution¹⁷. After nine years of efforts, the first Constitution of Pakistan finally framed and adopted on 23 March 1956, however, the general elections could not be held and postponed for several times. From 1947 to 1958, there was absence of political instability and the game of musical chair was in progress. In the early eleven years (1947-58), Pakistan experiences seven prime ministers and a series of political turmoil¹⁸. In October 1958, General Ayub Khan toppled the governments and first Martial Law began in the country. He suspended the Constitution, banned all the political parties as well as political activities of any kind. Later on, he framed a new Constitution of 1962. The general elections could not be held throughout the Ayub's era (1958-69)¹⁹. The first general elections of Pakistan were conducted in 1970. The list of all general elections is appended below along with a short glance of the electoral position of JUI/JUI (F):-

¹⁷ Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Op.cit., 49-63.

¹⁸ Yasmeen Mohiuddin Niaz, *Pakistan: A Global Studies Handbook* (California: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2007), 151-163.

¹⁹ Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Op.cit., 121-169.

Table -1: The List of General Elections in Pakistan and JUI/JUI (F)

Election Year	Election Held by (Government/Period)	Election won by (political party/alliance)	Formation of Federal Government(s)	Electoral Position of JUI/JUI (F)
1970	Gen. Yahya Khan, President of Pakistan and Chief Martial Law Administrator/ Chief of Army Staff.	Awami League (in East Pakistan) and PPP (in West Pakistan)	These were the first and last elections of the United Pakistan. In 1971, the East Pakistan becomes Bangladesh. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (PPP) formed his government in the rest of Pakistan (1972-77).	The main group of JUI was APJUI led by Maulana Mufti Mahmud. APJUI won 7 seats of NA and 9 seats of West Pakistan Assembly (2 from the Punjab, 4 from NWFP and 3 from Baluchistan). APJUI become part of the coalition governments of NWFP and Baluchistan. Mufti Mahmud elected as Chief Minister of NWFP.
1977	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto government (1972-77)	PPP	These elections became controversial due to opposition's allegations of rigging by the government. As a result of mass agitation by PNA, Gen. Zia ul Haq imposed Martial Law on 5 July 1977.	JUI was an active member party of PNA. Mufti Mahmud was the president of PNA. He was also the head of 3 member team constituted for negotiation with Z A Bhutto to resolve post-election mess.
1985	Gen. Zia ul Haq, Chief Martial Law Administrator/ Chief of Army Staff.	Elections were held on non-party basis.	Muhammad Khan Junajo (a Muslim Leagui) formed his government (1985-1988). Gen. Zia ul Haq dissolved this government and assemblies in 1988 under article 58 (2)(B) of the Constitution.	Being party less elections, JUI (F) did not take part in these elections.
1988	Care taker setup after the death of Gen. Zia ul Haq on 17 August 1988 in an air crash near Bahawalpur.	PPP	Benazir Bhutto formed a coalition government. Later, the Parliament elected Ghulam Ishaq Khan as the President of Pakistan. The President dissolved government and assemblies under article 58 (2)(B) of the Constitution on 6 August 1990.	JUI (F) won 7 seats of NA. In Baluchistan Assembly, JUI (F) was emerged as the largest party with 11 seats and was a coalition partner in the government.
1990	Care taker government of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi	JUI (an electoral alliance)	Nawaz Sharif (PML) formed a coalition government (1990-1993). Due to development of differences between the Prime Minister and the President	JUI (F) won 6 seats of NA. In KPK, JUI (F) won 2 seats, whereas, in Baluchistan, it won 6

			Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the President dismissed the Sharif government on 17 April 1993.	seats.
1993	Care taker government of Moin Qureshi	PPP	Benazir Bhutto formed a coalition government for second time. Later, the Parliament elected Sardar Farooq Ahmed Khan Laghari (PPP) as the President of Pakistan. Due to differences of the Prime Minister with the President and the Judiciary, the President dissolved government and assemblies under article 58 (2)(B) of the Constitution in November 1996.	JUI (F) and JUP formed an electoral alliance IJM. IJM won 4 seats of NA (all 4 candidates belong to JUI (F)). At provincial level, IJM won 1 seat from KPK and 3 seats from Baluchistan. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, Amir of JUI (F) was appointed as the Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee by Benazir Bhutto's government.
1997	Care taker government of Malik Miraj Khalid	PML (N)	PML (N) won a land slide 2/3 rd majority. Nawaz Sharif formed his government for second time. Soon government's conflicts developed with the Judiciary and Army. One sitting Chief Justice of Pakistan (Syed Sajjad Ali Shah) and an Army Chief (Gen. Jahangir Karamt) forced to resign from their services. On the issue of Kargil crises and differences between the Sharif's government with the Army Chief, the PM dismissed the Army Chief; Gen. Pervez Musharraf on 12 Oct 1999, but the later toppled the government on the same day with the help of Army Generals.	JUI (F) won 2 seats of NA. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman also lost his seat of NA. *However, JUI (F) won 7 seats of Baluchistan Assembly and become a coalition partner of provincial government.
2002	Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf, President of Pakistan and Chief of Army Staff (1999-2008)	PML (Quid-e-Azam)	PML (Q) formed the coalition government. Three prime ministers (Mir Zafar Ullah Jamali, Ch: Shujat Hussain and Shaukat Aziz) were experienced.	JUI (F) took part in the elections from the platform of MMA. MMA emerged the third largest party in NA by winning 45 seats. It won 7 seats of Punjab Assembly, 15 seats of Sindh Assembly, 47 seats of NWFP Assembly and 13 seats of Baluchistan Assembly. MMA formed NWFP government as well as a

				coalition partner of Baluchistan government. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman was the Opposition Leader in NA.
2008	Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf, President of Pakistan and Chief of Army Staff (1999-2008)	PPP	During election campaign, Nawaz Sharif PML (N) and Benazir Bhutto (PPP) returned to Pakistan after a long exile. Benazir Bhutto assassinated on 27 December 2007 at Rawalpindi. On election day, PPP won majority seats of National Assembly and succeeded to form a coalition government. Two Prime Ministers (Yosaf Reza Gillani (2008-2012) and Raja Pervaiz Ashraf (2012-2013) were experienced. Gen Pervaiz Musharraf resigned from the President ship of Pakistan on 18 August 2008 and Asif Ali Zardari (PPP) elected as President of Pakistan on 6 September 2008.	JUI (F) took part from the platform of MMA but this time, JUI (S) and JI were not the part of MMA, and hence, JUI (F) was the only main party of MMA. MMA won 6 seats of NA (all the winning candidates belonged to JUI (F)). MMA won 2 seats of the Punjab Assembly, 8 and 5 from NWFP and Baluchistan Assemblies respectively. JUI (F) becomes coalition partner at federal government as well as in Baluchistan government. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman was appointed as the Chairman of Kashmir Committee.
2013	Care taker government of Mir Hazzar Khan Khosro	PML (N)	PML (N) succeeded to become the largest party in the National Assembly as well as in the Punjab Assembly and formed its government both at federal and Punjab level. In the Sindh Assembly, PPP emerged as the largest party and formed the provincial government. In KPK Assembly, PTI emerged as the largest party and formed a coalition government with JI and QWP. In Baluchistan Assembly, a split mandate has been observed, which resulted a coalition government including PML (N), NP, PMAP and independents.	**JUI (F) won 10 seats of NA, 13 and 6 seats from KPK and Baluchistan Assemblies respectively.

Source: For general elections from 1970 to 2008, Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Op.cit., 201-541 and Reports of Election Commission of Pakistan.

* ABS Jafri, *The Political Parties of Pakistan*, (Karachi: The Royal Book Co., 2002), 34.

**Election Commission of Pakistan (<http://www.ecp.gov.pk/>)

2.4. Political Parties of Pakistan – An Overview

It is an interesting fact that there are more than one hundred political parties registered with Election Commission of Pakistan, hence, Pakistan is a polity of multi-party system. However, only a few political parties have actively participated in the general elections and played effective role in the national, provincial and regional politics. Pakistan Muslim League and Pakistan Peoples Party are the mainstream parties having vote bank across the country. Other political parties have limited or concentrated vote bank, including regional and religious parties. In the context of religion based politics, these political parties may be divided into two categories, the secular political parties and the religious political parties. Hereunder is an overview of some important political parties from both the categories which will be facilitative for analysis of electoral politics of Pakistan in forthcoming chapters.

2.4.1. Secular Political Parties

Pakistan Muslim League (PML)

Pakistan Muslim League associated herself to All India Muslim League (AIML), who is generally credited with having won Pakistan's independence. Muslim League proved to be as a conservative, pro-business and right-of-center party. After Pakistan's independence, a number of right-of-center parties labeled as Muslim League, all claimed to be the rightful heir of AIML and shown a dedicated affiliation to the father of Nation, Quid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. In 1965, two factions of Muslim League were prominent, Ayub Khan's Convention Muslim League and Fatima Jinnah's Council Muslim League. In the recent past and the present day era the important and effective Muslim Leagues are PML (Nawaz) and PML (Quid-e-Azam). PML (N) is being led by

Nawaz Sharif since 1993. PML (Q), led by Chudhery Shujat Hussain and Chudhery Pervaiz Ellahi, is an off shot of PML (N) created on the eve of general elections 2002²⁰.

Pakistan People's Party (PPP)

Pakistan People's Party emerged in 1967 in opposition to Ayub Khan's military government. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was its founder and Chairman. Due to his charismatic leadership, the party gained a remarkable popularity in West Pakistan. Initially, it was a center-left party with an attractive socialist programme, however, in 1990s, Benazir Bhutto adopted open market economic programmes, hence, the party closely resembled the PMLs. PPP has formed five of seven governments elected on a party basis since 1970 to 2008. PPP has a handsome vote bank all over the country, especially in rural Sindh due to belonging of Bhutto family from Sindh. With the passage of time, several factions have been created in PPP as well, e.g. PPP (Sherpao), PPP (Hoti), PPP (Shaheed Bhutto) and PPP (Patriots)²¹.

Regional and Ethnic Political Parties and Groups

Pakistan has four provinces, which are, the Punjab, the Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. Each province has a distinct language, culture and traditional value system. As Pakistani society is divided on ethnic differences; therefore, ethnicity is an important aspect in the politics of Pakistan. With the passage of time, a number of political parties and pressure groups have been emerged in Pakistan politics, mostly based in three provinces except the Punjab, to safeguard provincial autonomy, ethnic and regional interests. Hereunder is a short introduction of regional political parties of Pakistan:-

²⁰ ICG Asia Report No. 102, *Authoritarianism and Political Party Reforms* (Islamabad/Brussels: 2005), 11.

²¹ Ibid.

Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)

MQM represents Mohajirs, who migrated from India to Pakistan at the time of partition of India (1947), and mainly based in Urban Sindh. The majority of Mohajirs are lived in urban Sindh, especially in Karachi and Hyderabad. MQM mostly represents middle class of the society. Mohajir traders and business houses provide financial support to MQM. MQM began its journey on the road of politics in 1984 with the name of 'Mohajir Qaumi Movement', initially supported by General Zia ul Haq, who used MQM to counter the influence of PPP in urban Sindh, which has strong hold in the politics of Sindh. With the inception of MQM, PPP's support reduced to rural Sindh²². Other main political parties like PML, JUP and JI who have a healthy vote bank at Karachi and Hyderabad, suffered badly due to MQM factor. MQM has been receiving military's patronage since its beginning. For many times, MQM has been succeeded to become an indispensable coalition partner in the formation of federal government as well as the Sindh government. Being a coalition partner, it has been played its roll for several times during 1990s to withdraw its support to destabilize the government; as a result, the intensity of political turmoil was increased.

Sindh Based Regional and Ethnic Political Parties

In response to perceived economic and political dominance of Mohajirs and Punjabi-dominated civil and military bureaucracy, there have been emerged some Sindhi regional parties who initially started their journey to demand a separate and independent state for Sindhis i.e. 'Sindhu Desh'. The main parties are Rasul Bux Palejo's Sindhi Awami Tehrik, G.M. Sayed's Jiya Sindh, Mumtaz Bhutto's Sindh National Front and Sindh Taraqi Pasand Party. Now days, these parties are struggling for the devolution of

²² Ibid., 12.

political, fiscal and administrative power. Having a popular support base, these are able to mobilize people on certain national and provincial issues and central government's projects such as Kalabagh Dam and the Thal Canal, which are, according to these parties, are harmful projects for Sindhis²³.

Baluchistan Based Regional and Ethnic Political Parties

Baluchistan is physically the largest but least populated province of Pakistan. This province is rich in natural resources. Baloch and Pashtoon are two major ethnic groups in Baluchistan, who are competing for power and resources with each other and with the central government, as well, for more provincial autonomy and authority. The two Baloch parties, left-leaning, are the Baluchistan National Party led by Sardar Attaullah Mangel and the National Party headed by Abdul Hayee Baloch. The third important Baloch party, which is a moderate one, is the Jamhoori Watan Party of Nawab Akbar Bughti (Late). There are two moderate Pashtoon parties, Pashtoon Khwa Milli Awami Party of Mahmood Khan Achakzai and Awami National Party (ANP)²⁴.

Awami National Party (ANP)

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP), only one party, Awami National Party (ANP), has its important role in national as well provincial politics. Like PML, ANP has its roots in the politics of United India before partition. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's *Khudai Khidmatgar Party* was an ally of the Congress in opposition of creation of Pakistan and partition of India. After creation of Pakistan, this party takes part in the politics of NWFP with the name of National Awami Party (NAP). ANP's agenda was maximum provincial autonomy, limiting the federal government's jurisdiction to foreign policy, currency,

²³ Ibid., 12.

²⁴ Ibid., 13.

communication and defense. Its key goal was to rename the province to Pakhtunkhwa and opposition of Kalabagh Dam. ANP has been succeeded to change the name of the province from NWFP to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during PPP government (2008-2013). In the political battle ground, ANP has tough competition with the religious parties, who have a considerable vote bank in the province. ANP has been remained a coalition partner in central government of PPP and PML and formed the provincial governments for many times as well²⁵.

2.4.2. Religious Political Parties of Pakistan

Most of the Muslim countries got freedom from the colonial powers during twentieth century. During freedom movements, along with nationalist movements, the religious groups also struggled hard for the independence of their homelands, perhaps, on the basis that on the name of religion it is easy to mobilize the masses especially against non-Muslim colonial powers. Some of the colonized Muslim states adopted the way of democracy due to the previous colonial legacy, however, most the countries faced dictatorial regimes, both military and civilian. As a result, religious parties faced two types of behaviours from their governments. In some cases these parties supported dictatorial regimes through compromising or compelling politics. Pakistan is one the same example, where religious parties developed their nexus with military dictatorial regimes. In some countries, religious parties and groups faced brutal force of state and obstacles to enhance their agendas like Ikhwanul Muslimeen of Egypt, Islamic parties in Turkey and other countries of the Middle East.

²⁵ Ibid.

In some Muslim countries, despite of practical problems of electoral politics, less support of the masses, religious parties take initiatives to participate in the general elections and play their role in the formation of governments or opposition parties. In this way these parties enhance their agenda while exerting influence on legislations in the Parliaments. In some cases, the success of Islamic parties showed remarkable victories in general elections, like Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria (1991), Justice and Development Party in Turkey (2002, 2007 and 2011), Islamic Resistance Movement (Hammas) in Palestine (2006) and Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) in Pakistan during general elections of 2002²⁶.

In Pakistan, the use of Islam as a tool through religious parties by the civil as well as the military governments is a common practice since beginning. Due to this reason, the religious parties consider it appropriate to enhance their agenda through agitation as well as compromising and patronage politics. It has already been mentioned that the religious parties, by and large, opposed the idea of Pakistan. However, AIML succeeded to win the favour of a small faction of JUH, *Pirs* and *Sajjadahmisshins* of shrines in the Punjab and the Sindh, which ultimately proven beneficial for AIML to demand a separate homeland for the Muslims of Sub-Continent -- Pakistan on the name of Islam. After independence, the *Ulema*, as well as, the religious parties earlier opposing the idea of Pakistan, successfully exploited the weak and instable governments of newly born Pakistan. The Objective Resolution (1949) which contains the Islamic characteristics is an outcome of efforts of the religious parties of Pakistan. In the Constitution of 1956, the official name of state was declared as "Islamic Republic of Pakistan". Ayub Khan omitted the portion

²⁶Charles Kurzman, and Ijlal Naqvi, *Islamic Political Parties and Parliamentary Elections* (Working Paper, United States Institute of Peace, January 15, 2009, revised on March 17, 2009), 3. Article on line. Available from http://www.ducis.jhfc.duke.edu/wp_content/uploads/2009/03/kurzman_20080326.pdf

"Islamic" in the Constitution of 1962, but due to pressure of religious parties, again compelled to add the same. In the Constitution of 1973, framed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's PPP government, more Islamic clauses had been got included in the Constitution by the efforts of JUI, JUP and JI, which have considerable seats in the National Assembly elected in the general elections of 1970. As per Article-2 of the Constitution, Islam has been declared as state religion and Article-227 ensured that no law can be framed against the spirit and teachings of Islam. Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) was created to suggest recommendations to governments on Islamic matters.

In 1977, PNA (earlier an electoral alliance, which later on, converted into an agitation alliance led by religious parties) gave tough time to Bhutto's government which further led to the imposition of Martial Law in the country. General Zia ul Haq successfully unitized the religion as well as religious parties in the process of Islamization to legitimize his rule. The religious parties, especially the JI and JUI, were supportive and cooperative to Zia's government during Afghan war (1979 to 1988) against the USSR. During the democratic period (1988 to 1999), the religious parties also effectively played their role, although, the ratio of their popularity was on decreasing. In the general elections of 2002, held under Musharraf administration, the strength and importance of the religious parties again become prominent as a result of remarkable victory of MMA (being the third largest party after PML (Q) and PPPP in the National Assembly) and formation of independent government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then NWFP) and a major coalition partner with PML (Q) in the Baluchistan government. During these elections,

the military successfully countered the mainstream political parties, the PML (N) and the PPP, through creation of PML (Q) and MMA²⁷.

Hereunder is a short overview of important political parties, enabling further discussion about their electoral performances.

Jama'at-i-Islami (JI)

Jama'at-i-Islami (JI) was established in 1941 by Abul Alah Maududi, a renowned Muslim scholar. JI is the most organized and disciplined political party in Pakistan under the hierarchy of leadership, having a powerful internal organizational structure. It is mainly supporter of Islamic revivalism and wants to implement a complete code of Islamic life. Despite opposition to the idea of Pakistan, JI has been playing a crucial role in the politics of Pakistan since 1947.

Generally, JI is the party of educated and professional people, hence, its main vote bank and support lies in the urban areas of Pakistan. Before the establishment of MQM in 1984, Karachi and Hyderabad serves as power centers for JI²⁸. Due to limited support base of JI, it is always ready to gain patronage from the military dictators. For example, in 1960s, it strengthened its relations with Ayub Khan. JI supported military operation of General Yahya Khan against Bangales in East Pakistan in 1970-71 through its front organizations, such as Al-Badar, Al-Shams and Islami Jamiat-e-Talba (IJT). JI having influential street power played key role in the PNA agitaional movement in 1977 against Bhutto's government. After imposition of Martial Law and hanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, JI favoured Zia's process of Islamization, as well as, actively involved in the Jihad (Afghan War) against the former USSR. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from

²⁷ Ashutosh Misra, "Rise of Religious Parties in Pakistan: Causes and Prospects," (*New Delhi: Strategic Analysis, Vol No. 2, Apr-Jun 2003 published by The Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis*), 190.

²⁸ ICG Asia Report No. 216, *Islamic Parties in Pakistan*, Op.cit., 9.

Afghanistan in 1988, JI's militant groups have been utilized by Pakistan military in the freedom movement of Indian held Kashmir. Under the close nexus with military, JI participated in internal politics as well military dominated foreign policy²⁹.

Irrespective of close relations with military authoritarian regimes, JI believe in democracy to promote its agenda of Islamization through electoral politics. Although, the membership of JI is quite limited due to tough criteria to qualify as a member, however, JI has been making efforts to develop links with poor, ordinary and general masses through its sub-ordinate welfare organizations (NGOs) like Al-Khidmat Foundation and Al-Khair Trust. These NGOs engaged in Welfare works in the fields of education, health, and rescue relief operations at the time of natural calamities.

As regards electoral politics, JI has been taken part in almost all general elections except 1997 and 2008. Due to its traditional nexus of with military, JI smartly constituted MMA before general elections of 2002 and struggled hard to bring MMA as the third largest party in the Parliament. In this way, on one side, General Musharraf succeeded to have a firm grip on internal politics of Pakistan by countering the mainstream political parties i.e. PML (N) and PPP, and on the other side, to persuade the USA and her allies about the danger of Islmaists in the region, to strengthen his regime through international support³⁰.

Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)

Some details about JUI and its emergence have already been mentioned in the first chapter. JUI (F) being a case study will be discussed in details in next chapters. Here will be described a short glimpses about JUI. JUI, represents Deobandi orthodoxy sect, emerged as an off shot from JUH in 1945 and favoured AIML on the demand of a

²⁹ ICG Asia Report No. 102, *Authoritarianism and Political Party Reforms* (Islamabad/Brussels: 2005), 13.

³⁰ Ashutosh Misra, "Rise of Religious Parties in Pakistan: Causes and Prospects", Op.cit., 191-193.

separate homeland – Pakistan. After independence, the leader of JUI, Allama Shabbir Ahmed Usmani proposed the Objective Resolution in 1949, which remained the main reference point in Pakistan's constitutional development³¹. JUI is a conservative religious party having orthodoxy sentiments and believes in Caliphate of seventh century as the best Islamic system of state. It has participated in almost all the religious movements of Pakistan. On political scene after the general elections of 1970, Mufti Mahmud, the then *Amir* of JUI, become Chief Minister of NWFP (now KPK) by forming a coalition government with National Awami Party (NAP) for a short period of 1972 to 1973. JUI played important role to include Islamic clauses in the Constitution of 1973. In 1977, Mufti Mahmud led the PNA's *Nizam-e-Mustafa Movement* against Bhutto's government. During General Zia's regime, JUI favoured his Islamization process in the country and extended cooperation for Afghan War (1979-88) against the USSR.

JUI's main support lies in vast network of *maddariss* and mosques. Almost 65% of *Maddariss* in Pakistan belongs to Deobandi School, which serve as base centers of support for JUI. JUI is mainly popular and having a considerable vote bank in the Southern districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Pashtoon belt of Baluchistan³².

JUI was split into two factions in mid 1980s, JUI (F) of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman and JUI (S) of Maulana Sami ul Haq³³. This gulf widen in 1990, when JUI (F) made alliance with PPP in the general elections. Since then, there are severe conflicts and lack of understanding and respect between these two factions of JUI. JUI (S) was remained more pro Zia than JUI (F)³⁴. In 1990s, JUI (S) established Taliban Movement in Afghanistan,

³¹ ICG Asia Report No. 49, *Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military* (Islamabad/Brussels: 2003), 11.

³² *Ibid.*, 11.

³³ ICG Asia Report No. 216, *Islamic Parties in Pakistan*, *Op.cit.*, 11.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

as most of the Taliban leaders were educated in the *Maddariss* of JUI (S), most prominently the *Jamia-e-Haqqania* of Akora Khattack, Noshera (KPK)³⁵. JUI (S) rendered its full support to Taliban government in Afghanistan (1996 to 2002), and later on, since USA led war on terror against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

On the eve general elections of 2008, the JUI (F) further disintegrated into two factions and a splinter group appeared in Baluchistan led by Maulana Asmatullah, who named their group as JUI (Nazryati) or JUI (Ideological). This splinter group was formed when the hardcore supporters of the Afghan Taliban in the JUI (F) abandoned the party with the plea that the party had stopped preaching *Jihad* as well as support to the Taliban movement in the neighbouring Afghanistan.

In the 2008 elections, JUI(N) chief Maulana Asmatullah defeated JUI(F) Baluchistan chief Maulana Muhammad Khan Sherani in the NA-264 constituency of the National Assembly. The party also won several seats in the provincial assembly. But in the general elections of 2013, the JUI (N) did not win even a single seat from Baluchistan³⁶.

As regards electoral politics, JUI (F) is comparatively more successful than JUI (S). JUI (S) has its support in the limited districts of KPK, whereas, JUI (F) has a vast vote bank in two provinces of KPK and Baluchistan. On the basis of which, JUI (F) being a part of MMA, was the main beneficiary of general elections of 2002, by winning 29 of the MMA's 44 seats of National Assembly and succeeded to lead KPK provincial government and was a major coalition partner of PML (Q) in Baluchistan government as well³⁷.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 13.

³⁶ The Friday Times Pakistan (Weekly), May 31 – June 06, 2013 – Vol XXV, No. 16.

³⁷ ICG Asia Report No. 49, *Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military*, Op.cit., 11.

Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)

Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) is a religious political party represents Bareilvis (a Sunni sub-sect). Before partition of India, the Bareilvis leadership had supported AIML and favoured the idea of Pakistan. After creation of Pakistan, the Bareilvis struggled for greater Islamization in the new polity. For this purpose, as well as, to provide a platform to Bareilvi sect in the politics of Pakistan, JUP was established in 1948³⁸.

Although the majority population of Pakistan follows Bareilvi sect, however, JUP could not succeeded to attract these followers effectively in the electoral history of Pakistan. During the first general elections of 1970, JUP could be able to win 7 seats, more than JI and equal to JUL. At a convention held in Multan in 1971 the party leadership was transferred from Maulana Qameruddin Sayalvi to Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani³⁹.

Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani was a renowned religious scholar and being president of JUP played an important role in framing the Constitution of 1973. In 1977, JUP was a part of PNA; however, JUP could not maintain good relations with General Zia ul Haq, who is more interested to promote Wahabi Islam. Furthermore, MQM, a creation of General Zia, eroded JUP like JI in the urban caners of Sindh, mainly in Karachi and Hyderabad, which were previously a strong voting base for both these parties. JUP has also been blaming Saudi Arabia to promote Wahabi militant groups and political parties, which are involved in sectarian violence in Pakistan⁴⁰.

JUP could not transform into a strong religious political party due to its internal conflicts of leadership. The party disintegrated into two factions in 1990 on the issue of by-elections in Lahore, when a faction led by Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi made

³⁸ ICG Asia Report No. 216, *Islamic Parties in Pakistan*, Op.cit., 15.

³⁹ ABS Jafri, *The Political Parties of Pakistan*, Op.cit., 38.

⁴⁰ ICG Asia Report No. 216, *Op.cit.*, 12.

alliance with PML (N) dominated IJI. Being part of MMA Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani was president of MMA till his death in 2003; however, JUP could not perform well as compare to JUI and II. After Noorani, Sahibzada Fazal Karim separated his faction as JUP (F), which has become practically more active in the politics.

JUP (F) has publicly opposed religious extremism, attacks on shrines by Taliban and other militant groups of Deobandi and Ahle-e-Hadith. The party also opposed to accord peace deal with pro-Taliban and Deobandi *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi* (TNSM) which resulted in the imposition of *Nizam-e-Adl* 2009 in KPK's Malakand region, including establishment of Islamic Courts (*qazi*). To bring all Bralevi groups on one platform, the Sunni Itihad Council (SIC) was formed at Islamabad in 2011⁴¹.

Markazi Jamiat Ahle-e-Hadith

The All India Ahle Hadith Conference was established in 1906 to propagate Islam on the basis of the Quran and *Sunnah*. Like JUI and II, Ahle-e-Hadith also opposed the idea of Pakistan. After Pakistan came into being in 1947, Ahle Hadith started their political activities with a new name of Markazi Jamiat Ahle-e-Hadith. Presently, Professor Sajid Mir is leading the party. The party was not actively involved in politics until the first general elections held in 1970. Later on in 1990s, the party made electoral alliance with PML (N). The party was also a part of MMA in general elections held in 2002, however, Professor Sajid Mir contested election on the ticket of PML (N). Later on, he was selected as PML (N) senator.

Due to less and scattered vote bank, Markazi Jamiat Ahle-e-Hadith could not prove to be an effective political player in the general elections. However, its militant group Lashkar-e-Tayyaba has been engaged in welfare activities, as well as, street protests and rallies to

⁴¹ Ibid., 16.

publicly criticizing the brutal acts of the USA in the Muslim World (especially in Afghanistan and the Middle East), as well as, highlighting Indian Army's use of force to suppress the freedom movement of Kashmiris. Lashkar-e-Tayyaba has been propagating in favour of *Jihad* openly against Non-Muslims. On foreign front, both USA and India have been pressurizing Pakistan government regularly to ban Lashkar-e-Tayyaba due to charges of its militant and violent activities across Indian held Kashmir and India⁴².

Shia Political Parties

Until general elections of 1970, Shias of Pakistan mostly favoured moderate and liberal political parties like PPP. After successful revolution of Iran in 1979, Shias of Pakistan also become inspired and motivated to play an active role in the politics of Pakistan. Furthermore, due to Islamization process of General Zia on the patterns of Deobandi and Ahle Hadith, Shia's leadership become worried about their religious rights. Afghan war was another factor, in which, Pakistani Sunni groups were actively engaged by Pakistan Military with the aid of the USA and Saudi Arabia. Due to these reasons, a Shia political party was established in 1979 and named it as *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria* (TNFJ) by Allama Mufti Jaffar Hussein. After Hussein's death in 1983, the party leadership split into two factions, Hamid Musvi group and Arif Husseni group. There are currently following three Shia political parties in Pakistan.

Islami Tehrik-e-Pakistan (ITP)

TNFJ-Husseni group transformed from a religious pressure group to a political party, Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) in 1987 under the leadership of Arif Al-Husseni. Al-Husseni proclaimed that Iran should be the model for Pakistan to follow⁴³. After the

⁴² Ibid., 11.

⁴³ Ibid., 18.

assassination of Arif Al-Husseni in a sectarian attack in 1988, Allama Syed Sajid Ali Naqvi took over the party. He entered into a temporary alliance with the PPP. In 2002, General Musharraf banned the TJP, being declared a terrorist outfit; therefore, TJP changed its name as the Islami Tehrik-e-Pakistan (ITP)⁴⁴. ITP become a part of MMA in 2002 general elections due to which, a large number of Shia community shown their displeasure over Allama Sajid Naqvi on the plea that the religious parties constituting MMA have conflicting ideologies to that of Shias.

Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria (Musvi Group)

Syed Hamid Ali Musvi was elected as President of TNFJ in 1983. He declared in an interview in 1996 that our party will not take part in elections and only confined to religious activities. TNFJ (Musvi) has been involved in direct confrontation with Sunni militant groups. The party has also been victim of sectarian attacks since long. However, TNFJ (Musvi) has constantly been struggling to pressurize government for safety and protection of Shia community, especially during the month of *Moharram ul Haram* to perform their religious rituals⁴⁵.

Majlis-e-Wahdutul Muslimeen

Majlis-e-Wahdutul Muslimeen (MWM) was established in 2008 with division with the Shia's community after Allama Sajid Naqvi's perceived "fall from grace". MWM considers itself as a true successor of Allama Arif Al-Husseni. MWM is struggling for the protection of religious rights of Shia community. It has a three point agenda: Pakistan's stability, being practically defending it against foreign interference, preventing

⁴⁴ Ibid., 19.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

sectarian fighting and insisting on a universal *Ummah*, and ending injustice⁴⁶. Being a new party, it has not participated in the general elections until 2008.

2.5. Conclusion

The religio-political history of Pakistan represents a political landscape of multi-party system emerged on the basis of variety of diversities, different sects of Islam and ethnicity. It also shows that Pakistan is not a homogeneous monolithic state. Furthermore, the role of religion in the politics of Pakistan has its roots in the historical struggle before the existence of Pakistan and is not a post 9/11 phenomenon. In the presence of religious as well as secular political parties, Pakistan is representing a religio-political landscape.

JUI (F) is a product of a number of conditions and changing circumstances by the passage of time. Absence of democratic norms and hereditary leadership are some common characteristics of almost all the political parties of Pakistan which resulted disintegration of political parties into a number of factions and splinter groups. JUI has no escape from this process, however, JUI (F) proved to be the leading representative religious political party of Deobandi sect.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 20.

Chapter Three

JUI (F): EVOLUTION, ORGANIZATION, IDEOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the evolution, organizational structure and ideology of JUI (F) will be discussed in details. The history of JUI spread over one and half century from the United India to present day Pakistan. Although, JUI's parent organization the JUH was established in 1919, however, its historical and ideological links can be traced back to Darul Ulum Deoband and further in the decline of Muslim rule in the Sub-Continent. After the creation of Pakistan, the JUI has been passed through the process of many phases under the conditions and circumstance of political journey of Pakistan which spread over many decades.

3.2. From JUH to JUI (F) – *A History of Struggle and Transformation*

3.2.1. The Establishment of JUH and Pakistan Movement

The *Ulema* have always been an important and integral part of Muslim society. Since centuries, they have been respected and playing a significant role in the political and social milieus¹. In the Sub-Continent, during the Muslim rule, the *Ulema* were confident as well as considered themselves the custodian of Islam under the patronage of Muslim rulers. On declining of Mughal rule and colonization of India by the British, the *Ulema* resisted against local opponents as well as foreign rule. In the absence of a Muslim government and patronage, the *Ulema* felt it their responsibility to preserve that Islamic teachings, culture and values which had now been vulnerable from different sides. The

¹Pirzada, *The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam 1970-77*, Op.cit., 1.

Ulema initiated reformist and revivalist movements to adhere general awareness about the dangers faced by the Islam as a religion and Muslims as a community, while stressing to spent lives according to the Quran and *Sunnah* (the path of the Holy Prophet, PBUH). Establishment of *Madrasah* network is felt essential for the organized religious teachings. The establishment of Dar ul Ulum Deoband in 1867 was an effort in the same direction, which proved to be a center for *Ulema* and scholars belonging to Deobandi sect as well as for the Muslims of India. The Muslim society had now been guided by the learned *Ulema* through issuance of *fatawas* for the solution of their *Shar'iat* related problems².

As a result of implementation of British institutional system of governance and administration in the Sub-Continent, the liberal and modern sections of society had been preparing for playing their role through political participation since the establishment of British rule. The establishment of associations and political parties on Western style were the same efforts. The Indian National Congress established in 1885, while All India Muslim League in 1906. These both were nationalist parties, initially struggling for the rights of their fellow Indians irrespective of their overt religious or sectarian affiliations. In this scenario, the *Ulema* felt it essential that they might be organized themselves on political front to secure their interests and rights through participatory process by using political means³.

Anjuman-i-Khudam-i-Kaabah established in 1913 to recognize the British rule regarding safety of sacred places of Islam at Saudi Arabia. This movement, later on, was converted into Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind (JUH) in 1919; generally representative of Deobandi school of

²Barbara Daly Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1989), 50.

³M. Qasim Zaman, *Contemporary Ulema in Islam*, Op.cit., 11.

thought⁴. While showing anti-imperialists gesture, JUH with the cooperation of the Congress, launched All India Khilafat Movement (1919-1924). After the failure of the Khilafat Movement, the Congress separated its path and become busy in managing the Hindus movements of *Shuddhi* and *Sanghten*, whose objectives were to convert Muslims into Hindus. In response, JUH organized *Tabligh* missions⁵.

In 1940, AIML demanded separate homeland for Muslims of Sub-Continent on the basis of two nation theory. However, JUH and the Congress, being champion of 'composite nationalism' were against the partition of India, rejected the idea of Pakistan. Some leading and eminent scholars of JUH; like Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanwi, Allama Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, Mufti Muhammad Shafi Deobandi and Muhammad Zafar Ahmed Usmani supported the idea of Pakistan on the basis that in a separate Islamic state, the Muslims will live freely in accordance with the teachings of Islam, under an Islamic system of governance. On the other side, some top leaders of JUH; like Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madni, Maulana Ahmad Saeed and Maulana Hifzul Rahman Siyoharwi collaborated with the Congress in opposition to the idea of Pakistan⁶. On the issue of composite nationalism, two nation theory and the idea of Pakistan, there was a series of scholarly debates between both the groups of JUH as well as issuance of *fatawas* in support of their viewpoints. In 1945, the splinter group of *Ulema* of JUH arranged a conference at Calcutta and established All India Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (AIJUI). Allama Shabbir Ahmed Usmani elected as President and Maulana Sayyid Muhammad Quraysh as *Nazim* of AIJUI⁷. Due to favour of these influential *Ulema*, the position of AIML

⁴Pirzada, *The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam 1970-77*, Op.cit., 1.

⁵Ibid., 2-3.

⁶Ibid., 5.

⁷Ibid., 10.

which was already enjoying the favour of *pirs* and *sajaddahnisins* of shrines, become stronger in the polls of 1946.

3.2.2. JUI after Creation of Pakistan

After creation of Pakistan in 1947, Allama Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, who was elected as member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) on the ticket of Muslim League in the polls of 1946, re-organized AIJUI with the new name as Markazi Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (MJUI) and opened its office in Karachi. Since early days of Pakistan, Allama Shabbir Ahmed Usmani struggled for framing of an Islamic constitution to make the newly born state into an Islamic State, where a system of the *Quranic* principles and *Sunnah* of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) will be enforced. After the announcement of 3 June 1947 Plan, an *Ain Saz Majlisul Ulema Pakistan* was established by Maulana Shafiq Ahmed Siddiqui to frame an Islamic constitution of Pakistan. Allama Shabbir Ahmed Usmani was the President of this body⁸. Due to strenuous struggle of Allama Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, the Objective Resolution passed by CAP in 1949, which has far sighted impacts on future constitutional making developments in Pakistan⁹. MJUI continued its support to the ruling Muslim League governments regarding framing of an Islamic constitution and played a significant role along with other religious parties, in adjusting the Islamic contents of 1956 Constitution. However, during long and delayed constitution making process, the East Pakistan wing of MJUI become suspicious of Muslim League and withdrew its support of ML in the polls of 1954. This wing took part in the polls under the banner of Nizam-i-Islam Party (NIP) which later become part of the United Front who defeated ML in the polls. In West Pakistan, after 1956 Constitution, MJUI

⁸ Ibid., 13.

⁹ Ibid., 17.

realized that due to dependency and relying on Muslim League, they have failed to create their political constituency. Hence, after two years of formation of NIP, Markazi Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam West Pakistan (MJUIWP) was established on 7 October 1956¹⁰.

3.2.3. General Ayub Khan's Era

Ayub Khan imposed Martial Law in 1958 and banned all political parties. MJUIWP converted itself in a non-political body, Nizamul Ulema Pakistan (NUP). The *Amir* and *Nazim-i-Ala* of MJUIWP, Muhammad Ahmed Ali and Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi were elected as the *Amir* and *Nazim-i-Ala* of newly created NUP at Lahore on 23 June 1959¹¹. In the elections of 1962, held under new Constitution of 1962, Maulana Mufti Mahmud was elected as member of National Assembly and Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi as member of West Pakistan Assembly. In National Assembly, Mufti Mahmud criticized the Ayub Khan's dictatorial regime regarding failure to make Pakistan an Islamic state and reiterated his efforts to amend the 1962 Constitution in the light of *Quran* and *Sunnah* and democratic norms¹².

In July 1962, after lifting of ban on political parties, the MJUIWP was re-established. Maulana Abdullah Darkhawasti (1881-1994) was elected as its *Amir* and Maulana Ghulam Ghuas Hazarvi as *Nazim-i-Ala*. In August 1962, the party was again re-organized under the new name of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan (JUIP)¹³. In 1965, JUIP decided to contest the Presidential elections; however, the candidates nominated by JUIP could not succeed to submit their nomination papers at Rawalpindi. Later on, JUIP opted to support Miss Fatima Jinnah (1893-1967) of Combined Opposition Patties (COP) or Ayub Khan

¹⁰ Ibid., 23.

¹¹ Ibid., 24.

¹² Ibid., 25.

¹³ Ibid., 26.

of Convention Muslim League on the basis of three point Islamic programme. However, due to least interest in these points from both sides, JUIP did not support any presidential candidate¹⁴.

3.2.4. The General Elections 1970

In the mid 1968, the JUIP re-organized with the new name as All Pakistan Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (APJUI)¹⁵. In July 1969, APJUI entered in an alliance with the Pakistan Labour Party (PLP), which was a socialist party, due to which, it came under severe criticism of *Ulema*, especially from the defunct MJUI (which was not revived in 1962). On 22-24 August 1969, the defunct MJUI had been revived at Karachi. During election campaign in May 1970, APJUI constituted an electoral alliance of nineteen religious parties, the Mutahida Dini Mahadh (MDM). Mufti Mahmud was its President. Both APJUI and MJUI contested the elections of 1970 separately by fielding their candidates, however, APJUI performed far better than MJUI by winning 7 seats of National Assembly from the West Pakistan, 2 seats in Punjab, 4 in NWFP and 3 in Baluchistan Assemblies. MJUI won only 1 seat in the East Pakistan Assembly¹⁶.

3.2.5. JUI after 1971 Debacle

As a result of a continuous political turmoil after the general elections of 1970, at last, East Pakistan wing become an independent state – Bangladesh on 16 December 1971. Now the West Pakistan becomes a new Pakistan on the map of world. Soon after this incident, the political parties of new Pakistan were engaged to form new governments at federal and provincial levels. JUIP and National Awami Party (NAP) were the majority parties in NWFP and Baluchistan. A series of dialogues was held among PPP (the

¹⁴ Ibid., 27.

¹⁵ Ibid., 30.

¹⁶ Ibid., 31-34.

majority party at the center, the Punjab and the Sindh), JUIP and NAP. As a result of these dialogues, JUIP and NAP formed coalition governments in NWFP and Baluchistan. Mufti Mahmud become Chief Minister of NWFP and Sardar Atta Ullah Mangel become Chief Minister of Baluchistan.

In NWFP, Mufti Mahmud started the process of Islamization which was the actual mandate of JUIP. In Baluchistan government, the representation of JUIP is quite less; therefore, NAP did not implement the process of Islamization effectively¹⁷. Due to conflicting ideologies of JUIP and NAP, soon differences emerged between both coalition partners. On the other side, internal instability and law and order situation in Baluchistan was worsening, which led to dismissal of Baluchistan government by the federal government on 15 Feb 1973. As a reaction to this move, JUIP-NAP government of NWFP resigned on 22 Feb 1973. Due to harsh attitude of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto towards opposition political parties, an opposition alliance, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was constituted at Rawalpindi between 28 Feb and 1 March 1973. The constituent parties were JUIP, PDP, PML (Convention), PML (Council), NAP, JUP, JIP and Independent Parliamentary Group. Pir Pagara was elected as President and Mufti Mahmud as Vice President of UDF. The aims and objectives of UDF were evolving ways and means to restore democracy, checking dictatorship and striving for an Islamic democracy and parliamentary constitution¹⁸. UDF arranged public meetings, demonstrations, protest against the Bhutto government and boycotted the CAP proceedings. President Bhutto invited UDF leadership for dialogues, which were held during 2-4 April 1973 at Rawalpindi, where, Bhutto urged for some fundamental concessions on vital

¹⁷ Ibid., 66-67.

¹⁸ Ibid., 88.

constitutional matters¹⁹. As a result, UDF ended boycott of CAP. On non-fulfillment of demands, the UDF decided to launch a movement for civil disobedience in the month August 1973; however, due to floods in the Punjab as well non active role of some constituent parties, this movement could not be proven fruitful²⁰.

Maulana Hazarvi of JUIP launched a campaign against Mufti Mahmud due to presence of JIP in UDF on the plea that JUIP and JIP has serious ideological clashes. He demanded either JIP be expelled from the UDF or JUIP disassociate itself from UDF. On non-fulfillment of the demand, JUIP split into two groups on 19 August 1973, JUIP (Hazarvi) and JUIP (Mufti). JUIP-NAP alliance was another important factor for this disintegration because NAP has been engaged in some anti-Pakistan stance and activities²¹. In the meanwhile, another faction of JUIP, JUIP (Haqiqi) emerged at Karachi under the leadership of Maulana Zahid Qasimi of Karachi. JUIP (Haqiqi) proved to be a pro-PPP group and could not expand its network like Hazarvi and Mufti groups²².

3.2.6. Framing of Constitution of 1973

JUIP along with other religious parties having representation in the Parliament played a significant role to include Islamic contents in the Constitution of 1973. During preparation of Draft constitution, a dead lock had been created between PPP government and Opposition parties as a result of divergent viewpoints on various provisions. Mufti Mahmud along with leaders of other Parliamentary parties met Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and

¹⁹ Ibid., 96.

²⁰ Ibid., 100-101.

²¹ Ibid., 101-105.

²² Ibid., 106.

both sides agreed unanimously on a 45 point Accord, which paved the way to frame the Constitution of 1973²³.

In mid-1974, as a result of a violent clash between the students of Nishter Medical College and a group of Qadianis at Rabwah Railway Station, a country wide protest and condemnation of the incident started. At National Assembly, Mufti Mahmud, Chudhery Zahoor Elahi and Sahibzada Safi Ullah moved adjournment motion to discuss the issue. An *All Parties Khatm-i-Nubuwwat Action Committee* (APKNAC) established, consisted of the prominent and hounarable *Ulema* and Parliamentary leaders belonging to all sects of Islam. APKNAC demanded that Qadianis be declared as non-Muslim minority²⁴. After a series of protests, strikes, debates in the National Assembly and in a Special Committee, constituted for the proposed amendment in the Constitution, the religious parties succeeded through their combined efforts to get amended the Constitution, in which Qadianis were declared as non-Muslim minority²⁵.

3.2.7. The General Elections of 1977 and Afterwards

On the announcement of schedule for the general elections of 1977, the UDF, the alliance of Opposition Parties combined into an electoral alliance which named as Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). PNA was consisted of nine political parties; The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Conference, the National Democratic Party (NDP), JUP, PDP, the PML, the JIP, the APJUI (Mufti), the Khaksar Tehrik and Tehrik-e-Istaqlal (TI). Mufti Mahmud was elected as President, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan as Vice President, Rafiq Ahmed

²³ Ibid., 75.

²⁴ Ibid., 118-120.

²⁵ Ibid., 123.

Bajwa as Secretary General and Pir Pagara as the Chairman of Central Parliamentary Board²⁶.

In the general elections of 1977, the main competitors were PPP and PNA. Both started their election campaigns with full strength. The public took active part while showing their interest and extended favour for both the opponents. As a result of polls held on 7 March 1977, PPP emerged as a majority party by winning 155 seats out of 200 in the National Assembly. PNA won only 36 seats. PNA did not accept the results, charged Bhutto government for heavy rigging in the elections and boycotted the polls of provincial assemblies to be held on 10 March 1977. Countrywide strikes broke out and Pakistan was on the way of another political turmoil. PNA demanded for fresh elections. As a result of worsening situation of law and order in the country, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto compelled to initiate a dialogue process with PNA to settle the crises. PPP team included Z A Bhutto, Maulana Kusar Niazi and Hafiz Pirzada, whereas, PNA delegation comprised of Mufti Mahmud being team leader, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Professor Ghafoor Ahmed. A series of meetings were held to reach on an accord. This process was continued but General Zia ul Haq imposed Martial Law on 5 July 1977. All political leadership including Prime Minister Z A Bhutto was put under house arrest²⁷.

After imposition of Martial Law, all political activities were banned. Gen Zia ul Haq promised to hold general elections within 90 days. On scheduling the general elections, election campaign was started. Although, Bhutto was under arrest, however, his popularity-level was still very high. PNA felt it dangerous for themselves to contest elections in such circumstances. On the other hand, General Zia ul Haq, who was

²⁶ Ibid., 150-151.

²⁷ Ibid., 150-195.

watching all these proceedings vigilantly, postponed the elections likely to be held on 18 October 1977²⁸. PNA showed a split reaction on the postponement of general elections. TI, JUP and NDP left PNA, whereas, JI, JUI and ML joined hands with General Zia ul Haq²⁹.

After the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on 4 April 1979, General Zia ul Haq was still not ready to hold general elections as well as handing over the authority to civilian government. As a result, PNA ministers left Zia's cabinet. In 1980, after the death of Maulana Mufti Mahmud, his son Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman had become the *Naib Nazim* of JUI (Mufti). Due to Zia's delaying tactics to hold general elections and to prolong his regime, the political parties especially from the defunct PNA realized that there is a dire need to cooperate with each other as well as with PPP to get rid of dictatorship. To put a joint effort, on 6 Feb 1981, an alliance was established with the name of Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), by the PPP and some smaller parties. Later on, JUI (Mufti) and TI joined MRD, however, JI did not join MRD and continued its support for General Zia ul Haq³⁰.

During Afghan war (1979-1988), the religious parties of Pakistan, especially JI and JUI supported Afghan Jihad against the USSR by developing close ties with Zia's military regime. These parties recruit *Mujahedeen* through their Madrasah networks. As a result of this collaboration, the party's lower ranks become more hardliner, radical and pro-military. On the other side, the central leadership of JUI is supportive of MRD as well, which created disagreements and rift in the party's leadership. The party split into two factions in the mid 1980s; JUI (Darkhawasti) and JUI (Fazal-ur-Rehman). JUI (D)

²⁸ Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, Op.cit., 325.

²⁹ Ibid., 346.

³⁰ Ibid., 356.

remained more pro-Zia, whereas, JUI (F) engaged in the struggle for political freedom and democracy from the platform of MRD³¹. This gulf widen in 1990, when JUI (F) entered in an alliance with PPP, both having ideological clashes and rivalry of about two decades³². The JUI (D) further re-named itself as JUI (S) on the name of Maulana Sami ul Haq.

In 2007 and 2008, on the issue of open support and favoure for Taliban Movement, the rift has been created in the ranks of JUI (F). A hardcore group under the leadership of Maulana Asmatullah alleged that Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman has abounded the preaching for Jihad and support for Taliban. As a result, JUI (F) further disintegrated into two factions and a splinter group emerged in the Pashtoon belt of Baluchistan led by Maulana Asmatullah, who named his group as JUI (Nazryati) or JUI (Ideological). In 2008 general elections, JUI(N) chief Maulana Asmatullah defeated JUI(F) Baluchistan chief Maulana Muhammad Khan Sherani in the NA-264 constituency of the National Assembly. The party also won several seats in the provincial assembly, but in the general elections of 2013, the JUI (N) did not win even a single seat from Baluchistan³³.

3.3. Organizational Structure of JUI (F)

The JUI (F) has less tightly and loose organizational structure than JI. Difference of opinion has often been observed between both hardliner and moderate members.

However, limited mechanisms ensure party discipline. According to Joshua T. White,

“The JUI party more loosely, with much of their political activity taking place outside of their formal party committees. Key decisions of JUI (F) are routinely made by Fazal ur Rehman and a travelling coterie of personal advisors, and the party has only recently invested in a well-equipped headquarters. The combination of charismatic leadership and decentralized party structure has led to a nearly constant dissention within the JUI (F),

³¹ ICG Asia Report No. 216, *Islamic Parties in Pakistan*, Op.cit., 11.

³² ICG Asia Report No. 49, *Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military*, Op.cit., 12.

³³ The Friday Times Pakistan (Weekly), May 31 – June 06, 2013 – Vol XXV, No. 16.

most of which is dealt with informally in Pashtun-style *shuras* and quiet deals.³⁴

The politics of JUI (F) mainly relies on its *Amir*, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman. After the death of Maulana Mufti Mahmud on 14 October 1980, his elder son Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman promptly succeeded his party and elected as the deputy secretary general³⁵. He originally belongs to Abdulkhel Banyala area in Dera Ismail Khan, a district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. He inherited mass public support from his father, Mufti Mahmud, the former *Amir* of JUI, from his native area of Dera Ismail Khan. He has obtained religious teachings from Dar ul Ulum Haqqania of Akora Khattack. He is also MA in Religious Studies. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman pursued a teaching career and is currently principal of Jamia-al-Marooof Shar'iat at his native town. Being head of JUI (F), he has been proved himself as a seasoned and experienced politician and parliamentarian since last three decades, having a firm grip on the internal affairs of his party as well as influential in the politics of Pakistan.

The central headquarter of JUI (F) is located at Lahore. The Constitution of Jamiat Ulema Islam Pakistan has been finally approved in a meeting of central *Majlis-e-Amoomi* held on 12-13 June 2001 at Qalat (Baluchistan)³⁶. The secretariat of JUI (F) comprises of four provincial bodies which represent each province including entities at district and tehsil levels. The central and provincial level each includes a president, four vice presidents, a *Nazim* and seven other members. At each tier, there are three distinct bodies; the *Majlis-*

³⁴ Joshua T. White, *Pakistan Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and US Policy in Pakistan North-West Frontier*, (CIFA, 2008), 39.

³⁵ ABS Jafri, *The Political Parties of Pakistan*, Op.cit., 34.

³⁶ The Constitution of Jamiat Ulema Islam Pakistan, (published in Lahore in July 2001), 1.

e-Amoomi (General Council), the *Majlis-e-Shura* (Consultative Council) and the *Majlis-e-Amla* (Central Working Committee)³⁷. The responsibilities of each body are as follows:

3.3.1. *Majlis-e-Amoomi*

All the members of JUI are the members of *Majlis-e-Amoomi*. It elects 30 members at tehsil levels. These 30 members then elect members for district level, who in turn elect one member for the province. The provincial members elect one member for representation at federal level. For the selection for party ranks at tehsil and district levels, one should have the membership of *Majlis-e-Amoomi* at least for two years³⁸. According to the Constitution of JUI, it is compulsory that all party ranks of each level should be elected through elections. The rules and procedure relevant to elections of party ranks have been mentioned in the party's Constitution³⁹.

3.3.2. *Majlis-e-Shura*

This body is responsible for making important policy decisions regarding participation of party in government and other political decisions according to the circumstances. Its members are chosen by provincial *Amirs* and must not exceed 45 in total (fourteen of who are *Majlis-e-Amla* members), with at least 25 per cent *Ulema* at the district level and 50 per cent at the provincial and central levels⁴⁰.

3.3.3. *Majlis-e-Amla*

This body comprises of 14 members whose main responsibility is to implement party's policy. If any member of this body does not attend three consecutive meetings, the *Amir*

³⁷ Ibid., 5.

³⁸ Ibid., 6-7.

³⁹ Ibid., 7-8.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 9.

will call his explanation and in case he does not provide a valid argument, his designation will automatically stand disband⁴¹.

Besides above administrative bodies, there are provincial and district electoral boards for the nomination of candidates for national and provincial assemblies. The provincial board finalized the nomination of candidates on the recommendations of district boards. In case of any dispute, appeal can be made to the center⁴².

Alongside above structure, there are some other groups linked with JUI (F). In the student politics, the JUI affiliated group is Jamiat Talba-i-Islam (JTI). Although, it is not much organized and strong like JI's student wing Islami Jamiat-e-Talba (IJT), however, its presence in the colleges and universities campuses is significant for JUI. Some Deobandi militant groups, like Taliban, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Harkat-ul-Mujahidin have also maintained their ideological affiliations with JUI (F), however, JUI (F) has never claimed officially about any links with these militant groups. According to Joshua T. White,

"JUI has historically been careful to remain in the political mainstream and act in accordance with democratic and constitutional norms, but have also cultivated links with movements such as the Taliban (and, neo-Taliban), sectarian groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba, and Kashmiri militant organizations such as Harkat-ul-Mujahidin. Not entirely unlike the bifurcation of political and militant wings of Irish Republican Army or Hamas, the Deobandi establishment has produced a network of segmented organizations which together advance an overarching political or social agenda."⁴³

3.4. Ideology of JUI (F)

Like other religious parties, JUI (F) also emphasized to follow the teachings of Islam, the Quran and the *Sunnah* of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) being the source of inspiration and origin of faith.

⁴¹ Ibid., 13.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Joshua T. White,, *Pakistan Islamist Frontier*, *Op.cit.*, 41.

JUI (F) is a party of *Ulema* of Deobandi sect of Islam. About Deobandi *Ulema*, Barbara D. Metcalf states that during Muslim period in Sub-Continent as well as other parts of the world, *Ulema* had always been played their significant role. At the same time, they were the part of government bureaucracy, appointed as *qazi* and likewise designations, and on the other side, enjoyed independently based local spiritual leadership being *imams* of mosques and teachers of Muslim community. These *Ulema* also played the role of defender and protector of faith and Islam, debating with their opponents on certain conflicting issues and were preachers of Islam. Deobandi *Ulema* were notably successful in playing multifaceted role⁴⁴. About the ideological basis of Deobandi *Ulema*, Muhammad Qasim Zaman observed that,

"Deobandi (*Maddariss*), though often without any formal affiliation with the parent madrasah (Dar ul Ulum Deoband, India) – share the same doctrinal orientation, which emphasizes the study of law and of the traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad (*hadith*), as well as a self-consciously reformist ideology defined in opposition to existing form of popular Muslim belief and practice. Within modern South Asian Islam, the "Deobandis" distinguish themselves not only from the Shi'a but also from other Sunni rivals such as the "Barelawis" and the Ahi-i-Hadith, both of which also emerged in India in the second half of the nineteenth century. Though these three movements are united in their reverence for the teachings of the Prophet (PBUH), their interpretations of the sources of religious authority differ markedly⁴⁵."

As regards education, the Deobandi *Ulema* have been mostly relying on the traditional teachings of Islamic sciences instead of modern day sciences. JUI (F)'s rhetoric is reformist in nature, emphasizing reforms and purification of faith through the pulpit of mosques and *maddariss*. The party has been proven to be a conservative favouring orthodox Islam, norms and values and shown resistance to modernity by criticizing the liberals.

⁴⁴ Barbara D. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900*, Op.cit., 138.

⁴⁵ M. Qasim Zaman, *Contemporary Ulema in Islam*, Op.cit., 11.

Joshua T. White, *Pakistan Islamist Frontier*, Op.ci.t, 39.

Regarding governing the state, JUI (F) emphasizes to establish the State as Caliphate (by following the path of first four rightly guided Caliphs of Islam). In this context, JUI (F) has appreciated and supported the Taliban Caliphate in Afghanistan. Furthermore, JUI (F) is vocal of establishment of Islamic Welfare state, Islamic system of justice, interest free economy, Islamic system of living all based on the principles of the Quran and the *Sunnah*⁴⁶. However, in modern state system, JUI (F) also believes to contest elections and representation in Parliament (the democracy - a Western style of government) and to influence legislation on Islamic patterns and sentiments. In this regard, their struggle for the following eventful legislation in Pakistan is worth mentioned:-

- Objective Resolution in 1949.
- "No law can be framed against the principles of the Quran and Sunnah." By making this clause a part of the Constitution of Pakistan of 1973.
- Declaration of Qadianis as non-Muslim in 1974.
- Farming of *Hudood* Ordinance and Blasphemy laws of General Zia ul Haq.

The Deobandi *Ulema* have a tradition of anti-imperialist stance. Before partition these *Ulema* were anti-British, during Afghan war played the role of anti-Soviet (communism) and now days anti-American (on the issue of war of terror in Afghanistan and tribal areas of Pakistan against the Taliban). JUI (F) inherits *Jihadi* tradition against non-Muslims from the nineteenth century Jihad movement of Syed Ahmed Shaheed against Sikhs, the War of Independence (1857) against the British and the *Reshmi Romal Tehrik* (silk

⁴⁶Pirzada, *The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam 1970-77*, Op.cit., 223-230.

handkerchief movement) in the early twentieth century⁴⁷. Deobandis are anti-Shi'a, which generate sectarian divide and sectarian conflicts within Pakistan. Militant groups of Deobandis emerged to wage war on sectarian lines and to support Jihadi activities in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

3.4.1. Aims and Objectives of JUI (F)

The aims and objectives of JUI (F) as mentioned in its Constitution are summarized as under⁴⁸:-

- (i) To unite the scattered forces of Muslims under the guidance of *Ulema* for strengthen and preaching of Islam through organized efforts. Furthermore, to protect the Islamic faith as well the center of Islam i.e. Saudi Arabia where the holy cities of Makah and Medina are situated.
- (ii) To guide the Muslims in all walks of life and state administration in the light of teachings of the Holy Quran and the *Sunnah* of the Holy Prophet (PBUH).
- (iii) To establish an Islamic government and Islamic Justice system in Pakistan to safeguard the people of Pakistan from the harmful effects of Capitalism and Communism.
- (iv) To promote such a homogeneous education system in Pakistan through which the Muslims may able to abide by the teachings of Islam.
- (v) To promote feelings for *Jihad*, defense, stability and integrity of Pakistan.
- (vi) To promote such sentiments in Muslims which are helpful to turn down the provincial, regional, linguistic and racial prejudices.

⁴⁷ ICG Asia Report No. 49, *Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military*, Op.cit., 13.

⁴⁸ The Constitution of Jamiat Ulema Islam Pakistan, Op.cit., 3-4.

- (vii) To strengthen relations with Muslim *Ummah*.
- (viii) To favour and struggle for the occupied Muslim states and Muslim minorities in Non-Muslim states so that they can live honourable Islamic life.
- (ix) To promote and develop different Islamic institutions like mosques, *Maddariss*, libraries and orphan houses.
- (x) To curb and forestall the activities and attempts of unbelievers to harm the Islamic teachings and ideals by using all constitutional means as well as through writings and speeches.

3.4.2. Manifesto of JUI (F)

The manifesto of a party is based on its ideological stance on certain issues and give an explanation about its category, whether, it is a party of right, left, center, liberal, modern or conservative character. This is a basic document around which party aligns its electoral politics as well as election campaign. This is a well-known fact that the manifestoes of all the religious political parties has been based on the supremacy of the teachings of the Quran and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet (PBUH) and these parties consider the implementation of *Shar'iat* law as the solution to every problem. The manifestoes of the religious parties are so similar that it is difficult to distinguish these in the absence of party's name.

In each election, the manifesto of JUI (F) is almost replication of manifestoes of previous elections. Summary of some important features of the manifestoes released by JUI (F) during the general elections held from 1988 to 1997 (JUI (F) contested these elections

independently except the general elections of 1993 when it entered into alliance with JUP, the IJM) are as under.

As regards social agenda, JUI (F) is generally believed in overhauling of the social structure of Pakistan through readjustment of its economic system. It emphasizes on the creation of a social system of Islam, where poor and needy persons will be looked after through government support and allowances (*guzzarah* allowance) will be given to such people. The wages of the labourers and industry workers will be increased to such extent that they can address their economic problems easily. The utilities of daily life will be provided to all people on cheap rates⁴⁹.

On gender issues and the role of women in the society, the JUI (F) has emphasized in its manifestoes of almost all the previous elections that the women will be respected and their role as fixed in the *Shar'iat* will be observed in all walks of life. JUI (F) has not been believed on the equality of man and women by augmenting the biological differences of both. The party also stressed on the separate education of both men and women⁵⁰.

Regarding good governance and democratic norms, JUI (F) has always been vocal of restoration of democracy as well as 1973 Constitution, by making such amendments null and void which introduced by the military dictators to strengthen their rule e.g. Eighth Amendment introduced by General Zia ul Haq⁵¹ and the Seventeenth Amendment of General Musharraf. The rhetoric of JUI (F) is that all laws should be according to the

⁴⁹ "Election 1990 *Manshoor* of JUI," *The daily Imroz Lahore*, 23 October 1990, "Intikhabi *Manshoor*," *The daily Jang*, 21 September 1993, and *The daily Jang*, 9 January 1997.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ "Election Special," *The Herald* (1988), 31.

Quran and the *Sunnah* and all aspects of life should be guided according to the *Shar'iat*⁵². It gives special importance to Islamic Advisory Council and reiterated that the recommendations of this council on the legislation of laws should be considered in true spirit⁵³.

About foreign relations, the stance of JUI (F) is more idealistic than realistic. It emphasized on the strengthening of relations with other Muslim countries. It stressed over the maintenance of Islamic ideals and morals in the relations with other countries as well. JUI (F) extends its favour to the people of Kashmir and Palestine for their rights of self-determination. It also expresses anti-American and anti-imperialist⁵⁴ stance over America's use of brutal force against some Muslim countries especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. Like other religious parties, JUI (F) also shows its hard stance on the issue of India Pakistan relations and believes in the use of force if the issues are not resolved through negotiations.

The general elections of 2002 and 2008 were contested by JUI (F) from the platform of MMA, an electoral alliance of six religious political parties. The constituent parties of MMA belonged to different sects of Islam having different ideological orientations. However, all the parties developed a general consensus on the issues and released a combined 15-point manifesto (Appendix II)⁵⁵. MMA tried to include a number of issues by depicting ideologies of its constituent parties relevant to Islamic welfare state, human rights, education, unemployment, women, abolishment of feudal system, quick and uniform justice system etc.

⁵²"JUI (F) ka Manshoor brayia Intikhabat," *The daily Jang*, 9 January 1997.

⁵³*The daily Nation*, 3 February 1989.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵http://mma.org.pk/the_party/manifesto/

The overall analysis of the manifesto of JUI (F) shows the lack of interest on certain key issues of Pakistan like, **Energy, Devolution and Local government System, Policy to counter terrorism, Women Development, Youth, Nuclear Policy and Relations with the West especially the USA.** On the other hand, on certain issues, the JUI (F) shows extra ordinary excitement, which may be served as a source of attraction for voters, however, in real sense, are quite difficult to act upon. About the ability to act upon on party's manifesto, Muhammad Waseem asserted that,

"In the case of smaller parties, with their limited support base in terms of ethnicity, religio-sectarian identity or a tribal enclave, the electoral process is used essentially to 'stake out turf' i.e. to present alternative positions on major issues even without the hope of influencing the official policy in the short run. Elections carry some relevance for public policy inasmuch as contesting parties and candidates project their policy profiles, often without a reference to their ability to implement them⁵⁶."

3.4.3. Mosque and Madrasah Network

Mosque and *Madrasah* (religious school) have always captured central importance in the Muslim society. In *Maddariss* (plural of "*madrasah*"), *Ulema* have been engaged, for centuries, to teach the religious education relevant to the Quran and Hadith (the sayings of the Holy Prophet (PBUH)), the *fiqh* (the Islamic Jurisprudence) and adherence of guidance for Muslim community in religious matters. In Sub-Continent, after the decline of Muslim rule, the *Ulema* felt the challenge to preserve the teachings of Islam, for which, they tried to establish the organized networks of *madrasah* system across the country. In this connection, one of the remarkable efforts was the establishment of Dar ul Ulum Deoband in 1867⁵⁷.

⁵⁶ Muhammad Waseem, , *The 1993 Elections in Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Book Ltd., 1994), 19.

⁵⁷ Barbara D. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900*, Op.cit., 87-88.

In Pakistan, the organization and structure of *madrasah* system has generally been associated with the sectarian divisions; mainly the five major sects, Deobandi, Bareilvi, Salfi (Ahle Hadith), Shia and JI. In these *Maddariss*, generally the students belong to the poor and needy families, which are unable to provide modern education to their children in schools and colleges. This depicts government's lack of efficiency, interest and preference in the field of education on one hand and on the other side, in these *Maddariss*; the students have been provided not only free education but food and shelter as well. The upbringing and socialization of these students is carried out in a sectarian environment with a message to love and loyalty for their sect and rivalry and religious enmity for the rest⁵⁸.

According to ICG report, there are more than 10,000 *Maddariss* in Pakistan, where more than one and half million students are busy to study the religious education⁵⁹. At the time of creation of Pakistan in 1947, there were about 137 *Maddariss*, whose number has been increased to 10,000 in 2002. The most rapid increase taken place during General Zia's era, when especially the *Maddariss* of Deobandi and Ahle Hadith sects as well the *Maddariss* of JI were the main source and supply lines for Jihad for different mujahedeen groups engaged in fighting against the Soviet forces during Afghan War (1979-1988). During 1990s, Taliban Movement emerged from the Deobandi (JUI) *Maddariss* of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, where most of the Afghan refugees are getting

⁵⁸ Muhammad Waseem, "Origins and Growth Patterns of Islamic Organizations in Pakistan" (2004), 28 available from <http://apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalismAndSecurityinSouthAsiach2.pdf>

⁵⁹ ICG Asia Report No. 36, *Pakistan: Madrassa, Extremism and the Military* (Islamabad/Brussels: July 2002), i.

such development projects such as roads, electricity, tube wells etc. to facilitate the *Maddariss*⁶⁴.

3.5. Conclusion

The comprehensive and detailed analysis and study of evolution, organization and ideology of JUI (F) reveals that the party struggled hard for its survival by changing strategies according to the needs of the time. In the early years of Pakistan, the party's main appearance is mere a religious group struggling for Islamization of newly born state. However, gradually it is felt by the then leadership of the party that to achieve the desired objectives, political strength is equally necessary. By the passage of time, the party was remained under the process of organization and re-organization.

In the general elections of 1970, the representation of the party in the Parliament and two provincial assemblies as well as being part of coalition governments of two provinces of KPK and Baluchistan, although short lived, boosted the morale and potential of JUI. In the preceding years, the party was actively involved in the politics of Pakistan and played an effective role throughout the electoral history of Pakistan. Presently, JUI is not only competes with its rival religious political parties but also able to give a tough time to the secular political parties in its specific influential areas.

To transform the JUI from a religious group to a religious political party, the role of Mufti Mahmud and his family has been worth mentioned. Mufti Mahmud re-organized the party on political lines, adhere and defend his ideology in the Parliament and in public as well. During his tenure, the party, for the first time, able to form a coalition government at NWFP and Baluchistan. This share of power was remained a valuable

⁶⁴ Joshua T. White, *Pakistan Islamist Frontier*, Op.cit., 56-57.

experience for the party. After Mufti Mahmud, his son, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman effectively led the party since last three decades and achieved a number of political successes through his ability of maneuverings and changing strategies according to the circumstances.

Chapter Four

COMPARASION OF ELECTORAL POLITICS OF JUI (F) WITH OTHER RELIGIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES - 1988 TO 2008

4.1. Introduction

In democracies, the general elections provide opportunities to masses to elect their representatives by reflecting their preferences. These representatives formed government or opposition to government and frame or influence such public policies through which the aspiration of their voters could be met¹.

Pakistan is a polity having various kinds of diversities and divisions based on ethnicity, linguistic, racial, sectarianism etc. Furthermore, military's continuous interventions in the affairs of the state, both directly or indirectly, weaken the country's political institutions. Therefore, political system shaped by these circumstances could not be stabilized and become mature to meet the criteria of democracy in real terms. Furthermore, the political parties shaped by weak political system could not become internally democratic and become a tool in the hands of political elites who always tried to secure their vested interests.

The first general elections were held in 1970, after 23 years of independence. These were the first and the last general elections held in the United Pakistan, as after these elections, Pakistan was disintegrated in to two parts due to political turmoil in the East Pakistan. In these general elections, there was diverse number of political parties who contested in the

¹ Michael McDonald and Ian Budge, *Elections, Parties, Democracies: Confessing the Median Mandate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3.

elections. There were mainstream, nationalist, socialist, regional, ethnic and religious political parties representing a multi-party culture in the country. This phenomenon has been prevailed throughout the electoral history of Pakistan.

In the preceding paragraphs, the electoral history of Pakistan from 1988 to 2008 is being described with a focus on the religious political parties and a special emphasis of the electoral successes and achievements of JUI (F). Each election is being analyzed separately along with pre-election as well as post-election scenario.

4.2. The General Elections 1988

Pre-Election Political Scenario

As a result of the general elections 1985, hold by General Zia ul Haq on non-party basis, Muhammad Khan Junejo becomes the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 23 March 1985. Junejo basically belonged to Pakistan Muslim League form the Sindh province². After securing a safe position by making a deal with the parliament and the civilian government and keeping the lever of power in his own hands through the Eighth Amendment in the Constitution of 1973, General Zia ul Haq lifted the Martial Law on 30 December 1985³. During the years 1987-88, serious conflicts emerged between General Zia and Prime Minister Junejo on certain policy issues; most remarkably, the Afghan war, the Geneva Accord, blast in the Ojheri Camp Rawalpindi and many other administrative issues. As a result, General Zia used the power of 58 (2) (B) and dissolved the Junejo government as well as the National Assembly on 29 May 1988. On 30 May 1988, all the Provincial Assemblies were also dissolved. General Zia announced that new elections, again on non-party basis, will be held on 17 November 1988. However, his plans could not become

²Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Op.cit., 373.

³Ibid., 376.

reality due to his sudden death along with some top military officers in an air crash on 17 August 1988. After the death of General Zia, the political affairs took new shape. The Chairman of Senate, Ghulam Ishaq Khan become acting President of Pakistan, whereas, General Aslam Baig, the Vice Chief of Army Staff become the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). Both the personalities reiterated to hold general elections as per schedule. The Supreme Court while giving decision on a writ petition, ordered to hold general elections on party basis⁴. Therefore, all the political parties, most of whom were earlier thinking to boycott the general elections, started their preparations to participate in the forthcoming general elections.

Electoral Alliances

After the dismissal of Junejo government, due to internal conflicts, the PML split into two groups, PML (Junejo) and PML (Fida). The PML (J) was led by Muhammad Khan Junejo, whereas, PML (F) was led by Fida Muhammad Khan with the strong support and backing of Main Nawaz Sharif, the former Chief Minister of the Punjab as well as the military and the establishment. Due to mass support and popularity of PPP, as observed during the election campaign, PML (F) gathered other anti-PPP political parties and formed an electoral alliance, the Islami Jamhoori Itihad (IJI) on 6 October 1988. The constituent parties of IJI were PML (F), NPP, JUI (Darkhawasti), MJAH (Lakhvi), JM (Sahabzada Fazle Haq), HJ, Nizam-e-Mustafa Group and Azad Group. Later on, JI also joined IJI on 10 October 1988⁵.

In the meanwhile, PML (J) along with TI and JUP formed another electoral alliance, Pakistan Peoples Alliance (PPA). However, on the other side, efforts were underway for

⁴ Ibid., 384-392.

⁵ Akhtar Hussain, *Politics of Alliances in Pakistan: 1954-1999*, (an unpublished PhD Dissertation, QAU, 2008,), 158.

the unification of both groups of PML. These efforts become fruitful and both groups were unified on 14 October 1988 under the leadership of Junejo, therefore, PML (J) withdrew from PPA and become the part of IJI. The PPA, now comprising of only two parties, TI and JUP, remained in active and contested the general elections, as well⁶.

In these elections, although all other prominent religious political parties i.e. JI, JUI (D), MJAH (Lakhvi) and JM (Sahabzada Fazle Haq) were part of an electoral alliance (IJI) and JUP was in PPA. JUI (F) contested the general elections without entering into any electoral alliance. However, a seat adjustment formula with PPP had been agreed at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa level, where both parties decided to field their candidates on half-half seats of the National Assembly (13+13=26) and Provincial Assembly (40+40=80)⁷. JUI (F) fielded its candidates in almost all the constituencies of National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies of Baluchistan.

The Election Results

The general elections of the National Assembly were held on 16 November 1988 and those of Provincial Assemblies on 19 November 1988. As a result of the general elections of National Assembly, no party got clear majority to form independent government. PPP emerged as the largest party with 92 seats and IJI on the second by winning 55 seats. The largest group was of independent candidates with 27 seats including 13 seats of MQM who did not use their party label. JUI (F) succeeded to win 7 seats of National Assembly, 3 from NWFP and 4 from the Baluchistan. The JUI (F) *Amir*, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman also became the member of National Assembly from his native constituency NA-18.

⁶ Ibid., 159-160.

⁷ *The daily Jang Rawalpindi*, 19 October 1988.

In provincial assemblies, the situation was varying province wise. In the Punjab, IJI got majority by winning 108 seats. In Sindh, PPP was leading with 67 seats. In NWFP, there was split mandate as IJI got 29 seats, PPP won 21 seats, ANP was with 12 seats and the 15 independent candidates were also ready to play their role. Similarly in Baluchistan, IJI won 8 seats, PPP got 3 seats, JUI (F) emerged as the largest party with 11 seats and BNA won 6 seats along with 7 independents.

Post-Election Situation and Government Formation

Being the single largest party, the PPP, created a post-election coalition at the federal level with the MQM, the ANP and independent members. The PPP leader, Benazir Bhutto was elected as the Prime Minister on December 2, 1988 on a joint initiative of the Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the Army Chief, General Aslam Baig. Benazir Bhutto is said to have made three commitments before to assume the office of PM that future President of Pakistan will be Ghulam Ishaq Khan, retention of Lt. General (Retired) Yaqub Ali Khan as the Foreign Minister, and finally no unilateral reduction in the defense budget. On December 13, Ghulam Ishaq Khan was elected as President of Pakistan for five years with the support of the ruling coalition⁸.

In the Punjab, IJI succeeded to form its governments with the support of independents. Mian Nawaz Sharif was become the Chief Minister. In Sindh, PPP formed a coalition government with MQM and Syed Qaim Ali Shah was become the Chief Minister. In NWFP, there was a coalition government of PPP, ANP and independents. In Baluchistan, IJI and PPP formed its coalition government. The Baluchistan coalition government soon become in crises as the Chief Minister Mir Zafar Ullah Jamali of IJI has very limited

⁸*The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan*, (Islamabad: PILDAT, May 2013), 20.

support in the Assembly. The CM advised the governor of Baluchistan to dissolve the Provincial Assembly, who did so, however, the Baluchistan High Court restored the Assembly. IJI, JUI (F), BNA and Pakhtun Khwa Awami Milli Ittehad formed a coalition government and Nawab Akbar Bugti was become the Chief Minister⁹.

Due to the continuous rivalry between PPP's federal government and IJI government in the Punjab as well as dissatisfaction of the coalition partners of PPP at Center as well as in the provinces of Sindh and NWFP, the PPP government could not prove to be stabilized. The coalition partners of PPP withdrew their support. The situation further becomes tense when an Opposition alliance of all anti-PPP parties was formed in the National Assembly, and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was its President. Furthermore, the relations of Benazir Bhutto with both the President of Pakistan Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Army Chief Aslam Baig were also deteriorated on certain administrative issues like appointment of Judges and changing of ISI chief. As a result of the continuous tussle among several stake holders and instable political situations, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the Benazir government on 6 August 1990 under the Article 58 (2) (B), dissolved National Assembly as well as all four Provincial Assemblies and announced for fresh elections¹⁰.

In these general elections, JUI (F) did not enter into any electoral alliance, like other religious political parties, and contested general elections independently. The party fielded its candidate in almost all the four provinces for National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies with a special attention to its support base i.e. the NWFP and the Baluchistan. In this scenario, JUI (F) was remained comparatively more successful by

⁹ Akhtar Hussain, *Politics of Alliances in Pakistan: 1954-1999*, Op.cit., 165-166.

¹⁰ Ibid., 173-182.

wining 7 National Assembly seats and 11 seats in Baluchistan Assembly. The party further succeeded to become a coalition partner of Baluchistan government as well.

4.3. The General Elections 1990

Electoral Alliances and Election Campaign

After the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto government on 6 August 1990, caretaker governments established at federal and provincial levels. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the Opposition leader of IJI in National Assembly, was become the care taker Prime Minister. Similarly, the care taker governments of all four provinces were belonging to IJI. As regards, electoral alliances, the leaders of the component parties of IJI decided to keep the alliance intact to contest the general elections through a combine platform to defeat the PPP. On the other side, PPP also entered into an alliance, the Peoples Democratic Alliance (PDA), comprising of PPP, TI, TNFJ (Sajid Naqvi group) and ML (Qasim Group). ANP and MQM made seat adjustment with IJI; however, JUI (F) contested the elections independently like 1988 without entering into any alliance¹¹.

In the election campaign of general elections of 1990, Mian Nawaz Sharif, who was leading the IJI, presented himself and his alliance as an alternative to the PPP and her allies regarding solutions of different problems faced by the nation, like improvement of economy, law and order etc. Due to presence of religious parties in IJI, the IJI was also showing her commitments for more Islamization process in the country. The PPP was on defensive footings due to the charges of corruption and bad governance during his tenure of 1988 to 1990¹².

¹¹Ibid., 189-191.

¹²*The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan*, Op.cit., 21.

Election Results

As compare to results of previous general elections of 1988, IJI stood first by a landslide victory both in the National Assembly as well as Provincial Assemblies. The PPP-led alliance, the PDA, remained on the second position. As regards National Assembly, IJI won 105 seats (mostly from the Punjab), PDA got 45, and MQM bagged 15 seats mainly from Karachi and Hyderabad. JUI (F) won 6 as compare to 7 in the previous general elections, JUP (Noorani) got 3 (all from the Punjab) and ANP took 6 seats mainly from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These results reveal that only difference occurred in the seats of IJI and PDA, and the other religious and regional parties almost got the same number of seats in the National Assembly. Furthermore, IJI got majority of its NA seats (91) from the Punjab, which again proved to be the major support base for IJI¹³.

The results relating to Provincial Assemblies were also favoring IJI to form future governments. In the Punjab, IJI won remarkable victory by getting 214 seats out of 240. In Sindh, PDA remained the first by getting 46 seats, whereas, MQM won 28 seats and IJI bagged only 6, while Independents were 19. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, IJI got 33, ANP won 23, whereas, PDA got 6 and JUI (F) won 2 seats. In Baluchistan Assembly, IJI won 7, PDA got 2, whereas, JWP bagged 19, JUI (F) 6 and BNA 3 seats along with 5 independents. The overall result shows that by sticking alliance with regional, religious and smaller parties, PML succeeded in the number game by emerging the largest party in National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies of the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa¹⁴.

¹³Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Op.cit., 409.

¹⁴Akhtar Hussain, *Politics of Alliances in Pakistan: 1954-1999*, Op.cit., 191-192.

Post-Election Situation and Formation of Governments

After declaration of all the results, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the leader of IJI, succeeded to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan, by winning a two-third majority with the support of MQM, ANP and Independents. At provincial levels, IJI formed its government in the Punjab quite easily, whereas, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, IJI formed government by making a coalition with ANP. However, JI who won 8 seats of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly did not accept IJI's partnership with ANP due to her ideological clash with the later; therefore, JI did not become the part of the Provincial government and requested for separate seats in the Assembly. In Baluchistan, IJI also succeeded to form its coalition government with the help of various smaller parties and independents. In Sindh, where PDA was being the majority party with 46 seats, could not succeed to form its government. Here, IJI's Jam Sadiq Ali formed his coalition government with the help of MQM (28 seats) and independents (19 seats). In this way, as a result of land slide victory, IJI formed the Central, as well as, all four provincial governments.¹⁵

IJI was an amalgam of such parties, who have conflicting view points and ideologies on certain national and international issues. Furthermore, each party and its leadership were trying to secure their particular interests. Due to these reasons and power game, soon cracks had been developed in the cadres of IJI. JI got dissatisfied from the Prime Minister and his dominating PML on the issue of Pakistan's Afghan policy. The religious parties heavily criticized Nawaz government for non-implementation of the *Shar'iat Bill* in its true spirit. The 1992 'Operation Clean up' in Karachi, carried out by army, alienated the MQM, who considered the said operation, was launched to only target their party. The PDA (PPP-led alliance) did not accept the results of 1990 elections and considered them

¹⁵ Ibid., 192-193.

as a big fraud, however, sit in the National Assembly under protest. Benazir Bhutto claimed for time and again that their mandate had been stolen. PDA continued its efforts to haunt the Nawaz government both from inside as well as outside of the Parliament. Moreover, Nawaz Sharif developed his conflicts with the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on certain issues, who considered himself as the custodian of the Constitution. By the end of 1992 to April 1993, the overall political situations in the country become worsen. In 1993, the conflicts between the PM and President reached to such a peak that the President decided to dissolve both the government and National Assembly and he did so on 18 April 1993 and established a care taker government of Balkh Sher Mazari. Nawaz government approached the Supreme Court of Pakistan for restoration of government as well National Assembly. The Supreme Court after hearing the case in detail gave the decision to restore both Nawaz government and the National Assembly. The Nawaz Sharif was back in the government; however, due to mass protest arranged by PPP and other opposition parties with the backing of the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the overall political situation could not become stable. At last, Army Chief General Waheed Kakar intervened. As a result, both Nawaz Sharif and Ghulam Ishaq Khan had resigned from their respective offices. The National Assembly and all the four Provincial Assemblies were dissolved, new care taker government of Moeen Qureshi was established and the nation was informed for fresh general elections¹⁶.

¹⁶ Muhammad Waseem, *The 1993 Elections in Pakistan*, (Lahore: Vanguard Book Ltd, 1994), 42-56.

4.4. The General Elections 1993

The Caretaker Government

Moeen Qureshi, who was almost unknown in Pakistan, a retired bureaucrat, mostly served in the World Bank outside of Pakistan, was appointed as caretaker Prime Minister of Pakistan. He immediately took some important measures to improve economic conditions of Pakistan by declaring the State Bank of Pakistan, Television and Radio as autonomous to get rid of political government's influence. He published the lists of such bank defaulters who took heavy loans without proper guarantees and procedures as well as exposed those tax-payers who were dogging the tax collectors by paying minimal tax. Although, Moeen Qureshi took very concrete steps regarding improvement of the economic system of Pakistan, however, he could not be much succeeded due to short span of time of only ninety days¹⁷.

Electoral Alliances and Election Campaign

Both the previous major electoral alliances, the PML (N)-led IJI who contested elections of 1988 and 1990 and PPP-led PDA, who contested elections of 1990, were torn out before the eve of general elections of 1993. Both the mainstream parties, the PML (N) and the PPP, almost contested the elections independently. However, both parties made provincial based electoral alliances as well as used seat adjustment formula. The previously operated coalition of PML (N) and ANP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was remained intact. PML (N) and MQM cooperated with each other in the Sindh. Similarly PML (N) and PKMAP reached at a compromising formula in Baluchistan. On the other hand, PPP joined hands with PML (J) and JUI (F) in the province of Khyber

¹⁷Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Op.cit., 425.

Pakhtunkhwa. In Baluchistan, PPP local leadership entered into constituency level alliances with the local political parties¹⁸.

The religious parties crafted the electoral alliances in the general elections of 1993. Qazi Hussain Ahmed of JI established Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF). JUI (F) and JUP both rival sectarian parties made Islamic Jamhoori Mahad (IJM) to contest elections by supporting each other in all over the country. Maulana Sami ul Haq of JUI (S) also established an electoral alliance, the Mutahida Democratic Mahad (MDM). Although, MDM was comprised of about 25 political parties, however, the important and most prominent were JUI (S), the Khaksar Tehrik and SSP. The rest were mere supporters of these major parties and had no important role ever in the electoral politics¹⁹.

PPP and PML (N) both rival parties campaigned on the basis of propaganda and by putting sever allegations against each other. JI-led PIF organized a massive election campaign blaming both mainstream PML (N) and PPP and presented PIF as an alternative to both. Qazi Hussain Ahmed, *Amir* of JI declared both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif as the enemy of Pakistan. PIF claimed very high expectation for their victory in the general elections of 1993. During election campaign, PML (N) tried to join hands with JI but JI did not show any interest. On the other side, PPP leadership was satisfied with the blowing election campaign of PIF which was a real threat for PML (N) vote bank, mainly the religious inclined voters²⁰ (both PML (N) and JI are considered right wing parties).

¹⁸ Muhammad Waseem, *The 1993 Elections in Pakistan*, Op.cit., 110-116.

¹⁹ Ibid., 16-17.

²⁰ Ibid., 124-138.

Election Results

PPP contested on 166 constituencies of the National Assembly and won 86 seats and emerged as the largest party. PML (N) contested on 173 constituencies and won 73 seats and stood at the second position. PIF fielded 104 candidates but won only 3 seats by obtaining 3.20% votes. IJM fielded 51 candidates and won 4 seats (2 from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 2 from Baluchistan all belong to JUI (F). IJM obtained 2.33% votes from all over the country. MDM fielded 35 candidates, won only 2 seats by getting 1.08% votes.

In the Punjab Assembly, PML (N) once again emerged as the largest party by winning 106 seats as compared to PPP who got 94 seats, whereas, PML (J) remained on third position by getting 18 seats. 17 independents were also ready to play their role in the formation of future government. In Sind, PPP stood first by winning 56 seats, whereas, MQM was on second position with 27 seats. PML (N) won only 8 seats and 5 seats won by the independents. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, PPP emerged the largest party with 22 seats, whereas ANP was on the second position with 21 seats. PML (N) won 15 and PML (J) won 4 seats. As regards, religious parties/alliances, PIF won 4, MDM and IJM won 1 seat each. 11 seats won by the independents. In the Baluchistan Assembly, like the results of previous assemblies, there was split mandate and no party was in a strong position. PPP won 3, PML (N) 6, ANP 1, JWP 5, PKMAP 4, IJM 3, MDM 1, BNM (H) 4, BNM (M) 2 and Independents won 9 seats²¹.

The Islamic parties generally did not perform well as compare to previous elections. PIF, whose election campaign was quite impressive, could not meet its expectation. However, the overall performance of JUI (F) by winning 4 seats of the National Assembly, 1 and 3

²¹ Ibid., 165-180.

seats of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan Assemblies respectively was somehow better as compare to other religious parties. During Benazir's second term, JUI (F) had been remained cooperative with the government on several issues. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman had also served as the Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee.

Government Formation

Benazir Bhutto of PPP succeeded to form federal government, with the support of PML (J) and independents, by winning 121 votes against Nawaz Sharif's 72. JUI (F), JI and NPP did not vote, whereas, MDM did not attend that assembly session²².

At provincial level, Manzoor Wattoo of PML (J) elected as Chief Minister of the Punjab by winning 131 votes against Shahbaz Sharif's 105. In the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pir Sabir Shah of PML (N) elected as Chief Minister with the support of ANP and independents, by gaining 48 votes against PPP candidate who got 29 votes. In Sindh, PPP nominated Abdullah Shah defeated Dr. Farooq Sattar of MQM by 72 to 27. In Baluchistan, Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Magsi, an independent member, elected as Chief Minister with the support of PML (N), PKMAP, BNP (H), PNP and MDM by gaining 26 votes against his opponent (a combine candidate of PPP, JWP, BNP (M), IJM and certain independents) who got 16 votes. IJM (JUI-F) sat on Opposition benches²³.

4.5. The General Elections 1997

Dismissal of Benazir's Government and the Caretaker Setup

Benazir Bhutto's second term as Prime Minister was also elaborated with political crises one after another. Due to bad governance style, rivalry with other political stake holders as well as state's institutions like judiciary and establishment, Benazir government was

²² Ibid., 189.

²³ Ibid., 190.

dismissed by her own party 's loyalist and elected President of Pakistan Farooq Laghari under Article 58 (2)(B). The main allegations against her government were corruption, mismanagement, attempts to destroy the independence of Judiciary through the proposed accountability law, the bugging of telephones of senior officials and judges, extra judicial killings and country's economic collapse. The provincial governments were also dissolved²⁴.

Malik Miraj Khalid, a founder member of PPP, former Chief Minister of the Punjab and former Speaker of the National Assembly, was appointed as caretaker Prime Minister of Pakistan. Similarly, caretaker governments of all four provinces had also been installed. The general elections for the National Assembly as well as for all four Provincial Assemblies were scheduled to be held on 3 February 1997²⁵.

Electoral Alliance and Election Campaign

In these general elections no major electoral alliance was formed at national level. However, at provincial level, some parties were supporting each other through seat adjustment. PML (N) made alliance with ANP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. PPP and JUI (F) also agreed to support each other in some selected constituencies of the National Assembly. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, JUI (S) agreed to not field candidates against the common candidates of PPP-JUI (F). Similarly, PPP-JUI (F) did not field their candidates in NA-9, NA-10 and NA-16, where JUI (S) fielded her candidates²⁶. Imran Khan, a former cricketing star, established his own political party Pakistan Tehrik Insaf (PTI) on 25 April 1996, also participated in the elections for first time. JI boycotted the general elections, however, other religious parties and groups fielded their candidates. Except

²⁴Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Op.cit., 423-429.

²⁵*The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan*, Op.cit., 26.

²⁶*The News Islamabad/Rawalpindi*, 16 December 1997.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the religious parties were scattered and competing with each other instead of making any strategy to face the mainstream political parties. Overall, PML (N) dominated the election campaign and PPP was once again on defensive footings due to her bad governance in the previous government²⁷.

Elections Results

PML (N) emerged as the largest party in the National Assembly by winning 136 seats out of 207. PPP did poorly in her electoral history by bagging only 18 seats. MQM obtained 12 and ANP 9 seats. 21 Independents also won. Among religious parties, only JUI (F) succeeded to get representation in the National Assembly by winning only 2 seats from Baluchistan. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, PPP, JUI (F) and JUI (S) could not win even a single seat of the National Assembly irrespective of their electoral alliance. In the Punjab Provincial Assembly, PML (N) emerged as the largest party by winning 211 seats out of 240. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, PML (N) bagged 32 seats and its allied party ANP won 29 seats. Here, JUI (F) won only 1 seat. In the Sindh, PPP performed comparatively well by bagging 34 seats, whereas, MQM and PML (N) got 28 and 15 respectively. In the province of Baluchistan, once again split mandate was observed²⁸. Here, JUI (F) succeeded to win 5 seats of the Provincial Assembly.

Government Formation

Mian Nawaz Sharif of PML (N) succeeded to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan for the second time with the support of MQM and ANP. At provincial level, Shahbaz Sharif of PML (N) elected as Chief Minister of Punjab. In Sindh, PML (N) succeeded to install her government by allying with MQM. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, PML (N) formed her

²⁷*The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan*, Op.cit, 26.

²⁸Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Op.cit., 450.

government with the support of ANP. In Baluchistan, BNP, JWP and JUI (F) formed their coalition government with the support of some smaller parties²⁹.

The general elections 1997 were proved to be a disaster for PPP as well as for the religious parties. The vote bank and representation of religious parties in the National Assembly had been on decline since 1988, and this decline reached at its peak in these general elections. JI boycotted the general elections of 1997 and no other religious party except JUI (F) could perform satisfactorily. Even JUI (F) who got only 2 seats of the National Assembly and 1 and 5 seats of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan Provincial Assemblies respectively, could not maintain her previous victories. The *Amir* of JUI (F) Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman had also lost his native National Assembly seat.

4.6. The General Elections 2002

Pre-Election Scenario

The landslide victory of PML (N) in the general elections of 1997 resulted a two-third majority to the party in the Parliament and establishment of strong governments both at federal as well as provincial levels, especially in the Punjab. However, soon conflicts of Nawaz's government emerged with her allies as well as other state's institutions. Firstly, Nawaz Sharif got rid of the President Laghari and elected his own party loyalist Rafique Tarrar as President. Chief Justice of Pakistan, Syed Sajjad Ali Shah had to go home due to serious constitutional battles between government and judiciary. Later on, in 1998, the Army Chief of Staff (COAS), General Jahangir Karamat resigned as Nawaz government was not pleased by his proposal of National Security Council. In this way, Nawaz government's confrontation with other pillars of power was continued throughout his

²⁹The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan, Op.cit., 27.

second tenure. On the other hand, Nawaz government's coalition partners, both MQM and ANP, left the government due to non-fulfillment of their aspirations, which they were ensured by PML (N) at the time of formation of government³⁰.

As a result of Kargil crises, severe differences emerged between Nawaz government and the Army's high command. On 12 October 1999, Nawaz Sharif's attempt to change the Army Chief was blown back. In response, Army arrested the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and other important ministers and imposed Martial Law in the country. General Musharaf declared himself as Chief Executive. The National Assembly, Senate, all four Provincial Assemblies and their governments had been suspended. Later on, on 11 December 2000, Nawaz Sharif along with his family members was exiled to Saudi Arabia³¹. On 20 June 2001, General Musharaf promulgated the President Succession Order 2001 and sent President Rafique Tarrar to home³².

The events of 9/11 gave a new birth to General Musharaf. Earlier, due to his dictatorial practices by de-railing the democracy in the country, he had not been succeeded to win the support of the democratic West. Now an opportunity had been available for General Musharaf to become an important ally of the US and NATO forces, who attacked Afghanistan to disband the Taliban government and in search of Osama Bin Laden (the Al-Qaida Chief, who was allegedly involved and held responsible in the 9/11 incident by the USA). General Musharaf took historical U-turn on Pakistan's Afghan policy and provided full logistic support to American forces³³.

³⁰ Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, Op.cit., 473.

³¹ Ibid., 480.

³² Ibid., 482.

³³ Ibid., 483.

As a result of Referendum on 30 April 2002, General Musharaf also became the President of Pakistan like his predecessors General Ayub Khan and General Zia ul Haq. General Musharaf introduced new Local Government Reform Order and Legal Framework Order in 2002 which ensured his firm grip on the politics of Pakistan³⁴.

Electoral Alliance and Election Campaign

The general elections were announced to be held on 10 October 2002. The top leadership of both the mainstream parties i.e. PPP and PML (N) were on exile and the lower ranks of these parties were under target and severe pressure of the Musharaf regime. Although General Musharaf designed such measures to keep himself on the top of government through legal and constitutional arrangements, however, he was much worried about the popularity of these mainstream political parties and considered them as a real threat for his regime. With the help of his military establishment as well as intelligence agencies, he successfully established a king's party, PML (Q), mainly consisting of dissenters from the PML (N) and the PPP³⁵.

To further damage the vote bank of the mainstream political parties, an important and significant development was the creation of an alliance of religious parties, the *Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal* (MMA). MMA was an effective electoral alliance of six religious parties, which includes, JI led by Qazi Hussain Ahmed, JUI (F) led by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, JUI (S) led by Maulana Sami ul Haq, JUP led by Shah Ahmed Noorani, Sajid Mir's *Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadith*, and Allama Sajid Naqvi's *Pakistan Islami Tehrik* (formerly *Tehrik-e-Jafaria*) of Shia sect³⁶. The MMA launched a massive election campaign by arranging large gatherings, public meetings and rallies throughout the country. The MMA

³⁴ Ibid., 485.

³⁵ Ibid., 490.

³⁶ Ashutosh Misra, *Rise of Religious Parties in Pakistan*, Op.cit., 192-193.

planned their election campaign on anti-American and pro-Taliban stance due to attack on Afghanistan by American-led forces and anti-Musharaf stance due to latter's attempt to curb on *Maddariss* and *jihadis* in the context of 9/11³⁷. Like other political competitors, MMA also presented an effective manifesto emphasizing on the improvement of educational and health facilities, development of interest free economy, land reforms, provision of justice and most importantly the implementation of *Shar'iat*. As compare to the Punjab and Sindh, MMA succeeded to attract majority of voters in the Pakhtun-dominated areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. Due to severe criticism by the Pakhtun elements in JUI (F), JUI (S) and JI, within MMA, ethnic factor proved to be an important contributing element in the victory of MMA. However, in Sindh, MMA managed to exploit the sentiments of the people against the US war on Afghanistan as well as utilized the anti-incumbency factor against the MQM by highlighting local issues such as health, education, civic concerns and *bhatta* (extortion)³⁸.

Some smaller political parties established an electoral alliance, the National Alliance, which was comprising of Millat Party of Sardar Farooq Ahmed Khan Laghari, National People's Party of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Sindh Democratic Alliance of Arbab Ghulam Rahim, and Sindh National Front of Mumtaz Bhutto³⁹.

Election Results

The election results were a mixture of expectations and surprise. As per expectations, PML (Q) became the largest party in the National Assembly by winning 78 seats and PPP-P stood second who got 62 seats. However, surprisingly MMA became the third

³⁷ Ibid., 192.

³⁸ Ibid., 196.

³⁹ *The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan*, Op.cit., 29.

largest party by getting 45 in the National Assembly and won majority of seats in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. The overall party position is as under:-

TABLE 2: Party Position in the General Elections 2002

PARTIES	NATIONAL ASSEMBLY	PUNJAB ASSEMBLY	SINDH ASSEMBLY	KPK ASSEMBLY	BALUCHISTAN ASSEMBLY
Total Seats (General)	272	297	130	199	51
PML (Q)	78	128	10	07	10
PPP-P	62	63	51	08	02
MMA	45	07	15	47	13
INDEPENDENTS	28	34	05	14	07
PML (N)	14	37	-	05	-
MQM	13	-	31	-	-
NA	12	12	10	-	04
PML (F)	04	-	04	-	-
ANP	-	-	-	08	-
PPP-Sherpao	02	-	-	09	-
Other Parties	10	06	02	01	11
Total	268	287	128	99	47

Source: Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, Op.cit., 490.

Formation of Governments

In the National Assembly, although, PML (Q) emerged as the largest party with the support of NA (National Alliance) and MQM, however, for the formation of government, it had short of numbers. The intelligence agencies once again came into action and compelled the independents to join PML (Q). Even then, more members were required to support PML (Q). Finally, NAB and ISI acting together, were able to break ten members of PPP-P by making a forward block with the name of Patriots. After these maneuverings by the Musharaf regime, PML (Q) succeeded to form its government at federal level and

Mir Zafar Ullah Khan Jamali from Baluchistan elected as Prime Minister with 172 votes in the House of 342 with a barest minimum majority. Both PPP and MMA contested the election of Prime Minister by fielding their candidates separately. Due to this divide, it was become difficult to nominate the leader of opposition in the National Assembly for about one year. After passing the Seventeenth Amendment with the help of MMA, its Secretary General Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman was declared by the Speaker of the National Assembly as the leader of the Opposition⁴⁰.

At provincial level, PML (Q) formed its government in three provinces. In the Punjab, Chudhery Pervaiz Ellahi elected as Chief Minister. In Sindh, with the coalition of MQM and MMA, PML (Q) formed its government. In Baluchistan, a collation government of PML (Q) and MMA was formed. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, MMA formed its independent government and Akram Durrani (belongs to JUI (F) elected as Chief Minister.

The remarkable victory of the alliance of religious parties surprised many both at home and abroad. The percentage of votes polled to MMA for National Assembly was 10.61%. The provincial breakdown of the polled votes for the National Assembly in percentage for MMA is as under:-

Table 3: Percentage Share of Votes Polled for MMA in General Elections 2002

PROVINCE	PERCENTAGE OF VOTES POLLED FOR NA FOR MMA	SEATS WON BY MMA
Punjab	5.2%	3
Sindh	10.6%	6
Baluchistan	16.4%	6
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	46.6%	29

Source: Muhammad Waseem, *Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of The 2002 Election*, Op.cit., 165-167.

⁴⁰Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Op.cit), 491.

According to Dr. Hassan Askari Rizvi,

"The most outstanding feature of the 2002 election results was the extra-ordinary success for the MMA which formed the provincial government in NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). It was part of the coalition governments in Sindh and Baluchistan. Pakistan's Islamic parties never obtained such a success in the past"⁴¹.

Out of MMA's constituent parties, the JUI (F) was remained the main beneficiary of the general elections of 2002. Traditionally, the JUI (F) had always maintained a presence in the politics of Baluchistan. It had returned 2-3 candidates on the 11 National Assembly seats and 4-10 candidates in the Provincial Assembly on an average⁴². Overall, in Baluchistan, all the candidates of the National Assembly as well as Provincial Assembly, won on the tickets of MMA, were belonged to JUI (F). In the National Assembly, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, the Amir of JUI (F) designated as the leader of Opposition. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, Akram Durrani of JUI (F) elected as Chief Minister. Hence, JUI (F) was performing a leading role in the National Assembly as well as the two Provincial Assemblies of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan.

4.7. The General Elections 2008

Pre-Election Scenario

General Musharaf had successfully used the federal and provincial governments, formed after the general elections of 2002, to strengthen his regime through constitutional and legal means. Through the Seventeenth Amendment, the President General Musharaf had once again become the source of power, enjoying the discretionary powers to appoint judges of Supreme Court and High Courts, governors of provinces, the Chiefs of Armed

⁴¹*The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan*, Op.cit., 31.

⁴²Muhammad Waseem, *Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections*, Op.cit., 217.

Forces, to dissolve the National Assembly and the elected government by riving the Article 58(2)(B) etc.⁴³

Since the beginning of Musharraf's rule, conflict emerged between the military regime and the Judiciary. In 2000, Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Saeed-uz-Zaman Siddiqui along with certain other Judges of Supreme Court refused to take oath under Musharraf's PCO. As a result, the Judiciary had divided and become weaken. General Musharraf appointed such Judges who were ready to provide legal shelter to his regime⁴⁴.

In 2005, Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chudhery becomes the Chief Justice of Pakistan. His judicial activism, alertness and taking sue motto actions and giving decisions against the sitting government by highlighting certain irregularities in the privatization of the Karachi Steel Mills, issue of missing persons, and violation of human rights in the country etc. irritated the General Musharraf and his military and civilian companions. Furthermore, such pending as well as new cases were expected to be come before the Supreme Court like future Presidential elections, the possibility of postponement of the general elections to be held in 2007, the legality of President retaining his position as COAS etc⁴⁵.

On 9 March 2007, General Musharraf called the Chief Justice at Army House Rawalpindi, in the presence of the Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and DGs ISI and MI, and alleged certain charges of misconduct and asked him to resign. In spite of being pressurized, the Chief Justice refused to do so. Being the President of Pakistan, General Musharraf suspended Iftikhar Muhammad Chudhery from the office of Chief Justice as well as the Judge of Supreme Court of Pakistan. He was put under house arrest along with his

⁴³Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, Op.cit., 506.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid. 510.

family. In the absence of Justice Bhagwan Das, the senior most after Justice Iftikhar Chudhery, Justice Zafar Iqbal was appointed as the acting Chief Justice of Pakistan. Later on, Justice Bhagwan Das, sworn as Chief Justice of Pakistan on his return from abroad. In the meanwhile, a reference against the Chief Justice Iftikhar Chudhery was filled by Musharaf regime in the Supreme Judicial Council. On the other hand, on the actions taken against the Chief Justice by General Musharaf and misbehaviour of police authorities with him fuelled the public sentiments against the Musharaf regime. General Musharaf was heavily criticized by the public at large, the political parties, the civil society, the lawyers and the media. On 20 July 2007, a full court bench comprising of 13 Judges of the Supreme Court restored Iftikhar Chudhery as the Chief Justice of Pakistan by the majority of 10 to 3 Judges⁴⁶.

As a result of the judicial crises and later on restoration of the Chief Justice Iftikhar Chudhery, a new twist taken place in the politics of Pakistan. This provided an opportunity to opposition parties and the public at large to heavily criticize the General Musharraf's attempts to prolong his dictatorial rule. The Musharraf's dual position as the President of Pakistan and COAS had once again been challenged in the Supreme Court by Qazi Hussain Ahmed of JJ and Imran Khan of PTI. During the election process for the President of Pakistan, Musharraf's opponent candidate of Presidency; Justice (retired) Wajjih-ud-din Ahmed filled a petition in the Election Commission of Pakistan by objecting his dual positions. The case was still under process in the Supreme Court of Pakistan but on 6 October 2007, Musharaf got himself elected as the President of Pakistan in a one sided election, for second consecutive five years term⁴⁷.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 510-515.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 519.

After being re-elected as the President, General Musharraf feared that the Supreme Court might give decision against him. Hence, before the decision of the Supreme Court, General Musharraf being COAS proclaimed Emergency on 3rd November 2007, issued PCO and asked the Judges of the Supreme Court to take fresh oath. About 70 percent Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts including the Chief Justice Iftikhar Chudhery refused to do so. Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar was sworn in as the new Chief Justice under the PCO. General Musharraf was under severe criticism both at home and abroad. The opposition political parties, lawyers, civil society, media and public were protesting against Musharraf's acts. As a result of massive opposition and internal pressure from the Army generals, General Musharraf at last decided to quit himself as COAS and handed over the command of the Army to General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kiyani on 28 November 2007. On 29 November 2007, General Musharraf took oath as a civilian President and ensured that the Emergency would be lifted on 16 December 2007, withdrawal of PCO and holding of general elections on 8 January 2008⁴⁸.

Along with these crises, the political parties were preparing for forthcoming general elections. As a result of negotiations between Musharraf regime and Benazir Bhutto, General Musharraf issued a National Reconciliation Order (NRO) for withdrawal of cases made on political basis against the politicians and others between 1st January 1986 and 12 October 1999. The issuance of NRO led the return of Benazir Bhutto to Pakistan in the month of October 2007. There were suspicious about the holding of general elections. Some political parties were thinking to boycott the general elections being held under Musharraf regime's appointed caretaker set up which mostly belong to PML (Q). The PPP-P decided to participate in the electoral process, however, some political parties

⁴⁸ Ibid., 523.

under the banner of All Parties Democratic Movement (APDM) which comprises, the PML (N), JI, PTI, PMAP, announced on 24 November 2007 to boycott the general elections. On return of Nawaz Sharif to Pakistan on 25 November, PML (N) decided to take part in the general elections. However, other constituent parties of APDM maintained their decision of boycott. Some Baloch nationalist parties, the BNP (Mengel), JWP and the National Party had also decided to boycott the process of general elections⁴⁹.

Electoral Alliances and Election Campaign

During election campaign, Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on 27 December 2007 at Liaquat Bagh Rawalpindi. This sad demise resulted a country wide protests and violence by the PPP workers. Nawaz Sharif announced for boycott of the general elections as a protest; however, he withdrew his decision when Asif Ali Zardari, the successor of Benazir Bhutto announced to take part in the general elections. Due to the sudden death of Benazir Bhutto, the polling date was changed to 18 February 2008, however, the election process continued⁵⁰.

In the context of general elections 2008, there was no significant electoral alliance formed by the political parties which were taking part in the elections independently. Although, some religious parties were united under the banner of MMA, however it had lost its importance due to JI's decision of boycott. The major component party of MMA was JUI (F). The JUP, after the death of its long lived president Shah Ahmed Noorani

⁴⁹ Ibid., 525-526.

⁵⁰ ICG Asia Report No. 203, *Reforming Pakistan's Electoral System*, (Islamabad/Brussels: 2011), 9.

(2004), was under the process of disintegration into factions and unable to play any concrete role in the areas of her influence⁵¹.

PPP-P election campaign was generally Bhutto's centric. PPP-P tried to win sympathy votes on the grounds of Benazir Bhutto's assassination. PML (N) was more critical of Musharraf regime and vocal of restoration of the Judges which was a burning issue that time. However, PPP-P and ANP stance on the restoration of the Judges was ambiguous. The JUI (F) was mainly focused on its efforts to serve people as a part of the MMA government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and talking about its future preferences. As American-led War of Terror had still been contained in Afghanistan, hence, like previous elections, the JUI (F) was campaigning on anti-American stance as well. Overall the election campaign was low-keyed due to threats of terrorism and there was less big public meetings and rallies⁵².

Election Results and Formation of Government

As a result of a split mandate, no political party could get an absolute majority in the National Assembly. The PPPP emerged as the largest party with 95 general seats. This number rose to 122 by adding the reserved seats for women and non-Muslims won by the PPPP. The PML (N) stood second with 72 general seats and 20 reserved seats for women and non-Muslims with a total of 92 seats. The erstwhile ruling PML (Q) won 41 general seats and 12 reserved seats, hence, their total seats were 53. The MQM won 19 general seats, all from urban Sindh. Its strength reached 25 by adding reserved seats. The ANP won 10 general seats, all from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. By adding 3 reserved seats for women, it had total 13 seats. JUI (F) won 6 seats (4 from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 2

⁵¹ *The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan*, Op.cit., 34.

⁵² *Ibid.*

from Baluchistan) and by adding 1 seat reserved for women, its total seats in the National Assembly become 7. Independent candidates won 10 seats⁵³.

At provincial level, the party position is tabulated as under:-

Table 4: Party Position in Provincial Assemblies in General Elections 2008

Party	Punjab Assembly	Sindh Assembly	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly	Baluchistan Assembly
PPPP	77	66	18	7
PML (N)	102	0	4	0
PML (Q)	64	10	4	17
MQM	0	36	0	0
ANP	0	2	29	2
BNP (A)	0	0	0	5
MMA	2	0	8	5
Others	2	11	16	10

Source: The Dawn dated 27 February 2008.

The PPPP, being the largest party in the National Assembly invited PML(N), MQM, ANP, JUI (F) and some independent members to set up a coalition government at the federal level. As a result, Yousaf Raza Gillani of the PPPP elected unanimously as Prime Minister of Pakistan on 25 March 2008. However, on the issue of restoration of the Judges, the cooperation between the PPP and the PML (N) proved short-lived. After a period of six weeks, the PML (N) withdrew from the Federal Government and decided to sit on opposition benches. However, the coalition government of PPP continued with the support of MQM, ANP, JUI (F) and independent members.

⁵³ Ibid.

Almost all political parties in the Parliament agreed to impeach the President Musharaf, resultantly, President Musharaf resigned from the office of President. In Presidential elections, the co-chairman of the PPP, Asif Ali Zardari elected as the President of Pakistan in September 2008 by defeating the PML (N) nominee.

At the provincial level, in the Punjab, the PML (N) which was the largest party in the Provincial Assembly formed a coalition government with PPPP and the independent members. The coalition of PML (N) and PPPP continued at provincial level even PML (N) withdrew from the federal government. In Sindh Provincial Assembly PPP being the largest party formed its coalition government with the support of MQM, smaller political parties and independents. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the ANP-led coalition government was installed. PPPP and the independents were the other coalition partners. The provincial government in Baluchistan was also a coalition of several political parties including JUI (F), led by Aslam Raesani of PPP⁵⁴.

In the absence of JI in the electoral contest, the other religious political parties, except JUI (F), once again performed poorly. However, JUI (F) which was the only active party in MMA now, had been succeeded to secure its position in the Parliament to some extent by winning 6 general seats and 1 seat reserved for women. However, its overall performance was less impressive as compare to the previous general elections of 2002. JUI (F) also succeeded to become a coalition partner of PPPP in federal and Baluchistan governments. As a result of political bargaining of JUI (F) with the PPP government, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, the *Amir* of JUI (F) was appointed as the Chairman of Kashmir Committee, Maulana Muhammad Khan Sherani, a parliamentarian and chief of JUI (F) Baluchistan appointed as the Chairman of Islamic Ideological Council (IIC) in

⁵⁴ Ibid., 35.

2010. Another JUI (F) senator, Talha Mahmood Aryan chairs the standing interior committee of the Senate⁵⁵.

4.8. Conclusion

The role of religion in the politics of Pakistan has been a permanent feature as depicted from the results of the general elections. In the first general elections held in 1970, 21.5 percent votes were polled for the religious political parties. After 1970, a decline has been observed in the votes of the religious political parties, which reaches to 6.7 percent votes in 1993 and in 1997 only two seats won by JUI (F), the only religious party gained access to the National Assembly⁵⁶. In the general elections of 2002, the remarkable victory of the electoral alliance (MMA) of almost all the prominent religious parties marked some peculiar effects and consequences on the politics of Pakistan. As a result of these elections, the religious parties were able to access the resources of the state and share the power of state effectively in their favour. MMA proved to be reflection of the united power of the religious political parties. However, on the other hand, the disintegration of MMA after completion of the term of government (2002-2007), the clash and rifts among the religious parties is also well evident, which has been reflected in the results of general elections of 2008.

The results of all the six general elections (1988-2008) proved that among religious parties, JUI (F) always performed well as compare to other religious political parties and groups. It remained the leading religious political party whether contested general elections independently or entered into an electoral alliance. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman,

⁵⁵ <http://www.islamopediaonline.org/country-profile/pakistan/islam-and-politics/jamiat-ulema-e-islam-jui>

⁵⁶ Muhammad Waseem, "Origins and Growth Patterns of Islamic Organizations in Pakistan" (2004), 23 available from <http://apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalismAndSecurityinSouthAsiach2.pdf>

being a shrewd politician, succeeded to maximize his political gains even the electoral success were limited. Furthermore, the party succeeded to secure its vote bank concentrated in the Sothern districts of KPK and Pashtoon belt of Baluchistan.

From the above analysis it is evident that the JUI-F is an important religio-political party which although emphasizes its Islamic roots and ideology but its politics is not limited to the religion only. In many respects, its politics are similar to those of other political parties. Party leaders readily assist JUI (F) members and voters to sort out their common problems and disputes at the police stations and courts which is a feature of conventional politics in Pakistan. The leadership as well as elected representatives of JUI (F) enjoys the protocol and the perks that come with the job and adjust themselves to work with the existing system of Pakistan⁵⁷.

⁵⁷Rahimullah Yousafzai, *The NEWS* 07 May 2013, also available from <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-16-175892-The-JUI-F-way>

Chapter Five

JUI (F): BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM

5.1. Introduction

Ideology is considered as an important base for every religious, social, political or cultural movement. Political parties, whether religious or secular, liberal or conservative, or of any other kind, mainly attract the general masses through the manifestoes and programs based on their ideologies. On the other hand, in real politics, political parties often take such steps which may not match with their ideologies while using pragmatic approaches.

5.1.1. Ideology

Ideology is comprised of the comprehensive patterns of moral beliefs about man and society. It is a way of thinking about the cultural and social programmes of a political movement. It also deals with abstract speculation and is a systematic set of arguments and beliefs used to justify an existing or desired social order. About political ideology, Reo M. Christenson states that *a political ideology is a system of beliefs that explain and justifies a present political order, either existing or proposed and offers a strategy (institution, process, programme) for its attainment*¹. He further argued that *an ideology offers an interpretation of the past, and an explanation of the present and a vision of the future*².

¹ Reo M. Christenson, *Ideologies and Modern Politics*, 3-4, cited by M Ikram Rabbani in *Pakistan Affairs* (Lahore: The Carvan Press, 1996), 1-2.

² Ibid.

Hence, briefly it can be understood that ideology serves as a motivational force for a nation, political party, movement or group of people to move ahead and act upon systematically to achieve the desired goal(s). Through ideologies, people are attracted and gathered at a common platform for some common purpose(s).

5.1.2. Ideology and Political Parties

Political party is like an organization having loose structure and mainly relies on the support of masses. The masses idealize and support a political party on the basis of the manifesto and programmes of the party based on its ideology. Hence, ideology which builds a specific perception of a political party among masses plays an important and basic role in electoral politics.

As regards religious political parties, the religious teachings, faith, rituals, all serve as sources for their ideologies. These parties are more prone to implement the divine authority and law in the society. The ideology of a religious party provides space and opportunities to the religious clergy to play their role effectively in the politics and influence the social order according to their preferences.

The main sources of the ideologies of Islamic political parties are the Holy Quran and the *Sunnah* as well as the political thoughts of their founders, eminent scholars and *Ulema*. For example JI follows and propagates the ideology of Abul Ala Mawdudi and JUI gets inspiration from the political struggle and anti-imperialistic stance of JUH and likewise other religious parties. The religio-political parties shaped their ideologies and manifestoes to address the socio-economic issues of society in the context of religion by presenting their patterns and programmes as an alternative to those of secular political parties. Religion has crucial impacts on the lives of its followers with an ability to mold

their political behaviors and perceptions in a specific direction. The religious political parties generally used this well known tendency and propagate their ideologies and try to penetrate into the social system.

Since the independence of Pakistan, the religio-political parties have been struggling to achieve their agenda of Islamization of the state and religio-socialization of society. In early periods, these parties managed to define the ideological discourse of the state through the Objective Resolution of 1949. According to these parties, the divine laws have their precedence over the laws made by the man or parliament. All these parties supported the Islamization process of General Zia ul Haq. On the front of religio-socialization of society, these parties have promoted a discourse of religious socialization which has been merged with their political objectives. Their achievements are significant as the trends of religio-socialization have been increasing and visible in the society³.

5.1.3. Pragmatism

Pragmatism is a philosophical term which simply means that an ideology or proposition is true if it works satisfactorily, and impractical ideas are to be rejected⁴. Pragmatism is a process instead of a result. This is only the approach itself, whose task is to find solutions that make the most sense in the simplest way possible. The pragmatic approach by its very nature allows for the dynamic interplay between theory and practice, since it is assumed that an ultimate truth cannot be reached in the first place and so the process is always "under construction." In order for the pragmatic approach to work there must be

³ Muhammad Amir Rana, "Agenda of Religious-Political Organizations," *Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, Islamabad, Jan-Mar 2011, 1.

⁴[Online] available from <http://www.iep.utm.edu/pragmati/>

shared agreement from all parties of a dispute or problem that a greater good than their own is desired or greater than the material solution at least⁵.

In this chapter the electoral politics of JUI (F) will be discussed in details while comparing its ideology and political preferences and practices. Similarly, the performance of JUI (F) as compare to other religious political parties will also be analyzed in the same context.

5.2. Ideological Basis of JUI (F)

JUI (F) is the harbinger of the ideology of its parent organization the JUH and JUIP. To understand the ideology of JUIP or JUI (F), the historical principles set and presented by the first President of JUIP Allama Shabbir Ahmed Usmani in February 1949⁶ have always been considered important. These principles serve as the basis of the ideology of JUIP. By summarizing these principles, the main features of the ideology of JUIP about an Islamic state are as follows:-

- The sovereignty belongs to Allah and the people of Pakistan shall exercise it within the parameters fixed by Islam. Islam should be the state religion. The teachings of Islam as contained in the Quran and *Sunnah* should be the basis of the laws of the country, and the Constitution must recognize Islam as the complete religion, and finality of the Prophet hood of Muhammad (PBUH). The precedent set by the pious caliphs would also be a source of inspiration.

⁵Terri L. Kelly, "A Pragmatic Approach to Conflict Resolution: Benefits and Problems," (Unpublished graduate paper, Department of Conflict Resolution, Portland State University, 2000). [Online] available from <http://www.q7.com/~terri/Papers/cr523.htm>

⁶Maulana Muhammad Sharif Hazarvi, *Jamiat Ulema Islam kay Aghraz-o-Maqasad in the light of the Quran and Hadith* (Lahore: Jamiat Publications, 2006), 10-11.

- To maintain law and order and provide Justice to the people of Pakistan irrespective of their religious, ethnic and racial affiliations. By reforming the Western patterns of Justice, the quick and economical justice to be provided to the people. Along with protection of the faith and civic rights of minorities, steps be taken to promote Islamic norms in the society.
- To promote the individual abilities of the people of Pakistan by ensuring equal economic opportunities and social welfare.
- To take measures to culminate the social evils from the society and to struggle to purify the society through moderation and education.
- To provide religious and military training to each Muslim of Pakistan so that he may become a solidier of Islam and Pakistan.

In the Constitution of JUI (F), it is reiterated that JUI will struggle to convert Pakistan into an Islamic State where Islamic Justice System will be prevailed through which the people of Pakistan could be safeguarded form the ills of Capitalism as well as Communism and Socialism and to get benefits from the goods of natural (here means 'Islamic') social system⁷. Professor Usman and Masood Ash'ar compiled the manifestoes of all the political and religious parties of Pakistan in their book "*Pakistan ki Siyassi Jamateian*" (published in Urdu by Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore 1986) described the ideology of JUI that no law could be made against the Quran and the *Sunnah*. JUI confines legislation within the *Hanfi* framework by arguing that the state must follow the majority faith in its legislation functions⁸.

⁷ The Constitution of Jamiat Ulema Islam Pakistan, Op.cit., 4.

⁸ Cited by Rana M. Amir, *Agenda of Religious-Political Organizations*, Op.cit., 4.

From the above mentioned features of the ideology of JUI (F), it can be concluded that the party believes in the supremacy of the *Quranic* teachings and the path of *Sunnah*. It desires to convert Pakistan into an Islamic state by opposing the social and economic systems of both Capitalism and Communism and believes in the social and justice systems of Islam. To insist on the implementation and adoption of this ideology clearly means that the present system and structure is neither trustworthy nor beneficial to the people of Pakistan. JUI (F) considers the present system and democracy as the heritage of the West and not fully compatible to the Islamic norms and principles of Caliphate.

5.3. Electoral Strategies of JUI (F) - A Comparison with other

Religions Political Parties

JUI (F) is a popular religious party and the largest representative of Deobandi School. Its vote bank has been concentrated in Pashto speaking areas, mainly the Southern districts and Pashtoon belt of Baluchistan. In these areas, there is a vast network of Deobandi *Maddariss*, from where both the leadership and supporters of JUI (F) have been emerged. Due to this reason, the leadership of JUI (F) is belonging mainly to Pashto-speaking clerics. The full Pashtunization of the JUI is a product of Afghan war (1979-1988), when both JUI and JI had supported *Jihad*, designed and planned by Pakistan military and CIA and funded by Saudi Arabia and Gulf states, against the Soviet forces. During this period, both JUI and JI established hundreds of new *Maddariss* by receiving donations from abroad, to train Afghan, Pakistan and Arab *jihadis* for chain supply of *Mujahedeen* for Afghan *Jihad*. This phenomenon caused to strengthen the ties between Pashtun population living across the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan⁹. The emergence of

⁹Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (New York: Public Affairs, Perseus Book Group, 2011), 480.

Taliban in 1990s from the *Maddariss* of both factions of JUI, and later on, their fall in 2002 was another factor exploited by JUI in their electoral politics. During this scenario, ANP which is a rival party of JUI (F) utilized Pashto nationalism as base for their ideology as well as to gain success in the general elections. But, JUI (F) has been succeeded to Islamize the Pathan nationalism in these areas to maximize his political strength¹⁰.

From the study of electoral history of JUI (F), it is apparent that the party has been changing its electoral strategies to contest general elections and becoming part of coalition governments as well as opposition forces, according to the conditions of political environment. In the general elections of 1988, JUI (F) contested independently without entering into any electoral alliance. At that time, other religious political parties were part of electoral alliances, e.g. JI was in IJI and JUP was in PPA. At the end of elections, JUI (F) got 7 seats of NA and emerged as the largest party in Baluchistan Assembly by winning 11 seats. At National Assembly, JUI (F) was part of opposition; however, in Baluchistan after the fall of Mir Zafar Ullah Jamali government, it had become part of coalition government with BNP, PML (N) and JWP.

In 1990, JUI (F) once again contested general elections independently; however, a seat adjustment was made with PPP at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa level. JUI (F) won 6 seats of NA, 2 seats of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 6 seats of Baluchistan Assemblies. JUI (F) opted to sit in Opposition benches both at National as well as Provincial Assemblies. As regards other religious political parties, JI being part of IJI shared power at federal and the Punjab governments; however, it did not join the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government due to presence of ANP as a coalition partner of PML. JUP won 3 NA seats only.

¹⁰ Ibid., 481.

The general elections of 1993 were somehow different to those of 1988 and 1990. Both the mainstream parties, PML (N) and PPP were contesting elections independently without forming any electoral alliance. This time, JUI (F) changed its strategy and formed IJM, an electoral alliance with JUP, which is a representative party of Bareilvi School rival to Deobandis. JI who had quitted from IJI in 1992, formed its separate electoral alliance, the PIF, and launched a massive election campaign. Another electoral alliance of religious parties was MDM, led by Maulana Sami ul Haq of JUI (S). As a result of these elections, IJM got 4 seats of NA (the winning candidates belonged to JUI (F) and won 2 seats each from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan). PIF and MDM won 3 and 2 seats of NA respectively. At provincial level, JUI (F) won 1 seat of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 3 seats of Baluchistan Assembly.

The overall performance of the religious political parties was not satisfactory and these were losing the trust of voters which was being reflected in terms of reducing their representation in the Assemblies. However, JUI (F) performed well to some extent as compare to other religious parties. During second tenure of Benazir Bhutto's government, JUI (F) extended its cooperation for government. The *Amir* of JUI (F) Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman was appointed as the Chairmen of Foreign Affairs Committee. It was the time when Taliban movement was getting momentum and in 1996 captured Kabul and established their government. In this scenario, the role of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman was quite crucial, because he had links with Taliban who mostly belonged to the *Maddariss* of JUI. Pakistan was the first country who recognized the Taliban government of Afghanistan.

In the general elections of 1997, the overall performance of religious political parties was considered as the poorest in the electoral history of Pakistan. JI decided to boycott the general elections. There was no major electoral alliance in the field. JUI (F), once again, was contesting these elections independently. PML (N) swept these elections and succeeded to maintain a two third historical majority in the Parliament. Out of religious parties, only JUI (F) succeeded to win 2 seats of National Assembly. The *Amir* of JUI, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman had also lost his native seat. JUI (F) sat on the Opposition benches both at federal and provincial levels. This was a disappointing time for the religious political parties of Pakistan who had no effective voice as well as any role in the legislative process carried out in the Parliament. At the same time, in the neighboring Afghanistan, the Islamists i.e. the Taliban were getting strengthen themselves by stabilizing their regime.

The general elections of 2002 were held under the military regime of General Musharraf. This time, the scenario was quite changed. Instead of caretaker setup like those of previous general elections held between 1988 and 1997, now there was military regime ruling over the country. Furthermore, the overall perception of the Muslims all over the world had been changed after 9/11 incident and brutal attack of US-led forces on Afghanistan which resulted fall of Taliban and generated an anti-American wave across the Muslim world especially in the people living in the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The religious political parties, which were earlier exerting their potential against each other, this time, decided to unite themselves under the banner of MMA, an electoral alliance. JUI (F) and JI were the leading parties of MMA. It has already been mentioned in details in the previous chapter that MMA had got remarkable victory at

National Assembly as well as the Provincial Assemblies of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. After these elections, JUI (F) led the coalition government of MMA in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. JUI (F) also become coalition partner of PML (Q) led government of Baluchistan. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman was the Opposition leader in the National Assembly. This was an interesting arrangement that JUI (F) was leading opposition against PML (Q) government at federal level, however, adjusted itself with PML (Q) in Baluchistan government. During this period (2002-2007), both JUI (F) and JI were the main beneficiaries of MMA. After the death of President of MMA Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani in 2003, JUP had lost its importance. JUI (S) was not comfortable in the presence of JUI (F). Overall, JUI (F) had been comparatively more benefited as it was part of the governments of both the provinces, whereas, JI was part of only Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government.

In the general elections of 2008, JI was once again on boycott, like that of 1997 general elections. However, JUI (F) who was still leading MMA, decided to go for polls. As a result, JUI (F) succeeded to win 6 general seats of NA, 2 seats of the Punjab Assembly, 8 seats of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 5 seats of Baluchistan Assembly. JUI (F)'s decision to participate in the general elections of 2008 further become fruitful, when PPP who emerged as the largest party in the National Assembly was compelled to form coalition governments at federal as well provincial levels. In this situation, the key role has to be played by smaller parties. JUI (F) decided to become coalition partner of PPP-led federal as well as Baluchistan governments. Moreover, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman was appointed as the Chairman of Kashmir Committee. Due to bad governance of PPP and conflicts of PPP with JUI (F) on certain issues, JUI (F) withdrew itself from the federal government

but stayed in the Baluchistan government. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman also continued his Chairmanship of the Kashmir Committee till the end of tenure in 2013.

The analysis of above six general elections shows that JUI (F) was remained on changing its electoral strategies. It contested the general elections of 1988, 1990 and 1997 independently. In 1993, it formed electoral alliance with JUP. In 2002, it formed MMA by allying the six major religious parties. In 2008, although MMA was intact, however, without JI and JUI (S) as well as weak position of JUP, JUI (F) was the only major party leading the alliance. From 2002 to 2007, JUI (F) was playing dual role i.e. leading the opposition parties in the National Assembly as well as a coalition partner in the Baluchistan government. From 2008-2013, it was remained the part of coalition government at federal as well as in Baluchistan government. The electoral history of JUI (F) reveals that whenever there is a chance to become a part of federal or provincial government, it never hesitate to make alliances with its rival religious political parties as well as the mainstream and regional secular political parties.

5.4. Role of Leadership of JUI (F)

The role of leadership of a political party has always been very important and crucial. It is the responsibility of the leadership to increase the popularity of party among the masses to win the support of voters at polls. On the other hand, there is a tough competition from other rival parties which are also making efforts of the same kind. After elections, the next stage of formation of government(s) also requires quick, timely and right decisions by using bargaining tactics.

The leadership of JUI (F) mainly belongs to Pashto speaking areas, where JUI (F) has its concentrated vote bank. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman being *Amir* of JUI (F) has always

played important role, whether he was in government or in opposition. He has been leading the party successfully for the last three decades and has a firm grip on the affairs of his party. He has proven himself as an experienced, intelligent and pragmatic politician having ability to work out multiple options and their justification as well. He has ability to move further with open minded manipulations regarding adjustment and accommodation even with his rival political forces. For example, JUI (F) formed electoral alliance with JUP in 1993 and with JI, JUP, Ahle Hadith and even Shia political party in 2002. All these parties have conflicting ideologies and it was for the first time in the electoral history of Pakistan that all prominent and major religious political parties formed such an electoral alliance which was comprised of only religious parties. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman also supported PPP in 1993 to 1997 and 2008 to 2013, which is a pure secular and socialist party. In Baluchistan, JUI (F) is the only dominant religious political party. In this province, for many times, it agreed to make coalition governments with the local nationalist as well as the mainstream political parties.

The above mentioned political maneuverings, electoral strategies, formation of electoral alliances and ability of bargaining at the time of formation of governments with such political and religious parties whose ideologies are contradictory to that of JUI (F), a perception of JUI (F) has been emerged that the party is always ready to tie up with other parties without respecting its own ideology. In an interview from Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman telecasted on Geo TV¹¹, Saleem Safi the host of the talk show "JIRGA" asked the question that why has JUI (F) always been ready to avail the chance to become a partner in government of such parties whose ideologies are different to that of JUI (F)?

¹¹ Interview by Saleem Safi in a Geo Talk Show "JIRGA" telecasted on 3 August 2013 [Online] available from video.tezpakistan.com/jirga-molana-fazal-ur-rehman-executive-3rd-agust-2013/

Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman replied that it may possible that you have conflicts with your coalition partners; there are some issues on which both partners have common views. For example, if JUI (F) is ideologically more near to PML (N) and both have some common viewpoints, then why could we not come close to each other. Similarly, if JUI (F) has some conflicts with PPP on certain issues, why could we not reach at a compromise by putting our differences at side? He further clarified that we are politicians, and if our political behavior is based on an open warm policy, it will be better for us. Although, difference of opinion is a part of politics but this difference of opinion should not be converted into a permanent enmity and hate.

In another interview with PJ Mir, telecasted on Din News on 2 July 2012¹², the host asked the question that JUI (F) is always ready to compromise with its rival political parties to gain power by making coalition governments. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman replied that media as well as other political forces criticized us for not cooperating with each other to solve the problems of country. However, in case we proceed towards compromises and accommodations, then the same forces put allegations upon us that we are playing the role of friendly opposition as was the case of 2002-2007 or we are watching our vested interests as was the case of 2008-2013. I think along with political difference of opinion, there should be passion and tolerance towards others. If this is not adopted, then politics will always remain subjugated, and away from the realities. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman further said that I believed in a balanced politics and did not favour the politics of extremism, fundamentalism and enmity.

¹² Interview by PJ Mir in a Din News Talk Show telecasted on 2 July 2012, [Online] available from www.metafe.com/watch/9863693/quid_e_jamiat_maulana_fazal_ur_rehmn_with-p_j_mir_02_07_2012_din_news/

The comparison of the leadership of JUI (F) with those of JI, JUI (S) and JUP reveals that the response of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman is always based on the ground realities. For example, Maulana Sami ul Haq of JUI (S) openly favored Taliban of Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman never shown any such affiliations and favour irrespective of the fact that Taliban have emerged from Deobandi *Maddariss* of JUI (F) and JUI (S). Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman has always been careful for his response about Taliban, because if he openly opposes, it may become a problem for his party who has a handsome vote bank in those areas, where Taliban also have their influence. On the other hand, if JUI (F) openly shows its favour for Taliban, the party will be posed to display an extremist and militant posture which is also harmful as people of Pakistan as well as international community generally rejects such trends of Islamic parties¹³. On the issue of *Jihad* and showing affiliations with Taliban, a hardliner splinter group has been parted its way from JUI (F) and named their faction as JUI (Nazryati) functioning mainly in Baluchistan.

In Pakistan, it is a common strategy of almost all the leadership of the political parties to comment on the issues and events taking place in the country. By adopting such kind of strategies, the actual objective of some parties is to gain popularity among masses. The religious parties have no exception in this regard. However, some religious parties react emotionally by converting a sensitive issue into a more complex and controversial issue. If we compare the attitude of the leadership of the religious parties in this context, it will be revealed that Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman deals such kinds of issues skillfully while keeping in view the future developments. For example, on the issue of Lal Masjid

¹³ Joshua T. White, "Vigilante Islamism in Pakistan: Religious Party Responses to the Lal Masjid Crises," (an article published in "Current Trends in Islamist Ideology" by Hudson Institute in 2008), 54.

situated at Islamabad, the strategy of JUI (F) is quite opposite to that of JI. In the mid 2007, the female students of Jamia Hafsa (a *madrasah* for female students adjacent to Lal Masjid) engaged in such activities which cannot be permitted by the state authorities. Some of their acts like capturing a children library, kidnapping of alleged prostitutes from a Chinese acupuncture clinic, the abduction of some police officers, the attacking of a music shop, the stock piling of arms; and the burning of a nearby government building are a few examples. Ghazi brothers of Lal Masjid, who were running the affairs of the mosque and Jamia Hafsa, were encouraging these students, who were demanding implementation of *Shar'iat* in the country. Ghazi Abdul Aziz established a parallel *qazi* court in Islamabad as well and began to issue *fatawas* on the problems of local citizens especially against women on charges of vulgarity¹⁴. These incidents had been projecting by both national and international media, hence, damaging the image of Pakistan as well as Islam.

The *Ulema* and other important personalities were trying to settle the issue peacefully. At this critical juncture, the response from the religious parties were very important. Earlier, both JUI (F) and JI declared that the demand of Ghazi brothers to implement *Shar'iat* is quite right, and advised that state authorities should negotiate with the activists. However, at the same time, both JUI (F) and JI criticized the students for their illegal acts to harm the local inhabitants and their properties. When the issue of Lal Masjid was converting into crises, the leadership of JI decided to support the viewpoints and activities of Ghazi brothers. JI's Amir, Qazi Hussain Ahmed had begun his support and favour forcefully from different forums. He visited Lal Masjid to show his solidarity with Ghazi brothers. In contrast to JI, JUI (F) responded carefully and did not favour the illegal actions of

¹⁴ Ibid, 55

Ghazi brothers, irrespective of the fact that Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa belonged to Deobandi sect. Later on, when the situation become more worsen, the Pakistan Army launched its operation against the Ghazi brothers and militants hiding in the mosque and *madrasah*. This resulted loss of many precious lives including Ghazi Abdul Rashid and students of Jamia Hafsa. The analysis of the response of religious leadership on such a sensitive issue shows that the view point of the leadership of JUI (F) was based on mature calculations of the circumstances, whereas, the JI's leadership reacted mere emotionally. The JUI (F) was more concerned about its position on safeguarding its *Maddariss* from the state's attempts of reforms. The leadership of JUI (F) took the stance that although the demand to implement Islamic laws i.e. *Shar'iat* laws in the country is genuine, however, this should not be done by using violence and deteriorating the law and order. The JUI (F) was also worried that if they support Ghazi brothers they will face the same situation as well as a negative impact in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where JUI (F) was leading the MMA government¹⁵.

The analysis of electoral politics of JI shows that the strategies of this party of intellectuals could always not been proven beneficial for it as well as for the nation. For example, in 1992, JI quitted from the Nawaz Sharif government and joined opposition. This move further paved the way to destabilize the government and finally its dismissal by the then establishment. In 1993, JI formed PIF and launched a massive election campaign by presenting itself as an alternative to the mainstream political parties i.e. PPP and PML (N). The end result was disappointing for JI and far beyond its expectations. JI won only 3 seats of National Assembly and was unable to play any vital role in terms of legislation and policy making. In 1997 and 2008, JI decided to boycott the general

¹⁵ Ibid., 56-57.

elections. The consequences of this boycott were harmful for JI as well as its supporters as both had no representation in the National and Provincial Assemblies. Furthermore, due to the boycott of JI which has its vote bank in the middle class of the urban centers of the Punjab and Sindh created a space. PML (N) succeeded to catch these right leaning voters. Although, the members of JI are more committed to the policies of its leadership, however, the general voters definitely opted for other choices. Professor Muhammad Waqas Khan, the *Naib Amir* of JI of district Rawalpindi and a former MPA (2002-2007) admitted in an interview¹⁶ that the JI's decision to boycott the general elections of 1997 and 2008 proven to be harmful for the party. He further added that the solo flight of JI in the general elections of 1993 and in 2013 could not be proven much beneficial. He empathized that the religious parties which have limited support base in the masses, alliance politics is better for them instead of an individual effort. Professor Waqas quoted the example of MMA who was the third largest party in the Parliament. He emphasized that the electoral alliance of religious parties is a much better option as it enhanced the collective power of these parties, as was experienced during 2002-2007. The other option, he said, is the alliance of religious parties with the right wing parties like PML (N) or PTI. To answer a question that in past, JI's alliance either with secular parties or religious parties could not be proved durable, he told that the aims and objectives of JI are in accordance with its ideology and JI is confined itself in its ideological barriers. If JI feels that his aims and objectives are not being fulfilled, it will definitely quit from the alliance. This was the case when JI quitted form IJI in 1992. Although MMA completed its term being in government from 2002-2007, however, there were severe conflicts

¹⁶ Interview conducted by the Researcher on 29 November 2013. Complete interview is affixed as Appendix-I.

among the religious parties due to their ideological clashes. According to Professor Waqas, if these parties put their differences at side, they can be converted into a strong political force.

As compare to JI, JUI (F) participated in all general elections and succeeded to secure its position as well as served for its voters, and this is a better step to safeguard the support base, a valuable asset for a political party. Furthermore, by participating in general elections continuously the leadership as well as workers of the party has become more experienced. Another advantage is that the party regularly checks its potential in the electoral politics while being part of government and opposition.

As regards the electoral politics of JUI(S), it has a limited area of influence in some central districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Although, it formed electoral alliances in 1990s, however, due to its limited electoral success, it never able to play any key role whether becomes a part of coalition government or in opposition. JUI (S) was the part of MMA but due to its differences with JUI (F) it was also not comfortable. Before 2008 general elections, it withdrew itself from MMA.

JUP is another major religious political party having millions of voters in the Punjab and Sindh. It performed quite well in the general elections of 1970; however, later on it was remain on the path of decline. Although, in each election, it was a part of an electoral alliance, however, its overall performance was almost poor in terms of electoral success and formation of government afterwards. There are three major factors behind its decline and failure in the electoral politics. Firstly, according to the results of general elections of 1970, Karachi and Hyderabad was the support base of JUP. Since the emergence of MQM in 1984, the vote bank of JUP like that of JI has been damaged badly. Secondly, in

the presence of PPP and PML (N), the two mainstream political parties having their support base particularly in Sindh and the Punjab respectively, JUP could not be able to win any meaningful victory over here. Thirdly, the leadership of JUP could not be proved much dynamic and successful to contest in electoral politics as well as to organize and mobilize the party loyalists impressively. The internal conflicts and creation of factions is another contributing factor.

5.5. JUI (F) between Ideology and Pragmatism

JUI (F) is a conservative religious political party and representative of Deobandi sect shows its posture as an ideological party. To enhance its appeal in the religious segments of society, it is vocal of religio-political discourse in the society. JUI (F) is a party who believes in the electoral politics and understands the importance of the ballot box through which it can gain public offices. Hence, it is eager to serve the interests of its voters in return of their support. In the prevailing multi-party political environment of Pakistan, the survival of smaller parties is a bit difficult task. Furthermore, with limited electoral strength, the bargaining with larger political players and actors is another difficult assignment. Although, in moral sense, the ideology is much important to follow, however, in the prevailing harsh realities of politics, some extra ordinary political skills, strategies and maneuverings are equally essential. Keeping these ground realities in mind, the JUI (F) is considered to be a pragmatic political party, which always remains enthusiastic to win public offices and try to access state resources.

According to Joshua T. White,

the JUI (F), by contrast, is a relatively pragmatic party with a rural, clerical constituency whose objectives are to protect the madrassah

system form state interference and promote a conservative interpretation of Pashtun social values which they defend as Islamic¹⁷.

He further added that

"The Deobandi political leadership, by contrast, has proven to be relatively less driven by ideological motivations, and more attuned to patronage incentives from the state. Its strategy, for the most part, has been to bandwagon with the ruling party so as to ensure that it retain access to state resources.¹⁸"

When a question about the politics of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman was asked from Professor Waqas, he commented as follows,

"His (Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman) style of politics is almost like secular instead of purely religious revolving around only ideology.....the politics of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman and his party has been revolving around their vested interests. He does not hesitate to make alliance with purely secular party PPP and likewise. He only watches his as well as his party's interest. Due to his compromising attitude, he is successful to safeguard his *Maddariss* from Musharraf's attempts of reforming the *Maddariss*. Similarly, being a coalition partner of any government, the benefits come down to the lower ranks of JUI (F)¹⁹."

5.6. Conclusion

The above discussion of ideology and political strategies of JUI (F) and their comparison with other religious parties reveals that JUI (F) is comparatively more pragmatic political party than others. Being a religious party it is dependent on the support from the pulpit of mosques and network of its *Maddariss* mainly operated in the tribal and traditional society of Pashto speaking areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. Along with these areas, it is also functioning in the urban areas of the Punjab and Sindh, though it gains negligible success from here. Being party of masses, it has to deliver and act upon on its manifestoes and programmes, for which access to state resources is a vital

¹⁷ Joshua T. White, *Pakistan's Islamists Frontier*, Op.cit., 39.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Interview of Professor Waqas Khan, Op.cit.

requirement. Moreover, as stated above that JUI (F) believes in electoral politics, which is a democratic process. The party further negates the use of violence or forcefully implementation of *Shar'iat* and conversion of Pakistan into an Islamic state. JUI (F) apprehends that this could only be possible through legislation in the Parliament for which practical participation in the general elections is quite essential to have representation in the legislature. In 2010, being coalition partner of PPP-led federal government, JUI (F) succeeded to get appointed Maulana Muhammad Khan Sherani, the *Amir* of JUI (F) Baluchistan, as the Chairman of Islamic Ideological Council (CII). CII is responsible to forward recommendations to the Parliament regarding legislation of Islamic laws and their implementation thereof.

JUI (F) is careful about its perceived links with the militant groups including Taliban who have a Deobandi origin and were in the ranks of JUI (F) in near past. JUI (F) cleverly keeps itself away from these militant militias to save its moderate and democratic image in the society, most preferably in the urban areas.

It is, therefore, become quite essential for a party to operate skillfully and pragmatically in the field of politics. JUI (F) always struggles hard to contest elections by making alliances with religious as well as secular parties, to keep intact its support base constituencies through mosques, *Maddariss* and Deobandi clerics and finally bargaining pragmatically with other political parties at the time of formation of governments to secure its interests.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

In Pakistan, a number of Islamic political parties and groups have been participating in the politics and general elections to achieve their goals since many decades. Some Islamic political parties like JI, JUI, and JUP have been present in the field of politics since or before the creation of Pakistan. However, these parties could not inspire much as compare to mainstream political parties like PPP and PML irrespective of the fact that majority of the population of Pakistan is Muslim. To find out the reasons behind the low popularity of religious political parties is not the focus of this thesis, however, it can be assumed on the basis of results of general elections that the people of Pakistan preferred secular political parties over the religious political parties, by considering secular political parties more trustworthy to solve the grave problems of the country.

Being limited and divided vote bank of Islamic political parties, these parties have been seeking for state patronage including nexus with military; a dominant force in the politics of Pakistan. Among the major religious political parties i.e. JUI (F), JI and JUP; JUI (F) seems to be comparatively more successful in the electoral politics of Pakistan. It has been adopting diverse electoral strategies while contesting general elections independently, through seat adjustment formulas as well as making electoral alliances with both religious and secular political parties. It was remain in opposition and in government. Sometimes, it played the dual role of ruling party as well as opposition party simultaneously (e.g. 2002-2007). JUI (F) alongside a coalition partner in the governments of PPP (1993-96 and 2008-2013), enjoyed some other important positions as follows:-

- Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman was the Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee during second tenure of Benazir Bhutto's government (1993-1996).
- Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman was the Chairman of Kashmir Committee (2008-2013).
- Senator Talha of JUI (F) was the Chairman of the Standing Interior Committee of Senate (2008-2013).
- Maulana Muhammad Khan Sherani was the Chairman of Islamic Ideology Council (2010-2013).

JUI (F) generally believes in democracy and supremacy of Parliament through which it tried to struggle for Islamic based legislation. Although JUI (F) emphasizes through its religious discourse to convert Pakistan into an Islamic State, implementation of *Shar'iat* laws, vocal of Islamic systems of Justice and economics; however, it does not favour for militant and violent attempts for this purpose as we observed its stance in the case of Lal Masjid. JUI (F)'s support base lies in the vast network of Deobandi *Maddariss* and the propagation for its agenda by the *Ulema* and *imams* form the pulpit of mosques. By considering the mosques and *Maddariss* as a key source of its support and survival, JUI (F) uses its political strength to safeguard the status of these institutions and diffuses the state's attempt of interference.

Now coming to our research question, *how and why, JUI (F) has been able to perform comparatively better than other religious political parties in the electoral politics of Pakistan*, the answer can be summarized as under:-

- JUI (F) is a party of masses and believes in democracy, electoral politics and supremacy of Parliament.
- JUI (F) is a religious political party and repeatedly propagates for its ideological discourse; however it uses pragmatic approaches in the politics and does not confine itself in the orbit of its ideology. Its open minded and balanced political behavior enables it to cooperate even with the secular political parties.
- JUI (F) has always been in search of opportunities to form its own government at provincial level as well as to become a coalition partner at federal level to have access to state's resources and administration to serve the interests of its party workers and general masses.
- By participating in general elections regularly, the party has gained a valuable experience of competing general elections as well as experience of governance. These factors are helpful to develop party's realistic approach to address the issues and problems faced by the people of Pakistan as well as Pakistan's foreign policy issues and limitations.
- JUI (F) does not keep itself limited to religious segments of the society only. In past some liberal and moderate persons have also been given the party tickets. Senator Muhammad Talha and Senator Azam Swati are a few examples in this regard.
- JUI (F) has the ability to translate its limited political strength into broader gains by making political deals and bargainings with other political forces.

In view of the detailed study of the electoral politics of the religious political parties in previous chapters and the factors mentioned in above paragraphs, it has been proved that JUI (F) is comparatively more successful than other religious political parties. Furthermore, it is the able leadership of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, whose charismatic personality transformed the party into an important political actor in the politics of Pakistan. He has been leading the party more than three decades and now the name of JUI is like synonyms of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman. His pragmatic approaches, tolerance and balanced political behavior makes himself as an important political figure whose viewpoints are given due respect and value.

Before closing our discussion, the behavior of Muslim Democrat's as pointed out by Vali Nasr will serve as another avenue for future research. He writes,

"Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule of *Shar'iat* (Islamic Law) or even a restored caliphate, Muslim democrats view political life with a pragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a *Shar'iat* state, and their main goal tends to be more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platforms and stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests – Islamic as well as secular – within a democratic arena whose bounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state¹."

The End

¹Vali Nasr, *The Rise of "Muslim Democracy"*, Op.cit., 13.

APPENDIX I

Interview with Professor Muhammad Waqas Khan², ex-MPA (PP-5 Taxila/Wah)

Conducted on 29 Nov 2013

Q. 1. Since 1988, JI has been contesting general elections by adopting different strategies. In 1988 and 1990 it was part of IJI, in 1993 it formed PIF (where JI was the major party), in 2002 it was part of MMA, in 2013 JI contested elections independently and in 1997 and 2008 it boycotted the general elections. In your opinion which was the best strategy in terms of electoral success?

Answer. In the general elections of 1970, the Pakistani voters divided into two major groups, right and left. In West Pakistan, the PPP has been attracting the left leaning voters, whereas, on the other side, the party's candidates of right wing voters are divided. Keeping this aspect, in 1997, the religious parties including JI formed PNA and in 1988 and 1990 elections, IJI was formed. The PNA could not become fruitful due to Martial Law imposed by General Zia ul Haq, however, as regards IJI, it has gained victory in the Punjab in 1988 and in other parts of the country as well in 1990. However, in 1992, due to non-fulfillment of objectives of IJI, JI decided to quit from IJI. In 2002, formation of MMA was a good move which proved to be effective. Hence, it can be assumed that the alliance of religious parties is the best option; however, JI's alliance with right wing main stream parties like PML (N) and PTI will be better.

² Professor Muhammad Waqas Khan has been contesting general elections for the Punjab Assembly from Taxila/Wah constituency since 2002. He has been elected as MPA on the ticket of MMA in 2002 by-elections. Presently he is Naib Amir of JI Rawalpindi and member of Majlis-e-Shoorah of JI. He is son of Dr. Muhammad Kamal who is presently Naib Amir of JI Pakistan.

Q. 2. In 1997 and 2008, JI boycotted the general elections. Was this a better strategy or a harmful strategy in terms of electoral politics?

Answer. Yes, it was proved to be a harmful for JI, as it provided space for other right wing parties to catch the JI's voters. As a result, in 1997, PML (N) succeeded to win a landslide victory and in 2008, PML (Q) and PML (N) both got these votes.

Q. 3. It has been proven that JI's alliance with other political parties irrespective of secular or religious parties could not be durable and JI has not been remained comfortable. Why?

Answer. There are certain aims and objectives of JI which are according to its ideology. When these objectives could not be fulfilled, then JI feel it better to quit from the alliance. So JI is confined in its ideological barriers. Within IJI, JI's objectives could not gain as result it quitted from the IJI. In MMA, there are ideological and sectarian conflicts among the six religious parties due to which JI quitted from this electoral alliance. If the religious parties could put their difference at side, it will be better to increase their overall strength.

Q. 4. In 1993, irrespective of JI's massive campaign from the platform of PIF, it could win only 3 seats of NA. In 2013, JI took part in general elections independently, but again restricted to win only 3 seats of NA. Was it not better that JI managed to make alliance with other political parties to increase her parliamentary strength?

Answer. Yes, in near future, alliance politics is better than an independent effort.

Q. 5. In your opinion, which religious party is comparatively more successful in terms of electoral politics? Is it not JUI (F)?

Answer. Yes, of course, JUI (F) is comparatively better than other religious parties due to two reasons. Firstly, JUI (F) is the only prominent religious party which is representing a major sect of Deobandis and Deobandi voter has also been trusting on JUI (F). Furthermore, JUI (F) has a vast network of Mosques and *Madrasah*, which provide base for their electoral politics. Secondly, the patterns and style of Amir of JUI (F) Maulana Fazal ur Rehman is different from that of JI's leadership. His style of politics is almost like secular instead of purely religious revolving around only ideology.

Q. 6. How do you see the politics of Maulana Fazal ur Rehman? Has he not been the successful politician in the politics of Pakistan?

Answer. As I earlier said that the politics of Maulana Fazal ur Rehman has been revolving around their vested interests. He does not hesitate to make alliance with purely secular party PPP and likewise. He only watches his as well as his party's interest. Due to his compromising attitude, he is successful to safeguard his *maddariss* from Musharaf's government's attempt to reform the *maddariss*. Similarly, being coalition partner of governments, the overall benefits come down to the lower ranks of JUI (F).

Q. 7. What do you think about the role of the religious parties in the future politics of Pakistan, when along with two mainstream political parties PML (N) and PPP, now there has been emerged a third force PTI in the elections of PTI?

Answer. For religious parties it will be better that whether they make alliance among themselves or make alliance with any right wing main stream political party i.e.

PML (N) or PTI. Furthermore, now the Pakistani voter has been showing a mature attitude and in future only that party (ies) will survive who will deliver and address the core issues of Pakistan as well as solve the problems of common people. Without these practical attempts, relying only on the ideology, charisma and political jugglery, no party can secure its position in the electoral politics of Pakistan.

APPENDIX II

MANIFESTO OF MMA (GENERAL ELECTIONS 2002 & 2008)³

- (i) To revive fear of God, affection to the Prophet (PBUH) and service to people with particular emphasis on government officials and cabinet members.
- (ii) To make Pakistan a true Islamic welfare state to ensure justice to people and eradicate corruption whatsoever.
- (iii) To ensure provision of bread, clothes, shelter, education, jobs and marriage expenses to all citizens.
- (iv) To protect basic human rights (life, property and honour) of citizens.
- (v) To create an independent, just and humane economic system where citizens will be provided opportunities for halal jobs, business and investments.
- (vi) To ensure uniform and quick justice to every citizen, from the president to a layman.
- (vii) To develop a God fearing, helping, brave and protecting police system.
- (viii) To get the entire society literate within ten years to enable everyone to know one's rights and responsibilities.

³ [Online] available from http://mma.org.pk/the_party/manifesto/

- (ix) To ensure compulsory and free of charge education till matriculation and provide opportunities to meritorious students and scholars for advanced research.
- (x) To protect rights of women guaranteed by Islam and restoration of their honour and prestige.
- (xi) To abolish all chronic and new feudal systems with forfeiture of illegal wealth and its distribution among poor.
- (xii) To provide lands to peasants and farmers for their livelihood and guarantee reasonable prices to their productions.
- (xiii) To protect provincial autonomy and district governments, taking care of backward areas and classes and taking special steps to get them at par with developed areas.
- (xiv) To get the country and people rid of influence of imperialistic forces and their local agents.
- (xv) To extend moral, political and diplomatic help and support to all suppressed with particular emphasis on Kashmiris, Palestinians, Afghans and Chechens.

GLOSSARY

Amir	President
Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Kaaba	An association of the servants of Khana Kaaba, a holy place in Makah, where Muslims perform Hajj
Ain Saz Majlisul Ulema Pakistan	Constitution making body of Ulema
All Parties Khatm-i-Nubuwwat Action Committee	A committee of Ulema established in 1974 for the movement to struggle to declare Qadianis as non-Muslims
Dars-i-Nizamiyah	A syllabus of religious education current in South Asia from the eighteenth century
Dar ul Ulum	A traditional religious seminary
Fatawas (sig. Fatwa)	An authoritative ruling on a religious matter
Hadith	Sayings, practices, and approved actions of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)
Hanafi	Referring to the Sunni legal mazhab ascribed to Abu Hanifa (699-767 CE); Most Sunni Muslims in South Asia belong to this school of law.
Hudud	Islamic Laws
Imam (plural: Imams)	The person who leads prayer
Jamia-e-Haqqania	A religious institution (madrasah) situated in Akora Khattack, Noshehra near Peshawar (Pakistan)
Jihad	A holy struggle for the cause of Islam
Jihadi	Holy warriors of Islam
Khudai Khidmatgar	The servants of God
Madrasah (plural: Madariss)	A traditional institution (school) meant for religious teachings only
Majlis-e-Amoomi Majlis-e-Shura	General Council Consultative Council

Majlis-e-Amla	Central Working Committee
Moharram ul Haram	The first Islamic month, especially known for the martyrdom of the Prophet's (PBUH) grandson, Hazarat Imam Hussain
Mujahedeen	The soldiers or warriors taking part in Jihad (holy war)
Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal	Joint council of action
Madrassa-yi-Rahimiyyah	A <i>madrasah</i> established at Delhi by Shah 'Abd al-Rahim (father of Shah Waliullah), where Shah Waliullah got education, and later on, started his teaching career.
Maulana	"Our Protector," a title given to a person respected for religious learning
Nazim	Secretary
Nazim-i-Ala	Secretary General
Nizam-e-Adl	System of Justice
Nizam-e-Mustafa Movement	A movement for implementation of system of governance set by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). PNA launched this movement in 1977 against the then Prime of Pakistan Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his government.
Naib Amir	Vice President or Deputy President
Nazryati	Ideological
Pirs	Saints of shrines
Pakistan ki Siyassi Jamateian	The Political Parties of Pakistan
Quran	The sacred book of Islam revealed on the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)
Quranic	The verses or teachings of the Holy Quran
Qazi	A state-appointed Muslim judge who rules according to the Shar'iat

Sajjadahnasheens	Hereditary keepers of Shrines
Sanghten	A movement which organized armed terrorism against Muslims
Shuddhi	A movement to convert Muslims to Hinduism
Shar'iat	System of Islamic law
Sunnah	A traditional portion of Muslim law based on the Prophet's words or acts
Tabligh	To preach Islam
Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi	A movement launched by Sufi Muhammad in Malakand district since 1990s for the implementation of Shar'iat laws.
Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria	A political party established by Shia clerics in 1979.
Ulema	Plural of alim, (A learned man, in particular one formally trained in the religious sciences, especially but not exclusively in Islamic law and hadith)
Ummah	The worldwide community of Muslims

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