

**ARAB MIGRATIONS TO IRAQ AND
TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC
STRUCTURES 632-750 AD**



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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the
Degree of PhD in the discipline of History
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at the Faculty of Social Sciences,
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ABSTRACT

Migration in Human History has always occupied a special place as a phenomenon which affects and transforms social structures of the societies. The mode and nature of these migrations can be different, yet they intensely affect the various aspects of human life in all its forms. The present study is an effort to look into the nature, motives and consequences of the Arab migration to Iraq which were initiated as a result of Arab conquests of these areas. Economic motive were certainly very vital in initiating this migration, yet there were certain other social and political motives as well which determined the interest of the migrants to move. The study will significantly focus on the transformation that the migration brought in the lives of the Arab migrants. The factors related to the local area had less impact on the migrants; instead the factors related to their own migratory group laid more vital impact on the polity of the Arabs.

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Allah Almighty is the most merciful and beneficent. *Allah Almighty*, Who always gives me the courage and strength of mind to achieve my ambitions. All praise to *Allah*, Who intended in me the strength and spirit to complete my work successfully and Who is always there to listen me in every critical phase of my life.

Since the time when I begin my journey to explore the field of early Muslim History up till date, there is a lot to share and to express. Entering into a world which is somehow foreign to oneself is a unique experience in which I felt that I was unable to see deep at time but could observe some structures clearly visible on the surface, being an outsider. Yet by all means, it was a wonderful experience which enabled me to clearly look into the past from the eyes of the present and to enjoy the individuality of culture, norms and customs of a unique civilization along with occasionally relating it to the universal whole.

Thus although a difficult task it was, I was largely supported by my friends and colleagues. I would like to express my sincere appreciation; first and foremost, to my respected supervisor Prof. Dr. Khurram Qadir for providing necessary research instructions, for the training and support I have received in order to reach this stage of my academic career. I would also like to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Ex-Director, Islamic Research Institute who always encouraged me to work in this field and provided me with all necessary academic help. I would gladly like to declare that I could learn Arabic only with the sincere efforts of Dr. Ansari for which I would always remain indebted to him.

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For whatever deficiencies there are in this study, I am solely responsible.

Rafia Riaz

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GLOSSARY

<i>Aḥādīth</i>	The reported words, deeds and occasions of tacit approval by Prophet Muḥammad(PBUH), pass on by a chain of reliable authorities
<i>Ahl al-fay</i>	The migrants who used to be responsible for the care of abandoned lands of Kisra which was part of the spoils to be divided amongst the victors.
<i>Ahl-al-Yaman</i>	People of Southern Arabia
<i>Ahl-ul-Dīn wa faḍal</i>	Religious people whose status is considered high
<i>Ahl-ul-Kūfa</i>	People of Kufa
<i>Ahl-ul-Nizār</i>	People of the tribe of Nizar mainly the northern Arabs.
<i>Ahl-ul-Qādīsiya</i>	The people who had fought the battle of <i>Qādīsiya</i>
<i>Ahl-Dhimma / Dhimmi</i>	The word <i>Dhimmi</i> was used for all those locals with whom the Arabs had made peace treaty and who have accepted the dominance of Arabs.
<i>Akhbār / khabar</i>	News or story
<i>‘Amāl</i>	Officers
<i>Amīr</i>	Governor
<i>Amīr-harb</i>	Commander of the army
<i>Amīr-i-kharāj</i>	Financial agent
<i>Amṣār</i>	Garrisons
<i>Ansab/ Nasb</i>	Genealogy
<i>Qusūr</i>	Fortified enclosures
<i>A’rābiyya</i>	The local residents of Arabia
<i>Ashrāf</i>	Notables
<i>‘Aṭā</i>	Regular stipends
<i>Ayyām</i>	A branch of knowledge that existed in pre-Islamic

Arabia. This *ayyam* was recorded in the form of poetry as well as oral narratives

<i>Baīt-ul-māl</i>	Treasury
<i>Dār-i-hijrat</i>	The place where one can migrate
<i>dahqān</i>	A Persian landed aristocrat
<i>dīnārs</i>	Old currency of Arabs
<i>dirham</i>	Old currency of Arabs
<i>Dīwān</i>	Registers
<i>Dū aba</i>	The lands between the two rivers
<i>Farsakh</i>	Six miles as one <i>farsakh</i> is considered to be a distance of three miles
<i>Fay</i>	Literally means the spoils of war
<i>Hamām</i>	Hot baths
<i>Hijrī</i>	The year when the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) moved from Makka to Madina
<i>Isnād</i>	Authority of the chain of transmitters
<i>jizya</i>	The tax levied on the non-Muslim population of the Arab empire
<i>khams</i>	One fifth share of the government in the spoils
<i>Kharāj</i>	The taxes extracted from the non-Arab lands
<i>Khawārij</i>	A group of people who left 'Alī and developed a different religio-political ideology.
<i>Madīnat-ul-Rizq</i>	Provision depot of al-Baṣra where food was stored.
<i>Maghāzī</i>	The tales of the wars
<i>Mawālī / mawla</i>	The non-Arabs manumitted slaves
<i>muhajirūn</i>	The migrants
<i>Namaz-i-Qaṣr</i>	Short prayer during journey

<i>Qaṣr-i-Abayd</i>	White palace of al-Ḥīra
<i>Ra'is ul-qabīla</i>	Tribal chief
<i>Rās-ul-Arab</i>	Head of Arabs, literally means the best of the Arabs
<i>Rāvī</i>	The narrator of traditions
<i>ridda</i>	Wars fought purely for religious purposes
<i>rifāda</i>	Feeding provided for pilgrims, here it means the later migrants
<i>Shāṭ-i-Uthman</i>	Literally <i>Shāṭ</i> means the seashore, here it represent a coastal land that belongs to Uthman.
<i>Siffin</i>	A place where a civil war was fought.
<i>Seerah</i>	The record of the life of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)
<i>Shia/ Shias / Shian-i-‘Alī</i>	Followers of ‘Alī
<i>Taba'in</i>	Those who had seen and followed the companions of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)
<i>Tabaqat/ tabaqa</i>	Literally means ‘layers’, <i>Tabaqat</i> literature was an innovation within narrating the biographies
<i>Zakat</i>	The poor tax imposed on the Muslims

FORWARDING SHEET

The thesis entitled Arab Migrations to Iraq and Transformation of Socio-Economic Structures 632-750 AD, submitted by Rafia Riaz in the partial fulfillment of Ph.D. Degree in History with specialization in early Muslim history has been completed under my guidance and supervision. I am satisfied with the quality of student's research work and allow her to submit this thesis for further process of as per IIUI rules and regulations.

Date: _____

Signature: _____

Name: Dr. Khurram Qadir

Introduction

Generally in search of food and shelter, humans have been migrating since the earlier ages from the less resourceful areas to lands which are full of affluence. Apart from seeking material goods, there can be several other reasons as well behind human migration, for instance some people are forced to flee to other areas due to the domination of another people on their land, or due to several climatic factors like drought, flood or earthquake etc. The Arab migration to Iraq¹ was a conscious movement of people made in the hope of gaining huge economic benefits and a high standard of life.

The Arab migration to Iraq was a direct consequence of the Arab conquest movement which completed in various stages. Thus migration also was not a sudden instant move; instead it took several years. The migrants moved in the form of a tribal army and after a long journey, during which they kept on settling at different stations, finally planned to settle in the garrison cities of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra. Iraq was a fertile land due to the presence of Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The Arab migration to Iraq was provoked by different factors, yet the main motivation was to obtain the economic benefits and to retain the control of the conquered areas. The army composed of diverse tribes was mainly interested in

¹The word Iraq was used by the Arabs to denote the land between the Tigris and the Euphrates. It has been derived from Iraqi-ud-Dalu and Iraqi-ul-Qurbat. Al-Mas'ūdī, Al-Ḥasan 'Alī bin Ḥusain bin 'Alī, *Mūruj-ul-Dhahab wa M'ādan al-Jawāhir*, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar-ul-Undulus, 1965), 43; The southern half of the great plain of Mesopotamia was called by the Arabs as Al-Iraq meaning the cliff or shore, but it is doubtful how this term came originally to be applied. The alluvial plain of Southern half was known by the Arabs as al-Sawād, the Black ground which is frequently used as synonym to al-Iraq. Ibn Yāqūt, *Ma'ujam-ul-Buldān*, vol. 4 (Beirut: Dar-as-Sadr Publishers, 1977), 93; Le Strange G, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1905), 24.

collecting spoils of war but when caliph 'Umar decided for them to reside at Iraq; they complied with the decision gladly. Initially 'Umar was probably not planning for permanent settlements but with the passage of time he was convinced of the need of the long-term garrisons.

The consequences of this migration for the Arabs were numerous. They got huge financial benefits as they were expecting, and a major shift came in their socio-economic structure. The combination of nomadic, semi-nomadic and settled tribes formed a new urban society in which tribes were lesser important than political affiliations and economic gains. The tribes cease to work as one unit, instead the new units of the Kufan and the Basran Arabs emerged. This identity was stronger than the tribal identity. Another kind of identities of the migrants were created on the bases of their economic and political position and later on were further distinguished because of their different response to the increasing state control.

The different climatic condition and social configuration of Iraq also affected the Arab migrants but only to a slight degree. The migrants had developed lesser interaction with the locals who kept on residing in their own villages and towns but the locals who entered the society of the Arabs in the form of slaves and *mawālī* were gradually assimilated into it. These slaves and *mawālī* played a vital role in the polity of the migrants and influenced the culture and social outlook of the migrants.

Nonetheless the most significant change that came in the socio-economic structure of the migrants was the emergence of a strong state and consequently the shift of their status from independent tribesmen to mere citizens. The tribesmen,

particularly the nomadic and semi-nomadic, were habitual of leading a free life independent of any political control. The tribesmen when initially had joined the conquest movement thought it to be the routine raids of the Arab tribes towards Iraq, the spoils of war of which are meant to be distributed equally. They were unable to comprehend the changing realities of the emergence of the new Muslim elite who was keen to form a strong Arab Muslim empire. Migrants realized later that their status has been changed from independent tribal warriors to salaried regular army due to which the state enhanced its control over them. The migrants were not ready to share the fruits of their conquests with the newly emerged Arab state thus they kept on trying to invalidate its control through different means. In their clash against the state, the migrants tried to manipulate different events in their favor and played an important role in all the civil wars and political disputes of the state. At times, they were in a position to dictate their terms to the government, and at others the government controlled them strictly.

A further vital change that came in the life of the migrants was the shift in their economic status. Being the conquerors of the new land, they earned huge wealth from it in the form of the spoils of war and income being generated from the conquered areas. They inhabited new cities in Iraq which gave a boost to the economic activity. Moreover the Arabs were keen to initiate commercial activity in the form of trade and opening new businesses. They were also eager to bring reforms in the agricultural sector in order to increase the revenue from the agricultural lands. All this economic activity not only augmented the wealth of the migrant Arabs but also led to the development of an urban luxurious lifestyle. It

also created many new jobs for the slaves and *mawālī* and consequently crystallized the process of assimilation of the Arabs and the locals.

The present study intends to uncover the motives of the migration in order to relate it with future changes. It will also look into the nature of this migration by highlighting its major characteristics. Furthermore, it is also the scope of the present study to find out the transformation that came in the socio-economic structure of the migrants as a consequence of migration. The study will try to unravel the transformation in the life and society of the migrants. The study will argue that this transformation was brought largely by the factors associated with the migratory group and was less affected by the factors associated with the place of migration.

This study will deal with a period of hundred and twenty years roughly which includes the period of pious caliphate and the Umayyad dynasty, however off and on for understanding several historical phenomena, references will be given from the pre-Islamic and the early period of Islam. The spatial scope of the study will be confined mainly to Iraq, but there will be certain references of Arabia and the rest of the Arab empire as well. Iraq was part of the Sassanid Empire when it was conquered by the Muslim Arabs but in history from time to time it was also taken over by the Byzantine Empire.

Migration studies usually explore the nature and complexity of the movement of people, cultures, ideas and objects. Looking at the experience of migration is a latest approach in social history in which the problems and the cultural transformation of the new settlers as well as the older residents are analyzed. This approach is applied extensively for the study of world history

where human migration has revealed several important samples of the development of civilizations. This concept, if applied on the history of medieval ages will hopefully disclose significant patterns of development, and gradual shifts in social, cultural and economic structures of the society. The Arab migration to Iraq not only affected the demographic proportion of the newly conquered areas but also transformed the whole social and economic structures of the migrants.

Problem-oriented approach has been selected for the present study instead of source-oriented approach to create present-relevance. In the modern world, the issues and problems, life patterns and cultural norms of the common men have gained as much importance as of the political and military elite. The framework of this study is of the present times as migration is a social experience and it has created several problems of social, economic, political and cultural adjustments in the modern societies, hence finding similar prototypes in the past will be helpful in creating a better understanding of the present.

It was considered vital to limit the scope of the present study to one aspect in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon. Thus this study exclusively deals with the changes that came in the life of the migrants alone and has ignored the impact of migration on locals. Although there is a general discussion on locals but that is in the reference of the Arab migrants and their relations with the locals.

Literature Review

Migration has been studied under various disciplines. In historical studies, migration has been mostly seen in the context of world migration or migration of Barbarian races in Europe. There is an enormous literature available on different kinds of migration but it is largely irrelevant with the present study. A few migration theories and frameworks are certainly helpful and thus they have been discussed in detail in chapter 1.² On the other hand, the huge migration of Muslims towards the areas they conquered has been seen rarely in literature. In this context there could be found a few works which have discussed the Arab migration. For instance Khalil Athamana has partially touched the issue of the Arab migration to Iraq in his article “*A’rāb and Muhājirūn in the Environment of Amsār*”.³ Athamana argues that in the Islamic law, the status of *muhājir* was always higher than those who never migrated. The concept initially began with certain sayings of the Prophet (PBUH) who encouraged migration to Medina mainly in order to increase the fighting force of Muslims in Medina. Later on when the front of Syria and Iraq was opened, the same *ahadīth* were propagated again in order to encourage the nomad tribes to migrate. The word *a’rābiyya* or *a’rāb* was used for those who never migrated. Khalil believes that the status of *a’rāb* was always considered lower than the *muhājirūn*. Gradually this resulted into the formation of distinction between *a’rābiyya* and *muhājirūn*. Moreover he argues finally that the migration and settlement of tribes in *Amsār* (garrisons)

² See chapter 1, part 1.

³ Khalil Athamana, “*A’rāb and Muhājirūn in the Environment of Amsār*” in *Studia Islamica* 66, (1987): 5-25.

“contributed to the disunity of the tribe[s]”⁴ and the state became more powerful. Athamana has chosen a very under researched area for his study which incites to prompt more into the issues of migration into the garrisons but unfortunately does not provides any more significant analysis on the subject.

Yusuf Fadl Hasan chose to work on the “Main Aspects of the Arab Migration to Sudan”.⁵ The study if not directly relevant is significant in finding out the patterns of the Arab migration towards the western border. As is obvious Hasan began his study of the Arab migration with a discussion on the Arab conquests towards the west. The Arab migration to Sudan was different in its nature from the Arab migration to Iraq as it was not a sudden migration of thousands of army men; instead the Arabs mainly began to move to Sudan in the Abbasid period. Although the Arabs had initially migrated to parts of Egypt as soldiers but they moved to Sudan only when they lost their privileges and their names were cut off from the register as regular soldiers by caliph al-Mu'taṣim to be replaced by the Turks. This policy of al-Mu'taṣim encouraged the Arabs to migrate further towards Sudan in the beginning of the ninth century. As far as the motives of this migration were concerned, the Arabs were attracted by the economic opportunities available at Sudan in the form of slave trade and gold mining activities. Hasan has also given significant proportion to the issues of assimilation and concluded that the Arabs specially the tribes of Rabī'a intermarried and intermingled with the local people of Sudan. Many similarities of the Arab migration to Sudan can be created with the Arab migration to Iraq. Yet

⁴Ibid, 24.

⁵Yusuf Fadl Hasan, “Main Aspects of the Arab Migration to Sudan” in *Arabica* 14, fasc. 1 (Feb., 1967):14-31.

as the subject matter differs greatly, there is no direct relevance of the study of the Arab migration to Sudan with the present work.

In the same way Chase F. Robinson has discussed the issues of settlement in northern Mesopotamia after the Muslim conquests in his book, *Empire and Elites after the Muslim Conquests: The Transformation of Northern Mesopotamia*.⁶ He has focused the post-migration structures. His technique is also quite different and instead of exploring the broad patterns, he has studied some selected issues. Robinson “interweaves history and historiography” and explores the historical problems by applying methods of internal criticism. While discussing the post-migration period, Robinson takes into account the administrative and political structures of al-Jazīra and al-Mūsal. He has further explored some questions of settlement, construction of cities and administrative transformation of garrisons into the cities. Robinson has also highlighted the changing role of the Christian and the Muslim ruling élite in northern Mesopotamia. He however has given less importance to social transformation or effects of administrative changes on the society. Likewise he has explored the role of the Christian and the Muslim élite but has not brought into light the interaction between the locals and the Arabs which would be the focus of the present study. Robinson has tried to explore the occurrence of migration and has given more importance to settlement and post-migration changes. He however has narrowed down his work only to northern Mesopotamia and has avoided including the discussion of lower Mesopotamia that is Iraq. The pattern of society and polity in

⁶Chase F. Robinson, *Empire and Elites after the Muslim Conquests: The Transformation of Northern Mesopotamia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

both these areas were relatively different, thus Robinson although provides an insight into post migration structures but has rarely touched the Arab migration to Iraq.

On the other hand, while exploring the general literature on Muslim history, it appears that the migration of the Arab tribes towards the areas of former Byzantine and Sassanid Empires was an obvious and notable event in the early Muslim history and almost all works of historiography on this period have dealt with the issue in one form or the other. Migration was a parallel process to the conquests and corresponded with each other. Most of the historians of Muslim history, however have failed to develop the relationship between the conquests and the migration. William Muir, for instance, in his book *The Caliphate, its Rise, Decline, and Fall*⁷ considers that migration preceded the Arab conquests. He was of the view that the Arabs migrated in a massive number for the desire of gaining rich spoils of war and availing the opportunities lying in the rich and fertile lands ahead. The present study argues that migration was a gradual process which went parallel to the Arab conquests. The major part of the conquests of Iraq was over before the Arabs settled at al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra and another wave of conquests towards Iran and Khūrāsān began after their settlement at the garrisons.

Some of the historians have further raised the issue of cultural amalgamation of the Arabs and the non-Arabs which happened as a natural consequence of migration yet they have not explored the nature and the process of this amalgamation. Joseph Hell in his work *The Arab Civilization*⁸ argues that

⁷ William Muir, *The Caliphate, its Rise, Decline, and Fall* (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915).

⁸ Joseph Hell, *The Arab Civilization*, tr., S. Khuda Bukhsh (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons Limited, 1925).

majority of the soldiers took their wives, slaves and clients along with them. Migration inculcated a habit of settled people amongst the nomad Arab tribes and they desired to acquire land in newly conquered areas. The decision of 'Umar to discourage any such effort and to encourage the local population to stay in the administrative posts which they held earlier, failed the designs of the Arabs for the time being. Most of the trained persons of the new administration were the non-Arabs which led to a closer contact and integration between the Arabs and the non-Arabs and cultural borrowing began. Hell however did not develop the argument further.

On the other hand some studies have placed their focus on the cultural aspect of the migration as Marshall Hodgson for instance in his book *The Venture of Islam: A Short History of Islamic Civilization*⁹ believes that the effects of migration were different in different regions. The older elements in Iraq were replaced and the Arab merchants happily migrated and penetrated in Iraq as they saw benefits in those areas. He further argues that after the settlement, customs and traditions of the Muslim Arab life dominated the new lands. Hodgson also though did not explore the process of this cultural domination. Likewise he also believes that smaller tribes had lost their importance and larger tribal blocs were formed. He yet was not able to comprehend a new social structure and grouping based on new economic and political interests.

⁹Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: A Short History of Islamic Civilization*, vol.1 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1961).

In the same way, Patricia Crone in her book *Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of Islamic Polity*¹⁰ has talked about a new kind of grouping which was different from the tribal grouping. She argues that this new group had emerged from the military and administrative division of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra into fourths and fifths. She believes that these military regiments formed the basis of new identity in Iraq. The leader of the tribe was in fact a military leader, not a tribal chief. Yet she talked about the local factions as well which she thinks emerged as more powerful than the local army. Probably here she was confusing the concept as the local factions had essentially emerged from the Iraqi army and not from outside it.

Subsequently there is a group of literature of early Muslim history which has focused on the early Muslim conquests. Some of them have slightly touched the consequent settlement in the new areas as well. These works are probably the most relevant with the present study as conquests was the first step towards migration. For instance, Hugh Kennedy in his book *The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State* gives his opinion that the *ridda* wars were fought purely for religious purposes though it became the first step of the Arab conquests and expeditions. He also believes that there were a lot of opportunities for those who left Arabia for a new homeland. Kennedy considers migration as a planned movement which took place due to the military expeditions followed by later waves of migration. He further argues that in al-Jazīra, the settlement of tribes did not involve the abandonment of nomadic way of life but it

¹⁰Patricia Crone, *Slave on Horses: The Evolution of Islamic Polity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

happened in Iraq. He also claims that there were no Arab settlements outside Iraq, Fusṭāṭ and a small garrison town in Alexandria. As far as the cultural influences were concerned, Kennedy stated that the spread of Islam and Arabic language was slow in the newly conquered areas.¹¹ Kennedy however unfortunately did not develop the argument further. As he was mainly concerned with the military history, he could not present a deeper analysis on the issues of migration and settlement.

A few of the works on conquests have tried to explore the nature and early stages of migration. For instance Fred M. Donner in his work *The Early Islamic Conquests*¹² argues like Kennedy that the Arab migration was the result of a planned and pre-arranged process therefore it was different from certain other migration. While talking of the pattern of the settlement he concluded that the non-military element in the immigrants was very few, and a limited number of children and women were accompanied. The Arab tribes established their camps in Iraq even before the completion of its conquest and al-Kūfa was selected as a new place for settlement. Al-Kūfa was constructed according to a proper planning and many of the Arab soldiers married the local women. The main focus of Donner however is on conquests, not on the migration. Moreover he has only taken into account the pattern of settlement in Iraq and certain other areas but has given no information about the motives and effects of the Arab migration to Iraq. Thus the literature on conquests has seen migration mostly in the backdrop of the

¹¹Hugh Kennedy, *The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State* (London: Routledge, 2001).

¹²Fred McGraw Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

conquests and hardly dealt with the implications of these migrations. The present study intends to highlight these issues. The present study is an effort to exclusively focus the occurrence of migration and its implications on the migrants.

Another kind of literature also exist which although has not discussed the conquests or the migration but has focused the post-migration structure of Iraq. M. Morony was one of those historians who have studied Iraq in very detail. Fortunately he has based his work *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest*¹³ on post-migration Iraq. Morony emphasizes upon the themes of cultural interaction of locals and the new Arab migrants. He has given special reference to the earlier Arabs living in Iraq. He further argues that some of these Arabs were made prisoners and later turned into *mawālī*. The Sedentary Arabs living in Iraq made peace with the new Arab migrants, continued their customs and were not dislocated. While dealing with the influence of local culture on the Arabs, he further argues that the Arabs retained some of their cultural features and total assimilation was prevented. Thus he provides valuable information about post-migration Iraq yet the framework he adopted was different. Morony focuses on the themes of change and continuity and he takes the units of Late Sassanid and early Muslim period in Iraq in order to measure the amount of continuity or change. He is of the view that there was continuity in late Sassanid and early Muslim period. Morony concludes that there was continuity in the customs and traditions of all ethnic and religious groups who lived in Iraq. He tries to synthesize the discussion and concluded that the earlier traditions of various groups living in Iraq were transferred or were adopted by the Arab migrants as

¹³ Morony, M, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

they interacted with these people. He believes that in this way almost all of the Sassanid administrative and cultural practices continued into the Muslim period. He also sorted out continuity in change. The change that Sassanid had begun was taken up and continued by the Muslims. Thus he has not exclusively focused the changes that came in the life of the Arab migrants which the present study intends to carry out.

Apart from the literature which has seen early Muslim history from a topical view of either conquests or regional view of measuring transformation in a particular region, another literature is present which has taken up the issue of conquests, migration and post-migration issues into account in the format of a general chronological discussion of early Muslim rule. For instance Shaban in his book *Islamic History: A. D. 610-750 (A.H.132): A New Interpretation*¹⁴ discusses in detail the post migration structure of Iraq without emphasizing the event of migration itself. He analyzes the situation at Iraq particularly mentioning the various groups that were formed there. He tries to give a new interpretation of the *qurrā'* of Iraq and in his view the *qurrā'* were the people of the settled communities, Madīna, Makkah and Taif. Moreover he believes that most of the people of the Madīna and Makkah had gone back, thus those tribes who had been loyal to the Muslims in *ridda* wars apart from the Madinans and Makkans acquired the nomenclature of *qurrā'* to distinguish them from *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. The present study will not challenge this assumption of Shaban however it will try to present a deeper analysis based on the earlier assumption of Shaban. The

¹⁴M. A. Shaban, *Islamic History: A. D. 610-750 (A.H.132): A New Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

present study concludes that the *qurrā'* probably had mainly derived their identity from the 'people of the villages' but due to the support of some religious men amongst them tried to manipulate religious symbols to exert more pressure on the authorities. The present study further concludes that the identity of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* was stronger than the identity of *qurrā'* as the later could not last for a longer time.

The present study will exclusively focus the different aspects of migration. The study will give due importance to the phenomenon of migration itself and will try to explore the nature of this migration along with finding out its major motives. Moreover it will highlight the problems of early settlement as well as the implication of migration on the social, political and economic structure of the migrants. The study will particularly highlight the post-migration structure of the migrant's society and will try to measure the changes which migration brought in their lives.

Methodology

This research will employ the traditional research sources in Muslim history as well as the non-traditional sources. For the present research, Inductive analytical approach has been adopted however several frames of reference would be taken from the earlier historical and sociological works on migration. The data of the sources of Muslim history provides very little guidance about social history and particularly about migration studies thus there is a need to use new research techniques along with the inductive research method. Therefore quantitative

research methods through statistically analyzing the data would also be used for the study, where required.

A Note on the Primary Sources

The early Muslim history was formed out of the amalgamation of some already existing branches of knowledge of the Arabs with newly developed branches of knowledge initiated by the Muslims. The early form of literature that grew in the Muslim civilization can be precisely used as a source of history even if it is not a piece of historiography itself. One of such pre-Islamic sciences was the science of genealogy. It was not only orally preserved but could also be found in several Yamanī inscriptions and written material. After the coming of Islam, a general trend was to give less importance to genealogy in order to promote equality but there emerged another serious theological concern which enhanced the importance of genealogy. The Muslim law emphasizes upon the importance of knowing the correct parentage of a child and does not even allow changing the real name of the parents of the adopted children. The purpose was to discourage fornication and illegal sexual relations. This indirectly augmented the significance of preserving genealogy and many scholars wrote genealogies in the early period of Islam.

Some earlier genealogists includes Muḥammad bin al-Kalbī (d.763), who collected tribal pedigree to form a comprehensive account, Hishām bin Muḥammad al-Kalbī (d. 819), who followed his father and improved upon his work, Mu‘ṣab al-Zubayrī (d. 847), and Al-Haythamī bin ‘Adī (d.821).¹⁵ While

¹⁵A. A. Duri, *The Rise of Historical Writing Among the Arabs*, ed., and tr., Lawrence I. Conrad (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 51-4.

exploring the lineage of the Arab tribes for the present study, several books of *Ansāb* have been consulted for gathering data about different tribes. Genealogy was certainly not the central theme of the study yet it was important to provide a basic knowledge of the tribal ancestry and lineage. *Al-Ansāb*¹⁶ of Sam'ānī, *Al-Isāba*¹⁷ of Ibn Ḥajr, *Ansāb-ul-Ashrāf*¹⁸ of Balādhurī and *Jumhara Ansāb-ul-'Arab*¹⁹ of Ibn Ḥazm were quite useful in providing the detailed genealogies of some persons, yet Ibn Khaldūn²⁰ was the most significant source in providing a general understanding of the tribal pedigrees. Ibn Khaldūn has not only provided a detailed discussion on the genealogy of the different Arab tribes but also provided a brief account of the places where these tribes lived and threw light on their finest characteristics. Likewise *Murij-ul-Dhahab* of Mas'ūdī²¹ was also relevant in providing such information. Ibn Athīr's *Al-Kāmil*,²² again not a work of genealogy provided very valuable information about pre-Islamic tribes and specially their *ayyām*.

¹⁶ Muḥammad bin Maṇṣūr Al-Sam'ānī, *Al-Ansāb*, ed., Muḥammad 'Abdul Qādir Ata, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar-ul-Kutb al-Ilmia, 1998).

¹⁷ Ibn Ḥajr al-'Asqalānī, *Al-Isāba fi Tamīz-ul-Sahāba*, vol. 1, 3, 7 (Beirut: Dar-ul-Kutb al-Arabi, n.d.).

¹⁸ Aḥmad bin Yaḥyā Balādhurī, *Ansāb-ul-Ashrāf*, ed., Sohaīl Zekār and Rīḍā Zarkalī, vol. 1, 6 (Beirut: Dar-ul-Fikr, 1996).

¹⁹ Muḥammad 'Alī bin Aḥmad bin Sa'īd Ibn Ḥazm, *Jumhara Ansāb-ul-'Arab* (Beirut: Dar-ul-Kutb al-Ilmia, 2003).

²⁰ 'Abdul Reḥmān bin Muḥammad bin Khaldūn, *Tarikh-ibn Khaldūn*, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar-ul-Fikr, 1979).

²¹ Al-Ḥasan 'Alī bin Ḥusayn bin 'Alī al-Mas'ūdī, *Murij-ul-Dhahab wa M'ādan al-Javāhir*, vol. 1, 2 (Beirut: Dar-ul-Undulus, 1965).

²² Muḥammad bin Muḥammad bin Abdul Karīm bin Athīr, *Al-Kāmil fī 'l-Tārīkh*, vol. 1-4 (Beirut: Dar-ul-Sadar, 1965).

The *ayyām* of the Arabs was also a branch of knowledge that existed in pre-Islamic Arabia. This *ayyām* was recorded in the form of poetry as well as oral narratives. According to Duri, Iraqi school of historical thought²³ was particularly influenced by *Ayyām-ul-'Arab*. This school prevailed in Iraq and important representatives of this perspective are Abū Mikhnāf (d. 744), A'wāna bin al-Ḥakam (d. 764), Sayf bin al-'Umar (d. 796), Naṣr ibn Muzāḥīm (d. 827) and al-Madā'īnī (d. 839).²³

There was a school of thought who was equally influenced by the *ḥadīth* method of chain of transmitters but was keen to spread the details of the battles of the Prophet (PBUH) and his companions. Wāqidī was probably the first real historian to write *maghāzī* which was a mixture of *sīra* and *ayyām*. Wāqidī was not particularly very relevant for the present study but the trend to write *maghāzī* encouraged the future historians to record different battles fought by the Muslims. The *Futūh-al-Buldān* of Balādhurī²⁴ provides very significant information about the conquests and the subsequent events. Balādhurī was however strictly not a *maghāzī* writer, instead he chose to follow up a quite different method to write his history. The Muslim historians of early centuries were free to make experiments with their style, form and content probably because of the lack of any strict epistemological tradition and institutionalization of the discipline of history. Thus Balādhurī has divided his content into the conquests of different cities but he never stops there. After providing detailed information about the conquests of a particular region, he continues his narrative and present data about the different

²³Duri, *The Rise of Historical Writing*, 41-50.

²⁴Abīmad bin Yahyā Al-Baladhūrī, *Futūh-al-Buldān*, ed., Rizwan bin Rizwan (Beirut: Dar-ul-Kub al-Ilmia, 1983).

characteristics of that region. In this regard, he was very helpful in providing details about the decision to settle at al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra. He also relates some facts about the climate of these areas, along with adding up details of the different canals dug in the area, properties being sold or bought and any other economic activity that he could gather. This information was extremely helpful in determining the economic activity of the migrants and in finding the climatic and environmental problems of the area.

More details about conquests were provided by the most extensive narrative written on the early Muslim history by Ṭabarī in his *Tārīkh-ul-Rusul wa 'l-Mulūk*.²⁵ Ṭabarī also was not simply a *maghāzī* writer but could be safely called a historian who used multiple traditions in order to provide all possible explanations of a single event. Moreover, he was strict in the use of *isnād* and was very particular about the authenticity of his sources. He again adopted a slightly different style and unlike Balādhurī, his framework of study was confined to strict chronology. Ṭabarī has discussed the events year by year. Apart from providing information about several Muslim conquests, Ṭabarī portrays a complete picture of the political developments of the Iraqi garrisons. Fortunately most of the sources that Ṭabarī consulted were from the Iraqi school of thought thus he provides detailed data about the garrisons, however there appeared a huge gap after the revolt of Ibn al-Ash'ath,²⁶ when he redirects his attention from Iraq to Khūrāsān. The present study offers an explanation for this historiographical shift. It argues that the revolt of Ibn al-Ash'ath was the last show of power by the *ahl-*

²⁵Abū Ja'far Muḥammad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh-ul-Rusul wa 'l-Mulūk*, vol. 1-2 (Lugd. Bat. Brill, 1964).

²⁶See chapter 4 for details.

ul-Qādisiyya. Hajjaj was not only successful in curbing the last powerful revolt by Ibn al-Ash'ath but also eliminated all *khawārij* elements. Nothing significant was happening at Iraq that Tabarī would have considered worthless to record. Later on Tabarī narrated a few incidents of minor revolts in Iraq but has concentrated his discussion on Khūrāsān which had become a centre of power and where all conquests activity was going on. Khūrāsān had also become important as it later emerged as the centre of the Abbasid revolution.

Another less renowned but equally important source of history consulted for this study was *al-Futūh* of Kūfī.²⁷ Although titled as *al-Futūh*, it was also not particularly related with the details of battles. Kūfī followed a loose chronological pattern and narrated the events with the title of *Akhbār* or *khabar* of any particular event. Being a resident of al-Kūfa, he had more access to the information of Iraq. Thus he talks in detail about the situation at Iraq, particularly about *qurrā'*, the civil wars of *Jamal*²⁸ and *Ṣiffīn* and about *khawārij*.

The genealogical studies, already mentioned, promoted the growth of another kind of literature that was of writing biographical dictionaries. Some genealogical works actually jumped from the genre of genealogy to biography. Later on, this took the shape of *Tabaqāt* mainly pioneered by Ibn Sa'd who wrote *Al-Tabaqāt-ul-Kubrā*.²⁹ *Tabaqāt* literature was an innovation within narrating the biographies and Ibn Sa'd wrote the biographies in the form of layers. These layers

²⁷ Abū Muḥammad Aḥmad bin A'ṭhim al-Kūfī, *al-Futūh*, ed., N'aīm Zūrzūr, vol. 1-4 (Beirut: Dar-ul-Kub al-Ilmia, 1986).

²⁸ The battle of *Jamal* was fought in which 'Ayi'sha, the wife of the Prophet (PBUH) and Talḥa and Zubaīr, two of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH) fought against 'Alī, the caliph of the Arab empire at that time.

²⁹ Muḥammad Ibn Sa'd, *Al-Tabaqāt-ul-Kubrā*, ed., Ḥamza al-Naṣrāni, 'Abdul Ḥafiz Farghālī and 'Abdul Ḥamīd Muṣṭafā, vol. 3, 5, 6, 7 (Cairo: Al-Maktabat-ul-Qayyūmat, n.d.).

mainly represented the different generations while the unit of differentiating between different layers was inspired by *hadīth* studies. These biographies were aimed at relating the details of people who were *rāvī* of traditions either from the Prophet (PBUH), his companions or scholars of later generations. Thus basically the first *tabaqā* was comprised of those who narrated *hadīth* from the Prophet (PBUH), the second *tabaqā* included the men who related traditions from the famous companions for instance ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān and ‘Alī, the third *tabaqā* represented those who narrated *hadīth* from people like ‘Abdullāh bin ‘Umar and ‘Abdullāh bin ‘Abbās and this practice is followed till the last *tabaqā*. Ibn Sa‘d was very helpful in providing a general picture of the population of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra over the years. This was however particularly important as it finally offered a rough sketch of the tribal composition of migrants at Iraq. For biographical details, al-Dhahabī and Ibn Athīr have also been used; both have written histories but at the end of every year provided brief biographies of the people who had died in that particular year.

Apart from all these benefits that the sources of Muslim history offer, it was not an easy job to deal with these sources and to ask the questions of choice. There were several questions on which the sources of Muslim history were silent. For instance, the identity of *qurrā'* was not explicitly stated in any of the important sources. An idea has been drawn by interpreting the different references of *qurrā'* yet it creates confusion or contradiction at times. Likewise it became very difficult to find out the details about the identity of *khanqārij*. Despite the existence of huge literature on biographies, the biographical details of earlier

khawārij are usually missing in all important sources.³⁰ Likewise the sources of Muslim history explicitly do not inform us about the motives of Arab migration to Iraq specially there is no visible information on the issue of motives of individual migrants. An indirect method of inquiry was chosen to dig out the relevant answers. It was thought better to find out the characteristics of tribes in pre-Islamic Arabia in order to ultimately know the possible reasons and factors of motivation for migration.

Theoretical Framework

This study does not strictly confine itself to any particular theoretical framework; instead it has tried to develop a framework of its own certainly followed by elements taken from already existing theories in order to form a better understanding of the phenomenon of Arab migration to Iraq. This framework will be drawn from the factual data gathered by the narrative sources of Muslim history. The main task of this study is to look at the Arab conquests, settlement and post-settlement happenings in Iraq from the perspective of migration. As it has already been discussed in literature review that the conquests and its effects, the development of future polity and other related topics have been repeatedly discussed in the literature on early Muslim history; thus the aspect that was missing was to view it from the perspective of migration.

³⁰The people who had a negative image are difficult to find in the historical sources. For instance al-Dhahabī has given year by year biographies of all important men who die in that particular year. But he has omitted the biographies of those *khawārij* who die in the battle of *Nehrwan* while fighting against Ali. Similarly *Asad-al-Ghābā* of Ibn Athīr and *Tahdhīb-ul-Tahdhīb* of Ibn Ḥajr does not provide any clue about the identities of early *khawārij*. Al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh-ul-Islām*, ed., 'Umar 'Abdul Salām Tazmīrī vol. 3(Beirut: Dar-ul-Kitab-ul-Arabi, 1987), Ibn Ḥajr al-'Asqalānī, *Tahdhīb-ul-Tahdhīb*, vol. 7 (Hyderabad Deccan: Majlis-ul-Marif, 1326AH); Muḥammad bin Muḥammad bin 'Abdul Karīm Ibn Athīr, *Asad-ul-Ghābā fī-Ma'rīfāt-al-Šāhāba*, ed., Ghar-ul-Din Abi-al-Ḥasan and Muḥammad bin 'Abdul Karīm, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar-ul-Ahya, n.d.).

The events and its implications appeared new when seen from the eyes of migration studies. Migration studies have almost attained the status of an independent discipline following its own parameters and methodologies. The amalgamation of history and migration studies has also been tested before. The novel point in the present study is to mix up the migration studies with the early Muslim history, a venture rarely attempted. It opened up a wholly new perspective in the literature of the early Muslim history.

Hence migration provided the basic frame of reference for this study, yet the study has not exclusively applied any single migration theory or not even tried to combine two or more theories together to develop its theoretical framework. These theories have been analyzed in detail³¹ concluding that the existing theoretical frameworks of migration studies are insufficient to explain the phenomenon of Arab migration to Iraq. It has been observed that most of the theoretical works on migration have been formulated on the basis of data gathered from some modern or western migration. These theories seem unable to grasp the nature, motives and implications of a medieval migration. Although a few of these theories have partially talked about ancient and medieval migration³² yet there are no structured laws formulated for its study. The other alternate was to find out the pattern of Arab migration to Iraq without confining it to any existing theory. The

³¹See section 1 of chapter 1.

³²William McNeill, "Human Migration in Historical Perspective" in *Population and Development Review* 10, no. 1 (Mar., 1984): 1-18; Robert E. Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man" in *The American Journal of Sociology* 33, no.6 (May, 1928), 881-893; Also see the detailed discussion in chapter 1.

present study has made an effort to identify the salient features of the Arab migration to Iraq in the first chapter.³³

Apart from the framework of migration, Arab migration to Iraq can be seen from a variety of perspectives. For instance it could be studied from the perspective of the relation between the Arabs and the locals and the level of cultural assimilation and social interaction of the two people. Migration moreover could be studied as an incident which resulted in the importation of Arabic language and Islam to the conquered areas. Arab migration to Iraq could also be analyzed from the perspective of changes and problems that the locals had to face due to this migration or simply how it changed the demographic proportion and administrative setup of the already existing society. The present study however particularly has seen the Arab migration to Iraq from the perspective of migrants alone. It has concerned itself with the issues of the reasons behind the migration, the motives of the migration, the forces which pushed the migrants to migrate, the problems in their adjustment and the changes that migration brought in their lives. As far as the implications of migration are concerned, the Arab migration to Iraq could be seen from its social, cultural, religious, economic, political, cosmological and psychological aspects and so on and so forth. The study definitely was unable to cover each and every change that came in the life of migrants, thus it has focused more on the political and economic changes probably because the political and the economic changes were the most notable and visible. Political and economic factors act as a dynamic for social change thus somehow the study deals with the social change as well. Some climatic factors and a few issues of

³³ See section 2 of chapter 1.

interaction and assimilation of migrants with the locals have also been taken up. The researcher hopes that future research will be conducted on finding out the varied aspects of implications of this migration. Similarly there is also a need to look into the Arab migration to Iraq from certain different perspectives.

Key Concepts and Terminologies

Some general concepts and terminologies have been used in a particular reference. It was felt important to elucidate that particular connotation here. 'Arab migration to Iraq' has been used only for that migration which occurred as a result of Arab conquests of Iraq, and it also included all kinds of later Arab migration to Iraq till the end of the Umayyad period. The previous migration of pre-Islamic Arabia and later migration of Abbasid period are not the scope of this study. Likewise the term 'the migrants' refers to the Arab migrants to Iraq. Some of the Arabs who had migrated earlier in the pre-Islamic period had also joined and settled with the migrants coming along with the conquest, thus the word, 'the migrants' at times includes those earlier migrants as well as the later migrants who kept on pouring in throughout the Umayyad period. 'Arab conquest movement' was also exclusively used for those waves of conquest which occurred after the emergence of Islam and mostly during the period of the first four caliphs, however 'Arab conquests' has also been used for later conquests regulated from the garrisons. 'The Arabs' or 'the Arab tribes' has been used for all nomadic, semi-nomadic or settled population of Arabia. The terminology of 'the Arab state' denotes the early Muslim state, initially formed by the Prophet (PBUH) and succeeded by the first four caliphs and then the Umayyad. Likewise 'the Arab army' meant those military units which have been sent by the Arab state and were

later regulated by it. Some of the Arabic terminologies have been translated which although spoils the real texture of the content, yet provides an easy understanding to the reader. Thus the word governor has been used for *amīr*, financial agent for the original word *amīr-i-kharāj*, commander of the army for *amīr-harb*, officers for 'ammāl, tribal chief for *ra'īs al-qabīla* etc. similarly some of the very common words like caliph, Umayyad, Abbasid, Kufan and Basran have been anglicized as is practiced in majority of the literature on Muslim history. Although the title contains the dates in AD, the study will give most of its dates in hijri era as have been mentioned in the sources. It has been observed that due to the differences of days and years in both calendars; it becomes faulty at time to convert the dates, thus it was thought better to mention the original dates. On the other hand, the time before the Hijri calendar began have been given in AD or BC. Similarly the dates given on the works cited or quoted have not been changed.

A Note on Transliteration

The transliteration system of *Islamic Studies* has been adopted which is a research journal, issued from Islamic Research Institute of International Islamic University. However in words like al-Kūfa, al-Basra, Balqa, the 'h' has been omitted which is originally mentioned in the transliteration system for "ha" as "a" seems sufficient to denote "ha". Moreover "alif" is always mentioned by ā. However certain established spells like Makkah and Abdullah have not been changed. The anglicized words have not been transliterated. Likewise the names of the authors, who write their names in English and do not transliterate their names, have not been transliterated. On the other hand, the authors of Arabic books and their titles have been transliterated. The names of publisher and

publication cities have also not been transliterated. In the same way the transliterated spells have been followed for the anglicized words.

Chapter 1

Nature of the Arab Migration to Iraq

1.1 Theories of Migration

Migration is a human experience which affects the psychological, ecological, demographic, social, economic and political life of the people. It determines a change in the traditions, behaviors, norms, and customs of the society. One of the very broader definitions of migration links the phenomenon of migration with “a permanent or semi permanent change of residence”¹. Yet migration is being studied in detail under various disciplines and has been defined accordingly. For instance, for ecologists like Hugh Dingle and V. Alistair Drake, migration is an important population phenomenon and it can be explained in terms of “population outcomes (dynamics, trajectories, displacements) the answer to the question, what is migration? includes all the consequences of migration for the dynamics of population and the relationships between them”².

From a sociological perspective, migration is a movement which affects the relationships between individuals or group to which they belong. Richard Startup defines social migration as “any instance of geographical movement of individuals or groups relative to one another, or any instance of the geographical movement of a group, which has consequences for group structure”³.

¹Everett S. Lee, “A Theory of Migration” in *Demography* 3, no.1 (1956): 49.

²Hugh Dingle and V. Alistair Drake, “What is Migration?” in *Bio Science* 57, no.2 (2007): 119.

³Richard Startup, “A Sociology of Migration” in *The Sociological Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (Spring, 1971): 177.

The present research is dealing with migration from a historical perspective, thus it is very important to see migration as a spatial and temporal process. From a historical point of view, human beings have been migrating since earlier times. By 8000 BC, a great migration had been completed which resulted in the growth of cultures and civilizations.⁴ Civilizations had expanded either by conquest or by migration. By about 2000 BC, the civilizations had matured and different “patterns of human migration” had emerged.⁵ McNeill distinguishes four possible forms or patterns of migration. They are

1. Radical displacement of one population by another as a result of systematic exercise of force.
2. Conquest of one population by another, leading to symbiosis of two previously diverse communities on the same.
3. Infiltration of outsiders with some degree of acquiescence from existing populations without displacing existing rulers.
4. Importation of individuals or even of whole communities that had been forcibly uprooted from their initial place of residence by slave raiders and/or traders.⁶

This division of the patterns of migration has significantly explained the modes of migration in the late ancient and medieval times. The Arab migration to Iraq comfortably fits in the second category of migration as explicated by this theoretical framework. According to McNeill, when nomad tribesmen saw any weaknesses in the civilizations, they start their raids which sometimes become

⁴William McNeill, “Human Migration in Historical Perspective”, 1.

⁵Ibid., 3.

⁶Ibid., 4.

74-16656

successful and turn out to be a conquest. These nomads spread their culture and language but at the same time adopt urbanized way of living of the civilized nations.⁷ The Arab movement of conquest towards Iraq was also started with the initial raids of Shaybān, a nomad sub-branch of Bakr bin Wā'il.⁸ These raids were supported by the Arab state and it became successful and turned out to be a conquest. The second assumption of the amalgamation of both cultures, of the conquered and the conquering nation, is also valid. This theoretical framework somehow explains the nature of the Arab migration to Iraq. It specifically links the migration with the conquest which is one of the main factors of the Arab migration.

A few other works also partly talk about migration in a historical perspective. For instance, Robert E. Park makes a distinction between the migration of present and the past. In his words, migration in past was "...an invasion followed by forcible displacement or subjugation of one people by another", now it has assumed the shape of a "peaceful penetration" He further argues that when migration leads to conquests, "...assimilation is inevitable. The conquering people impose their culture and standards upon the conquered." Sometimes this relation takes the form of slavery and in other cases caste system emerges, however in both the cases "...the dominant and the subject people

⁷Ibid., 4-5.

⁸Bakr bin Wā'il was a large tribal grouping of northeastern Arabia around 600 AD. It included many separate tribes and the most prominent are the Shaybān, 'Ijl, Qays bin Tha'laba, Dhuhl, Taym Lāt, Yashkar and Hanīfa. Bakr bin Wā'il included both nomadic and sedentary people. The bulk of the Shaybān were nomadic tribesmen whereas most of Hanīfa were settled tribesmen occupying the fertile region of Al-Yamāma in the eastern Arabia. Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 25.

become, in time, integral part of one society".⁹ The present study will consider to some extent the issue of assimilation of the migrants and the locals. In the case of the Arab migration, it was however not followed up by conquest; instead it was almost a parallel process. A few conquest was followed by temporary settlement; temporary settlement led to some more conquest followed by permanent settlement. The conclusion of Park that in such cases, assimilation is inevitable will not be challenged; though the assimilation in the case of the Arab migration to Iraq was slow as the Arabs established new cities and lived in groups. They had fewer interactions with the locals.

William Peterson tries to develop a migration theory taking into account the spatial and temporal factor and divides migration into four major types. The first is the primitive migration which is mainly forced by ecological factors. Second is forced and impelled migration, which denotes forceful transportation of people from their native land to some other area. The third division is the free migration. Some of the individuals move as they are "adventurers or intellectuals motivated by their ideals". These individuals are followed by certain groups who migrate willingly from one place to another. The last category is that of mass migrations. There are two further types of mass migrations according to the nature of destination, one is settlement and another is urbanization. Settlement means moving of a people in mass number from one area to another but in urbanization

⁹Robert E. Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man", 886, 891.

the people move from a rural area to an urban area. The table which Peterson has prepared explains his typology.¹⁰

Relation	Migratory Force	Class of Migration	Type of Migration	
			Conservative	Innovating
Nature and man	Ecological push	Primitive	Wandering	Flight from the land
			Ranging	
State (or equivalent) and man	Migration policy	Forced	Displacement	Slave trade
		Impelled	Flight	Coolie trade
Man and his norms	Higher aspirations	Free	Group	Pioneer
Collective behavior	Social momentum	Mass	Settlement	Urbanization

Although Peterson claims that he has tried to provide a general typology of migration which intends to cover all kinds of migration but this theory hardly talks about the group migration resulted by the conquest. The mass migration mentioned in the typology is the frequent movement of people from one area to another in the capacity of individuals. The Arab migration to Iraq was a group migration of a huge army who had moved in thousands and had settled together.

Apart from these few works, most of the migration theories neglect the temporal aspect of migration and mainly the theories are formed by collecting data from the modern times.¹¹ Migration in modern times is quite different in its nature and consequences, still many similarities can be found in the motives of

¹⁰William Peterson, "A General Typology of Migration" in *American Sociological Review* 23, no.3 (June,1958): 256-266.

¹¹This argument has been highlighted by Douglas S Massey who argues that intellectual debates on migration reflect some fundamental disagreements or conflicts. The first dimension of conflict concerns time. It is debated whether migrations be studied in synchronic or diachronic/historical perspective. Some of the scholars argue that migration is fundamentally a historical process however others disagree. Ravenstein belongs to the second category. Douglas S. Massey, "Social Structure, Household Strategies and the Cumulative Causation of Migration" in *Population Index* 56, no. 1 (Spring, 1990): 3.

migration. Thus it becomes fruitful to take a full account of these theoretical works on migration. For instance the first theoretical work on migration was the “The Laws of Migration” by E. G. Ravenstein.¹² The theory is developed from the data gathered in England and its smaller kingdoms in modern times thus the theory reflects an understanding of migration as a modern phenomenon. The basic assumptions of Ravenstein to consider migration as a rural to urban movement setting towards great centers of commerce only partially explains the phenomenon of migration.¹³ Later this theory and such similar theories which emphasize the economic factor as the only motive for migration were classified as neo-classical theory. According to this theory, “...migration is the result of individual decisions made by rational actors who seek to improve their well-being by moving to places where the reward of their labour will be higher than the one they get at home”.¹⁴ The Arab migrants to Iraq had also moved in order to seek better economic opportunities in the new lands. This opportunity was initially not in the form of new jobs or businesses, instead was obtained by conquering the migratory place and gathering spoils of war. In this way, the migrants had taken control of the resources of the locals and had used it for their own economic well-being.

This Neo-classical theory was later rejected due to its shortcomings particularly because it downplayed the non-economic factors specially the cultural determinants. These shortcomings were tried to be overcome by the theory of the

¹²E.G. Ravenstein, “The Laws of Migration”, in *Journal of the Statistical Society of London* 48, no. 2, (Jun 1885): 167-235.

¹³Ibid., 198.

¹⁴Joaquin Arango, “Explaining Migration: A Critical View” in *International Social Science Journal* 52, no. 165 (September 2000): 285.

new economics of labour migration. The theory of the new economics of labour migration highlights the role of families and household in the decision to migrate.¹⁵ Another important factor in determining the migration decision is the role of state. Migration is being controlled by state since long. For instance mercantilist European monarchs knew that their power relied on their people and if they will move, their power will be destroyed thus they prohibited migration from their country.¹⁶ The theory of the new economics of labour migration is also somewhat relevant with the Arab migration to Iraq as the Arab migration was regulated by the state. The decision was approved and happily accepted by the Arab tribes and the state had at first not used any forceful measures. Afterward however the state had regulated some forceful migration as well. State had also created a difference between earlier and the later migrants and had made the privileges of the later migrants as lower to the earlier migrants.

Another of such modern frameworks is the theory of Dual labour market which focuses on international migration in industrialized societies. This theory states that industrialized states required foreign labour to fill up their gap of labour power in their own countries.¹⁷ Although it has focused the local conditions of the places where the migrants move instead of only focusing on the motives of the migrants, still the main framework of the theory is modern industrialized world divided into developed and under-developed societies which is hardly relevant with the Arab migration to Iraq. One more theory of migration is world system

¹⁵Ibid., 286-8.

¹⁶Stephen Castles, "The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration Policies" in *International Migration Review* 38, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 854-5.

¹⁷Joaquin Arango, "Explaining Migration: A Critical View", 290.

theory which highlights “the domination exerted by core countries over peripheral areas, in the context of international relations fraught with conflict and tension”.¹⁸

This framework is also drawn mainly to elucidate the modern concept of migration. Both of these theories consider the international manipulative politics as an important factor in regulating the migration. There was hardly any such factor associated with the Arab migration to Iraq. Hence Dual labour market theory and world system theory are not relevant to the Arab migration to Iraq.

All of the above-mentioned theoretical frameworks have given significant weight to the motives of migrations yet there are a few works particularly focusing on the motives of migration. For instance Everett S. Lee finds following factors in the act of migration while determining its motives

1. Factors associated with area of origin
2. Factors associated with area of destination
3. Intervening obstacles
4. Personal factors¹⁹

Lee believes that by comparing the positive and negative factors between area of origin and destination, a person can make his decision to leave his native place and to migrate to the area of destination.²⁰ The migrant knows better about his place of origin but on the other hand, “knowledge of the area of destination is seldom exact, and indeed some of the advantages and disadvantages of an area can only be perceived by living there. Thus there is always an element of ignorance or

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Everett S. Lee, “A Theory of Migration” in *Demography* 3, no.1 (1966): 50.

²⁰Ibid.

even mystery about the area of destination.”²¹ His decision of judging the positive and negative factors between area of origin and destination can also be affected with his mental condition. If for instance he has spent youth and time of good health in place of origin, he will not think of many other negative factors at his place of origin.²² The Arabs at large were not attached emotionally with their native place. As one might expect, it was far easier for them to leave their place of origin and to settle at a new place. The reason was the nomadic and semi-nomadic character of the Arabs. The nomad and semi-nomad tribes had migrated in larger number to Iraq as compared to the settled tribes.

Moreover Lee talks about the intervening obstacles which can be in any form, for instance long distance, difficult route, international restrictions like visa and cost of travel.²³ Finally there are some personal factors which “facilitate or retard migration”.²⁴ Lee does not explain in detail about personal factors but it can be deduced that it opens up a huge exception as personal factors can be vastly different varying from one person to another. Moreover Lee believes that “it is not so much the actual factors at origin and destination as the perception of these factors which results in migration”.²⁵

To conclude, it can be assessed that the historical works on migration appears to be the most relevant for the present study; but unfortunately they do not

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., 51.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

provide any broader framework; neither have they dealt with minute details. Thus the only option is to utilize non-historical theoretical frameworks in order to get a better understanding of the Arab migration. Yet, most of these theoretical works have only focused on the motives or at the most the process of migration.²⁶ The present study although deals with the motives but focuses more on the affects of migration.

1.2 Nature of the Arab Migration to Iraq

The Arab migration was a phenomenon of medieval times in which such kind of movements were common as the pattern of empire formation was already followed by the Persians and the Romans. Romans for instance conquered different areas and settled there as conquerors.²⁷ Thus conquest and migration were interlinked in the medieval times. Yet the Arab migration to Iraq must have had certain unique aspects, distinguishing it from not only the modern migration but also from the medieval migration of Romans and Persians. This section will particularly determine the nature of the Arab migration by looking at its salient features.

Immediately after some initial conquests, some of the Arabs started moving from Arabia to the conquered areas of Iraq and Syria and settled there.

²⁶This point has also been highlighted by Douglas. According to Douglas, the last dimension of dispute between scholars on migration concerns "the relative emphasis placed on the causes versus the effects of migration". For details see, Douglas S. Massey, "Social Structure, Household Strategies and the Cumulative Causation of Migration" in *Population Index* 56, no. 1 (Spring, 1990): 3-4.

²⁷Tim McNeese, *History of Civilization: Roman Civilization* (Dayton: Lorenz Educational Press, Milliken Publishing, 1999), 8. Karl Christ, *The Romans: An Introduction to their History and Civilisation* (London: University of California Press, 1984), 17-22.

Later on, they also moved and settled in Egypt, parts of Iran and Khūrāsān. The Arab migration to Iraq was a corresponding and parallel process to the conquests. The army had to migrate to the battlefields of Iraq for initiating the conquests. Throughout the initial phase of conquests, the army stayed in the new areas by forming temporary settlements. Permanent settlements were made only when a major part of the conquests was over. The conquest of Iraq began with the opening of the eastern front at the border of Arabia. The Arabs had opened this front by giving permission to the tribe of Shaybān²⁸ to continue with their raids in the Persian territory.

Gradually the Arab state realized that they have opened an enormous front and in order to secure the already conquered areas, they must station their forces in Iraq. Accordingly the army consisting of various Arab tribes was ordered to find a suitable place for them and settle them at Iraq. The army accepted it willingly. Climatically, Arabia was a hard region. The Arab population was divided into nomads, semi-nomads and settled population. Nomads and semi-nomads were mainly the sheep and camel herders and were living a tough life. The settled population had either adopted agriculture or trade.²⁹ Obviously, it was more attractive for the nomads and the semi-nomads to migrate to Iraq and settle there. Hence the majority of the migrants were nomadic tribes. The settled people of Quraysh, Anṣār and Thaqīf were lesser in number.³⁰ Besides, the settled tribes moved mainly for attaining positions of power and authority. Consequently many

²⁸See note, 8.

²⁹Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 11-49.

³⁰See details in chapter 2, Part 2.

men of Quraysh and Thaqīf enjoyed power in the migratory places during the Umayyad period.³¹

The people moved in the form of an army thus all of them fit in to military profession yet they were also accompanied by their families. The soldiers who had settled at al-Kūfa initially along with their families were twenty thousand.³² This number had increased greatly in the later period.³³ It gives an idea about the later migrants who had followed the initial migrants in a large number. All of these migrants had moved in search of economic gains in the form of spoils of war.

The social structure of Arabia was organized on tribal basis therefore the army was also organized in tribal units, each headed by its own tribal head. The army had moved in the form of component tribal groups which is another important feature of this migration. The formation of the army was mainly consisted of tribal units, and the small tribal units were united together to form larger units of army. As a result the tribes had moved, fought and settled together. Besides being the conquerors, this factor of group movement made this migration different from the modern migration.

The migrant group however never moved in one unit. Two major fronts were opened and the army was sent according to the requirements of the fronts. One front was from al-Hīra at the northern side of Iraq and the other was at al-

³¹Details have been discussed in chapter 2.

³²Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 276.

³³See details in chapter 3, notes, 167-9.

Baṣra,³⁴ in which the conquest had begun from the southern part of al-Ubūlla³⁵ to al-Ahwāz³⁶ and further north. The migrants also entered mainly from these two sides.

The initial migration was further followed by the continuous wave of migration towards Iraq. After the permanent settlement was established and conquest was consolidated, certain individuals as well as tribes kept on moving from Arabia to Iraq. These later migrants played a vital role in the polity of the new areas.

The nature of the Arab migration to Iraq can be further exemplified by the changes that came in the life of the migrants. These changes were as much associated with factors related to the migratory place as these were associated with factors related to the migratory group itself. The migrants had faced lesser problems of adjustment with regard to the local people and the local climate. More significant was the economic prosperity that the migratory place had brought in their life. As one might expect, the migrants had earned huge wealth not only from conquest but also by utilizing the rich and fertile land of Iraq. They had also consumed the resources of Iraq to flourish trade and commerce for themselves.

³⁴ Al-Baṣra lay close to the border of the desert at some distance to the West of the estuary. In al-Baṣra, numerous canals carry the water of the Great Swamp into the Tigris. It lay about twelve miles from the Tigris estuary being connected by two great canals, the *nehr-i-Makil* from the northeast and the *nahr-al-Ubūlla*. Ibn Yāqūt, *Ma'ujam-ul-Buldān*, vol. 1, 430; Le Strange, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, 43-44.

³⁵ Al-Ubūlla lay on the estuary of al-Baṣra and the Muslims built this further inland near the desert border. Ibn Yāqūt, *Ma'ujam-ul-Buldān*, vol. 1, 76; Le Strange, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, 47.

³⁶ Al-Ahwāz is a district in the East, now part of modern Iran. The main city in the region was called as *Suq-i-Ahwaz* (market of Ahwaz). It was consisted of a large market and a mosque. Ibn Yāqūt, *Ma'ujam-ul-Buldān*, vol. 1, 284; Le Strange, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, 234.

Another essential change that had come in their lives was related to the migratory group. The migrants began to get involved in frequent civil wars and the older tribal identities were melted down. Based on some ideological or economic motives, the migrants figured out their own groups. These factions played more central role in the politics of the migrants as compared to their grouping as tribes. All of these factions sought after power and authority, yet all of them adopted a slightly different attitude towards the state. Some of them were cool-minded, appeasing and apparently loyal. Still others were openly rebellious. The state dealt with them accordingly; threatened a few with the snatching away of their benefits and used force for some others.

Thus certain common features together has fashioned the nature of the Arab migration. Some of these features can fit into the theoretical framework formed by modern theorist of migration yet a few are unique. The main attributes of the Arab migration to Iraq can be elucidated through following statements:-

1. Migration was parallel to the conquest movement
2. The migrants had moved and settled in tribal and group formation
3. Initial migrants was the most beneficiary group
4. The migrants were soldiers/army men
5. State had regulated the migration
6. Individuals and tribes were motivated for migration in search of economic gains
7. A few tribes moved due to some other socio-economic and political dynamics
8. Later waves of migration had followed the first migration
9. Main settlements were at garrison cities

10. There were smaller garrisons as well and a small proportion of the Arab population was scattered in other areas too.
11. The migrants had to face some climatic problems in their adjustment.
12. The migrants had adjusted easily with the local population
13. The tribal identities were gradually melted down and new identities were emerged.
14. There was much political disturbance in migrating place and many ambitious elements had based their activities in the migratory garrisons resulting into frequent civil wars and faction building.
15. The migrants were uncomfortable with increasing state control and tried to avert this control through various means.
16. The migrants had gradually began to dislike the military activity and had adopted luxurious urban lifestyle
17. The migrants had earned huge wealth in the migratory place.
18. The social and political decisions of the migrants were mostly controlled by economic motives.

1.2.1 Migration as Parallel to the Conquest Movement

The Arab migration to Iraq was parallel to the movement of the Arab conquest of Iraq. Migration was not a swift movement, the army kept on moving from one place to another almost for five to six years. During this period of roaming, the migrants settled at different areas in smaller groups, finally to reunite at al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra. These places can be termed as earlier migratory places. Many of the conquest were then regularized not from Arabia but from the earlier migratory places. Some of the Arabs remained settled in the earlier settlement.

It is a fact that first wave of migration was subsequent to the first phase of conquest; however the migration did not stop there, neither the conquest. After the first and second wave of conquest was over, the state decided to settle the

migrants in Iraq. This permanent settlement was followed by another wave of conquest towards Iran and Khūrāsān. These later conquests were regulated from the garrisons and earned huge spoils of war for the migrants. This encouraged the Arabs stationed at Arabia also to migrate to Iraq in search of new sources of income. Finally a subsequent wave of migration began, followed by more conquests. Hence conquest and migration were interlinked and were parallel in the Arab migration to Iraq.

1.2.2 The Migrants Moved and Settled in Tribal and Group Formation

The migrants in the modern world either move alone or with their families, but in the case of the Arab migration to Iraq the migrants had moved and settled in the form of tribes and the larger units of the Arab army consisting of several tribes. As is obvious, this tribal structure of the migration had influenced the structure of the future society. The whole settlement plan was formed according to the tribal formation. The streets and lanes of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra were allocated according to the tribal divisions. The different tribes settled together and formed their colonies as hub of their tribal activities.

Similarly the system of administration was basically drawn from the tribal structure of the society. In al-Kūfa, initially seven and then four tribal divisions were formed for administrative convenience. Alike five divisions were formed at al-Baṣra.³⁷ The head of each tribal head was responsible for the conduct of its members and was answerable to the governor. He was also responsible for receiving the *atā* of his tribesmen from the government and distributing it to the concerned men.

³⁷Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2495.

Steadily, the tribal affiliations and strong bonds of tribes decimated in the new urban society. The migrants realized the variance between the polity of earlier tribal society of Arabia and the new society strictly controlled by the state. Members of the same tribe saw their interests in following divergent groups of authority. In the new society, the migrant tribesmen found new avenues of gaining progress and prosperity. Still a large number of tribal values remained alive in the early period of migration.

1.2.3 Initial Migrants was the Most Beneficiary Group

The migration from Arabia to Iraq occurred as a result of conquest which turned out to be a vital factor in figuring out the shape of the future society. The migrants had willingly moved to a place where they expected better opportunities of progress and growth. Their position as conqueror of the land was their most powerful tool.

As Arabs, their status was quite higher than the local populace. Accordingly, the relationship with the locals was also determined by their status as conquerors. The initial migrants had been the heir of all the benefits of the conquests thus all permanent spoils of war was taken over by them and their descendants in the form of regular stipends (*atā*), revenue from abandoned lands (*say*)³⁸ and spoils of wars in further battles. Likewise they were the partners in the power politics and often their members were chosen for military leadership during different campaigns and civil leadership as they were sent as governors or as other officials to different areas.

³⁸See details in chapter 5

The status of the initial migrants as the conquerors of the land created an elite class named as *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. *Ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were the victors of *Qādisiyya* and the term includes both *ridda* and non-*ridda* tribesmen. *Ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* was the most privileged group amongst the migrants. This group was entitled to the revenue of the *fay* land. Throughout the Umayyad period, they kept on securing their *fay* land from the government. These men were jealous of their newly conquered areas and were probably not happy with the decision of 'Umar to not to divide the land of Iraq amongst the victor army. Still, they hoped to enjoy a special status and exceptional economic benefits. But unfortunate for them, their migration was followed by a heavy wave of the later migrants resulting into the loss of their privileged position and their exclusive economic rewards. In addition, their benefits and status was further curtailed by the state which by virtue of its authority considered its right over the victory of Iraq and its resources. The state increasingly snubbed them and took away their benefits.³⁹

1.2.4 The Migrants as Soldiers/Army Men

First and foremost role of the Arabs was their military expedition, not the migration, thus the migrants were at first the soldiers. The initial migrants moved in the form of a tribal army and finally settled at garrisons. At the outset of the conquest, these soldiers were given share in the spoils but after they settled at garrisons, their names were registered and they were allocated regular stipends along with any share in the spoils. The later migrants either moved in the form of families or smaller tribal groups. They were keen to enlist them in the register as regular soldiers as they envisioned the opportunity to gather huge spoils of war in

³⁹See further details in chapter 4.

the further conquest of east regulated from the garrisons. Thus the military profession of the migrants engaged them in further conquests and they kept on gathering huge spoils of war. Furthermore, the fighting nature of the migrants encouraged them in future to play a leading role in the civil wars of the empire. Divided into different factions, they kept on fighting for the sake of power and resources.

1.2.5 State had Regulated the Migration

The Arab migration to Iraq was regulated by the Arab state. Nothing was planned in the first stage of conquests when armies were sent at first and were called back when their task was over. It was the caliph 'Umar who realized for the first time the need to establish settlement or garrisons in the conquered areas. He understood the need to maintain garrisons in order to secure the areas which had been conquered. Thus he ordered his commander of the army to find a suitable place for the Arabs. 'Umar who was constantly involved in the selection of place for settlement, kept in view the strategic and climatic factors in the final selection of garrison for the Arabs. After the selection of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra, the state remained equally involved in dealing with matters of planning and construction and nominated an engineer to design the settlements at al-Kūfa.⁴⁰

The state could not keep a very strong control over the later migrations; probably it encouraged it for the need of manpower on the eastern front. Soon after the state became conscious of the excessive number of the migrants moving from Arabia to Iraq. By then, it was too late and it was not possible to send them

⁴⁰Abu Ḥayyāj bin Mālik was appointed for the planning of al-Kūfa and 'Aṣim bin Dulf Abū al-Harba was appointed for al-Baṣra . Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 2, 529.

back. Ziyad⁴¹, the governor of Iraq for Mu‘āwiya found a solution for this problem. He moved five thousand families of al-Baṣra to Khūrāsān and settled them there permanently.⁴²

1.2.6 Individuals and Tribes were Motivated for Migration Mainly due to Economic Factors

Several motives could have convinced the individuals to move from their place to another. One of the most important motives of migration has been to find better economic opportunities in the new land. Most of the modern migrations are carried out for this motive. The Arab migration to Iraq thus resembles with the modern migrations in this prior motive. The neo-classical theory can be applied to some extent on the Arab migration. According to this theory, “migration is the result of individual decisions made by rational actors who seek to improve their well-being by moving to places where the reward of their labour will be higher than the one they get at home”.⁴³ The Arabs initially were not very enthusiastic to go to Iraq but once when they observed the richness and wealth of Iraq, they moved to Iraq in bulks, hence the motive of the later migrants was purely economic.

⁴¹Ziyād bin Abū Sūfyān also called as Ziyād bin Sūmayah was the famous governor of Iraq for Mu‘āwiya. He had initially supported Ali but had joined Mu‘āwiya on his accession to power. Shamsuddīn Aḥmad bin Muḥammad bin Abī Bakr Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt-ul-Ayān wa Anbā-ul-Abnā-ez-Zamān*, ed., Ahsan ‘Abbās, vol. 6 (Qum: Manshurat-ul-Razi, 1374 AH), 356.

⁴²Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 400.

⁴³Joaquin Arango, “Explaining Migration: A Critical View”, 285.

1.2.7 A Few Tribes Moved due to other Socio-economic and Political Dynamics

Cultural and social factors played a lesser role in the Arab migration to Iraq. Yet there were some other factors which helped them to make their decision to migrate. For instance some of them already had some interaction with the Iraqi areas and they knew its economic prosperity. Moreover, there were already some Arab tribes settled in various districts of Iraq, especially at al-Hīra and al-‘Anbar, the fact which encouraged the Arabs to settle at Iraq.⁴⁴ Finally the nomadic character of the Arabs also helped in letting them move from one place to another. A few of the other tribes, specially some Yemini tribes felt the dominance of Müdar specially Quraysh in Arabia and found no place for them thus they find it better to stay at Iraqi garrisons which were not only resourceful but were also emerging strong centers of power.

1.2.8 Later Waves of Migration Followed the First Migration

As has been mentioned before, the initial migrants were the soldiers; unclear in their plan, they had only come to conquer Iraq. Once when they had conquered the important areas of Iraq, and had decided to settle, they were enticed by many who had remained back at Arabia. Thus a more swift movement of the later migrants began.

The later migrants were actively involved in the further conquests of the east, yet they failed to attain the status that the earlier migrants enjoyed. There was a considerable difference in the salaries of the initial and the later migrants. In addition, the initial migrants were treated as the political elite of the new community, the status which the later migrants lacked. The later migrants at first

⁴⁴Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, 428-9; Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest*, 221.

were happy with the improvement in their economic condition occurred due to migration but with the passage of time, they began to dislike their meager standing. They opposed the nobility or elite consisting of the initial migrants by fighting a battle in the leadership of al-Mukhtar Thaqif⁴⁵ against the initial migrants.⁴⁶ Yet their desire to attain higher status was not fulfilled as the battle had turned out to be a defeat for them. There was no major tussle between the initial and the later migrants after this incident.

1.2.9 Main Settlements were at Garrison Cities

After passing through various phases of initial conquests and some temporary settlements, the Arabs were willing to look out for a residence for rather longer period. The state had played pertinent role in motivating the tribes to form settlements for longer duration. 'Umar had suggested Sa'd bin Abi Waqqas⁴⁷ to settle his forces somewhere at Iraq and to develop a *dār-i-hijrat* for the Arab troops.⁴⁸ The forces initially decided to stay at al-Madā'in, which lured attraction for the Arabs as it was the capital of the Sassanid at Iraq. Al-Madā'in was an already constructed city which was vacated by the Persians when they had fled along with their king. The Arabs found it better to take over the houses of these

⁴⁵ Al-Mukhtar bin Abi 'Ubayd bin Mas'ud belonged to the tribe of Thaqif, which is a sub-branch of Müdar. His father Abi 'Ubayd bin Mas'ud of Thaqif was an earlier convert and migrated with the Holy Prophet (PBUH) from Makkah to Medina. Abi 'Ubayd was chosen as commander by 'Umar and was sent to fight at the front of Iraq. He fought the battle of *Jisr* and was martyred. Al-Mukhtar led a very significant revolt of the *shia* in Iraq and ruled Al-Kufa for a brief reign. *Sam'ānī, Ansāb*, vol. 6, 375-6.

⁴⁶ See details in chapter 4.

⁴⁷ Sa'd bin Abi Waqqas belonged to 'Abd Manaf of Quraysh. He was an earlier convert and had participated in *Badr*. He was appointed as the commander of the army of Arabs at *Qādisiyya* by 'Umar. Later on, he also acted as the governor of al-Kufa for a small period. *Ibn Saad, Tabaqat*, vol. 6, 12-13.

⁴⁸ *Balādhuri, Futūh*, 274.

runaways and resided there. Hardly a year or two had passed, when they began to realize the unbefitting climatic conditions of al-Madā'in. The moist air of the vacated capital was probably perfectly suitable for the Persians but the Arabs had never been accustomed to such climatic areas. They were disturbed by the presence of flying insects like bees and mosquitoes. Their health also deteriorated.

Thus finally again on the advice of 'Umar, they selected al-Kūfa as the next place of settlement. Thus most of the Arab troops of *Qādisiyya* stationed at north gathered at al-Kūfa and resided there. Al-Kūfa was an uninhabited place and was populated by the Arabs. Al-Kūfa turned out to be the most important garrison of the Muslims. On the other hand, the forces stationed at the southern front found al-Baṣra as their residence. Al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra was developed in order to inhabit the armies of conquests. The later migrants who settled in these garrisons were also registered as soldiers. These garrisons controlled the further conquests and consequently the regulated the administration of the areas of further east.

Al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra were the centers of all economic and political activity of the Arab state. The governor of east used to stay in either of these cities. The importance of al-Kūfa was further amplified when Aii as the caliph of the Arab state had decided to move and settle at al-Kūfa. Throughout the Umayyad period, most of the migrants remained settled at these two garrisons.

1.2.10 Smaller Garrisons at al-Madā'in, al-Ḥīra and al-Qādisiyya

Along with the majority of the migrant population settled at al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra, there was a significant proportion of the Arabs who thought it better to stay behind at al-Madā'in, al-Ḥīra or al-Qādisiyya. Their number was certainly much lesser than those who had settled at al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra; yet it did not

cease their political importance. Al-Madā'in was a fortified city and remained a hub of activity throughout the period. Al-Hīra and al-Madā'in were always considered important by the political actors and by the state. They provided logistic support to al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra, provided intelligence to governors and acted as a permanent post for the state army. All important political or religious movements tried to exert their influence on the people of al-Madā'in and al-Hīra too along with al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra.

Hence, the migrants living at smaller garrisons remained aware of all the political developments and formed an integral part of the migrant's society at Iraq. Yet they were living in much peaceful areas as compared to al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra. Though the migrants living in smaller garrisons had some encounters with *khawārij* and certain other rebels which they handled by fortifying them in the city, closing the city gates and avoiding the fight as much as possible; but on the whole they were least disturbed by the political turmoil and activities at al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra. The major civil wars and rebellions were centered at al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra thus people of smaller garrisons were set aside from this disturbance.

A few of the Arabs also used to live in some parts of Iraq either in areas where they own property or probably for some other business like trade etc. They often use to visit the garrisons and remain tied with the mainstream migrants.

1.2.11 Climatic Problems

The earlier problems of adjustment included the climatic problems as well. Iraq was very closer to Arabia; still the climate of most of the areas at Iraq initially did not suit the Arabs. No complaint was reported at al-Hīra and al-Qādisiyya, probably because both of them were on the west of river Euphrates and Tigris,

closer to Arabia, while at al-Madā'in which was on the East of these rivers, the Arabs found considerable environmental problems. After crossing the two rivers the Arabs found the climate very unpleasant. At al-Madā'in, Sa'd wrote a letter to 'Umar complaining about the moist air, mosquitoes and bees of al-Madā'in. He further told 'Umar that the Arabs have lost their energy, their skin colors have darkened and their arms have lost their strength. Likewise the atmosphere of Takrīt at the northern most end of Tigris was the most unsuitable place for the Arabs and their physical strength was lost.⁴⁹

For that reason, the Arabs had left al-Madā'in and settled at al-Kūfa. Al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra were climatically better suited to the Arabs, but they were caught by certain diseases; the most noteworthy of them was plague. Plague was reported at al-Baṣra and at al-Kūfa too. This plague was probably brought in Iraq by the army of Khālid bin Walīd⁵⁰ from Syria as after the conquests of al-Ḥīra, this army was ordered to move to Syria and then it came back to Iraq. There could be other channels as well as Syria and Iraq were part of the same empire in this period. No other diseases or climatic difficulties were reported at al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra. The Arabs gradually adjusted with the climatic conditions of Iraq.

1.2.12 The Migrants Adjusted easily with the Local Population

The migrants had initially interacted with the locals during the conquest. The first interaction was not very friendly and they met as enemies. Afterward,

⁴⁹Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2482.

⁵⁰Khālid bin Walīd belonged to Makhzūm of Quraysh and was a famous commander. He accepted Islam after the battle of Uhud and led many expeditions of early Islam. He is particularly famous for his services rendered during the *ridda* movement and also led the Muslim forces to fight to the front of Syria and Iraq. For his role in earlier conquests see, S. K. Malik, *Khalid bin Waleed: The General of Islam: A Study in Khalid's Generalship* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1968).

when some peace treaties were formed, misconceptions and mistrust was minimized. The people of those areas which resisted strongly and were defeated were made slaves. This was also not a happy relationship at first but when many of them were freed and were made *mawali*, the relationship turned somewhat affable. These *mawali* became an imperative part of the future polity of the migrants. One of the forms of interaction was the usual stay of the Arabs during their travels in the houses of locals. The local population of Iraq was required to provide feast to their Arab guests for three days.

The locals always remained subservient to the authority of the Arabs. They usually remained neutral in the civil wars of the Arabs. A few of them were appointed as financial agents of the Arab governors and they were responsible for collecting taxes from the rest of the population. The Arabs mainly kept their contact with these tax-collectors. Several of these tax-collectors provided intelligence to the governors but they were rarely asked to fight the Arab rebels of the state. Even when al-Hajjāj was troubled by the Iraqis and most of the fighting force of Iraq joined Ibn Ashtt against al-Hajjāj, he did not ask the military help from the locals, instead an Arab army was called from Syria. But in rare instances their help was taken. For instance, al-Hajjāj hired a force of two thousand locals on contract basis in the year 76 AH. These two thousand joined a thousand Kufans to fight the *khawārij*.⁵¹ Thus the locals were largely kept away from the power structure. They were restrained to their areas and had less interaction with the Arabs. Thus the Arab migrants to Iraq had no major problems of adjustment with the local population.

⁵¹Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 890.

In so far as the *mawali* and slaves are concerned, they became the part of the migrant's society. They affected their polity as well as their customs, culture and learning. The *mawali* were mixed up with the migrant's society. One of the examples is Hasan Başrī whose father and mother were brought as slaves but he emerged as the leading scholar of al-Baṣra. They also began to play some role in the power politics of the migrants. It became evident from their participation in the movement of al-Mukhtār. Slowly *mawali* formed an essential group in the migrant's society. Many of the Arabs relied heavily on the support of their *mawali* who fought along with them and helped them on different stages.

1.2.13 The Tribal Identities were gradually Melted Down and New Identities Emerged

As has been repeatedly asserted that the migrants had come and settled in the form of tribes, and tribal formation played a very significant role in shaping their future polity. However migration transformed the socio-political structure of the migrant's society and tribal structure was not an exception. Migration led to the configuration of new identities of the Iraqi, the Kufan and the Basran Arabs along with already existing tribal identities. This identity was at times transformed into a collective identity of the Iraqi Arabs. Both these identities remained intact and were further strengthened in the Umayyad period.

Apart from these regional identities, there emerged various political and military factions amongst the migrants. The most important such groups were *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*, *khawārij* and *shīān-i-‘Alī*. *Ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* has already been discussed.⁵² The group was politically conscious and eager to maintain its special privileged position throughout the Umayyad period. At first they adopted

⁵²See page no, 41-2.

conciliatory policy towards the government in order to draw benefits for them. Later their descendants led open revolts against the government. At that stage, the government acted harshly against them, crushed their revolts and curtailed their benefits.

Khawārij and *shī'a* had adopted religious symbols to forward their political and economic motives. They were openly rebellious against the government and led various revolts in the Umayyad period. They were dealt strongly by the government and their power almost vanquished at the end of the Umayyad period.

1.2.14 Political Disturbances and Civil Wars in the Garrisons

Soon after, the garrisons at Iraq became the centre of power politics and all ambitious political actors looked towards the Kufans and the Basrans for strengthening their positions. When ‘Ayi’sha had developed differences with Ali, she chose to go to the Basrans for gathering support for her cause. On the other hand, Ali was also not satisfied while living at Medina so he moved to al-Kūfa in order to deal with the rebellion of ‘Ayi’sha. From then onwards, Iraq remained the centre of political activity.

When Ḥusayn disagreed with the decision of Mu‘āwiya to declare Yazīd as the next caliph, he was ensured by the Kufans of their help. He thus moved towards al-Kūfa and fought with the forces of Yazīd there.⁵³ In the same way al-Mukhtār based his ambitious political plan in Iraq. He took benefits from the political weaknesses of the governors selected by the community and got control

⁵³See a detailed discussion in chapter 4.

over al-Kūfa. Afterwards he was removed by Mu‘ṣab bin Zubayr, the governor of ‘Abdullāh bin Zubayr.⁵⁴

Khawārij was another element who constantly rebelled and led the people of Iraq into civil wars. The result of all this political turmoil was that there emerged various factions in Iraq supporting one or the other political group. This further encouraged the groups to revolt frequently against the existing governors again resulting into civil wars. This political warfare was sometimes heightened by tribal warfare as it has happened once in al-Baṣra.⁵⁵ Hence, the migrants remained actively involved in the civil wars and rebellions led and controlled by different political actors.

1.2.15 Increasing State Control

Another significant transformation in the life of the migrants was the increasing state control that they had to put up with at Iraq. Most of them belonged to areas which were stateless in which their only political unit was tribe; a largely independent component. They definitely had to face political domination from some larger tribes or kingdoms of Lakhm and Ghassān. Besides, they were also influenced by the Byzantine or Sassanid rulers occasionally. However most of the migrants had never experienced direct state control.

This state control was unbearable for them and they had adopted various means to get out of this control. In the beginning most of the migrants felt them to be a part of the Arab state but soon they realized that their interests are different from the ruling elite. They manipulated their positions by influencing the political

⁵⁴ See a detailed discussion in chapter 3 and 4.

⁵⁵ See details in chapter 3

decisions. *Ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* was the most important group who tried to influence the political decisions. Initially they demanded the governor to be one of them. When this demand was not accepted anymore, they wanted the governor to be of their choice. They exerted pressure, used force and some manipulative means to ensure their participation in political decisions. Still, *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* dealt the state with patience and adopted a rather conciliatory policy.

The rest of the groups on the other hand were most averse to state control. *Khawārij* revolted openly against the government. They wanted the caliph to be of their choice. Likewise the *shī'a* were also dissatisfied with the state control and wanted someone from the family of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) to be their caliph. They revolted occasionally under the leadership of some of the leading *shī'a* or some member of the family of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). The state dealt strongly with all these elements and made them realize their status as mere citizens of the state.

1.2.16 The Migrants gradually Began to Dislike Military activity and Adopted Luxurious Urban Lifestyle

As has been claimed before that the migrants had at first come as soldiers and all of them were involved in military activity. The conquest did not end up after the settlement of the migrants. Thus they kept on doing their duty as soldiers after their settlement in the migratory place. The initial migrants were followed by a large number of later migrants to join them in their military expeditions. They collected huge spoils of wars and earned enormous wealth from this profession.

With the passage of time, the migrants began to dislike the military activity. Various reasons were responsible for this behavior of them. Iraq was a

fertile land and there were many opportunities for trade, commerce and agriculture. Many of the migrants adopted several such occupations which were more promising and comfortable than military profession. In addition the second and third generation of the migrants was ease-loving as they had left their nomadic and semi-nomadic life and had adopted urban luxurious lifestyle. They had become reluctant to fighting.

Another reason of their dislike of military activity was their relationship with the state. State wanted them to fight on their behalf as regular army servants. The independent minded tribal men could not accept this status, thus they refused to fight without having any share in the power structure.

1.2.17 The Migrants Earned Huge Wealth in the Migratory Place

The migratory place Iraq was a rich fertile land. The migrants had entered as conquerors and had earned huge spoils of war in the early stages of migration. They kept on conquering the areas after their settlement, thus kept on collecting spoils of war. This remarkably enhanced their economic status and within a decade, most of the migrant Arabs turned out to be the richest men of Arabia.

Apart from the military activity, there emerged several other sources of revenue generation for the migrants. Several of them were involved in smaller businesses in the garrisons. They opened baths, markets and dug canals to improve the agricultural output. All of this economic activity helped in developing the urban lifestyle in the garrisons but it primarily improved the economic status of the migrants. They earned huge wealth from this economic activity.

1.2.18 The Social and Political Decisions of the Migrants were mostly Controlled by Economic Motives

As is obvious, the migrants were mostly consisted of those people who were innovative and wanted to improve their economic status, thus after gaining the profit of conquests, they were very particular about securing them. In order to retain the benefits for their later generations, they engaged them in various power moves. This factor was very significant for the Arab migrants to Iraq and determined the course of their political and social activity.

Even if the migrants had developed ideological and political affiliations with several groups yet most of their decisions were motivated by the economic motives. Many of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had their tilt towards Ali and they wrote letters to Ḥusayn to come and join them. Nonetheless it was one of the descendent of the leading *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* who was forced to fight against Ḥusayn. ‘Umar bin Sa‘d bin Abī Waqqāṣ⁵⁶ told Ḥusayn about the danger of the loss of his house and property if he will not fight Ḥusayn.⁵⁷

Most of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* decided to be apparently loyal to the authorities for securing their financial benefits. They handed over their rebels to the authorities and fought against *khawārij* to secure their spoils. *Khawārij* used to collect revenue from the conquered areas which were considered to be the right of the migrants specially the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. The various revolts of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were also meant to secure their political and economic interests

⁵⁶He was the son of Sa‘d bin Abī Waqqāṣ. He remained governor of al-Ray for Ibn Ziyād and fought the forces of Ḥusayn on the order of Ibn Ziyād. Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 334.

⁵⁷Ibid., 314.

The *khawārij* and some of the other smaller groups rebelled as they believed that the conquered areas and its revenue was their belonging. They never wanted the state to share their economic benefits. Thus most of the social and political decisions of the migrants were motivated by economic factors.

Hence, the Arab migration to Iraq can be understood by keeping the above dynamics in view. The factors which led to migration were mostly related to economic gains, yet aspiration for political control was also part of it. Certain similarities can be created of the Arab migration to Iraq with modern migrations on the basis of its motives. The impact of migration however had its own dynamics. The Arabs had lesser contact with the locals thus had largely maintained their own cultural system and had borrowed very little. The most significant changes that came in the life of the migrants were largely due to the factors associated with their own group. The factor of conquests of new areas and the huge revenue generating from these areas definitely had a great impact on their polity. Yet their political life, the emergence of new identities and the civil wars and revolts for gaining political control were issues mainly created by the migrants themselves. Before the study proceeds to look into the details of the impact of migration, it is pertinent to find out the minutiae of the motives to migrate of the migrants and the state.

Chapter 2

Motives of the Arab Migration and Composition of the Migrants

Before the enquiry begins to measure the change in the socio-economic structure of the migrants, it is significant to find out the motives behind the migration. It is hard to determine the motives of individual migrants but the collective motives of the migrant society can easily be analyzed. These motives had shaped the future policies of the migrants.

State had played an imperative role in furthering and finalizing the Arab migration to Iraq. The state had comprehended the need to stay at Iraq first in the form of temporary garrisons but finally as permanent residence. Migration was a corresponding process of the conquest and the state took decisions about migration along with the changing nature of the conquest. The Arab state was basically motivated for initiating this migration due to military and strategic reasons. Besides, the state was visualizing certain social and economic benefits attached with the process of migration.

The Arab tribes on the other hand were not at first enthusiastic to either join the eastern front or to settle themselves there. Only a few tribes had some earlier interaction with the Iraqi region, and thus they knew the importance and fertility of the area. The composition of different tribal groups amongst the migrants determined the level of their interest in migration. Apart from the economic factor which was the foremost motive behind the migration, there were certain other social and political motives. Some of the tribes migrated in larger number because of their earlier interaction with Iraq and the presence of their

tribal fellows in Iraqi cities. The rest moved due to their nomadic character which made it easier for them to move and settle in a new place. Yet others, specially some Yamanī tribes realized the dominance of Muḍar specially Quraysh in Arabia and found no place for them thus they find it better to stay at Iraqi garrisons which were not only resourceful but were also emerging strong centers of power. There was a huge wave of later migration followed by the initial military migrants. These later migrants had come to know the immense economic benefits that their fellow countrymen were enjoying at the new place. This motivated them to migrate to Iraq in larger numbers.

2.1 Motives of the State

The Arab state at first was not interested to expand itself especially towards the eastern side. The Prophet (PBUH) in his lifetime had sent certain expeditions towards north. His attention was primarily drawn towards north because of the trade links of Quraysh with Syria. After the Prophet (PBUH) had migrated to Medina, he tried to cut off all trade routes of Quraysh from Medina to Syria. Several treaties were formed with the tribes settled at north and several raids were made against Quraysh in that direction.¹ The incident of the murder of a delegate of the Prophet at Balqā² further provoked him to continue with his northern expeditions, this time particularly against Syria.³ Thus, an obvious interest could be seen on the northern front. The Prophet (PBUH) on the other

¹For instance the Prophet (PBUH) had made a pact with a northern tribe of Juhayna who lived in al-Ays, near Yanbū'. Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 2, 7.

²Balqā is located in southeast of the Dead Sea in modern day Jordan.

³Hārith bin 'Umayr al-Azadī was nominated as a delegate of the Prophet (PBUH) to take his letter to the Roman King. He was killed by the Ghassānī governor of the Romans at Mu'ta'. Wāqidī, *Kitāb-ul-Futūh*, vol. 2, 755. (Beirut: Alam-ul-Kitab, n.d.), 755.

hand was also not unaware of the importance of the eastern front. He wrote letters to the Persian King and invited him to accept Islam, yet he had not started any practical campaign against them.

The successor of the Prophet (PBUH) Abū Bakr, continuing with his policy was also particular about sending the troops towards Syria and the Iraqi front remained unnoticed. After the successful completion of the *ridda* wars, Abū Bakr was informed of the activities of Muthanna bin Ḥāritha al-Shaybānī⁴ on the Iraqi border. Muthanna had commenced certain raids in the Iraqi territory which were probably the routine raids of border tribes in the absence of any obstacles. The positive aspect which caught the attention of Abū Bakr was that Muthanna had already accepted Islam⁵ hence there was a possibility to regularize his activity under the command of the Arab state. Muthanna was called by Abū Bakr and inquired. Muthanna requested Abū Bakr to officially declare him as the leader on his people and to allow him to fight against the people of Fars.⁶ He must have informed Abū Bakr about the bright prospects of these raids and would have briefed him completely about the situation there. Abū Bakr seems to be convinced and both felt comfortable in making a deal. Muthanna had to acknowledge the authority of the state and Abū Bakr had to provide legitimacy to Muthanna. Muthanna will get the backing and support of the state and the Arab state will get

⁴Muthanna belonged to Sa‘d bin Mūrra bin Dhūhal bin Sinān branch of Shaybān. He died before fighting Qādisiyya. Ibn Ḥajar, *Isāba*, vol. 3, 34; Other details about him are added into the text.

⁵Muthanna had not only accepted Islam but also fought *ridda* wars along with Khālid. Muthanna was actively involved in the *ridda* wars and Ṭabarī reports his involvement in the *ridda* wars. He relates that Ila bin al-Harami from Bahrain ordered Muthanna to keep a check on the defeated fleeing army of the rebels of Rabī‘a. Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 1971.

⁶Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 242.

control over these raids without losing anything. It was a happy alliance serving the interests of both parties. Abū Bakr appointed him leader over his people and extended him the authority to fight the people of Fars, but he also nominated Khālid bin Walīd⁷ to lead this campaign and ordered Muthanna to obey Khālid.⁸ From then onwards, Muthanna, always remained second in command to the Qurayshi leader on the Iraqi front. This happened probably because the state aspired to exert a strong control on all conquest moves and a Qurayshi was more appropriate choice for the caliph as compared to a nomad of Bakr bin Wā'il. Kūfī adds that Khālid was only sent when the Persians had outnumbered the forces of Muthanna and the forces of Shaybān were in trouble on that front.⁹ If we accept the tradition of Kūfī, this further confirms the intentions of Abū Bakr. He was not interested to personally indulge on the front of Iraq and was comfortable to depute a border tribe and its forces to fight there. Finally when Khālid had completed his task at Yamāma and his forces were free, it was a good option to reinforce Muthanna and to secure whatever he had already captured.¹⁰

The Arab state was still not much clear about its objectives. Donner argues that Khālid had only sought to subdue the western border areas of Iraq and it was the extension of the *ridda* wars in which all major tribes and areas of Arabia and

⁷For Khālid, see chapter 1, note, 50.

⁸Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 242.

⁹Kūfī, *Futūh*, vol. 1, 74-5.

¹⁰According to Shoufani, the wars of *ridda* and the Arab conquest movements are the one and the same operation. Elias S. Shoufani. *Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972). 147.

around Arabia were subdued.¹¹ Thus after the conquest of al-Hīra, the Arabs were not much interested in moving onwards. Khālid was ordered to move to the Syrian front and the Iraqi front was considered closed.¹² But on the other hand, the Persians were completely disturbed by this activity of the Arabs. They had taken serious notice of the raids and capturing of different areas of Persian empire, which the Arabs were not expecting. When the Persians planned to give response to the Arabs and started their preparations, it panicked Muthanna who was stationed at al-Hīra. He straight away moved to Medina to seek reinforcements.¹³

By that time Abū Bakr had died (in 13 AH) and ‘Umar had to take this major decision about this important front. He decided to secure this front and was ready to support Muthanna by all means. He sent a huge army under the command of Abū ‘Ubayd bin Mas‘ūd of Thaqīf¹⁴ for the support of Muthanna. After some smaller skirmishes with the locals, Arabs went forward to fight *Jisr*¹⁵ which proved to be a disaster for them. This army had encountered the Persian royal

¹¹Donner also argued that Abū Bakr showed his interest by sending Khālid bin Walīd to Iraq, only to consolidate the conquests of the Arab tribes. It was a continuation of the *ridda* wars. Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 177.

¹²Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 2, 407-8; Shaban argues that the raids at Iraq were of no military importance however it had material advantage. Thus, when there was an emergency at Syrian front, Abū Bakr decided to sent Khālid to Syria. He interestingly argues the independent nature of Khālid who rarely asked permission from the caliph. Shaban. *Islamic History: A. D. 610-750 (A.H. 132)*, 24-6.

¹³Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2120; Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 2, 415.

¹⁴Abū ‘Ubayd bin Mas‘ūd belonged to Thaqīf which is a famous tribe of northern Arabia. He was an earlier convert and had migrated with the Prophet (PBUH) from Makkah to Madina. Balādhurī, *Ansāb-ul-Ashrāf*, vol. 6, 375-6.

¹⁵*Jisr* is an Arabic word which means ‘the bridge’. The battle was named as *Jisr* as the Arabs had crossed the river to fight this battle and the bridge was cut off when they tried to retreat. The battle was fought in 13 AH. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2175-8.

army for the first time. Persians had brought many elephants in this battle and Arabs were unable to fight them, they were killed and many were drowned.¹⁶

The battle of *Jisr* made Arabs more cautious. The Arab state responded promptly and revised its policies; subsequently a lot of new people were recruited. A helping force was sent under the command of Jarīr bin ‘Abdullah al-Bajalī.¹⁷ ‘Umar himself wanted to go to the Iraqi front but refrained on the advice of some companions.¹⁸ The force of Bajīla was followed by a larger and much well-prepared army under the command of Sa‘d bin Abī Waqqāṣ. This army was consisted of soldiers comprised of many tribes.¹⁹ This army won the battle of *Qādisiyya*²⁰ and conquered al-Madā'in, the capital of the Sassanid. It in addition pursued the Persian army to Ḥulwān,²¹ Jalūlā,²² and Takrīt²³ but ‘Umar was alarmed once again. He never thought of going into that much strategic depth in

¹⁶Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 252-3; Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 2, 438-40.

¹⁷Jarīr bin ‘Abdullah al-Bajalī belonged to Bajīla, fought the battle of *Qādisiyya* and later settled at al-Kūfa. His descendants played an important role in future politics of al-Kūfa. Ibn Sa‘d, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 6, 23-4.

¹⁸Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2214.

¹⁹Ibid., 2217-21.

²⁰Al-Qādisiyya is situated between the moat-canal and al-Atīq. In the area to the left of it there is dark water and a green valley. It further extends towards Al-Ḥīra. To the left of al-Al-Qādisiyya is al-Walāja. Ibn Yāqūt, *Ma‘ujam-ul-Buldān*, vol. 4, 291; Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2229-30; For a very detailed account of the Battle of *Qādisiyya*, see, Muhammad Aḥmad Bāshamīl, *Al-Qādisiyya wa Ma‘rak-ul-‘Irāq* (Cairo: Maktaba dar-ul-Turath, 1303 hijri).

²¹Ḥulwān was a town of Jibal province of Iran close to Diyāla river. It lies in the mountainous region of Persia after crossing the Mesopotamians plain. Ibn Yāqūt, *Ma‘ujam-ul-Buldān*, vol. 2, 290; Le Strange, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, 191.

²²Jalūlā was a town lying on the Khūrāsān road. Ibn Yāqūt, *Ma‘ujam-ul-Buldān*, vol. 2, 156; Le Strange, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, 62.

²³Takrīt was also a town lying thirty miles north of Samarra on the west bank of Tigris. Ibn Yāqūt, *Ma‘ujam-ul-Buldān*, vol. 2, 38; Le Strange, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, 57.

Iraq thus he ordered the forces to stop any further conquest and to settle somewhere. It was decided to settle at al-Madā'in.²⁴

The state at that moment was represented by the caliph ‘Umar and his commander on the Iraqi front, Sa‘d bin Abī Waqqāṣ²⁵. Both decided to settle their forces at al-Madā'in. The Arab forces had previously settled at al-Ḥīra but this was a border area between Arabia and Iraq and earlier was ruled by an Arab dynasty; thus settlement at al-Ḥīra was not a major policy shift. Moreover, al-Ḥīra was largely occupied by the border tribe of Shaybān who used to live around al-Ḥīra even before the conquest. However, the decision to settle at al-Madā'in was a major policy shift. ‘Umar and Sa‘d both knew the earlier problems on the Iraqi front when the forces of Khālid had left for Syria which made all conquered areas including al-Ḥīra as vulnerable to attacks by the Persians. They never wanted to repeat the mistake. Arabs remained in al-Madā'in until they completed the subjugation of all important areas where the Persians went. This took two years after which the caliph ‘Umar ordered them to stop any further invasions. ‘Umar was not in a mood to make any additional conquest and was reported to utter the words, “I wish there were between us and the people of Fars a mountain of fire through which they cannot reach us, nor we them”,²⁶ still he knew that he must make some effort to retain whatever has been taken. Accordingly the Arabs were

²⁴Ibn Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, vol. 2, 514.

²⁵For Sa‘d bin Abī Waqqāṣ, see chapter 1, note, 47.

²⁶Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2545; For quotation see Ṭabarī, *The History of al-Ṭabarī: The Conquest of Iraq, Southwestern Persia, and Egypt*, vol. xiii (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 126.

not called back this time after the completion of major conquest; instead they were advised to stay in Iraq.

Arabs were not comfortable at al-Madā'in, thus they were instructed by 'Umar to choose a suitable place for them in Iraq. 'Umar suggested that there should not be a sea between Arabia and the new place and that the Arabs should be settled at a place whose environment suits them. They therefore moved to al-Kūfa from al-Madā'in. Al-Kūfa was closer to al-Anbār,²⁷ al-Hīra, and al-Madā'in. These were the places where many Arabs had settled and many Arab kings had flourished.²⁸

It appears that both the options were kept open by 'Umar. He desired to find a suitable place where Arabs could live a better life; and he was also willing to settle them for a longer period, still he was not fearless from the option of Sassanid attacking back the Arabs. Only in this perspective, he would have advised the commander not to keep any sea (it is most probably an instruction about river as there was river Euphrates around and in the conquest of *Qādisiyya* there was no question of sea as sea was very far away) between Arabia and the place of settlement of migrants so that if ever required, the retreat of the Arabs should be easy.²⁹

²⁷Al-Anbar was one of the great cities of Iraq, and was called by the Persians as Firūz Sabūr by the name of its founder King Shāhpūr. The town was used as granary and the Persians used to store wheat and other food items for their troops in this city. Ibn Yāqūt, *Ma'ujam-ul-Buldān*, vol. 4, 161; Le Strange, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, 65-6.

²⁸Abū 'Abdūllah Aḥmad bin Muḥammad bin Ishāq Ḥamadānī Ibn al-Faqīh, *Kitāb-ul-Futūh*, ed., Yūsaf al-Hādi (Beirut: Alam-ul-Kutb, 1996), 248.

²⁹Also see Marshall Hodgson who keeps a similar view, Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 2, 208.

Even by then 'Umar probably had never thought of a permanent settlement at Iraq. He was perhaps thinking of temporary garrisons which may be called back once the conquest is consolidated. In al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra, 'Umar had ordered the soldiers to build houses of Bamboos and to build temporary residents.³⁰

Settlement at al-Baṣra was also decided by the state as 'Umar had sent the forces towards the southern front. It looks as it was initially planned as a temporary garrison and the decision to make it permanent was made much later. The contradictory tradition about the date of the establishment of al-Baṣra supports this argument. There is a group of historian who argue al-Baṣra to be founded in 14 A.H.³¹ On the other hand some historians claim that al-Baṣra was founded in 16 or 17 AH.³² Both traditions are stronger and depict a contradictory picture however the tradition of Madā'ini are usually considered more reliable as compared to Saīf, therefore it can be fairly assumed that al-Baṣra would have been founded in 14 AH. This argument has further been supported by Balādhurī,

³⁰Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2487-8.

³¹According to Tabarī, al-Baṣra was constructed in 14 hijri, the same year when battle of *Qādisiyya* was fought. It is stated by Tabarī on the report of Madā'ini that 'Umar sent Utba bin Ghazwān to put a check on the people of Fars and don't let them help the forces at al-Madā'in. He ordered him to stay there. Balādhurī reported the tradition closer to it and stated that Suwaīd bin Qaṭba Al-Dhūhalī was making raids on the lower side of Iraq where later Basra was found. When 'Umar came to know of his raids, he thought it proper to send his own agent there. Therefore Utba bin Ghazwān of the tribe of Mazan was sent there and Suwaīd came under his leadership. The instructions Utba was provided by 'Umar were to keep a check on the people of Ahwaz, Fars and Maysān so that they could not help the Persians against the Muslims on the Kufan front. Khalīfa bin Khayāt agrees that Basra was founded by Utba bin Ghazwān in 14 AH and Al-Qādisiyya was fought in 15 AH. Ibn Athīr also believes that Utba was sent to al-Baṣra in 14 AH. Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 341-2; Khalīfa bin Khayāt, *Tārīkh*, 128, 132; Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 2, 485.

³²Tabarī related on the report of Saīf that Muslims settled at al-Baṣra in 17 AH. Ibn Sa'd supports this point and reports that Utba fought Qādisiyya with Sa'd. Then 'Umar wrote and ordered him to send Utba towards the land of Hind. Utba moved from al-Kūfa with 800 men and went to al-Baṣra. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2486; Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqāt*, 25-26.

Khalīfa bin Khayāt and Ibn Athīr. Yet on the other hand, the report of Saīf and Ibn Sa‘d cannot be rejected completely. Thus this contradiction in fact provides ground for asserting that al-Baṣra was established in 14 AH as a temporary garrison. Then after the conquest of *Qādisiyya*, there arose a need to place rather long-term garrison at al-Baṣra in order to secure the areas of the northern Iraq. Gradually when the Persians kept on gathering forces against the Arabs and the Basran forces were required occasionally, the state decided to have a rather permanent garrison at al-Baṣra in 16 or 17 A.H.³³

As it has already been stated ‘Umar ordered the Arabs forces not to follow the Persians after the battle of Jalūlā³⁴ but when the Persians kept on troubling the Arabs and fought different battles with them leading to the battle of Nihāwand,³⁵ ‘Umar concluded that the Arab army must destroy the royal forces of the Sassanid and must kill their king in order to live peacefully.³⁶ Hence the Arabs were constantly involved in warfare after they had settled at Iraq. Similarly in the conquest of Nihāwand, ‘Umar had no other option than to use the forces of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra. He wrote to the Kufans that two-third of their members should

³³Donner has put a different argument and he believes that ‘Umar deliberately established al-Kūfa in order to form a settlement for the bedouin tribes of Sa‘d’s army. Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 227.

³⁴Jalūlā was fought immediately after *Qadissiya*. See details in Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 264-5.

³⁵The battle of Nihāwand was fought between the Arabs and the Persians in 21AH. See details, Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2596-637.

³⁶Ibid., 2634.

go for war and one third should stay at al-Kūfa for its protection. 'Umar had also sent a party from al-Baṣra.³⁷

After the conquest of Nihāwand, a wave of battles with the Persians began. Abū Mūsa al-Ash'arī joined the battle of Nihāwand, and then on his return conquered Al-Dīnūr, Māsbadhān and Mehr-i-Jānqadhaf.³⁸ On the conquest of Māh-Dīnār, Basrans fought and Kufans helped them.³⁹ In the same way Hamadān was conquered probably by Jarīr bin 'Abdullah or by someone else from al-Kūfa.⁴⁰ Qum, Qāshān and Isbāhan were conquered by Abū Mūsa al-Ash'arī⁴¹ from al-Baṣra.⁴² Continuing with the same tradition, 'Umar wrote to 'Ammār bin Yāsir⁴³ and ordered him to send eight thousand soldiers towards al-Ray and it was conquered by the Kufans.⁴⁴ In the battle of Ahwāz, 'Umar wrote Abū Mūsa to convince or prompt the Arabs to go for a battle and consequently, ten thousand people were gathered from al-Baṣra for the battle.⁴⁵ The later conquest of Qazwīn

³⁷ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 300; see details of Nihāwand in Al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh-i-Islam*, vol. 3, 664-8.

³⁸ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 304-5.

³⁹ Khalīfa bin Khayāt Al-Shaybānī, *Tārīkh*, ed., Akram Zia al-Umari (Damascus: Dar-ul-Qalam, 1397), 151.

⁴⁰ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 306-8.

⁴¹ He was the one of the important leaders who joined the battle of Qādisiyya and later also became the governor of al-Kūfa. Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 6, 16.

⁴² Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 308-11.

⁴³ Ammār bin Yāsir was an earlier companion of the Prophet (PBUI). Later he supported Ali in the battle of *Jamal* and *Saffīn*. Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 6, 14.

⁴⁴ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 313-6.

⁴⁵ Kūfī, *Futūh*, 267, 268,

and Zanjān were also regularized from al-Kūfa.⁴⁶ Likewise Adharbījān was repeatedly conquered by the Kufans.⁴⁷

Thus it can be determined that after Nihāwand, the Kufans and the Basrans were constantly engaged in onward warfare which slowly convinced the state of the need of a permanent garrison. They had gradually conquered so huge an empire and it was not possible now to call the forces of al-Kūfa and al-Basra back to Arabia. Instead the state realized the need to establish additional garrisons at Iran. At this stage, the state policy was clear and obvious. They sought after permanent settlements at Iraq and gave special importance to the governors of this area. Even 'Umar loved to call the Kufans as the Ras-ul-Arab (head of Arabs) and valued this place.⁴⁸

In the period of 'Uthmān, the migration was further consolidated by his decision to exchange lands of Arabia with lands at Iraq or vice-versa. At this decision, the migrants finally decided their fates. Those who required staying at Iraq bought the lands of those who had chosen to stay at Arabia. Ṭalḥa bin 'Ubaydulla⁴⁹ who was a very rich person bought the lands of 'Uthmān, the caliph

⁴⁶Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 318-321.

⁴⁷Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 321-6; Al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh-i-Islam*, vol. 3, 169-241.

⁴⁸Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqāt*, vol, 6, 3.

⁴⁹Talḥa bin 'Ubaydulla was the famous companion of the Prophet (PDUH).

at Iraq. In the same way Marwān⁵⁰ bought the lands of *nehr-Marwān* which was a forest at that time.⁵¹

Another factor which affected and finalized the decision of the state to permanently settle their troops at Iraq was its economic output. Iraq was a fertile land and had generated rich spoils of war. It was expected that Iraq will provide great income to the state. Motivation for conquest was also drawn from better means of earning and Muthanna himself had put in the picture the Arabs of the fact that half of Sawād, a very fertile land, has already been taken.⁵² Khālid motivated the Arabs to attack the Persians by comparing Arabia with Iraq. He tried to draw the attention of the Arabs to the heaps of food scattered in Iraq. He in addition advised them to fight for green areas of Iraq and to leave the drought and hunger of Arabia for those who are not willing to fight.⁵³ This motivation was also reminded to Arabs by 'Umar,⁵⁴ who proposed to Azd⁵⁵ and Kināna⁵⁶ to go to the Iraqi front instead of Syria as he believed that Iraq has controlled all routes of trade and economy.⁵⁷ 'Umar again informed Bajīla⁵⁸ that Iraq has taken control

⁵⁰ Marwān bin al-Ḥakm was the cousin of 'Uthmān and Mu'āwiya. He was chosen as the Umayyad caliph after the death of Mu'āwiya II. Balādhurī, *Ansāb-ul-Ashrāf*, vol. 6, 255

⁵¹ Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2854-55.

⁵² Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 2, 432-3.

⁵³ Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2031.

⁵⁴ Tabarī, *Tārīkh* vol 1, 2160.

⁵⁵ Azd was a southern tribe of Arabia and belonged to migrated Kahlān tribes.

⁵⁶ Kināna was also a southern tribe and belonged to Quḍā'a.

⁵⁷ Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2187-8.

⁵⁸ Bajīla was another southern tribe and belonged to settled Kahlān tribes.

over economy thus they must go towards Iraq. He further added that Allah will give them share in that growing economy and they will get proper means of earning.⁵⁹ ‘Umar and other important members of the state had understood the economic importance of the fertile land of Iraq. Besides when Iraq was conquered; the state recognized the excess amount of revenue that Iraq could generate. ‘Umar was the first person who made the measurements of Sawād. He imposed *kharaj* on those lands which were conquered and *jizya* on *ahl-dhimma*⁶⁰. On rich forty eight dirhams, on mediocre, twenty four dirhams and on poor twelve dirhams per year *jizya* was made obligatory. The *kharaj* of the lands in Sawād and al-Jabal reached at the maximum level of two crore, and ten lacs.⁶¹ ‘Umar decided that the lands of Sawād will not be distributed so that its taxes should be left for the next generations. This was probably the reason of the resoluteness of ‘Umar to secure the Iraqi front after the defeat of *Jisr*. This also helped the state in taking the final decision about keeping permanent garrisons at Iraq.

Therefore this huge amount of revenue finally convinced the state of the benefits of retaining the conquered areas of Iraq. Hence they decided to keep their troops at Iraq for a very longer period. This economic benefit was also attractive

⁵⁹Tabarī, *Tārīkh* vol 1, 2186; Certain tradition attributed to the Holy Prophet (PBUH) in which he emphasized the importance of migration were also said to be propagated in order to motivate the tribes to migrate. Khalil Athamana argues that the status of *muhājir* was always considered higher than those who never migrated. Thus migrating towards garrisons provided opportunity to many nomadic tribes to change their status from *a'rāb* to *muhājir*. See, Khalil Athamana “A'rāb and Muhājirūn in the Environment of Amsar”, 9.

⁶⁰The word was used for all those locals with whom the Arabs had made peace treaty and who have accepted the dominance of Arabs.

⁶¹Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 3, 206; see a detailed discussion on *kharaj* extracted from Sawād and taxes levied on it in different periods in Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 268-74.

for the migrants themselves. On receiving the huge amount of stipends, share in spoils of wars and other financial benefits, the migrants were willing to stay at Iraq for a very long time or perhaps decided to live there on permanent basis.

2.2 Motives of the Migrants and their Composition at Iraq

Even if all of the migrants been discussed here were ethnically Arabs, who shared some common religious and cultural characteristics; there were many differences as well amongst them. The migrants belonged to different tribal groups, different social and economic backgrounds and had different outlooks on life. The motives of the migrants thus can only be examined by keeping the huge variety of people in mind. It was not possible to analyze the motives of each and every individual separately; therefore a much larger unit of tribe has been chosen which will not only trace the variety of motives but will also help in exposing the composition of the tribes at the migratory place.

In order to derive the motives of migration of each tribe, the tribal composition of al-Kūfa has been drawn out through a study of the 6th volume of *Tabaqāt-ul-Kubra* of Ibn Sa‘d which provides the biographies of the Kufans.⁶² Ibn Sa‘d has divided his study into various *tabaqāt*. *tabaqāt* literally means ‘layers’ and Ibn Sa‘d has ordered his *tabaqāt* by the categories of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH), and different *tabaqāt* of *tābe‘īn* starting from first *tabaqā* to ninth *tabaqā*. The companions of the Prophet (PBUH) obviously reported traditions from the Prophet. The first *tabaqā* related traditions from Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān or Ali, and the second *tabaqā* belongs to the *tābe‘īn* who

⁶²Ibn Sa‘d, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 6.

narrated traditions from Ibn ‘Abbās and ‘Abdullah bin ‘Umar etc. The third *tabaqā* of *tābe ‘īn* were those who reported traditions from some scholars of al-Kūfa. Likewise the fourth and fifth *tabaqā* of *tābe ‘īn* belongs to those who relied on later scholars of al-Kūfa as their source. This explains that there was difference of time between first, second, third, fourth and fifth *tabaqā* which can further establish the fact that the companions of the Prophet (PBUH) and first *tabaqā* of *tābe ‘īn* were mostly the initial settlers at al-Kūfa. Most of them had also participated in the battle of *Qādisiyya*. In the same manner, the *tābe ‘īn* of second and third *tabaqā* were either the descendants of the earlier settlers or some of them were the new settlers. Similarly, the *tābe ‘īn* of fourth and fifth *tabaqā* would mostly be the descendants of the *tābe ‘īn* of second and third *tabaqā* and there is very less chance of any new migration in this period. This study will take the unit of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH) and of first *tabaqā* as initial settlers. The idea is to analyze the composition of tribes in the initial period and then to judge the change that came in the second, third, fourth and fifth *tabaqā* in the tribal composition of al-Kūfa which will be treated as later period. The change, increase or decrease in the composition of tribes will help in analyzing their motives to migrate and their adjustment in the new environment. The later *tabaqāt* have not been studied as they mention the biographies of the people who lived in the Abbasid era which is not the scope of this study.

The methodology adopted for this study is to gather the *nasb* of each individual and then to count the numbers of individuals of each tribe in each *tabaqā*. The method has some flaws as it has generalized the information of some selected biographies. Still, it was a fine method to get an idea of the rough

composition of tribes at al-Kūfa. Besides, this study of Ibn Sa'd has been supported by the narratives of the Muslim history in order to draw a balanced conclusion.

An Arab tribe has certain common features which distinguishes it from the other tribes. Most of the tribes shared common territory and common economic and political status. Even the tribes who had settled apart had some common features, relationships and links with the remaining members of the tribe. The example is that of Kinda whose sub-tribe had settled at Dūmat-ul-Jandal and some of them kept living at Yaman. They maintained a common identity. Some of the tribes who had settled apart from each other and developed their separate identities will be dealt separately in this study. For instance Aws and Khizrij of Madina and Azd of Oman will be taken as separate tribes, although ethnically all of them belonged to Azd.

Ibn Sa'd has also devoted one volume of his research on the biographies of Basrans.⁶³ This volume has not been studied in detail. It has already been examined in a research of similar kind by Donner. Within the study, the conclusions of Donner will be repeated and analyzed to take a view of the situation of al-Baṣra, yet this study will largely formulate its conclusions on the basis of composition of tribes at al-Kūfa.

Before moving to the discussion of the analysis of the motives of each tribe separately, it is better to have an integrated look at the initial stages of the

⁶³Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 7.

movement. The tribes who moved at first to the Iraqi front and fought must be seen and analyzed carefully before moving to their composition at al-Kūfa.

The Iraqi front was opened by Shaybān, a sub-tribe of Bakr bin Wā'il.⁶⁴ The conquest of Iraq started with the personal initiative of Muthanna of Banu Shaybān at the northern front of Iraq. One of the reasons for the acute interest of Bakr bin Wā'il in the conquest and subsequently in the settlement at Iraq was their nomadic behavior and their constant habit to be engaged in raids and battles in the pre-Islamic times. They fought battles mainly against Tamīm,⁶⁵ but also against certain other tribes like Tagħlib,⁶⁶ and Ɗabba.⁶⁷ Shaybān had also followed the practice of raiding certain tribes.⁶⁸ Certain tribes raided Shaybān as well but they were defeated, for instance Sūlaym and Tay'⁶⁹ raided Shaybān but they

⁶⁴See chapter 1, note 8.

⁶⁵Tamīm is a northern tribe of Muḍar. Ibn Athīr has related many incidents of battles between the two but unfortunately he has not provided the chronology. In one of the instances, Shaybān gathered their men and raided the land of Tamīm and attacked on Tha'labā bin Yarbū', Tha'labā bin Sa'd bin Ɗabba, Tha'labā bin Adi bin Fazara, and Tha'labā bin Sa'd bin Zubayr. Shaybān killed them and looted their property. Tamīm gathered their forces and attacked Shaybān in return, killed many and took their spoils back. Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol.1, 598; There was again a series of battle reported between Tamīm and Shaybān. Ibid., 602-6, 610, 637.

⁶⁶Tagħlib is the other important branch of Rabī'a from which Bakr bin Wā'il also belonged. Tagħlib and Bakr fought for the first time in very older times. The reason was the murder of Kulib of Tagħlib by Jusas of Murrah bin Shaybān. Tagħlib won and many of the Bakr were killed in this battle. Ibid., 523-32; Another battle was reported in the time of the emergence of Islam. Muthanna bin Ḥāritha raided Tagħlib who lived near Euphrates. He remained successful, killed many of them and looted spoils. Ibid., 647. Ḥabarī explains that Muthanna raided Tagħlib during his campaigns towards Iraq and the reason was the acute shortage of supplies to his army. Ḥabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2062.

⁶⁷Daħħba is another northern tribe of Muḍar. Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 1, 613.

⁶⁸Ibid., 598, 612-3, 647.

⁶⁹Sūlaym was a northern tribe of Muḍar while Tay' was a migrated Kahlān tribe of southern Arabia.

themselves were defeated.⁷⁰ In most of these *Ayyām*, Shaybān remained successful. Due to their habit of raiding, they also particularly raided certain tribes living at Iraq,⁷¹ hence it can be concluded that they were already willing to fight against Persians.⁷²

Another factor which had crystallized the willingness of Shaybān to fight against Persians was the battle of *Dhi-Qār*. Shaybān was the participant in the battle of *Dhi-Qār* which was fought by the Arabs against the Persians.⁷³ The reason was the revolt of Na‘mān bin al-Mandhar, the last ruler of al-Hīra against his patron, the Sassanid King. When Na‘mān set off to fight Kisra (the Persian king), he took the members of Shaybān along. Hanī bin Mas‘ūd was the leader of Shaybān who was warned by Kisra not to follow Na‘mān but he and many others from Bakr bin Wā'il had participated in this battle. In this battle Persians were defeated and Bakr bin Wā'il was successful.⁷⁴ Donner pointed out that the

⁷⁰Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. I, 608-9.

⁷¹For instance Shaybān raided tribe of Zubayd who lived in the territory of Persia. Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol.1, 612-3.

⁷²See more about the *Ayyām* of the Arabs in Sa‘d Zahgol Abdul Hamid, *Fi-Tārīkh-ul-Arab Qibl-ul-Islam* (Beirut: Dar-un-Nahzat-ul-ARabi‘a, 1976), 311, 321.

⁷³According to Mas‘ūdī, *Harūb zī-qār* started at the birth of the Prophet (PBUH) in which Bakr bin Wā'il fought against the Persians and continued till forty years. Mas‘ūdī, *Marij*, vol.1, 306-7; Morony stated that Bakr bin Wā'il defeated Sasanids in 604 AD. Morony, Iraq after the Muslim Conquests, 220; Donner argued that Bakr bin Wā'il defeated Persians in 611 AD. Fred M. Donner, “The Bakr bin Wā'il Tribes and Politics in Northeastern Arabia”, *Studia Islamica* 51, (1980): 6. It seems that these wars continued for a longer period and there were series of battles in this war.

⁷⁴The reason of the revolt of Na‘mān was that Kisra asked Na‘mān to bring his sister as he was told that the sister of Na‘mān is the most beautiful women of the Arabs. Na‘mān was enraged over this and took an army to fight the Persians. See detail in Mas‘ūdī, *Marij*, vol.2, 76-8; Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol.1, 482,488-90; Kister argues that the dynasty of Iakhm was abolished because it could not be trusted. They failed to prevent the Arab tribes to raid on Persian territories and probably Na‘mān had planned a new policy of supporting and backing the Arab tribes due to

rebellious chiefs of Bakr bin Wā'il had defeated a Persian army at the battle of *Dhi-Qār*. He argued that these tribes had already developed their grievances against the Sassanid and when the Muslim armies were fighting the *ridda* wars, these tribes were eager to attack Persia.⁷⁵ Muthanna in fact wanted to attack Iraq to kill the people of Iraq whom he believed to be his enemies.⁷⁶ Muthanna had participated in the *ridda* wars and fought on the side of Muslims.⁷⁷ After the completion of this task, he reverted back to his old enemies.

However the ultimate motives and the desire to settle at Iraq had not emerged only because they had developed enmity against the Persians. Before the battle of *Dhi-Qār*, Shyaban, like many other tribes of Tamīm and Rabī'a was also keeping good relations with the Persians. Qays bin Mas'ūd Al-Shaybānī, one of the chiefs of Shaybān, was granted the lands of Taff Ubūlla by the Persian King Parwīz, after the death of al-Na'mān III on the guarantee that Bakr bin Wā'il will not attack the areas of Sawād.⁷⁸ The bulk of the Shaybān was nomadic tribesmen and had regular contacts with Iraq just before the rise of Islam. Parts of Shaybān had close relations with the Sassanid and lived a settled life but majority of them lived

the weaknesses of Persian Empire. M. J. Kister, "Mecca and Tamīm" *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 8 (1965):115.

⁷⁵Donner, "Bakr bin Wā'il", 6.

⁷⁶Ibn Hajar, *Isāba*, vol. 3, 341; Shaybān and some of the others from Rabī'a were living in Sawād with the permission of Kisra. They lived there peacefully for some time but after some time the Persians started teasing them. At this, Muthanna came back and took revenge from the Persians. Kūfī, *Futūh*, vol.1, 73.

⁷⁷See note, 5.

⁷⁸Kister, M. J. "Al-Hira: Some Notes on its Relations with Arabia" in *Arabica* 15, fasc. 2 (June, 1968): 151.

as nomads and semi-nomads.⁷⁹ Shaybān and parts of Bakr bin Wā'il have seen the prosperity and affluence of the Iraqi cities. Some of the Shaybān were living in the areas of Sawād in pre-Islamic times or were at least found near Iraq⁸⁰ Kūfī reports that Shaybān and some of the others from Rabī'a had moved from Tihama and Hijāz to Iraq in the times of drought and took permission from Kisra to stay there in pre-Islamic times. They were given the Permission on the condition that they will act as good neighbors.⁸¹ When Islam appeared and Bakr bin Wā'il felt threats, some of them again decided to move to the areas of Sawād.⁸² Nonetheless they always seem willing and keen to gain settlements at Iraq. Their interaction with the Persians and their earlier experience of settlements at Iraq was the most important factor in motivating the groups of Bakr bin Wā'il to settle at Iraq.

On the other hand, the rest of the Arabs were initially not attracted towards the eastern front. Even Khālid himself was reported to have disliked the decision to send him to Iraq.⁸³ Although there were some individuals who took initiative and attacked the Persian territory without the orders of central command, the

⁷⁹Donner, “Bakr bin Wā'il”, 22; *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 25, 171.

⁸⁰Tamīm and Taglib came to attack Shaybān in pre-Islamic times and a battle was fought at in an area of Sawād, which means some of Shaybān were living in Sawād. Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 1, 648; Shaybān occupied the districts West of Euphrates from Al-Ubulla to Hit but they were specially found in the areas west of al-Hīra. Donner, “Bakr bin Wā'il”, 22.

⁸¹Kūfī, *Futūh*, vol.1, 73.

⁸²Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 1, 654; They must have been those sections of Bakr bin Wā'il who had not participated in Dhi-Qār and were against the Muslims.

⁸³The decision of sending Khālid to Iraq was initiated by ‘Umar in the period of the rule of Abū Bakr. Khālid believed ‘Umar never to be his well-wisher. Khālid was staying in a valley in Yamāma. Kūfī, *Futūh*, vol 1, 74; Tabarī, *Tārikh*, vol. 1, 2016.

northern and southern Arabs were largely not interested in moving towards the Iraqi front.⁸⁴

Probably Arabs were unwilling to fight the Iranians due to their mighty power, yet there were certain other factors as well. The Persians had become weaker in their constant warfare with the Byzantines and Arabs. They were also facing political problems but when the caliph 'Umar incited the Arabs to fight against Persians, they had become well-organized again because of the crowning of Yazdjard bin Shahryār who was a direct descendent of Kisra.⁸⁵ 'Umar, Muthanna and Khālid had motivated the Arab tribes to go to Iraq for finding rich spoils,⁸⁶ however after the defeat of *Jisr*, the Arabs again become reluctant to go towards the Iraqi front. Balādhurī even talks about a year of silence in which the Arabs did not send any expedition towards Iraq after the defeat of *Jisr*.⁸⁷ 'Umar convinced some of the tribes to go to the Iraqi front. He even offered huge benefits to certain tribes on the condition that they would go and fight at the Iraqi front. Azd and

⁸⁴ 'Ilā' bin al Hadramī was sent by Abū Bakr to Bahraīn, basically to deal with the rebel tribes of Rabī'a over there. Rabī'a wanted to give the leadership of Bahraīn to the family of Mandhar. The brother of Na'mān bin al Manzar was appointed as their leader. 'Ilā' fought and defeated the rebel tribes, he then crossed the sea and reached at Daraīn, which was part of the Persian territory to fight the fleeing forces of the defeated army. The decision was disapproved by 'Umar and 'Ilā' was demoted from his position, however some of the members of his army kept staying at Iraq. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 1957-76; Martin Hinds argues that this was the third front of conquests towards Iraq which have not been given importance by scholars like Shaban and Donner. Martin Hinds, "The First Arab Conquest in Fārs" in *Iran*22, (1984): 39-53.

⁸⁵ Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2119.

⁸⁶ See details on page no, 67-8.

⁸⁷ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 253-4; Kūfī gives a different description and in his account Jarīr was sent immediately after the defeat of *Jisr* to reinforce and to help the defeated army. Kūfī, *Futūh*, vol. 1, 137-8; Tabarī also relates that Jarīr was sent somewhat earlier from the main army of Sa'd as Tabarī further told that Bajīla participated in the battle of Būwaīb and after the battle, the one forth of Khams was given to Bajīla. After the battle of Būwaīb, Muthanna died and 'Umar sent Sa'd bin Abi Waqāṣ and made 'Abdūlla bin Jarīr under his command. Ibid., 2183-4.

Kināna came to 'Umar and asked him to send them to Syria but 'Umar incited them to go to Iraq, and they agreed.⁸⁸ Similarly 'Abdullah al-Bajalī came and showed his willingness to join the Iraqi front with his people, but on the condition of one fourth share in the spoils.⁸⁹ Jarīr related that Muḍar wanted to go to Iraq and Yamanī wanted to go to Syria but 'Umar decided about each group himself according to the requirements of different fronts.⁹⁰ Thus it was not always by the choice of the tribes that they moved to the Iraqi front. Most of the tribes had come without any particular motives. The only thing they wanted was to fight and to collect spoils. But once when they saw the huge benefits of conquest at Iraq, most of them took their decision to settle.

The narratives of the Muslim history also provide a general idea of the composition of tribes in Iraq. A general idea can also be taken by assessing the composition of the armies of the conquest. Khālid joined the forces of Muthanna and his forces were mainly consisted of Ansār and *Muhājirūn*.⁹¹ Although Khālid was sent to Syria but on the death of Abū Bakr, 'Umar called all of the army of Khālid from Syria to Iraq on the instructions of Abū Bakr. This army was defeated at *Jisr* and many of its soldiers fled back to Medina. Thus in order to find

⁸⁸ Ibid., 2187-8.

⁸⁹ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 253; However Tabarī gives a different story and he believes that 'Umar himself motivated Bajila to move to Iraq. 'Umar told Bajila that Iraq has taken control over economy thus you must go towards Iraq. Allah will give you share in that growing economy and you will get proper means of earning. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2186; However in another tradition, Tabarī relates that Jarīr came to 'Umar, gathered his members of Bajila and only agreed to fought on Iraqi front when he was not given permission to go to Syria. 'Umar himself rewarded him with the one fourth of Khams in the spoils of war. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2183.

⁹⁰ Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2222.

⁹¹ Kūfī, *Futūh*, vol. 1, 77.

a general assessment of the initial settlers, the composition of the armies of *Qādisiyya* must be analyzed carefully as they were not called back.

By then, it has been clear that Bakr bin Wā'il, Azd and Bajīla were the prominent forces of *Qādisiyya* and these tribes were also the initial settlers at Iraq. Besides, under the leadership of Sa'd bin Abī Waqqāṣ, a new and larger army was prepared by different tribal groups. This army remained successful and almost all of its elements settled somewhere at Iraq. This army included Bajīla, Azd, Kināna, Ribāb,⁹² Sa'd (Jush'am),⁹³ Ḥabba, and "Abdūl Qays. Three thousand men and one thousand women and children had come from Sirāt and Yaman to join the conquests but they desired to go to Syria. 'Umar insisted and sent half of them to Iraq. The people who had come from Yaman largely belonged to Nakh'a of Madhhij, Ju'fī and its halifs and Ḥadarmaut.⁹⁴ 'Umar also sent reinforcements to Sa'd in the form of two thousand Yeminis and two thousand Najidī who were from Ghāṭfān and Qays 'Aiyālān.⁹⁵ Sa'd further selected a thousand from Ribāb and three thousand from Tamīm to join his army. Al-Ash'ath bin Qays⁹⁶ from Kinda joined Sa'd with an army of seventeen hundred.⁹⁷ Muthanna at the time of

⁹² Ribāb is a confederacy of Muḍar tribes from Northeastern Arabia that included the Taym, 'Adī and Thawr, 'Abd Manāt bin Udd, Ukl, Athal and the Ḥabba bin Udd. Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol.1, 617;

⁹³ Jush'am of the Sa'd is a small sub-tribe of the Sa'd Tamīm. 'Abdu'l Qays is the sub-tribe of Rabī'a.

⁹⁴ Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2218.

⁹⁵ Ghāṭfān is a sub-branch of Qays Aiylan. Qiys Aiylan was a sub-branch of Muḍar. Ibid., 2221

⁹⁶ Al-Ash'ath bin Qays was the leader of Kinda who had fought against the Muslims in *ridda* wars, later repented and joined the conquest movement. He and his descendants played an important role in future politics of Iraq.

⁹⁷ Kinda is the sub-tribe of the migrated Kahlān. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2222.

Qādissiya had eight thousand men from the tribe of Rabī'a, six thousand from Bakr bin Wā'il, from Yaman two thousand of Bajīla and two thousand from Qudā'a and Tay'.⁹⁸ These are almost the same tribes which appeared in the study of *Tabaqāt* of Ibn Sa'd. Abī 'Abdullah.

The Tribal Composition of Kufans till the end of the Umayyad Period


Name of the tribe	Compan ion of the Prophet (PBUH) 143 total	First Tabaqā of Tābe'in 336 total	Second Tabaqā 66 total	Third Tabaqā 122 total	Fourth Tabaqā 80	Fifth Tabaqā 51
		Initial period	Later period			
[Redacted]	4	29	4	8	4	4
[Redacted]	2	32	9	13	7	4
[Redacted]	8	10	7	3	3	3
[Redacted]	14	2	4	1	1	2
[Redacted]	2	12	0	1	2	1
[Redacted]	2	9	1	3	1	0
[Redacted]	4	11	0	3	0	0
[Redacted]	2	16	2	4	2	1
[Redacted]	2	14	0	1	1	2

⁹⁸Ibid., 2221.


	6	5	0	4	0	1
	7	6	2	4	3	2
	0	7	6	12	16	10
Hūdhayl	1	2	2	2	0	1
Tamīm (Zayd Manāt+yarbū')	2	6	0	0	1	0
Hawāzin (Thaqīf)	4	2	4	2	1	1
Tha'laba	2	0	0	2	1	0
Bakr bin Wā'il (Shaybān)	1	7	1	3	2	0
Bakr bin Wā'il ('Ijl)	1	4	0	1	0	0
Bakr bin Wā'il (Hanīfa)	0	2	0	1	1	0
Khuzā'a	5	3	1	1	1	0
Kināna	1	1	0	0	0	1
Dabba	1	3	0	1	4	1
Muhārib	4	3	0	3	2	0
Fazāra	1	4	0	1	1	1
Jurham	1	1	0	1	1	0
Sūlaym	3	2	2	1	3	2
Tay'	3	4	3	1	1	0
Hawāzin (Jush'am)	1	1	0	2	0	0
Ghaṭfān	0	4	6	1	0	0
Ashja'	8	3	3	0	0	0

Hadrama	0	7	0	4	0	1
Nahdī	0	1	0	2	1	0
‘Abd (‘Abdūl Qays)	0	2	0	2	2	0
Kāhil (Asad)	0	4	0	2	0	0
‘Ukl	0	1	0	1	0	0
████████	0	1	0	1	0	0
████████	0	0	0	2	1	0
████████	0	0	0	0	0	1
████████	1	2	0	0	0	0
████████	4	3	0	0	0	0
████████	1	1	0	0	0	0
████████	1	3	0	0	0	0
████████	1	5	0	0	0	0
████████	0	3	0	0	0	0
‘Umro bin ‘Awf	5	0	0	0	0	0
Khazr‘a (halif of Anṣār)	1	0	0	0	0	0
Aslam	3	0	0	0	0	0
Hārith bin Kulāb	1	0	0	0	0	0


■ Category one: The tribes whose number was very high in the initial stages and kept on increasing in the later period ■




■ Category two: The tribes whose number were high in the initial period and remained consistent in the later period. ■





■ Category three: The people whose number increased gradually and were higher in the last tabaqa.




4. Category four: The tribes whose number was few in the initial period and they remained consistent in the later period (few and consistent)






Category five: The tribes whose number was very few



6. Category six: The tribes whose number was very few and they almost disappeared (few and disappeared)



In the stage of initial settlers, the most numerous groups appear to be that of Madh̄ij, Hamadān, Bajīla and Asad. Majority of these tribal groups belonged to migrated Kahlān of Yaman and Asad belonged to Rabī'a. Anṣār, Quraysh, Kinda, Abs, Khuzayma, also seems to be in very good number. ‘Amr bin Ṣaṣ'a, Ashja'i and Azd were also found in a considerable number. The difference between these tribal groups came in the later period. Madh̄ij, Hamadān and Bajīla remained increasing in the later period. It appears that these tribal groups not only settled themselves at Iraq but called their friends and relatives from Arabia to Iraq. It can be assumed that most of the late migrants would be belonging to these tribal groups.

The number of Quraysh did not increase as it was expected from larger number of their initial settlers. There are certain examples of the return migrants from the tribe of Quraysh. It can be assumed that Quraysh belonged to the elite of Medina and after completing their conquests, they sought to go back to Medina to settle back there. Azd, Kinda, Abs, Khuzayma and Asad were also numerable in the initial period and their number remained consistent in the later period. Azd, Kinda and Asad showed their considerable presence at al-Kūfa in the Umayyad period and can be seen in the narrative accounts but lesser accounts about Khuzayma and Abs were found.

A large number of tribes have shown a consistent composition throughout the period. They did not appear as larger groups in the initial period, instead their number was few. No considerable change came in their composition in the later period and they remained consistent. Tamīm, Bakr bin Wā'il, Sūlaym, Tay' and

'Abdūl-Qays are some of the examples of this category. The tribes whose number either decreased or they become totally absent in the later period are, 'Umro bin 'Awf, Aslam and Hārith bin Kulab.

It comes out from this study that the people from some important tribal groups like Tamīm, Bakr bin Wā'il and Ṭay' were very few at this time although they participated in *Qādisiyya*. This can also be explained by the study done by Donner on the composition of Basran tribes. He concluded that in the period of the companion of the Prophet, (PBUH) (here it has been called as period of initial settlers) some branches of Tamīm and Bakr bin Wā'il like Dhuhl were well represented in al-Baṣra. Bakr bin Wā'il and Tamīm continued to exist in the first and second ṭabaqa in al-Baṣra.⁹⁹ Thus it means Tamīm mainly settled there. The less number of Bakr bin Wā'il at al-Kūfa can also be understood by the initial phases of migrations where Shaybān and others from Bakr bin Wā'il had stayed at al-Ḥīra. It seems they always preferred al-Ḥīra on al-Kūfa, later probably some of them had moved to al-Kūfa.

Another important change was the gradual increase in the numbers of slaves and *mawali*. There were some *mawali* who were themselves Arabs and were *mawali* of the Arab tribes. The number of Arab *mawali* was lesser than the non-Arabs slaves and *mawali* and the Arab *mawali* were largely found in the period of initial settlers or to some extent in the period of the first *ṭabaqa*.

⁹⁹ Fred M. Donner, "Tribal Settlement in Basra During the First Century A.H." in Tarif Khalidi, *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1984), 103-4.

To further support the conclusions of the study, it is significant to have a look at the representation of tribes as shown in the settlement pattern of al-Kūfa. The tribes had settled around the mosque and market place. Three streets were constructed on the eastern and western side of the mosque, while four and five streets were erected on its back and front side respectively. On the front side Sūlaym, Thaqīf, Hamadān, Bajīla, Taym al-Lāt, and Taghlib were dwelled in different streets. Likewise, Asad, Nakh'a, Kinda and Azd were settled in the four streets on the back side of the mosque. On the eastern side, Anṣār, Muzayna, Tamīm, Muḥārib, and 'Amir had been inhabited. Finally on the western side of the mosque, Bijāla,¹⁰⁰ Bajla, Juhayna, Jadīla and related tribes were settled. Other residences were built behind these main settlements.¹⁰¹ This description of tribes tallies with the information gathered by study of Ibn Sa'd. Taghlib is the only tribe whose presence was missing and it appeared in the fifth *tabaqā* in the study. Such contradictions can easily be removed by adding accounts from narratives of Muslim history. Taghlib had been living along the Euphrates and were either full time shepherding groups or were semi-nomads.¹⁰² Taghlib had a prolonged history of Taghlib-Qays wars in the pre-Islamic times. The tribe was also involved in *ridda* wars along with false prophetess Sajah and her Tamīmi clan, while some of them had resisted against the Muslim conquest armies and were the late converts

¹⁰⁰Bijāla is a sub-tribe of Dhūhal bin Bakr bin Sa'd bin Dabba. See Sam'āni, *Ansab*, vol.1, 41.

¹⁰¹Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2489-90.

¹⁰²Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 19.

but afterward they joined the Muslims and dwelt at al-Kūfa in an earlier stage.¹⁰³ ‘Abdullah bin Mu‘tam while conquering Takrīt made a peace treaty with several Arab tribes of Tagħlib, Iyād and Namīr who had accepted Islam.¹⁰⁴ Those who remained non-Muslims were dealt kindly and were charged with lesser amount of *jizya*. Tagħlib and their sub-tribes of Iyād and Namīr were given way to al-Madā'in to Sa‘d and then resided with him at al-Kūfa.¹⁰⁵ Utba bin al-Wagħl of the Tagħlib¹⁰⁶ was a political activist in al-Kūfa at the time of ‘Uthmān. On the battle of *Jamal*,¹⁰⁷ Tagħlib fought under the banner of Rabī‘a on Ali’s side. According to Micheal Lecker, the Tagħlibi community living at al-Kūfa was reported to be very small,¹⁰⁸ thus it can be fairly assumed that the reason of their being missing in the accounts of Ibn Sa‘d would have been due to their smaller number. Yet certainly they had their presence at al-Kūfa.

In order to further explore the motives of the tribes, the tribes will be examined according to their larger tribal grouping. The motives of the tribes of Yaman (Kahtān) will be dealt separately from that of ‘Adnān. Within Yaman

¹⁰³ Micheal Lecker, *Peoples, Tribes and Society in Arabia around the Time of Muhammad* (London: Ashgate, 2005), 41-45.

¹⁰⁴ Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2476.

¹⁰⁵ Tabarī, *Tārīkh* vol. 1, 2482.

¹⁰⁶ He belonged to Sa‘d bin Jush‘am bin Bakr of Tagħlib.

¹⁰⁷ The battle of *Jamal* was fought in which ‘Ayi’sha , the wife of the Prophet (PBUH) and Talha and Zubair, two of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH) fought against ‘Ali, the caliph of the Arab empire at that time. For details see, Muhammad Barkat al-Baili, *Tarikh-ul-Dawlat-ul-‘Arabiat-ul-Islāmia mandh Ba‘th-ul-Nabwaiyya Hata Saqūt-ul-Dawlat-ul-Umwaiyya* (Cairo: Kulayat-ul-Arab, n.d.), 212-23.

¹⁰⁸ Micheal Lecker, *Peoples, Tribes and Society in Arabia at the Time of Muhammad*, 41-45.

(Kahtān), the division of Quḍā'a, migrated and settled Kahlān has been devised. In the same way Rabī'a and Muḍar will be studied in detail while discussing the tribal group of 'Adnān.¹⁰⁹

2.2.1 Tribal Composition of Yaman (Kahtān) at al-Kūfa

Sabā bin Kahtān, an ancestor of Arabs had ten sons according to a tradition related to the Prophet (PBUH). He informed that Lakhm, Judhām, Amila and Ghassān had dwelt in Syria, and Asad, Kinda, Ḥumayr, Aṣh'arī, Madhhij, Anmār had settled at Yaman. By Anmār the Prophet (PBUH) meant Bajīla and Khath'ām. In another tradition, in place of Madhhij and Aṣh'arī, Ak and Azd have been mentioned.¹¹⁰

The two large divisions in Kahtān are Ḥumayr and Kahlān

2.2.1.1 Ḥumayr (Quḍā'a)

Name of the tribe	Initial Settlers	First Tabaqa	Second Tabaqa	Third Tabaqa	Fourth Tabaqa	Fifth Tabaqa
[REDACTED] (whose sub-tribes have not been mentioned)	1	5	0	0	0	0
[REDACTED]	0	0	0	2	1	0
[REDACTED]	0	3	0	0	0	0
Kināna	1	1	0	0	0	1
Nahdī	0	1	0	2	1	0

1. Quḍā'a, Juhayna and Layth: Very few

¹⁰⁹For Tribal Genealogy see, Abi Fauz Muhammad Amin Al-Baghdadi, *Sabaik-uz-Zahb fi-Marafat-ul-Qabail-ul-Arab* (Beirut: Dar-ul-Kutub al-Ilmia, n.d.)

¹¹⁰ Sam'āni, *Ansab*, vol.1, 24.

2. Kināna and Nahdī : Few and consistent

By looking at the table, it can be analyzed that Quḍā'a and its sub-tribes not only decreased in number but in fact they were never the enthusiastic migrants. Their number has in all periods remained very meag̚r. A few of them left and their number slowly decreased or completely vanished away. Rests of them were late comers but their number was also not very significant. Kināna was the only tribe which has been mentioned as participating in the conquest army thus they were willing to inhabit them at Iraq. Kināna had always stayed as leading tribe of the Quḍā'a. In pre-Islamic times, Zahīr bin Jināb al-Kalbī of Kināna bin Bakr bin 'Awf al-Kalbī was a leader of Quḍā'a, under whose headship, all Quḍā'a were united in 350 or 450 AD. He fought a war with Ghāṭfān and then collected all Yamanī against Bakr and Taghlib. Zahīr defeated them, killed many and collected huge spoils of war.¹¹¹ Besides one member of Kināna who had later settled at al-Kūfa was the companion of the Prophet (PBUH),¹¹² hence they had some kind of interaction with Muslims before the conquest. Another sub-tribe of Quḍā'a which had played an important role in the early history of Islam was Juhayna. Juhayna was a sub tribe of Quḍā'a and was settled in the hilly tracts of "Dudwa in Yanbū'.¹¹³ There was a treaty between Muslims and Juhayna concluded immediately after the *Hijrat* of the Prophet (PBUH). Ibn Ishaq and Ibn Sa'd have also mentioned that Juhayna were in alliance with the

¹¹¹ Ibn Athīr *al-Kāmil*, vol.1, 502-5.

¹¹²Khālid bin Arfata of Quḍā'a met the Prophet (PBUH) and relates traditions from him. Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqāt*, vol.6, 21.

¹¹³Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 247; Yanbū' exists in the north of Arabia. Many early expeditions of the Prophet were directed towards north and Juhayna helped the Muslims in those early raids.

Muslims.¹¹⁴ Juhayna became the major supporters of the Prophet (PBUH) and helped him on various occasions. The prominent members of Juhayna who supported the Prophet were Jūndab bin Makīth and Ma‘dib bin Khālid al-Juhnī.¹¹⁵ As Juhayna was settled at the northern territories of Arabia, thus they were least interested in moving towards Iraq. They might have moved towards Syria.

2.2.1.2 *Migrated Kahlān*

Name of the tribe	Initial Settlers	First Tabaqa	Second Tabaqa	Third Tabaqa	Fourth Tabaqa	Fifth Tabaqa
[REDACTED]	14	2	4	1	1	2
[REDACTED]	2	9	1	3	1	0
[REDACTED]	2	12	0	1	2	1
Tay'	3	4	3	1	1	0
Khuzā'a	5	3	1	1	1	0

Anṣār, Azd and Kindah: High and consistent

Tay', Khuzā'a: Few and consistent

The migrated Kahlān tribes originally belonged to Yaman but in pre-Islamic times, they had migrated from Yaman and had settled at different areas of Arabia. For instance Azd of Oman migrated to Oman, some of other Azd migrated to Medina (the descendants of those were called Aws and Khazrij) and Khuzā'a migrated to Mecca. There is confusion about Khuzā'a. Some of the genealogists

¹¹⁴ Ibn Sa‘d, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 2, 6.

¹¹⁵ Both were the earlier converts and supported the Prophet (PBUH). Waqidi, *Futūh*, vol. 2, 571; vol. 3, 990.

consider Khuzā'a as a sub-tribe of Elyās bin Muḍar, however it seems more correct that they belonged to Kahlān and had migrated to Makkah. Khuzā'a were the *halīf* of the Quraysh and were part of the *Hudābiyya* pact.¹¹⁶ Likewise some of the other Kahlān tribes also migrated. Lakhm and Judhām migrated to al-Hīra, Tay' went to northwards Ajā and Salma Mountains, and Kinda dwelt in Bahraīn but later went to Najd.¹¹⁷

It could be observed that the migrated Kahlān tribes were high in the initial period and remained consistent in the later period. Others were few and their composition remained consistent. While looking at the background of these migrated Kahlān tribes, Azd appears to be the most significant tribe. A few of the Azd in the pre-Islamic period had migrated to Oman and were later called as Azd of Oman. Some other had migrated towards Medina and Aws and Khizrij were the sub-branches of those migrants of Azd.¹¹⁸ It is very clear that Anṣār developed a completely different background from the rest of the migrated Kahlān tribes. Anṣār were in the forefront of the Islamic movement being the early supporters and followers of the Prophet (PBUH). Anṣār had participated in conquests in huge number and consequently were seen in a larger number at al-Kūfa in the initial period of migrations. They also appeared in a huge number at al-Baṣra in the period of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH). Donner remarked that they either continued to migrate or had descendants at al-Baṣra. He also believed that

¹¹⁶Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 315.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 252-3.

¹¹⁸Ibid., 252; for details of Azd see, Brian J. Ulrich, "Constructing Al-Azd: Tribal Identity and Society in the Early Islamic Centuries" PhD Dissertation, Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2008, 62-145.

it was the conscious policy of the state to send Quraysh to Syria and Anṣār to Iraq.¹¹⁹ Yet there are many examples of the return migrants from Anṣār. Abū Qatāda bin Rab‘ī and Abū Mas‘ūd al-Anṣāri of Khizrij had migrated to al-Kūfa but soon after migrated back to Madina.¹²⁰ In the same way Thābit bin Zaīd bin Qays of Khizrij had migrated to al-Baṣra but went back to Madina and died there.¹²¹ Even then, apart from these few incidents of return migrants, most of the Anṣār decided to settle at al-Kūfa as their number remained high and consistent.

Azd were sent to the Iraqi front by caliph ‘Umar before *Qādisiyya* therefore they were the early settlers at Iraq. Tabari however relates that they were the last to settle at al-Baṣra.¹²² Ulrich has interpreted this passage of Ṭabarī in detail and has concluded that Azd were the earlier settlers and found many evidences for it for instance that the battle of *Jamal* took place in the Azd district of al-Baṣra.¹²³ Tay’ likewise came to the Prophet (PBUH) in 10 AH and accepted Islam. Adi bin Hatam, the son of Hatim Tay’i supported Muslims in the ridda wars, gathered *sadaqa* from his people and brought it to Abū Bakr.¹²⁴ He settled at al-Kūfa in the colony of Tay’, supported Ali and participated in the battles of *Jamal* and *Saffīn* with him.¹²⁵ Tay’ remained in a stronger position in their

¹¹⁹ Donner, “Tribal Settlement of Basra”, 102-4.

¹²⁰ Ibn Sa‘d, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 6, 16.

¹²¹ Ibn Sa‘d, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 7, 31.

¹²² Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 450.

¹²³ For details see, Brian J. Ulrich, “Constructing Al-Azd”, 101-105.

¹²⁴ Al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh-Islam*, vol. 2, 686-7

¹²⁵ Ibn Sa‘d, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 6, 22.

homeland in Arabia as well. They took control of many areas left by Madhhij, Kinda and other tribes.¹²⁶ On the other hand they also took control of the areas of the desert to the south of Iraq from their base on the modern Jabl-i-Shimmer throughout the Sassanid period. They also attended the annual markets of al-Hīra¹²⁷

Another important tribe of migrated Kahlān was Kinda who were the kings of Yaman in pre-Islamic times. The leader of this tribe made peace with the Prophet (PBUH) on the payment of *jizya*.¹²⁸ One of its important members Ash't bin Qays al-Kindi participated in *ridda* wars against the Muslims. He later repented and was forgiven by Abū Bakr. Ash't fought at *Yarmūk*, then came back to the Iraqi front, fought *Qādisiyya* and settled at al-Kūfa. His descendants played a very imperative role in the politics of Iraq.¹²⁹ The reason of their migration seems clear. They had lost their kingship; the areas they dominated were taken away by the Muslims. Although they accepted Islam but they were the latecomers as well as participants in the *ridda* wars, therefore they could not expect any elitist position while living at Arabia, thus they decided to migrate to Iraq and established their power there. When 'Uthmān allowed Iraqis to exchange their properties of Arabia with properties at Iraq, Ash't bin Qays exchanged his

¹²⁶ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 254.

¹²⁷ Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquests*, 216. 219.

¹²⁸ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 257; Al-Dhahabī records that Kinda brought their delegation to the Prophet (PBUH) in 10 AH and accepted Islam. Al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh-i-Islam*, vol. 2, 689.

¹²⁹ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 257; also see Ibn Ḥajr, *Isāba*, vol. 1, 66; Ibn Athīr, *Asad-ul-Ghaba*, vol. 1, 98

property at Ḥaḍarmaut for property in Iraq.¹³⁰ Kinda had however very less representation at al-Baṣra.¹³¹

Another factor which might have motivated some of the Kahlān tribes to participate in conquests of Iraq and then to settle there was their earlier interaction with the Iraqis. A few of these Kahtān had attacked Iraq in pre-Islamic times and not only conquered different areas of Iraq but also settled some of their tribes in and around Iraq. This probably was the most important reason behind their decision to migrate to Iraq. They already had an exposure to the Iraqi front and cities and it was not something unusual for them to migrate and settle at Iraq. In pre-Islamic times when Azd used to live in Bahraīn, the descendants of ‘Adnān went to Bahraīn and convinced the Azd to attack Iraq. Before that, Bakht Naṣr had settled some of the Arab prisoners at al-Hīra.¹³² After the death of Bakht Naṣr, these Arabs went to al-‘Anbar and supported the Azd and the descendants of ‘Adnān when they decided to attack Iraq. Hence these Arabs settled at Iraqi border areas were occasionally used to fight against Iraq. This attack was successful and the Arabs took control over whole of Sawād Iraq. After this attack Lakhm and Qays settled at al-Hīra with the help of Kinda. Likewise, in the period of the Sassanid King, Ard Shīr Bahman, Ḥārith bin Umro bin Ḥujr al-Kindī¹³³ asked Tūbba‘, another leader of Kahtān to fight against Iraq. This Tūbba‘ was Asad Abū

¹³⁰Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2855.

¹³¹Donner, “Tribal Settlement of Basra”, 105.

¹³²Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 1, 271-2.

¹³³This Ḥārith died in 528 AD and he also brought some sub-groups of Bakr like ‘Ijl, Tha‘labā and Dhuhl from Yamāma and Bahraīn to the border of Iraq. Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquests*, 217.

Karb, the last of the Tūbba'. When he came to attack Iraq he left some of his weaker troops at al-Hīra. These were the people of Azd, Lakhm, Judhām, Quḍā'a, Hudhayl and Jurham. They settled in different cities of Iraq.¹³⁴ Mālik bin Fahm of Azd also ruled al-Hīra for sometime before the rule of Lakhm.¹³⁵

Thus the migrated Kahlān for one reason or another were the enthusiastic migrants. Ibn Khaldūn relates about Kahtān as a whole that they were usually nomads and kept on changing their places. They had a history of great conquests and magnificence and there were times when they dominated. However gradually they began to lose this domination due to their luxurious lifestyles and their kingships was snatched away. After this destruction, they usually revert back to their old nomadic lifestyle.¹³⁶ This nomadic lifestyle made migrations easier for them and it was not difficult for them to leave their place and to settle at another area. Moreover, it was easier for the migrated Kahlān who since pre-Islamic times kept on changing their places.

2.2.1.3 Settled Kahlān

Name of the tribe	Initial Settlers	First Tabaqa	Second Tabaqa	Third Tabaqa	Fourth Tabaqa	Fifth Tabaqa
[REDACTED]	4	29	4	8	4	4
[REDACTED]	2	32	9	13	7	4

¹³⁴ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol.2, 237-40; Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol.1 415-6.

¹³⁵ Mas'ūdī, *Marūj*, vol. 2, 66.

¹³⁶ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 236-7.

Ash‘aria	1	2	0	0	0	0
	8	10	7	3	3	3

- Madh̄ij , Hamadān, Bajīla: High and increasing
- Ash‘aria: few and consistent

Bajīla was probably the most significant tribe after Shaybān who had participated in conquest. Jarīr bin ‘Abdullah al-Bajalī offered the services of his tribes at a very critical period of the war between Arabs and Persians.¹³⁷ Jarīr bin ‘Abdullah al-Bajalī also supported Muslims in *ridda* wars and had joined ‘Ikrima bin Abī Jahl in the war against Kinda.¹³⁸ Besides, Bajīla was one of the allies of the Quraysh at Yaman who accepted Islam in the last year of the life of the Prophet (PBUH) and supported Muslims during the conquests.¹³⁹ While looking at the background of this tribe, it becomes evident that they were living in a very poor condition in Sardāt between Bahraīn and Ḥijāz. They were not happy with their circumstances and were living a very poor life. Ibn Khaldūn relates that they spread out to different areas during conquest due to their worries and economic problems.¹⁴⁰ This justifies the motive behind the involvement of Bajīla in the conquest and their decision to settle at Iraq. They not only came in influx in the initial period but their number remained high in the later period as well.

¹³⁷ See note, 90.

¹³⁸ Kūfi, *Futūh*, 59-60.

¹³⁹ Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 78.

¹⁴⁰ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 254.

Along with Kinda, Madhhij also lived in central Arabia but they were forced to south by a rival confederacy in the mid-fourth century. There they were employed as mercenaries and settled. They became part of the ruling class and were treated as valuable warrior aristocracy by Himayrite dynasty.¹⁴¹ Certainly after the downfall of Himayrite, their position had declined and after the Muslim conquest, they felt no further chances of their empowerment at Arabia. A few of the Madhhij had come to see the Prophet (PBUH) and had accepted Islam.¹⁴² Some of them had participated in the conquest. ‘Umro bin Ma‘ṣrāb of Madhhij had participated in *Qādisiyya* and was of *ahl-ul-ridda*.¹⁴³ Nakh‘a was the most numerous branch of Madhhij who willingly participated in *Qādisiyya* and also brought their women along. It is reported by Tabari that the majority of women present at *Qādisiyya* were from Bajila and Nakh‘a. So seven hundred of Nakh‘a and a thousand women of Bajila were married to men of other tribes.¹⁴⁴ This explains their desire to settle at the conquered areas.

Hamadān and Madhhij both had been the rulers of certain lands and had dominated some areas but when the Muslim conquest increased which created a fear of the loss of their lands and power, they began to spread in different areas. Hamadān were even attacked by Persians and fought a lengthy war until the Prophet (PBUH) took control of their areas and they decided to ally with Prophet

¹⁴¹ Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 19, 42.

¹⁴² Al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh-i-Islam*, vol. 2, 689.

¹⁴³ Ibn Sa‘d, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 5, 612-3.

¹⁴⁴ Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2363-4.

(PBUH).¹⁴⁵ Very few Bajīla and Madhhij remained back. On the other hand Hamadān migrated in a great number but still a lot of them remained back in Yaman and it was considered as one of the numerous tribes of Yaman after many centuries of Islam.¹⁴⁶ There was very less representation of Yamani tribes such as Bajīla, and Madhhij at al-Baṣra although they were very prominent in al-Kūfa. Only one man of Bajīla settled in al-Baṣra during the conquest.¹⁴⁷ It signifies that they were concentrated more at al-Kūfa hence the Kahlān tribes of Yaman highly migrated to al-Kūfa but they had lesser representation at al-Baṣra.

Thus it can be concluded that Bajīla was fairly clear about their decision to migrate and they kept on migrating since the initial stage. The basic motive behind their migration was their poor economic status which they wanted to improve. They were very vigilant in the first phases of conquest and when they realized the unwillingness of majority of the Arabs to go to the Iraqi front, they offered their services and secured huge benefits for them. In the same manner, Madhhij and Hamadān moved and decided to settle in the conquered areas as they had almost lost their lands to the Muslims. When they settled at Iraq, they saw the huge opportunities of success in the form of money, land and status; hence they decided to settle there permanently. Thus almost all of the settled Kahlān tribes were very enthusiastic migrants and they easily settled in the new place.

¹⁴⁵ Ibn Sa‘d, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 6, 29.

¹⁴⁶ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 252.

¹⁴⁷ Donner, “Tribal Settlement of Basra”, 105.

2.2.2 Tribal Composition of 'Adnān

'Adnān were the descendants of Ismail. Genealogists believe that the son of 'Adnān, Ma'd bin 'Adnān was the only descendent of Ismā'il who remained alive. All others were destroyed in the attack of Bakht Naṣr. Ma'd had one son named Nizār and the descendants of Ismā'il are virtually the descendants of 'Adnān alone. Nizār had four sons, Enmār, Iyād, Rabī'a and Muḍar.¹⁴⁸ In Iraq, only the tribes of Rabī'a and Muḍar were found from the ancestry of 'Adnān.

2.2.2.1 Rabī'a

Name of the tribe	Initial settlers	First tabaqa	Second Tabaqa	Third Tabaqa	Fourth Tabaqa	Fifth Tabaqa
Shaybān (Bakr bin Wā'il)	1	7	1	3	2	0
'Ijl (Bakr bin Wā'il)	1	4	0	1	0	0
Ḩanifa (Bakr bin Wā'il)	0	2	0	1	1	0
[REDACTED]	2	13	1	5	3	0
[REDACTED]	0	2	0	2	2	0
'Abd (Ābdūl-Qays)	2	16	2	4	2	1
[REDACTED]	0	0	0	0	0	1

- Bakr bin Wā'il and Asad: High and consistent
- 'Abdūl-Qays: Few and consistent

¹⁴⁸ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 298; Sam'āni, *Ansab*, vol.1, 23.

- Taglib: Very few

Rabī'a lived between Jazīra and Iraq. Bakr bin Wā'il was the most important tribe of Rabī'a who not only participated in initial conquest but also kept settlement at Iraq. They were not found in as large numbers as Hamdan, Madhīj and Bajīla, however their slight less representation can be explained by their huge presence at al-Baṣra. Donner argued that Bakr bin Wā'il were well-represented at al-Baṣra in the period of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH). They continued to exist at al-Baṣra in the period of first and second ṭabaqa.¹⁴⁹ Bakr bin Wā'il as a whole were seen in a larger number in al-Kūfa too in the initial period and their number remained consistent in the later period. The motives of migrations for Shaybān have already been discussed in detail.¹⁵⁰ Ḥanīfa, and ‘Ijl are also the sub-tribes of Bakr bin Wā'il. Ḥanīfa is a large tribe and most of them lived in Yamāma. Ḥanīfa was an important *ridda* tribe who had revolted against the Muslims. ‘Ijl lived in areas from Yamāma to al-Baṣra. Some of these also ruled in the areas of Iraq.¹⁵¹ The reason for low representation of Ḥanīfa is their involvement in the *ridda* wars. These tribes were initially discouraged by ‘Umar to join the conquest movement, later they were allowed. Secondly most of the Shaybān were nomadic tribesmen while most of Ḥanīfa were settled tribesmen doing agriculture in Yamāma.¹⁵² That could be another reason for their low number of migrations at Iraq. The geographical closeness of

¹⁴⁹ Donner, "Tribal Settlement of Basra", 103-4

¹⁵⁰See page no, 77-8.

¹⁵¹ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 302.

¹⁵²Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 24.

‘Ijl with Iraq could be an important motivating factor for them. They were also the enthusiastic participants in the battle of *Qādisiyya* and that’s why they were found in better number at al-Kūfa.

‘Anzah of Asad lived in ‘Aīn-ul-Tamr,¹⁵³ and then they migrated to Khyber. Hilāl bin ‘Amir is a sub-branch of ‘Anzah. After they had settled at al-Kūfa, ‘Anzah had voluntarily killed a rebel and took his head to caliph Abdul Malik who rewarded them with stipends and the area of Bānīqiyā.¹⁵⁴ Jadīla lived in Tihama, and then settled at Bahraīn in an area called Bilād-i-Hijr. It remained as part of the Persian government for many years.¹⁵⁵ A sub-branch of Jadīla is ‘Abdūl-Qays. Some of them had come to the Prophet (PBUH) and had accepted Islam. However a few of them were also involved in *ridda* wars. Ila bin al-Haḍrami¹⁵⁶ was sent to curb their revolt.¹⁵⁷ The ‘Abdī mentioned in the table is in fact ‘Abdūl-Qays as Ibn Hujr while giving the genealogies of certain ‘Abdī has referred to them as ‘Abdūl-Qays.¹⁵⁸ The Prophet (PBUH) praised the delegation of the Abdūl-Qays tribe as the “best people of the East” because they did not ask for money from him.¹⁵⁹ Abdūl-Qays are also represented at al-Baṣra in the study of Donner in the stage of initial settlers.¹⁶⁰ Zara bin al-Wazīh al-Abdi, belonged to

¹⁵³ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 300.

¹⁵⁴ Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 893. Bānīqiyā was a fertile land below al-al-Kūfa and al-Hīra.

¹⁵⁵ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 300.

¹⁵⁶ See note no 84.

¹⁵⁷ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 301.

¹⁵⁸ Ibn Ḥajar, *Isāba*, vol. 1, 40, 274, 296.

¹⁵⁹ Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 66.

¹⁶⁰ Donner, “Tribal Settlement of Basra”, 103.

Bahraīn and settled in al-Baṣra. He was also a participant in the delegation of Abdūl-Qays.¹⁶¹ Likewise ‘Umro bin al-Marjūm, belonged to Bahraīn and ‘Abdūl-Qays. He was the first member of ‘Abdūl-Qays who settled in al-Baṣra.¹⁶² The motivation of migration for ‘Abdūl-Qays was derived probably from their geographical location. Although they were sent by ‘Umar to fight *Qādisiyya* but most of them decided to settle at al-Baṣra as it was closer to their homeland. Similarly ‘Anzah, Jadīla and Hilāl of Asad probably moved because of their geographical closeness to Iraq and they were well-represented at al-Kūfa. They were found in larger numbers in the initial stages of settlement and afterwards their number remained consistent.

Taghlib is the sub-tribe of Wā'il. ‘Umro bin Kalsūm was a famous poet of Taghlib. There is also a tribe named Taghlib in Quḍā'a but it seems that the Taghlib living at Iraq belonged to Rabī'a. One of the reasons is their geographical location. Furthermore many references of Taghlib of Rabī'a can be found in the narratives of Muslim history. For instance a famous *khārijī* Walīd bin Ḥarīr bin ‘Amir who fought in Iraq, belonged to Taghlib of Rabī'a.¹⁶³ Taghlib had a long history of war with Shaybān and probably it was the reason that although they joined the conquest movement yet they were found at al-Kūfa in lesser number. Taghlib had fought in favor of Kisra in the battle of Dhi-Qār.¹⁶⁴ During the battle of *Qādisiyya*, they left the Persians and joined the Muslim army. Some causes of

¹⁶¹ Ibn Sa‘d, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 5, 649.

¹⁶² Ibid., 650.

¹⁶³ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 301.

¹⁶⁴ Ibn Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, vol. 1, 488-9.

the lesser representation of Tagħlib had already been discussed.¹⁶⁵ Thus apart from Tagħlib and Hanīfa, Rabī'a was well-represented at al-Kūfa. The most important motivation behind their migration was their earlier interaction with Iraqis and their geographical closeness to Iraq

2.2.2.2 *Mudar (Qays 'Aiylān)*

Name of the tribe	Initial settlers	First tabaqa	Second Tabaqa	Third Tabaqa	Fourth Tabaqa	Fifth Tabaqa
Għaġfan	0	4	6	1	0	0
Tha'labha	2	0	0	2	1	0
Hawāzin (Thaqif)	4	2	4	2	1	1
Muħārib	4	3	0	3	2	0
Fazāra	1	4	0	1	1	1
Sūlaym	3	2	2	1	3	2
Ashja'i	8	3	3	0	0	0
Hawāzin (Jush'am)	1	1	0	2	0	0
[REDACTED]	1	3	0	0	0	0
Hawāzin ('Umro bin Awf)	5	0	0	0	0	0
Hārith bin Kulāb	1	0	0	0	0	0
[REDACTED]	2	14	0	1	1	2
[REDACTED]	6	5	0	4	0	1

¹⁶⁵See page no, 87-8.

• Ghaṭfān, Tha‘laba, Thafiq, Muḥārib, Fazāra, Sūlaym, and Jush‘am and Ashja‘i:	Few and consistent
• Salūl:	Very few
• ‘Umro bin Awf and Ḥārith bin Kulāb:	Few and disappeared
• ‘Abs and ‘Amr bin Ṣa‘ṣa‘a	High and consistent

Ghaṭfān is a vast tribe and has various branches, for instance ‘Abs, Fazāra and Ashja‘i. Ghaṭfān had been living in Najd in the period of Muslim conquest; afterwards they migrated to several other places. Abs is the only branch of Ghaṭfān which was larger in number in the initial period and remained consistent in the later period. Otherwise all sub-branches of Ghaṭfān were few and consistent. Abs lived in Najd and was famous as an independent and brave tribe. ‘Antara bin Shadād al-‘Absī was one of the seven great pre-Islamic poets and famous for his bravery and chivalry.¹⁶⁶ That’s probably the reason for their eager involvement in the conquest and subsequently their settlement at al-Kūfa in larger number.

Another tribe of Qays ‘Aiylān which was well-represented in the initial period and remained consistent in the later period was ‘Amr bin Ṣa‘ṣa‘a, the sub-tribe of Hawāzin. ‘Amr bin Ṣa‘ṣa‘a was found in larger number at al-Baṣra as well.¹⁶⁷ Other branches of Hawāzin were Salūl, ‘Umro bin Awf, Jush‘am and

¹⁶⁶Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 305.

¹⁶⁷Donner, “Tribal Settlement of Basra”, 104.

Thaqīf. Salūl of Hawāzin lived between Tihama and Najd.¹⁶⁸ Salūl had come to the Prophet (PBUH) as a delegation and embraced Islam. Earlier, one of their members gave his oath of allegiance to the Prophet at *Hudībiyya*. After the conquest, a few of them settled at al-Kūfa. Several Salūli were staunch supporters of ‘Alī bin Abū Talib at al-Kūfa.¹⁶⁹ They decided to settle at Iraq as they were involved in initial stages of conquest. In addition, they thought it beneficial to settle at Iraq instead of moving back to Tihama and Najd, the areas which were economically backward as compared to al-Kūfa.

Other branches of Hawāzin whose number remained consistent were Thaqīf, and Jush‘am. Thaqīf was well-represented in al-Baṣra in the period of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH) and kept on migrating or their descendants lived in al-Baṣra in first and second Tabaqa.¹⁷⁰ Thaṣīq got power and rule in various parts of Iraq, Syria, Yaman and Makkah after Islam. Hajjāj bin Yūsaf and Mukhtar Thaqafi, the two important characters of Kufan history belonged to Thaqīf.¹⁷¹ Thaqīf were settled at Taif before Islam and had trading relationship with the Makkans. Both Quraysh and Thaqīf were engaged in joint trade caravans. Abū Sufyān and Mughīra bin Shu‘ba were said to be involved in several joint trade projects. Umayyad and Thaqīf had close relationships including marital relations as well. Moreover, Thaqīf were amongst those few Arabs who had some

¹⁶⁸ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 310.

¹⁶⁹ Micheal Lecker, *People, Tribes and Society in Arabia*, 29.

¹⁷⁰ Donner, “Tribal Settlement of Basra”, 102, 104.

¹⁷¹ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 309-10.

number of literates.¹⁷² This probably reveals the causes for the high status of Thaqīf after conquest.¹⁷³ The close relation with the Quraysh also explicates their motives to migrate. Though Thaqīf were settled people and it was difficult for them to migrate but they migrated for positions of power and authority.

Muḥārib and Sūlaym are two other important branches of Qays ‘Aiylān whose number remained consistent at Iraq. Some of the Sūlaym had accepted Islam and had joined Prophet (PBUH) in the battle of *Hunain*.¹⁷⁴ ‘Umro bin Utba was a friend of the Prophet (PBUH) and had accepted Islam along with Abū Bakr and Bilāl. Yet, several of them were staunch enemies of Islam and accepted it very late. Sūlaym were agriculturists but both Sūlaym and Hawāzin were famous for their military exploits. Sūlaym had good relations with the Madīnans and used to do trade with them. Sūlaym were also appointed to higher posts and this was because of their good relations with Quraysh. Some of the Sūlaymi settled at Iraq and held higher positions as well.¹⁷⁵ Sūlaym were well-represented at al-Baṣra in the period of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH) but their number decreased in the first and second ṭabaqa.¹⁷⁶ Their lesser representation can be explained by their settled background. They were agriculturists and it is difficult for settled population to migrate.

¹⁷² Micheal Lecker, *People, Tribes and Society in Arabia*, 84-6.

¹⁷³ For more details about Thaqīf see, Abdul Jabbar Mansi Al-Abidi, *Al-Ṭā'if-wa-dawr-i-Qabīla Thaqīf al-‘Arabīat Min al-‘Aṣr-ul-Jahiliya Al-Akhīr Hata Qayāmat-ul-Dawlat-ul-Umwiyyat*, Al-Riaz: Dar-ur-Rafahi, 1982.

¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁵ Micheal Lecker, *People, Tribes and Society in Arabia*, 31-3.

¹⁷⁶ Donner, “Tribal Settlement of Basra”, 102, 104.

On the whole Qays 'Aiylān had lesser representation at al-Kūfa. Tabari on the other hand claimed a better representation of Muḍar at al-Baṣra, and commented that Muḍar outnumbered Rabī'a at al-Baṣra in 64 AH.¹⁷⁷ Similarly according to the study of Donner, Thaqīf were very well-represented at al-Baṣra and kept on increasing. Still, apart from Thaqīf, none of the major tribes of Qays 'Aiylān were seen in majority at al-Kūfa. It is reported by Ibn Khaldūn that most of the Hawāzin migrated to Africa and the West. Correspondingly Fazāra, the sub-branch of Ghāṭfān also migrated in large number to Africa and West. Most of the Sūlaym also went to Africa and West.¹⁷⁸ This probably throws light on the reasons of their lesser number at Iraq.

2.2.2.3 Muḍar (*Elyās*)

Name of the tribe	Initial Settlers	First Tabaqa	Second Tabaqa	Third Tabaqa	Fourth Tabaqa	Fifth Tabaqa
Quraysh (fāhir) Taym, makhzoom, Abd Manaf bin Zuhra	7	6	2	4	3	2
Hudhayl	1	2	2	2	0	1
Tamīm (Zaid Manat+yarbū'h)	2	6	0	0	1	0
Banu Ḍabba	1	3	0	1	4	1
Kāhīl (Asad)	0	4	0	2	0	0
██████████	4	3	0	0	0	0

¹⁷⁷Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 450.

¹⁷⁸Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 306-7.

Aslam	3	0	0	0	0	0
	4	11	0	3	0	0

- Quraysh, Hudhayl, Tamīm, Dabba, Kāhil: Few and consistent
- Muzayna: Very few
- Aslam: Few and disappeared
- Khuzayma High and consistent

It appears that the number of the tribes of Elyās mostly remained consistent and most of them were not so eager to shift in large numbers at al-Kūfa after the initial settlement. The only tribe of Elyās whose number was high in the initial period and it remained consistent in the later period is Khuzayma. Asad bin Khuzayma bin Mudrika lived in Najd in the neighborhood of Tay'. This Asad migrated to different areas and now there is no remain of them in Najd. Kāhil and Dawdān bin Asad are its sub-tribes.¹⁷⁹ The increase in the number of Dawdān bin Asad can be explained by this phenomenon. Kāhil must have moved to some other places as well.

When looking at the background of Tamīm, it appears to be an important tribe of Muḍar. Tamīm had come with a large deputation of Tamīm to the Prophet

¹⁷⁹Ibid., 319-20

(PBUH) in 10 AH and accepted Islam.¹⁸⁰ In pre-Islamic times, Quraysh had established close ties with the nomadic tribe of Tamīm who cooperated in the organization of Makkahn caravans. Quraysh used to give them certain duties in the performance of cultic rituals in Ka‘ba. Furthermore Quraysh had also formed marriage ties with them. Important members of Tamīm were given gifts in excess of their share of the booty by the Prophet (PBUH) due to their prestigious position. Tamīm was also involved in *ridda* wars against the Muslims.¹⁸¹ However, they were forgiven, had participated in *Qādisiyya* and due to the loss of their power and prestige at Arabia decided to settle at Iraq. The number of Tamīm at al-Kūfa was few and it remained consistent, nonetheless they were well-represented at al-Baṣra in the period of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH) and it continued to exist in the first and second ṭabaqa.¹⁸²

The most noteworthy tribe of Elyās was Quraysh who was the elite of the Arab state. The Quraysh had decided not to settle in larger number at Iraq. The Quraysh mainly spread to different areas as they had gained the positions of power and authority at various places.¹⁸³ Quraysh were very few at al-Baṣra in the

¹⁸⁰ Al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh-ul-Islam*, vol. 2, 675-7; Shoufani argued that Tamīm did not formally accepted Islam however many of its sections made pacts with Prophet (PBUH). Shoufani, *Al-Riddah*, 34-5.

¹⁸¹ Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 28, 65, 85.

¹⁸² Donner, “Tribal Settlement of Basra”, 103-4. Tamīm provided ten to twelve thousands fighting men in Basra by 656AD and they were found in larger numbers at Basra. Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquests*, 247.

¹⁸³ Donner argued that the Muslim elite was consisted of Quraysh and Thaqīf of al-Taif, both settled people and Islamic state wanted to subjugate the nomadic tribes. Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 79-81.

period of the companions of the Prophet.¹⁸⁴ Likewise they were few in number at al-Kūfa too, yet their political significance was undeniable.

Similarly some other tribes of Elyās were also not very eager migrants. For instance the number of Ḥabba was also few and consistent. Ḥabba lived in Najd in the neighbourhood of Tamīm. Ibn Khaldūn relates that they had migrated to Iraq in the period of conquest. The chief of Ḥabba had fought in the favor of Ayesha against Ali in the battle of Jamal.¹⁸⁵ Another tribe which appeared in the category of few and consistent was Hudhayl. ‘Abdullah bin Mas‘ūd, a famous companion belonged to Hudhayl. He had participated in Badr. ‘Umar had sent him to al-Kūfa to teach religion to the people of al-Kūfa. ‘Abdullah bin Mas‘ūd had migrated back to Medina in the period of ‘Uthmān and died there, though the members of his family appeared in the third and fifth ṭabaqa. Probably he had left his family at al-Kūfa or they had moved back to al-Kūfa in the period of political crisis as many people migrated to other areas from Medina during the siege of ‘Uthmān.¹⁸⁶

Another tribe of Elyās showing the representation of very few was Muzayna. Na‘mān bin Umro of Muzayna had participated in battle of Ditch.¹⁸⁷ On the other hand, Muzayna were in a good number at al-Baṣra in the period of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH).¹⁸⁸ Thus on the whole, the representation of Elyās was also low at Iraq. Yet, Quraysh and Tamīm had played a central role in

¹⁸⁴Donner, “Tribal Settlement of Basra”, 102.

¹⁸⁵Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 319.

¹⁸⁶Ibn Sa‘d, *Ṭabaqāt*, , vol, 6, 14, 227, 233, 234.

¹⁸⁷Ibn Sa‘d, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol, 6, 19.

¹⁸⁸Donner, “Tribal Settlement of Basra”, 102.

the politics of Iraq in future years despite of their lesser number. Tamīm and Bakr bin Wā'il had been the enemies in pre-Islamic times. They continued to make alliances and enmities in the later times.

On the whole Yamani and some tribes of Rabī'a were more interested in settling at al-Kūfa. The number of the tribes of Muḍar was low except for a few tribes like 'Abs, 'Amr bin Ṣa'ṣa'a and Duadan bin Asad of Khuzayma. The reason of the settlement of Rabī'a is clear as most of the tribes of Rabī'a lived on the banks of Euphrates, had participated in the conquest movement and were aware of the prosperity and wealth of Iraq. Likewise Kahlān of Yaman were also found in a larger number at al-Kūfa. The reason was their pre-Islamic contacts and interaction with Iraq. Another reason was the change in their status by the emergence of new ruling elite. Most of the Yaman had been the rulers of different dynasties of Yaman or of some smaller areas. Many of the Yamani had migrated in larger number in order to settle themselves at a secure place through which they could also share the benefits of conquests instead of losing their own places and property.

After the tribes had settled, they faced certain problems of adjustment. All of these tribes belonged to different backgrounds and some of them had also a history of warfare amongst them. Bakr was an enemy of Tamīm and Taghib. Quraysh were allies of Sūlaym, Thaqīf and Khuzā'a. Now it is to see how these factors influenced the settlement pattern of the migrants. Moreover, they also faced certain climatic and ecological changes which affected their life. The most

important change was the difference of polity that occurred in their life after migration.

Chapter 3

Adjustment Issues of the Migrants

Whenever people move from one place to another, they have to face certain issues of adjustment, the nature of which can be varying according to the type of migration. These problems are more severe for those who migrate during political turmoil and chaos. In most of such cases, the migrants are the undesired group of people with whom the natives are frequently not ready to share their resources. Usually, such groups have to put in great effort to position them in the new society. The adjustment matters remain intact in free migration too, however with lesser intensity as most of the free migrants had generally arranged some measures before their arrival at the new place. Several of them only migrate after getting assurance about some job.

The Arab migration to Iraq was not as difficult for the Arabs as modern migration is for the migrants. Being the conqueror, the Arabs had decided to inhabit new cities; thus they had faced less problems of adjustment. Initially when the army was not sure to stay permanently at Iraq, they had to deal with certain problems related with the change of residence. The army was moving gradually without intending to stay at these places for longer times yet they had to spend a considerable time in these areas. This time was a vital stage of migration during which the migrants gained a new experience which not only helped them in making final decision to permanently settle at Iraq but also taught them about certain cultural and climatic aspects of the new area. The journey throughout Iraq acquainted them about its different places and determined their relations with the

locals. Finally the Arabs had decided to settle mainly in the garrison cities of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra, and a small population also chose to live in certain other garrisons.

One more major transformation that came in the life of the migrants was the homogenous urban lifestyle of the garrisons. Urbanized life was new for the migrants who had originated from varying backgrounds, both nomads and semi-nomads. It was also novel for them to live amongst a variety of the Arab tribesmen belonging to different tribes. With the passage of time, they leant to live in this inter-tribal environment resulting into conversion of old tribal identities into regional identities. Another factor which affected the migrants was the climatic and ecological change. The climate was unusual for them and it took them some time to adjust in the new areas.

Apart from these issues, the migrants had to adjust with lesser cultural transformation. Unlike some of the modern migrants, they were sure about their economic benefits leading to a definite improvement in their life standards. The migrants had less interaction with the locals and were not forced to adopt the cultural system of the new society, yet it influenced them. Migration had changed their neighborhood and had increased their exposure. The vast island dominated by the Arab tribes was replaced by a country populated by the Persians, mostly the agriculturalists, speaking Persian or Aramaic, eating different kinds of foods and wearing different kinds of clothes. Some contact with the locals was unavoidable which later determined the level of relationship between them and the locals along with formulating the role and status of the locals in their polity.

3.1 Adjustment at Earlier Migratory Places

The Arab migration towards Iraq was not a sudden movement to be completed in one day or one month; in fact it was a gradual process which extended from five to six years and went parallel to the conquest movement. The army kept on moving step by step and stayed at different stations. After five to six years of continuous conquests and stay at different stations, the army finally decided to inhabit al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra. The intermediate places can be termed as “earlier migratory places” and can also be called as “intervening obstacles”. According to Everett S. Lee, the intervening obstacles can be in any form, for instance long distance, difficult route, international restrictions like visa and cost of travel.¹ The stay at “earlier migratory places” was a difficult part of the migration in which the Arabs were not sure about their success and had no idea about their permanent stay at Iraq.

The migrants handled several adjustment issues in the earlier migratory places with much ease, yet a few of these issues were difficult to cope with. One of such critical problem was their very smaller stay at certain places. The army had stayed at only two stations al-Hīra and al-Madā'in for longer time and for rest of the places, their stay was very short. When the army got acquaintance with a certain place, there had already come the time to move forward. The earlier stage of migration was full of long and tiring travels. For instance the army of Khālid kept on moving between the areas from al-Ubūlla to al-Hīra and resided at

¹Everett S. Lee, “A Theory of Migration” 51.

different stations² On the other hand, the armies of Muthanna were standing at north, somewhere around al-Hīra. Shā‘ban had already been roaming in the areas in and around Iraq thus they had not travelled much. The forces of Muthanna and Khālid joined each other at al-Hīra. Until by this time the Arab army was divided into different units, and has been sent to Iraq from different fronts. The main course was to attack an area, make a treaty or to collect spoils of war and to stay there for a few days.

After the defeat of *Jisr*, the Arabs revived their policies; and a lot of new people were recruited.³ The army sent under the command of Sa‘d bin Abī Waqqāṣ never retreated from Iraq and successfully completed the mission of conquest. The new armies settled at Shirāf for a considerable time due to cold weather.⁴ From there they moved to al-Qādisiyya and a battle was fought there. The stay at Shirāf and al-Qādisiyya were also short.

After the battle of *Qādisiyya*, the Arab army began its travel once again in pursuit of the fleeing Persian army. Persians had fled to different areas like Dīr Ka‘b and finally to al-Madā'in. The Arab forces followed them in small units but when the Persians entered al-Madā'in, Sa‘d sent a huge army and he himself joined them. Before entering al-Madā'in, the Arab army went from al-Qādisiyya and stayed at different stations. First they went to Sābāt and stayed there. They

²For instance they stayed in areas like Al-Khūrība, Nehr-ul-Murra, al-Madhār, Zandward in Kaskar, and Ullays. Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 243-4.

³Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2217-21.

⁴Kufī, *Futūh*, vol. 1, 138; Sa‘d had married the widow of Muthanna at Shirāf. Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 2, 453.

continued their journey and went to Buhrsīr and stayed there for many days.⁵ The rapid journey must have been relatively easier for the nomadic Arab tribes, but it was probably very hard for the settled tribes of the army.

Even when the Arabs decided to stay permanently at al-Madā'in, the travel for smaller station was not over. The stay of migrants at al-Madā'in was for a longer duration, still a few of them were sent for other expeditions which required them to continue their travels. Hashim bin 'Utba was sent from al-Madā'in with a force towards Jalūlā⁶ to fight the enemy and the army resided at Jalūlā for a brief time.⁷ Likewise, Qa'qā' bin 'Umrū⁸ was sent to Ḥulwān⁹ to follow Persian forces and his army stayed at Ḥulwān until the Arabs settled at al-Kūfa.¹⁰

The concerns of those stations where the Arabs stayed for longer duration were different. For instance they lived for an extensive time at al-Hīra, and al-Madā'in. When the forces joined together at al-Hīra and it was captured,¹¹ the army of Khālid for the first time decided to reside there for a lengthy period. This was the first Arab colony where they had settled along with their families.¹²

⁵Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 262-3.

⁶See chapter 2, note, 22.

⁷Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol, 1, 2482.

⁸Qa'qā' bin 'Umrū was one of the leading commanders of the battle of *Qādissīya*. Later on he settled at al-Kūfa and turned against 'Uthmān. Al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh-ul-Islam*, vol. 3, 662; Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2935-6.

⁹See chapter2, note no, 21.

¹⁰Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2464.

¹¹A treaty was made with people of al-Hīra on one lac dirhams annually. This treaty was made by Khālid bin Walīd. Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 246.

¹²Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2057.

Al-Hīra was previously the center of the Arab retinues of Persians and was ruled by the Lakhm dynasty. The Persian Kings used to deal with their matters at Arabia especially in Tihama and Ḥijāz through the chiefs at al-Hīra. For instance when Qubādh was enthroned, he deposed Naṣr from the throne of al-Hīra and nominated al-Harit al-Kindī who accepted his mazdakite religion. He was ordered by Qubādh to spread this religion to Makkah and when some of the Makkans refused, Qubādh ordered al-Harit to attack Makkah. He however convinced Qubādh to refrain from this action due to his partisanship with the Arabs.¹³ In the same way there are traditions which confirm that the king of al-Hīra had always exerted his influence over the affairs of Madina. There was a time when Jews, Aws and Khazrij had disputed amongst each other and there were quarrels until Amr bin al-Itnaba al-Khazraji entered the court of Na‘mān bin al-Mandhar, the king of al-Hīra and was nominated by him as the chief over al-Madina.¹⁴ The kings of al-Hīra worked through making alliances with the local chiefs, giving them share in spoils and granting them fiefs. They also very cleverly used intertribal feuds and hostilities for their own advantages.¹⁵ Ibn Khaldūn has reported that several Arab tribes like Hudhayl, Lakhm, Ju‘fī, Ṭay’, Kalb, Azd, Judhām and Quḍā‘a stayed at al-Hīra in ancient times. Some of them later went to Yaman and Syria but a few stayed there.¹⁶

¹³Kister, “Al-Hira: Some Notes on its Relations with Arabia”, 144-15.

¹⁴Ibid., 147.

¹⁵Ibid., 148-9, 155-6.

¹⁶Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 237-40.

Thus al-Hīra was a place which the Arabs always idealized. The power and magnificence of the kings of al-Hīra was known to the Makkans and the Madinans. The Arabs had utilized al-Hīra as their first base and sent further expeditions to different areas from al-Hīra. During their stay at al-Hīra, the Arabs captured almost half of Sawād and raided the areas till the end of Tigris.¹⁷ Thus the Arabs were most willing to stay at al-Hīra but they were soon forced to leave the place. The armies of Khālid were called back by the Arab state and only the armies of Shā'ban had remained at al-Hīra. The Persians attacked and easily took the control of al-Hīra back from the Arabs. The armies of Muthanna had moved from al-Hīra to Dhī-Qar after the people of al-Hīra had renounced their treaty.¹⁸ For regaining their control over al-Hīra, the Arabs had to pass a lengthy process of conquest of whole Iraq.

Later on when al-Madā'in was conquered, Sa'd decided to permanently settle the armies there. He had been offering *Namaz-i-Qaṣr* (short prayer during journey) at earlier stations but at al-Madā'in, Sa'd offered full prayer.¹⁹ Sa'd entered in *Qaṣr-al-Abyad* (*white palace*) and declared it to be place for offering prayer.²⁰ The houses of al-Madā'in were divided between the Arab population and they called their families to al-Madā'in.²¹ The Arabs stayed at al-Madā'in for a longer period and conquered Jalūlā, Takrīt and Maḥaṣil from here. Yet, after a two

¹⁷Tabarī, *Tārīkh* vol. 1, 2059-75.

¹⁸Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 2, 448-453.

¹⁹Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2443.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid., 2451.

years stay at al-Madā'in, the Arabs began to feel the problems of this new place and desired to shift. This time they were not forced to leave by the local population and al-Madā'in remained in their control. It was in fact the climatic condition with which the Arabs were not adjusting. They were not comfortable with the environment thus they decided to move to al-Kūfa.

Apart from those places where the Arabs set off as invaders, there were several places which they used for residing their families. After the army of Khālid left for Syria, the Persians took several areas back from the Arabs. In response, the Arab state prepared a huge army to go to the Iraqi front.²² The new forces that had come as reinforcement had left their families at al-Qawādis (probably al-Qādisiyya) and the already fighting tribes like Muthanna had their families settled at Dhī-Qār.²³ The women and children at al-Qawādis were almost defenseless but it was surely under the control of the Arabs, as the earlier instructions of Abū Bakr were not to leave any area unconquered before proceeding further.²⁴ The spoils of war in the form of food items like goats, flour etc was sent to these women and children after the battle of Bū'waib.²⁵ The army of Sa'd bin Abi Waqqās also brought their families along. There is strong evidence supporting the assumption that the army of Sa'd had settled with their families. The accounts relate that there were women and children present at al-

²²Ibid., 2161.

²³Ibid., 2197; Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 2, 434-5.

²⁴Tabarī, *Tārīkh* vol. 1, 2057.

²⁵Ibid., 2197.

Qādisiyya. The majority of them were from Bajīla and Nakh'a.²⁶ There is also reference to many other women who had participated in the battle of *Qādisiyya* as they had brought the martyrs from the battlefield and had made arrangements for their burial.²⁷ Similarly, when Sa'd was in al-Madā'in, 'Umar had ordered him to leave the women and children behind in al-'Atīq and also to leave a guardian army for them.²⁸

A further concern of adjustment at the earlier migratory places was to manage the basic necessities of the migrants. During this intervening stage of migration, it was very essential to find out proper resources of food, shelter, clothing and other basic necessities. The Arabs relied extensively on the spoils of war for the fulfillment of their needs. Apart from spoils of war, they also reinvented the old Arab custom of raiding for collecting food and money. Jarīr was sent by Khālid to Bānqīyyā where he signed a peace treaty on the condition of thousand dirhams and an Iranian cloak.²⁹ The Arabs looted gold, silver and other valuable items from al-'Anbar and after the surrender of the people there a treaty was prepared finally. This peace was also signed by Jarīr bin 'Abdullah on four lac dirhams and one thousand dresses (some kind of cloaks) annually.³⁰ Likewise 'Aīn-ul-Tamr was captured from where were found the famous Abān bin Humrān, Abū Muḥammad bin Sīrīn and his brothers, and Nuṣayr, the father of Mūsa bin

²⁶Ibid., 2363-4.

²⁷ Mas'ūdī, *Marij*, vol, 2, 317,

²⁸ Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol, 1, 2419.

²⁹Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 247.

³⁰Ibid.

Nuṣayr.³¹ In the same way when ‘Umar had sent reinforcement to Muthanna, Abū ‘Ubayd³² and Muthanna took slaves from different areas.³³ The further raids were not only satisfying the requirements of food but were also providing the migrants with a sufficient number of labour force which they could employ for different manual jobs. The captured slaves were added as part of the Arab household and played a vital role in the future polity of the Arabs at Iraq. Other successful raids from Al-Hīra included the attack on the towns of Tagħlib, Rabī‘a, ‘Ukbara and al-Bardhan.³⁴ After completing all these raids, Jarīr came back to the people of al-Hīra, Nakhīla and Bānqīyyā and received the annual tax, which later on turned out to be a permanent source of income for the migrants.³⁵

This policy of raid continued even during and after the battle of *Qādisiyya*. Several smaller raids were attempted in order to get food, cattle and other provisions. In these raids men, women, and cattle was captured and food items were taken over to be distributed amongst the army and also amongst the families. After the conquest of Būwaīb, Muthanna was advised by two men to raid the markets of Khanāfas and Baghdād which they did followed by the killing of many men and pillaging gold and silver.³⁶ In the same manner, when the Arabs had

³¹Ibid., 248-9.

³²Abū ‘Ubayd was the new commander of the Muslim army

³³Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2170.

³⁴Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 249-50.

³⁵Ibid., 248.

³⁶Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2202-5; Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil* vol.2, 445-7.

settled at al-Qādisiyya, they looted the local people and only those were saved who were in their fortresses; other men and cattle were taken over by the Arabs.³⁷

The stay at earlier migratory places was a hard part of the Arab migration. The migrants stayed for a very short duration at most of the stations and remained in a state of journey most of the time. Twice when they decided to stay for extensive time, their plan was failed. At al-Hīra, they were forced to leave by the local population and at al-Madā'in, they were compelled to depart due to the unsuitable environmental conditions. Leaving families behind somewhere in the new place was also a tough task. They had to keep guardian army for their families and also had to take care of their needs. For fulfilling the needs of the migrant army and their families, the migrants had to made several raids and smaller expeditions during their stay at earlier migratory places. Yet the migrants successfully dealt with these initial hardships and happily moved over to the next phase of migration.

3.2 Urban and Intertribal Lifestyle

A further change with which the migrants had to adjust was the new settlement pattern consisting of two major and some smaller garrisons. Most of the migrants were nomadic before and the garrisons were constructed to promote urban lifestyle. The main settlement was at al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra where the Arabs had built their houses. Besides, separate colonies were constructed for different tribes who began to live together in a consolidated place.

³⁷Tabarī, *Tārīkh* vol. 1, 2223-5, 2244-5; Also see Morony, *Iraq After the Muslim Conquest*, 226.

The style of construction of the garrisons was urban in which proper planning was involved. For instance in al-Kūfa, there was a mosque in the centre adjoined with the palace of the governor and the market place. Sa'd had originally built the palace and the mosque separate but when an incident of stealing in *bait-ul-māl* occurred, he joined the buildings of the mosque and the palace. The new joint building was constructed by Rozūba, a Persian builder who used bricks of a desolated palace of al-Hīra to construct this building and took *sang-e-mar mar* (marble) from the churches of Kisra to beautify its pillars.³⁸

The rest of the city was constructed around the mosque and the palace. This continued to be a common pattern of construction of the Muslim cities afterwards. The design was probably originally took by Makkah in which Ka'ba held the central position surrounded by the rest of the city. Morony however believes that in the construction of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra, an inspiration was taken from al-Hīra. According to him,

The organization of late Sasanian Hīra around several fortified enclosures (Ar. *qusur*) that were identified with particular clans, the existence of tribal churches, and the political and social domination of the town by an elite of notables (Ar. *ashrāf*) belonging to the leading clans make Hīra a good example of a late pre-Islamic Arab city as well as a prototype for tribally organized early Islamic cities such as Kūfa and Baṣra.³⁹

In al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra, the army initially resided in tents and bamboo houses but after an incident of fire broke out, the settlers took permission from Caliph 'Umar to built houses of bricks.⁴⁰ Some of the houses later were double

³⁸Tabarī, *Tārikh*, vol. 1, 2489.

³⁹Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest*, 221.

⁴⁰Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 277; Later on people built beautiful houses at al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra. For instance, Zubayr bin Awām prepared a house in Baṣra, a magnificent house in which wealthy

stories as is evident from some of the incidents.⁴¹ Al-Kūfa however was not a fortified city as al-Madā'in was.

There is not much information about the pattern of the construction of al-Baṣra but it could be assumed that the style would be the same more or less. Al-Baṣra was initially developed by the houses of tents but gradually when the population of the area increased, some of the Arabs constructed seven colonies with mud bricks. Azd and Tamīm formed four colonies; two each, likewise three more colonies were formed by some other tribal groups.⁴² There was a provision depot near al-Baṣra famous with the name of Madīnat-ul-Rizq which was a fortified city. It was originally formed as a supply centre where food was stored and cattle were slaughtered.⁴³

The construction of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra was not only urban but it was also inter-tribal. The Arabs of several distinct genres were settled together and lived in one place. In al-Kūfa, the tribes were lined up in different streets around the mosque.⁴⁴ A separate settlement was prepared for the border Arab tribes of Mūsal, if in case they ever would like to come to al-Kūfa and stay there. Thus the caravan of Mosul or other borders used to stay at that specific place at al-Kūfa.⁴⁵

merchants used to come and stay. He also constructed a house in Al-Kūfa and was considered to be a wealthy person. Similarly Ṭalḥa bin Ubaydulla constructed a magnificent house in Al-Kūfa . It was famous with the name of "kinasa dar ul Batheen". Mas'ūdī, *Marūj*, 332-3.

⁴¹Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2529-32.

⁴²Ibn Saad, *Tabaqat*, vol. 7, 5.

⁴³Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 681-2.

⁴⁴See details on chapter 2, 87.

⁴⁵Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2490.

The Arabs learnt to live in an inter-tribal environment and instead of having tribal warfare; they made alliances and cooperated with each other. The Arab tribes had come from several different backgrounds and then all of them had settled at al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra. Their different identities were gradually merged and new identities of the Kufan and the Basran Arabs emerged. In the initial phase of settlement, the tribes were happily settled. At al-Kūfa, Sa'd had determined the boundaries of the city and made a lucky draw between *ahl-al-Yaman*⁴⁶ and *ahl-ul-Nizār*⁴⁷ for the better part of the city which was the eastern part. The draw was won by the *ahl-al-Yaman* and they settled in the eastern part while *Nizār* went to the western part.⁴⁸

The initial period of settlement during the reign of caliph 'Umar and 'Uthmān was of peace between the tribes as they were busy in further conquests. Even in the time period of 'Uthmān and 'Alī, the tribes did not fight on tribal bases, instead the new identities of being the supporters of Ali or the supporters of other groups emerged. Thus in the battle of *Jamal*⁴⁹ which was fought between 'Ayi'sha and 'Alī, the members of the tribes fought against their own members. Most of the Kufans supported Ali and most of the Basrans supported 'Ayi'sha.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ *Ahl-ul-Yaman* were the southern Arabs including Quḍā'a and Kahtān.

⁴⁷ *Ahl-ul-Nizār* were the northern Arabs comprising of the tribes of Rabī'a and Muḍar.

⁴⁸ Balādhuri, *Futūh*, 276.

⁴⁹ The battle of *Jamal* was fought in which 'Ayi'sha, the wife of the Prophet (PBUH) and Talha and Zubār, two of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH) fought against 'Alī, the caliph of the Arab empire at that time.

⁵⁰ In the battle of *Jamal*, the tribes this time did not remain united, there emerged factions and it is reported by Tabarī that both the armies contained tribes of Muḍar, Rabia and Yaman. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 3224.

After the battle of *Jamal*, Ali gained control over the whole of Iraq and prepared the Kufans and the Basrans to fight against the Syrian army of Mu‘āwiya. A broader identity of the Iraqi Arabs emerged and was most visible in the civil war of *Siffin* in which all Iraqi Arabs fought against the Syrian Arabs.⁵¹ Throughout the Umayyad period, the identity of being an Iraqi remained much stronger than the tribal identity; probably that was the reason of lesser tribal conflicts at Iraq during this period. Iraq was famous for its ant-Umayyad attitude and all of the conflicts and civil wars reveal this attitude.

Al-Kūfa was more diverse in its tribal composition yet no major tribal conflict was reported there. It however occurred in al-Baṣra but the duration and severity of the conflict was very low. Azd and Tamīm emerged as the two most important tribal groups in al-Baṣra. Ziyād was the governor of al-Baṣra for Ali, but when the position of Ali declined, Mu‘āwiya sent Ibn al-Hazrami as his governor over al-Baṣra who gathered the support of the majority of the Baṣrans for Mu‘āwiya. Ibn al-Hazrami was staying with Tamīm, and Ziyād had taken refuge with Azd. Ziyād wanted the Azd to fight a battle with Tamīm, yet Azd refrained from it.⁵²

Likewise there is another incident of tribal conflict between Tamīm and Azd. It was also associated and related with the political crisis of that period. The death of caliph Yazīd was an unexpected and shocking event for the pro-Umayyad group. It had also weakened the position of the provincial governors thus

⁵¹Ibid., 3287; See details in Mahmoud M. Ayoub, *The Crisis of Muslim History: Religion and Politics in Early Islam* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 106-133.

⁵²Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 3414-17.

Ubaydulla,⁵³ the governor of al-Baṣra was also in an instable position. Ubaydulla fled with the help of an Azdi and took refuge with Mas‘ūd bin Amr who was the leader of Azd in al-Baṣra.⁵⁴ After giving protection to Ubaydulla, Azd was ordered to be armed to defend him. In the meanwhile controversy began between Muḍar and Rabī‘a. Ubaydulla heated up the controversy which had emerged between a Qurayshī and a Bakrī on the incident of the death of two men of Bakr bin Wā'il by ‘Abdullah b. Kazim at Khurasan.⁵⁵ When Ubaydulla heard of this quarrel, he sent Mas‘ūd and told him to make an alliance with Bakr.⁵⁶ They had also made an alliance previously for the support of caliph Yazīd. Bakr and Azd renewed the old alliance and wrote an agreement.⁵⁷ They appointed Mas‘ūd bin ‘Amr of Azd as their joint chief and together with the people of Yemen and Rabī‘a, they went to the governor house. Mas‘ūd ascended the pulpit but was killed by Tamīm.⁵⁸ After Mas‘ūd was killed, a great battle was fought between Tamīm and Azd with Bakr as their allies. Finally Tamīm and Azd made peace on

⁵³ Ubaydulla was the son of Ziyād bin Abū Sufyān.

⁵⁴ Al-Harith convinced Mas‘ūd bin ‘Amr to give refuge to Ubaydulla. Mas‘ūd was slightly reluctant and do not want to deceive the other tribes of his garrison. Still, he agreed to give refuge to Ubaydulla. Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 445-6.

⁵⁵ In 64 AH, ‘Abdulla bin Kāzim of the Sūlaym killed two sons of Sūlaymān who belonged to Bakr bin Wā'il. After this incident, Bakr bin Wā'il and Ibn Kāzim with Muḍar fought a war for one year in which Bakr bin Wā'il was defeated. Ibn Kāzim killed all captives of war. Ibid., 488-97; This had its effects on Basrans. There was a gathering in a mosque and a Qureshī spoke rudely to Mālik bin Misma‘ of Bakr bin Wā'il, who was previously the leader of Bakr. One of the members of Rabī‘a hit that Qureshī and quarrel broke out between Rabī‘a and Muḍar. Many of the Tamīm came for the support of Muḍar and defeated Rabī‘a. On this, Bakr bin Wā'il got annoyed and their leader ‘Ashyām bin Shaqīq al-Sadūsī ordered them to kill any Muḍar whom they came across. Mālik bin Misma‘ pacified them and there was no quarrel till one month. But after one month, another incident of quarrel broke out between Bakr b. Wail and Tamīm which finally resulted in a battle between the two. Ibid., 447-8.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 449.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 449.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 450-2.

the condition of the payment of ten times the blood money for the killing of Mas'ūd.⁵⁹ Ubaydulla wanted to utilize this controversy in his own favor. When failed in his plans, he simply left his protectors for Syria.⁶⁰ Apart from these fewer events, the sources have not reported any considerable tribal conflict in al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra despite of the fact that several Arab tribes had enmities in pre-Islamic times.

The Arabs who settled in smaller garrisons were more easily settled. They were less affected from the political turmoil and crisis of the empire when compared with al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra. Several civil wars were fought in al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra but the smaller garrisons like al-Madā'in, al-Hīra and al-Qādisiyya were safe from such incidents. Some of the initial settlers had remained back at al-Madā'in and al-Hīra but there are several examples in which some of the people of al-Kūfa later on loved those places and preferred to have their homes at al-Madā'in or Hira.⁶¹ In point of fact al-Hīra was treated as a sub-district of al-Kūfa being geographically closer to it. The leader of the *khawarij* Mustawrid bin 'Ulifa, had settled at al-Hīra in 43 AH. He had a house at al-Hīra near *Qasr al-Adasiyyin*.⁶² Similarly Hajjar b. Abjar⁶³ had a house at al-Hīra closer to the house

⁵⁹ Ibid., 462-3.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 433.

⁶¹ For instance Mughīra b. Shubah demanded from Ziyād to give him the settlements at Qarqisiyya, a town on the left bank of Euphrates where Qays Aiylan had already settled. Ibid., 72. Al-Hasan after assuming caliphate went to al-Madā'in and lived there until he granted caliphate to Mu'āwiya. Ibid., 2-4.

⁶² Ibid., 29-30; Qasr Adisiyyin was one of the fortified enclosures at the town of Al-Hira, about six kilometers from al-Al-Kūfa .

⁶³ He belonged to 'Ijl of Bakr bin Wā'il and had given testimony against Hujr bin Adi. Ibid., 113.

of Mustawrid. It also appears that they kept on moving from their house of al-Hīra to al-Kūfa frequently.⁶⁴

There was also a small number of the Arab population who were earlier settlers at Iraq. As it has been discussed in chapter 2 that several tribes of Rabī'a and Kahtān had settled at al-Hīra, al-‘Anbar and several other districts of Iraq in pre-Islamic times thus it has been reported by Morony that Tanūkh, Tay'i, Tamīm, Sulaym, ‘Ijl, Shā'ban, Tha'laba, Asad, Azd, Quḍā'a and Kalb had their members at al-Hīra.⁶⁵ It can be assumed that probably the members of these tribes had preferred to settle at al-Hīra. Thus Quḍā'a, Tanūkh and Kalb did not settle at al-Kūfa. They settled at al-Baṣra in a small number and made alliance with Azd. Similarly very few of Iyād, Namīr and Taglib settled at al-Kūfa.⁶⁶

In the same way Al-Madā'in continued to be the centre of the Arabs for a longer time. Kufi reports that when ‘Umar ordered Sa'd to move to al-Kūfa from al-Madā'in, he also ordered him to leave Salman Farsi with a group of Muslims at al-Madā'in.⁶⁷ These people were registered at al-Kūfa as they used to collect their *ata* from al-Kūfa every year when pay was distributed.⁶⁸ They found al-Madā'in more comfortable. A few of them had also joined the repentance movement.⁶⁹ Apart from some attacks of the Khawarij and consequent battles at al-Madā'in, the

⁶⁴Ibid., 29-32.

⁶⁵Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest*, 221.

⁶⁶Ibid., 228.

⁶⁷Al-Kufi, *Futūh*, vol. 1, 220-1,

⁶⁸Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 504.

⁶⁹Ibid.

city was largely peaceful. Even in cases when enemy forces reached al-Madā'in, their first strategy was to close the doors of the city and to fortify themselves. Al-Madā'in was politically important and remained active throughout the Umayyad period. Ḥasan⁷⁰ stayed in al-Madian for some period.⁷¹ There were separate governors appointed for al-Madā'in.⁷² In 43 AH, the governor of al-Madā'in was Simak bin 'Ubayd who helped the Kufan army during the revolt of *khawarij*. He kept on informing the Kufan army about the location and position of *khawarij* along with providing food and proper arrangement for their rest thus the army stayed at al-Madā'in for three nights.⁷³ The migrants settled at al-Madā'in had a proper system to guard themselves. There was enough fighting army, for instance when *khawarij* tried to enter al-Madā'in, Simak bin 'Ubayd lined up his men at the gate of the city and posted archers on the walls.⁷⁴ Later on in 76 AH, Ḥajjāj bin Yūsaf⁷⁵, the then governor ordered his commander to collect five hundred cavalrymen from al-Madā'in to fight *khawarij*.⁷⁶ The governor of al-Madā'in

⁷⁰Ḥasan bin 'Alī bin Abū Ṭālib was the elder son of Ali and the grandson of the Prophet (PBUH). Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil* vol. 3, 460.

⁷¹Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 2.

⁷² Sa'd bin Mas'ūd was the governor of al-Madā'in when Ḥasan stayed there. He was the brother of Abū 'Ubayd bin Mas'ūd Thaqafī and uncle of Mukhtār Thaqafī. *Ibid*; Also see Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 280.

⁷³Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 45-6; The various armies used to stay at al-Madā'in, for instance see *Ibid.*, 901, 903

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 57.

⁷⁵Ḥajjāj bin Yūsaf bin Ḥakm belonged to Thaqafī. He played an important role in the politics as a strong governor of Iraq. He died in 95 AH. Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 4, 583-7.

⁷⁶At that time there were many men from the nobles of the garrisons and their families and numerous fighters at Madain. They were staying there to protect the areas of Jukha and 'Anbar. Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 980.

provided the army of Ḥajjāj with sufficient support. In return, the *khawarij* attacked al-Madā'in, seized their horses and killed many men. The people threw stones and arrows at the army of *Khawarij* from the roofs of the houses.⁷⁷ Thus al-Madā'in always remained politically significant⁷⁸ yet both al-Madā'in and al-Hīra faced less political chaos as compared to al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra .

The town of Qārqissīya had also settlements of Arabs. Zufaīr bin al-Ḥārith al-Kalbi was the governor over that place. Markets were set up in the town if some army of the Arabs settles there. The army of the *tawabīn*⁷⁹ stayed at Qārqissīya. It was a rich town as Zufaīr provided *tawabīn* with plenty of food items as gifts.⁸⁰ Likewise five hundred men had been posted at al-‘Anbar by Ali, therefore it seems that there was also some Arab population in al-‘Anbar.⁸¹ People of al-Kūfa had also made houses and settlements at some far-off places in Iraq.⁸² Thus Arabs had settled them in larger as well as smaller garrisons. These garrisons had

⁷⁷Ibid., 899-901.

⁷⁸Al-Madā'in was politically very important. Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh* wrote about al-Madain that it was the gateway to al-Kūfa and whoever takes the control of al-Madain, he takes the control of Al-Kūfa , this statement at another occasion was put in the mouth of Muṣarrif bin al-Mughīra who was the governor of al-Madā'in and requested Al-Hajjaj to provide him with reinforcements to protect al-Madā'in as al-Madā'in is the gate and fortress of al-Kūfa. Ibid., 929, 982; However Shabīb never give such importance to al-Madā'in, he was always interested in al-Kūfa .

⁷⁹*Tawabīn* was a brigade of people of al-Kūfa who repented over their action to leave Ḥusayn alone at Karbala and because they failed to join him. See details of the movement in chapter 4.

⁸⁰Forty camels were sent to al-Musayb and Surad and ten camels each were sent to prominent men of the army and commanders of each quarter. Moreover a large number of animals were sent along with a huge quantity of barley and the soldiers were told to take as much as they wished. Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 551-3.

⁸¹ Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 3445.

⁸² For instance, Mukhār Thaqaffī had made a settlement at Khutarniyah. Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 520

gradually developed into the centers of commercial activity. All of these garrisons remained in close contact with each other and thus relied less on the local populace.

3.3 Climatic Problems

It always becomes difficult for the migrants to adjust in new climatic conditions. Same happened with the Arab migrants. They did not face much problem in the earlier phases of migration which was also the initial stage of conquests. Even when they decided to settle their armies at al-Hīra, there was not much trouble. The reason probably was the climatic similarities of Arabia and al-Hīra. Al-Hīra laid less than a league south of al-Kūfa and Arabs were easily adjusted in al-Kūfa. Al-Kūfa occupied an extensive plain lying above the river Euphrates.⁸³ Al-Hīra was already populated by the Arabs. At the time when it was conquered by Khālid, it was ruled by Buqāila, who belonged to the tribe of Azd.⁸⁴ Thus the Arabs were easily adjusted at al-Hīra. Later they stayed at al-Qādisiyya for some time. Al-Qādisiyya lie on the actual desert border, five leagues west of al-Kūfa and it was surrounded by palm-groves.⁸⁵ The Arabs remained comfortable at al-Qādisiyya too.

However when the Arabs went to al-Madā'in and decided to settle there permanently, they had to face major problems of climatic change. They disliked the climatic conditions and moisture of al-Madā'in and found themselves

⁸³ Ibn Yāqūt, *Ma'ujam-ul-Buldān*, vol. 4, 490; Le Strange, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, 75.

⁸⁴ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 244.

⁸⁵ Le Strange, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, 76.

uncomfortable. The people complaint of the environmental conditions of al-Madā'in like in one tradition they complaint of bees and in another they were wretched by the mosquitoes.⁸⁶ One of the army men of Sa'd named Ḥuzaīfa wrote to 'Umar that the stomachs and various body parts of Arabs have become weak and their body colors have changed at al-Madā'in.⁸⁷ From al-Madā'in, the Arabs went to conqueror Jalūlā and Takrīt. The weather of Jalūlā was also very extreme for the Arabs and their health had been influenced considerably there.⁸⁸

'Umar suggested Sa'd to treat the Arabs according to their own nature. 'Umar believed that the nature of Arabs is similar to the nature of camels and thus the Arabs would like sandy areas or would like anything that is suitable for the camels.⁸⁹ His other direction was to avoid a sea between that place and Arabia.⁹⁰ At this stage, the areas from al-Ubula to Takrīt from south to north and al-Qādisiyya to al-Madā'in from east to west were conquered. There was probably no question of settling across the Persian Gulf. Thus it can be assumed that it was most probably an instruction about river as there were two rivers between Madina and al-Madā'in. Moreover al-Madā'in was very close to river Tigris and the moist environment did not suit Arabs. Caliph 'Umar probably wanted to instruct them to remain a little away from rivers. Thus finally they selected al-Kūfa which

⁸⁶ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 276-7.

⁸⁷ Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 2, 527; Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2483.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 2482.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 2483.

⁹⁰ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 275.

occupied an extensive plain lying above the river Euphrates.⁹¹ Al-Kūfa has been occasionally declared as a place of better climate. Ibn al-Faqh has mentioned a discussion in the court of an Abbasid caliph about different places. It was argued and agreed upon that al-Kūfa is better than Syria and al-Baṣra both. Al-Kūfa was declared to be unclear from the diseases which grow in Syria. The superiority of al-Kūfa was also asserted over al-Baṣra as al-Kūfa was a highland when compared with al-Baṣra and Euphrates flows from al-Kūfa which makes its water sweet.⁹² Whenever a governor landed in a-Kūfa, he found the water sweet, the air clean and the earth dirt free.⁹³

In the same way in the selection of al-Baṣra, ‘Utba bin Ghazwān⁹⁴ wrote to ‘Umar that Arabs need a place to settle and to get rest during their attacks. This time ‘Umar gave slightly different instructions to settle the people to an area which is closer to water and greenery. ‘Utba found this place at al-Baṣra.⁹⁵ Khalīfa bin Khayāṭ on the other hand believes that when the Arabs opened another front from al-Baṣra, they made their choices according to their own climatic suitability. ‘Utba bin Ghazwān reached al-Barūra which was land where Bamboos grew. He disliked it and went to al-Huraība. In another tradition, he went to al-Marbad and

⁹¹Le Strange, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, 75; It is reported by Balādhurī that Buqaīla went to Sa‘d and advised him to settle at al-Kūfa which is both away from desert and is elevated from moist and wet land. Ibid., 387; According to Khalīfa bin Khayāṭ, al-Kūfa was a place which was high and there were no mosquitoes, moreover it was a forest but was at land (not sea). He also reported it to be a green land. Khalīfa bin Khayāṭ, *Tārīkh*, 138.

⁹²Ibn al-Faqīh, *Kitab-ul-Futūh*, 201.

⁹³Ibid., 249.

⁹⁴‘Utba bin Ghazwan was sent as the commander over the Basran front. Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2026.

⁹⁵Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 241-2.

liked the red hard stones there. He named it al-Baṣra and told his followers to settle there.⁹⁶

Initially the Basrans were not well-adjusted in the new climatic and environmental conditions. They felt jealous from the climatic superiority of al-Kūfa and considered it as the result of unequal distribution of resources. Ahnaf bin Qays⁹⁷ went to ‘Umar with some of the Baṣrans and complained about the miserable conditions in which they were living. They mentioned that their brothers (people of al-Kūfa) were living in the houses of the earlier nations⁹⁸ and enjoying the facility of clean water and fertile green lands, but on the other side these people claimed to live in areas where on the one side lie sulphuric water⁹⁹ and on the other side, there are barren lands. They further complained that they cannot cultivate the lands, nor can keep cattle, thus have no source of income. Their women have to go to two *farsakh* (six miles as one *farsakh* is considered to be a distance of three miles) to bring water while she tightens her small kid on her shoulders. They requested ‘Umar to find some solution of their hunger and trouble. ‘Umar wrote down their names in the register for the payment of *atā* to them and wrote to Abū Mūsa al-Ash‘arī to dig a canal for them.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ Khalīfa bin Khayāt, *Tarīkh*, 128; Ibn al-Faqīh, *Kitab-ul-Futūh*, 227.

⁹⁷ Ahnaf was the head of Tamīm at al-Baṣra. ‘Umar praised him and appointed him to be the leader of people of al-Basra in the battle of Ahwaz. Tabarī, *Tarīkh*, vol. 1, 2538, 2540; Also see Ibn Athīr, *Asad-ul-Ghaba*, vol. 1, 55; and Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, vol. 2, 449.

⁹⁸ He was probably talking of the earlier settlement of Kufans at al-Madā'in.

⁹⁹ Sweet water had disappeared from Basra due to some climatic changes. Ibn al-Faqīh, *Kitab-ul-Futūh*, 205.

¹⁰⁰ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 350-1; Ibn al-Faqīh, *Kitab-ul-Futūh*, 232-3. Ahnaf had actually went to complain about their lesser salaries but he also talked about climatic hardships.

Later, the Arabs not only adjusted themselves in the new environment but also contributed in stopping the deterioration of the geographic conditions of Iraq. In the last days of the Sassanid, probably in 638 or 639 AD, a flood came in Tigris and Euphrates and various dams were broken. Sassanid tried their best to rebuild those dams but the flood was very heavy. The water flowed towards the neighboring areas resulting in the formation of a swamp there. Mu‘āwiya nominated his *mawla* ‘Abdullah bin Duraj over extracting *khirāj* from Iraq. He made the lands of swamp useable, repaired the dams and controlled the water. Thus he was able to extract fifty lac dirhams from these lands. Later on various lands were made useable for Hajjāj and Hisham.¹⁰¹

Another important ecological factor which struck the migrants was the breaking out of plague. The major plague was reported to break out in Syria. It can be assumed that plague at al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra was probably transported from Syria through the Arab army which kept on moving from Syria to Iraq. There are some reports of plague at al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra and it was found to be the reason of the death of earlier two governors, Mughīra and Ziyād.¹⁰² It also seems from the accounts that there were repetitive attacks of plague.¹⁰³ In 64 AH, during the governorship of ‘Abdullah bin al-Hārith Babbah,¹⁰⁴ plague again broke out in al-Baṣra. The mother of ‘Abdullah died due to this disease.¹⁰⁵ Therefore in the initial

¹⁰¹ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 290-2.

¹⁰² Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 87, 158.

¹⁰³ Plague struck at al-Kūfa and Mughīra bin Shu‘ba fled from al-Kūfa. When the disease disappeared, he came back to al-Kūfa but was stricken and died. *Ibid.*, 87.

¹⁰⁴ He was chosen as governor by the people of al-Basra. *Ibid.*, 463.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 466.

stages, some of the new diseases spread and created problems for the settlers. Yet most of the population was well-adjusted and liked the new place.

3.4 Issues of Social Adjustment

Although the Arabs had lesser contacts with the locals and developed their own social system, still they interacted with them which affected their socio-economic structure. This interaction was mainly developed on two levels. One was the dealings with the local non-Arab and non-Muslims. The other was the communication on the level of slaves and *mawālī*. Many of the locals made their place in the social network of Arabs in the form of slaves and *mawālī* who gradually increased in number and became an important part of the population of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra. Another problem of social adjustment arose when a bigger wave of later migrants began. The relation between the earlier and the later migrants was also one of the important features of migrant's life.

3.4.1 Migrants Relations with Local Non-Arabs

The relationship of Arabs with the locals was determined by their status as conquerors. The initial interaction with the locals was developed during the conquest movement. At that moment some of the locals helped the Arabs and thus found their place in the new society. The first interaction includes the meetings of different deputations of Arabs which were sent to the Persian court of Yazdjad¹⁰⁶ and the encampments of Rustam.¹⁰⁷ The person who acted as the translator for

¹⁰⁶ See chapter 2, note, 85.

¹⁰⁷ Rustam bin Farrukhzād al-Armani was the military leader of the Persians. He was given much importance in the sources. Many Arab delegates went to Persians and had lengthy dialogues with Rustam. Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2235-2238, 2243-59.

Rustum was an inhabitant of al-Hīra and was an Arab, similarly Arabs had translators in their army who usually inquire the Persian soldiers.¹⁰⁸ Although during the battles between Persians and Arabs, the locals were more willing to support Rustam and the Persian forces as they were their co-religionists but when the Persian forces had left them alone to fight against the Arabs, the common villagers changed their loyalties. They made several treaties with the Arabs and gave them money, food items and their cattle in order to save their lives from them. They also considered it an option to become subservient to the Arabs if no support would come from the Persians. The chief of al-Hīra clearly told the Persian king about their right to protect them by bribing the Muslim or surrendering to them if the Persian army will not defend them.¹⁰⁹ A few of them accepted Islam as well. For instance a soldier was captured during the battle of *Qādisiyya* who accepted Islam and remained with Ṭulayḥa,¹¹⁰ the man who had captured him.¹¹¹ A few others who accepted Islam during the battle of *Qādisiyya* were given share in the spoils of war and stipends of two thousand.¹¹² For instance Rafial was an important member of the army of Rustam who accepted Islam and got stipend. He was the narrator of different traditions regarding the army of

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 2275. 2263.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., vol. 1, 2256.

¹¹⁰ Ṭulayḥa bin Khuwaylid al-Asadi was the false prophet who had accepted Islam and fought different battles along with the Arabs. Ibid., 2259-2262.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 2260.

¹¹² Ibid., 2261.

Rustam and the situation at Persia.¹¹³ Some people accepted Islam after the conquest of *Qādisiyya*.¹¹⁴

Likewise there were some larger groups who had left the Persian royal army and had joined the Arabs. Daylimites and Asāwira both were the major army units of the Persians who joined the Arabs on the condition that they will be provided protection, will be given freedom to choose their *hāfi* and will be given stipends. Both of these groups chose to live with Tamīm. Dalymites lived at al-Kūfa and Asāwira lived at al-Baṣra.¹¹⁵ These two groups played an important role in future politics. Asāwira supported Tamīm during their tribal conflict with Bakr and Azd at al-Baṣra.¹¹⁶

Apart from these individuals and groups, the rest of the population stayed in their lands. Arabs made contracts with all of this population. A few of them had come to visit the caliph or governors occasionally. For instance the *Marzbān* of

¹¹³Ibid., 2269.

¹¹⁴Ibid., 2341.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 2341; Balādhuri, *Futūh*, 366-9; Daylamites were also called al-Hamra. They fought for Muslims in the conquest of Zanjan and Azarbijan and acted as border guards for Musim. See more details in Mohsen Zakari, *Sasanid Soldiers in Early Muslim Society: The Origins of Ayyaran and Futuwwa* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1995), 116-7.

¹¹⁶Asāwira were the best archers. They under the leadership of Mah Afrīdūn stroke two thousand arrows on the group of Azd and Bakr at the day of their conflict. They also fought along with Tamīm with his five hundred men when they killed Mas'ūd bin 'Amr of Azd. Tabari, *Tārīkh*, Secunda series I, 452, 454; 7 A canal named *Nehr-ul-Asāwira* and a mosque named as *Masjid-ul-Asāwira* was constructed for Asāwira. Mohsen Zakari, *Sasanid Soldiers in Early Muslim Society*, 115-6.

Marw¹¹⁷ had come to visit 'Alī to submit to his authority.¹¹⁸ There were a few who used to come as fugitives and sought to live in the garrisons.¹¹⁹

In general, there were three sorts of local people. Those who had already formed a pact with the Arabs and did not fight Arabs in further battles; the contract was retained for them after the conquest of Sawād. There was another group who had never formed a contract with Arabs, however they had not fought with Arabs; the Arabs formed new contract with them after the conquests. Third, there were those locals who had left their lands; they were called back by the Arabs and a peace treaty was formed with them. All of them were given the status of *dhimmi*. Thus almost whole of the population of Sawād remained at their original places and were supposed to pay *kharāj* on their lands.¹²⁰

The future relationship of the Arabs and the locals thus was woven in this intricate bond of a conqueror and the conquered. In most of the modes of interactions, the Arabs acted as the authoritative leaders and the Persians as obedient servants. Yet, gradually there could be seen a sort of emotional and ideological affiliation between the two. According to some of the contracts, the non-Muslim population was required to give feast to the Arab travelers¹²¹ which

¹¹⁷ *Marzabān* was the title for the district leader of the Persians. Morony, *Iraq After the Muslim Conquest*, 28.

¹¹⁸ Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 273.

¹¹⁹ Crone, *Slaves*, 51.

¹²⁰ Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2368-71.

¹²¹ Ibid., 2470. They were supposed by the contract to act as guides, to take care of roads, bridges and markets and to pay *jizya*.

was probably a show of the Arab power but definitely had played an important role in knowing and understanding each other's culture.

Moreover, the locals were employed in different kinds of jobs by the conquerors. Some of the lands owned by the Arabs were cultivated by the local slaves and peasants.¹²² They were also given importance and were trusted for several administrative jobs. Ubaydulla had appointed *dahāqīn*¹²³ over the finances of Iraq and found them more comfortable with the authorities. He believed that the *dahāqīn* are more trustworthy and reliable as compared to Arabs.¹²⁴ These *dahāqīn* provided certain other services to the governor as well. For instance, the *dahāqīn* provided intelligence to the governor regarding different rebels of the state.¹²⁵ They were valued for their services.¹²⁶

Another kind of interaction was seen during different battles and civil wars in which the locals acted as guides and were employed in different smaller kinds of labor. For instance during the revolt of *khawarij* in 43 AH, the locals played a very important role. They acted as guides for both the parties, probably because of the payment they got. The commander of the Kufan army was constantly

¹²²Lands were given to soldiers in the form of grants. Even Umar gave some grants, however 'Uthmān and Ali surely gifted people with land grants in Iraqi alluvium. *Ibid.*, 2376

¹²³*Dahāqīn* were the Persian lower landed nobility and were the heads of the villages. Mohsen Zakari, *Sasanid Soldiers in Early Muslim Society: The Origins of Ayyaran and Futuwwa* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1995), 30.

¹²⁴Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 458.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, 916.

¹²⁶Mohsen Zakari on the other hands argues that the relationship between the *dahāqīn* and the Arabs was that of suspicion although the *dahāqīn* supported the Arabs in order to retain their previous position of privilege and the Arabs also utilized their services, still some of the *dahāqīn* were found in some anti-Umayyad revolts, thus were seen with suspicion. Mohsen Zakari, *Sasanid Soldiers in Early Muslim Society*, 101-2.

informed about the status of his rear guard by the locals and the villagers. Thus villagers were a source of information.¹²⁷ Locals were also employed for some smaller labor as there is an example that *khawarij* had employed a local for repairing bridge.¹²⁸ In the later period, the locals were also employed in the Arab army as for instance, Ḥajjāj hired a force of two thousand locals on contract basis in the year 76 AH to fight *khawarij*.¹²⁹

The governors and some notable Arabs have occasionally shown concern towards the locals. Ḥajjāj had shown his extreme anger when two of the *dahāqīn* were killed by an Arab. He was about to give punishment to the Arab but that Arab had already taken a safe grant from the governor without letting him know his identity. Due to this reason, Ḥajjāj left him without any punishment.¹³⁰ Similarly some other notables have shown their kindness and concern towards the locals. For instance Shabīb Khārijī¹³¹ was very merciful for the locals. The people wanted to support him but feared the authorities.¹³² However there was one *dihqān* who supported him. A *dihqān* provided hospitality to Shabīb. He provided him with food and kept him in his fortress.¹³³ In this way, he probably annoyed

¹²⁷Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 48, 53, 57, 60, 62.

¹²⁸Ibid., 51-2.

¹²⁹Ibid., 890; Those soldiers who were not registered in the regular *diwān* were paid a smaller allowance which was confined to the period of their service. Mohsen Zakari, *Sasanid Soldiers in Early Muslim Society*, 126; For the role of different groups of non-Arabs in the polity of Arabs as regiments and private militias see Khalil Athamana, "Non-Arab Regiments and Private Militias during the Umayyād Period", *Arabica*45, fasc. 3 (1998), 347-78.

¹³⁰Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 941.

¹³¹He was a famous leader of Khārijī who fought battles against Ḥajjāj for a very long time.

¹³²Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 934.

¹³³Ibid., 909.

the authorities but expressed his personal feelings of affiliation and affinity towards an Arab.

Thus the relation between the Arabs and the locals was very smooth. As the Arabs had migrated in group, they had to make lesser contacts with the locals, still the frequent interactions they had were very unfussy. The Arabs were comfortable with the local non-Arabs, employed them in various jobs and developed cordial relations with them. On the other hand, the locals also adjusted easily with the Arabs and did not create much trouble for them. There was not a single example of any revolt of the locals against the Arabs in Iraq. The locals gradually developed various ways to seek employment or certain other benefits from the conquerors. Arabs were happy with their services and utilized them whenever was required.

3.4.2 Migrants Relations with Slaves/*Mawālī*

One of the level on which they interacted with the locals was those slaves who were captured from different areas of Iraq. Some of these slaves were freed by the Arabs and were made *mawālī*.¹³⁴ Similarly some other Arabs were made

¹³⁴ *Mawālī* is the plural of the word *mawla*. The word ‘*mawla*’ carried a variety of connotations. It conferred the meaning of “master and slave, patron and client, companion, neighbor, confederate, relation (affinis), the granter and the receiver of a favour, etc.” M.de Slane, tr. *Wafayat-al-Ayan wa Anba al-Zaman*, vol. III (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1970), 4; and Sayyid Mutlub Husayn, *Evolution of Social Institutions in Islam: During First Century of Hijrah* (Lahore: Islamic Book Foundation, 1986), 288. However *mawālī* were generally considered as the freed slaves of the Arabs who made a contract of *walā* with their masters. The institution of *walā* was prevalent in Arabia before the emergence of Islam. For details of *mawālī* see Patricia Crone, *Slaves on Horses: the Evolution of Islamic Polity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); and Roman, *Provincial and Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); At times, it turns out to be a complicated fixation to differentiate between the *mawla* and slave

contractual *mawālī* and were given certain privileges and protections.¹³⁵ Migrants kept friendly relations with the slaves and particularly with the *mawālī*. Most of the slaves worked on domestic level, however the status of *mawālī* was different. He was a freed slave still was associated with his former master, due to the bondage of *walā* as well as due to the personal relationship that had been developed between the slave and the master.

The Arabs at Iraq relied heavily on the services of their *mawālī*. Muṭarrif bin al-Mughīra¹³⁶ made his *mawla* Yazīd bin Abī Ziyād as the incharge of his guard at al-Madā'in.¹³⁷ Several governors had appointed their *mawālī* as heads of their personal guard.¹³⁸ Gradually the slaves and *mawālī* attained a very crucial and indispensable position in the Arab migrant society of the garrisons. Most of them formed part of the household of their patrons.¹³⁹ Governors were mainly

sharply. The manumitted slave led half of his life as slave and later half as *mawla*. One of the principal *mufī* of Makkah, 'Ikrima bin 'Abdulla was a slave of 'Abdulla bin Abbas. Ibn Abbas died without giving him freedom, however his son freed him. Similarly Hasan Baṣri was born as a slave but was later freed. Ibn Khallikān, *Waṣayāt*, vol. 1, 69-73; vol. 3, 265-6.

¹³⁵ There were two kinds of *mawālī*. One was the freed slaves of the patron and the others were the voluntarily commended *mawālī*. The voluntarily commended *mawālī* were freemen, usually non-Arabs but formed an agreement of *walā* with the patron. These were also known as contractual *mawālī*. Arabs were of the view that "there was merit in both kinds". Tabari, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 1853; Sayyid Mutlub Hussayn has given three categories of *mawālī*, which are *mawla al-Itaqah* (freed slaves), *mawla al-agd* (client by agreement) and *mawla ar-rahm* (client by blood relationship). Sayyid Mutlub Husayn, *Evolution of Social Institutions in Islam: During First Century of Hijrah* (Lahore: Islamic Book Foundation, 1986), 289-92. Also see Jamil Ahmed Chaudary, "Muslims and Mawālī" *Hamdard Islamicus* 4 (winter 1994), 85-6.

¹³⁶ Muṭarrif was the son of Mughīra bin Shu'ba. He led a revolt against Hajjaj.

¹³⁷ Tabari, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 983.

¹³⁸ According to Kennedy, the commander of the guard, *ashab-ul-haras*, usually were the non-Arab *mawālī*. Kennedy, the Armies of the Caliph, 35. For the use of *mawālī* as personal guards see, Ibid., 218-220, 798, 1403, 1743, 1803, 1820.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 256.

accompanied by their personal *mawālī* whenever they move within the garrison.¹⁴⁰.

Gradually the Arabs developed a relationship based on emotional attachment and affinity towards the slaves and especially towards *mawālī*. This relationship was expressed when the *mawālī* were ready to sacrifice them or their interests for the favor of their master. For instance 'Abīs bin Abī Shabīb¹⁴¹ told his *mawla* to fight against the enemies of Ḥusayn and he followed the instructions, being a conscientious slave.¹⁴² In return the *mawālī* were also given importance by the migrants. *Mawālī* had attained a position definitely superior to the slaves, thus the Arabs felt closer to them and developed friendly relations with many of the *mawālī*. Some of the *mawālī* were the close friends and associates of governors at Iraq.¹⁴³ The *mawālī* also tried to help out their Arab friends whenever it was required. 'Umar ibn Sa'd departed from al-Kūfa to hide himself from Mukhtār, he hid him with one of his *mawla*.¹⁴⁴ Similarly Yazīd bin al-Muhallab al-Azdi¹⁴⁵ was the governor of Iraq during the caliphate of Sulymān. He appointed al-Mughīra bin Abī Kurra, a *mawla* of Sadūs as his scribe who advised him not to mention

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 244

¹⁴¹ He was one of the followers of Ḥusayn.

¹⁴² Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 353

¹⁴³ Ibn al-Iraq, a *mawla* of Thaqīf had friendly relations with Hajjaj. Ibid., 525.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 673.

¹⁴⁵ Yazīd bin al-Muhallab al-Azdi was the son of al-Muhallab who had fought many successful battles against the *khawarij*.

amount of taxes in written form. Yazid rejected this advice and was tortured by the next governor on account of not paying that money.¹⁴⁶

On the basis of the same affinity and closeness between the migrants and the *mawālī*, both developed marital relationships amongst them. Marriages formed a very complex phenomenon due to the existence of concubinage in the Arab society. Many non-Arab slave-girls were taken as concubines and bore children to their patrons. Still, numerous marriage contracts were also in practice between the slaves or *mawālī* and the migrants. Most of the elite contracted marriage with slaves or *mawālī* and provided legitimacy to this practice. On the death of Husayn, his wife married Zubayd, the *mawla* of Husayn. In the same way Zaīn-ul-‘Abidīn married one of his slave-girls after enfranchising her.¹⁴⁷ Humrān bin Abān¹⁴⁸ also married in Arab tribes and also had his children married with Arabs.¹⁴⁹

The *mawālī* had attained a significant position in the society of the migrants. They were enjoying their own business and wealth. Humrān bin Abān was provided a house in al-Baṣra by the caliph and he prospered in the city.¹⁵⁰ The *mawla* of Thaqīf, Mūsa bin Abī Mukhtār owned a house in Al-Baṣra.¹⁵¹ The *mawla* of Ziyād, Fil, constructed one of the initial baths in al-Baṣra and earned

¹⁴⁶ Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 1334-5.

¹⁴⁷ Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, vol. 3, 269.

¹⁴⁸ Humrān bin Abān was the *mawla* of ‘Uthmān. He was exiled as punishment to al-Baṣra. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2923.

¹⁴⁹ Ignaz Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, tr., C.R. Barbe and S. M. Stern and ed., S. M. Stern, vol. 2 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1967), 122.

¹⁵⁰ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 362.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 347.

huge money out of it.¹⁵² Migrants were quite comfortable with this growth of the *mawālī* however the *mawālī* had some financial restrictions which rates them lower to the migrants. The *mawālī* had no share in the *fay* of the Arabs.

During the revolt of Mukhtār in al-Kūfa, the governor ‘Abdullah bin Muṭī told his people that five hundred of the manumitted slaves have joined Mukhtār and if Mukhtār will attain victory, the *fay* of the people will be transferred to their manumitted slaves.¹⁵³ The governor told them that it will mean the passing away of the migrant’s authority and power to the *mawālī*. Correspondingly when the Kufan *ashrāf* rose in revolt against Mukhtār, they again complained of the same favors of Mukhtār towards the *mawālī* and the slaves. Ṭabarī had quoted a tradition from Abu Zuhayr al-Nadr bin Sāliḥ who narrated the following words by the Kufan *ashrāf*, “He (Mukhtār) has drawn our *mawālī* near to himself, mounted them on horses, given them stipends and assigned our *fay* to them. Our slaves have disobeyed us, and our orphans and widows have thus been despoiled.”¹⁵⁴ All of the *ashrāf* agreed that the most distasteful act of Mukhtār was keeping a share for *mawālī* in the *fay* of the migrants.

However after the success of the revolt, Mukhtār practically did not show much concern towards the slaves and *mawālī*. None of them was appointed on higher post except for Kaysān Abū Amrah, who was appointed as chief of his

¹⁵²Ibid., 348.

¹⁵³ Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 627.

¹⁵⁴Ibid., 649; for quotation see, Ṭabarī, *The History of al-Ṭabarī: Victory of the Marwanids*, tr., Michael Fishbein, vol. XII.(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 11.

personal guard.¹⁵⁵ This position was already occupied usually by the *mawālī*. Mukhtār even was ready to withdraw all benefits of slaves and *mawālī* on the complaints of Kufan *ashrāf*.¹⁵⁶

This event had definitely spoiled the smooth relationship of the migrants and the slaves and *mawālī*. After the defeat of the Kufan *ashrāf*, they took help from Mu'sab bin Zubayr and specially complained about their own slaves and *mawālī* who had turned against them.¹⁵⁷ Even the leaders who were fighting along with Mukhtār felt bitterness towards the *mawālī*.¹⁵⁸ The Kufan *ashrāf* and the forces of Mu'sab killed innumerable *mawālī* in their battle against Mukhtār.¹⁵⁹ Shabt bin Rab'i, a famous leader of Tamīm was fighting against Mukhtār. Once he caught some prisoners, *mawālī* and Arabs both. He killed those who introduced them as *mawālī* and left those who claimed to be the Arabs.¹⁶⁰ The Kufan *ashrāf* were very angry with their slaves and *mawālī* and it probably took a lot of time to slaves and *mawālī* to revive their position amongst the migrants.

Gradually this incidence was forgotten and *mawālī* again were seen in some important jobs. Ḥajjāj sent his personal *mawālī* and slaves against Shabīb

¹⁵⁵ Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 634

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 650

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 718

¹⁵⁸ Abdulla b. Anas was made incharge of the right wing of the forces of al-Mukhtār against the Kūfīn *ashraf* and Musab. He advised his commander to force *mawālī* to fight on foot just because of his animosity towards the *mawālī*. Ibid., 721

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 723-4.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 623.

Kharijī and told them to occupy the roads outside al-Kūfa.¹⁶¹ Afterwards, their relations with the migrants improved more and *mawālī* attained some noteworthy positions in the Iraqi administration which reflect their revived status. Sulymān had appointed Yazīd bin al-Muhallab as governor of Iraq and Sāliḥ bin ‘Abdur Rehman, a *malwa* of Tamīm as incharge of fiscal administration. Sāliḥ was very powerful and strict in regulating the usage of state money. Once he even refused to pay the extravagant bills of Yazīd, the governor who found himself in an awkward position but was unable to take any action against Sāliḥ.¹⁶² Arab migrants, in practice relied heavily on the support of their slaves and *mawālī* who fought along with them and helped them on different stages. Although there had been stages when their relations strained but the revolt of Mukhtār was not specifically a revolt between the Arabs and the slaves and *mawālī*. Several of the Arab migrants were also the supporters of Mukhtār. Slaves and *mawālī* helped the migrants in adjusting with many local circumstances. On the other hand the migrants were the ruling class and fulfilled the financial and economic requirements of the slaves and *mawālī*. The congruence of interests proved helpful in maintaining a balanced relationship between the two people.

3.4.3 Later Migrants

Another definite change that came within the society of the migrants was the rapid further inclusion of the later migrants in the garrisons. The news of the settlement of the Arabs at Iraq reached Arabia and many of the ambitious men

¹⁶¹Ibid.,958.

¹⁶²Ibid.,1306-7; Also see Shaban, *The Abbasid Revolution*, 77-8.

decided to move to the new areas in order to test their fates. They moved either in tribal formation or in the composition of families. They join the original inhabitants of their tribe. The late settlers were called *rifāda*.¹⁶³

The number of later migrants kept on increasing with the passage of time. The populace of twenty thousand who initially settled at al-Kūfa including the army and their families¹⁶⁴ grew so rapidly that in the period of ‘Uthmān, only the number of fighting force at al-Kūfa was increased to forty thousand.¹⁶⁵ Afterwards, the number of fighting population of al-Kūfa was reported to be fifty seven thousand and that of al-Baṣra sixty thousand in the reign of ‘Alī after the battle of *Siffin*.¹⁶⁶ This number had further increased in the period of the governorship of Ziyād to sixty thousand for al-Kūfa and eighty thousand for al-Baṣra.¹⁶⁷ It shows that a large number of later migrants had followed the initial migrants. In the period of the governorship of Ubaydulla bin Ziyād, the register of fighting men at al-Baṣra was increased from seventy thousand to eighty

¹⁶³Shaban informs that the late settlers were also given the status of first, second or third *rifāda* according to their time of arrival and their salaries and other benefits were fixed accordingly. Shaban, *Islamic History: A. D. 610-750 (A.H.132)*, 45.

¹⁶⁴Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 276.

¹⁶⁵Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2805.

¹⁶⁶Ibid., 3370-2.

¹⁶⁷It was reported that in the period of Ziyād, there were eighty thousand soldiers and one lac and twenty thousand were their dependents in Basra and, in al-Kūfa there were sixty thousand soldiers and eighty thousand dependents. Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 344-5.

thousand.¹⁶⁸ Before that Ziyād had moved fifty thousand families of al-Baṣra to Khūrāsān in order to relieve the pressure of the constant wave of later migrants.¹⁶⁹

The state was also encouraging the later migration initially. At times several men were deputed from the caliph as experts of Quran and *hadīth* to be sent to the Iraqi garrisons. Abū Mūsa al-Ash‘arī took along with him twenty nine companions of the Prophet (PBUH) when he was made governor of al-Baṣra.¹⁷⁰ On certain occasions when ‘Umar disliked someone due to some of his unpleasant acts, he was sent to some garrison city, for instance Naṣr bin Ḥajjāj and Abū Zayb from Sūlāym were sent to al-Baṣra.¹⁷¹ In the period of ‘Uthmān, many renowned companions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) from Madina had migrated to al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra.¹⁷²

Gradually Iraq became a centre for the later migrants and they loved to come to Iraq in the search of new economic avenues. The later migrants also posed an economic threat to the earlier migrants. The details will be discussed in the next chapters.

Thus in a few years migrants dealt with most of the initial problems of adjustment and they were well-settled at Iraq. Their main problem however was to

¹⁶⁸ According to Ṭabarī, in the period of the governorship of ‘Ubaydulla bin Ziyād, the register of fighting men in Basra was increased from seventy to eighty thousand and the number of dependents was increased from ninety thousand to one lac and forty thousand. Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 434.

¹⁶⁹ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 400.

¹⁷⁰ Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2531.

¹⁷¹ Ibn Sa‘d, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 3, 86-7.

¹⁷² Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 3026; Crone also believes that there was a new wave of immigration to Iraq in the period of ‘Uthmān. Crone, *Slaves*, 63.

manage their relations with the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Arab state and to protect their economic benefits. The Arab state gradually began to assert its power which was largely detested by the migrants. They resisted strongly to this control and reacted through adopting different means.

Chapter 4

Emergence of New Factions amongst the Migrants And their Relations with the State

After migration, significant transformation can be observed in the political structure of the migrants. The Arab migrants to Iraq belonged to the northern as well as the southern Arabs. The northern Arabs were not familiar with the concept of centralized government and they lived in the form of independent tribes. Each tribe was itself a separate political unit. The southern on the other hand had experienced some political control in the form of empires which ruled them but the tribes kept on playing a significant role in the formation and destruction of these empires.

The Arab migration to Iraq was almost parallel to the formation of an Arab state. The tribesmen initially did not feel the restriction and bondage of the centralized authority. Instead they felt themselves as part of this growing state power and considered them to be the ruling authorities however when gradually they realized that their status is promptly changing from the ruling class to the ruled, they rebelled. Due to their tribal characteristics, they were unable to accept any centralized control over their lives. This shift from the ruling to the ruled was severely painful for them. They resisted strongly and to some extent were successful initially to exert their influence and to make their importance being acknowledged.

On the other hand, the state was equally keen to exert and to increase its influence over the Iraqi tribesmen and to treat them as citizens instead of the ruling elite. The state gradually attained this task and eliminated all anti-state elements. The state employed force in response to the migrant's symbolical and ideological battle. The migrants were divided into several sub-groups and many of them had their clashes with the government. They organized several revolts against the state and the three most important groups who revolted were *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*, *khawārij* and *shī'a*. The most powerful group was the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* who was completely routed by force after the revolt of Ibn al-Ash'ath and did not appear again. Some of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* developed their differences with 'Alī and made a different group. They were named as *khawārij*. They kept on revolting against the authorities till the end of the Umayyad regime. The *shī'a* (followers of 'Alī) formed another group. It was comprised of some *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and some late settlers. This group organized many revolts on large scale however their power was also minimized and by the end of the Umayyad regime the *shī'a* of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra were totally dispirited. All of the three groups overlap each other. It is possible that some of the migrants are *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and *shī'a* at the same time or *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and *khawārij* at the same time, however *shī'a* and *khawārij* hold different ideologies thus cannot be merged into one group.

Ahl-ul-Qādisiyya were mainly interested in attaining some economic and political benefits, thus the slogan they used was to secure their *fay* and other benefits of conquests from the ruling authorities. They further wanted a share in the political authority as well and wanted the governors to be employed on their choice. Their strategy was not an outward and open revolt; instead they exerted

pressure on the state through different means. The state at first adopted several lenient tactics to deal with the migrants, with off and on use of force and off and on use of bestowing some political or economic benefits on them. When *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* realized that the state has ultimately controlled all of the economic and political benefits, they revolted openly. In consequence, they were routed and were completely subdued.

On the other hand, *shī'a* and *khawārij* clearly employed ideological and symbolic ideas and kept on their struggle against the Umayyad on the basis of this belief. These groups were more strict opponents of the regime and had organized more revolts. Thus the state was also strict towards both of these groups and except for a few occasions, it employed force to deal with them.

4.1 *Ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and the State

Ahl-ul-Qādisiyya formed a group of elite comprising of the people who had fought the battle of *Qādisiyya*. The composition of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* has already been discussed in detail¹ which includes the northern and the southern Arabs, both *ridda* and non-*ridda* fighters. Although the people and the land of Iraq were not distributed amongst the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* yet they were given huge salaries and a share in the *fay* land.² A few of the earlier settlers though did not participate in *Qādisiyya* attained a status at par with *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*, for instance the conquerors of Ahwaz were also awarded with the same benefits and salaries as

¹For detail, see chapter 2

²See details in chapter 5.

the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were granted.³ Thus the term *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* will be used for elite comprising of initial settlers and earlier migrants who took part in *Qādisiyya* and a few other earlier conquests of the east and their status was equated by equal salaries. Due to the presence of later migrants, *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* gradually turned into a strong minority. This elite played an essential role in the future polity of Iraq, and held all important positions of tribal chieftainship and military or political leadership. In order to assert their special status and to safeguard their interests from the government and the later migrants, the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* tried to control the economic and political benefits of the conquests.

A few of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* later also split into *khawārij* and *shī'a* yet it did not damage their superior and reputable identity. The mainstream *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* kept on playing their role in the polity of Iraq. Thus they turned against the *khawārij* and helped the government in eliminating them. By that way, *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* not only thrived, but maintained their identity and pursued their financial interests against the latecomers, government and slaves/*mawālī*.

A few of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* undertook a task to create a separate identity of *qurrā'* but the endeavor was failed. The distinctiveness of *qurrā'* could not last long and was gradually again merged into the usual *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. Being an ambiguous term, it has been defined diversely and has been interpreted as Quran readers by some scholars⁴. Nonetheless Shaban disagrees with the conventional

³Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2540.

⁴Gibb has referred to them as “the religious party”. H. A. R. Gibb, “An Interpretation of Islamic History”, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* (London: Beacon Press, 1962), 7-8; Hodgson also believes that there were several Quran-reciters amongst the *khawārij* thus he must be talking

version and believes that *qurrā'* were the earlier converts of minor tribes who had favored the Muslim government in *ridda* wars.⁵ It might be probable as a few of the leading *qurrā'* like 'Ammār bin Yāsir, Qays bin Sa'd of Anṣār, and 'Abdullah bin Būdayl⁶ were earlier converts, yet belonged to Makkah and Madina in some form. 'Ammār bin Yāsir although belonged to 'Ans of Yaman but used to live in Makkah.⁷ Likewise Qays bin Sa'd was an Anṣār of Madina and Būdayl belonged to Khuzā'a of Makkah. His father Būdayl bin Warqā al-Khuzā'ī was a friend and well-wisher of the Prophet (PBUH). Būdayl bin Warqā had a home at Makkah while his tribe lived in Tihāma. Khuzā'a had joined the Prophet (PBUH) at *Hudībiyya* in which Būdayl acted as the delegate of the Prophet (PBUH) towards the Quraysh convincing them to arrange peace. Resultantly the peace of *Hudībiyya* was arranged.⁸ Thus it can be assumed that *qurrā'* were probably the earlier converts belonging to tribes other than Quraysh who might have participated in the earlier battles. Conversely, some of the other very prominent

about *qurrā'* whom he believes to be the Quran-reciters. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 2, 215.

⁵Shaban has argued that there was a distinction between the *ridda* and the non-*ridda* soldiers of *Qādisiyya*. He has termed the non-*ridda* tribesmen as *qurrā'*. Shaban, *Islamic History: A. D. 610-750 (A.H.132)*, 50.

⁶'Ammār bin Yāsir, Qays bin Sa'd of Anṣār, and 'Abdullah bin Būdayl led the *qurrā'* of Kufa in the battle of *Siffin* while Muṣṭir bin Fidakī al-Tamīmī led the *qurrā'* of al-Baṣra. Ziyād bin al-Naḍr Ḥarithī was also fighting in the contingent of *qurrā'*. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, 3283-4, 3289.

⁷Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 6, 14.

⁸Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, 1608, 1614, 1655; Abdulfah bin Budayl was probably 'Abdullah bin Būdayl bin Warqā who belonged to Adī bin 'Amir of Muḍar who participated in the conquest of Makkah, battle of Hunayn and Tabūk. But whatever his real lineage was, it is clear that he was an earlier convert. Tabari, vol. I, 2319.

qurrā' leaders like al-Ashtar Nakh'aī,⁹ Ziyād bin al-Naḍr Ḥarīthī¹⁰, Mas'r bin Fidakī al-Tamīmī¹¹ and Zaīd bin Ḥaṣayn al-Tay'ī were not very well-known earlier converts. This creates a controversy in the earlier assumed argument and hence another supposition can be constructed assuming that the word *qurrā'* perhaps represents the Quran readers and pious people, no matter they were earlier converts or not.

Yet, there is another very convincing rationalization of *qurrā'* which must not be overlooked. Jan Retso who somehow agrees with Shaban further adds that the word *qurrā'* was used in the times of the Holy Prophet (PBUJH) for the people of the villages which he believes to be the villages of Ḥijāz. In addition, he argues that some of the people of Yaman claiming to have a close relationship with 'ariba Arabs (people of villages) were also labeled as *qurrā'*. Resto concludes that all of the *qurrā'* were people of villages mainly coming from Ḥijāz.¹² The argument is not only logical but also well-documented, thus appears to provide a better elucidation of *qurrā'*. But on the other hand, if the role of *qurrā'* in al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra is observed, it looks a little difficult to relate this interpretation as *qurrā'* included men from Anṣār, and tribes like Tamīm, 'Abdūl Qays and Nakh'a

⁹ Al-Ashtar belonged to Nakh'a of Madhīj. He joined the army of Khālid and had fought the battle of Yarmūk. He was later sent to Iraq along with the rest of the army of Khālid by 'Umar. Al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh-ul-Islam*, vol. 3, 593.

¹⁰ Ziyād bin al-Naḍr Ḥarīthī was probably the son of Naḍr bin al-Ḥarīth who was a famous leader of Quraysh belonging to 'Abd Manāf bin 'Abd Dār and was a strict opponent of the Prophet (PBUH). Balādhurī, *Ansāb-ul-Ashrāf*, vol. 1, 158-9.

¹¹ Mas'r bin Fidakī al-Tamīmī was the son of Fidakī bin Abid. He belonged to Zaīd Manāt bin Tamīm and fought a battle with the tribe of Sa'd in pre-Islamic times. Ibn Ḥazm, *Jumhara Ansāb-ul-'Arab*, 217. He or his father was also not mentioned as earlier converts.

¹² Jan Retso, *The Arabs in Antiquity: Their History from the Assyrians to the Umayyads* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 48-51.

belonging both to Yaman and Ḥijāz. What seems strange is that how the people of so much different lineage belonging to different areas suddenly decided to have a common identity? Moreover how later on they claimed to have religious authority as many of them have been clearly mentioned as pious and religious men in the sources.

A few of the other citations of *qurrā'* can help which clearly represent them as religious men. The word has been used frequently in the reign of 'Uthmān during the governorship of Sa'īd bin al-'Aṣ. According to the words chosen by Kūfī, the *ashrāf* of al-Kūfa and their *qurrā'* went to see the governor.¹³ Later, Sa'īd wrote a letter to 'Uthmān in which he complained about the attitude of al-Ashtar Nakh'aī and a group of people along with him who assume that they are *qurrā'* but in fact they are stupid. "wa maa 'ho qaūma yaza'mūna anahum-ul-*qurrā'* wa hum *Al-safahā*"¹⁴ providing an impression that *qurrā'* were probably a group of those who had read Quran or learnt some other teachings of religion. The impression is further strengthened by another report of Kūfī stating the details of a letter written to 'Uthmān by the *qurrā'* and the nobles of al-Kūfa complaining about his dealings and warning him to correct himself.¹⁵ 'Uthmān was incidentally told by the messenger that the letter has been written by the *sulā'īd* of *ahl-ul-Kūfa*, their *qurrā'* and *ahl-ul-Dīn wa fadāl*.¹⁶ A further noteworthy information is of the two of the companions of al-Ashtar, Aswad bin Yazīd and 'Alqama bin Qays who

¹³ Kūfī, *Futūh*, vol.1, 381.

¹⁴ Ibid., vol.1, 384.

¹⁵ Ibid., 389.

¹⁶ Ibid., vol.1, 391.

were referred to by Maqrīzī as Quran readers and those who excelled in the knowledge of Quran. Both of them were relatives and belonged to the tribe of Nakh'a to which al-Ashtar belonged.¹⁷ Hence the word was frequently used to refer to the Quran-readers and those people who were very pious and religious or at least they consider them to be.

Yet, the matter remains unresolved. If *qurrā'* was the religious party, how some of the very late converts belonging to largely nomadic background claimed to be *qurrā'*. Morony provides a remarkable answer to this problem. Mainly talking about the *khawārij* who had emerged from an alliance of “dissident elements and Quran readers”,¹⁸ he probably provided a clue to this query. Thus it is likely that the *qurrā'* would have mainly derived their identity from the ‘people of the villages’ but due to the support of some religious men amongst them tried to manipulate religious symbols to exert more pressure on the authorities. This interpretation also gives explanation of the variety of groups represented as *qurrā'*.

Whatever the real identity of *qurrā'* was, the matter of the fact is that the effort to create a separate identity of *qurrā'* was not long-lasting. In the battle of *Siffin*, *qurrā'* were fighting under their own commanders from al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra which confers an idea that they were politically mobilized group. Nonetheless after the battle of *Siffin*, this group identity of *qurrā'* was shattered. Many of the prominent *qurrā'* leaders remained loyal to Ali, for instance Al-

¹⁷ Maqrīzī, *Imtā'-ul-Asmā'*, vol. 4, 305; Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 138-9.

¹⁸ Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest*, 468-9.

Ashtar Nakh'aī, Qays bin Sa'd, and Ziyād bin al-Naḍr Ḥarithī while Zaīd bin Ḥaṣayn al-Tay'ī and Maṣ'r bin Fidakī al-Tamīmī turned against Ali and became *khawārij*.¹⁹ Hence it can be concluded that there was no well-structured group of *qurrā'* and they kept on differing with each other.

Qurrā' were again referred to in the battle of 'Abdul Reḥmān bin al-Ash'ath against the *khawārij*. He had a group of *qurrā'* who fought under the leadership of Abū-al-Ahwās, the companion of 'Abdullah bin Maṣ'ūd.²⁰ Abū-al-Ahwās was famous for his religiosity.²¹ Thus by then probably the *qurrā'* had largely been recognized as the religious group. *Qurrā'* appeared again in the revolt of 'Abdul Reḥmān bin al-Ash'ath and fought along with 'Abdul Reḥmān against the authorities. The important *qurrā'* leaders were Abū-ul-Bakhtarī, Sa'id bin Jabīr, Sha'bī²² who were again famous for their religious knowledge and piety. Still they were led by Jabala bin Zahr al-Jū'ī²³ who is not as famous as the rest of the three leaders mentioned above for their religious knowledge. This again provides space for taking up the earlier argument that *qurrā'* was not only the religious group; the identity had originally begun from probably 'the people of the villages'.

¹⁹ Shaban believed that the non-*ridda* tribesmen were later called as *Qurrā'* and they were later turned into *khawārij*. Shaban, *Islamic History: A. D. 610-750 (A.H.132)*, 89.

²⁰ Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 876.

²¹ Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 6, 200-1.

²² Ibid., 361-2, 279-293,

²³ Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 1086-8.

Thus *qurrā'* showed their presence in the later period as well nonetheless they played less significant role in politics as compared to *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. *Ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* gradually emerged as the strongest elite. Their separate identity and group feeling emerged due to the collision of their financial and political interests. There seems to be no difference in the salaries and other financial benefits of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. According to a report cited by Balādhurī, all *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* either got two thousand or at least fifteen hundred dirhams as *atā*.²⁴ Those who decided to separate them from the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and tried to create new identities always remained at a loss.

On attaining such huge victories like *Qādisiyya*, *Madā'in* and *Jalūlā*, the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were joyous as well as jealous of their spoils. They felt these victories to be their personal triumphs and thus wanted the state to be under their control. Their first interaction was with caliph 'Umar who acknowledged their services and declared the veterans of *Qādisiyya* as "Ras-ul-Arab".²⁵ Although he was a strict ruler but he was much concerned about the public opinion of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. He kept on removing and changing his governors for al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra frequently on complaints and requests of the migrants.²⁶ This attitude enhanced the confidence of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and they felt their strength in the power structure. Another reason of this attitude was probably the weakness of the empire to deal with different Arab tribes. The Arab state had recently seen the

²⁴Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 439.

²⁵Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 6, 3.

²⁶'Umar removed Sa'd bin Abī Waqqāṣ, 'Ammār bin Yāsir and Abū Mūsa al-Ash'arī from the governorship of al-Kūfa. Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2676-2680; Mughīra bin Shu'ba was removed from the governorship of al-Baṣra. Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol.1, 2529.

trauma of *ridda* wars and had restored their authority through a long tiring process. Thus caliph 'Umar was in no position to annoy the powerful Arab tribes instead he wanted their energies to be used against the non-Arabs.

This lenient attitude of 'Umar on the other hand created problems for 'Uthmān who thought that the time is apt to exert and enforce the authority of the state. Initially he listened to the complaints of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*,²⁷ but gradually he realized that in order to have a smooth running of the administrative affairs, he must gain some authority over the subjects. This was a daring attempt and was not approved by some of the independent minded *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. There was a group of earlier migrants including Mālik al-Ashtar, Aswad bin Yazīd Nakh'ai, Ṣa'ṣa'a²⁸ and some others who were against the dominancy of Quraysh. The *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* after the deposal of Walīd bin 'Uqba were not even happy with the appointment of Sa'īd bin al-'Aṣ. They demanded from 'Uthmān for his deposal, however when the request was not complied, they adopted some forceful methods. Some of the very eager *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* began a movement against 'Uthmān. Initially these people were removed from al-Kūfa to Syria and Jazīra as exiles. They though managed to come back and began their movement against 'Uthmān by spreading messages against him and finally forcefully stopping the governor Sa'īd bin al-'Aṣ from entering al-Kūfa; in his

²⁷ Abū Müsa al-Ash'arī was deposed from al-Baṣra on the complaints of the Basrans. This was not a hard decision for 'Uthmān as he appointed his own young cousin 'Abdulla bin 'Amir bin Kurayz to Basra. Similarly the Kufans forced him to depose Walīd bin 'Uqba. Ibid., 2828-2840-2850.

²⁸ Ṣa'ṣa'a bin Sohān was the important leader of 'Abdūl Qays, which is a tribe of Rabī'a.

place they appointed *Abū Müsa al-Ash'arī*.²⁹ 'Uthmān had to give his approval. Yet, *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* felt threatened by 'Uthmān. In order to demonstrate a power show, they gathered at Madina and murdered the caliph.

The *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* settled at al-Kūfa were probably lesser than five thousand (Kufans when settled at al-Kūfa were twenty thousand along with their families).³⁰ If some of the other earlier migrants are added up, still they would not be more than eight thousand. In the period of 'Uthmān, only the fighting army had increased to forty thousand³¹ out of which *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* represented a small minority. A small number of army varying from five hundred to one thousand rebelled against 'Uthmān and went to fight against him from al-Kūfa. A similar number has been reported from al-Baṣra.³² Although none of the leading members of *Qādisiyya* went physically to fight against 'Uthmān, yet it can be assumed that the people who moved were the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* or their descendants.³³ The reason was that the later migrants had yet not developed a strong identity and interests. Furthermore the positions of leadership were exclusively held by *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* due to their superior financial and political position. A few of the leading *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had bitterly turned against 'Uthmān. The most prominent

²⁹Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2930-1.

³⁰Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 276.

³¹Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2805.

³²Ibid., 2954-5; Kūfī, *Futūh*, vol. 1, 397.

³³The prominent people who went from Kufa against 'Uthmān were Zāid bin Sohān, Ashtar, Ziyād bin al- Naḍr Ḥarīthī, 'Abdulla bin al-Asīm and 'Umro bin al-Asīm. From Basra, Ḥakīm bin Ḥabla Abdī, Zarh bin Abad Al-Abdīyān, Bashr bin Sharīb al-Qaysī and Ḥarqūs bin Zahīr joined this revolt. Tabarī, vol. 1, 2954-5; Al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh-ul-Islam*, vol. 3, 438 and Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 79-80; Apart from Ashtar and Harqus, none of them ever remained very prominent but they must have participated in earlier battles but probably not in leadership role.

of them was Qa‘qā‘ bin ‘Umrū.³⁴ Moreover Ashtar was one of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* who believed that ‘Uthmān was minimizing their privileges and he probably would have been followed by *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* who held this opinion.

The argument can be further strengthened by the fact that some of the leading *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were satisfied with the replacement of ‘Uthmān by Ali. Many of them including, Ashtar, Jarīr bin ‘Abdullah, Ash‘t bin Qays and Qa‘qā‘ bin ‘Umrū³⁵ turned out to be the loyal supporters of Ali. After the murder of ‘Uthmān, the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were successful in fulfilling their demands of having leader of their choice. They chose Ali who was against the policies of ‘Uthmān, thus it was expected by the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* that Ali will safeguard their interests. ‘Alī, on the other hand had to face multiple challenges and was suppose to satisfy people of divergent interests.³⁶ He had the drawback to oppose the policy of the state control which became a dilemma for his own governance. His power being relying on public opinion was reduced.³⁷ He took several decisions under the pressure of this public opinion which ultimately became the reason of his failure.

The career of ‘Alī began with a very painful civil war between the leading members of the Quraysh. Probably the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* was not expecting this as

³⁴Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2935-6.

³⁵Qa‘qā‘ bin ‘Umrū was a famous leader of *Qādisiyya* and belonged to Tamīm. Al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh-ul-Islam*, vol. 3, 662.

³⁶Shaban believes that ‘Alī was supported by three diverse groups; Anṣār, *ridda* tribesmen and non-*ridda* tribesmen, Shaban, *Islamic History: A.D. 610-750 (A.H. 132)*, 71-2.

³⁷For instance Aḥnaf bin Qays reminded ‘Alī once that he must keep friendly relations towards Tamīm of al-Baṣra as he would require their services. Tabarī, vol. 1, 3218-9

they had only supported Ali in order to secure and enhance their economic interests. Now they seem unwilling to support 'Alī for the civil war. The Kufan governor Abū Müsa al-Ash'arī, who was the choice of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* was the most reluctant to join 'Alī against 'Ayi'sha, Talha and Zubayr.³⁸ 'Alī had to send 3-4 deputations for convincing the Kufans to support him.³⁹ Finally when he sent Hasan for campaigning, he convinced the people. Majority of them joined 'Alī on the plea that they had given oath of allegiance to 'Alī and they must obey him.⁴⁰ Yet there was no ideological drift towards him as was developed in the later days.

The clear victory in the battle of *Jamal* left a positive impact on all followers of 'Alī including *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and they felt vigorous and energetic to fight another battle, now with the Syrians. Ali had distributed seven hundred thousand amongst his followers after the success of *Jamal* and promised them similar kinds of financial benefits if they would get victory over Syria.⁴¹ There was an ample chance for gathering rich spoils in the case of victory against the Syrians. The most significant aspect of the victory will be the share in the rule of a powerful empire. Being the followers of 'Alī, the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had more prospects to attain governorships and other important political designations.⁴² The

³⁸Tabarī, vol. 1, 3167-72.

³⁹Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 226-30.

⁴⁰Tabarī, vol. 1, 3172-4.

⁴¹Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 259.

⁴²Crone argues that Alī had deliberately enhanced the importance of men like Ibn al-Ash'ath to strengthen him. Crone, *Slaves*, 77.

group of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* which was interested in securing their financial benefits remained loyal to 'Alī. A huge army was prepared to fight against the Syrians.⁴³

After a long war, the energies of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were exhausted again confusing them about their decision to support 'Alī. They turned towards Abū Mūsa al-Ash'arī who had warned them about the consequences of this war. Leading *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* Ash't bin Qays along with Mas'r bin Fidakī al-Tamīmī, and Zaīd bin Ḥaṣayn al-Tay'ī forced 'Alī to accept arbitration and appointed Abū Mūsa al-Ash'arī as an arbitrator from the side of Iraqis without the consent of 'Alī.⁴⁴ In the meanwhile a split came amongst the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and a few of them turned *khawārij*. This however did not damage the mainstream *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* who were happy to fight *khawārij*. Probably in their view it would provide them a chance to reduce the number of competitors for power and prestige. The Baṣrans were conversely not very enthusiastic and only three thousand two hundred came to join him out of sixty thousand to fight against *khawārij*.⁴⁵

After fighting a battle with the *khawārij*, *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* seems unwilling to fight any further battle on behalf of 'Alī. As soon as 'Alī decided to have some rest before moving to Syria, all the soldiers left their camp and moved towards al-Kūfa to their homes.⁴⁶ Yet 'Alī was in no position to take any action and overlooked this act of his soldiers. He also moved to al-Kūfa and postponed the

⁴³Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 3256-7.

⁴⁴Ibid., 3330.

⁴⁵Ibid., 3372.

⁴⁶Ibid., 3386.

plan to attack Syria.⁴⁷ Likewise after a few days he called them to follow him towards Egypt to fight the forces of Mu‘āwiya but no one responded to his call. The registered number of Kufan soldiers at that time was sixty three thousand and besides there were soldiers from other cities as well like al-Baṣra and al-Madā'in.⁴⁸ The enthusiasm of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* to support ‘Alī was cooled down partly by the lack of decision on the part of ‘Alī and gradual loss of his control over the empire and partly by the decision of ‘Alī to prefer Anṣār and Hashmites for governorships. Although some of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were rewarded with the governorships⁴⁹ but the important positions mainly remained with Anṣār and Hashmites.⁵⁰

Furthermore *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had understood that the power of Mu‘āwiya is growing. One of the very notable leaders of *Qādisiyya* Jarīr bin ‘Abdullah al-Bajalī was not patient enough to see the ultimate decline of ‘Alī and joined Mu‘āwiya before he formally assumed power.⁵¹ This changing opinion of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* was probably the reason for the smooth transfer of rule from Ḥasan to Mu‘āwiya. The Kufans had given their oath of allegiance to Ḥasan but they were not willing to fight on his side. Ḥasan seems to be more aware of his limitation

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid., 3372.

⁴⁹Jarīr was appointed as governor of Hamadān and Ash‘t bin Qays as governor of Azarbijān before *Sīffīn*. Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 276.

⁵⁰‘Alī nominated Ibn ‘Abbās as governor of al-Baṣra and Qays bin Sa‘d of Anṣār as governor of Egypt. Later he sent Muḥammad bin Abī Bakr, the son of caliph Abū Bakr as governor of Egypt. Ṭabarī, vol. 1, 3230, 3233-5.

⁵¹Ibid., 3256.

than his father thus he decided to make a pact with Mu'awiya.⁵² The majority of the Iraqis were already not willing to fight any more civil wars and the transition was a smooth one. Mu'awiya entered al-Kūfa and was welcomed, only Qays bin Sa'd and some of his companions resisted but when they were granted safety of their wealth and lives, they also agreed to accept the caliphate of Mu'awiya.⁵³ Leading *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* like 'Adī bin Ḥātim⁵⁴ Shabt bin Rab'i,⁵⁵ and Ma'qil bin Qays⁵⁶ heavily supported the regime. The staunch supporters of 'Alī and leading nobles including Ṣa'ṣa bin Sohān,⁵⁷ also supported the governors of Mu'awiya.

Ahl-ul-Qādisiyya were proceeding cautiously by generally accepting the ascendency of every new ruler and providing him their full support. As soon as they grasped that the governor/ruler is no more effective, they silently left him to

⁵²Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 2.

⁵³Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 408-9; Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 7-8; Later on, some of the prominent supporters of 'Alī were retained on their tribal chieftaincy. Ma'qil bin Qays al-Riyāḥī and Ṣa'ṣa bin Sohān of 'Abdūl Qays are its example. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 33.

⁵⁴'Adī bin Ḥātim was a chief of the tribe of Tay' and the son of Ḥātim Tay', the famous legendary generous character of the Arab history. 'Adī bin Ḥātim had participated in battle against Iraq. He was fighting under Khālid. He fought the battle of al-Mazar and participated in Al-Qādisiyya too. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2022, 2027, 2221. He supported Ali after he settled at Iraq. Ibn Hajar, *Tahdīb-ul-Tahdīb*, vol. 7, 166.

⁵⁵Shabt bin Rab'i belonged to Riyāḥ bin Yarbū' of Tamīm, Ibn Ḥazm, *Jumhara*, 228-9. He was the son of Rab'i bin 'Amir and led the forces of Ḥāzala of Tamīm in the forces of Ubū Ubād. He was a leader of a unit of army at *Sifīn* and was fighting in favour of 'Alī. Later he turned a *khārijī* but then renounced that ideology. In the period of Mu'awiya, he supported the regime, but then wrote letters to Ḥusayn. He changed his loyalties from Ḥusayn to Ubaydalla when the former plunged into a crisis. He then supported the governor of Ibn Zubayr but on the defeat of the governor of Ibn Zubayr by Mukhtār, Sabth gave his oath of allegiance to al-Mukhtār out of compulsion. Later he revolted against al-Mukhtār too. His career truly represents the course of action adopted by the majority of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2188-9, 3265, 3349, 3380; Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 330, 513, 535, 629, 633.

⁵⁶Ma'qil bin Qays belonged to Riyāḥ bin Yarbū' of Tamīm. Ma'qil bin Qays was the conqueror of Tastar thus might have participated in *Qādisiyya* too. Ibn Ḥazm, *Jumhara*, 228-9; Ma'qil bin Qays al-Riyāḥī was the leader over Tamīm in al-Kūfa. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 33.

⁵⁷Ṣa'ṣa bin Sohān was the leader of 'Abdūl Qays during the period of Mu'awiya. He had before supported 'Alī. Ibid., 33.

support the next person in power. They were initially contented with the caliphate of Mu‘āwiya. The administration of Iraq was running smoothly under the governorship of Mughīra⁵⁸ and ‘Amir bin Kurayz.⁵⁹ Both of them respected tribal traditions and were not willing to assert forceful authority of the state. It was reported about Amir that crime rate was increasing in al-Baṣra in his period. This happened due to his compassionate outlook as he never punished any person due to respect for his particular tribe.⁶⁰ During the governorship of Mughīra in al-Kūfa, the *khawārij* had again emerged. Consequently the governor called the leading nobles (mainly the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*) and requested them to help the government in dealing with these rebels. Ma‘qil bin Qays was sent to fight against the *khawārij*.⁶¹

However things changed rapidly with the assuming of the power of Ziyād. The governorship of Ziyād was a landmark shift when the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* recognized that they have lost their superior position as conquerors of the land. The state gradually emerged as a tool of exerting force and *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were reduced to the status of the common citizens. Ziyād made fourths of the Kūfans and and fifths of Basrans for administrative purposes.⁶² This enhanced the control of the state. Unlike the previous governors, Ziyād was very harsh towards the

⁵⁸ Mughīra bin Shu‘ba belonged to Thaqīf and was an earlier convert. He was also one of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. He played an important role in the politics of early Muslim history. He died in the year 50 AH. Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 461.

⁵⁹They were appointed governors of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra respectively. *Ibid.*, 413, 416.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 440-1; Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 67-8.

⁶¹Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 37.

⁶²Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2495.

people of Iraq particularly showing his rage towards the *shī'a*, he managed to punish them through different ways⁶³. Despite of all these hardships, the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* tried to keep good relations with Ziyād. In this process, they might not have realized but they had turned compliant and subservient towards the authority of the state. Yet they disliked it from their heart and it seems that if ever they will get a chance, they will act against the existing regime.

This chance was provided to them by the death of Mu'āwiya. The people like Shabt bin Rab'i, Ḥajjār bin Abjār⁶⁴ and Yazīd bin al-Ḥārith⁶⁵ wrote letters to Ḥusayn though they were the first to desert him once they saw the situation going in favor of 'Ubaydalla bin Ziyād.⁶⁶ The resoluteness of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* to cooperate with the authorities can be seen from the fact that the descendent of the commander of the army of *Qādisiyya*, 'Umar bin Sa'd bin Abī Waqqāṣ was leading the forces against Ḥusayn.⁶⁷

The *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* gave their whole hearted support to their new and powerful governor as long as their stipends were secure and their profit from the

⁶³Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 111-144; For the case of Ḥujr bin 'Adī, an important tribal chief of Kinda who was accused of keeping pro-Alid feelings and was consequently was sent to Mu'āwiya for execution see Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 472-88.

⁶⁴He belonged to 'Ijl of Bakr bin Wā'il and had given testimony against Ḥujr bin 'Adī. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 113. There is mention of Abjār in the army of Khālid. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2033 This Abjār must be the father of Ḥajjār bin Abjār. Khālid Yahya Blankinship believes him to be Abjār bin Jabīr bin Bujayr al-'Ijli, most probably the father of Ḥajjār bin Abjār. Tabarī, *The History of al-Tabarī: The Challenge to the Empires*, tr Khālid Yahya Blankinship, vol. XI (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993) n. 145, 23.

⁶⁵Yazīd bin al-Ḥārith belonged to Shaybān of Bakr bin Wā'il. He became a governor of Al-Ray and al-Madā'in for Ibn Zubayr. He fought against Mukhtār. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 614; Also see Crone, *Slaves*, 119.

⁶⁶Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 330.

⁶⁷Ibid., 334.

lands of *fay* was coming. However once more they found an opportunity to shift their loyalties from the existing regime to someone new and more promising. After the death of caliph Yazīd I, the situation had become uncertain, due to which ‘Ubaydalla bin Ziyād had become a weakling and was forced to leave Iraq secretly.⁶⁸ *Ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* now turned towards Ibn Zubayr. Any realistic person would have done so. The events were turning in his favor. He had got control of Ḥijāz and Iraq both. On the other hand, in Syria, the caliph had died and there was no suitable candidate for caliphate.

Leading *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and their descendants supported Ibn al-Mutī and Mu‘šab bin Zubayr, the governors of Ibn Zubayr for al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra respectively. It seemed that events will turn in the favor of Ibn-Zubayr but something totally unexpected happened. The son of the hero of *Jisr*, Mukhtār bin Abū Ubayd al-Thaqafi⁶⁹ appeared and realized the importance of using slogans for political purposes. He raised the slogan of “revenge of Ḥusayn” and began to influence the general public of al-Kūfa. The veterans of *Qādisiyya* and their descendants being too pragmatic did not respond to this call. The only exception was the son of Ashtar Nakh‘ai who supported Mukhtār.⁷⁰ Another thing which was the most alarming for the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* was the slogan of giving equal rights to slaves and *mawālī*. Furthermore this program of providing equal rights was much appreciated by the later migrants who were sharing lesser benefits.

⁶⁸Ibid., 435.

⁶⁹Abū Ubayd was chosen by Caliph ‘Umar to lead the Arab forces towards Persia. This army fought the battle of *Jisr*. See note ?

⁷⁰Kūfi, *Futūh*, vol. 3, 253.

Thus *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were alerted and fully supported the governor of Ibn Zubayr who had told them that he is only in al-Kūfa to levy taxes from the conquered lands and to distribute the rest amongst the Kufans and had assured them that he cannot take away or distribute their money without their approval.⁷¹

Ibn al-Mutī and some of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* gathered the people and instigating them to fight; they warned them of the danger of sharing their spoils with slaves and *mawālī*.⁷² It seems on the other hand that the number of the supporters of al-Mukhtār mainly the late comers and the slaves and *mawālī* was more than the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* who had already been divided into several sub-groups. Mukhtār was successful and the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* gave him oath of allegiance out of compulsion.⁷³

Despite of the fact that *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*, supported Mukhtār for a brief period; they were actually not satisfied with the policies of Mukhtār. His program to apply equality to all of the Kufans was a constant threat for the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. Furthermore Mukhtār was not only supporting the slaves and *mawālī*, in fact his real support was rooted amongst the Arabs, the later migrants. The people who joined Mukhtār belonged to the late settlers as his policy to give equal treatment to all probably was also offering great advantage to the late settlers who were enjoying lesser privileges than the original settlers. Apart from 'Abdullah bin Hārith, the brother of al-Ashtar; all other men appointed by Mukhtār as governors

⁷¹Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 603.

⁷²Ibid., 627.

⁷³ Shabth bin Rabi, 'Abdūl Rehmān bin Sa'īd bin Qays Al-Hamdānī and Muḥammad bin Ash't bin Qays gave him oath of allegiance. Ibid., 652.

were less renowned.⁷⁴ It can be assumed that they represented the later migrants and thus the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* automatically supported the governor of Ibn Zubayr to safeguard their privileged position both from the later migrants as well as from slaves and *mawālī*.

Leading *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* Muḥammad bin Ash‘t bin Qays, Shabt bin Rab‘ī and the son of Jarīr bin ‘Abdullah⁷⁵ decided to fight against Mukhtār with a smaller force. Result was obvious, they were badly defeated. On defeat, they fled towards al-Baṣra and took the help of Mu‘šab. On this, some of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* who had remained with Mukhtār, also left him and joined the Basrans. For Instance ‘Abdul Reḥmān bin Sa‘īd bin Qays al-Hamadānī⁷⁶ was made governor of Mūṣal by Mukhtār but he later joined the forces of Mu‘šab.⁷⁷

Ultimately Basrans had come for the help of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and a fierce battle was fought. In this battle, some of the leading descendants of the notables of *Qādisiyya* like Muḥammad bin Ash‘t bin Qays⁷⁸ and ‘Abdul Reḥmān bin Sa‘īd bin Qays al-Hamadānī were killed.⁷⁹ They forced Mu‘šab to take revenge from the

⁷⁴Ibid., 634-5.

⁷⁵His name was Bishr bin Jarīr b. ‘Abdulla. Ibid., 652.

⁷⁶‘Abdul Reḥmān bin Sa‘īd bin Qays al-Hamadānī was a chief of Hamadān. His father Sa‘īd bin Qays al- Hamadānī fought the battle of Nihāwānd and was a leader over one wing of army. Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2619.

⁷⁷Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 643, 740.

⁷⁸Muḥammad bin Ash‘t bin Qays was the son of Ash‘t bin Qays.

⁷⁹Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 741.

prisoners of war and seven thousand of the late comers, slaves and *mawālī* were killed.⁸⁰ It had made the position of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* stronger in the garrisons.

The rule of Ibn Zubayr could not remain intact for a longer period. In Syria 'Abdūl Mālik had assumed power who was a resolute and determined caliph. He gradually took action against all of the anti-Umayyad forces. He decided to attack al-Baṣra but before he wrote letters to some of the leadings Basrans, among whom there were people like Ḥajjār bin Abjār, and Muḥammad bin 'Abdul Reḥmān bin Sa'īd bin Qays Al-Hamdanī.⁸¹ Once again the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* adopted a very cautious procedure. They responded positively on the letter of 'Abdūl Mālik without letting Mu'ṣab knew this. The *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* of al-Kūfa had also realized the power of 'Abdūl Mālik and did not come out for the help of Mu'ṣab.⁸² The late migrants were on the other hand extremely unhappy with Mu'ṣab due to the large killings he made in al-Kūfa. Mu'ṣab was left alone and the victory was certain for 'Abdūl Mālik, keeping the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* again on the safe side.

In the midst of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*, the family of al-Ashtar Nakh'aī showed some different characteristics. Al-Ashtar once when had given oath of allegiance to Ali remained loyal to him till his death. He was one of the very few persons who accepted all decisions of Ali including the decision to not to accept arbitration with the Syrians. After his death his son Ibrāhīm bin al-Ashtar supported Mukhtār and fought on his side.⁸³ After the death of Mukhtār, he had to

⁸⁰Ibid., 745.

⁸¹Ibid., 804.

⁸²Ibid., 804.

⁸³Kūfī, *Futūh*, , vol. 3, 253.

choose between 'Abdūl Mālik and Mu'šab, and he settled on to give his oath of allegiance to Mu'šab.⁸⁴ Despite of having any ideological association with Mu'šab, he remained loyal to him and showed him the letter written by 'Abdūl Mālik, when all other *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had decided to support 'Abdūl Mālik.⁸⁵

Ahl-ul-Qādisiyya welcomed 'Abdūl Mālik in al-Kūfa.⁸⁶ Yet their desires to attain governorships and positions of eminence were not fulfilled. 'Abdūl Mālik had promised to many of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* the governorships in return to their support which he did not fulfill. The leading *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* who had supported him could not get any manifest benefit.⁸⁷ After a brief reign of the governorship of Bishr bin Marwān, 'Abdūl Mālik apprehending the gravity of the situation at Iraq, made up his mind to send Ḥajjāj bin Yūsaf⁸⁸ which finally vanquished all hopes of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* to attain power and control. In fact their previous role to manipulate the position of the governor of Iraq according to their own choice was also gone. The policies of Ḥajjāj were the harshest for the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*.

The most noteworthy policy which was disliked by the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* was the strictness which Ḥajjāj showed towards military expeditions.⁸⁹ The present generation of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* as well as the rest of Iraqis was not interested to fight against the *khawārij*. They had no ideological conviction for

⁸⁴Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 742.

⁸⁵Ibid., 805-6.

⁸⁶Ibid., 814-5.

⁸⁷Ibid., 817.

⁸⁸See chapter 3, note 75.

⁸⁹Ḥajjāj forced the armies to fight. Kūfī, *Futūh*, vol. 4, 13.

fighting these men. Besides they had become lethargic and were not interested in military activity any more. They were only willing to withdraw their stipends as descendants of the conquerors without putting them on military rolls. Probably a generation of urban life has slightly changed their characteristics. Furthermore, in earlier expeditions, people were given option to join military expedition and they used to go according to their own willingness, still being on the military pay rolls. Ḥajjāj changed this method and ordered the officials to select four thousand men from the military rolls and ordered them to depart for an expedition.⁹⁰

This attitude of Ḥajjāj was strongly detested by the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and also by some of the late comers. The *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had asserted their importance and had maintained their dignity since the migration occurred. Now, they were in most awkward position. On the other hand, *khawārij* had created problems and had reached to al-Kūfa. At this Ḥajjāj sent several expeditions against them which were failed. One of them was sent under the leadership of 'Abdul Reḥmān bin Muḥammad bin al-Ash'ath.⁹¹ 'Abdul Reḥmān bin Muḥammad bin al-Ash'ath was the grandson of Ash't bin Qays, the famous chief of Kinda.⁹² The family of Ash't bin Qays played a very important role in the polity of Iraq. Ḥajjāj ordered him to select six thousand men and advance towards the *khawārij*. 'Abdul Reḥmān pursued the *khawārij* but when they fled and entered Mūsal, he decided to come back.⁹³ Mūsal was the territory of al-Baṣra and

⁹⁰ Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 902-3.

⁹¹ Ibid., 930; Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 4, 501.

⁹² Balādhurī, *Ansāb-ul-Ashrāf*, vol. 7, 303.

⁹³ Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 930-1.

‘Abdul Reḥmān being a Kufan did not find it binding upon him to help Basrans. In his view, the Al-Baṣra ns must defend their territory themselves. ‘Abdul Reḥmān and other descendants of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had never considered themselves as paid army of the state. They had always fought for securing their own territory and their financial benefits. Now Ḥajjāj adopted a different policy and ordered ‘Abdul Reḥmān to pursue the *khawārij* wherever they go. Ḥajjāj reminded ‘Abdul Reḥmān that he is not an independent general and “the authority is that of the commander of the Faithful and the troops are his troops”.⁹⁴

This strategy was a milestone shift for the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* who had been treating the lands they had conquered as their *say* and had only fought the *khawārij* to protect their lands. ‘Abdul Reḥmān unwillingly accepted the decision of Ḥajjāj and set out for Mūsal. Ḥajjāj on the other hand did not fully trust him and handed the command over to ‘Uthmān bin Qatan, a loyalist to the Umayyad family. ‘Abdul Reḥmān fled back and hid himself in al-Kūfa after defeat.⁹⁵

At last when Ḥajjāj found the armies of Iraq disinterested in fighting against the *khawārij*, he threatened them with the warning of snatching away their spoils and granting it to someone else.⁹⁶ This intimidation was taken seriously by the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and led them finally to make their decision to revolt. It was though not ‘Abdul Reḥmān from the descendants of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* who decided to revolt first against Ḥajjāj. It was instead Maṭarrif bin Mughīra bin

⁹⁴Ibid., 930-1; For quotation, *Tabarī, The History of al-Tabarī: The Marwanid Restoration*, tr., Everett K. Rowson, vol. XXII.(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 83.

⁹⁵Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 932-9.

⁹⁶Ibid., 942.

Shu‘ba, the son of Mughīra.⁹⁷ He was appointed the governor of al-Madā'in by Ḥajjāj, and got interested in making an alliance with the *khawārij*. Particularly attracted by the manifesto of *khawārij* which was against the confiscation of their spoils and autocratic nature of the government, he wanted to make an alliance with them in order to fight the existing regime, but refrained as the question of leadership was not settled between him and the *khawārij*.⁹⁸ He revolted openly against Ḥajjāj and presented a manifesto offering to make a council from among the Muslims who will decide the matter of caliphate.⁹⁹ He had overestimated his power. Ḥajjāj had sent an army against him and his revolt was easily crushed.¹⁰⁰

The anger and disappointment of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* was not over. They finally revolted under the leadership of the most famous of the descendants of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*, ‘Abdul Reḥmān bin Muḥammad bin al-Ash‘ath.¹⁰¹ He was followed and supported by one of the descendants of Shabt bin Rabi¹⁰² and many others of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. Their moves were very careful and tactical. *Ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had never revolted openly as they never wanted to close all other options. They had usually accepted the authority of anyone who became powerful and surrendered their freedom when it was required to safeguard their economic interests. But the revolt of Ibn al-Ash‘ath was an open and complete revolt in

⁹⁷For Mughīra see note, 58.

⁹⁸ Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 983-5.

⁹⁹Ibid., 993.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 994-1003.

¹⁰¹See details of this revolt. Kūfi, *Futūh*, vol. 4, 84-110.

¹⁰²See note no, 55.

which there was no chance of retreat. There can be two important reasons for the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* to adopt this attitude. First, the earlier generation of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had passed away and the new generation was not politically as tactical as the earlier generation was. They felt confidence in their abilities, thus they tried once and for all to attain leadership in their own hands. Second and the most important was the authoritarian attitude of Ḥajjāj and his policies of sending forceful expeditions along with his reliance on the Syrian army and to take away all positions of power from the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*.

Even after that, the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were open to any kinds of treaties or peace agreements and they were good at that. During the battle, Ibn al-Ash'ath was offered a deal from 'Abdūl Mālik, according to which he was promised governorship of any city of Iraq he chooses, along with the benefit of the replacement of Ḥajjāj and bestowing of stipends on Iraqis in the same manner as the Syrians are given stipends.¹⁰³ Ibn al-Ash'ath being the descendant of one of the very pragmatic and tactical leaders, decided to accept these conditions but his followers refused to accept it.¹⁰⁴ The number of his followers was very high which gives an impression that many of the later migrants had also joined him. These people were not as flexible as the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* was. Besides this deal was beneficial only for Ibn al-Ash'ath but if they attain victory, many of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* hoped positions of eminence and governorships.

¹⁰³Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 1073.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 1074-5.

Unfortunate for the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* that Ibn al-Ash‘atlī and his followers had lost this battle.¹⁰⁵ This was a complete defeat for *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and a complete victory of the Umayyad regime against the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*.¹⁰⁶ Ḥajjāj had called the Syrian army to fight the Iraqis and after the defeat of Iraqis, Syrian army was settled permanently at Iraq to replace the Iraqi army.¹⁰⁷ Ibn al-Ash‘ath had revolted in 80 AH and was killed in 85 AH. All benefits of Iraqis were lost, their energies were broken down and they were completely demilitarized. Ḥajjāj killed all the survivors of the party of Ibn al-Ash‘ath.¹⁰⁸ The *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had been dispersed and was not given any positions of power any longer subsequently they could not gather money, men or any other kind of support for rebelling against the authorities. Iraq turned out to be a comparatively peaceful region after the crushing of this revolt for almost fifteen years till the year 101AH.

In 101 AH, the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* made another abortive effort, but not under the leadership of any of the descendants of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*, instead they tried to revolt along with Yazīd bin Muḥallab, previously a loyal Umayyad governor.¹⁰⁹ The father of Yazīd, Muḥallab bin Abī Ṣafra had settled at al-Baṣra and was a reliable adherent of Mu‘āwiya. He held up his support for Ibn Zubayr after Mu‘āwiya and fought many battles against the *khawārij*. Yazīd bin Muḥallab was also working as a steadfast worker of Umayyad but Ḥajjāj dismissed him due

¹⁰⁵ Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 4, 383-4.

¹⁰⁶ Hodgson also believes that the failure of the revolt of Ibn al-Ash‘ath Iraqi Arabs were reduced almost to the status of subject population, Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 2, 245.

¹⁰⁷ Crone, *Slaves*, 111, 115.

¹⁰⁸ Kūftī, *Futūh*, vol. 4, 115-119.

¹⁰⁹ He belonged to Azd.

to some suspicion.¹¹⁰ He was put in jail by caliph Walīd I, but he sought help from caliph Sulymān who awarded him with governorship of Iraq during his time.¹¹¹ After the death of caliph Sulymān, he was imprisoned by caliph ‘Umar bin ‘Abdūl Aziz. On managing to escape from the prison, and losing all hopes to retain his position in the reign of caliph Yazīd II, he revolted.¹¹²

Ahl-ul-Qādisiyya were initially not very mobilized by the urgings of Muhallab but when he distributed huge amount of money and people hoped for financial benefits, they supported him.¹¹³ The program of Muhallab was also attractive for the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* which carries the demand of sending the Syrian army back. It also demanded that no authoritarian ruler would be appointed as governor over Iraq.¹¹⁴ Thus the remnants of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* who themselves have become weak provided him with their full support. People like Na‘mān bin Ibrāhīm bin al-Ashtar, Mālik bin Ibrāhīm bin al-Ashtar, Muḥammad bin Ishaq bin Muḥammad bin al-Ash‘ath, and ‘Uthmān bin Ishaq bin Muḥammad bin al-Ash‘ath supported him.¹¹⁵ This revolt was also suppressed by the Umayyad through the help of the Syrian army.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁰Kūfi, *Futūh*, vol. 4, 154.

¹¹¹Ibid., 187.

¹¹²Ibid., 241-2.

¹¹³Tabāri, *Tārikh*, vol. 2, 1382.

¹¹⁴Ibid., 1398.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 1397; As is obvious from their names, all of them were the descendants of Ashtar Nakh‘ai and Ash‘at bin Qays.

¹¹⁶Ibid., vol. 2, 1402.

Thus *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*, or the earlier migrants formed a separate group enjoying certain privileges and benefits. They enjoyed positions of power and authority and remained as the elite of the garrisons for a very long time. The position of later migrants always remained subservient. During the revolt of Mukhtār, the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and the later migrants confronted each other as opponents. Many of the later migrants were killed after the success of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and were subdued. Yet during the period of Hajjāj, the interests of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and the later migrants converged as Hajjāj was oppressive towards all. Thus the later migrants joined Ibn al-Ash‘ath in a large number. By that time, *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had maintained their special position and privileges as *ashrāf* of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra but after the defeat of Ibn al-Ash‘ath, they lost their special privileges. Their role as leaders of their people was terminated. The failure of the revolt of Ibn al-Ash‘ath was the period of the downfall of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. Though they took part in the revolt of Yazīd bin Muhallab but they participated as followers, not as leaders. The Umayyad rulers were successful in completely subduing the independent and rebellious attitude of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. They were never able to muster their energies again and could not initiate any movement against the authorities nor were they in a position to dictate their terms to the authorities any longer.

4.2 Khawārij and the State

Khawārij was a group of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* who parted from the mainstream and differed with *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* over their gradual and strategic

policies. *Khawārij*¹¹⁷ were not patient enough to wait and see the events, instead they were in favor of direct confrontation with the authorities. Many of them had gone out to oppose the policies of 'Uthmān. Ḥarqūṣ bin Zāhīr was the most famous who went out in revolt against 'Uthmān.¹¹⁸ After the murder of 'Uthmān, they chose the most cooperative person amongst the Quraysh. But in a very short time, they realized their mistake. When the rest of *ahl ul-Qādisiyya* were contented and satisfied with smaller positions of power and authority, the *khawārij* were looking for more bigger targets. Instead of choosing someone from Quraysh and ensuring that he will take care of their interests, they decided to take the leadership into their own hands. They had tried Ali but several civil wars made them understand that 'Alī was following his own agenda. His rule thus was not according to their wishes.

As soon as 'Alī decided to fight civil wars, *khawārij* felt that any of the Qurayshī leaders will not serve their interests. Hence they took advantage of the ceasefire at the battle of *Siffin* and decided to appoint their own *Amir-ul-Mūminūn*.¹¹⁹ This group included many of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* for instance 'Abdullah bin al Kuwa al-Yashkarī,¹²⁰ Ḥarqūṣ bin Zāhīr, 'Abdullah bin al-Wahb al-Rāsibī¹²¹ and Mas'r bin Fidakī al-Tamīmī. They developed a religious ideology

¹¹⁷See a detailed discussion in Morony, *Iraq After the Muslim Conquest*, 468-78.

¹¹⁸Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2955.

¹¹⁹Ibn Athīr believes that later *khawārij* like Mustawrid bin Ullīfa was also named as *Amir-ul-Mūminūn*. Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 425.

¹²⁰'Abdulla bin al Kuwa al-Yashkarī has turned *khawārij* but later changed his opinion and supported Mu'āwiya. Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 67-8.

¹²¹'Abdulla bin al-Wahb al-Rāsibī belonged to Azd and had participated in the conquests of *Qādisiyya*. Ibn Hajar, *Isāba*, vol. 3, 95.

in order to promote their interests; the most important doctrine of this ideology was the belief that any one amongst the Muslims could become the caliph which was earlier considered as the exclusive right of the Quraysh. According to this doctrine, they were able to appoint an *Amir-ul-Mūminūn* from amongst them.¹²²

Some of these *khawārij* were ex-*qurrā'*. As it has already been explained that *qurrā'* was a people from the villages of Hijāz combined with the religious group who used to recite Quran and perform other rituals of religion. For instance 'Abdullah bin al-Wahb al-Rāsibī was famous as an extremely religious person who later turned into *khawārij*.¹²³ Such people helped to develop a religious ideology and thus the *khawārij* used to argue on the basis of Quranic doctrines.¹²⁴

The biggest mistake which these Khawārij made was to overestimate their power. Initially four thousand Khawārij gathered at *nehr-ul-Marwān*. A few of them apprehended their lesser number and departed from the group leaving it to only two thousand and eight hundred.¹²⁵ The *khawārij* fought with this smaller number and were badly defeated. Yet this defeat could not stop them from pursuing their demands. They revolted openly against Mu‘āwiya and did not

¹²² See details debates on the Khawārij in Hamid Dabashi, *Authority in Islam: From the Rise of Muḥammad to the Establishment of the Umayyads* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989); Also see Elie Adib Salem, *Political Theory and Institutions of the Khawārij* (Maryland: John Hopkins Press, 1956).

¹²³ Ibn Ḥajr, *Isāba*, vol. 3, 95.

¹²⁴ See a detailed doctrinal discussion between a member of 'Alī and famous *khawārij*. Küfti, *Futūh*, , vol. 2, 261-5.

¹²⁵ Tabarī, *Tārīkh* , vol.1, 3380.

accept his caliphate. They attacked Mu‘āwiya during his stay at al-Kūfa but the Kufans retaliated and protected Mu‘āwiya.¹²⁶

Along with their main political doctrine, certain extremist practices were associated with them. For instance the sources relate that they killed a companion of the Prophet (PBUH) and slit the belly of a pregnant woman. They were also reported to kill several other women.¹²⁷ This was a strange attitude and could not be reconciled with their religious approach. Their religious ideology was also confused and they argued recklessly with ‘Alī who was an earlier convert. This doctrine of considering all as pagans except for those who had accepted their doctrine was created in order to assert their dominancy and fear. *Khawārij* wanted to attain leadership by forcing all to accept their political and religious ideology. Probably they felt that only through this way, they will be able to create their leadership.

In 42 AH, rest of the *Khawārij* gathered again under the leadership of Mustawarid bin Ullifah. They kept on moving from one place of Sawād to another. Their tactic was not to be engaged in heavy warfare; instead they wanted to run away from the Kufan forces.¹²⁸ Moreover, considering themselves as the conquerors of Sawād, they wanted to collect the tribute from different areas of Sawād by themselves. The Umayyad governor was concerned about this revolt.

¹²⁶Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 10; Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 409-10.

¹²⁷Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 3374-5; See a historiographical discussion on the combination of violence and piety in *khawārij* and how the sources of Muslim history have depicted them. Thomas Sizgorich, *Violence and Belief in Late Antiquity: Militant Devotion in Christianity and Islam* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 196-230.

¹²⁸Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 426-35.

He decided to send the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* to curb this revolt. A big army of al-Kūfa under the leadership of Ma‘qil bin Qays was sent against the *khawārij*. The *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and *shī'a* both hated them for their own reasons. *Shī'a* disliked them for their being disloyal to Ali and for the murder of Ali. The *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* considered them a hindrance in their smooth relationship with the government. Moreover, destroying all of them will give them a chance to share their *fay*. A fierce battle was fought and all of the *khawārij* were killed except for one.¹²⁹

Later on in the governorship of ‘Ubaydalla bin Ziyād, who feared the revolt of some *khawārij*, and thus killed all the *khawārij* in prison except for one.¹³⁰ This one was Bilal bin Mirdas. He was also a very religious person and prayed a lot. He revolted against ‘Ubaydalla bin Ziyād with forty men but was defeated and killed by Ibn Ziyād. Ibn Ziyād also killed all other suspected of this belief.¹³¹ Thus the original adherents of this belief were almost completely annihilated and could not be found again.

The *khawārij* who appeared in the period of ‘Abdūl Mālik were actually rebels of the state.¹³² They could never have emerged from the remnants of the earlier *khawārij* as almost all of them were killed. Moreover this new group was very numerous. Only the Azriqa who fought at al-Baṣra were ten thousand in

¹²⁹Ibid., 434-6.

¹³⁰Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 186-7.

¹³¹Ibid., 514.

¹³²Several jurists believed that there was no difference between *khawārij* and rebel (*bhagi*). All the rebels of the state were usually called as *khawārij*. See Khaled Abu El Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 248-9.

number.¹³³ Moreover, the later *khawārij* had not emerged from Iraq alone, instead they belonged to different areas of the empire and kept on moving from one place to another. A group of them decided to stay in al-Baṣra. This new group had however taken some views of the early *khawārij* and idealized their approach. Still their views, ideology and interests are somehow different from the original *khawārij*. As they had borrowed the religious ideology of *khawārij* to forward their political interests, they could not unite their followers on a single interpretation of this religious ideology. The Basran group of the later *khawārij* thus was divided into three groups, Azriqa, Ibadis and Sufriyyah; each defining its own interpretation of *khawārij* religious ideology.¹³⁴

The Azriqas who later on fought with the Basrans believed that it was legal for them to take away the property, life and wealth of the polytheists and they considered all who have not accepted their doctrines as polytheists.¹³⁵ Thus they legitimatized their activity of plundering the property, life and wealth of the Muslim population as well as the non-Muslim. They had adopted the idea of raids practiced in pre-Islamic Arabia and in the period of Prophet (PBUH) too. It gives an impression that the rebellion was not all about wealth, money and power; perhaps the Arabs were idealizing the old Arab values of independence in which the tribes used to raid each other for gaining wealth and power.¹³⁶

¹³³Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 591.

¹³⁴Ibid., 519-20; Kūfi, *Futūh*, vol. 4, 41-47.

¹³⁵Ibid., 519-20.

¹³⁶Watt also believes that *khawārij* mainly belonged to nomadic tribes and were longing for their free and independent lives. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology* (New Jersey: The State University, 1962), 4; For more views on *khawārij* see Hussam S. Timani, "The

These *khawārij* were probably the late settlers as they were not happy with their status and with the existing regime. The *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* of al-Baṣra decided to act against them in order to secure their territory and taxes from them. The larger number of these later *khawārij* threatened the al-Baṣra ns and they took the matter seriously. The Baṣran *ashrāf* (mainly the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*) were eager to eliminate these *khawārij* so far so that they agreed to surrender the land and its revenue for three years to Muḥallab on the condition that he will fight the *khawārij*.¹³⁷

By then the Umayyad government was not much concerned about the threat of *khawārij* and they were considered the responsibility of the Iraqis themselves. The governor of Iraq and his selected army was usually enough as well as eager to fight with any rebels like *khawārij*. Azriqa had revolted in the period of the control of Ibn Zubayr over Iraq.

In the year 68 AH, those of the Azriqa who had survived came back to the Iraqi territory. They commenced a raid at al-Madā'in, killing several men and women. Once again they were reported to be merciless towards the weak and unarmed.¹³⁸ They also plundered the revenues of different districts.¹³⁹ The severity of their doctrine can be seen from the fact that it allowed them to kill women as

Khawārij in Modern Islamic Historiography", PhD Dissertation (Los Angeles: University of California, 2002).

¹³⁷Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 590-1; Muḥallab was already fighting against *khawārij* before the governorship of Hajjāj. Hajjāj confirmed Muḥallab for this expedition. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 580-91. Küfti, *Futūh*, vol. 4, 12; Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 4, 365-7.

¹³⁸Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 756-7.

¹³⁹Ibid., 764.

well. There was the practice of enslaving women in pre-Islamic Arabia as well as in Islam. But killing women was an extremist act which showed their rebellious attitude. They were not only the rebels of the state but had also made an attack on the life and property of the Iraqis. They can be more likely compared to the band of robbers of medieval times who keep on wandering from one place to another and were present in almost all medieval societies. The common people were always fearful of them as they used to plunder and kill them. One of the most important reason for seeking robbery as their lifestyle was their hatred towards the rules and regulation formulated by state. Thus it can be Sa‘id for the Azriqa that they were fed up of the rules and regulations formed by the state. They declared themselves as free of these limitations, never adopted any appeasing attitude towards rulers and felt happy with this independent life.

The Kufan governor had proceeded against the Azriqa who had attacked at al-Kūfa and al-Madā'in them but they had left the territory of al-Kūfa . Later on, when they came back, Muhallab was sent to fight them. They fought for eight months without any conclusive result.¹⁴⁰ The fighting temporarily discontinued at the death of Mu‘šab and the control of Iraq by ‘Abdūl Mālik. ‘Abdūl Mālik took special interest in curbing the revolts of *khawārij*. He ordered his governor to reappoint Muhallab to fight the *khawārij*. Muhallab defeated them but could not completely annihilate them.¹⁴¹ In the year 73 AH, the Azriqites were defeated. Six

¹⁴⁰Ibid., 761-5.

¹⁴¹Ibid., 825-9.

thousand of them were put to death and eight hundred were made captives. In the year 77, the Azriqites were completely destroyed.¹⁴²

Another important revolt which is famous with the name of *khawārij* was that of Sufriyyah. People from Tamīm and Shaybān were more dominant in this revolt. Their methodology was more or less similar to the Azriqites however their views were somewhat moderate. They refrained from killing women. Yet, they plunder people and killed males.¹⁴³ This was a more organized and devoted movement. Azriqites and Sufriyyah both expressed the feelings of discontent with the existing structure of the state.

Sufriyyah had declared Shāliḥ as their *Amir-ul-Mūminūn*.¹⁴⁴ After his death Shabīb¹⁴⁵ replaced him. Shabīb had defeated the Kufan army for several times. Shabīb also govern those people from whom he took *Jizya* and was concerned about them. Shabīb used to cut off land revenue and plunder the people of different regions.¹⁴⁶ In one of such raids, when his men were killing the tribe of Taym bin Shaybān, they accepted their doctrine and joined them.¹⁴⁷ One of the reasons for rapid successes of the Sufriyyah against the Kufan army was the living style of these men. Shabīb belonged to Mūrra bin Hammam. Although born in one

¹⁴²Ibid., 1003-1020.

¹⁴³Ibid., 894-5.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., 886.

¹⁴⁵Shabīb had remained a legendary character due to his brilliant military strategies. He was successful in creating an awe and fear amongst the Kufans for a very long period. His death by drowning in the river also created many stories including the assumption that it was not possible for any human being to kill Shabīb.

¹⁴⁶Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 901, 907, 933-4.

¹⁴⁷Ibid., 895-6.

of the garrisons, Shabīb was often taken by his father to the desert to his people.¹⁴⁸ He must have learnt the hardships of desert and fighting from there. On the other hand, the Kufans had become settled people. They were not able to fight against the pure Bedouins. Finally Hajjāj had to call the Syrian army against Shabīb which finally defeated him.¹⁴⁹

After curbing these two revolts, there was no significant *khawārij* revolt and the authorities were relaxed. There was however a small uprising in the year 100 AH during the caliphate of 'Umar bin 'Abdūl Aziz.¹⁵⁰ He was a person from Rabī'a who revolted. Caliph 'Umar bin 'Abdūl Aziz had a dialogue with him. 'Umar was lenient towards them and was probably considering their idea to modify the method of the selection of the caliph.¹⁵¹ However the dialogue ended without any result due to the death of 'Umar bin 'Abdūl Aziz. This rebel group was easily subdued in the period of Yazīd II.¹⁵²

Thus *khawārij* was not comprised of a single group. Many rebels of the state had adopted the ideology of *khawārij* and had modified it according to their requirements. *Khawārij* were openly rebellious and were not ready to surrender their claims on petty financial benefits. The Initial revolts of *khawārij* were very

¹⁴⁸Ibid., 977.

¹⁴⁹Ibid., 954, 959-972.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., 1348.

¹⁵¹Jonathan Berkey acknowledges the individuality of the political ideology of the *khawārij* and believes that *khawārij* gave "impetus to the emergence of a self-conscious Islamic identity". Jonathan P. Berkey, *The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 86.

¹⁵²Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 1348-50.

disorganized and ill-planned, but the later groups were much organized and more numerous in number. They offered stiff resistance to the government; consequently all of their revolts were finally crushed. On the other hand, the *khawārij* were never successful in gathering public support. The migrants of Iraq generally dislike the doctrines and tactics of *khawārij*.

4.3 Shī'an-i-‘Alī and the State

Another important group of the migrants which created problems for the state was the *shī'an-i-‘Alī*. They were the ideologically motivated people, who unlike *khawārij* had narrowed down the concept of caliphate to the house of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). The love for ‘Alī and his descendants had become a deliverance call for many. They accepted this call in order to get relief from the tyrant regime.

As, it has already been discussed, that the Iraqis had no ideological association with Ali in Iraq before his caliphate. Thus when he went to al-Kūfa to gather army against ‘Ayi’sha, Ṭalha and Zubayr, he was not received warmly. On repeated calls and insistence, some of them gathered for his help. Yet, they helped Ali on their conditions and kept on disobeying him. There were few who had developed some affinity towards ‘Alī and they remained loyal to him. For instance Ḥujr bin ‘Adī kept on praising ‘Alī during the reign of Mu‘āwiya.¹⁵³ The earlier governor of Mu‘āwiya, Mughīra bin Shuba overlooked this attitude. Mughīra

¹⁵³Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 472-88.

probably considered this attitude as harmless for the state as Ḥujr was not supported by many Iraqis. Moreover, he was not planning any revolt against the authorities, thus was ignored. Ziyād came with a different policy. In his view, it was important for each member of the state to show his respect and concern towards the regime. Furthermore, he probably was threatened by the prospects of any future revolt led by Ḥujr. He convinced Mu‘āwiya to adopt a strict attitude towards Ḥujr and his followers and consequently they were executed by the caliph.¹⁵⁴

This action of the state increased the hatred of the regime in the eyes of those who already had some soft corner for ‘Alī. Some of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had written letters to Ḥusayn and called him to assume power after the death of Mu‘āwiya.¹⁵⁵ When Ḥusayn sent his deputy to al-Kūfa, he was given secret oath by many of the Kufans.¹⁵⁶ The response of the state towards this menace was simple and drastic. They adopted extremely hard policy towards this emerging group. The governor threatened the migrants of the loss of their wealth and all other economic benefits, if they were found involved in any rebellious activities. Moreover for some of the very zealous supporters, the state adopted force. Thus ‘Ubaydalla ordered the torturous execution of some of the supporters of Ḥusayn.¹⁵⁷ Rest deserted him when they were threatened with the taking away of their spoils and other financial benefits.

¹⁵⁴Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 111-144.

¹⁵⁵Kūfi, *Futūh*, vol. 3, 31-4.

¹⁵⁶Ibid., 40.

¹⁵⁷Ibid., 64-8.

Hence it seems that *shī'a* belief had not developed by then as an ideology whose adherents could fight for their cause.¹⁵⁸ State was successful in dealing with *shī'a* threat very easily. The state utilized the services of the supporters of Husayn and sent those who had written letters to Husayn to fight against him.¹⁵⁹ These were mainly the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and the leaders of the tribes. The governor controlled the rest of the tribesmen through this strategy. The caravan of Husayn was not more than a few hundreds and as he was not supported by the migrants, the revolt was very easily crushed.¹⁶⁰

The murder of Husayn and his family created a very significant and long-lasting impact on the development of the *shī'a* ideology. After three years of the murder of Husayn, some of the zealous *shī'a* began to realize the consequences of their mistake by not following Husayn and began a movement with the name of *tawabīn*. It was in fact the time when 'Ubaydalla bin Ziyād had left Iraq and it was governed by comparatively weak governors appointed by 'Abdullah bin Zubayr. The movement was led by Sulymān bin Şurad al-Khuza'ī, Al-Mūsayab bin Najāba al-Fazārī, 'Abdullah bin Sa'd bin Nufayl al-Azdī, 'Abdullah bin Wal al-Taymi and Rifa bin Shaddād al-Bajalī. Letters were written for support to the *Shī'a* of al-Madā'in and al-Baṣra.¹⁶¹ They were able to gather more support because of the death of Yazīd and fleeing of 'Ubaydalla bin Ziyād, conversely in the meanwhile Mukhtār entered al-Kūfa. Mukhtār broke away some members of the *tawabīn* over

¹⁵⁸ See a discussion on the doctrinal foundation of *shī'a* ideology in Hamid Dabashi, *Shiism: A Religion of Protest* (Cambridge: Harward University Press, 2011), 2-9.

¹⁵⁹ Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 334.

¹⁶⁰ See details of the incident of Husayn, *Ibid.*, 227-390.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 504-5.

to him.¹⁶² 'Abdullah bin Yazid al-Anṣari was the governor of al-Kūfa when *tawabīn* began their movement. He advised the *tawabīn* to fight against the Syrians instead of fighting him. They accepted this idea and made their preparations public.¹⁶³ As soon as the leaders of the *tawabīn* decided to set out, only four thousand people joined out although sixteen thousand have given them the oath of allegiance.¹⁶⁴ It seems that many of them were taken back by Mukhtār. The *tawabīn* still decided to fight against the Syrians and a battle was fought at Ain-ul-Wardah. The *tawabīn* were completely defeated by the Syrian army.¹⁶⁵

The *shī'a* ideology was strengthened during the movement of *tawabīn*. The *tawabīn* during their journey visited the tomb of Ḥusayn, prayed there and wept over there. There were some who even made circles around the tomb in the similar manner as the Muslims made circles around the Ka'ba.¹⁶⁶ The *tawabīn* thus showed an emotional attachment towards the family of 'Alī.¹⁶⁷ They were offered by the governor 'Abdullah bin Yazid to make a joint venture against the Syrians. Similar offer was made to them by Zufair, the governor of Qārqiṣṣiya. Yet they refused to accept their help. One of the reasons was that they were not

¹⁶² Ibid., 509.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 513.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 538.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 563-8.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 547.

¹⁶⁷ Mahmoud believes that 'Alī had an emotional following in Iraq even in the earlier period and he considers al-Ashtar to be a representative of this ideology. He still agrees that very few of his followers agreed with the policies and idealism of 'Alī. Mahmoud, *The Crisis of Muslim History*, 85.

willing to make any further delays and second they wanted to return the leadership to the descendants of Ali, not to Ibn-Zubayr.¹⁶⁸

Mukhtār was waiting to see the consequences of the revolt of *Tawabīn*. Mukhtār was an ambitious person and wanted to attain power and position by manipulating the *shī'a* emotions towards the murder of Ḥusayn. When the *tawabīn* were defeated badly and the rest of them fled back to al-Kūfa, he welcomed them. He wrote a letter to them claiming that they were not victorious actually because they were not following him and that he was in fact the real leader who has been sent to take revenge of Ḥusayn.¹⁶⁹ After that Mukhtār continued his efforts to persuade the *shī'a* to him. Finally all of the leading *shī'a* including the leaders of the *tawabīn* movement acknowledged his leadership.¹⁷⁰ Mukhtār claimed that he was sent by Muḥammad bin al-Haniffiya, one of the sons of 'Alī. Muḥammad bin al-Haniffiya and others of the family had decided to live a life of isolation but from the core of his heart, he wanted someone to help them and to avenge the blood of Ḥusayn.¹⁷¹ This provided legitimacy to Mukhtār and he

¹⁶⁸Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 549-50, 553-4; Montgomery Watt interestingly finds out that the greater number of Yamanites supported Ali and remained as *Shī'an-i-'Alī* while a larger number of northern tribes turned to *khawārij* views. The most important reason that he has found behind this ideological attachment is the pre-Islamic political structure of Yaman and North Arabia. Yaman had experienced kingship and dynasties and northern Arabs were habitual of an egalitarian political system, thus the Yamanites found Charisma in Ali and became his followers while northerns believed all Arabs as equal and claimed that anyone can attain the position of caliph. W. Montgomery Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought*, Edinburgh, University Press, 1973.

¹⁶⁹Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 569-570.

¹⁷⁰Ibid., 599.

¹⁷¹A few of the *shī'a* personally went to Muḥammad bin al-Haniffiya to ask about the legitimacy of Mukhtār. His answer proved supportive for Mukhtār as he believed that Allah has the authority to support ahl-ul-bait from any of his creatures. Kūfi, *Futūh*, vol. 3, 251-3.

gathered the support of a large number of people in al-Kūfa. He revolted openly against Ibn-al-Mutī, the governor of Ibn-Zubayr for al-Kūfa and was successful.¹⁷² Mukhtār took oath of allegiance and became the independent ruler of al-Kūfa. Immediately after attaining victory, he began to hunt down the people who were involved in the murder of Ḥusayn. But before he could do this, there came a severe resistance to him by the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* under the leadership of Shabt bin Rab‘ī. Muḥammad bin al-Ash‘ath and ‘Abdul Reḥmān bin Sa‘īd bin Qays and Shimr bin Dhī al-Jawshan were some of the other prominent leaders who shared this view. As some of them were involved in the murder of Ḥusayn, (Shimr was directly involved) thus they became conscious and were not willing to support Mukhtār anymore.¹⁷³ They decided to instead fight against Mukhtār in which they were defeated. After the defeat Mukhtār killed many of them who were involved in the murder of Ḥusayn. In one place, he was reported to kill two forty eight men only belonging to the tribe of Wādiah.¹⁷⁴ Shimar was perused and was also killed.¹⁷⁵ Moreover Mukhtār also killed ‘Umar bin Sa‘d bin Abī Waqqāṣ who was involved in the battle against Ḥusayn.¹⁷⁶

Mukhtār was later defeated by Mu‘ṣab bin Zubayr and thus ended a brief *shī‘a* rule over al-Kūfa. Mu‘ṣab and the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had taken their revenge and murdered a number of the followers of Mukhtār. Apart from being *shī‘a*,

¹⁷²Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 614-632; Kūfī, *Futūh*, vol. 3, 257-64.

¹⁷³Ibid., *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 650.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., 660.

¹⁷⁵Ibid., 663.

¹⁷⁶Ibid., 673; Kūfī, *Futūh*, vol. 3, 271-2; Balāduri, *Ansāb-ul-Ashrāf*, vol. 6, 405-11.

many of them were probably the later migrants. However, the rule of Mukhtār had cooled down the emotions of *shī'a* as they had taken revenge from the leading murderers of Ḥusayn. This slogan of revenge for Ḥusayn thus was no more valid. The *shī'a* movement remained inactive for more than thirty years in Iraq.

In 100 AH, Muḥammad bin ‘Alī bin ‘Abdullah bin ‘Abbās began to renew the *shī'a* movement. This time, it was purely aimed at getting power. He took the support of twelve respectable people at al-Kūfa but none of them was the descendant of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. This secret activity continued in Iraq. Many of the *mawālī* and less renowned people had joined this movement.¹⁷⁷ Missionaries were sent to Khūrāsān from al-Kūfa.¹⁷⁸ However this group never chose Iraq as to be their centre of activities. They have given more importance to Khūrāsān and began their movement from there.

In 121 AH, a grandson of Ḥusayn, Zayd bin ‘Alī revolted in al-Kūfa. This was the time when *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had become very weak. The Syrians have taken full control of Iraq. Zayd was also given support by the descendants of the later migrants.¹⁷⁹ The quarters were still ruled by the descendants of some prominent *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* for instance Bajīla was headed by Ibrāhīm bin ‘Abdullah bin Jarīr al-Bajalī¹⁸⁰ and Kinda was ruled by Al-Mundhir bin Muḥammad bin Al-Ash‘ath.¹⁸¹ Zayd was also convinced to begin a revolt because

¹⁷⁷Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 1467.

¹⁷⁸Ibid., 1501.

¹⁷⁹Ibid., 1679.

¹⁸⁰For details of Ibrāhīm see Ibn Sa‘d, *Tabaqāt*, vol. 6, 326.

¹⁸¹Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 1702.

he was concerned about the oppressive rule of Umayyad and wanted to attain leadership for him. The slogan that he used for attracting people was the unjust and oppressive rule of the Umayyad.¹⁸² Only 218 people joined Zayd bin Ali although forty thousand have given him the oath of allegiance. The people of al-Kūfa were locked in the great Mosque but Zayd felt it was not a good excuse for not joining him.¹⁸³ Later on however the people joined him and he fought a successful battle for two days. Unfortunate for him and his followers, at the end of the second day, he was killed. The Syrian forces had no idea of his death. The Kūfans again became weak due to the loss of leadership. Yayha the son of Zayd tried to provide a leadership but had not continued the battle the third day. Instead he fled to al-Nahrayn or probably to Khūrāsān. Probably he took the wrong decision to leave his position. Finally he was pursued and killed.

Thus *shī'an-i- 'Alī* had constantly posed a threat to the Umayyad rule. Although initially people had not developed any emotional attachment with Ali but after the murder of Husayn, this affinity was created. Some of the sections of migrants realized that Ali and his family had provided better governance than Umayyad. Others were touched and shocked with the incident of the murder of Husayn and thus provided their support to *shī'a* movements. Moreover it can also be observed that apart from 'Alī and Husayn, the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had never supported the *shī'a* movements. The movement of *tawabīn* was ill-planned and was led by emotions, thus the tactical and politically wise *ah! ul-Qadisiya* did not support it. *Ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* had deserted Husayn and when Mukhtār came to take

¹⁸²Ibid., 1700.

¹⁸³Ibid., 1703.

revenge, they were concerned about their safety thus they also could not support him. Gradually the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* separated them from *shī'a* ideology and the *shī'a* movement in the later times was dominated by the later migrants and the manumitted *mawālī*. It was Mukhtār who for the first time relied on the services of later migrants and *mawālī* but the movements of Muḥammad bin ‘Abdullah bin ‘Abbās and Zayd bin ‘Alī also confirms that majority of the later *shī'a* were consisted of later migrants or the *mawālī*. After the death of Mukhtār, the *shī'a* activity in Iraq remained ineffective for a very long time. Almost after fifty years, the great grandson of Ḥusayn made another effort to restore authority to the family of Ali. The Umayyad government has always acted very harshly towards the *shī'a*. Their attitude towards Ḥusayn reveals the level of apprehension that they had from the *shī'a*. Still, the Umayyad was always successful in exterminating their most important enemy. In their struggle against *shī'a*, Umayyad were supported by *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*, either by deserting *shī'a* leaders like ‘Alī and Ḥusayn or by openly fighting against Ḥusayn, Mukhtār and Zayd.

Apart from the political leadership, the migrants were equally concerned about their financial interests. Most of their moves were taken in order to secure their economic benefits. Iraq was providing them with rich opportunities to enhance their economic position. Migration had significantly changed their economic status and they earned huge wealth from Iraq.

Chapter 5

Change in the Economic Structure of the Migrants

Most of the tribes who had migrated to Iraq were previously nomadic or semi-nomadic. They were living a life which was hardly fulfilling their basic needs of food, shelter and water. Their economic status was certainly enhanced by the conquest itself; however the permanent benefits of the conquest were exclusively kept for the migrants alone. Migration transformed the economic structure of the migrants. The armies who went back to Madina only had shared the spoils of war but the armies who stayed at al-Kūfa, al-Baṣra, al-Madā'in and different parts of Iraq retained their benefits in the form of regular salaries or *say* for a very longer duration.

A further financial benefit which the migrants gained was due to the fertile land of Iraq and the bright opportunities it was providing to the migrant Arabs. The garrisons had developed as urban centers thus there were ample chances of the growth of trade and business in these centers. The Arabs tried many of the urban-natured businesses at Iraq and earned huge amount of money out of these businesses. A few of them were also involved in agriculture and took keen interest in reshaping old canals and building new ones. They were also very particular about repairing the old dams and making the unusable land as fertile again.

The benefits of conquest and the result of their personal economic activity gradually enhanced the financial status of the migrants which ultimately transformed their social and political structure as well. Being the residents of

urban centres; they had left several customs of the desert life and considered themselves to be the rich city-dwellers living in the very important garrison towns of the new empire. Furthermore another significant transformation which this economic activity and profits brought was the worry to retain this wealth for a much longer time and the tussle between different claimants of this profit. The earlier migrants remained very particular about securing their spoils and other economic benefits. This put them in a clash against the later migrants as well as against the authorities.

5.1 Economic Gains Through Spoils

One of the most essential sources of revenue for the migrants was the spoils of war from which their salaries and other benefits were drawn. The migrants were very particular about their spoils and were not ready to withdraw or share it with others. On the other hand, the governments were keen to have strict control over the spoils of Iraq. Although there were certain other factors too, but the economic factor played a vital role in determining the involvement of migrants in different revolts and civil wars.

After the battle of *Qādisiyya*, *Madā'in*, *Jalūlā* and *Takrīt*, there was an issue of the distribution of lands amongst the victors. According to the already established rules, the whole of *Sawād* had become part of the spoils of war which must be divided amongst the victor army apart from the fifth which must be spared for the caliph. Nevertheless Caliph ‘Umar proposed a different arrangement for the lands of the *Sawād*. Instead of distributing it amongst the victor army, it was decided by ‘Umar to leave it to its original owners. He

believed that its income will be divided amongst the soldiers of the Muslim army as *atā*. Moreover he argued that if this land will be divided, nothing will be left for the next comers.¹ ‘Umar was thinking in the long terms. He never wanted to restrict the benefits of conquests to a smaller group. Besides, his actions enhanced the control of the state which was responsible for collecting the taxes and distributing it amongst the soldiers. In later times, it was strictly the authority of the governor to pay *ata* and other stipends. They kept on controlling the Kufan population through this manipulation.

Yet some parts of this land were taken in direct control by the Arab state and were distributed amongst the army. There was a land which was the property of Kisra, his family and nobles which was abandoned. It was taken over by the government and was considered as part of the spoils of war. So far there were a few lands which were never divided into the Arab population; that was consisted of jungles, ponds and rivers etc. Thus it can be Sa‘īd that the lands of Sawād were divided into three categories:

1. The abandoned land which was the property of Kisra, his family and nobles. It was taken over by the government and was to be divided amongst the victors of *Qādisiyya*.
2. Second, there was land consisted of jungles, marshes, ponds and rivers etc.

This was taken over by the Arab government and was never divided into the Arabs.

¹ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 268.

3. Third, there was land of the common Persians. The inhabitants of some of this land had made treaties with the Arab army. Some of the areas were taken by force. All of this land was part of spoils of war but it was decided by 'Umar to not to divide it amongst victors. Thus taxes were imposed on those lands which were taken by the Arab state and salaries of the soldiers were distributed from this category of land.²

The only land which was decided to be divided amongst the victors was the abandoned lands of Kisra, his nobles and family. This land was later called as *fay* which literally means the spoils of war. The Arabs were allowed by 'Umar to settle in the lands of Kisra which were declared as spoils of war and were to be divided into the victorious army. The victorious army on the other hand decided that they must not settle in those places as they were scattered in the whole of Sawād but they appointed one of them as supervisor for those lands (probably to cultivate those lands and to collect revenue). Arabs never settled there as after al-Madā'in, they settled in al-Kūfa but 'Umar was concerned about it and issued a notification reminding the soldiers to take over their spoils and if anything would go wrong, the government will not be responsible.³ Thus, this abandoned land came under the collective 'trusteeship' of the '*ahl al-fay*'. Shaban asserted that

²Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol, 1, 2467-69; Balādhurī, on the other hand claimed that vacated land of Kisra was taken under the custody of the state. Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 272.

³Ibid., 2469.

this responsibility was entrusted to non-*ridda* soldiers of minor tribes who were called as *qurrā'*.⁴

The abandoned lands or the *fay* of the migrants was part of the spoils of war, thus it was restricted only for the initial migrants and particularly for the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* but it was under the control of the government.⁵ It can neither be sold nor can the victors have any alternate plans for this land. The control of the government over the *fay* land also becomes visible when the caliphs granted lands to different people out of this *fay* land. For instance, 'Umar had given land to Talha, Jarir bin 'Abdullah and Abū Mūsa.⁶ Likewise 'Uthmān had granted lands to different people. Tabari believes that this land was granted from the *khams* (one fifth share of the government in the spoils) of the government.⁷ The common land of Sawād was decided not to be divided and the revenue had to be distributed amongst the victor army in the form of *atā* after deducting the one fifth share of the central government, certainly in the form of money not in land. Still the

⁴Shaban, *Islamic History: A.D. 600-750 (A.H. 132)*, 50; See a detailed discussion on *qurrā'* in chapter 4.

⁵ Balādhuri claimed that vacated land of Kisra was taken under the custody of the state. Bladhuri, *Futūh*, 272; This traditions reveals that there was some kind of state control over the *fay* land even in the initial period and the migrants were not completely free to deal with this land according to their own choices. Tabari however states that whenever the authorities wanted to distribute the land, the majority of the Muslims refuse to divide it thus the abandoned land was not divided. Tabari, *Tārīkh*, vol.1, 2469.

⁶As far as Jarir is concerned, Bajila had decided to go to the Iraqi front on the condition of one fourth share in the spoils of Iraq. The tribes were reluctant to go to the Iraqi front, thus Umar agreed to this condition of Bajila. Later however 'Umar probably give some land and money to Jarir and Bajila renounced their claim of one fourth of land of Sawād, Balādhuri, *Futūh*, 266-7; Similarly in another case, Abū 'Abdulla Nāfa' was granted land by 'Umar. Nāfa' pointed out a land in Basra which was not *kharāj* land, and it was useless. He proposed a proper feasibility plan for the usage of this land. He convinced the caliph that if he be granted this land, he will breed horses there. His ideas were endorsed by the governor, Abū Mūsa and the land was finally granted to Nāfa'. Tabari, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2376; Balādhuri, *Futūh*, 345.

⁷ Tabari, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2376.

government has got *khams* in the form of land from the first category which was the abandoned lands of Kisra.⁸ It seems more appropriate that the properties were granted from this category of lands which was the sole belonging of the government. The account of Balādhurī endorsed this view though he never talked about *khams*; Instead he believes that all of the abandoned land was under the complete control of the government, and that 'Uthmān has given all grants of land from the abandoned lands.⁹

The salaries or *atā* (annual stipends) of the migrants were given by the third category of the land of Sawād which was not divided amongst the soldiers. The taxes received from Sawād went up to ten crore dirham in the reign of 'Umar.¹⁰ The system of *atā* was introduced by 'Umar and he decided to keep significant difference between the *atā* of the earlier migrants and the late migrants. Thus the amount of *atā* varies from two thousand to three hundred dinars.¹¹ Apart from the regular salaries, the migrants remain engaged in further conquests and kept on gathering new spoils for them.

This arrangement gives an idea that there was a difference in the economic status of the migrants. The difference prevailed in their annual *atā* and salaries. Shaban makes a distinction between the *ridda* and the non-*ridda* tribesmen in Iraq from amongst the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. He has termed the non-*ridda* tribesmen as

⁸ Umar had ordered the Muslims to divide the 4 parts of the abandoned land amongst the victorious army and to sent the fifth part to him as *khams*. *Ibid.*, 2469.

⁹ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 273.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 270.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 438.

*qurrā*¹² and has argued that there is a difference of status of *qurrā'* and rest of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*.¹³ In fact there seems no difference in the salaries of *ridda* and non-*ridda* soldiers of *Qādisiyya*. According to a report cited by Balādhurī, all *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* either get two thousand or at least fifteen hundred dirhams as *atā*.¹⁴ Another report of Ṭabarī reinstates this information. Ṭabarī claimed that the annual stipends of the soldiers of Iraq were differently distributed for *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and latecomers. He believed that for forty three men, forty three women and fifty children, of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*, one lac dirhams was allocated. For other soldiers, one lac dirhams was allocated for every sixty men, sixty women and forty children.¹⁵ Later the conquerors of Ahwāz were given same salaries as *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were granted¹⁶ yet the salaries of initial and later migrants were never equated. Ahwaz was conquered in the period of 'Umar and the larger number of later migrants had poured in the garrisons in the later period of 'Uthmān and Ali. Moreover, the later migrants were even not entitled to any share of the revenues coming from the *fay* land which was the collective property of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*.

Ṭabarī has narrated an incident which confirms that in the period of 'Uthmān, this difference of earlier and late settlers was becoming apparent.

¹² See a detailed discussion on *qurrā'* in chapter 4

¹³ Shaban, *Islamic History: A. D. 610-750 (A.H. 132)*, 49-51.

¹⁴ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 439.

¹⁵ Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2496.

¹⁶ Ibid., 2540.

According to him, as soon as Sa‘īd was made governor over al-Kūfa , he reported back to ‘Uthmān that Kufans have become problematic and earlier settlers and noble families have been dominated by the later migrant Arabs. On this ‘Uthmān recommended Sa‘īd to adopt a pragmatic outlook; he thus instructed him to give preference to the original settlers and those who have conquered this country, to take care of the position and status of everyone and to keep the late comers as subservient to the original settlers. Yet ‘Uthmān on the other hand suggested Sa‘īd to change this policy if the original settlers prove themselves incapable and the latecomers establish them to be more capable.¹⁷ This narrative explains the situation of al-Kūfa as well as the policy directives of the caliphate towards the earlier and the later migrants.

Besides, it also becomes clear that the differences lie mainly between *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and the late settlers, not between the *ridda* and non-*ridda* tribesmen. Thus Sa‘īd called the original settlers specially those who had participated in *Qādisiyya* and instructed them to take care of their people and keep the governor informed.¹⁸ Sa‘īd followed the practice of giving importance to initial settlers. His special assembly was only filled by original settlers, the victors of *Qādisiyya* and *qurrā’*. Nevertheless Sa‘īd also used to have a common assembly of people in which earlier and late both kinds of people can join.¹⁹

¹⁷Ibid., 2853-4

¹⁸Ibid., 2853.

¹⁹Ibid., 2907-8.

Although the earlier settlers wanted the government to not to increase the benefits of the late comers but there was hardly any direct clash between the earlier settlers and the late comers until the revolt of Mukhtār. (It has been discussed in detail in chapter 4th) The late comers were mostly the relatives of the earlier settlers and belonged to the same tribes who had migrated earlier. For instance, the number of Bajīla, Hamadān and Madhīj kept on increasing in al-Kūfa which meant that some of the new migrants belonged to these tribes. The tribesmen were not very tough towards their own tribesmen. The government tried to create a difference between them by giving more respect to the earlier settlers. However these earlier settlers realized that the real danger to their spoils is not from the late comers but from the ruling class. It seems that the earlier settlers were more threatened by the Quraysh or the government, instead of the late settlers. That is probably one of the reasons of their dislike of the policies of 'Uthmān.

The *fay* land was the spoils of war of all *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and its revenue was to be divided amongst them. The earlier migrants took an impression that Sa'īd sought to reduce their influence in Iraq and specially wanted to bring their *fay* land under the control of the government. Sa'īd was accused of trying to control these land. There was a group of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* including Mālik al-Ashtar, Aswad bin Yazīd Nakh'ai, Ṣa'ṣa'a and some others who were against the dominancy of Quraysh. Once when Sa'īd bin al-As called Sawād-i-Al-Kūfa as a garden of the Quraysh, they severely objected and declared clearly that Quraysh are equal to other tribes as other tribes were also participants in different battles

and Sawād Iraq is a joint share.²⁰ Mālik Ashtar bin Ḥārith Nakh‘ai asked Sa‘īd, “do you want to control those lands illegally for you and your people whom we have gained through our swords?”²¹ The most active opponents of Sa‘īd were *qurrā’*. Although the salaries and other benefits of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were same, yet the *qurrā’* had distinguished them on the basis of their aims to be the most learned amongst the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. Sa‘īd did not keep a good opinion about the *qurrā’*. Sa‘īd wrote a letter to ‘Uthmān in which he complained about the attitude of Al-Ashtar Nakh‘āt and a people who assume that they are *qurrā’* but in fact they are stupid.²²

This feeling that Sa‘īd sought after the *fay* land of the earlier migrants was developed probably with the launching of ‘Uthmān’s scheme of the exchange of land. In order to facilitate the Arabs, ‘Uthmān had initiated a scheme of the exchange of lands. The Arabs who had joined the battles of *Qādisiyya*, *Jalūlā* and *Takrīt* but had come back to Arabia had share in the spoils of war and thus had share in the *fay* land of Iraq. ‘Uthmān offered them to bring their lands in Arabia. The proposal was that the land of Iraq should be exchanged from some land of Hijāz. In this way the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* who had moved back to Arabia would have their lands there and they would not have to worry for affairs at Iraq.²³ Thus, this suggestion was liked by all Madinans who had not migrated to Iraq and had

²⁰Ibid., 2908-10.

²¹Mas‘ūdī, *Maruj*, 337; Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 139.

²² “wa maaho qauma yazamona anahum-ul-qurrā’ wa hum As-safahao” Kūfī, *Futūh*, vol. 1, 384

²³Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2854-6.

stayed at Madina. Some of this land was bought by Ṭalḥa bin Ubaydulla who was a very rich person. Ṭalḥa had also bought the lands of ‘Uthmān, the caliph. Likewise Marwān had bought the lands of *nehr-i-Marwān* which was a forest at that time.²⁴ Ash‘t bin Qays exchanged his property at Hazrmaut for property in Iraq.²⁵ This appears to be a valuable opportunity for the migrant Arabs to increase their land and subsequently their influence in Iraq. Thus many men of Madina, Makkah, Ṭa’if, Yaman and Hazrmaut had their properties at Arabia which they exchanged in return for lands in Iraq.

This scheme was initiated by ‘Uthmān to facilitate the Madinans, it had hurt the interests of some of the dominant initial settlers. By this scheme, anyone who had a property at Arabia can gain property in Iraq, no matter he is an earlier settler or a later one. This made the initial settlers very particular about their *fay* land and they wanted to secure their spoils. It was specially the *qurrā’* who believed that they should get more share. Particularly some tribesmen of Madhḥij were very unhappy over the arrangement and were active opponents of Sa‘īd and ‘Uthmān. In the leadership of Mālik bin al-Ashtar Nakh‘aī, Madhḥij showed its resentment with the policies of ‘Uthmān. Nakh‘a was the most important branch of Madhḥij who had willingly participated in *Qādisiyya* and were the leading fighters at *Qādisiyya*. It is reported by Ṭabarī that the majority of women present at *Qādisiyya* were from Bajīla and Nakh‘a.²⁶ This explains their desire to settle at the conquered areas. Madhḥij was one of those tribes whose number was very

²⁴Ibid., 2854.

²⁵Ibid., 2855.

²⁶Ibid., 2363-4.

high and it kept on increasing in the later period. The major issue of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* was not only the security of spoils of wars; instead it was to gain political power. They were not happy with the governors of 'Uthmān and many of them could be found in the siege of 'Uthmān and consequently in his murder.²⁷

Another important controversy on the spoils of war emerged between the two garrisons especially in the period of 'Umar once they had fought joint battles. There were certain lands which Kufan and Basrans both claimed to be their spoils. After the battle of Tastar, a controversy arose between the Kufans and the Basrans as both of them claimed the conquest to be the result of their effort. They eventually wrote to 'Umar to resolve who decided in favor of the Basrans. The actual ruling declared it to be the conquest of Basrans making them entitled for its revenue, yet the Kufans were announced to get a nominal share in the spoils being the collaborators.²⁸ Another question was raised by the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* of al-Baṣra who claimed to be the equal contributor in the conquests, yet were not allocated with their proper share. The Basrans wrote a letter to 'Umar complaining of their large number and lesser *kharāj*. On this complaint, 'Umar responded immediately and increased the pensions of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* of Al-Baṣra, but none of the lands of Kūfans were given to Basrans.²⁹ A few of the lands which

²⁷See chapter 4, note, 33

²⁸Kūfi, *Futūh*, vol. 1, 283-4.

²⁹Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 3; Tabarī relates that in 22 AH, the Basran governor, 'Umro bin Sarāqa requested 'Umar to increase the lands of Basrans as their population has increased. There emerged a conflict between the Kufans and the Basrans and they began to argue on the ownership of different lands which were conquered by joint ventures. This conflict increased with the passage of time and the Basrans began to demand their share in the lands of *Qādisiyya* and other initial conquests. The matter became problematic and 'Umar decided between them and resolved the issue by giving certain lands to Basrans and certain others to Kufans. The lands from Mah Dīnār to Mihr-i-jānqadhaq were given to Basrans. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2672-3.

were conquered by joint venture of the Kufans and the Basran were divided amongst the both. Instead of dividing the parts of one region; it was decided to reserve one whole region for the Kufans and another for the Basrants. For instance, after the conquest of Nihāwand, the revenues of Nihāwand were also added in the revenues of al-Kūfa. Likewise the revenues of al-Dīnūre were reserved for al-Baṣra. In the period of Mu‘āwiya, this decision was reversed and al-Dīnūre was reserved for Kufans and Nihāwand for Basrants.³⁰

After successfully dealing with the threat of ‘Uthmān to their financial assets, the migrants turned towards ‘Alī. Apart from *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* of al-Kūfa, ‘Alī was supported by a few of the Basrants who at first tried to remain neutral in the civil wars but as soon as they realized that this will curtail their financial benefits, they joined Ali.³¹ Ali had adopted a strict policy towards finance. He was strict towards his governors in financial matters. The policy was disliked by several of them and resulted in the loss of support for him at times. For instance Maṣaqala of Shaybān, the governor of Ardsīr Khara by ‘Alī owed five lac dirhams to ‘Alī which he was unable to pay. He wanted ‘Alī to excuse him from paying this amount. Nonetheless ‘Alī insisted and on repeated calls, he selected to leave ‘Alī and joined Mu‘āwiya. He was of the view that Ali should have adopted

³⁰ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 303.

³¹ For instance, when Ṭalḥa and Zubayr controlled Basra, they give salaries and stipends to those who had supported them and increased their status. On this ‘Abdūl Qays and Bakr bin Wā'il revolted against them and attacked on *Baīt-ul-māl*. They were defeated, thus they decided to support ‘Alī. Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol, 1, 3131.

some relaxation towards him.³² 'Abdullah bin 'Abbās was also unhappy when Ali asked him to provide details of accounts to him.³³

There was another smaller group who was extremely unhappy with the financial policies of Ali. In fact they wanted the state to have lesser control on their financial matters. This smaller group revolted under the leadership of Kharīt bin Rāshid belonging to the tribe of Najia who took shelter in Ahwāz and instructed the people to not to pay any *kharāj* to the government. They were also of the view that *zakat* must not be collected by the government and the individuals have the right to spent *zakat* money on their poor relatives and closer friends. Kharīt and his people had not paid *zakat* from two years and thus they revolted. They were joined by a few men of 'Abdūl Qays. Ali had sent Ma'qil bin Qays to contain this revolt and it was easily suppressed. Kharīt was killed and the people were forced to pay their *zakat*. In the same way the non-Muslims were forced to pay *kharāj*.³⁴ This appears to be an effort by the migrants to have a direct control over the conquered areas and its *kharāj* and points out again the attitude of a few of the tribesmen who increasingly disliked the control of the state.

At first, the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were contented with the economic policies of Ali who apparently has shown no inclination towards controlling their *kharāj* and revenues from the *fay* land. Gradually they became conscious of the economic

³²Ma'qil bin Qays had five hundred prisoners of war belonging to Najia. Maṣaqala requested him to sell these prisoners to him for five lac dirhams. He was unable to pay this amount later and was called and questioned by 'Alī. Ibid., 3434-41; Kūfi, *Futūh*, vol. 2, 242-4.

³³Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 3454-56; Kūfi, *Futūh*, vol. 2, 240-2; Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 3, 364-71.

³⁴Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 3418-35.

losses that they had to deal with in the form of civil wars and due to the closing of richest fronts at Sistān and Khūrāsān. Owing to the decision of arbitration in the battle of *Sifīn*, the migrants were deprived of any expected spoils of war. Consequently a few of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* turned out to be *khawārij* and tried to exert their full control over the whole land of Sawād.³⁵ The initial *khawārij* had began the movement by looting properties of migrants at far off places but the later *khawārij* extracted the taxes from the various regions of Sawād in a very organized way. Thus they were of the view that the conquest belongs to them and they must collect the revenue themselves. The rest of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* also deserted 'Alī and were not willing to fight any more civil war on his behalf.

After the fall of 'Alī, Mu'āwiya came with a different policy, but in the beginning, he was not very assertive. With the passage of time, he began to enhance his control over the financial matters of the migrants. Ziyād, the governor of Mu'āwiya over Iraq demanded from one of the commander, who was sent to the Khūrāsāni front to select gold, silver and precious objects for the caliph. The demand was not accepted by the commander of the army who was not willing to pay the caliph more than a fifth of the spoils, and Mu'āwiya silently accepted it.³⁶ Ziyād brought some other financial reforms by eradicating the names of the dead and the *khawārij* from the *dīwān*. He also reorganized the distribution of stipends in order to cope with new social needs and realties.³⁷

³⁵See a detailed discussion in chapter 4.

³⁶Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 110.

³⁷Crone, *Slaves*, 87.

Several more pressing concerns arose for the migrants; one of which was the rapid increase in the number of later migrants.³⁸ This increasing population posed a constant economic threat for the initial migrants. During the reign of Mu‘āwiya, the Iraqis regretted on their attitude and appreciated the financial policies of ‘Alī.³⁹ They also declare the policies of Ali to be better than that of ‘Umar and ‘Uthmān who were arbitrary and willfull.⁴⁰

The migrants would have later grouped Mu‘āwiya also as a much better ruler as the later Umayyad governor were much more oppressive. By then, the migrants had also enjoyed a brief reign of the rule of Ibn Zubayr. The governor of Ibn Zubayr appeased them by not disturbing the earlier structure as well as by increasing the stipends.⁴¹ He further assured the migrants that he is only in al-Kūfa to levy taxes from the conquered lands and to distribute the rest amongst the Kufans and that he cannot take away or distributes their money without their approval.⁴² Due to these suitable financial policies of Ibn Zubayr, the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were tilted towards him and supported him by all means against the other contenders. But as soon as they felt that the power of Ibn Zubayr has declined, they left him in lurch.

³⁸See Chapter 3, note, 67-9.

³⁹According to Crone, Mu‘āwiya executed the famous *qurrā'* leaders as he wanted to enhance his control over the finances of Iraq. Crone, *Slaves*, 86-90.

⁴⁰Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 603

⁴¹Ibid., 603,

⁴²Ibid., 603.

In between Ibn Zubayr and ‘Abdūl Mālik, there was a brief reign of Mukhtār in al-Kūfa . Mukhtār was the only person who adopted a drastic policy and was firm to enforce some radical reforms in the existing economic structure. He demanded equality for the later migrants as well as for slaves and *mawālī*, thus posed the greater threat to the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. After Mukhtār assumed power, he distributed five hundred dirhams to his early followers and two hundred dirhams to those who joined later.⁴³ The policy of Mukhtār to give an equal treatment to the slaves and *mawālī* was alarming for the earlier settlers and especially for the elite of the garrison. The prominent men who had joined the revolt against al-Mukhtār were the notables of *Qādisiyya* or their descendants. It was against their plans to share their economic benefits with a group as low as *mawālī* and slaves. Being the conquerors of the land, they wanted them to be in the position of power and the agenda of Mukhtār was totally against their designs.⁴⁴

Apart from the political developments of the garrison, there were a few of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* who decided to adopt unlawful means in order to secure their spoils. As it has already been mentioned that Kharīt bin Rāshid revolted in the period of Ali. Likewise, during the governorship of Mukhtār, ‘Ubaydalla bin al-Hurr revolted. He belonged to the Jufi tribe and was of the view that the men must take control of their affairs by themselves. ‘Ubaydalla was a warrior of *Qādisiyya* and believed that if caliphate is only meant to collect money, he can collect it himself. Outlaws of many tribes had joined him and he gathered seven hundred fighting men. His method was to go to different districts and to collect money

⁴³Ibid., 649.

⁴⁴See a detailed discussion on the revolt of Mukhtār in chapter 4,

from the tax collectors. Once, they took all the revenue of al-Jibal province collected from the taxes. They used to harass the tax collectors and drew money from them. The tribe of Hamadān took action against him, burnt his house and sacked his estates. In return he plundered the estates of ‘Abdul Rehmān bin Sa‘īd bin Qays at Mah and took all properties of Hamadānīs in Sawād.⁴⁵ These people though had officially not adopted the doctrine of *khawārij*, yet resemble them in their dealing with the government and the people.

Later on, ‘Abdūl Mālik started the practice of increasing or minimizing the stipends of the individuals on his will. He extended stipend for the tribe of ‘Anzah as a reward for their loyalty. ‘Anzah were also allowed to made settlements at Bāniqiyā below al-Kūfa and al-Hīra.⁴⁶ The practice of seizing property was also increased.⁴⁷ The massive change in the financial policies came in the period of Ḥajjāj who declared to surrender complete authority to the state including the financial authority. Ḥajjāj took the orders of Ibn Zubayr to increase the stipends of Basrans back. On this, a smaller group revolted against Ḥajjāj led by ‘Abdullah bin al-Jarūd al-Abdī.⁴⁸

Besides, Ḥajjāj threatened them of the snatching of their spoils and granting it to someone else.⁴⁹ In the period of Ḥajjāj, the *khawārij* had added a

⁴⁵Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 765-777.

⁴⁶Ibid., 816

⁴⁷Ibid., 869.

⁴⁸Ibid., 873-4.

⁴⁹Ibid., 942

demand in their manifesto that they were against the confiscation of their spoils and the autocratic nature of their government.⁵⁰ This also confirms that Ḥajjāj had got much control over the *ṣay* land and the taxes. The most disastrous step of Ḥajjāj for the migrants was to call the Syrian army to Iraq. The migrants tried to secure their spoils by openly revolting against Ḥajjāj under the leadership of ‘Abdul Reḥmān bin Ash‘āt bin Qays. This revolt was crushed by Ḥajjāj and the power of migrants especially the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* was minimized.⁵¹ The state had got excessive control over the revenues of Iraq. Thus the initial migrants kept on securing their special privileges against the state and the later migrants. During the revolt of Mukhtār, the later migrants were largely suppressed. Yet they made an alliance with the initial migrants in the revolt of Ibn al-Ash‘āt to secure their spoils from the state. Finally however the state was successful in gaining full control over the revenues of Iraq and the conquerors of the land were forced to surrender to the authority of the state.

5.2 Economic Gains through Military Activity

Al-Ķūfa and al-Baṣra were developed as military garrisons and one of the very important motives of migration was to secure the conquests. Later on it was decided to continue with further conquests and for that reason military activity has always remained the integral part of the two garrisons. The migrants were interested in this military activity mainly due to the financial benefits and rich spoils it offers. This continuous warfare against the non-Arab areas provided the

⁵⁰Ibid., 983-5.

⁵¹See details of this revolt in chapter 4.

migrants with a constant source of income. It was more promising and attractive for the later migrants as they were not enjoying any permanent spoils thus involvement in military was a chance for them to improve their economic condition.

According to the rules of Quran, one fifth of the spoils was spared for the state and rest was distributed amongst the victor army. This was an attractive offer for the migrants and they were willing to register them in the regular army. The number of this regular force was increasing day by day. It was thus considered to be the foremost duty of the new settlers to provide military service to the state. The names of the men were recorded in a register and they were given pay accordingly. A system of annual salaries was derived for the Arabs of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra apart from the spoils of war. The *fay* was the permanent spoils which kept on benefiting migrants and their generations in the form of their salaries and income from their estates; however they were also entitled to spoils of war in every battle they fought.

The Arabs fought in different areas and then went back to their place of settlements during hard seasons especially during winter. They must have come mostly from al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra as has been frequently mentioned in the sources but as they were settled in small number in certain other cities as well like al-Ḥīra, Jalūlā, Al-Madā'in, Takrīt thus probably those Arabs had also been interested in fighting battles against the rest of Persians empire in order to collect booty. Ṭabarī

quotes an example that the Muslims of al-Ḥiṣra were invited by ‘Umar to join the battle with Kurds under the leadership of Salma bin Qays Ash‘arī.⁵²

As soon as the greater wave of conquest was over, the armies got maximum time of leisure. In the period of ‘Uthmān, there were forty thousand soldiers at al-Kūfa out of which ten thousand used to perform military duties every year and rest of them take rest for three years. Kufans were given the duties to handle the posts of al-Ray and Azarbījān.⁵³ In those three years, even if they were getting regular allowances, they had no activity to do thus they must have been involved in certain other cultural, political or economic activity.

Despite of these three years of rest, there arose certain activities which were voluntarily for the army. For instance, there appeared a problem at Roman front and the governor of Iraq, Walīd bin ‘Uqba instigated the Kufan army to join them and to help them in the hope of Allah’s happiness and some spoils of war. Thus eight thousand volunteers got ready to go to the Syrian front under the leadership of Salmān bin Rabī‘a.⁵⁴ In the same way when Istikhar was retaken, ‘Abullaha bin ‘Amir bin Kurayz prompted the Basrans to fight on this front and a huge number of army joined him.⁵⁵ In the period of ‘Abdūl Mālik too, there was the practice to recall the soldiers when their turn of duty gets over. It means that they were not sent for constantly long period and some kind of rest and holidays

⁵²Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2721.

⁵³Ibid., 2805.

⁵⁴Ibid., 2805.

⁵⁵Ibid., 2830.

continued.⁵⁶ The military activity was higher in the period of 'Uthmān however it slowed down in the period of Ali due to civil wars. The governors of Mu'āwiya reopened the fronts for Kufans and Basrans.⁵⁷

Apart from the regular army, there was also the option to be recruited on contract basis. For instance in order to fight the *khawārij*, Ḥajjāj prepared a huge army in which two thousand were hired on contract basis.⁵⁸

Apart from fighting from the non-Arabs in the new fronts, it was also the responsibility of the migrants to safeguard their own territories. This was equally important for the migrants themselves as their salaries were extracted from the taxes of these lands. Thus the regular Iraqi army had always fought with the rebels of the state, either they were *khawārij* or someone else. Gradually the Iraqi army felt the futility of fighting battles on fronts other than their own tax lands. They had become habitual to defend their own territories and were least concerned about other parts of the empire. The Basrans were worried about any revolts occurring in their tax lands and the Kufans were only concerned about theirs.⁵⁹

This became a reason for their gradual dislike for the military activity.

The state on the other hand wanted to employ these forces at their will and choice. Ḥajjāj was irritated when he sent one of the forces of al-Kūfa under the leadership of 'Abdul Reḥmān bin Muḥammad bin Ash't to fight *khawārij* and the

⁵⁶ Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 826.

⁵⁷ For military activity in the reign of Mu'āwiya see, Kūfī, *Futūh*, vol. 2, 311-19.

⁵⁸ Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 890.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 930-1.

forces decided to come back when the *khawārij* entered into the territory of Mūsal. Ḥajjāj reminded ‘Abdūl Reḥmān that “the authority is that of the commander of the Faithful [‘Abdūl Mālik] and the troops are his troops”.⁶⁰

The *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* gradually realized that they do not need to go on these aversive expeditions. They already were earning heavily from their income of the *fay* lands and estates. They had also developed certain business which seems to them more easier way of earning money than to be involved in tiresome military expeditions. Moreover they found it extremely foolish to fight on behalf of someone else. The independent minded tribal leaders were not willing to become obedient troops of the Umayyad caliph whom they never considered as superior to them. Thus the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* began to find excuses from fighting. They used to flee back from the battlefield if they were sent against their desires. The *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* provided the leadership to the rest of the army mainly comprising of the later migrants. Once when the commanders of the army decided to leave the battlefield, it was not possible for the rest of the army to fight, thus they followed their leaders.

Another important reason for the gradual dislike of migrants for military activity was the urbanization of the tribes. The migrants have showed their reluctance to fight in the period of Ḥajjāj. By that time, one or two generations of the migrants had passed and the new generation has grown up in an urban environment. This environment was more sophisticated, cultured and closer to

⁶⁰Ibid.

luxury. Thus this generation had not experienced the hardships of bedioun life which makes it easier for them to fight. Bedouins or nomads are brave people and they become sluggish and cowardly when they become sedentary. This was somehow true for the Arab migrants to Iraq. The urban lifestyle of the garrisons changed their priorities. They had gradually accepted the state control and had lost their qualities of independence and bravery. Their urban lifestyle was one of the hindrances in their involvement in the army.

Probably that was the reason of the failure of the large armies of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra against a few of *khawārij* during the governorship of Ḥajjāj. These were the same armies or their descendants who had conquered the whole of Iraq, and the eastern territories of the empire. Their failure was so great that the *khawārij* reached al-Kūfa, had several night raids on the city and finally besieged it. Ḥajjāj had to ask the caliph for help who sent some Syrian army for the support of Ḥajjāj; that's how the governor tackled with the menace of the *khawārij*.⁶¹

This attitude of the migrants gradually snatched from them the benefits of the military activity. In the period of Ḥajjāj, the Iraqi army was replaced by the Syrian army. A new garrison of Wāsiṭ was established and Syrian army was permanently settled there. He resided the Syrian army at Wāsiṭ, a new garrison at Iraq.⁶² The Syrian army was given stipends and salaries from the taxes generated

⁶¹Ibid., 954, 959-972.

⁶²Wāsiṭ was called Wāsiṭ because it lay equidistance from al-Kūfa , al-Baṣra and Ahwāz. Wāsiṭ was founded in 84 AH by Ḥajjāj. The city occupied the both banks of river Tigris and Yaqubi wrote that eastern Wāsiṭ had been a town before the days of Ḥajjāj and population was for the most part Persian. Ḥajjāj built the Green palace there, celebrated for its great dome. The lands around Wāsiṭ were extremely fertile. Ḥajjāj built a mosque even in the eastern half. Le Strange, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, 39-40.

from the lands of Kufans and Basrans. Ḥajjāj also formed another Iraqi army called as *muqātila*. The *muqātila* were those tribesmen of Iraq and eastern regions who supported the regime and its expansionist policy. In exchange of their locality and support they received the normal stipends and booty, they were often given a major part in ruling the countryside through the appointment of the leaders the sub-governorship.⁶³ They were given regular stipends and it is obvious that they must have been paid from the revenue of Iraq after their settlement at Iraq. The demilitarization of Iraqis not only deprived them of power and prestige but of also of the benefits of spoils and regular military stipends.

5.3 Economic gains through Other Businesses

Iraq was a rich and fertile land. In a letter sent to 'Umar by Ka'b bin Aḥbār, Iraq has been declared as a land of wealth.⁶⁴ When the migrants have been moving from Arabia, they were not only thinking about spoils of war and further military expeditions. They were also considering the richness of the Iraqi land and the economic opportunities it can provide. Many of the Arab tribes had practiced to go to Iraq in the times of drought in Arabia and they could find enough food and other necessities of life in Iraq.⁶⁵ Although the Arab tribes were more attracted towards Syria as they had more knowledge of that place but once when

⁶³ Crone, *Slaves*, 115.

⁶⁴ Ibn al-Faqih, *Kitab-ul-Futūh*, 225; Also see Mas'ūdī who related that Umar inquired about the characteristics of various areas of the world from a scholar who told him that Iraq is the heart of earth as it has two rivers which makes the area green and fertile and it is easy to settle cities in it. Mas'ūdī, *Maruj*, vol. 2, 36.

⁶⁵ Kūftī, *Futūh*, vol. 1, 73.

they saw the prosperity of those of their fellow countrymen who had migrated to Iraq, they were convinced of the rich economic prospects of Iraq as well.⁶⁶

That probably was the reason for the rapid migration of Arabs into Iraq. They had increased from the population of twenty thousand at the time of the initial settlement to one lac and forty thousand in the period of the governorship of Ziyād in al-Kūfa alone.⁶⁷ Although these later migrants were also keen to be enrolled in army, yet they found much spare time to utilize their energies in certain other economic activities and to earn huge benefits from it.

The example of al-Baṣra is very evident. Al-Baṣra was developed from a forest and green land to a properly planed and cultivated city where the settlers themselves consumed their energies in order to make a comfortable life for themselves and strangely enough, they earned heavily through this activity. People adopted different kinds of professions which not only increased their personal wealth but helped in developing al-Baṣra. Initially al-Baṣra was a very under developed city. The people of al-Baṣra went to ‘Umar and complaint about their grievances. They believed that they were given less benefits as compared to the Kufans. They asked ‘Umar to increase their stipends and to give them more lands. ‘Umar inquired into the matter and realized that the problem is genuine thus he increased their lands and in this way they got more revenue from their lands.⁶⁸

⁶⁶Hodgson believes that in the period of ‘Uthmān, The richest Makkahn families went to Iraq in the period of ‘Uthmān to “make business ventures there.”, he also believes that Ali withdrew to al-Kūfa not only because of its military prowess but also due to its fertility and richness. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 2, 212, 214.

⁶⁷Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 344-5.

⁶⁸Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 1, 2672-3.

Yet, apart from this collective revenue, they were also given certain opportunities to improve upon their economic status by certain other economic activities. Caliph 'Umar was told to give permission to Nāfa', Abu 'Abdullah to take a piece of land as his property. Nāfa' used to cultivate that land and brought up horses there.⁶⁹ Similarly in the time of 'Uthmān, various lands were given to Al-Baṣra ns, for instance lands given to 'Uthmān Thaqafī, 'Imrān bin Ḥaṣayn, and Ibn 'Amir. These lands and estates became a source of revenue for the Basrans.⁷⁰ 'Uthmān has granted a land to 'Uthmān bin Abi As al-Thaqafī in Al-Baṣra which was famous with the name of Shāṭ-i-'Uthmān. This land had excess water. 'Uthmān developed this land and started agriculture in it.⁷¹ Moreover, there were frequent cases of selling and buying of property and the original houses of the Basrans and their lands gradually increased in value, probably when a lot of canals were constructed.⁷² Thus along with military profession, a lot of other sources of revenue were found.

The land of al-Baṣra was cultivable, thus Basrans got interested in irrigation. The most important development they made was the construction of canals. The construction of canals not only made the city of al-Baṣra cultivated and prosperous land, but was a source of revenue for the individuals who built their canals in order to increase the value of their land and to increase the production of their cultivable land. Ziyād gave a lot of lands to Basrans so that

⁶⁹Ibid., 2376; Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 345.

⁷⁰Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 346.

⁷¹Ibid., 346-7.

⁷² For canals constructed in Basra see, Ibid., 352-356.

they cultivate it. He used to hand over the land, wait for two years, if it was cultivated, he retain the ownership otherwise he hand it over to someone else. The important thing was that the lands of al-Baṣra were very potential however the potential was realized into reality by the efforts of the settlers. People realized the potential of the land and were very ambitious to get as much share as they could get. In the case of Nāfa‘ bin Ḥārith Thaqafī, Ziyād ordered his men to give him as much land as he could walk. He walked to a huge piece of land and the whole was given to him.⁷³

Similarly Mu‘āwiya gifted the lands between the two rivers (dū aba) as a property to one of his nephews. When he came to see his property, Ziyād ordered his men to open the dams and the whole lands came under flood. When the nephew of Mu‘āwiya saw this condition of the lands, he was extremely disappointed and left Iraq thinking that the lands were of no use to him. Ziyād bought this land from him in two lac dirhams, closed the dams, repaired the lands, built canals and made them cultivable.⁷⁴

Migrants applied the modern technology, repaired the dams and made the uncultivable land as useable. Mu‘āwiya nominated his *mawla* ‘Abdullah bin Duraj over extracting *kharāj* from Iraq. He made the lands of swamp useable, repaired the dams and controlled the water. So that he was able to extract fifty lac dirhams from these lands. These lands were again drowned and became part of the

⁷³Ibid., 356-7.

⁷⁴Ibid., 355-6.

swamps⁷⁵ in the time of Ḥajjāj who did not pay attention to this problem.⁷⁶

However Mūsalyma bin ‘Abdūl Mālik took some of these lands as feud, repaired the dams, constructed new canals and gathered peasants to cultivate this land.

Later in the period of Hisham, Ḥayyān al-Nabaṭī made this land again useable.⁷⁷

In the later period, these lands became so important that Yazīd bin ‘Abdūl Mālik sent his governor ‘Umar bin Hubayra to go and find out a piece of land for the caliph. He went to al-Baṣra and investigated the ownership of each land. People were extremely annoyed due to these investigations and they told him that they have obtained these lands from their forefathers and it belongs to their descendants. He probably could not find any land for the caliph and went back.⁷⁸ Therefore it seem that by the time of the caliphate of Yazīd II, all the property of al-Baṣra was divided and taken by the earlier descendants and there was no more gains of the conquests left for other people or new comers. Instead by this time, the lands were confiscated or sold. For instance when Yazīd bin ‘Abdūl Mālik

⁷⁵The Great Swamp received the water of Euphrates a few miles to the south of Al-Kūfa and came down to the neighbourhood of Basra. It covers an area of fifty miles across and two hundred miles in length. It was developed due to various floods which came in the period of Persians. Le Strange, *The lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, 26; Also See Marshall Hodson, *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 1, 202

⁷⁶Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 291; Crone on the other hand argued that Ḥajjāj paid much attention to the repairing of canals and improving agriculture. She also believes that Ḥajjāj promoted agriculture in order to provide employment to the demilitarized population of Iraq. Crone, *Slaves*, 117.

⁷⁷Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 291.

⁷⁸Ibid., 359-60.

confiscated the lands of Yazīd bin Muhallab and his brothers and handed it over to ‘Umar bin Hubayra. This land was given to Yazīd by Sulymān in *baṭīha*.⁷⁹

One of the ways through which people started earning money was the construction of *hamām* (hot baths). Initially there were only three baths, one belonging to ‘Abdullah bin ‘Uthmān Thaqafī, other belonged to *mawla* of Ziyād, Feel, and third one was constructed by Muslim bin Abī Bakrā. They kept it a secret that they were earning heavily from the income of these baths. When the fact was known by some other people, they hurried and took permission from the governor to make their own baths. The permission was given to many and many baths were constructed in al-Baṣra. This was a source of income for many people and was a source of comfort for the inhabitants of al-Baṣra, however the huge income of the monopolists decreased.⁸⁰ There were also various baths at al-Ḥīra and al-Kūfa. One was owned by Oeen who was the manumitted slave of Sa‘d bin Abī Waqqāṣ. Oeen had not constructed it but had bought it from the already settled people of al-Ḥīra.⁸¹ There was another bath which was the property of ‘Umar bin Sa‘d bin Abī Waqqāṣ.

Similarly at al-Kūfa, the trade was a major activity in the city. Mirbād was the market place at al-Baṣra where people used to sell their goods. Farazdaq, a poet had brought some goods to al-Baṣra and sold them there at Mirbād in return for money.⁸² Another business was that of the guides who guide the merchants

⁷⁹ Ibid., 360-1.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 348-9.

⁸¹ Ibid., 280-1; Ibn al-Faqih, *Kitab-ul-Futūh*, 216.

⁸² Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 2, 95.

about the routes.⁸³ There was a camel market at al-Kūfa, named Kunaysah.⁸⁴

Working as merchants with the troops was also common.⁸⁵

Consequently, people earned a lot and had huge properties. Zubayr bin al-'Awām prepared a magnificent house in al-Baṣra, in which wealthy merchants used to come and stay. He also constructed a house in al-Kūfa and was considered to be a wealthy person. Similarly Ṭalḥa constructed a magnificent house in al-Kūfa. Sa'd bin Abī Waqqāṣ built a house in al-Āṣiq. Mas'ūdī mentioned many other companions who were wealthy and built magnificent houses and left thousands of dinar, jewelry and other precious things when they died.⁸⁶

The later governors paid more attention on the development of new cities and opening of new sources for revenue. Ziyād did many developmental works at al-Baṣra. He constructed *dār-ul-rizq*, *nehr-Ubulla*, *nehr-Ma'qil*, *nehr-Murra* and seven mosques.⁸⁷ Ḥajjāj for instance developed a new city named Wāsiṭ between al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra.⁸⁸ He ordered his men to dug canals near this new city in order to make the land cultivable. He also has given importance to extra lands. There was a huge portion of non-cultivable land consisted of barren lands,

⁸³Ibid., 102.

⁸⁴Ibid., 131.

⁸⁵Ibid., 907

⁸⁶Mas'ūdī, *Marij*, vol, 2, 332-3.

⁸⁷Ibn al-Faqih, *Kitab-ul-Futūh*, 224.

⁸⁸See note no, 66.

marshes and forests. Ḥajjāj made boundaries of such land by making belays and made them useable.⁸⁹ The revenue of this land was later added for the caliph.

Gradually they involved themselves in to certain other kind of businesses. Trade was one of the most important businesses. Yūsaf bin ‘Umar, the governor of Iraq for Hisham opened a new market in al-Ḥīra named *Sūq-i-Yūsaf*.⁹⁰ Some of the other governors also started some developmental projects in al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra. For instance, Khālid al-Qasrī constructed some shops. The motive definitely would have to expand business activities. It seems that he had some concrete development ideas to flourish commerce. This can be further seen by the activities of his family. His brother Asad al-Qasrī selected an area, took its ownership probably from Khālid and developed a market there, known as *Sūq-i-Asad*.⁹¹ He did not restrict him here and took another step to develop that market. He brought some people and inhabited them in that market to flourish the commercial activity. Definitely, as the owner of that market, he was getting huge economic benefits for himself but it also initiated economic activity in the garrison. Khālid-al-Qasrī has given equal importance to agricultural activities and constructed a canal which was famous with the name of *al-jāma'*.⁹² He also constructed another canal in Wāsiṭ which was famous with the name of *nehr-ul-Mubarak*.⁹³ He also took permission from Hisham to make a bridge on the river

⁸⁹ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 289.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 280; *Sūq-i-Yūsaf* has also been associated with Yūsaf bin ‘Umro bin Muḥammad bin al-Ḥakam bin Aqīl al-Thaqafī who was the cousin of Ḥajjāj bin Yūsaf. Ibn al-Faqih, 218.

⁹¹ Balādhurī, *Futūh* 284; Ibn al-Faqih, *Kitab-ul-Futūh*, 218.

⁹² Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 284; Ibn al-Faqih, *Kitab-ul-Futūh*, 218.

⁹³ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 289

Tigris. Hisham reacted in a conservative way initially and refused him on the grounds that if it had been possible, the Iranians must have constructed it; however finally he allowed Khālid. Khālid invested huge money on this project but unfortunately it was not a success. It was broken within a small time.⁹⁴ Yet, the enormity of this project reveals the enthusiasm and eagerness of Khālid to initiate new development projects.

Thus the migrants were the most wealthier and prosperous people who could utilize many opportunities for attaining wealth. But this attainment of wealth and adoption of new professions resulted into two major consequences. In the initial days of conquests, there were examples of generous and open hearted attitude of Arabs towards each other. For instance, Abī Bakra bin Ziyād was twice reported to generously gifting his lands to some of his friends. He still owned a huge property.⁹⁵ Gradually when the resources became exhausted, the migrants became jealous of each other.

Gradually a tussle started between the Arab themselves for power, position, fame and wealth. There are several cases of the litigation between Arabs on some property. For instance in the case of the canal of Harb, the litigation was between Harb bin Muslim bin Ziyād, probably descendent of Ziyād and Abdul-Ala ibn ‘Abdullah bin ‘Amir, son of ‘Abdullah bin ‘Amir, both claimed the

⁹⁴Crone argued that Khālid had been successful in promoting agricultural and business activity in Iraq. He invested huge money in the projects at Iraq and consequently eared huge wealth for himself. Crone, *Slaves*, 142.

⁹⁵Balādhurī, *Futūh*, 357, 362.

rights on this canal.⁹⁶ The relations between the family of Ziyād and the family of 'Amir, both ex-governors of al-Baṣra was strained. The reason was told by the sources as 'Uthmān ordered 'Amir, his governor to construct a canal but he refrained from the work. Ziyād was the custodian of *Baīt-ul-māl* and *diwan*. 'Abdullah went to Khūrāsān and made Ziyād as acting governor. Ziyād repaired that canal which was not appreciated by 'Amir. He accused Ziyād of initiating this act in his absence for getting fame and eminence.⁹⁷ Similarly the case of canal of Murghāb and its lands in the period of the period of the governorship of 'Abdullah al-Qasri is another example. This was the property of Bilal bin Ahwāz al-Mazaynī, given to him by Yazīd bin 'Abdūl Mālik. Bashr bin 'Ubaydulla bin Abī Bakra constructed several canals on this land and thus claimed it to be his own. It created problem between the two families and the matter was referred to the governor.⁹⁸

Thus Iraq was a very rich and fertile land and provided the migrants very huge opportunities to increase their financial status. The migrants on the other hand also proved that they were capable of taking up this business of crystallizing the economic activity by developing new cities and finding new ways of earning money. They not only provided means of earning for themselves but also helped the local population in getting jobs.

⁹⁶Ibid., 354.

⁹⁷Ibid., 352.

⁹⁸Ibid., 356-7.

Conclusion

Like many of the medieval migrations, Arab migration to Iraq was an outcome of the Arab conquests followed by the formation of new colonies for the conquerors. Politically and strategically, it was vital to implant the victorious nation in the areas of the defeated nation in order to control and administer those areas. It is not a pertinent requirement in modern day conquests. For instance, in the period of British and French colonization, there was lesser need of permanently instilling its army or citizens in the conquered areas. The British for instance controlled India through civil servants who used to stay in India for a few years and usually do not settle there permanently. Furthermore, this structure led to lesser assimilation of the cultures of the conquered and the conqueror.

Arabs had no such mechanism to control the defeated people and land without permanently settling there. Although at first the Arab state had not made up its mind to instill its army for a longer duration in Iraq neither it had any plans to expand itself anymore towards the East after the conquest of Iraq. After the first phase of conquests, the armies were called back and were sent to the Syrian front, however in the second phase, after the success of *Qādissīya*, 'Umar did not call them back. Keeping in mind the previous experience, he was determined to place a strong garrison at Iraq to consolidate the conquered areas. Still 'Umar was not clear about the future status of these settlements. He probably was thinking of a temporary garrison. Yet gradually he realized that the garrisons must be kept at Iraq for a slightly longer period. The reason was the continuous offensive battles from the side of the Persian government. The troops settled at al-Kūfa, al-Basra,

al-Madā'in and certain other smaller garrisons were used to fight against the Persian army in those battles. This decision enhanced the need of the troops to stay at garrisons for a much longer period. They had to live there until the entire east is taken under the control of the Arabs.

One factor which must have had affected the planning of the state was the satisfaction and easy adjustment of the Arab populace at Iraq. The general troops consisting of the Arab tribes were not expecting such a huge economic benefit. They might have decided to come back if the state had forced them to live at a new place without any significant benefits. Initially, majority of the Arab tribes were not willing to go to the Iraqi front. Most of the tribes idealized Syria and wanted to go to the Syrian front. The reason probably was earlier development at the Syrian front and the reports of economic benefits from that front. Finally they decided to move to the Iraqi front on the promise of Khālid bin Walīd and Muthanna of earning huge spoils of war in Iraq. The Arabs became enthusiastic when they saw the opportunities to go for further conquests which mean an opportunity to collect more spoils of war. Not only this, they claimed a right on the revenue of all the further areas that they had conquered. This economic prosperity not only contented the migrants, but also intensified the process of later migrations. A huge number of later migrants entered Iraq in the period of caliph 'Uthmān. Their satisfaction and their will to stay at Iraq for a longer period convinced the state not to disturb the garrisons for a very long period. In the period of 'Uthmān, the garrisons gradually developed as cities with proper economic activity and the state had now no plans to call the migrants back to home.

Another factor which helped the migrants in prolonging their stay and finally deciding to settle at Iraq was their easy adjustment with the initial challenges of the new area. Although there were quite a few difficulties for the Arabs but they dealt with these problems easily. The Arab migration to Iraq was not a single-stepped movement in which the migrants had to leave their homes immediately to be replaced by new one. Instead, migration was a slow process and it took the migrants five to six years to settle finally in al-Kūfa and al-Basra. Before, they kept on roaming in the form of an army whose prime motive was to conqueror the areas. They usually resided in the areas which they had conquered, for instance they stationed at al-Hīra, al-Qādissīya, Shirāf, Būhrseer and al-Madā'in. A few of the migrants also went to Jalūlā, Takrīt and Hulwān to conqueror those areas and lived there for a considerable time.

Hence the stay at earlier migratory places was a difficult part of the migration during which the migrants were not sure about their future plans. Equally they were not certain about their complete success. The army of Muthanna was forced to leave al-Hīra when major Arab army of Khālid had moved to Syria and several areas of Iraq were retaken by the Persians. Furthermore the climate of some of these areas was hard for them and Arabs had to face certain difficulties in adjusting into this climate. The weather of Jalūlā was extremely hard for the Arabs. It has changed the color of their skins and weakened them physically. Likewise, the climate of al-Madā'in was not suitable for the Arabs and they occasionally complained of the moist air, the bees and the mosquitoes. The weather of al-Madin had also left negative influence on the heath of the Arabs. Sad, the commander of the Arab army in consultation with Umar

decided to move the Arab army to areas which were better suited to the Arabs. They thus finally resided in al-Kūfa which was closer to Arabia and desert and its climate was dry as was the climate of Arabia. In the same way, the Basrans had decided to settle in al-Basra which was a place of red stones. In addition both of the garrisons contained sufficient water resources which not only fulfilled their basic necessities but also helped them to develop agriculture and farming.

During their stay at earlier migratory places, they relied on raids; thus they plundered the local population for fulfilling their basic needs of food and clothing. They pillaged food items, cattle, valuable clothes and quite a lot of other stuff from the villagers in order to feed their army and also the families which accompanied them. Besides, they also captured several slaves in these raids who were used for doing manual jobs for the conquerors.

Another factor which must have influenced the decision of the state and the tribes to migrate was the rich revenue that Iraq was generating. Sawād Iraq was a very fertile land and the Arabs immediately after their stay at al-Kūfa and al-Basra repaired the canals and developed agriculture. Moreover they took huge taxes from the local populace which was a source of revenue for the central government. The further conquests also provided rich sources of revenue in the form of spoils of war. This huge economic benefit was something which the Arabs had never thought of. Thus the state realized that it is fruitful to place their troops at such a rich land in order to ensure the generation of revenue from that land.

The tribes were also motivated to migrate to Iraq for several different reasons. Some of the tribes who lived at the bank of Euphrates showed

extraordinary interest in going towards the Iraqi front. A few branches of Bakr bin Wā'il had been living on the front of Euphrates since a long time and had observed the prosperity and wealth of the Iraqi cities. Furthermore many tribes of Bakr bin Wā'il had participated in the conquest movement towards Iraq. Several tribes of Yaman had also shown their keen interest in going towards the Iraqi front. One of the Yemini tribe of Bajīla rendered their services to fight at Iraq while securing some financial benefits for themselves. They came for a support to 'Umar immediately after the defeat of *Jisr* and ensured for themselves one third of the spoils of war. Bajīla were living a poor life and were not happy with their circumstances thus they took the opportunity of participating in the conquests to improve their economic status. Similarly a few other tribes of Yaman were also found in a larger number at al-Kūfa. The reason was their pre-Islamic contacts and interaction with Iraq. They had fought various wars with the Iraqis and once had controlled the whole of Sawād. During those campaigns various tribes of Yaman were left back at al-Hīra and al-Anbar. They settled in different cities of Iraq. The Lakhm of al-Hīra was also a Yamani branch of Arabs and had established their rule at al-Hīra. This earlier interaction probably encouraged them to migrate to Iraq.

A few of the other Kahlān tribes like Madhījj, Hamadān and Kindā although were happy and prosperous in their hometown, were fearful of the loss of their prestige, wealth and land with the campaigns of Khālid bin Walīd and ultimate control of their areas by Quraysh. Most of the Yaman had been the rulers of different dynasties of Yaman or of some smaller areas. In the new political setup the northern tribe of Muḍar was in an advantageous position. Thus Yamani

thought it better to migrate in order to settle themselves at a secure place through which they could also share the benefits of conquests instead of losing their own places and property.

Hence, on the whole Yaman and some tribes of Rabī'a were more interested in settling at al-Kūfa. The number of the tribes of Muḍar was low except for a few tribes like Abs, 'Amir bin Sausah and Duadan bin Asad of Khuzayma. Quraysh belonged to Muḍar and most tribes of Muḍar had closer alliances with Quraysh, thus they rarely found the need to move to other areas. Most of the tribes of Muḍar migrated only in order to enhance their position and to gain some very powerful position in the newly conquered areas. For instance Thaqif of Muḍar had close friendly terms with Quraysh. They only moved to different areas of Iraq, Syria and Yaman in order to enjoy some very important positions of power. At Iraq, Mughīra bin Shu'ba and Ḥajjāj bin Yūsaf, the two very important governors belonged to Thaqīf.

It can also be observed that the nomadic population settled at Iraq in larger numbers. One of the reasons of the migration of Yamani in larger number was their earlier migratory behavior. Azd, Kinda and Tay' were the famous examples. Most of these tribes had migrated from Yaman to different areas of Arabia. A sub-tribe of Kinda was ruling at Dūma-tul-Jandal and had played an important role in the politics of al-Ḥīra. They helped the Lakhm to establish their rule at al-Ḥīra. Likewise most of the tribes of Rabī'a who migrated were nomads. On the other hand, the settled tribe of Anṣār, Quraysh, Hanīfa and Thaqīf had migrated in lesser numbers and many of them had come back to their places after the conquests.

Anṣār were in a larger number in the armies of conquests but their number decreased immediately after conquests.

Once, the migrants had moved and settled at al-Kūfa and al-Basra, a new life began. Migration had brought various changes in their lives, most of which were related with their own migratory group. The changes that were related with the migratory place were easily dealt with by the migrants. They easily overcome the climatic difficulties of the new areas. They also managed to deal with the problems of the earlier migratory places. Their social interaction with the locals was also not problematic and they kept good relations with them. Their relations with the slaves and *mawali* were also smooth apart from the revolt of al-Mukhtār in which the slaves and the *mawali* supported al-Mukhtār against the leading nobles of the Arabs.

Thus the changes related with the migratory place were easily accommodated and adjusted by the migrants. On the other hand, they were unable to cope with the changing structure of their own migratory group. The most vital transformation that migration brought in their lives was the urban living style and the new state structure. The migrants were composed of several different tribes of Arabia who had to live together in one garrison. It remarkably changed the earlier existing tribal structure of the tribes and gradually transformed it.

The composition of garrisons was multi-tribal. Yet, surprisingly it had not resulted into any notable tribal conflicts in Iraq contrary to the fact that many of the settled tribes were enemies in pre-Islamic times. Tamīm and Bakr bin Wā'il had always been considered as rival tribes. Still, there was only an insignificant

tribal conflict between Azd and Tamīm in which Bakr bin Wā'il acted as allies of Azd. Otherwise, the tribes learned to live peacefully with each other. Again the reason was the transformation in the tribal structure and the formation of new socio-economic patterns in the migrant's society. The tribal identity was no more significant as the most important notions of identity and security provided by the tribes vanished away. The new structure was run by the state. Tribal chief was then selected by the state and he was a government official instead of the sole representative of the tribe. He was given the salaries and all other benefits by the government, thus he learnt to obey the government even if he has to sacrifice the duty to protect his clansmen. The rebel of the state was also his enemy, no matter if he belongs to his own tribe. This shift was however gradual. The Arabs tried to retain their old tribal and cultural values and there are examples of people who were eager to support their tribesmen or their guests.

The transformation melted down the tribal identities but resulted in the development of new identities, based on either regional or political and ideological foundations. These identities were stronger than the tribal identities. The transformation basically occurred due to the change of the Arab tribes from independent tribesmen to regular army. Furthermore the transformation occurred due to the relationship between the tribesmen mainly consisting of army and the state. The migrants considered the conquest as a result of their personal efforts and thus desired to control all the resources of the conquered areas. The state on the other hand began to assert its authority gradually and thus a tussle between the two began.

The seditious elements took advantage from this situation and initially when caliph ‘Uthmān had tried to emphasize the authority of the state, the situation was deliberately worsened. Likewise in the reign of ‘Alī, all enthusiastic contenders of power based their activities in Iraq. ‘Ayi’sha, Talḥa and Zubayr decided to initiate their revolt from al-Basra. In the later period, after the death of Yazīd, Ibn Zubayr took control of Iraq. Yet in the meanwhile Mukhtār Thaqafī, another fervent contestant for ascendancy revolted and took the hold of al-Kūfa. Thus Iraq always remained an important political centre for the political elite and it was overwhelmed by the civil wars and occasional revolts.

For migrants, the most vital task was to deal with the increasing influence of the state. They responded in different ways to this increasing control which resulted into the formation of several new identities in the new set-up. Furthermore the initial civil wars and attachment of migrants into rival political groups also resulted in the formation of new groups and identities amongst the migrants. Most of these groups had their clashes with the government yet all of them had adopted different strategies to deal with these clashes.

. The three most important groups which emerged in Iraq were *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*, *khawārij* and *shī'a*. The most powerful group was the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*, the victors of *Qadissiya* including both *ridda* and non-*ridda* tribesmen. This group always enjoyed a special status and exceptional economic benefits. But unfortunate for them, their migration was followed by a heavy wave of later migrants resulting into the loss of their privileged position and their exclusive economic rewards. In addition, their benefits and status was further curtailed by

the state which by virtue of its authority considered its right over the victory of Iraq and its resources. The *shī'a* and *khawārij* were more strict opponents of the existing regime and had organized more revolts. Thus the state was also strict towards both of these groups and except for a few occasions, it employed force to deal with them.

Ahl-ul-Qādisiyya began their new migratory life by means of a very safe and secure course of action. They began to assert their control in the affairs of the state during the period of caliph Umar by dictating the caliph about the choice of the governors. This attitude was discouraged by caliph ‘Uthmān who thought it better to gradually increase the control of the state. He had probably underestimated the power of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*, who were supported by a few of the political elite at Madina as well. ‘Uthmān tried to enhance the control of the state over the finances of Iraq. He particularly wanted the state to have more authority over the *fay* land which was considered as the collective spoils of war of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. They were not ready to withdraw or share their spoils, thus began a movement against ‘Uthmān ultimately leading to his murder.

The *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*, like many other groups turned towards ‘Alī and chose him as the next caliph. Ali came up with a different agenda, but unfortunately was initially caught up with several crisis and revolts. He was not ready to make any compromises with the rebel groups thus he decided to rely more on the support of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and a few of the Hasmites and Anṣār. ‘Alī instigated the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* to support him in the civil wars which they did on the hope of enhancing their economic and political status. But the

prolonged civil wars disappointed the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. Furthermore 'Alī had given important positions of governorships to Anṣār and Hashmites. *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* thought it futile to fight on behalf of Ali, thus deserted him and serenely accepted the new caliph Mu'āwiya.

Again to their disappointment, Mu'āwiya gradually began to exert his influence over the finances of Iraq. In addition his governor Ziyād was strict and rude towards the migrants including the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. Thus on the death of Mu'āwiya, the leading *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* wrote letters to Ḥusayn to call him to assume power but left him alone when he came to al-Kūfa for revolt. This gradually turned out to be the general attitude of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. They supported those who were in power and deserted them when their position declined. They deserted Ziyād after he became weakened and accepted the authority of Ibn Zubayr. They severely opposed the rule of Mukhtār who was talking of giving equal rights to the later migrants and the slaves and *mawali*. With the support of the governor of Ibn Zubayr, they defeated Mukhtār and killed a huge number of later migrants and *mawali*. Yet they were not obliged to Ibn-Zubayr and happily accepted the ascendancy of 'Abdūl Mālik when they saw that the power of Ibn-Zubayr had obliterated.

'Abdūl Mālik, being a powerful caliph desired to assert the power of the state in a much more forceful way as compared to earlier caliphs. He thus chose al-Ḥajjāj to control the Iraqi migrants. The persuasive policies of al-Ḥajjāj compelled the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* to leave their policy of diplomatic appeasement and acting as pressure group. Instead, they decided to rise in an open revolt

against the authorities. Al-Hajjāj was concerned to put his control over the Iraqi army due to which the army revolted under the leadership Abdul Rehmān bin Ash't bin Qays, one of the descendants of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*. Unfortunate for *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya*, the revolt was completely subdued by al-Hajjāj thus routing the influence and role of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* in the polity of Iraq. They could never rose again as contenders of power and were replaced by the Syrian army. Their prestigious positions, their influence over the selection of governors as well as their financial benefits were snatched away by the government.

The two other groups *khawārij* and *shī'a* responded to the state control in a quite different manner. They were less diplomatic and less compromising. *Khawārij* and *shī'a* hold contradictory political views. *Khawārij* claimed that anyone of the believers can hold the highest political position of the caliph. On the other hand, *shī'a* believed in restricting the position only for the family of the Prophet (PBUH) and the descendants of Ali. *Khawārij* were more extremists in their views and were not ready to surrender to any kind of the state control. Apart from having a political view, they also developed a religious ideology. This was a confused religious concept which was developed by some of the pious men amongst them. They were also violent towards those who did not accept their ideology. They initially rebelled against Ali, kept on opposing Muwaiyah and were completely annihilated by Ibn Ziyād.

The later *khawārij* had not emerged from this same group. They were numerically much larger than the initial *khawārij*. However they had adopted the religious ideology of the earlier *khawārij* and had modified it according to their


needs. Their actual desire was to attain freedom from the state control and to gain a control over the revenues of Iraq which they considered to be their right. Their religious ideology supported their agenda.

Shī'a, on the other hand were initially not very outwards and rebellious. At first they were not ideologically drifted towards 'Alī. Furthermore, they never threw off complete allegiance to the authorities. They instead accepted the rule of Mu'āwiya but with a dislike. Ziyād, the governor of Mu'āwiya was strict towards them. When Ḥusayn had revolted, they were not very particular about supporting him but the murder of Ḥusayn left a strong impact on them. The *shī'a* ideology in fact grew after that incident. The *shī'a* repented over their attitude and showed an emotional attachment towards the family of the Prophet (PBUH). When Mukhtār called them to take revenge from the murderers of Ḥusayn, they fully supported him. Yet even after that none of the major *shī'a* revolts were a success. An abortive effort was made by Zayd, the grandson of Ḥusayn to revolt against the authorities but practically he was not supported by his *shī'a* group.

Thus the migrants had gradually transformed from the independent tribesmen to submissive citizens with the increasing control of the state. The migrants tried in various ways to averse this state control but were ultimately failed. State proved itself to be more powerful and assertive than the several groups of migrants. Migration had definitely improved the economic status of the migrants, yet they were not able to retain these benefits for a much longer period. The migrants had come at first as soldiers but their replacement with the Syrian army deprived them of all economic benefits which they used to withdraw from

their military services. The migrants gradually diverted their attention to agricultural and commercial activity. They started new businesses and earned huge wealth from it. Thus at the end of the Umayad period, majority of them had loosened their status of military men and had been transformed as urban merchants and businessmen. Their tribal identity was almost vanquished and the religious and political identity of *khawārij* continued to exist for another brief period but the ideological identity of *shī'a* continued to exist till today and had altered into various shapes. It seems that majority of the *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* were pacified yet there is a need to further explore the role of *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* in the early 'Abbāsid period. Likewise there is much space to further identify the various groups that emerged in Iraq including *qurrā'*. The present study has slightly touched the issues but there is a need to further explore it. It is equally significant to find out the relationship between *qurrā'*, *ahl-ul-Qādisiyya* and *khawārij*. In the same manner, it is important to find out the original identity, interests and motivation of the early *khawārij*, the issues which are not highlighted by the sources.

	1	0.69	0.9	2	0.59	0.84	2	3.03	3.5	3	2	3	7.12	0	6	9	6	2.5
Hudhay																		
Tamīm (ZaydMa nāt+yarb ū')	2	1.39	1.81	6	1.78	2.52	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.2	1.5	0	0	0
Hawāzin	4	2.79	3.63	2	0.59	0.84	4	6.06	7.01	2	1.6	2.12	1	1.2	1.5	1	1.9	2.5



	1	0.69	0.9	1	0.29	0.4	2	1.6	2.12	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hawāzin (Jush'am)	1	0.69	0.9	1	0.29	0.4	2	1.6	2.12	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ghaffān	0	0	0	4	1.19	1.6	6	9.09	10.5	1	1.06	0	0	0	0
Aslā'a	18	5.59	7.27	3	0.89	1.2	3	4.54	5.26	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hadrāma	0	0	0	7	2.08	2.9	0	0	0	4	3.2	4.25	0	0	0
Nandī	0	0	0	1	0.29	0.4	2	0	0	0	2	1.6	2.12	1	1.9
'Abd (AbdūlQ ays)	0	0	0	2	0.59	0.8	4	0	0	0	2	1.6	2.12	1	1.9
Kāhil (Asad)	0	0	0	4	1.19	1.6	8	0	0	0	2	1.6	2.12	0	0
'Uqāl	0	0	0	1	0.29	0.4	2	0	0	0	1	1	0.8	1.06	0
Wādī	0	0	0	1	0.29	0.4	2	0	0	0	1	0.8	1.06	0	0
Wādī	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1.6	2.12	1	1.9
Wādī	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wādī	1	0.69	0.9	2	0.59	0.8	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wādī	4	2.79	3.63	3	0.89	1.2	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Qādī	1	0.69	0.9	1	0.29	0.4	2	0.4	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0

	1	0.69	0.9	3	0.89	1.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	0.69	0.9	5	1.48	2.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	3	0.89	1.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
'Umar bin 'Awf	5	3.49	4.54	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Khaazz'a (halif of Ansar)	1	0.69	0.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aslam	3	2.09	2.72	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harith bin Kulab	1	0.69	0.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	110	76.6	99.7	238	70.65	100	57	86.3	99.9	94	76.	99.	39	99.

Percentage of the Tribal Composition of the Tribes of Kufa

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