

**Madrassa-State Relations: An Analysis of the State Policies during
General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) and General Pervez
Musharraf (1999-2008) Eras**



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
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- Madrasa - Political aspects -- Pakistan
- Islamic religious education -- Pakistan
- Education and state - Pakistan

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
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
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
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


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
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Dedicated to:

My parents, brother and sisters

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am heartily thankful to my supervisor, Dr Husnul Amin, whose encouragement, guidance and support from the initial to the final level enabled me to complete dissertation. It has been an honour to be his PhD student. I appreciate all his contributions of time and ideas to make my PhD experience productive and stimulating.

I am especially thankful to Dr. Mumtaz Ahmad, Executive Director IRD, whose support and encouragement since I have joined the University has helped me to complete the PhD.

Abbreviations

DM	Deeni Madaris
H.S.C Level	Higher School Certificate
SSC Level	Secondary School Certificate
RCT	Rational Choice Theory
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
US	United States
ICG	International Crisis Group
MMA	Mutahhida Majlis-e-Amal
LFO	Legal Framework Order
Jl	Jammat-i-Islami
JUI	Jammiat Ulama-e-Islam
JUP	Jammiat Ulama-e-Pakistan
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
NSC	National Security Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
MJUP	Markazi Jamiyyat Ulama-i- Pakistan
MFLO	Muslim Family Law Ordinance
B.A.	Bachelor of Arts
NCDM	National Committee for Deeni Madaris
UGC	University Grant Commission
MRD	Movement for Restoration of Democracy
SSP	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhagvi
JUI-S	Jammiat Ulama-e-Islam—Sami-ul Haq
JUI-F	Jammiat Ulama-e-Islam—Fazlur Rehman
PMEB	Pakistan Madrassa Education Board
MRP	Madrassa Reform Project
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate
ITMDP	Ittehad-e-Tanzeem-e-Madaris-e-Deeniya
SRA 1860	Societies Registration Act 1860
FATA	Federally Adminstered Tribal Areas
LeT	Lashkar-e-Tayyaba
PPP	Pakistan Peoples Party
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PMEBO	Pakistan Madrassa Education Board Ordinance
PCO	Provisional Constitutional Order.

Abstract

This study aims to explore and investigate the state-led madrassa reforms initiated under the banners of Islamization and Enlightened Moderation philosophies which also served as a backdrop of madrassa-state relations in General Zia-ul-Haq and General Musharraf era. In order to approach the facts, the study has made use of the primary and secondary sources. This study has given an insight of how both the military regimes initiated the madrassa reforms with a great vigour but on the implementation stages diverted from the projected process. They kept on shaping and reshaping the reform plans by granting concessions to few among the stakeholders till they became adjustable to the regimes. This study has shown that modification of curriculum in order to integrate the madrassa system with the formal system of education in both regimes was the top priority besides resolving financial problems in Zia era and regulating madrassas in Musharraf era. The essence of the entire reform plans in both eras was declared to bring the madrassas into mainstream national life. Besides pointing out flaws left at the formulation and implementation stages, this study has taken into account the implications of reforms by categorizing the stakeholders into four as; madrassa students, madrassa administration, government and society. Firstly, taking into a glimpse at madrassa the study depicted that nothing concrete came up for the benefits of madrassa students and graduates in both eras. Infact, their conditions remained as deplorable as prior to reforms, their curriculum did not undergo any major shift that could give them acceptability in any other field for employment and they remained subservient to their teachers even after the reforms as they were ever before. Secondly, the study giving an in-depth analysis has shown that

madrassas' high ups enjoyed political powers hatched out of madrassa reforms and legitimized the military regimes by extending support in legislature. The only connection between the madrassa administrations and students driven out of madrassa reforms in Zia era was that students and graduates brought accommodation to the regime on the international level by participating in Afghan war against the USSR over the directions of their teachers most of whom were state's recipient for economic and political benefits. Thirdly, this study has highlighted that the state adopting the rational approach framed the madrassa reforms as the term 'mainstreaming' which was a sole and a common objective in both the aforementioned eras was not candidly defined either by the policy makers or literary circles. The military rulers used the term in their own ways to achieve maximum out of it and assigned roles to madrassa's high-ups in politics of the state under Islamization and Enlightened Moderation Ideologies, which was assumed as mainstreaming of madrassas in both eras. Fourthly, the study scratched out that the reforms directly and indirectly sowed the seeds of few of the multifaceted issues prevailing even in the contemporary society such as sectarianism and violence. Briefly, this study concluded that the interests of madrassa students and on a broader level society were quite divergent to the interests of madrassa administration and the state who was the real beneficiaries of implications emerged out of the realm of reforms in both the addressed eras. Moreover, this study asserts that neither madrassa administration nor the state were really interested in reforming madrassas for the benefits of the students and graduates in the long run rather reforms served as a shadow to settle their mutual 'gives and takes' which were accomplished successfully as the state had most of the attributes of a neo-patrimonial state.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The impact of madrassas on Pakistani society cannot be denied or overshadowed as each socio-religious activity is dominantly led by ulama. The political role of ulama has been also quite prominent since the creation of Pakistan as for instances Allama Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, a teacher at Dar ul-Uloom Deoband and an active leader of Jamiat-ulama-e-Islam was quite prominent member of the first Legislative Assembly. He was the first person to hoist Pakistan's flag first, inaugurated the first legislative assembly of Pakistan and presented the Objectives Resolution in the National Assembly which laid the foundation of the Pakistan's Constitution.

The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan was approved by the National Assembly which had on its floor renowned madrassa-based ulama such as Mufti Mahmood, Abdul Hakim, Abdul Haq, Abdul Mustafa Azhari, Ghulam Ghos Hazarvi, Muhammad Zakir, Shah Ahmad Noorani and Zafar Ahmad Ansari (Muhammad, 2012).

Keeping this in view, it can be said that Pakistan has had close relationship with religion since its inception as the state was achieved on ideological grounds as Pakistanis have had always close affinity with religion. The process of Islamization anchored its roots in the newly born state with the introduction of the Objectives Resolution in March 1949 which officially declared the state as an Islamic in character. Overtime, the state authorities exploited Islam as a source of legitimacy and a means of consolidating their power as the military rulers in particular leaned to the Islamic groups for ideological support. Although a host of leaders from Yahya Khan onwards tried to use Islam in political activities on the state level but Zia ul Haq accelerated these practices. During Zia era madrassas influence was expanded as some of them supported Islamic agenda implemented in the form of Islamization in Pakistan (Kirmani, 2011). The only major effort to shift the society from Islamism to secularism was observed in Pervez Musharraf's era where Enlightened Moderation Philosophy was used to serve as philosophical foundations for transformation of the society

Respect for madrassas in the Muslim societies has been an abiding phenomenon in the Muslim world in general and Pakistan in particular. Their glorification has been stretched from the Arab to the non-Arab world. Their services in all the religious and non-religious affairs are acknowledged all over the Muslim world. The madrassas' role and performance in the sub-continent dwindled as soon as the empire was colonized. Madrassa itself moved into twilight after they failed to play a vibrant role in the emerging political setup. Most of the madrassas in the sub-continent shun the door to modernism in order to

be focused to preserve the real face of Islam which resulted in confinement of their roles to just religious and social spheres. There have been a debate in the Muslim societies over the introduction of reforms in the madrassa system for the last many decades and in this connection reforms in education sector were practically implemented in many states as for instance Egypt after being invaded by France reviewed that their outdated education sector had caused their downfall. The Egyptians learned the French education system and then tested that in their own country's educational system and Al-Azhar University. The most prominent of those reformers was Muhammad Abduh (1894 to 1904) who had close ties with Jamaluddin Afghani who was campaigning against ignorance, totalitarianism and stagnancy. Muhammad Abduh suggested reforms in Al-Azhar University and recommended replacement of ineffective books, footnotes and commentaries with that of material relevant to contemporary society. Some more reforms surrounding around system of education, curriculum and facilities to the students and administration were brought in the religious education system in 1930, 1936 and 1961 (Hashim & Langgulung, 2008).

Indonesia's curriculum was entirely designed on the basis of Japan's educational system after being invaded by Japan. The Indonesian fighters for independence planned to establish Islamic Higher Institutions of learning. They established four faculties initially i.e. Religious, Laws, Economics and Education. The Religion Faculty was brought under the government control after independence and its curriculum was designed following Al-Azhar's curriculum. In 1950's the government set up schools for the training of the religious teachers

and brought some existed religious institutions under its control. However, Muslim organizations such as Muhammadiyah which was imparting education also retained its self-reliant status regarding the school management. The government was planning to improve madrasa standard by standardizing their curriculum, recognizing their certificate as equivalent to state madrasa certificate and facilitating madrasa students to get enrolled at primary, lower secondary and upper secondary levels of formal system of education (Hashim & Langgulung, 2008).

Various religious madrasa schools were established in Malaysia as result of the influence of Islah Movement led by Jamaluddin Afghani and Muhammad Abduh in the later part of the 19th Century. Among the reformists Sheikh Ahmad al Hadi and Sheikh Tahir Jalaludin were the renowned figures. Sheikh Ahmad abandoned the rote-learning method of study and narrow religious curriculum and introduced some new activities including rhetoric and debates for the students. The purpose of making reforms was to enrich the religious education and adjust it into the contemporary world (Hashim & Langgulung, 2008).

The number of madrassas also declined in Malaysia after the implementation of National Education Policy (1962) that replaced Malay language with that of Arabic as medium of instruction and accommodated more religious subjects into the curriculum of formal system of education. Malaysia like other Muslim states inclined towards religion in 1970, particularly after Iranian Revolution. The impact of religion became more obvious on Malaysian society as soon as Dr Mahatir implemented Islamization policy and promoted Islamic

teachings in the system of education. The Islamic Religious Schools (SAR) which were offering full time religious education were strongly backed by the state and they used the curriculum approved by the state. After 9/11 the state had stopped backing and funding those schools and as a result they were declining (Hashim & Langgulung, 2008).

There are two systems of madrassa education in Bangladesh; Aliya madrassas are state led and Quomi are private. A Commission on National Education which was set up under the chairmanship of Dr Muhammad Qudrat-e-Khuda soon after Bangladesh's independence recommended radical changes in the entire madrassa system to accommodate them into the contemporary world. The Report suggested integration of madrassa system of education with that of formal and bring them under state control. In 1978, Bangladesh Madrassa Education Board was established under an Ordinance which became functional in 1979. It was given complete authority over madrassa affairs such as; administrative and academic affairs. The prescribed Board introduced secular subjects in madrassa curriculum. At the *Alim* Level, Humanities and Science subjects were included in 1973 and in 1980 *Alim* Degree was recognized as equivalent to H.S.C Level. Later, *Dhakil* Degree was also declared equivalent to SSC Level. The governments of Bangladesh gave incentives to the teachers, students and administration of the madrassa frequently¹ (Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, 2011).

In Pakistan, four major reform programs have been introduced into the madrassa system since the creation of Pakistan. They include reforms of Ayub, Bhutto, Zia and Musharraf era. The present research focused on madrassa-reforms processes including their formulation and implementation stages along with their outcomes in order to make an accurate description and appraisal of the madrassa-state relations in two military regimes i.e Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf. The reforms which were initiated in Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf era under the banners of Islamization and Enlightened Moderation respectively were not void of any ideologies as Islamization slogan was perceived as a very much replacement of Pakistan's Islamic ideology on which it was achieved and Enlightened Moderation was a well-tested global ideology familiar for paving way to modernism.

Using the discourse analysis for the interpretation of data efforts were made to find the essence of the reforms and their adoptability and viability in both the regimes. The outcomes of the madrassa reforms were also analysed keeping in view the ideological contexts.

Currently, there are five distinct types of madrassa systems in Pakistan and their division is on the basis of sectarian and political lines. Perhaps the most significant madrassa systems are: Wafaq-ul-Madaris-Al-Arabia, Wafaq-ul-Madaris-Al-Salafia and Rabit-ul Madaris-Al-Islamia, Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Ahle Sunnat and Wafaq-ul-Madaris Shia. Besides these, there are recognized individual madrassas such as Jamia-e-Taleemat-e-Islamia, Jamia Islamia Minhaj-ul-Quran,

Jamia Ashrafia, Darul Uloom Mohammedia Ghousia and Darul Uloom of Karachi.

Four out of five boards mentioned above are affiliated to their respective sects; Bareilvi, Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith and Shia while the fifth board is not classified on the basis of any sect due to its affiliation to Jama'at-e-Islami. There are two primary sects in Pakistan; Sunni and Shia. The Shias make 15% of the Muslim population. The Pakistani Sunnis follow Hanafi school of thought. Majority among the Sunnis are Bareilvi who are much inclusive of local customs and rituals. The Deobandi School of thought rejects un-Islamic accretions to faith from custom and culture as they seek to purify Islam. The Ahl-e-Hadith also emphasizes purification of Islam but they do not follow any fiqh as opposed to the Hanafi Fiqh (Zaidi, 2013). Currently, there are five wafaqs/tanzeems representing five schools of thought. The detail is as under:

i. Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Arabia (Deobandi)

Although Bareilvis are greater in number within the Sunni sect but Deobandis have more religious seminaries in Pakistan as they are well organized in the realm of religious activism. Dar-ul-Uloom Karachi and Jamia Ashrafia Lahore are amongst the leading Deobandi madrassa. These are operating independently; their certificates and degrees were approved by the government in Zia regime. However, their students also appear to take exams of the board of Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Arabia. The registered number of madrassa of Deoband sect that are

registered with Wafaq ul Madaris al-Arabia is 16,800, including those who the education of *Hifz, Tajweed* and *Dars-e-Nizami* (Zaidi, 2013).

ii. **Tanzeem ul- Madaris (Barelvi)**

Some 8,000 madaris of Tanzeem ul madraris are registered. They are the followers of *Sufi* culture prevailed in the sub-continent. Some renowned Barelvi madrassas like Dar-ul-Uloom Muhammadia Ghosia Behra, district Sargodha, Punjab has more than 400 branches while Minhaj-ul-Quran has well equipped schools and colleges which are not affiliated with Tanzeem ul Madaris and they have separate education and exam system (Zaidi, 2013).

iii. **Wafaq-ul-Madaris al- Salafia (Ahl-e-Hadith)**

Ahl-e-Hadith is another Sunni group which is in small minority and holds some 1,400 madrassas having affiliation with Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Salafia in Pakistan. They follow teachings of Abdul Wahab and are known as Wahabis and/or Salafis in Pakistan. They reject all juristic schools of thought including Hanafi. Some renowned madrassa have affiliation with Wafaq-ul-Madaris al Salafia including madrassas of Jamma'at-ud-Dawa. Jamia Salafia Faisalabad which was founded by Hakeem Abdur Raheem Ashraf is the only independent madrassa of this school of thought which conducts exams independently and distributes degrees, getting approval from the government (Zaidi, 2013).

iv. **Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Shia**

Although Shias are in minority in Pakistan but they have considerable number of madrassas in Pakistan. 413 madrassas are registered under Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Shia. There is no distinct Shia seminary in Pakistan that can conduct exams and issue degree independently (Zaidi, 2013).

v. **Rabita-ul-Madaris al-Islamia**

Jama'at-e-Islami which was founded by Ab'ul ala Mawdudi—a prominent Muslim thinker, is “a revivalist and religio-political movement” which declares itself as the “vanguard” of Islamic revolution in Pakistan. About 1,000 madrassas have affiliation with Jama'at-e-Islami. The Jama'at claims no affiliation to any sect and holds independent orientation (Zaidi, 2013).

1.1 Rationale for Selection of Cases:

The state-led madrasa reforms introduced in Zia and Musharraf era which directed the state-led relations in both regimes were selected for the study because the ideological foundations of the reform plans in both era apparently seemed divergent to each other but an in-depth study showed some parallel points in them, including the stage set for them was same as military rule was prevailing and the ultimate objectives of both the reforms were a sub-set to each other as adopting Rational Choice Approach both the leaders headed towards the maximization of personal political interests to strengthen their military regimes. There were numerous institutions of the state that were even in a more wretched conditions than the madrassas and required urgent state care but madrassas were picked up readily by both the regimes for reforms either to get support of madrasa man

power and/or using them to appease global big powers. No doubt that the madrassa-state relations remained quite ambiguous apparently in both the military regimes but efforts were made to find the exact nature of their relations in context to reforms by approaching truth.

During the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq, the madrassa's role remained very active in domestic and international politics. Religious parties became part of government and their role was shaped through reforms by Zia in context to the international major events such as Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

During the democratic governments the role of religious parties was not very dominant although few parties remained government allies but their role in domestic and international politics was subservient. The state-madrassa relations underwent a shift since the start of the War on Terror after September 11, 2001. Pervez Musharraf introduced Madrassa Reforms that apparently aimed to limit the madrassas' autonomy but the role of madrassa-based political parties surpassed their past records as they were ruling solely or in coalition in two provinces and came up as the biggest opposition in the Centre.

This study analyzed the impact of madrassa reforms on state-madrassa relations but also on a broader level in the society which helped to draw conclusions regarding failure or success of state's policy towards madrassa in both the regimes. As, the madrassa and ulama are integrally related and connected so, by that analogy ulama were not set aside in the discussion and the study focused

on ulama, students and other madrassa stakeholders in context to reforms which directed the madrassa-state relations in the addressed eras.

1.2 Thesis Arguments

- Both of the state-led projects of reforming madrassas got mired into short term political interests during the formulation and implementation processes in Zia and Musharraf era.
- In order to achieve their short term political interests, both the state-led madrassa reforms largely failed in actualizing their conceived outcomes of bringing about any significant change in Madrassa System in Pakistan.

1.3 Research Questions:

- i. How and why, both the state-led madrassa reform processes under the banners of Zia's Islamization and Musharraf's Enlightened Moderation fell short of bringing any substantial desired change into the Madrassas system in Pakistan?
- ii. What were the policy formulation and implementation processes adopted by both the military dictators?
- iii. What were the immediate internal causes that led the state to the madrassa reforms initiatives?
- iv. What were the external dynamics that gave impetus to their reform initiatives?
- v. How far both of the reforms achieved their targeted goals?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The study mainly aimed to explain and explore:

- The policy formulation adopted by both the military rulers
- The implementation mechanism of the reforms initiated in both the military eras.
- The outcomes in terms of reforming and mainstreaming Pakistani registered and un-registered madrassas in both the aforementioned military rules.
- The reasons of the failure or success of the state's policy towards madrassa in both eras.

1.5 Methodology

This study was basically qualitative in nature.

Methods and Sources of Data Collection

Following instruments were used for the collection of data.

i. Policy Documents

This research was based on books, newspapers, articles, online and published Journals, policy papers, reports, government documents and other published and unpublished material to collect data that deal with the state-led madrassa reform processes in Pakistan. Different web sites were also visited.

ii. In-depth Interviews.

Besides that data collection was done through informal interviews, active observation and discussions in order to get an in-depth insight of the issue.

In order to achieve trustworthiness, triangulation of the multiple data sources was done to clarify meaning, verify data or interpretations. In order to assure quality the prior knowledge was also utilized by the researcher.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

There are very few studies relevant to madrassa-state relation in Pakistan that have been integrated to any of the theoretical framework. Masooda Bano's (2007) study in context of madrassa-state relations in reforms perspective has explained the interaction between State-Non-state Providers which has resulted due to Development Theory and Practice. According to her, when the State-Non-state providers engage with each other four outcomes can be produced; "Cooperation (similar strategies about means and ends), confrontation (dissimilar strategies about means and ends), cooptation (similar strategies about means with dissimilar ends) and complementarity (dissimilar strategies about means with dissimilar ends)" (Bano, 2007, p. 4). The theoretical model used in the above study explains the narrow side of engagement and can be used just a part to depict a specific dimension limited to madrassa-state relations. The frequent derailment of democracy in Pakistan by the military in the past had provided opportunities to the military leaders for exploitation of state's resources to prolong their regimes. S E Finer in his book "The Man on the Horse back: the Role of Military in Politics"² has chalked out that the major reasons of army's interference in politics revolve around three political leverages that it had over the civilian organizations i.e. superior in organization, higher emotional symbolic status³ and monopoly of arms

(Finer, 1962). These three advantages had made it easy for the army to interfere in Pakistan's politics in the past by dismissing democratic governments.

In this connection Jennifer Gandhi (2010) in her book "Political Institutions under Dictatorship" writes that political parties and legislatures are mere fake democratic institutions through which non-democratic institutions rule. The force of tradition or legitimacy from religious or other sources may play a role in the survival of some rulers. For any dictatorial or democratic ruler it is necessary to build coalition for the maintenance of power. Democratic leaders have properly constituted institutions while the channels through which the dictators consolidate their support over time remain opaque. According to the writer the dictators face two types of threats to their rule. One is internal that emerges from within the ruling elite and the other is external that comes from within the society. The dictators establish smaller institutions such as consultative councils, juntas and political bureau and use them as a first institutional trench against the threat from the ruling class but to minimize the second threat the dictators depend on democratic institutions such as legislatures and political parties that co-opt larger segment of society rather than the ruling elites (Ghandi, 2010). In order to ward off the first threat Zia named his consultative council as Majlis-i-Shura while Musharraf set up National Security Council and to avoid the second threat. Zia opted to co-opt with the religious segment of the society while Musharraf decided to align to the secular segment of the society. Both the military rulers tried to build such sort of coalitions that could strengthen both the regimes in their respective time periods.

All the writers including Nordlinger, Brooker, Wekh, Jennifer Gandhi and Smith had mentioned the ways through which military leaders keep on shaping and re-shaping policy making processes till they accomplish the desired objectives of sustaining their military regimes and the policies of both the military regimes towards madrassa in Pakistan were no exception to them.

As the present study deals with the madrassa-state relations in Pakistan in the two military regimes, so, Rational Choice Theory will be used to depict the individuals while Neo-patrimonialism will be used to show the characteristics of the state during the addressed era.

The origin of Rational Choice Theory is not exactly traceable but its modern roots can be traced in Neo-classical economic theory when Adam Smith made an effort to simplify the assumption of self-interest in his renowned book, "The Wealth of Nations," (1776). He wrote, "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest" (Adam Smith. (1776), 1886, p. 119). It is claimed that the Rational Choice Theory not only explains how some choices are made rather it explains how all choices are made. It also explains "how all individuals make all their choices". The theory is equally applicable to all "the lord and the peasants and the genius and the not so bright" (Parsons, 2005, p. 6).

Given the reference to costs and benefits, it can be found that the most ardent supporters of RCT are the economists but its application goes beyond

economic spheres to political spheres as the theory has been used to give an in-depth insight into the actions of lobbyists, bureaucrats, politicians and voters (Impithuksa, 2011). It can be viewed as the application of economic model of human action to the political spheres. Monroe's book titled "the Economic Approach to Politics" claims that why should there be distinction made for economic and political spheres as the individual who makes a choice in the economic sphere is the same individual who makes choice in the political sphere. The advocates of RCT believe that the theory claims to explain all choices for everyone, so it's a deniable to claim that it is applicable to economic choices only. Green and Shapiro have pointed out that there has been hardly any area of Political Science that has remained untouched by the influence of Rational Choice Theory (Parsons, 2005).

One of the biggest limitations in using Rational Choice Model is lack of terminological consensus.⁴ A group of critics criticises firstly the central assumption that individual being a rational actor always tries to maximize self interest in decision making process⁵. The critics claim that people often make decisions irrationally and they hardly have set of preferred goals and their actions are not always directed towards the achievement of benefits or pleasures (McCubbins, 1995). Additionally, people rarely have all the facts and accurate knowledge of the outcomes of their decisions. They reach solutions to problems in unorganized way relying on random relevant facts and information. People often make errors while making decisions and are often satisfied with serviceable solutions. According to RCT decisions are made in a static environment while the

reality is contrary to this as people have to deal in constant state of change and uncertainty along with number of other factors. So, their decisions may not reflect factors and variables at a specific static time. The critics claim that RCT fails to give any reason when people act altruistically or engage in cooperation or behave selfishly for the benefits of others even when there seems no direct benefit to them. So, the theory produces inaccurate predictions and cannot be used as an accurate research tool (Impithuksa, 2011).

The second criticism on RCT is that the theory explains social and human behaviour using mathematical models to depict "researcher's arguments and their simplifications of real world context". The critics claim that manipulation of data can easily be done through mathematical tricks to achieve desired goals. The proponents defend that mathematical manipulation can more easily be detected than verbal arguments. Thirdly, in Political Science, weak methods are used in research and if methods are sound many outcomes are not true. Fourthly, variables such as preferences and beliefs can never be empirically evaluated or tested. These variables cannot be observed in reality so mathematical model have no effective application in real life situations (Impithuksa, 2011). Fifthly, the methodology of individualism is contrary to very nature of social and political life. Politics operates more in social context rather than individual. Man, societies, states and institutions can never exist in isolation (Ibrahim, 2012).

George Tsebelis (1990) described rationality "as nothing more than an optimal correspondence between ends and means" (p.18). This definition seems to

capture the essence of politics as Tsebeli noted that all political processes inherent relationships between means and ends. This theory offers a systematic approach pertaining to the madrassa-state Relations in both the addressed military regimes. Another advantage for using RCT is that it focuses on socio-political constraints imposed on actors which leave a deep effect on payoffs and outcomes of their decisions. When we consider political decision making as "the resultant of interaction of the actor with such external factors" (Tsebelis:1990, p. 39) we find that policy making regarding madrassa in the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf was believed to be influenced by the interaction of actors with the external factors. The aforementioned assumptions about the individual behaviour can be applied to depict politicians' behaviour in dictatorial form of governments or autocratic rules similar to that of democracies (<http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com>). Although in autocracy a single individual holds an unlimited power but Olson (1993) argues that the single authority also acts rationally. He points out that if an autocratic leader provides public goods to a country, he does not have an intention to serve the public rather he intends to serve the personal gains and self-interests.

The above given assumption fits well on state-led madrassa reforms initiated in both the regimes having conceived aim of bringing substantial change into the madrassa system of Pakistan which were more for their personal political gain than that of the public goods Olson believes that office holders or political leaders in autocratic regimes have encompassing interests which vary according to the size of the stakes they have in the society. Rationally, if a political leader has

greater interest in the society, he tries to provide the greater incentives to his particular society to secure his personal interest. Olson (1993) and Fatton (1992) argue that the dictators are more interested in their political survival. He further says "individual state agents can utilize the powers vested in them by the state to pursue their own private motives" (Fatton, 1992, p. 22). The theory is used to analyze the state-policies towards madrassas in Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf's era as they were interested in initiating state-led reforms in madrassa system more for their own personal interest than for the betterment of madrassa stakeholders, particularly students. In both the military regimes, unlimited authority laid in single hand as President Zia ul Haq and Chief Executive Pervez Musharraf acted rationally to protect their regimes. They provided few incentives to madrassas to achieve the goal of prolonging their regimes. In both the military regimes the dictators were quite consistent towards the achievement of their goals so, they kept on shaping and re-shaping their policies towards various madrassas to achieve the desired ends. Madrassa was an institution which was used by them to fulfil their political goals through the reforms.

In order to underpin RCT, seven key assumptions are noteworthy;

The RCT is described by the scholars on two levels as thin rational approach and thick rational approach. The thin approach assumes that the individual will head towards maximization of their respective utilities but has not assumed any specific utility while the thick rational approach assumes that individual seek generally few goals involving power, wealth or status (Green and Ian Shapiro, 1994).

Rationality⁶ is still confusing but as both the military rulers were striving to retain power so, thick rational approach would be appropriate for the study. Even in spite of differences in using the theory can be underpinned by these assumptions “(1) Actors pursue goals; (2) these goals reflect the actors’ perceived self-interest; (3) behavior results from a process that actually involves (or functions as if it entails) conscious choice; (4) the individual is the basic actor in society; (5) actors have preference⁷ orderings that are consistent and stable; (6) if given options, actors choose the alternative with the highest expected utility” (Monroe, 1991, 78) and (7) actors possess extensive information on both the available alternatives and the likely consequences of their choices. The rational individual consciously makes preferences to gain self-interests. He makes the best choice after calculations of all the alternatives available due to required knowledge of the environment, computational skills and stable and well-organized system of preferences (Monroe, 2001). Both the military rulers misused office to extend their regimes. They exerted pressure on Pakistan’s judiciary to give verdict suitable to them. They used office to pass bills or promulgate Ordinances to contain or extend the activities of madrasa suitable to both of them according to the prevailing global and domestic political conditions.

The military regimes of Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf were pursuing a uniform rational end which was perpetuation of their military regimes. They had a plenty of options to pursue their goal as they were solely running the state’s affairs after grasping power and could use any of the segments or institutions of society for their political interests but they readily introduced reforms in religious

education institutions as a mean to achieve their ends. Most likely they could have used other institutions of the public sector for reforms but there were prospects that madrassa would provide manpower to Zia regime to anchor his roots in the society so some incentives were given to the religious institutions through Zakat money and equivalence of madrassa degrees to University degrees.

In Musharraf regime too, other sections and institutions of society were not focused so much as were madrassas and efforts were made to impose restrictions on them to curtail their likely responses regarding his enlightened moderation philosophy to diffuse the internal political pressure and to pounder to the international community regarding his concrete steps to promote Enlightened Moderation in order to win their support. Their priority was to strengthen their regimes, which was the highest preference for them so; they ranked the alternatives keeping that goal in view. Although both the military rulers got opportunity of remaking preferences after some global events but they chose the same religious institutions as a mean to achieve the ends. By conducting official and unofficial surveys on several occasions they tried to collect optimal information and in the light of that information adjusted preferences calculating their exact outcomes.

Although Anthony Down's (1957) seminal text showed articulation of RCT in 1957 but its traces were to be found in Neo-Classical economic Theory⁸. He believed that rational man only strives for his own selfish ends. The RC Model presented by Down (1957) depicts five major characteristics. Firstly, when there appears a series of alternatives, the rational man can even make decision.

Secondly, keeping his own preferences in view, he ranks the alternatives. Thirdly, his ranking of the preferences are transitive. Fourthly, when a large number of preferences are ahead of him he selects the highest ranking preferences and fifthly, when same alternatives are given on another occasion he makes the same decision⁹. In the dictatorial regimes the dictators have so many options and institutions to use for strengthening their regimes. During Zia as well as in Musharraf's era too, the dictators had a good number of alternative institutions to be used to get hold on power but using rationality they introduced reforms in madrassa system with a purpose to expand or curtail their influence on society and utilize their man power for their own political interests. As prior to the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan and Iranian Revolution and 9/11 incident General Zia ul Haq and General Pervez Musharraf initiated reforms in madrassas as their highest preference to gain their set objectives but they retained the preferences even after the emergence of the global external factors.

The present study uses Rational Choice Theory to analyse the behaviour of individuals Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf who were leading the two different military regimes. As Rational Choice Theory is arguably broad based so, Neopatrimonialism is also used to supplement the Rational Choice Theory. Neopatrimonialism¹⁰ will also be used to depict the characteristics and nature of state in both regimes. The term neopatrimonialism describes the two Weberian ideals; rational-legal and patrimonial domination which are operated simultaneously (Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, 1997).

In neo-patrimonialism the funds or office are misused by the patron who is office holder in state's institution in order to stay in power. Neo-patrimonialism has three common features. The first feature is that one dominant individual has systematic concentration of power "who resist delegating all but the most trivial decision making tasks. (Bratton, & Walle, 1997) The patron or the president who holds 'big man politics' stays for a very long time in power and sometimes holds it life time (Bienen & Wall, 1992). Both the cited military rulers kept the decision making power in their hands and the ministries seemed puppets in the hands of the rulers. Both ruled the state for a very long time as General Zia's rule lasted for 11 years which ended on his death and General Musharraf ruled over the state for 9 years.

The Neo-patrimonial rulers try to strengthen their rule and for that sake they prevent the activities of their opponents through the rotation of political elites so that they do not develop their own power base and they also make efforts to extend their clientelist network (Szyder, 1999). In order to secure their rule they award personal favours to other political elites in the form of expansion of the ministerial cabinet or so (Walle, 2001). In this connection the long tenure of the office holder or president and the short tenure of the key government members depict the fulfilment of Neo-patrimonial power concentration. The "big man" in both the military regimes did not allow their Prime Ministers to complete the tenure in order to avert or minimize any possible threat to their power by them. Zia ul Haq made a rotation of power by dismissing Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo¹¹ while Musharraf replaced Mir Zafar Ullah Khan Jamali with Shoukat

Aziz in order to prevent them from developing their own power base by joining hands with the regimes' opponents. Zia and Musharraf awarded ministries to their close circles. The leader of the patrimonial state misuses the state resources and funds and in this way corruption flourishes.

In order to understand the failure of policy in both the military regimes it is deemed necessary to refer four characteristics of Neo-patrimonial states:

A. Clientelism¹²:

The clientelism is the first characteristic of neo-patrimonial states which is helpful to gain and maintain political support. The state lacks or have narrow public realm. In the western sense, their clans are strong and they have ethnic or other sub-national identities. The exchange of favours, gifts and courtier practices and services of patronage are quite common in neo-patrimonial states in which position of power is valued on the basis of resources it obtains for one's family and kin. Corruption and clientelism are considered legitimate on the view that they serve community rather than individual enrichment (Walle, 2003).

Pakistan is a multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic state achieved on the basis of Islamic ideology and Islam is perceived to be the national identity of the state but even within religious segment there is a division on sectarian basis. The state disbursed zakat money among the madrassas and established a strong patron-client relation in Zia regime and in Musharraf's regimes efforts were made to disburse money through Madrassa-Reforms Project. In both the regimes religious parties were provided favours as by equalizing their madrassa degrees with that of

formal education system they were given opportunities to play a vital role in politics and in return they strengthened the regime by supporting governments in Majlis-i-Shura¹³ and National Security Council¹⁴. So, a strong patron-client relation¹⁵ was maintained in both the regimes.

B. Access to State Power:

Clientelistic practices in neo-patrimonial states are grounded on privileged access to state resources which the state leaders rationed following a solid political logic. Political elites have a control on state and its resources and policy levers allow political elites to practice clientelism on a larger scale through nepotism, patronage and granting of various dispensations such as exemptions and immunities from taxes, laws and licenses. It is true that not all forms of political clientelism are illegal. The public norms are involved in all aiming to get some personal gains. In weak political systems clientelism practices are not only helpful to maintain political stability but they also provide an attraction to political class to attain self-enrichment (Walle, 2002).

C. The Centralization of Power:

In neo-patrimonial states the centralization of power lies at the hand of the president who is above the law literally and he controls a large portion of state finance with little accountability and he delegates a very little of his authority on important issues. While making the most important decisions the president does not get any assistance from the relevant ministerial staff rather makes the decisions himself solely. The presidency emerges as the sole decision making

authority and a state within the state. Middle level managers within the presidency often have more powers than permanent secretaries in the ministries. Government ministries have hardly any discretion over policy matters. Cabinet meetings are held rarely and often are ceremonial in which president gives directions and offers advices which are more for the invited press rather than for the benefit of assembled ministries. It is argued that in neo-patrimonial states power is never properly institutionalized, so it is personalized (Walle, 2002).

Personal dictatorship is amongst the four main variants of neo-patrimonial regimes. "It is highly exclusionary because the strong man rules by decree", the institutions of participation just exist in their names and they do not have any authority to check the chief executive's absolute power. When Zia and Musharraf were holding power they were practically above the law as they were answerable to none and were controlling state's financial affairs too. They hardly respected the recommendations of any relevant ministries and made decisions solely on their own discretion over the important matters relevant to domestic politics or foreign policy such as decision to fight against the communism and to participate in the US-led War on terror. Although, cabinet meetings were held frequently to discuss such important affairs but they were just for the press coverage as the cabinet had hardly any discretion over policy matters. In both the addressed military regimes Foreign Minister, Education Minister, Interior Minister etc. did not have any discretion on political matters. Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo's government was dismissed just on the basis that he used his discretion in signing an accord that ended Afghanistan-USSR's war.

The regime in Neo-patrimonial states never allows any sort of political competition and that is done by adopting many ways, including crushing the opponents physically or imprisoning them for an indefinite time period. A personal dictator often emerges from either a dominant political party or from the army. He adopts two ways to strengthen his regime; either he weakens the formal political institutions or maintains absolute control over them. In both the regimes the political opponents were suppressed in many ways such as Zia regime Bhutto was hanged and in Musharraf regime leadership of two major political parties were exiled. Both the rulers maintained absolute control over the formal political institutions. They introduced state-led madrasa reforms which facilitated the religious parties to enter in parliament (Bratton & Walle, 1994).

According to the theory, the leader controls the flow of public revenues himself and disburses rewards to ethnic, familial or factional clients. The leader gets complete hold on policymaking process and personal emissaries rather than the formal institutions are used to implement instructions. The self-generated reforms become problematic, as there is no "mechanism for competition or participation" with the regime to provide as alternative ideas to the surface. The disposition of regime means the personal fate of the ruler which shows the concentration of power. It is impossible to bring a real political change as long as the ruler remains because he makes all the rules to secure his power. The real political change can only be brought about by the death, flight or deposition of the ruler which become a major focus of opposition in that transitory period. The ruler always tries to get rid of the protests which can nurture endanger against his regime or can threaten

his own political survival. There exists an extreme confusion between the self and national interests which leaves some serious implications for the political institutions. Whenever transition is observed in personal dictatorships, the political institutions are found weak in that setup. When there does not exist any institutional mechanism for the political competition, in that situation the protagonists find it hard to conclude any compromise formula helpful to end the regime. One of the characteristics of personal dictatorship is lack of civil associations. Even when there emerges wave of social protest as a result of any crisis, very few mass organizations come up to protest and challenge the regime. Although, when the regime starts weakening, real rights' organizations, political parties and trade union mushroom but they are impoverished, fragmented and lack traditions of participatory politics (Bratton & Walle, 1994).

Further, the neo-patrimonial character of these states is enhanced due to weakness of constitutional institutions and there are no counter weights to state power in civil society and private sector (Walle, 2001, 117). It was quite impossible for the democratic forces to bring any real political changes in the presence of the military dictators as what-so-ever they felt them threat for their regimes, they used to get rid of them like in Musharraf regime judiciary challenged his illegal execution of power but they were deposed, although the movement for their restoration was kept alive and ignited by the civil society throughout his regime. In reality there was hardly any strong civil society or private sector to counter-weight state power in both regimes and even the constitutional institutions like legislature whose members, getting favour of the

military rulers availed seats, had always fear of losing their seats in case of confrontation with the ruler as they were at the mercy of the state authorities.

D. Hybrid Regimes

The fourth characteristic of neo-patrimonial states is the co-existence of the informal institutions¹⁶ with the formal trappings of the modern state. It is quite uneasy that personal rule co-exists with a modern bureaucracy and its distinct logic. There can be any sort of arrangements dominating president's dealing with his top assistants but officially they are subject to civil service rules. Although, president's brother or wife may be influential in the state affairs but the authority rests with the legislature or cabinet legally. The top leaders of the state usually prefer to choose to undermine the strategies which can threaten their useful and profitable practices. In neo-patrimonial states patrimonial practices utilize legal rational institutions. Formal rational legal institutions and elites' commitment of separation of private and public spheres alongside informal patrimonial norms are the distinguished features of the neo-patrimonial states. The separation of private and public spheres exists only apparently, in reality there is hardly any practical difference existed between the two spheres (Chabel & Daloz, 1999).

In the states where there is a stable politics, the political rules of the game are governed by the complementary formal and informal institutions. Neo-patrimonial states do not have a common set of predictable rules. The formal and informal rules that they possess are also often contradictory. This brings contestation regarding the legitimacy of the rules of the game and as a result there prevails

uncertainty as to enforce which rules (Leftwich, 2006). As the rules are not defined clearly so, the neo-patrimonial states are marked by the presence of multiple and contradictory institutions or rules. In Pakistan's case too, one can find the presence of bureaucracy, cabinet and legislature in both the regimes which were holding legal authority of making decisions and its implementation but they were handicapped regarding the real and legal practice of their authority. The state adopted few of the characteristics of democratic regimes like formation of parliament through partial democratic process but the features of an autocratic regime seemed dominant as the dictators prevented the real democracy to flourish and banned either political parties or political leaders because the presence of real political parties along with their real political leadership could threaten the practices useful for the military rulers to prolong their regimes.

The critics of Neo-patrimonialism claim that when Van de Walle and Bratton operationalized the concept by using informal institution of presidentialism, the term became as it was a clear deviation from political science as they defined presidentialism as "one individual, who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision making task" and at the same time referred to democratic regime under presidentialism which was contrary to a parliamentary democracy (Erdmann & Engel, 2006).

Briefly, the theoretical framework shows that the military rulers General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf had a common pursuit of retaining and prolonging their military regimes. So, they adopted Rational Choice Approach for the adjustments of their interests. In order to achieve their interests on the national

and international levels they used madrassas. The ideologies which were the basis of their madrassa reforms plans were quite divergent but the ways to achieve their preferred goals of prolonging and strengthening regimes were similar. In other words means and ends of both the regimes in order to achieve goals overlapped each others. When both the military regimes were prevailing, the state depicted the characteristics of neo-patrimonial state as power was confined to single hand and the President had access to all the state's resources with a little accountability. The state's relations with the madrassas were turning out to be that of a patron-client relations and state seemed to have other hybrid characters too.

1.7 Study Plan

The first chapter of the study gives a detail scheme of studies. This chapter explains the madrassa system of Pakistan. The scheme of studies includes the methodology and tools of study. This chapter also covers the research questions and the objectives of the study.

The chapter includes theoretical framework. Two theories are used for the present study. Rational Choice Theory explains that the individual's behaviour is always around gaining maximum benefits for him. The chapter relates that how individuals in both the regimes i.e. General Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf made adjustments in the society to achieve their self-interests of sustaining their military regimes. Both the regimes were under extreme internal and external pressures and in order to cater to the prevailing situations, they used madrassa to achieve their political objectives. Neo-patrimonialism is used to explain the nature and characteristics of the state in both the military regimes. The rulers of

the neo-patrimonial state dominate in decision making to retain power for a long time even by limiting their opposition and misuse of power. Four major characteristics of neo-patrimonial states like clientelism, access to state power, the centralization of power and hybrid regimes are also explained in context to madrassa-state relations in Pakistan. Strong clans and sub-national identities are the hallmark of the neo-patrimonial states. These all characteristics were quite relevant to Pakistan's situation in both the military regimes of General Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf.

Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on madrassa reforms in Pakistan. This chapter depicts the contextual factors of the madrassa reforms in General Zia and General Musharraf era. The chapter also discusses the responses of the ulama regarding reforms. The chapter highlights the implementation stages of the state-led madrassa reforms along with scratching the flaws left at this stage.

Chapter 3 gives a detail of madrassa-state reforms initiated in General Zia era which were planned to be initiated after Sargodha Report and implemented in the light of Halepota Report. The reforms were initiated under the banner of Islamization and therefore this philosophy is explained in detail as this apparently targeted purging the society of evils. The Zia-ul-Haq government planned to integrate the religious system of education with that of formal education system so that the madrassa students after acquiring education would also play roles in all the affairs of the state. In order to achieve so, the government initiated few plans including madrassa reforms which were resisted by the ulama. The ulama had never been against reforms if these were purely initiated for the reformation of

Muslim society at large. In Zia regime, the ulama resisted reforms because too much state's interference in madrassa system was felt to be the biggest threat to madrassas' autonomy. Without bringing any noteworthy changes in curriculum or academic activities, the madrassa degrees were declared at a par with the formal system of education.

Although, the reforms were not implemented in their true essence and the government failed to bring any substantial changes into the madrassa system of Pakistan but it succeeded in attaining short term interests of prolonging the regime, utilizing the madrassa strength. These reforms left a long term ramification for the religious education institutions as each madrassa tried to get the state's patronage and set up new chains and branches which resulted in producing unskilled madrassa graduates. The unemployed bulk of graduates had no other viable option except to fight in Afghanistan which although contributed in gaining international support for the military regime but diverted the madrassa students' attention away from learning the real Islamic teachings. The settlement of financial affairs of madrassas through state-led Zakat system in the light of reforms also brought schism among religious factions and also widened the gap between the religious and secular segments of the society. The reforms also resulted in the negligence of public sector education and led to emergence of pedagogical problems in secular system of education.

Chapter 4 gives a detail of the madrassa reforms introduced in General Pervez Musharraf's era under the banner of Enlightened Moderation. In this chapter three major steps taken in this regard Pakistan Madrassa Education Board Ordinance,

Madrassa Reforms Project (2002-03 to 2007) and The Dini Madaris Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance 2005 are taken into account. The reforms aimed to integrate the religious education system with that of formal education system by introducing some modern subjects, to bring madrassa under regulation and to register all madrassas of Pakistan. Most of the above mentioned reforms did not meet the targets as the u'lama had reservation that they were introduced under the extreme foreign pressure. All the reforms in the pre and post 9/11 situation are covered in this chapter. The implementation stage is also depicted in the chapter in order to analyze the outcomes of the reforms. The state-led reforms efforts defamed the madrassas and bred misconceptions that they were hub of terrorism and nurseries of militancy on the national as well as international level. The government's efforts to regularize and register madrassa created a fear among the ulama that the government wanted to curb the autonomy of religious entities with a purpose to change the present Islamic education system along with the curriculum or in other words it was perceived that existence of madrassa as an institution was threatened in Musharraf era. The tone and tenor used by the government in the reforms formulation stage created more misperceptions against the madrassas. This chapter provides an in-depth insight of the initiation of madrassa reforms in General Musharraf era which on one side helped him to create his image as a reformer of the traditional and conservative Muslim societies and on the other hand used ulama in the newly emerging political setup who played a role of a fragile opposition in the entire tenure of the Assembly elected in 2002.

Chapter 5 gives a critical analysis of the short-comings of the state-led madrassa reforms in General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf era.

Chapter 6 concludes the study.

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Chapter 2.

Review of Literature

This study analyzes the madrassa-state relations in policy perspectives of the state towards madrassa in General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf era. Reforms served not only as a bridge between madrassa and state relations but also became an important component directing the state's policy towards madrassa in both the regimes.

2.1 Reforms in Historical Context

The reforms in societies following any specific ideology are often introduced in two different ways. Firstly, often individuals or a group of individuals following the specific ideologies revolving around religious or secular motivations make efforts to transform their concerned societies. Secondly, sometimes the state leads the society towards reforms following ideology or motivation.

a. A Glimpse of Individuals or Group of Individuals' led Reforms in History

Few dominant efforts to reform societies by individuals or group of individuals under religious motivation are as follows:

The major European Movement in this connection was the Protestant Reformation aiming to reform the beliefs and practices of the Roman Catholic Church. Its religious aspects were bolstered by the political rulers who were quite ambitious to empower themselves at the expense of the Church. As a result, though the unity of medieval Europe crumbled but the dawn of the modern era came up (Hillerbrand, 2009).

The English society was led towards reformation by reverend Jonathan Edwards who preached that faith in Christ and personal repentance could bring salvation. Another preacher George Whitefield travelled to colonies spreading the message of personal repentance. The impact of these reforms were known as the First Awakening which made individual powerful enough to get salvation on his own which minimized the importance of church leaders which split the Protestant Church. New sects like Baptists and Methodists emerged who challenged established Churches like Anglican.

The Second Great Awakening represented “individualistic and emotional reaction to the Enlightenment’s reliance on reason over faith” and shortage in church attendance was perceived to be as decline in piety. Charles Grandison Finney was leading the religious revival who preached that good works and deeds could lead individuals towards salvation not only for themselves but also for their nations. (www1.whsd.net/.../)

Religious reforms were observed in the sub-continent when Shah Waliullah initiated the reformation of the society. The essence of his teachings was promotion of religious obligations in the Muslim society. He emphasized to have close relationships between ulama and ruler where ulama should be given a role in state's affairs. He tried to promote the study of manqulat and denied the importance of maaqulat calling it a source of confusion. (Metcalf, 1982) His ideas were organized and carried on in a socio-political move under Shah Abdul Aziz to Shah Ismail and Ahmad Shah Barailvi.

Another apolitical religious reform effort was initiated by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The activities of the organization in the beginning were limited to membership recruitment, building a social service organization and discussion of moral and religious reforms. The organization started its political activities in 1930's with the Arab general strike in Palestine. They raised voice against the existing Egyptian political regime, specially the quasi-colonial British control of the country through their newsletters. In 1940's the party announced to contest elections on the manifesto of withdrawal of British troops from Egypt and social reforms which resulted in imprisonment of Al-Bana and other Muslim Brotherhood leaders by the British authorities. It was dissolved in 1948 with members' imprisonment but diminished completely after Al-Banna's (founder of the Organization) death (Mursion, 2001).

Reforms are not always brought with religious endeavor but can also be initiated on secular ideological foundations. The origin of the secular intellectual foundation of reforms can be traced in Immanuel Kant's ideas. Transcendent

Movement of New England had followed the essence of this philosophy as they believed that "one could transcend the limits of intellect and strive for emotional understanding and unity with God without the assistance of organized religion" (www1.whsd.net) The Movement motivated the individuals to follow conscience by scrutinizing his own views.

The aforementioned reforms were individuals or group of individuals' led ideological reforms in different societies.

b. State-led Reforms in History

Some of the societies have also experienced the state-led ideological transformations. For example, Iran had met state-led transformation process twice under secular and religious ideological foundations. Reza Khan Pahlavi promoted Westernization after taking charge of the government in 1926. He reformed education sector and judiciary to a large extent. His efforts were completely revolving around the minimization of the roles of clerics in the society. He promoted the European culture and way of life in the entire society (Martin, 2000).

Iran again experienced reformation in the form of Islamic Revolution in 1979 when Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the secular Pahlavi Dynasty after a long struggle and laid the foundation of Islamic Republic of Iran. After formation of Shia regime in the state Khomeini established Fundamentalist Iranian Republican Party and Revolutionary Guards to crush the opponents (Schmidt, 2006).

Turkey also experienced the state-led reforms under Kemal Ataturk as soon as the Caliphate was abolished. The entire education system was re-adjusted on secular lines. Some “secular legal code, modeled along the European lines” were also initiated that completely changed laws affecting women, family relations and marriage. He encouraged the people of his state to imitate westerns in all the social affairs and in this way completely transformed the Turkish society to secularization under the state patronage (Macfie, 2014).

The state-led madrasa reforms, initiated in both the regimes under the ideologies of Islamization and Enlightened Moderation in General Zia ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf era respectively had a conceived purpose of transformation of the society in accordance with the essence of their political ideologies¹⁷. As the present study argues that the state’s policy towards madrasa got mired into short term political interests in both the military regimes. So, in order to analyze the argument following aspects relevant to the study are covered in this chapter:

- i. Contextual factors of madrasa reforms
- ii. Debating the state-led madrasa Reforms
 - a. Ulama and the reform Process
 - b. The State and the Reform Processes
- iii. Role of ulama in politics in both the addressed eras

2.2 Contextual Factors of Madrassa Reforms

The factors that led the state to initiate madrassa reforms which had shaped the madrassa-state relations in both the military regimes could be categorized as internal and external. The actors involved could be categorized as domestic and international but it's quite a bleak situation to sub-categorize the internal actors because a good number of ulama also became the helping hands or levers to serve the state to prolong the military regime by accommodating its controversial policies as mentioned earlier. The role of external factors has been interpreted in a variety of ways by the writers.

There were few internal factors too that contributed a lot in the state-led madrassa reforms' programs. Abdur Rehman gives us a glance in his article "Dynamism of Pakistan's Civil Society: Religious-Secular Rivalry and its Resources" of how the religious-secular rivalry was promoted internally in Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf's military regimes. Protest against the alleged rigging in 1977 elections which resulted in PPP's marginal success and emergence of Tehreek-e-Nizam-e- Mustafa paved the way for Zia to proclaim Martial Law. Zia's Islamization program gained much popularity due to the global and regional situations. Both the military leaders General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf focused on choosing the desired segments of the society helpful to prolong their military regimes, keeping the global scenarios ahead (Rehman, 2006). The writer in his writing seems to be contradictory as on one side he

mentioned that the religious parties supported Musharraf to get constitutional legitimacy by getting 2/3rd majority in the legislature to be the Chief Executive and Chief of Army Staff while on the other side he claimed that Musharraf opted to align the secular segment of society. He has not mentioned the concessions given to the religious segments in both the military regimes which motivated them to support the regimes in sustaining its rule. One must not forget that the roots of this religious segment go to madrassas which are the origin and a source of producing this segment of civil society.

Khalid Rehman (2007) elaborates in this connection that the madrasa authorities got the sense of having political power after the Iranian Revolution while the Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan gave a sense of unity to the different religious schools of thought which led the state towards the reformation of the madrasa system. After 9/11 hostility of the West towards madrassas compelled Pervez Musharraf to introduce reforms in madrassas. As a result of those reform plans in Musharraf era five boards of madrassas¹⁸ have established Ittehad-e-Tanzeem-e-Madaris (Rehman, K. 2007). One cannot deny a new turn in Pakistan's religious segments after Iranian Revolution and Afghan war but it would be an over exaggeration to say that all religious schools of thought united after those major happenings in the region because in Zia Regime sectarianism in Pakistan reached at its zenith and each sect instead of strengthening its position tried to weaken other and Zia enjoyed the fragmentation of religious segments as

they all were sub-ordinate to him and did not pose any threat to regime and retained their individual image before him in order to get benefits.

Zia imposed state-led Zakat system in the light of Hanafi school of Sunni law which was resented by Shia masses who moved ahead to political mobilization in Pakistan and it deepened sectarianism (Malik, 1996). The role of external factor in promoting sectarianism negates Khalid Rehman's notion "sense of unity" in Zia era as Dr Noor-ul-Haq (2008) in his column "Configuration of Religious Communities in Pakistan-A historical Perspective" says that some external factors responsible for the madrassa reforms initiatives also became a source of fuelling sectarianism in Pakistan. He writes that Iran supported Shi'ah community after Iranian revolution while Saudi Arabia supported Sunni sect. The US supported Zia who encouraged religious militants mostly Deobandis to fight against the USSR.

Uzma Anzar (2003) in her article "Islamic Education—A Brief History of Madrassa with Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices", writes about the external factors that influenced madrassa reforms process directly as during Afghan War against the USSR, the madrassa students were taught to fight against the Godless Russians and mathematics was taught by counting dead Russians and their weapons. The funding by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to wage Jihad in Afghanistan and the US support to Mujahideen for its own interest had made the condition deplorable (Anzar, 2003). In Zia and Musharraf regimes Pakistan offered services to the external powers and fully utilized internal

resources including man power to serve their interests and madrassa-reforms initiatives were a chain of those services.

The writers have agreed that external and internal factors influenced state's policy towards madrassa a lot. This view can be further strengthened by the fact that although madrassa reforms process in Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf's era was initiated prior to Iranian Revolution and USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in Zia regime as surveys to explore the madrassa's problems were conducted prior to the two global incidents but these global incidents gave impetus to madrassa reforms process. Similarly, in Musharraf regime efforts to reform madrassa started prior to 9/11 but gained momentum in the post-9/11 period. This whole situation was perceived as a journey of military regimes from the achievement of domestic to international legality and vice versa in Musharraf regime. It shows that the state became the primary benefiter of the reforms while the madrassa circle either got some short term secondary benefits which proved to be fatal for them in the long run or were at a great loss.

Sarada Peri expresses that during Zia regime the madrassa curriculum was altered adding the Jihad obligations and reward, meeting the needs of the global powers. The US short-sighted policies contributed a lot in proliferation of madrassa promoting militancy. Even after the USSR's defeat, it became difficult for the government to control these madrassas. People found madrassa as an affordable alternative comparatively to the unaffordable secular education. The US planned to make the secular education system attractive in order to stop tendency of sending children to madrassas in Pakistan (Peri, 2004). It was due to

US-led war on Terror that Pakistan's madrassas were blamed directly for the militancy and 9/11 Commission's Report further enhanced problems for the madrassas. The 9/11 Commission Report stressed, "it is hard to overstate the importance of Pakistan in the struggle against Islamist terrorism" as it was pointed out that almost all the suspects of 9/11 spent time in Pakistan and "travelled the North-South nexus of Kandhar-Quetta-Karachi and blamed that madrassas of Pakistan "have been used as an incubators of violent extremism" (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2011).

Jessica Stern in her article "Pakistan's Jihad Culture" writes that madrassas received funding from all over the Muslim world. According to the writer Jihad was a mindset after Afghan War and in context to the global situations which could not be changed within a day (Stern, 2000).

Dr Noor-ul-Haq (2008) has shown a true picture of the external actors who adored the madrassa once in Zia regime but when their desired tasks were accomplished they were the first to circulate two misleading conceptions about madrassa. Firstly, madrassas were considered as jihad factories and secondly, madrassas represented anarchic learning and did not promote critical and creative thinking. After 9/11 the criticism against madrassa was not limited to the media. The matter went ahead and came under discussion in the US Congress and even it was brought under discussion in the United Nations that urged the Pakistan Government to freeze the assets of few madrassa based organizations that were allegedly involved in terrorism all over the world.

Jessica Stern's claim that "madrassa as Jihad factories" is not a trustworthy conclusion. It's quite common that factories are known for some specific production on a large scale. So, to say madrassa as Jihad factory means that in madrassa nothing is taught except the theory and practice of Jihad. Amir Rana (2009) in his article "Mapping the madrassa mindset: Political Attitude of Pakistani Madrassa", based on survey, mentioned that majority of the madrassa considered War on Terror as a strategy to kill innocent Muslims all over the world and to undermine Islam. 77% madrassa students were against Pakistan's role in the War on Terror (Rana, 2009). The article shows that the madrassa students were quite familiar with national and international politics. In the same survey he found that majority of the madrassa students were in favor of their involvement in political activities.

Although, Mumtaz Ahmad (2004) does not agree with this point of view and writes in his article that most of the madrassas keep their selves away from politics in order to be focused on their duty of promoting religious education and madrassa curriculum in Pakistan had nothing to promote militancy and terrorism. Citing about the impact of external and internal factors on Pakistan's madrassas, he writes that radicalism can be observed in some madrassas today which is due to the involvement of some domestic and international actors who wanted to use religious capital and manpower of those madrassas to promote their own interests. Few of the madrassas that promote militancy are near Afghan Border and were created during the Afghan War to accommodate a good number of Afghan refugees who took part very actively in Afghan Jihad. They were training camps

more than madrassas because religious knowledge that was imparted to the students focused to promote spirit of jihad amongst them. They were given the cover of madrassas just to raise funds from all over the Muslim world. In other words political conditions were created for jihad (Ahmad, M. 2004).

Saeed Shafaq (2004) in his article “Re-inventing Pakistan: Islam, Security and Democracy—What is changing?” also explains the impacts of internal and external factors on Pakistan’s madrassas in both the regimes. According to him, Zia government promoted Islamization in order to get support of the PNA¹⁹—an alliance of nine political parties out of which three were religious including JI, JUI and JUP.

In order to find out more about the madrassa-state relations Mahmud Sham’s (2004) article *Qoami Tanazar Deeni Taleem—Qoami Policy aur Haqumat ka kirdar* of the book “Pakistan mein Deeni taleem manzar, pas-e-manzar-o-paesh manzar” directs the debate on a very well track as he points out a very interesting thing that Pakistan is heading directionless if policy making process is observed critically. It is interesting that what-so-ever was considered as a necessary part of our faith from 1979 to 1999 was promoted under the supervision of the state but after 9/11 majority of them was considered illegal. Madrassa was honored under the banner of Islamization by the state while the same institution continuing to play the same role was defamed by the state under the banner of Enlightened Moderation (Sham, 2004). This lack of inconsistency on the part of the state towards madrassa shows that there were too many factors

and actors involved in shaping and re-shaping the state's policy towards the madrassa system. Besides, madrassas were providing free food, lodging and education to the poor segment of the society and they had been doing so since long. In the midst of all these services rendered by madrassa, what was the reason that governments needed to reform madrassa specifically when countless institutions of the state were even in a more wretched conditions than these religious institutions.

2.3 Debating the state-led madrassa Reforms

There emerge two schools of thought regarding the critical appraisal of reforms. First school of thought considers reforms as genuine to bring substantial changes into the madrassa system of Pakistan but considers intransigence of ulama as the sole cause of leading state-led madrassa reforms towards their wretched destination while the second school of thought believes reforms to be cosmetic and believes that the flaws at the formulation and implementation stages showed inefficiency on the part of state which led them to failure of actualizing their conceived outcomes of bringing about substantial changes into madrassa system of Pakistan.

a. Ulama and the Reform Process

Robert Looney is the representative of the first school of thought who considers ulama as a massive hurdle in reforms' implementation as he analyzes that historically the Clergy had been resistant to reforms as they perceived them threat to their autonomy. Keeping history in mind he had blamed clergies for

failure of Musharraf's plan to get madrassa registered. The writer believes that the Regulation and Registration Ordinance was watered down by the Musharraf administration under Clergy's extreme pressure. The writer considers government helpless before the powerful clergy and governments' shift to co-operative approach towards madrassa confirmed that clergy was dominant over state authorities (Looney, 2003). It's quite hard to accept in the light of Finer's Military Theory (as mentioned above) that the ideological forces would compel the military regimes having a huge edge over other institutions of the state to keep shifting their policies till these become tolerable to madrassa. The writer has confined himself to the limited preview of the reforms and has not been impartial to find the reasons of their failures.

Masooda Bano (2007 & 2009) is another noted writer whose point of view towards role of ulama in madrassa reforms matches with that of Robert Looney as her papers "Contesting Ideology and struggle for authority: Madrassa-State Engagement in Pakistan" and "Co-Production: Do faith Based Organisations Offer a Potential?" give almost same reasons of the failure of the state-led madrassa reforms. She has broadened the reasons of the failure of ulama's resistance to those reforms keeping in view domestic and global contexts. According to her, the state-led reforms' initiatives could not produce the perceived outcomes due to the resistance from ulama as they considered them the US backed reforms and onset of the US-led War on Terror had further strengthened their pre-established reflection towards reforms in Musharraf regime. She also believed that the reforms failed largely due to the weak "political will"²⁰.

Additionally, the state also failed to magnetize ulama to the reforms due to lack of its financial commitments. Although she has pointed out state's economic mismanagement also a cause of reforms' failure but in her papers ulama had been the central figure whose perceptions and evaluations of reforms under the shadow of suspicion had hampered the success of reforms of madrassa system in one way or another. Azhar Hussain in his article puts forth his ideas in more or less similar ways as he concludes that the madrassa reforms failed in Pakistan due to the misconception and mis-interpretation of reforms on the part of the ulama (Hussain, 2009). Certainly, being stake holders ulama were supposed to be the first to assess the impacts of reforms on society in critical junctures when the religious educational institutions in the society were seen through the prism of newly coined slogans of Islamization and Enlightened Moderation in Pakistan and obviously did so by evaluating those reforms in the light of historical overview that showed the outcomes of the past experiences of reforming madrassa of the sub-continent.

The historical overview that reveals reasons of ulama's suspicion towards reforms is rightly depicted in Francis Robinson's paper "Islam and Modernities" that shows glimpses of the past glory and decline of the Muslim World. There was a time when the grandeur of the Muslims was at its peak and they were highly revered by the rest of the world. Modern Europe owed much to their knowledge. Besides explaining their glory, he has also depicted their gradual decline. He had brought us to the fact that by 1920's most of the Muslim world was dominated by the West. Although, almost all got freedom till 1990 but they were under

constrains as the West kept on interfering in their policy making processes to fulfill their strategic requirements. He presented the example of Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan which proved to be costly for the Muslim world as it destabilized the Muslim world from Central Asia to Kashmir. The Muslim intellectuals and philosophers had great grievances for the lost dominant status. He cited few of the elegies including Hali's *Musaddas* that were full of lamentation of the decay of the great Muslim Civilization. He said that Iqbal, the great political thinker of the East, had also directed the Muslim world that Europe was a "destructive force and a false model of progress" for the Muslim world. The same sort of the feelings could be felt among the Muslims all over the world which was obvious in Sayyid Qutb²¹, Ayatolla Khomeini²² and Usama Bin Laden's philosophies (Robinson, 2007).

The memories of the glorious past of the Muslim world and fear of disappearance of remaining vestiges of Muslim civilization have always dogged Muslim Ulama and during the Colonial era they frantically tried to retain and salvage Islamic identity. Barbara Metcalf in her book *British Revival in British India Deccan* demonstrates that the way Muslims responded to the colonial rule was not exclusively their adaptation to western norms and institutions. In its essence, the response was to protect Muslim identity in an unfamiliar and hostile environment and in this way it took the form of the systematic recourse to facets of Islamic religious education. Some adjustments were made by the ulama of the sub-continent in this connection such as new emphasis on hadith, adoption of printing technology, using Urdu language as a medium of their reformist

discourse etc. The establishment of new madrassas was a big source of resisting the colonial threats. Much of the emphasis of ulama was on the moral up gradation of an individual rather than on the organization of state and society (Metcalf, 1982).

Obviously, education is the driver of change in any society and ulama's suspicion in both the military regimes was the continuation of those historic perceptions that by changing the madrassa curriculum, the West wanted to eradicate the imprints of the Muslim civilization. In broader terms the ulama had suspicion that the West wanted to assimilate into the Muslim civilization to prevent any clash of civilization²³ and the military rulers were their cohorts as their policies were wrapped around one interest i.e. to generate circumstances that could be helpful for them to rule the state for a long time. The ulama who were resistant of the reforms had an opinion that the West and the Military rulers had a nexus and they were adopting give and take policy towards each other. Although Arshi Saleem Hashmi does not seem to be subscribed to this view and points out that during Islamization process education sector was the first one to tamper with. Zia tried to strengthen his regime by portraying that Arabization and Islamization were inseparable. The reforms in education sector initiated by the state showed that the real clash was between orthodox and the moderates not between Islam and the West as projected (Hashmi, 2009).

Much of the focus of the above mentioned writers is around the ulama's response to the reforms and the reasons behind them while the state's flaws in

their formulation and implementation processes are ignored. So, to say ulama suspicious as a continuity of history is to show one side of the picture. The ulama's suspicion was genuine as Fair in her book argued that madrassa reforms were introduced largely "at the behest" of the United States. She had drawn conclusion on the basis of conversation with State Department's High Level officials that the reforms aimed "de-Islamization of Pakistan's education system". Her findings revealed that the US interference had really harmed Pakistan's madrassas reform more than they had helped. They actually "delegitimized government's efforts" and were perceived to be launched by Washington and London (Fair, 2008). Fair has substantiated her research arguments by drawing much on the field work and using the works of others that madrassa are not the primary promoter of militancy. She has used primary data extensively comprising on students' and teachers' interviews and other madrassa members in addition to surveys and opinion polls. The above mentioned reservations made by ulama clearly indicate that ulama were not consulted while reforming madrassa system and reforms' policy was in the hands of those who did not have any deep knowledge of madrassa curriculum, examination system, etc. so, they suspected that government was insincere towards madrassas and wanted to get hold on them through reforms following the colonial pattern.

h. The State and the Reform Process

Few of the writers have considered state as responsible for leading the reforms towards failure.

Mumtaz Ahmad (2009) gives an in-depth study of the reforms' failure as these were made in haste and their short term purpose was around security not education in Musharraf era. In order to adjust madrassa matters, the Interior Ministry and intelligence agencies were more active than any other ministry or institution. It showed that the government made reforms in haste without analyzing their projected outcomes that could have affected the madrassa system in the long run. If the reforms were intended to reform madrassa in its real essence then the Ministry of Education should have been given the dominant role rather than intelligence agencies and Interior Ministry. As the Military rule was prevailing in the state so, the intelligence agencies' involvement clearly prompts the critics to observe the role of military agencies in strengthening military rule through their visible or invisible presence. Policy formulation and implementation failure towards the madrassa was as a result of few ground realities. When the policy makers make any policy they give a huge weightage to the size of the population for whom the policy is being made. Muhammad Waqas Sajjid puts forth his views that any decisions regarding madrassa based on generalized understanding always proved to be flawed. There were tangible as well as intangible differences in madrassa based on their size, ideological dimensions, enrollments etc. (Sajjid, 2009). The success and failure of the reforms were largely based on the accuracy of these tangible and intangible differences. Let's analyze governments' efforts to gather those statistics accurately.

While formulating any policy regarding madrassa, the governments ought to have statistics of the enrolled students first to whom they were intending to

adjust in the society by facilitating them through reforms. But contrary to this, the government did not have any reliable data of the madrassa enrolled students in both the military regimes. The ICG Report no 36, 2002, gives description that the number of madrassas has increased dramatically after 9/11. The report says that about 33%²⁴ of all the enrolled students are in madrassas (International Crisis Group, 2002). Although that controversial data was corrected by ICG as a decimal error was pointed out later in a research report that declared the figures of ICG Report as far-fetched from reality and used three different sources to know the actual statistics. The researchers used 1998 Official Census of population, the 1991, 1998, and 2001 rounds of Pakistan Integrated Household Survey and 2003 Census of schooling choice conducted by their research team. On the bases of these three sources gave the figures that just less than 1% students were enrolled in madrassa (Andrabi & Das. 2005).

Samina Ahmed questioned the validity of Tahir Andrabi's report criticizing their sources as unreliable. 1998 Census was considered to be highly controversial and outdated, the house hold surveys were neither designed nor conducted to gather madrassa enrolment and the survey conducted by the researchers themselves was quite limited as it was based on three districts being served by number of public schools out of 102 districts. The question of a great consideration here is that why the government failed to reach a reliable data regarding madrassa while making policy.

None of the literature about madrassa gives the answer to this question. The failure to get reliable data of the madrassa enrolled students left a big question mark on the efficiency and political will of the policy makers to introduce real reforms that could produce expected outcomes beneficial for the madrassa students in the long run. This flaw shows that government had some short term political interests to achieve in a short duration. One must not forget Finer when he points out that the military rules have two major weaknesses: these are; their inability to administer and lack of legitimacy to rule. The above given literature shows clearly that in both the military regimes, the state was poorly administered but the lack of legitimacy raised a sense of urgency among the military rulers to legitimize their regimes on the national and international levels. The literature does not provide sufficient information of how the state used madrassa to get legitimacy of the military regimes.

Moreover, ulama did have some genuine reservations regarding reforms' formulation which they pointed out openly in both the military regimes as Dr Mahmud Ahmed Ghazi (2004) who had been given responsibility to reform madrassas claimed that being member of the Committee that formulated reforms, he talked to the ulama and noted few of the reservations about curriculum as it was demanded by the ulama that any change in curriculum could only be brought by the men of pens not by the government officials. It's quite obvious that the committee which was assigned the task to formulate reforms was dominated by those members who did not have even basic knowledge about madrassa curriculum.

Few of the writers have pointed out the flaws left by the state on the implementation stages of the reforms in both the addresses eras. Christopher Candland's (2005) study is a good comprehensive study regarding reforms in Musharraf's regime. He has conveyed how the reforms were poorly designed by the state and their implementation was also inefficient even in those cases where ulama agreed to the need of reforms. Pakistan Madrassa Education Board was established for the establishment of Model Deeni Madrassas. The second Ordinance promulgated was related to Deeni Madaris Regulation and Registration. The establishment of Model Deeni Madaris could not produce concrete outcomes due to weak administrative structure. Their meetings were not held on regular basis and chairman or secretary of the board was not nominated permanently. The Three Model Deeni Madrassas were not provided with proper buildings and to say that ulama were the biggest hurdle in way of reforms was an excuse for the delay and their failure (Candland, 2005). Infact, infra-structure is the fore-most condition for the successful execution of any plan which was lacking in Musharraf reforms plan. The writer pointed out the administrative flaws appeared at the implementation level but had not candidly pointed out the covert objectives desired to achieve by those who introduced the reforms. There was absolute lack of co-ordination at the implementation stage. Mumtaz Ahmad rightly pointed out that the political commitments seemed to sink as the interest of the concerned authorities was to enjoy new administrative positions.

Jamal Malik's (1999) piece of writing is one of the best detailed works on madrassas of Pakistan. He gives every step of the policy making process of state

towards madrasa in the post-partition period. According to him, in Zia era the ulama of all sects ignored the suggestions of National Committee of Deeni Madaris regarding curriculum. The Wafaq-ul-Madaris Deoband paid no heed to government's plan and Tanzeem-ul-Madaris also did not bring changes in their curriculum as recommended by the committee rather altered the curriculum at the primary and secondary levels following the suggestions of their own committees. The secular subjects were completely ignored while few subjects like Economics, Comparative Religious Sciences, Communism and Capitalism and other subjects were added as optional subjects. Later, wafaqs and Tanzeems brought changes in their education system after consultation with the government officials but that too were not meeting the government's real plans to bring substantial changes into the madrasa system of Pakistan. So, without implementing the reforms in their true essence, the last degrees of all wafaqs and Tanzeems was declared equivalent to M.A Islamiat and Arabic for teaching and admission purposes by the Zia-ul-Haq government. The government disbursed Zakat Money among the madrassas of all Barelwi, Ahle-Hadith, Jammat-I-Islami and Shia but Deobandi madaris refused to accept the Zakat money (Malik, 1999). A patron-client relationship was established between the state and madrasa with the acceptability of zakat money by the madrasa authorities. The writer has beautifully pointed out the space left between formulation and implementation stages in reforms process during the addressed era.

Saleem H Ali (2009) writes that the Model Deeni Madrassas that combined religious and secular education and other reforms have failed mainly

due to bureaucratic wrangling and gross mis-management in the Government-appointed Madrasa Board, which was meant to oversee the process of madrasa 'reforms'. In this connection he mentioned that students and teachers of the madrassas were inclined towards violent means for the achievement of their demands. His survey was quite a narrow one and on this basis some generalized opinion about the madrassas of Pakistan were given which might not be valid for the madrassas of other areas of the state. Though the bureaucratic wrangling and gross mis-management on the part of government as depicted by the writer is an undeniable fact of the failures of madrasa reforms in Musharraf era but the author's study lacks any convincing arguments. Additionally field work is done but not used and incorporated properly for analysis.

Saleem Mansoor Khalid's (2005) book "Deeni Madaris mn Taleem" is a great contribution which portrays how fishing for short term political imperatives by the state had led the practicality or outcomes of those reforms towards failure leaving ramifications for the madrasa system in the long run. When the madrasa degree was declared equivalent to MA degree in Zia regime, the enrolment of students in madrassas enhanced while different Boards tried to promote their own sects and got their students passed without considering the quality of education. In Zia regime the claims to disburse money among madrassas were high but in reality overall 36.6% madaris received money which was quite minimal about Rs 8944 per madrasa annually. In Musharraf's regime too, modern subjects were introduced and Madrasa Board was established through an Ordinance that was

dominated by those members who did not have any background of Madrassa studies and they considered madrassa as a useless institution.

(Khalid, 2005) presents some statistics that are far from reality even though he had relied on some government sources but even then figures are illogical. By ignoring the statistical doubts, his views that the reform initiatives class ignorant of religious education institutions left irrecoverable flaws that eclipsed their conceived policies of reformation of the madrassa system must be accepted. When reforms were introduced in both regimes it was claimed that those would be helpful to provide equal job opportunities to the madrassa graduates like that of formal system but later in Zia regime quantity oriented approach rather quality oriented approach towards madrassa enrolment was adopted.

Ulama like Maulana Ludhianwi also rejected reforms in Zia regime as pointed out by Qasim Zaman whose work shatters the view that the ulama were inflexible in their attitudes towards the social reforms and as a result become redundant. According to him, the reports of 1962 and 1979, were almost reflection of each other as both recommended to integrate religious education system with that of formal education system and regulation of madrassa education system on the pattern of formal education system.

The ulama blamed that reforms meant to produce the loyal government servants. The writer has focused on the point that Zia claimed non-interference in madrassa affairs on one side but on the other side tried to control madrassa affairs (Zaman, 2004). His book shows a magisterial command of both the dynamics of

national and international developments and the internal discourses the ulama use among themselves.

Jamal Malik (2009) in his book *Colonization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan* explains the madrassa reforms process under Ayub, Bhutto and Zia regimes. He explained Zia's efforts to reform madrassa under which Zakat system was set up in an organized way and some concessions were given to madrassa graduates to play an active role in national life. He has mentioned ulama's reaction towards those reforms initiatives which were perceived as state's efforts to bring madrassa and ulama under its control through the mechanism of Zakat disbursement. There emerged few socio-economic issues the way these reforms were formulated and implemented because the central objectives of the reforms was around attaining some personal political objectives of the military ruler (Malik, 2009).

The groups of writers also see flaws on the part of government are of the opinion that major flaws are obvious at every stage of the policy process, including formulation and execution stages.

The efforts to reform madrassa failed largely due to the lack of commitment of Pakistan's governments. Raymond Ciabattini (2010) in his article "Modifying the Madrassa: Promoting Moderate Islamic Education" writes rightly that the efforts to reform Pakistan's madrassas had failed largely because of corruption, weak government control in the country side and limited government accountability. He has pointed a very critical reality that power structure in

Pakistan's society develops and nurtures those institutions that it needs for its own sustainability and development. Mumtaz Ahmad pointed out that the Pakistan's madrassa curriculum had remained unchanged despite efforts from the government. The government instead of looking at its own areas of improvement blamed the madrassa authorities for their reluctance to adapt with the modern curriculum.

Gilles Kepel (2006) in his book "Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam" writes that reform efforts and disbursement of zakat money paved the way for government to interfere in madrassa by undermining their autonomy. The madrassas of different sects tried to outdo one another in order to get the state's patronage and in this way sectarianism promoted. The reforms brought in curriculum brought pedagogical problems for the secular system of education. The madrassa graduates mis-matched the labour market as they did not possess any skills to contribute in any sphere of life other than religion; as a result, they appeared to be a big economic challenge for the state (Fair, 2004) and to overcome those challenges some new opportunities were tried to provide them in other institutions.

2.4 Role of Ulama in Politics in Both the Addressed Eras

A group of writers have pointed out the role of religious parties in politics in General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf era. MMA which had two dominant madrassa based parties was degraded as B team of Musharraf as it was quite obedient and friendly opposition and in return Musharraf

Government was reluctant to take action against militants to make the ulama happy. (Pirzada, 2008) The International Crisis Group, (2007) has disclosed few of the decisions that helped the madrassa students to take part in state affairs directly in both the military regimes. The Election Commission decided to recognize madrassa certificates as equivalent of mainstream degrees in Pervez Musharraf's regime. As a result JUI's madrassa students got opportunity to contest elections directly. The military government banned student unions and rallies while the religious parties used madrassas and mosques backdrop as bases for their political campaigns. LFO²⁵, a part of 17th Amendment²⁶ supported by MMA justified the military coup of 1999 and as a reward JUI's Fazal-ur-Rehman was declared as the leader of opposition. The report shows that the state cultivated the specific group of religious leaders having pro-military views to achieve political interests on the national and international levels.

In Zia regime too, madrassa graduates were provided opportunities to play roles in the national mainstream. Bareilwi ulama joined Majlis-i-Shura nominated in 1981 and they also became active participants in government departments including Federal Shariat Court²⁷, Council of Islamic Ideology²⁸, Shariat Appellate Benches and Ruet-i-Hilal Committee. In 1985 elections they emerged as Nizam-e-Mustafa Group having a strong hold of JUP who favored the martial law authorities (Ahmed, 2008). Jennifer Gandhi (2010) rightly observes that political parties and legislatures are mere fake democratic institutions through which non-democratic institutions rule. So, in this context Zia used religious political parties and Majlis-i-Shura to rule as those were not representatives of the

entire society. The force of tradition or legitimacy from religious or other sources may play a role in the survival of some rulers as it was obvious in Zia regime.

ICG Report No 49 reveals that military and religious leaders considered the secular mainstream parties as their common enemy. In order to achieve common interests, rigid interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence and injunctions were introduced under Deobandi ulama and Jamaat-i-Islami in Zia era. They were also Zia's partner in Afghan Jihad that served the West's interests and in return military's institutional interests were fulfilled. Musharraf followed two-track policy as he joined hands with the US in the War against Terror while on the other hand he had a soft corner for the militants fighting in Afghanistan and they were not dealt with the iron hands (International Crisis Group, 2003). The ICG Report had made madrassa-state relations in the military regime even more complex to understand. Almost same findings of Frederic Grare strengthen the debate that MMA participated in 2002 elections as anti-Musharraf party and remained against LFO for fourteen months but later accepted LFO. MMA which was comprised of six parties' coalition, including two dominant madrassa based parties, many members of which benefitted from madrassa reforms as they had been declared eligible to contest elections, helped to institutionalize the presence of army in Pakistan's political life through the establishment of National Security Council (Grare, 2006).

Saigol (2009) writes that Zia getting support of the madrassa-based religious parties, conducted referendum that asked whether people wanted Islamic

Sharia Law and their affirmation meant that their vote had gone in favor of President Zia to be elected for the next five years. While Musharraf's friendly opposition in the Centre, ruling in NWFP, passed Hasba Bill that favored to enforce Shariat in NWFP and promoted the fear of Talibanization of the province. The purpose was to show the international community that in case Musharraf was dissuaded from power, then the religious parties sympathetic to Taliban's ideology would take over the state (Saigol, 2009).

Although there came few ups and downs in their relations as in 2005 the military rule used the Supreme Court to exert pressure on MMA²⁹ to end boycott of NSC and disqualified madrassa degree holders from running in elections without passing additional exams of English, Urdu, and Pakistan Studies. . The ICG (2004) report affirmed the perception that some steps were apparently taken by the military government of Pakistan to placate the concerns of the international community regarding madrassas but those did not seem to bring any substantial change into the madrassa system of Pakistan and claimed that the military government just wanted to continue its ally status with that of the US on the global level and patron-client with ulama on the domestic level as the ulama had always been a key supporter of the Army over its policy towards India. The report appeared in 2004 argued that President Musharraf owed to eradicate Islamic extremism from the society by reforming madrassa curriculum and controlling their funding but no concrete steps could be traced to do so along with their mechanism. "President Musharraf's MMA allies have categorically rejected, with a public campaign, government reforms of madrasas and any proposed laws

to regulate their functioning, including curricula and finances.” Most of the madrassas were unregistered, following no funding rules or uniform national curriculum. Pakistan’s law provided no clear picture on the status of extremist groups and terrorism. The government’s unfulfilled promises were promoting the sectarianism and jihadi culture more instead of diminution of these trends (International Crisis Group, 2004).

C Christine Fair (2004), believed that Pakistan’s Ahle-Hadith Organization Lashkar-e-Tayyba and some Deobandi militant groups had been carrying out militant activities in Afghanistan against the US, NATO and Afghan forces. Some other groups like Badr and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, backed by the state, were operating in Kashmir. They wrote that many militant organizations in Pakistan promoted sectarianism like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi³⁰ and Sipah-e-Sahaba³¹ operated by Jammiat-e- Ulema Islam had a viable contribution in launching Taliban in Afghanistan. These groups were really backed by the state (Fair, 2004).

Lisa Curtis (2006) said in this context, “Pakistan has traditionally relied on violent extremist groups to accomplish its strategic objectives in both Afghanistan and India”. In order to reduce the Indian influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan had relied on Haqqni network. Rebecca Winthrop and Corinne Graft (2010) do not seem to be convinced by the above mentioned claims as she found that it’s a misconception that the economic assistance in education sector would provide security in return. They were of the opinion that education can either mitigate or fuel militancy. They were of the opinion that growing militancy in

Pakistan has resulted due to Pakistan's Army patronage of madrassa based militant groups as mean of securing geo-strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Kashmir (Winthrop & Graft, 2010). The Musharraf government could not alienate clergy because they were an essential part of the power base. (Peri, 2004) But overall in both the military regimes the religious based parties were supported and accommodated with a purpose to retain military regimes.

This group of writers is of the opinion that the state used the madrassa-based parties to protect its interests on the national and international levels. The state showed extreme flexibilities for them to take part in the domestic politics while they played an active role for the survival of the military regimes for a long time assuming the role as a part of government and sometimes as opposition and that all had been made possible directly or indirectly due to state-led madrassa reform processes.

Conclusion:

The above mentioned literature covers documentation of the reforms formulation and implementation stages in detail, ignoring the outcomes in a broader spectrum of the reforms and their implications on Pakistan's society. When it is claimed that reforms initiated by the governments during Zia and Musharraf era failed, the sound arguments are not provided that why and how reforms failed. Musharraf reforms in Pakistan are studied in few pieces of writings but their policy perspectives are either wholly or partially ignored. Generally, it has been observed that failure of any policy becomes obvious on the

implementation stage when it faces extreme hurdles in implementation or if it is implemented the outcomes are not achieved or become even more detrimental in the long run. Moreover, flaws are hardly realized or accepted on the formulation stage rather when the policy undergoes the implementation stage the flaws at the formulation stage become a source of failure of any policy on the implementation or outcome stages. The literature relevant to madrassa-state relations does not critically analyse the flaws left at the formulation stage. Few short-comings at the implementation stage are highlighted but in a narrow perspective which even compels the readers to think that criticism on reforms' matter in Zia and Musharraf era are politicized by hiding the facts.

Some parts of the policy towards madrassa in both the regimes were implemented but their outcomes or implications on the society are not depicted in detail. In order to depict the madrassa-state relations, few studies give an insight to how madrassas helped the military rulers to sustain their military regimes but the bridge that united them were ignored i.e Reforms. None of the studies provide theoretical support to the arguments. The motivations of the military rulers behind those policy initiatives and the nature of the state when the military rulers were ruling the state in both the regimes is completely put aside in the above mentioned studies. Most of the studies vacillate between findings whether madrassa or state has to be blamed for the failure of reforms. Few of the studies have covered the economic aspects of the reform plans but completely ignored the political perspectives of the projects.

Not a single study has pointed out the ideologies which laid the sound foundations and reflected the very essence of the reforms programs in both the military regimes. Even wherever inefficiency or lacks of coordination and political will are mentioned as dominant factors of the reforms failure, there too, the real motives of the policy initiators are ignored. Some external factors that became a source of giving momentum to reforms process are pointed out but their negative implications on reform processes are not seen critically. Wherever reforms are studied their implications are not studied in the broader spectrum covering all stakeholders as most of the time the students who are the major stakeholders are ignored. Policy making is a process that is comprised of three steps i.e. formulation, implementation and outcomes. In order to analyse any policy all three stages should be analysed in order to get a reliable answer but none of the studies analyses both the state-led madrasa reforms keeping in view all the steps of the policy making process in connection to all stakeholders. In other words policymaking process is the integration of formulation, implementation and outcomes which must be studied together in order to get a valuable result of the research.

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Chapter 3

A Brief History of Madrassa from its Origin to Pre-Partition and Post-partition Period

Introduction

Madrassa and mosque have served as centres of Islamic education as well as some social and political activities. During the early years, the Muslims used to gather in mosques to offer prayers and acquiring knowledge about religion. Moreover, in times of conflicts against opponents, every plans and strategies to counter the situations were discussed in mosques. Later, madrassas were established to fulfil the educational services of the community. The madrassas provided some state's functionaries and, in this way participated directly and indirectly in state affairs. This chapter depicts the history of Islamic education in mosque as well as madrassa in the Arab world (during the Prophet Muhammad's time) and its spread beyond the Arabs after the Prophet's age. Madrassa's activities and their relations with the state during the medieval time are discussed in the chapter as madrassas were dominantly depended on the nature of the rule for their sustainability and roles. Likewise the madrassa education in South Asia initiated under the

patronage of Sultans but strengthened under different rules in the pre-Mughal time period are portrayed along with a glance at the madrassa state relations during that time period. The chapter also gives the role of religious and political services of the Farangi Mahalis in the sub-continent. An analysis of madrassa-state relations during the colonial time period are also made in the light of the suppressed role of Ulama in the newly framed political state up of the state. In the post-partition period, the madrassa -learned ulama despite that the state achieved on ideological basis failed to achieve a dominant role in state's political affairs. The madrassa-state relations in the post-partition period are also analyzed in the light of reforms introduced in General Ayub and Bhutto eras. Briefly, this chapter gives madrassa-state relations in Islamic history to the recent history of Pakistan uptill Bhutto era.

3.1 Religious Education in the Early Days of Islam

The education system was institutionalized by Islam almost since its inception as the mosques became the central place of imparting education in the early days of Islam and this tradition is kept alive even today. The newly revealed knowledge and its interpretation were conveyed by the Prophet to people who assembled in the mosque. The Muslims used to come to mosque to seek the answers of their problems in the light of newly revealed knowledge. There was no concept of hierarchy regarding the attainment of religious knowledge and even the common people who were interested in getting the knowledge could acquire it without any inconvenience. The people who were specifically interested in getting knowledge usually consumed much of their time in mosque "debating and polishing their knowledge of Quran" and others who were not involved in this activity simply

sought their guidance in all daily life affairs. Even, after the death of the Holy Prophet the mosque had retained its central place of learning in Islamic society as the people used to gather there, seeking knowledge through Quran, Sunnah and Hadith. The knowledge imparted in the mosque was sufficient to govern the lives of the people of Arabian Peninsula due to homogeneity of their language and cultural background (Anzar, 2003). During the first two centuries of Islam political powers had religious legitimacy which was strong and persistent. The Caliphs adopted the title Khalifat Allah that means deputy of God. The role of Caliph in the religious life of state and obedience of Caliph's role as God's command left no space for the separation of politics and religion.

3.2 Islamic Education beyond Arab

As Islam expanded to other parts of the world where aboriginal traditions and languages were followed, it was deemed necessary to produce a cadre of scholars who could develop sophisticated writings and textbooks on Fiqha, Sunna, Hadith and Tafseer. The basic purpose was to "preserve religious conformity through uniform teaching of Islam for all". Although the madrassa origin can be traced back to that time period but the first known madrassa was established in 1005 A.D by the Fatmid Caliph of Egypt. The madrassa administered under Fatmid dynasty opted to teach Shi'a version of Islam and had all the ingredients of an educational institution such as; teachers of all available subjects, students, who were provided all basic facilities for education and a library with some 6500 volumes of different subjects. Imam had quite a central and dominant role in political and religious affairs of Fatmid's Dynasty. The Friday Sermons at the

mosques were subject to Imam's approval. He used to supervise and monitor whatever was conveyed to subjects. This was done to promote Shia version in the territories. The Fatmid Palace, in addition to centre of political authority served as Ismaili training and education centre (Ramadan, Souad, 2014). Al-Azhar of Cairo which had received a world-wide reputation was established by Al-Muizz (925-975 AD) of Fatmid Dynasty. When Egypt was conquered by the Sunni Muslims, the Shi'a version of education imparted in the madrassa during Fatmid Caliph was refurbished and later completely transformed to Sunni version. The conquerors preserved the knowledge of early Islam and destroyed what so ever was seemed to them contrary to the original Islamic teaching³² but preserved maximum books of the earthly knowledge carefully. A huge stock of books was taken to Baghdad where Seljuk Vizier Nizam-ul-Mulk Tusi established the first state sponsored madrassa in 1067 (Anzar, 2003).

Later on, Nizam-ul-Mulk Tusi established some other madrassas which usually trained experts in Islamic law, ulama (who joined staff bureaucracy of the states as judges and muftis) as well as administrators. In other words, the madrassa-learned at that time period often served as helping-hands of the state as the ulama committed to the royal court legitimized state's authority on several critical occasions. The growing popularity of the rationalist Muta'zilites and the Isma'ili was felt to be threat by Nizamul-Mulk Tusi for his Sunni establishment and Asharite and Shafi'i orthodox ulama backed by Seljuk state, so, he made policies to suppress them³³. The state during that time period promoted Sunni ulama and suppressed Shia ulama with iron hands as they were felt threat to the

Sunni rule.

The syllabus adopted by the Nizamia madrasa was a blend of *naqli' ulum* and *aqli'ulum* which served as a model for the madrasahs established in other regions. The madrasah learned in the medieval time possessed prominent prestige in the entire society as they rendered incredible services by assuming occupations like administrators, military officers, and judges in military courts, teachers in religious schools and prayer leaders in mosques (Sikand, 2005). The economic reliance of madrasah over state acted as a lever exerted by the state to influence and control madrasahs.

Under the Umayyad and Abbasid rules the political power was rested with Caliph while the religious circle was organized under the ulama. The ulama who were differentiated from the rest of the general Muslim body were experts in Law and Islamic theology. The ulama served the state as qazi (judge), muhtasib and imam. In this way, their economic interests were tied to the state and they provided ruler-suited interpretation of Sharia. The two classes i.e. ulama and Caliphs worked in a great co-ordination to secure the interests of each other as the ulama were provided state patronage while in return they made diligent efforts to legitimize the rule of caliph through suitable interpretations of the Islamic traditions. During Abbasid period, Bait-ul-Hikma (House of Wisdom) was established in 830 A.D by Al-Mamun which was known as a milestone in institutionalization of learning (Khan, Saqib, & Anjum, 2003). Briefly, during the Abbasid Period, the Caliph's power enhanced while ulama's influence decreased as they turned to be subservient to the ruler.

3.3 Madrassa in the Medieval Time Period

During the Middle period, madrassat had a seminal role in transmission of knowledge and it was reflected as a typical feature of the urban areas of the Eastern and central and south west Asian cities. There was not any framed curriculum, infrastructure, examination system or system of degrees for the religious education. The only thing worth noticing was with whom one studied. Instead of any institutional degree the teacher's personal license for the student was accorded due value. The institutional set up was a matter of indifference as even the learning imparted at ones living room was acceptable depending upon the teacher's worth. The system of imparting knowledge in the medieval time period was informal and personal and wide-ranging and flexible in many ways. The madrassa development in the medieval time had a political dimension too because most of the madrassas were set up by those individuals who were usually a part of military elites ruling near Eastern societies from 11th to 12th Centuries down to the modern period. Those military elites known as mamluks ruled Syria and Egypt from 13th to early 16th Century were unfamiliar with the local culture and languages as they were often foreign born³⁴.

The military elites who were ruling the state provided institutions and endowments to the Muslim world and in return received high esteem from the public. The ruling elites never interfered in the institutional matters of the state's education system and gave free hand to the ulama to carry on activities regarding educational matters. Although, in few cases appointments of professors were observed to be made by the ruling class but that was not premeditated for the

purpose of shaping or guiding the educational life of the state (Berkay, 2010).

Portraying the administrative structure of Mamluk cities Lapidus says

“In Mamlūk cities no central agency for coordination or administration of the affairs of the whole existed. There were no municipalities, nor communes, nor state bureaucracies for urban affairs. Rather the cohesion of the city depended not on any particular institutions but on patterns of social activity and organization which served to create a more broadly based community, and this community was built around the religious elites” (Lapidus, 1967, 107).

Historians have two opinions towards madrasa state relations in medieval time period. One group of historians believes that madrasa provided a cadre of bureaucrats and functionaries to the Sunni government of the state to carry out activities against various Shia regimes. The second group of historians does not agree that there had been any systematic functional links between the madrassas and machinery of the Sunni government, established in the medieval period. In Iraq very few scholars joined the state bureaucracy besides performing the task of qadsi who served as viziers of Suljuq Sultan while in Mumluk Cairo too, the career path of bureaucrats and scholars remained separate except for those who were in the administrative machinery of Mumluks. The medieval Muslim societies attached great importance to the education but the transmission of religious knowledge was entirely conservative in outlook and character (Berkay, 2010).

The madrasa-state relations during the Mamluks were symbiotic which paved the way for them to rule. The rulers acculturated themselves with the religious-cultural world of ulama and in return won their acceptability and cooperation. The ulama during that period held unique positions as judges applying Islamic laws and administrators of certain economic affairs. The subjects enjoyed a constructive Mamluk-Ulama symbiosis which provided them enriched culture and religious values. The interests of Mamluks and the ulama working as jurists matched as former sought legality for the rule and later wanted flexibility in economic affairs especially in the matter of pious endowments. In short, the balance of power tilted more in favour of Mamluks but ulama were not entirely powerless (Levy, 2009).

3.4 Madrasa in South Asia

It is quite difficult to trace any specific discernible pattern of the foundation of madrasa in South Asia and similarly the nature, scope and role of madrasa also varied across the state depending on the mode of interactions between the Muslims and other local communities which differed from region to region most likely because the advent of Islam in the sub-continent was through different ways such as migration, preaching, trade and military invasion. During the Umayyad Period the Arabs formally entered in the northern parts of the subcontinent with the entrance of Muhammad Bin Qasim in the 8th Century with a mission to chastise some pirates off the coast of Sindh who had attacked an Arab trading ship which provides an evidence that the Arabs had trading contacts in the subcontinent long before the military conflicts. In the eastern part of the sub-

continent like Bengal, Islam spread through saints, Sufis and holy men whose entrance can be traced to the 7th Century. Some historians traced that some Arab scholars also migrated to Sindh following bin Qasim's invasion. According to some accounts, the founder of Turkish rule in India, Muhammad Ghori established first madrassa in the sub-continent in Ajmer in 1191 (Sikand, 2005). A large number of refugees including scholars fled from Ghazni and Khurasan to Lahore when Ghazni was besieged by the Turks and those refugees also left some imprints upon the education and culture of those areas.

The rulers of Dehli Sultanate who reigned from 1201 to 1528 demonstrated a great love for education and religious learning as a huge number of mosques; religious learning centers and madrassas were established during their rules. Madrassah-i-Miuzzi was the first madrassa in the capital Delhi, established by Shams ud Din Iltutmish (1211-1236). Muhammad bin Tughlaq (1325-1351) had also a remarkable contribution in the establishment of madrassas (Sikand, 2005). All the madrassas, no matter in what-so-ever rule they were established all over India had synchronized purpose i.e. educating people for the state employment (Riaz, 2011).

With the demise of the Abbasid Caliphate, the Islamic centers and madrassas were ransacked by the Mongols and as a result, a number of scholars migrated to north India who later influenced the curriculum of the local madrassas greatly in the light of their Hanafi school of thought. (Sikand, 2005) As soon as Delhi Sultanate weakened, a Motley of regional kingdoms appeared; the independent Muslim kingdom of Deccan was established in the South, the

Bahmani Sultanate established in 1347 located in Northern Deccan set up a number of madrassas; among them the most prominent was built in Bidar in 1472 by Khawaja Mahmud Gawan, who was the prime minister of Shams-ud-din Muhammad Shah Bahmani. The madrassa received state patronage and was established with the purpose to promote Shiaism, so, it appealed to most of the theologians, philosophers and scientists. The madrassa in South included both religious and secular subjects in curriculum. The first madrassa established by Mahmud Shah in 1347 was meant to impart education to the orphans where the state shouldered the responsibilities to provide free lodging and food along with education. The other educational institutions were also provided some subsidiaries by the state (Kaur 1990).

During the period of Delhi Sultanate Islamic education was institutionalized, although, the foundations were believed to be laid down as soon as the Sufis and saints arrived there and they established organized centers of learning in their khanqas which were usually supported by the independent local followers rather than the state. The maktabas and afterwards madrassas were community-based and community-supported until Ikhtiyar bin Bakhtiyar Khilji's military expeditions reached Bengal in 1197. While expanding his rule Bakhtiyar Khilji established a number of madrassas in his newly founded city Rangpura (Kaur 1990) and his successors followed the same tradition (Rahim 1982).

The above mentioned details show that expansion of Islamic education system which began under the rule of Delhi Sultanate continued even inspite of the gradual fading of Delhi Sultanate and upsurge of different political structures.

The religious centers kept on imparting religious as well as secular education there, so that the madrasa students would serve royal courts and various branches of administrations (Rahim, 1982). The students of those religious centers served as ruling elites and administrators and were highly revered in the Sultanate. The madrasa-state relation during the entire period was very cordial. The ulama were considered as an important part of the state machinery. They had closeness with Sultan even at battle array. Although, on few occasions they could not influence Sultan over few matters but they were not influenced by Sultan too on the matter contrary to religious principles. The ulama helped Sultan to consolidate the rule and during Bahram Shah onwards, they entered in to matrimonial relations with the ruling house. On very few occasions there also came some rifts in ulama-state relations in Delhi Sultanate when ulama conspired against their Sultan. In order to avoid this situation Bahram Shah Balban (1266—1287) adopted a power structure which justified the supremacy of ruler through Divine Law. Firuz Tughlaq had extreme good relations with ulama as they provided him assistance on most of the matters relevant to Sharia (Ahmed, A. 1970).

3.5 Madrasa under the Mughal Rule

The number of madrasas increased remarkably during the Mughal rule from 1556 to 1857 which was an outcome of the support of the Mughal royal court irrespective of rulers. There had been two dominant factors for the growth of madrasa during the Mughal period; firstly, the political stability at one center resulted in centralized bureaucracy and secondly the ulama as well as sufis enjoyed a great veneration in the society not only from the emperors but also from

the common people. In the early age of the Mughal rule *maqulat* (rational sciences) spread widely while in the rest of period *manqulat* (revealed knowledge) remained dominant at the cost of *maqulat* (rational sciences) (Riaz, 2011).

Almost all Mughal emperors were interested in facilitating people to get education. Babar assumed that it was the responsibility of the state to provide education to the people. Akbar established a department to regulate madrasa in order to provide state patronage to education and initiated several educational reforms. In order to expand madrasahs Jhangir made a law that if any rich man died and he did not have any heir, his property would be shifted to crown who would utilize it for building and repairing madrasa and monasteries (Ikram, 1964). The ulama gained much respect in the royal courts and their opinions about the state affairs were highly revered. Aurangzeb provided monetary support to the madrasahs in the form of jagirs too. The ulama who were Arabic and Persian trained achieved high esteem along with a prominent role in Mughal courts. They held the responsibility of education of the nobility. Their services ranged from prayer leaders in town mosques to influential advisors and courtiers. Their disciples included common men as well as emperors. Their support to the rulers largely depended on the extent to which the rulers established Islamic and social life. Often certain level of deviance from divine law was tolerated for the greater good of the public (Law, 1960, p. 190).

Nevertheless, during Akbar's rule the power of ulama in the society was curtailed³⁵ as they were forced to accept the right of Ijtihad for the ruler. He blamed ulama for misrepresenting Sharia to figure out their role in the state's

affairs. The rift between ulama and Akbar minimized during Aurangzeb's rule as he assigned the responsibility of compilation of monumental *Fatawa-i-Alamgiri* to the ulama, which is known as the most comprehensive juristic work of the region (Ahmed, A. 1970). Barbara Metcalf (1982) writes that the Mughal ulama seemed independent as following tradition of moral detachment they often resigned from the positions in case if ruler's policies deemed irreligious. Besides building a successful career the ulama's major focus was always to extend their religious ideas and interpretation to the state. Despite all that influential positions, the ulama were not completely independent like that of the ulama of the Ottoman Empire. The emperors especially Akbar and Aurangzeb often patronized the complaint religious leaders or assumed the religious role himself in order to enhance the royal position.

3.6 Political and Religious Services of Some Renowned Families in Pre-colonial India

The descendents of Mulla Qutb al Din Sihawi were well reputed for the consolidation of *ma'qulat* tradition partly because Mulla was the bearer of *ma'qulat* scholarship in direct line from Fadl Allah Shirazi and partly because of the outcomes of the tragedy emerged due to prevalent tension between central authority holders' *madad-i-mash* and local interest representing zamindars. Mulla Hafiz availed a grant in *madad-i-mash* in 1559 which was later transmitted to his great grandson Mulla Qutb-al-Din who was later killed along with two students by "local Usmani Zamindars" and his library having 900 books was also burnt in that incident. Aurangzeb assigned a European merchant's house in Lucknow to

Mulla's four sons as a compensation of that tragic loss (Robinson, 2001).

Mulla Qutb-ud-Din established such a good reputation for teaching and scholarship in Lucknow that a good number of students from all over India were fascinated to that madrasa in order to get education. The students who came outside of Lucknow were lodged either with the family or the city's Tila mosque where the Mughal treasury fulfilled their expenditures partly. Mulla Qutb-ud-Din's two sons Mulla Asad and Mulla Sa'id died amongst Awrangzeb's retinue in Deccan, while his third son inherited the family's fortune in Lucknow. He formulated curriculum known as Dars-i-Nizami, incorporating "the new ma'qulat traditions, balancing them against the traditional ma'qulat subjects" (Robinson, 2001).

The enhanced emphasis on *ma'qulat* in Dars-i-Nizamiyya resulted in a quality training of lawyers, judges and administrators³⁶. The study of advanced books of logic, dialects and philosophy sharpened the rational faculties to the business of the government men and helped them to produce "better trained mind and better-formed judgment", as the 17th and 18th century India had a sophisticated and complex bureaucratic structure so obviously that sort of production was the requirement of the system (Robinson, 2001). These services of the Frangi Mahalis brought them close to the Mughal emperors. The Farangi Ulama who were scattered in the entire Empire played a vital role in establishing authority of the emperors and for that reason they were highly revered in the court as well as among common public (Robinson, 2010).

Shah Waliullah's family was another noted family of India besides Mulla Nizamuddin. Shahwali Ullah's Grandfather Sheikh Wajihuddin, a scholar and his father Sheikh Abdul Rahim established a school at Delhi known as Madrassah Rahimiah. The school produced the renowned ulama of the sub-continent who not only taught the apolistic tradition to the people of every nook and corner of the sub-continent but also revived the soul of Jihad among the Muslims. Simultaneously, the number of students, disciples and knowledge seekers grew large and it seemed quite hard to impart a quality education to such a large number of students within premises of Madrassah Rahimiah so, in order to overcome the problem Muhammad Shah allotted a magnificent building to madrassah at Delhi. The school in which Shah Waliullah and his four sons and Moulana Shah Muhammad Ishaque, Moulana Abdul Ghani successively imparted instruction for a century and a half functioned most successfully and gained an excellent reputation for superior teaching. Gradually, the school lost its glory because there was no one left to handle the matters of management efficiently as soon as Maulana Muhammad Ghani migrated to Mecca after the death of a renowned figure Maulana Muhammad Musa in 1856 A.D There left very limited traces of school after the masses pillaged it in 1857 and raised their own dwellings on its ruins (Khan, 1967).

Shah Waliullah³⁷ longed for a stable Muslim rule in the sub-continent where ulama would be given a vibrant role to play. He emphasized on establishing balanced relationships between ulama and rulers where ulama should have a necessary complementary functions to play in the state's affairs. He laid much

emphasis on the study of *manqulat* or traditional subjects for every Muslim and denied the importance of the study of *maaqulat*, calling it as a source of confusion (Metcalf, 1982).

3.7 Madrassa during the Colonial Rule

The decline of the Mughal Empire resulted in blow to patronage availed by the Ulama and their madrassas. The grants earlier provided to them were squeezed and endowments were confiscated by the new British rulers. Actually, madrassas's importance in the society was replaced with the missionaries' schools. The madrassa's awards were seized and madrassa graduates having command on just Persian and Arabic languages were denied government employments³⁸. Moreover, reduction in funds and replacement of Kazis with judges trained in British Law further deteriorated the situations for the ulama of the sub-continent during the colonial rule (Nair, 2008).

In the medieval Europe there was no distinction made between "religious and secular" for the sake of benefiting the Church and same blurring situation was observed in the sub-continent during the British rule. Although the British tried to make some distinctions between religious and non-religious while handling the matters of education and public endowments but they were quite unsure whether the religion really encompassed the entire life of the people of sub-continent or they were made to believe so. In that condition reforms in education sector meant that if indigenous education was submerged into religious philosophy, then education must be taken out of the influence of religion. In the light of their available options they made some adjustments that could likely be appropriate for

them to rule the subcontinent comfortably (Zaman, 2004).

The British initiated some reforms in secular as well as religious education systems such as in the public school system they removed the religious instruction from the curriculum while for the religious education centers they adopted a bi-dimensional strategy as on one hand many of the madrassas were either abolished or jeopardized after the mutiny of 1857 while on the other hand the government provided grants to some religious education institutions conditionally demanding them to teach non-religious subjects up to the satisfactory level. In spite of all those reforms many madrassas were continued to be administered and financed by the government. Distinction between religious and non-religious had been central and constant theme of all the madrassa reform projects of the British era. The British concept of the usefulness of education left a little space for the teaching of religious education in the sub-continent. In the midst of all those crises the ulama who were already in grief because of the loss of Muslims' political power considered religious education even more necessary to retain their identity which was at stake in those uncertain circumstances (Zaman, 2004).

British initiatives to reforms were specifically around those madrassas which were established or funded by them. Colonial period had quite confusing and contradictory policies particularly towards madrassa and education. They launched plans to replace English with Persian and Arabic. In this context, Governor General Lord William Bentinck introduced law in 1851 that assigned responsibility to promote English in the sub-continent. Lord Macaulay laid emphasis on framing such education system that could secure the interests of the British.

The madrasa reforms introduced by the British were revolving around curtailing the likely threats for the colonial ruler.

The “namesake at Calcutta” madrasa opted Dars-i-Nizami curriculum in the beginning but attempts were made to reform that madrasa too and for that purpose alterations were introduced in its curriculum. The madrasa was divided into two separate departments in 1850, the Arabic (senior) department and the Anglo-Persian department (junior). The Anglo-Persian Department was modeled on Anglo-Vernacular Government Schools and was declared as a complete successful plan in government reports. Some efforts were also made to reform Arabic Department’s curriculum through introduction of “modern and rational system of instruction in the Arabic Language and in the Principles of the Mahommedan Law for the antiquated and faulty system of Indian Moulovies”. The government faced extreme resistance in order to implement its proposed plan and therefore no alteration was made in the curriculum of the Arabic Department (Zaman, 2004). The British were quite aware of the prestige of the madrasa in society and for that reason were quite careful in bringing about substantial changes in the madrasa even established by them as they could provoke resentment among the Muslim masses against the British. The implementation of the reform processes varied from region to region as in Bengal reformed, semi-reformed and unreformed madrasahs were established along with the madrasahs that had never been recognized or supported by the government which was a challenging situation for the government’s madrasah reforms projects (Zaman, 2004).

In 1803, the rule of the East India Company was set up as Delhi was captured by the British. The ulama instead of initiating any direct confrontation with the British rule largely relied on Fatwas to guide masses. For instance, son of Shah Waliullah Delhavi, Shah Abdul Aziz issued a fatwa against the British rule: "Our country has been enslaved. To struggle for independence and put an end to slavery is our duty". This fatwa laid the foundation of a long drawn freedom struggle in India. The ulama under the leadership of Syed Ahmed of Rai Bareilly started fighting against the British and later on merged their army with that of Amir Ali Khan's forces at the order of Shah Abdul Aziz. Syed Ahmed left Amir Ali after six years of struggle for freedom when he came to know about a pact which Amir Ali signed with the British. Syed Ahmed openly denounced the British rule in India and set up provisional government of free India on January 10, 1827 (Qasmi, 2001).

Syed Ahmed and his companion Maulana Muhammad Ismail were martyred in the battle of Balakot along with 300 comrades in a fight against imperialism. The companions of these martyrs carried out struggle for nearly half a century against imperialism. In 1857, 34 ulama including Maulana Qasim Nanautawi, Hafiz Zamin Shaheed and Maulana Rasheed Ahmed signed a proclamation for jihad against the British Army under the leadership of Haji Imdadullah at Shamli field. Although the revolt failed and Muslims were victimized by the British on a larger scale but the word Maulvi was perceived to be the synonymous to rebel for the British. Some 200,000 people were killed in

invited³⁹ of which 51200 were ulama and 500 ulama were hanged to death in Delhi alone (Fizem, 2012).

Actually, the British ruler diminished ulama's traditional role in the society and justice system.

A superb political stability prevailed in the Muslim world in the sixteenth century was quite unique in its duration and scope. For over two hundred years the Muslims ruled from Balkan to Bengal in a structurally similar designed agrarian based empires — the Ottoman, the Safavid and the Mughals where with the expansion of bureaucracies the role of ulama expanded. Their power was somehow circumscribed during the imperial rule but still the responsibility to impart knowledge to the nobility rested on their shoulders along with some other roles including staffing the various levels of judiciary and supervision of the entire charitable activities of the empire⁴⁰ (Metcalf, 1982).

In the 19th Century Muslims were already in deep grief due to loss of their glory from Istanbul to Delhi and that was portrayed well by the poets. "Hali's Musaddas or elegy entitled 'The Flow and ebb of Islam' captures the elegiac and nostalgic mood precisely" (Robinson, 2007, p.208):

When autumn has set in over the garden

Why speak of the springtime of flowers?

When shadows of adversity hang over the present,

Why harp on the pomp and glory of the past?

Yes, these are things to forget; but how can you with

The dawn forgets the scene of the night before?

The assembly has just dispersed;

The smoke is still rising from the burnt candle;

The footprints on the sands of India still say

A graceful caravan has passed this way.

In the immediate aftermath of 1857, two principal routes were adopted by the Muslim elite of the sub-continent to pave the way to independence. On one side, modernist Muslim intellectuals like Sir Syed Ahmed Khan adopted a strategy of making alliance with the British and revitalization of Muslims through western scientific education because after the mutiny he was much against the futility of rebellion. Following his strategy, he established Anglo-Oriental College which later turned to be the Aligarh Muslim University which played a vital role in the Indian politics subsequently. There emerged some disagreement among the ulama in the sub-continent during the colonial rule over the role of madrasa in the society and struggle for independence due to growing political activism in the sub-continent (Ali, 2009).

While when dominantly the theologians of the sub-continent perceived the British system of education as threat to their Islamic identity, so, they decided to choose another path which was by no way matching the plans of the modernists of the sub-continent. The Muslim elite adopted another strategy which was aiming to revitalize the Muslims through traditional Islamic education. Being fearful of the decline of Muslim prestige, power and civilization few of the Muslims led the

counter "Madrasa Movement" which sought to establish Islamic schools in order to safeguard Arabic-Persian legacy as well as faith, Islamic sciences and way of life. In short, by the 20th Century, Muslim movements were led by two distinct trends; one modernist and other traditionalist. The Aligarhians were representing modernists who worked to eradicate the mistrust between the Muslims of the sub-continent and British which got nurtured after 1857's War of Independence while majority of the Indian ulama were representing traditionalists. Several other schools were established in India in the latter part of the 19th Century including Dar al'Ulum Deoband (1866) and Nadwat al- Ulama, Lucknow (1893) which remained independent of the government control (Singh, n.d). The detail is as under:

a. Nadwat ul Uloom (1893)

In order to provide a balanced synthesis of modern and classical, Nadwat ul ulama was established with an objective to find ways in which Muslims could learn to integrate the ever transforming world of knowledge to the revealed fundamentals. The Nadwat al Uloom realized the need of a traditional madrasa to counter "the political ascendancy of the West". The west with its emphasis on liberal, secular and materialist values was perceived to be a factor of generating schism within Islam as it had divided Muslims into "the modernists" and "the orthodox". The orthodox reaffirmed their faith in the "infallibility of the way of life and thought of the Ulama of the past", while, the modernists imitated West in their education system (Singh, n.d).

The time when the Muslims of the sub-continent were divided within the context of Islam, Maulana Muhammad Ali Mungeri, the spiritual successor of Shah Fazlur Rahman of Muradabad and a pupil of Mawlana Lutfullah of Aligarh took the leadership of a group of scholars following the traditions of Shah Waliullah Dehlawi—a great 18th Century scholar, reformer and sufi. In 1893, the foundation of Nadwa was laid down at Cawnpore with Maulana Lutfullah as its president (Singh, n.d). The Nadwa outlined the following main objectives:

“Reformulating the Madrasa syllabi taking into account the changed conditions of modern life; addressing the problems and questions of modern life by recourse to scriptures – the Qur’an and the Hadith; establishing a modern library aiding the study and research on Islam; propagating Islam through the writing and publication of literature; and equipping preachers possessing a sound knowledge of the scriptures and the world” (Singh, n.d, para, 21).

In the beginning the function of Nadwa was confined to an association whose members gathered in different towns from time to time discussing the contemporary matters of the Muslims. Nadva’s first permanent school was established in 1898 at Lucknow. Nadva’s scholars had excellent reputation all across India. Mawlana Muhammad Ali Mungeri, the president of the Nadva was appointed as first *nazim* (General Secretary) in the school which was an honorary position. Later Mawlana Masihuzzaman Khan, Mawlana Khalilur Rahman from Saharanpur, Mawlana Syed ‘Abdul Hai, Mawlana Syed ‘Abdul ‘Ali and Mawlana Syed ‘Abul Hasan ‘Ali Nadwi (1914–1999) followed him as the General Secretaries of the Nadva (Singh, n.d). The early leaders of Nadva tried to assuage

the British suspicions regarding Nadwa by insisting on its apolitical character. A famous leader of this movement Chibli Noumani declared that Nadwa ought to become the religious representative of the entire Muslim community of India at a par with the All India Muslim League which was considered as a representative of the Muslims of India to safeguard their political interests. The Nadwa scholars criticized that madrassas were isolated in the world in which they existed so; they were incapable of providing leadership to the community (Zaman, 1999).

The Nadwa brought about several changes in the curriculum such as removal of outdated subjects of the medieval period which were irrelevant too and included languages and the study of modern sciences in its curriculum Maulana Nadvi played a vital role in fostering inter-faith harmony between the West and the Muslims so, he is remembered in both the Muslim world and in the West (Singh, n.d) even today. So, Nadwa's political role was not prominent as it solely focused on religious services for the people of sub-continent and for that reason was not felt a threat by the Colonial power.

b. Darul Uloom Deoband

There were five major sedition cases against ulama from 1864 to 1871 which are known as Wahabi cases and Ambala conspiracy cases in which allegedly involved ulama were either hanged or were life imprisoned (Tomson, 1952). Darul Uloom Deoband was inheritor of a rich legacy which could be traced back to the early 18th Century when Shah Waliullah Dehlavi led a revolution to change the whole system highlighting the degradation of European imperialism and rampant corruption among the oriental rulers. He wanted to establish a

government based on principles of equality and justice. Observing the degradation of the glory of Muslims in India and across the world, he concluded that imperialist and monarchist tendencies were the major reasons of worsening the state affairs. After the defeat of Sharnli Delhi, and in other battlefields it seemed very difficult to the Muslim leaders to save India from the cultural onslaught of the British and in order to counter this, they decided to establish an institution (Qasmi, 2001).

Deoband remained a center of Muslim religion and culture in the sub-continent as during the pre-Mutiny period the leading families of the town responded to the reformist movement led by Sayyed Ahmed Bareilwi. Keeping this in view, a madressa at Deoband was established in 1867 under a pomegranate tree in Chatta Masjid by Rashid, Ahmed and Muhammad Qasim. The town was typically of qasbahs scattered across north India. The town's leading scholarly families and officials had been a participant in Mughal rule and got their selves and the town patronized. The sufferings of the town started with the decline of the Mughal rule and it was victimized by Rohilla and Sikh depredations; during the mutiny too the town suffered a lot (Metcalf, 2002).

The school's financial activities were carried out by the money collected in the forms of annual pledges and pious endowments contributed by noble patronage. The school basically adopted Darsi Nizami but more emphasis was laid on hadith rather than on rational studies. The school adopted Urdu as a medium of instruction rather than Persian. The school administration also tried to introduce skills in the madressa but that plan did not work successfully. The purpose of

establishment of Darul Uloom Deoband was to produce a cadre who could fight "eye back to eye back" with the colonial power (Miyan, 2012). It was for the first time that the ulama of the sub-continent decided to have a long term planning to end up the foreign rule in the state.

Darul Uloom Deoband⁴¹ played their roles in education, spiritual and political spheres. Its role to produce free liberation movement cannot be ignored completely. The graduates of the madrasa resisted against the British rule on the domestic level and longed for the support of the Muslim world in order to regain freedom. Shaikhul Hind Maulana Mahmood Hasan who was the first student of Darul Uloom Deoband completed his study in 1877 and set up an organization called 'Samaratut Tarbiyat'. The organization aimed for armed insurrection against the British, but the movement stopped working after being functional for 30 years due to the death of patron Maulana Muhammad Qasim in 1880 and there few other voids also created hurdles in the achievement of the desired goals. In 1909, Shaikhul Hind Sheikh Ahmad Sirhandi re-organized his followers and established Jamiatul Ansar which was introduced in 1911 before gathering of 30 thousand ulama from India and abroad. The Jamiat presented its aims and objectives defending the necessity of freedom of the country. In the first meeting of the Jamiat at Muradabad in April 1911, large number of ulama and students from Aligarh, Nadwatul ulama and Deoband gathered there. Frustrated by a mass support of the Jamiat, the British thought to root out the origin of that organization. In that situation Shaikhul Hind directed the leading members to give

up the membership of the Jamiat so, that the possible damage to the Muslim educational institutions at the hands of the British could be averted (Qasmi, 2001).

The freedom seekers after the ban of Jamiatul Ansar in 1913 appeared again under the banner of Nazzaaratul Ma'arif with a purpose to get freedom from the British rule. Maulana Obaidullah and Shaikhul Hind were the prominent figures of that newly formed platform. Few organizational changes were made in the set up with a purpose to conceal the real purpose of the organization from the British. Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar, Maulana Sindhi, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad and Shaikhul Hind used to meet secretly at Delhi. During the First World War Fidayeen-e-Freedom thought it a golden opportunity to damage the British roots in the sub-continent and for that purpose they supported Germany (Qasmi, 2001).

Shaikhul Hind also met Anwar Pasha, the Defence Minister of Turkey and Jamal Pasha, the Syrian Governor in order to seek their support to attack the British bases in India. In the meantime, with the entry of the US in the allied forces—France, Russia and Britain, the whole scenario of the war changed. Turks and Germans were defeated and as a result Shaikhul Hind's dream of freedom by waging jihad against the British did not get materialized (Miyani, 2012).

Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi was sent to Kabul to establish a government in exile there in order to organize resistance against the Colonial rule. Shaikhul Hind was declared president of the newly formed Lashkar-e-Najat Dehinda which had its quarter in Madinah. An international group naming Junoodur Rabbaniyah was also set up with a purpose to win support against the colonial rule on the

international level and Shaikul Hind was declared its leader. Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi wrote the activities and future plan in Kabul and Maulana Muhammad Mian Mansoor Ansari the grandson of Maulana Qasim Nanautari also mentioned the details of Junoodur Rabbaniyah's activities and future plans in a letter written on a piece of silk (Qasmi, 2001).

The silk letter was captured by the British before it reached the final destination. After the disclosure of Silk Letter Conspiracy of 1916⁴², some 222 ulama and activists including Shaikul Hind Maulana Mahmoodul Hassan, Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi, Maulana Waheed Ahmed Faizabadi, Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madni and Maulana Azeez Gul were arrested and then released after several years (Miyan, 2012). The Silk Letter Movement aimed at overthrowing British rule by allying with Afghanistan, Ottoman Turkey and Imperial Germany.

The ulama of Jamiat after their failure in the above mentioned movements tried to adopt non-violent ways to get freedom. The ulama established Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind in March 1919 with Mufti Kafayatullah elected as the president of the organization. In the Khilafat Conference held on November 13, 1919, he moved a resolution to boycott the 'Victory Celebrations' of the British Government and later issued a fatwa signed and endorsed by 20 ulama declaring it impermissible for the Muslims to participate in these sorts of activities till an appropriate solution of the defeated Ottoman Empire was not found under the Islamic law besides keeping in view the sentiments of the Muslims all over the world. So, following the fatwas, non-cooperation movement was launched in

1920 by the Muslims. On August 8th, 1921, the British government declared that the Fatwas issued by the Khilafat Committee were illegal and arrested several reputed ulama (Qasmi, 2001).

The British faced a tough situation after the resolution "Boycott Foreign Goods" backed by Hindus and Muslims was passed but Chauri Chaura incident followed by Karan Movement separated Hindus and Muslims way which benefited the British. Although the Jamiat was against the Muslim League's goals and always demanded for complete independence from the British but it also participated in Civil Disobedience Movement and opposed conscription during the World War II and announced non-cooperation in the British war efforts as a result several renowned ulama of the Jamiat were arrested. The Jamiat also favored 'Quit India Movement' and as a result its leadership was arrested once again by the government (Qasmi, 2001).

Although few traditionalist ulama supported the freedom movement but it was led entirely by the modernists specifically Aligarhians who never claimed movement to be void of Islamic ideology as was made obvious by the two-nation theory--- propounded by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan which depicted Ideology of Pakistan and was claimed to be Islamic in nature. When the Urdu-Hindi controversy reached at its zenith, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan felt that it was quite impossible for Hindus and Muslims to make progress together as a single nation. He said that he was quite convinced that as Hindus and Muslims had a distinct religion and way of life, so, they could never become a single nation. Allama Iqbal held the same opinion in this connection and believed that Hindus and

Muslims were living together but they could not live together any longer due to difference of customs and traditions between them. So Muslims should get their own country where they could spend their lives according to the Islamic teachings. This ideology was further affirmed and brought forward by the Quaid-e-Azam, as he said,

"The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literature... Their aspects on life are different To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built for the government of such a state" (Wali, 1992, p. 64).

The Aligarhians focused much on maintaining close association with the British in order to win benefits for the Muslims of the sub-continent. Their focus was to contest Hindus on all political platform and make the British realize the importance and recognition of Muslims of the sub-continent as a distinct nation from that of Hindus in all aspects.

There had been a variety of motives among the supporters of the Pakistan Movement. Some thought that Urdu was important to retain the identity of Muslims of the sub-continent in the conditions when Hindus were imposing Hindi language in Northern India. Some felt Hindus' economic domination or their majority power to influence political decisions in united India as a threat to Muslims' interests in the sub-continent. Few others were afraid to foresee efforts of the militant Hindu organization to forcibly convert or exterminate the Muslims into Hindus. There is a least doubt that of all the factors to motivate the freedom

movement, the most dominant favoured by a significant number was to express Islam in social and political terms, in newly established state (Esposito, 1998). In short, when the freedom Movement reached its climax, the ulama and other sections' enmity shifted from British to the Hindus who were considered as rivals of the Muslims before the British.

3.8 Madrassa in the Post-partition Period (1947-1977)

Pakistan inherited very few well reputed and well organized madrassas as many of the better known madrassas had continued their existence in India even after independence. The only notable madrassa which came into Pakistan's custody after partition was Calcutta madrassa which according to the historians was "migrated" to Dhaka. There had been two departments of the madrassa; Anglo-Persian department and Arabic department. It was decided to move the Arabic Department which was dealing with the medieval Islamic sciences to Dhaka with the thinking that it would be well-fitted in the state achieved in pursuit of Islamic aspirations of a Muslim community (Malik, 1999).

Even after the creation of Pakistan, the Madrassas of all maslaks and sects continued to be run by the religious leaders but the opportunity for the madrassas to regain influence seemed eclipsed as their students did not have an access to government jobs and their roles were confined to preparing Imams for the mosques, delivering sermons and producing teachers for imparting religious knowledge and religious leaders to carry out rituals and some specific social responsibilities⁴³.

In order to make Pakistan an Islamic welfare state, the Barelvi Ulama decided to form a political party and laid the foundation of Markazi Jamiyyat Ulama-i- Pakistan (MJUP) in March 1948 at Multan (Qadri, A. n.d). The party lacked country-wide organization and could not pay much heed to the electoral and parliamentary politics due to its shortcomings. (Qadri, S. 1989) The leaders of the party struggled a lot for the enactment of the Islamic constitution and establishment of Islamic government in Pakistan. Immediately after independence, the power struggle between elites, bureaucracy and military went on but the religious community was kept at a bay and was excluded from the state's power game. Another major Islamic political party established was Jammiat-e-Ulma-e-Islam (JU). It broke off from JUI to form the Markazi Jammiat-Ulma-e-Islam led by Maulana Shabir Ahmed Usmani (International Crisis Group, 2011).

The Objectives Resolution which was the first practical step leading the state towards Islam was passed in 1949 which defined the character of the state and laid the basis of the constitution on Islamic junctions. The Objectives Resolution which was added as a preamble in all three upcoming constitutions of Pakistan says that sovereignty vests in Allah Almighty and the people of Pakistan have been delegated the temporal sovereignty which is a sacred trust with the prescribed limits of God's law. It further vows that the state would facilitate the Muslims to spend their lives according to the Islamic injunctions. Within three years of Objectives Resolutions an Ulama Board or Board of Talimat-e-

Islammiyyah was set up (Faruki, 1987). The Objectives Resolution was the first major contribution of ulama in politics in the post-partition period.

The religious leaders of all sects and *maslaks*, forgetting their theological differences, co-operated with each other for the efforts to enforce Islamic constitution in Pakistan from 1948 to 1956. The leaders of the religious parties failed to organize themselves in the next elections and later on supported Martial Law in 1958 but soon changed opinion (Ahmad, 2008) because Ayub Khan opted for liberal ideas and in order to have a state version of modern Islam; he opted for a policy to control over religious institutions. In this connection, General Ayub Khan tried to regulate *auqaf* property on which economy of madrassas was dependent and Madrassas and shrines were also brought under the control of *auqaf*. The controversy between the state and madrassas started when in 1959 four wafaqs organized themselves against the state's attempt to trespass on their autonomy.

Ayub Khan expressed his views on religion while addressing Darul Uloom Islamiya after a few months of taking over the charge in these words: "with the passage of time, the Muslims at large sought to concentrate more on the dogmatic aspects of Islam and less on its inherent greatness as a movement" which was "a dynamic and progressive" in the past. He expressed his hope in a letter to Mufti Mohammad Shafi of Darul Uloom Karachi that ulama would render services to extricate "religion from the debris of wrong superstitions and prejudices and making it pace with the march of time" (Ahmad, 1992). During the Ayub era Islam was tried to be used as a tool for the socioeconomic development⁴⁴ as it was

obvious in 1952's constitution but the shift of using Islam as a vehicle for political stability and regime's legitimacy was observed clearer in the ending years of Ayub era when there spread a nation-wide turmoil due to anti-government agitation.

Ayub also launched a madrassa reform program to achieve the above mentioned objectives. Although the committee setup in 1960's to introduce reforms in madrassa comprised of ulama and bureaucrats but the number of bureaucrats surpassed the ulama in the committee. The committee presented report in 1962 which basically conveyed reforms in two ways; "to restore purity of religious learning to madrassa by eliminating all that is perceived as unnecessary, non-religious or both; and at the same time, to introduce essential non-religious disciplines comprising modern knowledge into curriculum". The purpose seemed to replace unnecessary non-religious subjects with the essential religious subjects. The 1962's report which covered about 700 well-reputed madrassas where Dars-i-Nizami was taught, made recommendation that logic and philosophy be "drastically cut down" as the objectives of the religious education could be achieved without them (Zaman, 2004). The 1960/61 committee proposed several changes in the curriculum:

Proposals and Changes of the Committee of 1960/61 (Malik, 1999)

	Primary Level	Lower Secondary	Middle Secondary	Upper Secondary	Highest Level
<i>Arabic</i>	<i>Ibteddiyah</i>	<i>Thanawi tahtani</i>	<i>Thanawi wustani</i>	<i>thanawi fawqani</i>	<i>Al,la (sic)</i>
Duration	5 years	3 years	2 years	2 years	3 years
Class	1-5	6-8	9-10	11-12	13-15
Suggestions and modifications by the committee	According to directions of the Ministry of Education	More Qur'an and Hadith Prophet's tradition Islamic Law Modern Arabic lit English Mathematics Social sciences Sports Urdu	Islamic History Alternative Books English Sports Optional subject (preferably Urdu)	Principals of Tafsir More Hadith Modern Arabic lit English Less philosophy Less Logic	1. History of Hadith 2. fatawa 3. Modern Philosophy
Summary	Innovations	All but two are new subjects; Arabic and English preferred	All subjects are new and obligatory	All subjects are new or modified: four subjects are obligatory, one is optional	English and subsidiary subjects are additional; in the final year only the study of <i>hadith</i>

In 1961 Ayub Khan instructed both the provincial governments to utilize the abilities of the religious ulama in a constructive way. In order to attract the young and aspiring graduates of the madrassas, very attractive salary packages were offered to the Khatibs and Imams of the government controlled mosques. An academy was set up in the West Pakistan under the Auqaf Department to train ulama which also engaged a prominent Egyptian scholar. The academy which was

set up in the West Pakistan included these subjects for teaching; History, Politics of Pakistan and Geography, International Affairs; and problems of economic development, unity and harmony among various Islamic sects. In the rural areas the services of ulama were utilized to bring socioeconomic change in their areas through the US-AID funded training institution's project. The ulama who joined the project operated adult literacy centers, worked as extension workers for departments of health, animal husbandry and agriculture, managed cooperative societies, and distributed improved seeds, pesticides and fertilizer to the farmers (Ahmad, 1992).

In 1961, Waqf Properties Ordinance enabled the administrator to take over the waqf, apparently for the purpose of protection of these properties but the move had a clandestine political purpose of controlling the madrasa and shrine by the state. In order to reinterpret Islam on the basis of modern parameters and to satisfy ulama, Advisory Council for Islamic Ideology was established in 1962 (Bano, 2007).

The ulama of few sects fully supported Ayub Khan in 1964's election even though they strongly disagreed with his policies regarding the Muslim Family Law Ordinance (MFLO) and birth control and disapproved the modern Islamic scholarships coming out of the Islamic Research Institute. Majority of the Barelvi ulama strongly supported Ayub Khan in elections and even Maulana Ihtesham ul Haq who opposed introduction of MFLO and later started a personal campaign against Professor Fazlur Rehman and the Islamic Research Institute became Ayub's front line supporter. The ulama who appeared as an opposition belonged

to Deoband in the NWFP led by Maulana Mufti Mehmood of the JUI, Nizam-i-Islam party of the East Pakistan and Ahle Hadith of Lahore and Karachi but their efforts were never organized and united to form a movement (Ahmad, 1992).

Throughout the Ayub's era, the Jammat-i-Islami continued criticizing his government. When the Jammat-i-Islami tried to organize ulama against MFLO in 1961, the government arrested secretary-general of JI, Mian Tufail Muhammad but JI being a religious organization, continued to be operative although the other political organizations were banned. It utilized all its resources including publicity resources, nation-wide organizational network having hundreds of branches, workers loyalty, and non-political subsidiary organizations of students, professionals and labours to challenge the legitimacy of the military regime of Ayub Khan. The government controlled research centers that promoted modernity came under the attack of the JI's research organization. President Ayub tried to bring changes into madrassa system following Sharif Commission's Report in 1959. Noor Khan's Education Commission Report in 1969 also mentioned bright steps in 1969 but its implementation could not have been materialized due to political instability in the state (Muhammad, N. Muhammad, D. Shafiq, & Shah, 2011).

The JI countered Ayub's ideology of modernism through their publications, including monthly magazine like Chiragh-e-Rah, one entitled Islamic Law and other entitled Ideology of Pakistan. The founder of JI Sayyid Abdul Ala Maududi also contributed a lot through his publications that included Islam and Birth Control, Islamic Law and Constitution, Family Relations in Islam.

In 1964 the provincial governments of the East and West Pakistan declared the organization illegal after being exasperated by its anti-governmental activities and confiscated its record and assets and under Public Executive Order locked all the members of the Central Executive Council but later on Supreme Court lifted the ban on the organization declaring the government's decision illegal and the Jammah openly supported Fatima Jinnah in the upcoming elections (Ahmad, 1992).

In Ayub era some relaxations were given to madrasa students and efforts were made to address the genuine problems of madrasa students such as their transport fares were reduced like that of students of formal education system but these sorts of plans were not materialized as madrasa authorities were reluctant and afraid to give freedom or rights of such nature to their students which could motivate them to demand further rights resulting in loosening the grip of authorities over students and a threat to their autonomy. The only relaxation given to the students was their degrees were conditionally declared at a par with the degrees of formal education system (Ahmad, personal communication, July 1, 2014).

Even in spite of madrasa-state controversies the number of new madrasa grew rapidly in Ayub Era. The statistics are as under:

3.2 Growth of Higher Madrassa in Pakistan, 1947—1971 (Ministry of Education Government of Pakistan, 1988)

Year	Madrassas	Teachers	Students
1947	137	----	---
1950	210	----	----
1960	472	1846	40239
1971	908	3185	55238

Bhutto never initiated any religious reforms and his actions did not offend ulama to launch any agitation against his government. Bhutto was much aware of the potential power of ulama so, he tried to avoid any confrontation with them⁴⁵ and for that reason he promoted Islamization. (Ahmad, 1992) In Bhutto's era too, the madrassa's vital role was obvious especially in connection with declaring Islam as the state religion in the 1973 Constitution⁴⁶ and in anti-Ahmedis Movement. Bhutto exempted madrassa from nationalization and retained their autonomy. Contrary to expectations the religious parties joined hands with Army and formed an alliance with the anti-Bhutto parties to oust him from power. Bhutto made an attempt to control the madrassas through controlling the zakat system but an extreme resistance from the ulama stopped him to carry on the Zakat scheme until after March 1977 elections (Ahmad, 1992). Bhutto won the 1977 elections over the alliance of religious and secular parties by a little margin but the strong movement of the opposition alliance compelled the Army to depose him (International Crisis Group, 2002).

When the Bhutto's era was ending, a few concessions were given to the DM students and teachers to improve their social and economic status. The Certificate of the Wafaq al Madaris al Arabia was put at a par with the MA degree in Islamiyat provided the students could qualify for a B.A in English. The proposals petered out as the leaders of DM rejected them. In order to discuss the matter of the equivalence of degrees, the University Grant Commission was established and it was decided to give limited recognition to the DM Degree upto B.A. All universities did not agree to the proposals and as a result, the graduates of DM faced difficulties in getting education in the formal institutions (Malik, 1999).

The religiously charged mass movement of March-July 1977 against Bhutto compelled him to introduce the Islamization measures that comprised of banning alcoholic drinks, gambling, and dance and night clubs. He promised to reconstitute Council of Islamic Ideology comprising of ulama acceptable to JUI, JI, and JUP. He made a commitment to revise all existing laws in accordance with the teaching of Islam within six months but the religious parties rejected his measures objecting them "as too little and too late". So, inspite of all these efforts Bhutto failed to convince the ulama of his sincerity to initiate and fulfill Islamization measures in the Pakistani society (Ahmad, 1992).

Conclusion

Despite complexities on numerous occasions the madrassa-state relations had always been accommodative in the entire Muslim world particularly till the 18th Century. The ulama served as helping hand of the state's machinery in

interpreting Sharia and worked as a part of judiciary and achieved reverence from the state as well as from the public equally. The madrassas in the Muslim world had hardly been a threat to either state's existence or to ruling elites rather they used to justify the rulers' acts through their fatwas in the long past but the madrassa faced a real set back during the colonial era as efforts were made to minimize the importance of Islamic education in the Muslim community through reforms which became a turning point towards madrassa-state encounter in the sub-continent.

In the post-partition period madrassa-state relations remained strained as reforms were introduced in Ayub and Bhutto era which were solely rejected by the ulama considering them an extension of the colonial era. The above mentioned context of madrassa-state relations was based on historical facts and experiences. The next chapter deals with the madrassa-state relations in Zia-ul-Haq era which revolved around madrassa reforms launched in Zia era under the banner of Islamization.

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Chapter 4

Madrassa-State Relations: An Analysis of State Policies during General Zia Era

This chapter covers the Sargodha and Halepota Reports which provided the basis for the policy making towards madrassa in General Zia era. As the military regime was prevailing in the state which was having most of the attributes of patrimonial states so, this chapter gives an indepth details of the ways Zia-ul-Haq used Islamization policy to strengthen his military regime and related his madrassa reforms to Islamization policy with a rational approach. This chapter also addresses the internal and external dynamics which constantly shaped and reshaped each other and also left some candid trails on madrassa reforms policy in Zia era. This chapter highlights the ways the state settled all the academic and financial affairs of madrassa on the implementation stages despite ulama's strong reservations and resistances. Moreover, the outcomes of the reforms which left some direct and indirect implications: not only on madrassas but also on the broader level on state as well as society are also focused in the chapter.

4.1 Madrassa Reforms: Internal and External Dynamics

Before we take a glimpse into the state-led madrassa reform efforts in Zia regime, it is indispensable to look at the platform set for them in the social and political contexts. Bhutto's marginal victory in 1977's elections resented the opposition alliance as they alleged rigging in the elections. The country-wide protests started against the rigging which later on transformed into a religious movement Tehrik-e-Nizam-e-Mustafa. (Ahmed, 2008) The grand opposition alliance-- Pakistan National Alliance which was leading the masses in protests largely drew its support from bazar sector, small towns, mosques and other religious segments of society (Rehman, 2006). The prevailing unrest in the country paved the way for General Zia ul Haq to intervene in politics through coup d'état. There are always few motives behind the army's intervention in politics; Paul Brooker restructured and reduced check-list of motives presented by Finer to four types that included; national interests, corporate self-interest, social self-interest and individual self-interest. When national interest is a conceived motive of army's interference in politics then often assuming the role of custodian of national interest it plays an ambitious role of ruling the country (Brooker, 2000).

In Pakistan's case during Zia's take over one can find that the conceived motive of national interest acted as a driving force to achieve corporate as well as individual self-interest. During Zia era, the military regime faced extreme opposition from PPP, liberal intellectuals, women groups and other secular people in the beginning who were quite invigorated by socialism (Rehman, 2006).

In order to suppress the opposition against its regime, Zai-ul-Haq opted to align with the leftist including religious parties Jammāt-i-Islami and Jamiat Ulama-i-Islam while the liberal political parties opposing the military regime launched MRD Movement which comprised of most of the rightists including Pakistan Peoples Party, Pakistan Muslim League (Khawaja Khair Uddin Group), Pakistan Democratic Party, Pakistan Mazdoor Kisan Party, Pakistan National Party, National Awami Party, Qazmi Mahaz-e-Azadi, Tahrīk-I-Istiqlal (TI) and National Democratic Party (Shah, 2013). Although, the MRD kept on exerting pressure on the military regime but the Movement failed to end Martial Law and was dealt with iron hands by the military regime. Additionally some external factors also contributed a lot in opening the new vistas for the military ruler to shape the internal politics to sustain the regime.

On the external level, two major incidents that left a great impact on policies of Zia regime included Iranian Revolution and USSR's invasion of Afghanistan.

The seeds of Iranian Revolution were believed to be sown a few years before that actually turned into reality. The gap between rich and poor grew in Iran between 1953 and 1963, due to extreme poverty in Iran. Under the Pahlavi's dynasty secularism flourished in Iran and the influence of Shia scholars dwindled. The Shah allied himself with the secularists over the matters of alcohol, tobacco, gambling, movies and foreign dress in conflict with the traditionalist Muslims. A group of Muslims who were feeling extreme discontent formed Fedaiyan-e-Islam to counter the situation. Ayatollah Khomeini—a Shia cleric issued a fatwa against

the reforms that stimulated secularism, as a result he was exiled by the Shah and he settled in Southern Iraq in a Shiite community where he continued his activities to spread his message (Wagner, 2010).

Fundamentalist scholars allied with the exiled Khomeini continued their activities and agitation for change during 1963's revolt and 1970's processions. Resentment in public grew on a larger scale in Iranian society against Shah and some 50,000 poor Shia dwellers successfully resisted their forced displacement by the police in August 1977. The Shah imposed martial law when the situation went out of his control after the massacre of 40 religious protestors in December 1977. His troops gunned down thousands of protestors on Black Friday on September 8, 1978. The enraged people started processions and turmoil spread in the entire country, paralyzing the economic activities of the state which compelled Shah to flee to Egypt on January 16, 1979. Khomeini ended his exile after the collapse of the Pahlavi regime and cobbled together a multiparty provisional government. In order to squeeze opposition parties against his newly formed Shia regime, Khomeini established Fundamentalist Iranian Republican Party and Revolutionary Guards (Paasdaran) ----a political police force to marginalize the opponents. (Wagner, 2010) The Iranian revolution gave a new impetus to the Islamic forces, especially Shias to play a dominant role in Pakistan's politics (Haq, 2008). So, to counter the Shias' rising in the region, Zia ul Haq propelled Islamization program which also served as an umbrella to initiate state-led madrasa reforms.

Another event that had a much relevance to the current study was USSR's war in Afghanistan. In December 1979, the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan to rescue a communist-leaning government which was under attack by the Islamists rebels. (Baker, 2011) Initially the Russian forces visualized that it would be a small scale intervention but it continued for a decade (Reuveny, & Prakash, 1996) due to mujahideen's armed confrontation with the USSR's forces. The Mujahideen were a combination of Afghan refugees (who fled to Pakistan at the onset of the Soviet's intervention and later got training there to fight against the Soviets) and Afghan resistance fighter and Islamists who presented their services voluntarily for the Muslims of Afghanistan against the Soviets. The Mujahideen received substantial military and financial support from individuals and nations all over the world. In this backdrop the US fully supported and encouraged Zia government as well as the Mujahideen through CIA (Cooley, 2002) to fight against the USSR (Haq, 2008). These external interventions in Pakistan were fully enjoyed by Zia-ul-Haq as by allowing the international actors to use Pakistan's soil to extend their influence to Asia⁴⁷ rewarded Zia's military rule an international legitimacy in return. On the internal level as mentioned earlier, Zia used the momentum of Tehrik-e-Nizam-e-Mustafa in his own favour and introduced Islamization program to strengthen his regime.

4.2 Islamization in Zia Era

Zia created perception that anti-Bhutto agitation was as a consequence of un-Islamic trends in the country with a justification that it was natural for the citizens of a state achieved on ideological basis (Iqbal, 1984). Generally in autocracy

political parties and legislatures are mere fake democratic institutions through which non-democratic institutions rule. The force of tradition or legitimacy from religious or other sources may play a role in the survival of some rulers (Ghandi, 2010) and Zia's rule was no exception than this assumption as Islamization program gave legitimacy to his regime from the religious segment of the society on the domestic level and in this connection Zia with a predetermined approach decided to use ulama for the sustenance of his military regime.

On September 1, 1977 Zia disclosed his intentions to Islamize Pakistan in a pronouncement made publicly in these words:

"A presidential form of government closest to Islamic ideology with president or ameer elected by the entire nation was best suited for Pakistan. The president will be checked by a legislature and shall be guided by the consensus of opinion "Ijma" in the "majlis-e-mushawarat", the council of advisors consisting of the ulema possessing unimpeachable character. The president will be counterchecked by the prime minister and the prime minister by the National Assembly" (Kaushik, 1993, p. 54).

He had often repeated on various occasions,

" the ideology of Pakistan is Islam and only Islam. There should be no misunderstanding on this score. We should in all sincerity accept Islam as Pakistan's basic ideology ... otherwise ... this country (will) be exposed to secular ideologies" (Zakisits, 1988, p. 79).

So, apparently in order to eradicate the un-Islamic trends, he introduced Islamization program. Under his Islamization Program, mosques, seminaries and Islamic press were encouraged to play a vital role in society. His program was followed by introducing religious laws and establishing many institutions such as Shariat Bill, Shariat Courts⁴⁸, separate electorate for minorities and state controlled system of collecting zakat and ushr (Rehman, 2006). In 1980, General Zia-ul-Haq nominated 284 members of Majlis-e-Shura,⁴⁹ including ulama. Although in the past history of Pakistan other leaders also used Islam to gain personal political interests but Zia outdid all his predecessors which became quite obvious in the farcical Presidential referendum held in December 1984. The referendum was based on question, “whether the people of Pakistan wanted Islamic Shariah Law enforced in the country or not”. An affirmation of this question meant that the voters had cast vote in favor of Zia-ul-Haq to be the President of the state for the next five years. Although turnout was just 10% of the total registered voters but as predicted 95% answered in affirmation which meant Zia-ul-Haq had been elected as the President of Pakistan, getting 95% vote (Saigol, 2009).

The Islamization program launched by General Zia-ul-Haq under the rational approach for the maximization of interests affected many spheres of Pakistani society, including political, judicial, education and economic systems and culture and family laws. (Moscalenko, 1991) In short, the state-led reforms in the name of so-called Islamization program were stretching over the entire state as a “spider

brooding over her web". Even the state itself took the responsibility of choosing the desired brand of Islam for the masses. Keeping in view the political and ideological requirements, the state in the beginning of the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq launched the religious career of Dr. Israr Ahmed-- a revivalist, broadcasting his programs on the state media popularizing his brand of Islamic discourse but later seemed to be floating from revivalism to political consolidation as Zia replaced him with Tahir ul Qadri--a Beralwi scholar, a non-politician advocating devotional and sufi-oriented Islam (Ahmad, M. 2010). In the wake of Islamization program state-led reforms were initiated in madrassa too, along with other happenings. The madrassa reforms efforts in Zia regime were basically surrounded around the recommendations of two reports prepared in the light of surveys of different madrassas and were submitted to government.

1. Sargodha Report
2. Halepota Report

The details of the two reports are discussed under:

4.3 Sargodha Report

In the early phase of his Islamization Program General Zia-ul-Haq met several ulama at Sargodha who demanded to give autonomy to madrassa and in the light of their demands, Zia gave a task to the Ministry of Religious Affairs to conduct a survey of Deeni Madaris and submit a report covering all the issues regarding them. The report submitted to the government discussed few problems and gave recommendations regarding madrassas of Pakistan.

i. Problems faced by Deeni Madaris as pointed out in Sargodha Report

It was reported that the students of DM were found to be comprised of majority of rural population having poor economic conditions. The report revealed the problems of religious institutions regarding proprietary of rights over lands on which these were situated, grants of scholarship for teachers and students for higher education, recognition of sanads for obtaining jobs in civil services (Sargodha Report, 1978). It was pointed out that the owners of madaris performed the task of collecting donations to fulfill the economic needs of madrasa students and teachers.

ii. Recommendations brought forward in Sargodha Report

The report suggested retaining the autonomous status of Deeni Madaris. Few other suggestions were concluded to overcome shortcomings of Deeni Madaris. The suggestions included; alteration in curriculum so that the students would be able to face the challenges of the modern world in their practical lives, integration of formal education system with that of the madrasa education system, standardized system of education and establishment of Ulama Academy or University for Higher education (Sargodha Report, 1978).

Importance of Report

The report was of great importance in two ways. Firstly, it scratched the areas of special interests that the government could focus for the welfare of madrasa and secondly, it also served as a model for the 1979 survey (Zaman, 2004). As Monroe (2001) writes that the rational actor has consistent and stable

preference ordering so, meeting ulama at Sargodha at later conclusion of Sargodha Reports clearly indicated that the accommodation and assigning roles to the religious segments of the society was amongst the preferences of the military ruler.

4.4 Halepota Report

i. Establishment of a Committee for Deeni Madaris

The National Committee for Deeni Madaris headed by Dr Halepota comprising of renowned educationists and religious scholars was set up by government in 1979. Few of the tasks were assigned to committee included; making suggestions to bring improvement in the quality of madrassa education system and give the students access to higher education and jobs of all nature. The Committee was directed to make recommendations to integrate the madrassa education system with that of formal education system by achieving uniformity and standardization of curriculum and examination system. The committee was given a task to set criteria for equating Deeni madaris certificates, degrees and diplomas with that of the Secondary Boards and Universities. The Committee was directed to focus on existing physical facilities and curricula while undertaking survey of madrassas and make suggestions so that they could meet the requirements of inculcating basic tenets and spirit of Islam on one hand and cater to the needs of the modern age on the other hand (Halepota Report, 1979). The Committee pointed problems faced by the Madaris students and teachers and gave recommendations for their solution.

ii. **Problems faced by Deeni Madaris Students and Teachers and their Proposed Solutions**

During survey the National Committee realized the problems that the madrassa students faced in getting jobs even after completion of their degrees. So, to create more job opportunities for the students the practical implementation of equating the madrassa degree with that of formal education system suggested as:

Shahadatul Ibtidaya Primary level, *Shahadtul Muttawasita* Middle Level

Darja Aaliya Bachelor, *Shahadatul Aaliya* *Shahadatul Takhasus* M.A

Deprivation of basic facilities was another hurdle pointed out in a way to better education. It was suggested that the land should be specified for the madrassa while allotting land for the residential scheme and appraisal of the existed madrassa should be made taking into account the water, gas, light facilities required for creating healthy learning environment, so that estimation of developmental project could be made. It was proposed that water, gas and electricity should be provided to the deeni madaris on concession as that of mosque and their laboratories should be well equipped for teaching of the modern sciences. The government should make sure the access of books to the Deeni Madaris students. Book banks should be established in madrassas and foreign books that are required should be provided by the government on concession (Halepota Report, 1979).

The Committee for Deeni Madaris found a huge difference between the pays of the madrassa teachers and other formal school teachers. It was recommended that madrassa students should be provided treatment facilities in

hospitals, travelling facilities etc. They should be given preference in jobs like Khatibs in Army and Auqaf's mosques and teaching of Islamiat and Arabic in schools and colleges. Moreover, they should be preferred in all offices and institutions where appointments are on the basis of sharia and religion (Halepota Report, 1979).

iii. Recommendations on Academic Affairs Given in the Report

One of the attributes of neo-patrimonial states is the centralization of power which means that institutions of participation hardly have power to exercise and make decisions rather they serve as puppet in the hands of big man who is above law (Waltz, 2002). The Committee established under the chairmanship of Dr. Halepota was dominantly comprised of those members who hardly had any know-how of madrassa education and the members of the committee had no real power even to make recommendations regarding betterment of the madrassa graduates outside the limits prescribed by the state while assigning tasks. The assigned tasks to the committee were finding means to justify ends which means to find out ways to involve the religious segment of the society in to national politics which was a dire need of the military ruler to retain regime.

Keeping this in view, the Committee for Deeni Madaris brought forward a report known as Halepota report which put forth recommendations on academic affairs as described under:

In order to integrate the madrassa education system with that of formal education system, few of the modern subjects such as General Science, Mathematics, Social Science and Urdu at the Primary Level, Pakistan Studies,

Mathematics, General Science and English at the Secondary Level and two subjects from Economics, English and Political Science at the Graduate Level were recommended to include. One of the purposes of introducing those subjects was to prepare the students to meet the needs of the modern age but at the same time it was desired to increase the duration of Middle and Higher Levels and to give twice time to Dars-i-Nizami with that of school subjects so that the dominance of religious subjects could be retained to prepare the students to render services for Islam. The committee proposed to include Tafseer, Fiqha, Hadith and Maqoolat at the Master level and in order to get master degree in any one of these, there should be eight papers; four papers and a research paper from the relevant subject and three additional papers of History, Islamic economy, and Islam and politics would be compulsory while comparative religious sciences was to be offered as optional subjects (Halepota Report, 1979).

The proposed scheme of studies was to be comprised of:

Darja Ibtidaya (primary) will have five years duration, Darja Muatawisita (matric) five years duration, Darja Aaliy (B.A) two years duration and Darja Takhasu (M.A) having two years duration. The curriculum of Tajweed-o-Qiraat was declared equivalent to the Middle Class comprising of five years. The religious education for women was proposed equivalent to matric having five years duration (Halepota Report, 1979).

As curricula and exams are vital to gauge the standard of any education system, so, keeping in view the assigned task of standardization and uniformity of the education system, the Committee recommended the establishment of a

national Institute for Deeni Madaris that would hold responsibility to conduct exams, announce results, compile and revise curricula where necessary besides implementing other suggestions relevant to teachers and students as proposed by the Committee. The exams' procedure as figured out by the Committee proposed that the last exams of primary, middle, high and specialization levels should be external and conducted by the proposed National Institute for Deeni Madaris. It was proposed that the administration of DM would have an authority to appoint Darsi Nizami subject teachers while the appointment of modern subject teachers should be made in madaris from outside till the trained specialist of that subjects of specific curriculum had not been produced by the madrassas. The teachers of DM should be given opportunity to send their teachers abroad like that of Central Overseas Training Scheme. The students of DM should be given scholarship in order to enhance their performance (Halepota Report, 1979).

4.5 Ulama and Scholars Views about Reforms

Before the reaction of ulama regarding reforms in Zia regime is portrayed, it is deemed necessary to give their pre-established views about reforms in religious institution so that their reaction to reforms can be analyzed in the light of their pre-set criteria.

There was a time when the Muslims had flourished in all the walks of life encompassing Arts and Sciences. They were highly revered by the rest of the world. Their glory gradually diminished after they were colonized by different powers. Besides other perceptions of the factors of decline of the Muslim world, the ulama were also blamed for making the interpretation of the Islamic teaching

inflexible to meet the challenges of the Western Sciences (Robinson, 2007). The ulama had been under the immense criticism by the modernist thinkers Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Fazlur Rahman who believed ulama were "old-fashioned, irrelevant and unable to cope with the modern world" whose outdated knowledge was a hurdle in making the society progressed. The modernists consider ulama responsible for the inherent backwardness of the Muslim societies (Amin, 2011).

The ulama in Pakistan had never been against the reforms processes in religious institutions rather most of them feel that stagnation in the Muslim societies was as a result of the lack of Ijtihad that could open new vistas of knowledge by making curriculum flexible enough to survive in the contemporary world. Few of the ulama were of the opinion that western education should be acquired in order to make progress while few believed that such sort of education should be acquired that meet materialistic demands of the world through Islamic teachings but even those traditional ulama had never shut the door of research and logic for the Muslim world. Allama Ameer Shaqeeb Arsalan said that the reasons of the decline of Ummah were ignorance, hopelessness, the decline of ulama and Salateen etc. He considered the lack of modern equipment and modern knowledge as mere excuses for decline and cited example of Japan which was once a backward state but flourished after following the footsteps of Europe (Arsalan, n.d). The great Muslim political thinker, philosopher and poet Iqbal who rejected the West as "false model and destructive force" never taught shutting the doors of modern knowledge for the Muslims as he said (Ahsan, 1984):

Our entire wealth is the Book and Knowledge,

The Millet derives its stature from these two forces,
The former implies victories in the world of ardour and ecstasy,
The latter brings victories in the world around.
The material knowledge is not a product of the West,
Its origin lies in the joy of creativity.
If you make a deep probe, it too is a creation of the Muslims,
It is a pearl which has dropped from our hands.

Dr. Muhammad Rafi-ud-Din (1959) was very much against getting the Western education and claimed that Western philosophies had snatched the love of Islam from literate and ignorant classes of the Muslim societies equally. He believed that philosophies like Darwin's theory of Evolution, Fried's theory of Unconsciousness, Karl Marx Socialism, Machiavelli's nationalism etc. negated the existence of God and Risaalat and were contrary to the Islamic teaching. So, the Muslim world must dominate those theories and prove them wrong through their knowledge and wisdom. The Muslim world ignored the importance of research and logic⁵⁰, so, that's why they failed to present their own theories based on Islamic teachings and were dominated. He believed that the Muslim scholars due to their shallow knowledge sometimes applauded the elements of western thoughts that were un-Islamic and sometimes negated those concepts that were purely based on Islamic teaching (Rafi-ud-Din, 1959). The progress made by the West is an irrefutable fact and a thorough outlook conveys that their philosophies and theories are a blend of Islamic teaching and their un-Islamic views. The West

flourished due to their logic and research abilities which had been once the hallmark of the Muslim societies.

So, much of the emphasis of the Muslim intellectuals had been on utilizing the western knowledge that had not been incompatible with Islamic teachings. Ulama like Dr. Israr Ahmad (2002) believed that before the 20th Century the degradation of the Muslim society was always followed by reforms with an objective of defence and protection of religion rather than its revival. The main goal of reforms had been the preservation of the system of Islamic beliefs in its original forms (Ahmad, I. 2002). Mumtaz Ahmad believes that the ulama must get the knowledge of both worldly and religious affairs as Islam is a complete code of life which can likely be attained through reforms in madrassa system of education. In few of the situations people seek guidance from ulama about different worldly affairs such as economic matters, having confusions of being fair or unfair means of earning, social and political arenas leading to perceptions of having good or bad. The ulama are expected to be contributors in purging the society. So, the plan of introducing modern subjects into the madrassa curriculum was not a bad idea if it aimed atleast an acceptable know-how of modern subjects for the purpose of guidance for the society. (Ahmad, Personal Communication, July 1, 2014)

To conclude, reforms are not fully denied in the Islamic education system by even the most conservative and traditional class of ulama in one way or another.

4.6 Madrasa Reforms: Ulama's Responses

The reforms process initiated by Zia-ul-Haq regime was welcomed by the religious figures of society in the beginning as an effort to unify different theological schools of Deeni Madaris. Simultaneously, some disagreements arose within different schools of thought and between the committee and schools of thought as the reform process reached towards its implementation stage.

The question that appeals here is why the reforms were resisted even most of the ulama agreed in the beginning that these should be initiated in madrasa system with a purpose of getting broader role of religious segment in the society beyond their confined roles such as Imam, Nikhakhawn, Taweez writers etc. Some renowned ulama branded Deeni Madaris Committee as a state puppet. All schools of thought including Deobandis felt that their predominance would be affected due to the state led madrasa reforms. An important representative of Deobandis Muhammad Yusuf Ludhianwi criticized the reforms, declaring them irreligious dived at the erosion of madrasa autonomy. He believed that the reforms aimed at producing loyal government servants. He persuaded Deeni Madaris to reject the proposals of the Committee regarding curriculum, degrees or certificates and economy (Zaman, 2004). He rejected the idea of equality in religion as it was possible only to the extent of worldly matters. While criticizing the hybrid curriculum he argued that those scholars who had a good knowledge and command to appeal to their sect logically could never accept the uniform curriculum for all sects. For him the integration of modern sciences with that of religious education could produce a cadre neither useful for running worldly

affairs nor had a command on religious education. He insisted that ulama should insist on bringing about changes in formal education system that could be around eradication of non-religious subjects from their curriculum. Even the central organization of the Wafaq-al-Madaris expressed deep concerns over the reforms initiatives and refused to cooperate with the Committee (Zaman, 2004).

The founder of Jami'at-al-Ulum al Islamiyya of Karachi Mawlana Yusuf Banuri believed that one of the main reasons of the obscurity of many texts studied in madrassa was that they were written in the later Middle Ages when the Muslims were heading towards intellectual decline. He favored the curriculum reforms in madrassa as some of the texts really needed replacement but it did not mean to abandon traditional sciences. The changes should just aim to "create greater competence through the introduction of better books". He thought that few modern subjects could be added provided that they strengthen and deepen the religion (Zaman, 2004).

Mawlana Muhammad Taqi Usmani, the Vice President of the Dar al-Ulum madrassa of Karachi observed that pre-colonial curriculum of madrassa in South Asia was wide ranging as after the completion of madrassa education the students could have adopted any of the professions relevant to medicines and Science, Logic and Philosophy or exeget's Hadith and Law. He claimed that any change in madrassa curriculum could easily be adopted successfully if the true spirit of Darsi- Nizami was retained. He believed that efforts to integrate madrassa into mainstream could likely be fruitful if substantial changes were made to convert the mainstream of education to purely Islamic ones (Zaman, 2004).

Allama Saeed Kazmi of Bareilvi school of thought showed satisfaction over the report of the National Committee of Deeni Madaris while the report was solely rejected by Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia as they considered that a step towards undermining their autonomy through bureaucracy and requested madaris of all schools of thought to reject them. The mainstreaming of the religious institutions meant nothing other than to make them subservient to the modern education. The formal system of education itself was miserable and Deeni Madaris faced the demands of the holistic reforms just because they did not make accumulation of the worldly litter as their objective of life. According to him, the head of National Committee for Deeni Madaris Dr Abdul Wahid Halepota and Secretary Muhammad Yusuf Gereia were the people who did not represent madrassa. The Committee was dominated by modern educated people while in reality the task should have been assigned to the Ulama. Never ever the Ulama had been called to sort out problems of modern education then, why doctors, MA, BA degree holders were called to bring reforms in the religious institutions. To consider that the hybrid curriculum would produce graduates having command on modern and traditional knowledge would be a mistake as it was obvious that they would be misfit for both religious and worldly affairs (Mahnama Baeyanat, May, 1985).

Wafaq ul Madaris Al- Arabia rejected the plan of the establishment of authority that would control the affiliation process of DM, their administrative affairs and exam system. Their point of view was that if the modern subjects were added in the madrassa curriculum then it should be made sure that those who

completed madrassa education would not lose their skills of getting indepth knowledge and other academic capabilities. The Wafaq presented an alternate draft to retain the autonomy of madaris regarding the proposed board or authority. The ulama rejected the report as their reservations were ignored. Obviously, they strongly believed that whatsoever committee was proposed it would most likely be comprised of government servants and DM would become puppet in their hands (Mahnama Baeyanat, May, 1985).

The Wafaq also rejected the Ordinance of the Establishment of Madrassa Board proposed by the University Grants Commission as the Wafaq had earlier rejected the report of the national Committee for DM, and this proposal was based on that controversial report. According to their stance, the proposed board would be a great threat to autonomy of DM as it would be dominated by those who were outside madrassa while in a meeting held on February 13, 1985, it was agreed that the board would be comprised of ulama, and the sub-committee comprised of the heads of four wafaqs would draft the board plan (Mahnama Baeyanat, May, 1985).

4.7 Government's Response to Ulama's Resistance

The Ministry of Education arranged a meeting with ulama in 1981 in which Dr. Halepota confirmed that the government would not nationalize DM and even inspite of that they would receive financial assistance and equal treatment from the government. This was an evidence of the rational approach of the state towards madrassas as the government did not want to offend and turn them against itself and was also marked as the beginning of the patron-client relations

between madrassa and the state which strengthened the notion that the state was patrimonial in nature.

For the time being Zia postponed his reforms project expected to be brought forward in the light of Halepota Report. He proposed the establishment of a National Institute for Deeni Madaris with two chambers: syndicate and Academic Council. The composition of Syndicate was 12 ulama and 10 representatives of ministries, institutions of education and provincial governments while Academic council had 20 ulama and 12 administrative experts and academicians. Besides supervision of Deeni madrais attached to the National Institute for Deeni Madaris Pakistan, the responsibilities assigned to the syndicate included conduction of exams at the higher and intermediate levels and admission tests, improving teachers' qualification, issue certificates, collect contributions and levy, administer the funds of the Institute, present the annual budget and take care of other administrative matters. The Academic Council had responsibilities "to advise syndicate in all matters of scientific and pedagogical nature with special emphasis on matters of curricula and examinations". The institute would be financed from the contribution of DM, grants-in-aid by the state, awqaf, scholarships etc. (Malik, 1999).

In order to involve religious schools formally in the state policy making, the government organized ulama and *masha'ikh* conventions between 1980 and 1984. The purpose was to make the clergy realize the importance about their role in Islamization program and in national politics (Malik, 1999). The regime in neo-patrimonial states never allows political competitors against the rule and does so

adopting many ways including creating a counter force to the existed competitors besides suppressing them using force. President General Zia-ul-Haq delegated roles to the religious parties through madrassa reforms to counter the liberal parties including PPP opposing the regime.

4.8 Implementation of Madrassa Reforms:

The Deobandi Wafaq ul Madaris did not welcome the proposals of Deeni Madaris Committee 1979 regarding madrassa but later on in 1983 they introduced alternative curriculum positively. The Tanzim-al-Madaris of the Bareilvis also managed to modify their curriculum. The new scheme of studies introduced by wafaq and Tanzeem was comprised of 16 years as proposed by the National Committee of Deeni Madaris. The wafaq and Tanzeem preferred a stricter subdivision into six levels rather four levels similar to formal education system as recommended by the National Committee for Deeni Madaris. Although few of the alterations were adopted by the wafaq-ul-madaris in Darsi Nizami curriculum but they were essentially different from those suggested by Deeni Madaris Committee of 1979. The wafaq and Tanzeem paid no heed to the proposals of Halepota Report at the Primary level and few subjects were included at the Secondary level as the classical Darsi Nizami subjects were made a part of curriculum towards the end of that level (Malik, 1999).

The above mentioned proposals were made by the Deobandis having Salafi ideology which was criticized by traditionalist ulama; as a result, another committee was made representing both the groups. The committee retained the

decisions made regarding the primary and intermediate levels, while, for the highest level some alterations were made in the proposals of the first committee. The new subjects were offered additionally as compared to the old curriculum at the Darjah-e-takmil which was followed by darjah-e-takhassus. It included Logic, Philosophy, Euclidian Mathematics, Basics of Jurisprudence, Refutation of other Religions and Apostasy as well as Economics and Communism and Capitalism. There were two systems of education proposed by the Deobandi Wafaq; one to eight was secular, completed by Quran and Basics of Islam while second one continued to be as it was before i.e. Darsi Nizami. The Beralwis also added eight more years before their old curriculum as few of the modern subjects were listed but their contents were not specified and addition followed up to level 10 (Malik, 1999).

The studies of Islamic Law remained central to curriculum in contrast to the syllabus of the NCDM in which classical and modern subjects were made compulsory. Subjects like Pakistan Studies, General Science and English were not considered at all while the subjects like Economics, Comparative Religious Sciences and Capitalism and Communism, Social Sciences and other subjects were offered as optional subjects. Later on few of the alterations were made by wafaq in its proposed curriculum after several interactions with the government (Malik, 1999). In addition to Wafaqs five Jamias were also given authority to issue their own degree certificates recognized by the government which in other words meant they were equivalent to wafaqs. The five Jamias included Jamia Ashrafia, Feroz Pur Road (Lahore), Darul Uloom Korongi , K-Area (Karachi),

Darul Uloom Mohammadia Ghousia, Behra Sharif (Sargodha) Jamia Islamia Minhaj-ul-Quran (Lahore) and Jamia Taleemat-e-Islamia (Faisalabad). The prominent ulama who were heading those Jamias within the religious hierarchy secured the jamias' special status. The five wafaqs also formed their collective platform called "ittehad al Madaris" (Bano, 2007).

a. Settlement of Madrassas' Academic Affairs

The implementation stage of the reforms followed the settlement of few major issues including equivalence of madrassa degrees and settlement of their economic issues. The University Grant Commission was directed to set a criterion for the equivalence and its proposals were implemented on April 6, 1981. The Fawqaniyyah certificate of Islamiyat and Arabic was conditionally recognized by the universities as the graduates had to pass two more subjects compulsory for B.A examinations of formal education system. Later on according to the notification of the UGC released on November 17, 1982, it was decided that equivalency of M.A Islamiyat and Arabic would be given to the *Sahadat-ul-Fazila* Sanad of Wafaq-ul-Madaris Deoband, the *Shahadat-ul-Faragha* of Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Barévi and *Sultan-ul Afazil* the final certificates of Shia and *Ashahadatul-Alia* the final sanad of Ahl-e-Hadith were given similar status which could be used for teaching of Islamiyat and Arabic at the University and College level and for getting admission at higher level relevant to these specific subjects. While Deeni Madaris students were supposed to pass two more subjects other than Arabic, Islamic Studies, Persian and Urdu if they wanted to adopt any profession other than teaching of Islamic Studies and Arabic. In order to create

uniformity the final certificate was titled as *Shahadah-ul-Alamiya Min Uloom il Islamia* which was given after 16 years of education (Bano, 2007).

b. Settlement of Madrassas' Financial Affairs

The clientalism in neo-partimomial state is considered as legitimate on the logic that it serves community rather than the individuals. But, when individual who is central to power has rational approach then the situation becomes very clear that every logic is designed to serve regime's interests. In General Zia era, there were changes in the financial position of the DM. as the government-nominated Committee for Deeni Madaris instructed the government to eliminate the financial deficit of Deeni Madaris by providing them support through Zakat. The recommendation which was already sought by the government on the basis to control madrass and make them sub-ordinate by establishing patron-client relationship was accepted by the state. Zakat has been given immense importance in the Holy Quran and Sunnah as it is underlying principle of Islam.

The Islamization of economy was undertaken in order to create egalitarian society where the fair distribution of wealth could be made possible. In order to achieve so, Zia ul Haq promulgated Zakat and Usher Ordinance on June 20, 1980. He said on that occasion that Zakat is an important pillar of Islam. The needs of poor are fulfilled by God fearing persons in the society through alms, gifts and charity. Zakat which is an obligatory principle of Islam has an underneath philosophy of preventing accumulation of wealth in a few hands in the society. He emphasized that Islam gives freedom to earn as much as possible through fair means but enjoins upon believers to give away a portion of their earnings for the

orphans, the kindred, the needy, the destitute and the widows in order to make sure the circulation of money in the society. Before the promulgation of the Ordinance, the payment of Zakat was a private matter of an individual but the Ordinance gave the duty of imposition and collection of Zakat to the government. Madrassa served as an institution to give away Zakat to the poor and needy students of DM after the Zakat and Ushr Regulation of June 1980⁵¹, nevertheless, the madrassa as an institution was not eligible to receive Zakat (Malik, 1999).

There were 100 Deeni Madaris of all sects which were considered for financial assistance to provincial Zakat Council on the initial stages. It was conditioned that the DM had to register as a society and would be accountable for right usage of funds. The Central Zakat Council distributed funds to the provincial Zakat Councils and according to the Zakat Regulation, Zakat funds could just be utilized for the "sustenance of students, remuneration of the teachers and thus should serve to keep the DM functioning". Initially the ulama Committee laid down three categories of DM for distribution of Zakat fund, later, the classification extended to five when it ought to increase the distribution of Zakat. The Provincial Zakat Council extended the sub-division to 10 with a purpose to improve Zakat distribution. To ascertain other conditions regarding zakat fund a 12 members committee was notified by provincial zakat administration to finalize other details (Malik, 1999).

The ulama had deep concerns over the record keeping of the zakat funds provided to madrassas and their audit by the Zakat administration. The Dawrah-e-hadith level received more money in 1982/83 than it did in 1984/85. As in

1982/83, it received 25.9 which were dropped down to 18.6 in later two years. In the year 1982/83, the intermediate level (mawquf) received a major portion i.e. 66% of the Zakat money allocated for madraasa in Punjab. In the years 84/85, tahtani level's allocation of money enhanced from 8.1 to 29.8 percent. This year the small Deeni Madaris received huge money i.e. 30 % of the total money allocated for madaris. They were huge in number and for that reason the individual amount received by each was small while it was highest in total figures. The Central Zakat Administration claimed that the demand of auditing merely aimed to make sure that the zakat money had been utilized according to the Sharia rules. Few of the Deobandi madaris refused to be benefitted from the Zakat money while few accepted zakat. Contrary to Deobandis, Barelvis, Ahle Hadith and Jammāt-i-Islami's madrassas remained beneficiaries of zakat fund, even in spite of the ideological differences over the prevailing zakat system, some of the Shia madrasa also availed the zakat money. The proportion of funds disbursed to DM out of Zakat funds passed on to the provinces by the Central Zakat Council from 1981 to 1985 was 1.9, 4.4, 5.2, 3.1 and 9.4 respectively. Mostly the money received by madrasas was used for construction purposes (Malik, 1999).

The reports and the government initiatives never suggested the closing of madrasa but the focus had always been on regulating the madrasa like that of the institutions of formal education system.

4.9 Outcomes and Implications of madrasa-reform efforts in Zia Era

There is a common perception that the state-led reforms initiatives proved to be damaging not only for the madrasa students but also for the nation on a larger scale in the longer run as short term political interests were achieved which left a long term ramification for not only madrassas but also for the state. Some of the implications are as under:

a. Madrasa Boom due to Negligence of Public Sector Education

In neo-patrimonial states there is always confusion between self interest and national interest. Often policy initiated by the state becomes controversial whether it aimed to serve national interest or self-interests. Similarly, in Zia era there aroused a confusion whether the state's organized backing of madrassas leading to their immense growth and the negligence of public sector education were aiming to achieve self-interest or national interest. Both formal and religious education system form the education system of the state. Then why was religious education system promoted at the cost of the formal education system? This riddle is resolved if the individual's approach is rational as General Zia had, then obviously, self interests was a priority over the national interests. When Zia government was quite enthusiastic to implement madrasa reforms, he completely ignored the secular system of education. Education which is considered to be a matter of life and death for a nation and which is believed to secure the future of

any nation was given a little place in Pakistan's budget. The money allocated for the education sector was far lesser than half of the defense budget.

The ratio of education versus defence in Zia era was as follows (Siddiq, 2007, p. 163):

Years	Education %	Defence%
1981-82	1.4	5.7
1982-83	1.5	6.4
1983-84	1.6	6.4
1984-85	1.8	6.7
1985-86	2.3	6.9
1986-87	2.3	6.9
1987-88	2.4	7.2

As a result, the public sector failed to expand its education network affordable for the poor segment of society. In these conditions, the madrassa appeared as the best alternative for the poverty-stricken segment of society. Madrassas of different sects received a huge number of money in the form of donation from abroad and zakat on the domestic level. As a result, they extended their madrassa chain to the entire country. Riedel (2012) writes that the registered madrassa's number reached at 8,000 and unregistered at 25, 000 by the end of Zia era. The education imparted to the students was quite affordable for all the segments of society and their degrees were recognized at all levels of the formal education system. So, their organized expansion backed by the state through reforms resulted in mounting enrollment. A perception was created that the Islamization of state would open the door for the madrassa graduates to participate in all the affairs of

the state but their participation was reduced to few institutions and areas like Islamic Ideological Council and teaching Islamic Studies and at the school and college levels and there too very little number of graduates got opportunity to enter.

The sect-wise classification of madrasa from in Zia era is as under:

(Ministry of Education Government of Pakistan, 1988)

Year	Deo- bandi	Barailv i	Ahle Hadith	Shia	JI
1979	354	267	126	41	57
1984	1097	557	76	76	107
1988	1840	717	167	47	96

b. Unemployment Increased

Although Mumtaz Ahmad challenged the perception of madrasa booming in Zia era and stressed that growth in madrasa number was quite a natural phenomenon which must be addressed in comparison with the growth in population of Pakistan and increase in public and private education institutions imparting formal education. (Ahmad, personal communication, July 1, 2014) Even accepting this analysis it can be found that madrasa produced a huge number of graduates and the labour market demanded skills which madrasa graduates lacked. The madrasa failed to develop intellectual human capital of

large number of Pakistani youth studying there. They appeared to be a big economic challenge to Pakistan (Fair, 2004). Very few renowned figures of madrassas including Pir Karam Shah of Sargodha, Maulana Taqi Usmani of Karachi and Maulana Samiul Haq of Akora Khattak and others of their associates were appointed as judges in Federal Shariat Court, members of Councils of Islamic Ideology and many other newly created Islamic Commissions, committees and institutions during the Zia regime (Ahmad, M. 2002). A bulk of students educated from madrassa was unaware of any role if existed in the light of their new declared status⁵². It shows that following neo-patrimonial practices some of madrassas' notables were given access to state's resources rationally in Zia era as through madrassa's top leadership he wanted to gain influence over a large section of the society.

The extreme unemployment of madrasa graduates in the state left no opportunities for them to play their role except to participate in Jihad activities in Afghanistan. To tackle the problem of illiteracy, nearly 12,000 mosque schools were opened in 1983-84 and supposed to adopt an expanded curriculum introducing modern scientific disciplines (Talbot, 1999). But, that too did not produce the expected outcomes as unemployment of madrassa graduates was not minimized.

c. State's Efforts to Control Madar's

The levying of Zakat left remarkable effects on Pakistan's politics as those made the state powerful enough to interfere in madrassa system as government was the sole responsible of distributing the Zakat money among the traditional

madrassas to assist them financially. As a result a large number of madrassas accepted Zakat money even in spite of the fact that the government sought support in return for funding while few of the madrassas' authorities realized that financial dependency through the process of reforms initiatives would undermine their autonomy. So, they started fishing for foreign aid in order to retain their complete autonomy (Kepel, 2002).

The government rationally used Zakat money to gain some political objectives. The Zakat money was withheld from the madrassas that were run by any of the regime's opposition members like JUI led by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman did not receive money in this respect. The Zakat administration tried to force opposition groups into conformity with it. Through integration policy the state wanted to sub-ordinate DMs and to some extent it succeeded as sanctions were imposed on politicized religious schools and government took enough control on small and new Deeni madrassas by obliging them through Zakat money (Malik, 1999). The activities of Deobandi madrassas in Sindh were quite notable against Punjabi chauvinism which were quite evident in Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) and for this reason even majority of Deoband madrassas in Sindh rejected Zakat money but no decrease in disbursement of Zakat money was made rather it was increased and more money was allocated to forces other than Deobandis such as Brelwis, Jammat-i-Islami and Ahle-e-Hadith to secure political interests by Zia in order to suppress the religious and liberal opposition forces (Malik, 1999). In this way patron-client relations were retained by the state to achieve short-term political objectives.

d. Efforts to get State Patronage

The Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan provided an opportunity to Zia ul Haq to get legitimacy of his regime on the international level. In the name of reforms a huge amount of money was disbursed and a cadre of madrassa-learned emerged within a few year. Using rational approach, General Zia-ul-Haq made a conscious choice of encouraging those madrassa graduates to fight for the Muslims of Afghanistan as madrassa based parties were trying to outdo one another in order to get state patronage. There had been an official competition between and within the sects and sub-sects of Sunni and Shia clerics to achieve official patronage. In order to achieve so, they had made political parties, raised jihadi militias, expanded madrassa culture and had even become a part of government⁵³. It was claimed that the clerics of all sects and sub-sects were free to propagate their jihadi ideologies. As a result an unhealthy competition between madrassas of different sects started which imperiled the madrassa system.

e. Diversion from the Curricular Activities

The aforementioned activities on the part of madrassa really diverted the attention of madrassa administration and students from their real purpose of imparting and attaining true religious education to gaining more material benefits from domestic and global actors through politicization of madrassas. As it was obvious from the fact that Madrassas of all major sects recruited workers for the student organization such as Jamiyat Tulabi-i-Islam and Anjuman Tulab-i-Islam,

the wings of Deobandi backed Jamiyat Ulama-i-Islam and Barelwi's backed Jamiyat Ulema-i-Pakistan respectively. Many Shia affiliated madrassas in small towns had been a source of providing workers to Imamiya Students Organization—a Shia Youth group and Sipa-i-Muhammad—a Shia activist group. Jamiyat Ulema-i-Ahle Hadith had also a wing Ahle-Hadith Youth Force largely drawn from the madrassa students. It is not a hidden fact that the Deobandi madrassas recruited thousands of volunteers for Afghan Jihad and Jammat-i-Islami also established a wide network of madrassas in Baluchistan and NWFP with the help of Zakat money and foreign funds and they became breeding grounds for Mujahideen of Gulbedin Hikmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami movement. The madrassas kept on receiving funds from the Middle Eastern Muslim countries apparently for the purpose of Afghan relief and Jihad. The funds were wholly or partially used for recruiting more students, providing physical facilities to madrassas and for their sectarian activities, including acquisition of weapons (Ahmad, M. 2000).

There emerged two types of madrassas during the Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan that rendered services for the Saudi and US backed jihad. Jammat-i-Islami belonged to the first group which had never been a madrassa based party but later established madrassas to recruit and train mujahidin while Madrassas like Jamiat ul-umma Islam's affiliated madrassas belonged to the second group who were independent. Although they were opposed to Zia regime because they believed that they rendered more services in Afghan Jihad but got less funding but they were state's partner in Afghan jihad (Fair, 2004).

No doubt that the US and Pakistani governments during the Soviet's war against Afghanistan rationally encouraged the students to engage in sectarian militancy by influencing their curriculum. Some 13 million volumes of the textbooks prepared at the University of Nebraska Omaha (with the aid of more than US \$ 51 million by US Agency for International Development Funding from 1984-1994) motivating armed struggle in defence of Islam were distributed in madrassas. The mutual collaboration of the Pakistan and US government brought Kalashnikov culture and sectarian militancy in Pakistan (Candland, 2006).

f. Gap between Secular and Religious Segment Widened which polarized the Society

The implementation of madrasa reforms followed by winning political support from the madrasa sector turned Zia generous enough towards the religious segment of society and he awarded some more concessions to them which tilted the equilibrium between secular and religious segment of society in favor of the latter. This generated a huge gap between the two segments of society which in other words meant fragmentation of the society which nourished element of violence and intolerance in Pakistan's society in Zia era as the student and labour unions and different human rights organizations were banned considering them pro-Bhutto and press and independent writers, poets and thinkers were "subject to political prosecution" while Jammat-i-Islami, Islami Jamiat-e-Taliba were left unchecked by the state. One of the characteristics of neo-patrimonial states is that the ruler crushes the opponents before they launch organized protests and for that reason too, the liberals were tried to keep silent in Zia era. In other words Islamic

factions of society were promoted at the cost of liberal, secular and modern sectors (Rehamn, 2006).

Dynamism between the two sections of the society is quite measureable by focusing on their ideologies, campaigns and agendas which are quite conflicting in nature. The secular segment prefers to strive for pluralism, democracy, freedom of speech and expression and human rights' accountability of the state, modernism etc. while the religious segment stands and struggles for introduction and implementation of religious laws and order in the society, unification of Umma and eradication of injustices faced by Umma all over the world. The secular segment of society uses media debates, academic/research institutions, advocacy campaign and journalistic writings to achieve their goals and to have a connection with the people while the religious segment focuses on mosque, madrassa and street power to achieve their goals and also manipulates state and masses (Rehman, A. 2006). Although there is no disagreement that the goals of both segments of society are non-conflicting, infact they are parallel to each other. A healthy society accommodates dominant traditional and modern forces together for the constructive development of society. But in Zia regime the state instead of maintaining any sort of balance between the traditionalists and modernists brought them as competitor to each other which polarized⁵⁴ the society even more.

g. Diversification among the Religious Factions which promoted sectarianism and Militancy

Sectarianism promotes religious intolerance among the members of the society. Bitter hatred towards other sects of the society is preached as well as

overvalued which directly threatens the peace and harmony of a society. The religious organizations belonging to different sects protect and promote their own sects. Their rivalry assumes more aggression on each other's holy days and events (Afzal, Iqbal & Inayat, 2012). Zia's madrassa reforms brought diversification among the religious faction to such an extent that polarized factions started hating each other as a diverse society of mutually antagonistic groups may be a ticking time bomb (Rahman, T 2003) which led them to sectarianism⁵⁵ and paved the way for militancy.⁵⁶

In Pakistan's case one can find that the government imposed Zakat tax according to the prescriptions of Hanafi school of Sunni law sparked a great resentment amongst the Shia masses which led them to political mobilization in Pakistan (Zaman, 114). Zia promoted Sunni-based Islamization to counter Shia's political activism in the wake of the Iranian revolution⁵⁷ and radical Deobandi ulama led by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi formed Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan to strive to bring the people into the folds of Sunni version of Islam. The SSP did not lose any opportunity to combat the Shi'at at all levels. They demanded ban on Muharram procession and declaration of Shias as non-Muslims like Ahmedis and improve Sunni version of Islam as an official state religion. With the emergence of SSP in the mainstream politics of the state, the radical elements formed Lashkar-e-Jhagvi whose cadres participated in Afghan jihad on one hand and carried on efforts to achieve sectarian goals in Pakistan on the other hand (Mufti, 2012).

Jamiat Ulama-e- Pakistan, Jamiyat Ulama-i-Ahle Hadith, Jamiyat Ulama-i-Islam and Tehrik-i-Jafriya madrassa became a breeding ground for the recruitment of work force for the student organizations in all four provinces. Several madrassas indulged in violence and sectarian activism in Karachi, Multan, Jhang, Lahore, Gujranwala and Chakwal served as breeding grounds for anti-Shia Deobandi group –Sipah-i-Sahaba (Ahmad, 2002).

Zia regime promoted sectarianism rationally by favoring Deoband maslak⁵⁸ openly as khatibs in army were appointed who had Deoband maslak. Auqaf department was used to spread Deoband maslak throughout the country while their ulama were given a handful representation in the rubber stamp parliament. In Zia regime, anti-Shia madrassas and organizations such as Al-Rashid Trust and Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad the parent of Lashkar-e-Tayaba became very popular in the country (ICG, 2002).

The Shia community harboured an extreme resentment due to imposition of Sunni version of Islam in all the matters of the state, including the Zakat process. They considered such sort of measures having official patronage as an organized strategy of the state to suppress them. As a result in order to secure the interests of the Shia community and Shia version of Islam in the state they consolidated and organized their already established forum Tehrik-e-Nifaz-i-Fiqah-i-Jafriya (1979). The government rationally played a role in fomenting Sunni-Shia violence in the state as it patronized some religious organizations in the state in order to preclude them from making any united forum or alliance against the dictatorial regime (Grare, 2007) which depicted the patrimonial nature of the state.

President Zia-ul-Haq adopting rational approach supported Deobandi sect as he wanted to gain legitimacy for his regime on the international level specifically from the Arab world.

h. Pedagogical Problems in Secular System of Education

When the madrassa started producing a large number of graduates who were unskilled and could perform some very limited productive activities relevant to their specific subjects, the government tried to make some adjustments for them in the secular education system which created pedagogical problems in secular system of education.

The government after introducing modern subjects into madrassa through reforms process made efforts to reduce the gap of knowledge and linguistics between madrassa students and the students of formal education system in order to create more job opportunities for the madrassa graduates. Firstly, it introduced Islamic studies as a compulsory subject in formal education system (Kepel, 2006) and secondly, the government of Pakistan advised the English medium schools to make a shift to Urdu or any other regional language recognized by the state while Arabic was represented as a language of Islam and it was made compulsory foreign language and later on as medium for teaching and learning from class 1 in all government schools. English was planned to be introduced at level 6. This act of the government coincided with the government's support for Madrassas which seemed to pose cultural, pedagogical and political problems to the country on a large scale (Rassool, & Mansoor, 2007). On the other side when a perception created that English would be banned in Pakistan's school, the government

encouraged the growth of English medium private schools “catering for the fast expanding and more affluent middle class” which further polarized the society increasing gap between poor and rich (Rehman, A. 2004).

i. Political Support from Islamic Parties

There is a general agreement that the religious institutions such as mosques, madaris, temples and churches can be used as a mean to “provide organizational resource for mobilization in a number of ways”. They can lead to motivate the people to conduct both violent and peaceful activism passionately (Silberman Higgins, & Dweck, 2005). General Zia successfully used madrassa for political activism as he achieved political support from the Islamic parties by bringing them into the “political arena as members of his parliament, the Majlis-e-Shura” (Zaidi, 2007). One of the attributes of neo-patrimonial states is that they possess weak constitutional institutions and as a result the ruler enjoys unchecked power. In Zia era too, the constitutional institutions including legislature did not possess power to keep check on President’s authority and most of the members of the parliament had strong personal affiliations with the President although their political grounds were weak. Bratton and Walle (1994) believe that personal dictator adopts two ways to strengthen his regime either he weakens the formal political institutions or maintains absolute control over them. It was a fact that Zia-ul-Haq adopted both the ways to strengthen his regime as for example on one side he weakened the legislature by limiting the opposition liberal forces’ entry in the parliament and on the other side maintained absolute control over them as the members kept silence due to fear of being their removal from the parliament.

General Zia regime had a close association with a "right wing, neo-fundamentalist association" which was later turned to be a political party Jammat-i-Islami whose founder Maulana Mawdudi had a strong hold on small bourgeois. He was a great critic of ulama's "traditionalism and their conservative and anachronistic approach to Islam⁵⁹". He believed that Modern Science, technology, industrialism, mechanization should be openly accepted by the Muslims in order to survive and make a real progress in the world. The Jammat vociferously backed the military regime in the early two years as it not only bagged ministries in his civilian cabinet but also had an impressive representation in Islamic ideological Council and was influential in education system, mass media, armed forces, national and provincial bureaucratic agencies and labour organizations.

The Jammat also laid theoretical frame work of Zia's policies⁶⁰ which were surrounding around Islamization. After Bhutto's hanging the Jammat showed a great aversion to it and declared martial law as un-Islamic⁶¹. Apparently, the Jammat detached itself from Zia regime but unofficially continued support for the military regime as it did not launch any protest against Zia's regime (Wink, 1991). The JUI-S and JUI-F participated in Afghan Jihad to achieve the global agenda of which Pakistan was made a direct party in Zia era. So, direct and indirect support of religious political parties contributed in strengthening Zia regime.

Conclusion:

The above given entire scholarly, semi-scholarly works and government documents depict that madrassa reforms in General Zia era fell short of achieving the conceived outcomes of bringing about substantial changes into madrassa

system of Pakistan. There emerge two schools of thought depicting the madrassa-state relations in context to reforms. Jamal Malik and Masooda Bano belong to the first school of thought believe that the reforms aiming to bring madrassas into mainstream political life settled the academic and financial impediments by providing incentives to madrassas such as declaring their degrees at a par with the formal system of education and supporting them through the Zakat money. The first school of thought has also pointed out that flexibility was shown by the state with a purpose to establish good relations with the ulama which were maintained by giving them high positions in government and state's departments. The second school of thought having renowned proponent Qasim Zaman depicted that ulama's reluctance were the major reasons to precede the reforms from achieving the real conceived essence and madrassa-state relations remained complex throughout Zia era.

The study negates the perceptions that the madrassa-based ulama had complex relations with the state during the Zia era as the resistance showed by the ulama was a step of deal that one expects between patron and client (neo-patrimonial character) which settles matter through give and take policy. The settlement of academic and financial affairs later showed that patron-client relations between madrassa and state were established as madrassas' were given some concessions by the state and in return achieved their support to sustain the regime. This study ties the two apparently divergent schools of thought. The first school of thought cannot be denied as the government brought the madrassa graduates into the mainstream political life by equalizing their degrees to the

formal system of education without making any pedagogical changes as demanded by the state and disbursed money to cater their financial affairs which turned the madrassa-state relations as patron-client relations. The state showed flexibility in implementation stages to maintain good relations with ulama and when the ulama resisted the reform plans the state, keeping the real essence of reforms aside bequeathed the madrassa stake holders (clients) with unconditional academic and financial accommodations. So, infact both the schools of thought are not overlapping but the second school of thought is an extension of the first school of thought which is obvious in implementation stages. This chapter merged the first school of thought with the second school of thought logically using a common ground of Islamization philosophy rationally initiated by the military ruler to gain maximization of interests which filled the gap between outcomes and resistance by the ulama at the implementation stages by making flexibilities demanded earlier on the formulation stages.

When the outcomes or implications of the madrassa reforms are discussed in the chapter it can be found that there appeared few opinions in the semi-scholarly and scholarly work. Few writers including Christine Fair and Riedal believed that the madrassa's boomed as a result of state's official backing through the zakat money and they appeared to be a big economic challenge for the state. Few others including Fredrick Grare, Marium Mufti and ICG Reports claim that General Zia promoted Deobandi maslak in the wake of the Iranian revolution to gain some political interests such as not only suppressed the political opponents

but also precluded any religious and secular political parties for making any alliance against its regime and in this way he retained his power.

This study showed political and economic benefits to the renowned ulama running madrassas brought them close to the state. As using supportive arguments this study concludes that zakat money was used dominantly for construction purposes by the ulama which resulted in addition to their assets and rationally madrassas' high-ups were given constitutional posts in a neo-patrimonial state and in return using influence the ulama got enrolled students in huge number who served as loyal government servants rendering their services beyond the domestic level to Afghanistan which became a battlefield between the two major powers of the Cold War era. So, the study concludes that the state-led madrassa reforms proved to be quite supportive for the military ruler to win legitimacy and favour on the domestic and international levels.

A lot has also been written about sectarianism and dominance of religious segment in politics in Zia era. But none of the study provides the facts that the reforms and promotion of sectarianism in the entire state and dominance of religious segments in politics were all inter-related phenomenon shaping one another. Effect, this is the pioneer study that reveals that Zia-ul-Haq using rationality exploited the neo-patrimonial features of the state and created space for the madrassa-based religious parties through the state-led madrassa reforms which left implications; firstly, each of religious sect expanded its influence in the society on sectarian basis at the cost of the other sects which sowed the seeds of sectarianism in the society that the state is ripening even in the present times.

Secondly the state marginalized the seculars and promoted the religious which diversified the society.

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Chapter 5

Madrassa-State Relations: An Analysis of State Policies during Musharraf Era

Introduction

This chapter deals with the madrassa-state relations in context to madrassa reforms introduced under the banner of Enlightenment Moderation in General Pervez Musharraf era. The chapter portrays the grounds on which the Army came into power dismissing a democratic government in Pakistan in 1999. Throughout the regime the military ruler tried to create and avail opportunities to sustain his regime and madrassa reforms were an extension of those efforts. It gives an indepth analysis of the way the reforms were introduced with a rational approach to accommodate the religious segment of society into mainstream national politics prior to the 9/11 incident. After the 9/11 incident which changed the world history as it marked the beginning of a new era and changed the laws of the few states also brought transition in Musharraf's policy towards madrassa from 'accommodation' to 'prevention of the likely threats' for the world security. The

details of the formulation and implementation stages of the state-led madrassa reforms are given in detail along with the reservations of the ulama. Some efforts are made to depict the implications of the reforms on madrassasa stakeholders as well as the state and society.

5.1 Madrassa Reforms: Internal and External Dynamics

The Ancient Attic Greek, the ancient Semitic as well as classic Chinese regarded history as fundamentally static __moving through a yearly cycle where various ages of humanity eventually repeat older patterns. This notion of history might be misfit or debateable in other aspects of human life but seems appropriate for the history of Pakistan's politics. The history of military intervention in Pakistan's politics repeated itself once again in 1999 when the Army took over the charge of the government through coup d'état despite the social and political milieus contrasted 1977's situation when General Zia-ul-Haq imposed Martial Law.

Although apparently there was no viable resentment among public against the 2/3rd majority holding government but there seemed an eloquent tussle between the institutions of the state which resulted in Army's intervention in politics. There was a common perception that the government wanted to enhance the dependence of the state institutions including military and judiciary on itself by meddling in their administrative affairs and for that purpose it had made some institutional and executive changes to enhance its influence over those institutions and those measures of the civil government infuriated the Army. There also

emerged some variance of opinions between Army and the government over few of the critical issues of the national interests including Kargil issue and relations towards India.

So, this time among Paul Brooker's re-structured checklist of motives of army's intervention in politics, corporate self-interests seemed foremost which was later on somehow attached to the national interests through a political slogan "Pakistan First"⁶² that covertly served the self-interests of the military ruler according to few perceptions. Although the military government did not have to face any stiff resistance from the public on the domestic level in the beginning, partly due to the exile of the leadership of the major political parties and partly due to people's emotional attachment with the army as the memories of the Kargil Crisis as portrayed by the state controlled media were hovering in their minds and they were considering army as incarnation of safety for them but still the regime seemed to be in an urgency to cater to the demands of the international community regarding the restoration of democracy in the state. In those situations instead of taking some practical political measures to restore democracy to appease the international community, General Pervez Musharraf preferred to introduce the vision of a moderate Islamic society, modern in nature and secular in essence and raised the slogan of Enlightened Moderation for the state which was perceived and welcomed by the West as necessary for Pakistan as a "Guide Cane for the blind" in context to the post 9/11 situations.

The most dominant external event that led the world to raise questions over the madrassa system of the Muslim world in general and Pakistan in

particular was the 9/11 incident, when the global hegemony--the US met two tragic incidents on September 11, 2001. The two hijacked planes carrying passengers hit the World Trade Center and one hijacked plane hit the Pentagon, as a result the World Trade Center which was an apt symbol of global capitalism demolished while the Pentagon which stood as an icon and center of U.S military power was damaged partially. In other words the great symbols of the US economy and defence came under attack causing a huge damage. The very initial reaction by the US administration following the attack clearly depicted that the US would take some aggressive measures against the suspects as they were

"repeatedly portraying the conflict as a war between good and evil in which the U.S. was going to "eradicate evil from the world," (Kellner, 2004. Para, 15).

Although Musharraf initiated madrassa reforms prior to 9/11 incident in order to anchor the roots of his military regime in the society but taking advantage of the pre-mature responses of the US Administration following 9/11 incident President Musharraf rationally connected the general criticism of the US officials on the Muslim world to Pakistan's madrassa and sought justification for his regime on the international level on the condition that he would eradicate militancy in Pakistan's madrassa with iron hands under his Enlightened Moderation Philosophy. As a result of the developments including 9/11 incident followed by the US-led war in Afghanistan made Pakistan an ally of the West and a key strategic player and accordingly had upgraded Musharraf's international

stature and strengthened his hand⁶³ to remain in power ("Pakistan's Musharraf", 2005).

Pakistan's religious education institutions remained as central subject in context to the Global War on Terror as the two more global incidents 7/7 London Bombing and the Mumbai Attacks added fuel to that intense criticism.

5.2 Some Examples of the Efforts to Reform the Muslim Societies in History

The slogan to transform the Muslim societies into secular and modern had not been a new experience as the history of the Muslim world had preserved the details of few of the efforts made in this regard. In 1923 when Reza Khan became the Prime Minister of Iran, he tried to secularize and modernize the Iranian society but abstained himself from implementation of such designs due to clerics' extreme resentment.

In 1925, the Qajar dynasty was deposed by a majlis which was dominated by Reza Khan's men as a result Reza Shah Pahlavi the military officer was conferred upon crown in April 1926. In order to promote westernization and government control over the state, Reza Shah launched a broad program of change which was designed with the assistance of a group of European trained army officers and young bureaucrats. The reform program expanded the bureaucracy on a large scale and overhauled the administrative machinery which was followed by some more developments such as establishment of a chain of secular primary and secondary schools and the first European style university in Tehran in 1935. Many

of Shah's policies were framed to break the hierarchy of the religious segments, particularly clerics in the society. In this connection, the state became even more influential in the matters of licensing of graduates of religious seminaries and administration of religious endowments to end clerics' monopoly over the education system. He undertook a codification of laws that created a body of secular law applied and interpreted by the secular judiciary outside the control of the religious establishment with a purpose to contain the growing power of the clerics. After excluding the clerics from judiciary, Reza Shah established a system of secular courts and transferred the important and lucrative task of certifying documents from the clerics to the state-licensed notaries. In order to unify the heterogeneous people of Iran, to emancipate women and cater foreign influence, Reza Shah imposed European dress on the population and abolished the wearing of the veils for women (Amuzegar, 1991).

In the beginning Reza Shah won a huge support from his countrymen for unifying the country, for restoring the order and for introducing economic and educational reforms. He tried to remove all the hurdles in a way of his achievements including the press and ulama. Many of the religious leaders were jailed or exiled and in 1936 number of worshippers who were protesting against Reza Shah's reforms was killed in one of the worst confrontations between the government authorities and ulama. When troops violated the sanctity of the shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad (Amuzegar, 1991). So, his efforts to promote secularism were appreciated by the society for some time but at the same time confrontation between ulama and the state never subsided.

Another notable effort in this regard was made in Kemalian Republic when the new nationalist regime led by Kemal Ataturk abolished the Ottoman Empire in 1922 while in 1924 he abolished the Caliphate which was held by the Ottoman Sultanate for centuries. In Ottoman Empire, Islam encompassed all areas including political, social, economic and cultural spheres of life as a religion and as a way of life. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his friends initiated a new series of socio-cultural reforms with a purpose to denounce religious dogmatism. Kemalist secularism was anti-clerical secularism in its true spirit as the Young Turks espoused the idea that Islam was hurdle in the way of development and progress which was basically positivists' ideas derived from the vision absorbed by them from France. They believed Islam to be a threat to modern Turkey as the Catholic Church was to French Republic (Lewis, 2002).

The abolition of Caliphate ended any direct relationship between state and religion in Turkey. As a result, the state suppressed the religious orders, secularized the public school education, closed the religious schools and revoked shariah (Islamic Law) in order to readjust the entire social frame work of the Turkish people. By equating modernization to westernization Kemal Ataturk initiated some radical reforms to secularize and westernize the society. Some secular, legal code, modelled along European lines was introduced that completely altered laws affecting women, marriage and family relations. Ataturk urged the countrymen "to look and act like Europeans" and wearing the West European style dresses were encouraged and he himself became the primary promoter of ball room, surnames and official functions were considered as incomplete without dancing. Titles of

honour given in the past were abolished. Men started wearing hats rather than the Fez, and women started wearing modern dresses and stopped wearing veils (Landau, 1984). Turkey adopted Latin alphabet which showed its conscious inclination towards the West. The opportunities to learn Arabic language for the new generation was kept limited, as a result they were unable to get education from the traditional scholars. (Landau, 1984) In this way the Turkish society successfully made a transition to secularism and modernism which in other words could be weighed equivalent to Westernization.

5.3 Enlightened Moderation Philosophy of General Pervez

Musharraf

The real essence of Musharraf's Enlightened Moderation⁶⁴ appeared in refined form after 9/11 incident which asserted his philosophy to be based on a two-pronged strategy.

"The first part is for the Muslim world to shun militancy and extremism and adopt the path of socio-economic uplift. The second part is for the West and the US in particular, to seek to resolve all political disputes with justice and to aid in the socio-economic betterment of the deprived Muslim world" (The Washington Post, June 1, 2004).

The term Enlightenment was originated in 16th Century in the West with the launching of revolutionary movements in philosophy and science. The contribution of Descartes, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Newton, Bayle and Spinoza prevented the term from being dried out. It gained immense popularity in the 18th Century as thinkers such as Hume, Kant and Madison, Jefferson and Franklin

contributed a lot in keeping the Movement alive (Owen, John M., Owen J. Judd, 2010). The origin of the secular intellectual foundation of reforms can be traced in Immanuel Kant's ideas. The most famous definition of Enlightenment is that of German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804):

“Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of reason, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! 'Have courage to use your own understanding!'—that is the motto of enlightenment” (Kant 2010 [1784], p. 1).

Transcendent Movement launched in New England had followed the essence of Kantian philosophy as they believed that “one could transcend the limits of intellect and strive for emotional understanding and unity with God without the assistance of organized religion” (www1.whsd.net). The Movement motivated the individuals to follow conscience by scrutinizing his own views.

The post-modernists challenge reason that reason when acts as a factor or means to establish justified rational order it paves way to purely instrumental reason which focuses much on gaining interests of the powerful, nurturing colonialism and neo-colonialism, gaining more wealth etc using reason and scientific methodology (Rosenfeld, 2009) and here in case of Musharraf, Enlightened moderation Philosophy turned to be a rational approach derived out of the realm of Reason (instrumental reason) keeping the Religion aside.

Using instrumental reasoning President Musharraf contended the international community that he was working to curtail extremism, fundamentalism, sectarianism and militancy through socio-economic uplift of madrassa graduates through madrassa reforms. He also showed intentions to reverse few of the decisions made in the past under the umbrella of Islamization as soon as he seized the power in 1999. In the very beginning of his regime on October 17, 1999, he urged ulama to present a true picture of Islam by curbing those elements that exploit religion for their pre-set interests. He claimed in the beginning of his regime that he had made a very comprehensive strategy regarding madrassa that comprised of spurring their strength and eradicating their weaknesses. He showed his will to introduce the modern subjects in madrassa under the Enlightened Moderation philosophy in order to break the hurdles that had confined the learned at madrassa to just few religious and social activities. He showed his interest to improve the standard of education with such necessary alterations helpful for the students to adopt any of the professions they wanted (Parpart, 2002).

In order to propagate his philosophy of Enlightened Moderation on the domestic level he used scholars like Ghamadi who openly favoured Musharraf's plan on state-sponsored and other media to amend Hudood Ordinance arguing it misinterpretation of the Shariah by a limited circle of traditional Jurists. Ghamadi also declared that the Jihad backed by Organizations against Hindus, Jews and Christian as illegal. He advocated that Jihad was obligatory only when a Muslim state came under unjust attack of the foreign country (Ahmad, M., 2010).

Munawar Hassan, the Jammat-I-Islami's Central Secretary General interpreted Musharraf's Enlightened Moderation as a measure to eradicate Islamic values and denounce Islamic traditions. He criticised that Musharraf under the Enlightened Moderation Philosophy wanted to promote un-Islamic ways of life and practices in the society. He forgot the specific basic structure of the Muslim societies, their psychology, temperament and real dynamics, which was inherited from the Prophet (<http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com>).

Some extreme criticisms came from other ulama too, as most of them believed that the concept of Enlightened Moderation was another dangerous tool used by the non-Muslims after being failed to convert the Muslims to other religions. They believed that if Muslim was not converted to non-Muslims, he should at least be no longer a Muslim which in other words meant their conversion to a liberal, enlightened and progressive Islam (Haft Roza Al-Ehtasam, 11 to 17 February, 2005).

In spite of reservations of ulama, Musharraf was quite clear and well-planned regarding the enactment of his Enlightened Moderation Philosophy as he readily picked up religious institutions to bring such a major change in Muslim society considering them a key to each sort of development that could transform the very nature of society from religious to secularism and modernism. The madrasa reforms plans in General Musharraf's era were comprised of three steps.

- i. Pakistan Madrasa Education Board Ordinance
- ii. Madrasa Reform Project (2002-03—2007)

iii. *The Din-i-Madaris Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance, 2005*

Below are the details of the state-led madrasa reforms project launched in pre and post 9/11 periods in the Musharraf regime:

5.4 Pakistan Madrasa Education Board (PMEB) Ordinance

On 18th August 2001, the government promulgated Pakistan Madrasa Education (Establishment and Affiliation of Model Deeni Madaris) Board Ordinance which aimed to introduce secular subjects in the madrasa curriculum. This Ordinance was a brainchild of the Committee appointed by the Ministry of Education in 1998 under the chairmanship of S M Zaman which outlined curriculum and proposed the establishment of a board to keep check on madrassas (Riaz, 2008).

On the formulation stage of the Ordinance there appeared three reservations from the ulama; firstly, Deeni Madaris' autonomy would be endangered due to PMEB Ordinance and the government officials should not be allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of the madaris through any means. Secondly, it was also conveyed that to bring changes in curriculum of any form of education is purely a matter to be handled by the teachers and men of pen and the government's policies should not affect them. There was no controversy over these two issues so, these were resolved with consensus. Thirdly, the ulama had doubt that if a board of model Deeni Madaris was established then government would compel Deeni Madaris to get affiliation with the board. Although they were given assurances that the President did not have any intention to do so but

obviously, no one could assure whether same would be followed in the next government policies (Rehman & Bukhari, 2005).

The major things that became a part of Ordinance included establishment of a board which would have no interference and control over the existed independent madaris. It would be responsible of the administrative affairs of only model deeni madaris or those madaris which agreed to have affiliation with the board. It was decided that the buildings under Auqaf's control which were not utilized in a proper way could be used for Deeni Madaris. Few other buildings were recommended to be used for establishment of religious education institutions like Badshahi Masjid or other buildings adjacent to such huge buildings which were not properly being utilized for any productive purpose. There could be established model deeni madaris which would impart religious as well as modern education. It was decided that affiliated madrassas would adopt the curriculum proposed by the board⁶⁵ and their students would appear in the board exams following the board's set rules and regulations. They would be independent in rest of all matters relevant to their administration, internal and financial matters (Islam, 2012).

The board would not have any flexible laws to interfere in these affairs. When the matter of Ordinance moved ahead the ulama had reservation that the large madrassas would get the charter and would give affiliation to madrassas already affiliated with the Wafaq-ul-madaris, Tanzeem-ul-Madaris, etc and as a result the wafaqs and Tanzeem would be weakened. So, the matter was again brought in to the consideration of the concerned authorities and it was decided that

any institution comprising of deeni madaris, wafaqs and Tanzeems and sought charter as an examining university could be given permission for that like Punjab University was given charter as an examining university in the past.

Objectives of PMEB Ordinance

The objectives of the Madrassa Education Board were to enable the establishment of Model Deeni Madaris⁶⁶, to create uniformity of standard education through integration of formal and Deeni Madrasas education system, to smooth the registration and regulation by maintaining their autonomous character, to improve the education and training imparted in the Deeni Madaris, to cater to the demands of the modern age on one hand and infuse the spirit of Islam on the other hand, to regulate their examination system and to provide opportunities to Deeni Madaris graduates to play a vital role in national life by recognizing their degrees equivalent to that of the formal education system. (Ahmad, 2009)

5.5 Implementation of the First Reforms

A board was established to run the administrative affairs for the implementation of the PMEB Ordinance. The composition of the board was:

Chairman	Educationist	1
Vice Chairman	Educationist or Aalim	1
Secretary	Educationist	1
Other members		

Secretary Federal Education Ministry 1, Secretary Ministry of Religious Affairs 1.

Secretary Ministry of Science and Technology 1, Representatives of the Ministry of Science and Technology, 2, Ulama nominated by the Chairman Islamic Ideological Council 2,

Representative of the University Grant Commission, 1, university Professor of Islamic Studies, 1, Secretary Education of the Four provincial Ministries, 4, one representatives each from wafaq, Rabta, Tanzeem, 3, Chairman Interboard Committee, 1

The total number of the above mentioned board was 20 and out of which only 6 including Vice Chairman, 2 persons nominated by the Chairman Islamic Ideological Council and 3 representatives one each from Wafaq, Tanzeem and Rabta were Ulama designing curriculum and handling other madrassa affairs (Khalid, 2005). It was decided that the Madrassa Education Board would be headed by the government appointed person while the five Wafaq would nominate the vice-chair (Fair, 2008). In non-territorial states the leader controls the policy making process himself and personal emissaries hold more power in policy making process after getting instructions from the leader (Bratton and Walle, 1994). As president Musharraf had a rational approach in his policies towards madrassa so, he did not delegate real rights of formulating and implementing policy to madrassa stakeholders. The headship of PMEB was assigned to the

government appointed person to achieve maximum political benefits for the regime.

5.6 Ulama's Reservations regarding PMEB

The ulama had reservations regarding the tasks assigned to the PMEB. Dr Mahmud Ahmed Ghazi who was given responsibility to reform madrassa was also the member of the committee that proposed reforms, consulted the ulama and noted few of the reservations. According to him, the ulama believed that the government could limit madrassas' autonomy if they were compelled to have affiliation with Madrassa Board. Another reservation was about curriculum as it was demanded by the ulama that any changes in curriculum could only be brought by the men of pen not by the government officials⁶⁷. Few madrassas were given funds for the promotion of few secular subjects but their administration claimed that money used as donation and alms could never be used to teach the worldly subjects (Ghazi, 2004).

All the five boards unanimously rejected Deeni Madaris Board Ordinance and had decided that none of the madrassas affiliated with these boards would become a part of Madaris Board or Deeni Madrassa Ordinance. If the government took any steps against the autonomy of Deeni Madaris or adopted legal or administrative ways to harm them then these religious institutions would be protected with great zeal. The real asset of madaris was trust in God and they did not want to lose that valuable asset just at the cost of government's offer to

provide materialistic support. The ulama and the madrassa graduates never craved worldly jobs. The government should utilize energies to provide jobs to those unemployed college and university degree holders instead of focusing on the future of madrassa degree holders. The madaris would make such necessary arrangements themselves to cope with the situation. The government should fulfill its interest of introducing reforms in those institutions on which it had been spending heavily for the last several decades (The Jang, August 29, 2001). The Ordinance could not achieve the desired goals as all wafaqs refused to join on the plea that the Ordinance was framed without their consultation. They showed concerns that establishment of PMEB would lead to the abolition of their wafaqs and Tanzeemat.

5.7 Implementation of PMEB Ordinance:

Despite the above mentioned reservations nearly 500 madrassas applied for affiliation with PMEB in 2003 but PMEB did not hold its meeting in the entire year contrary to the mandate of the Ordinance that demanded to hold the meeting of the board at intervals of no longer than six months and as a result the affiliation process did not proceed⁶⁸. Although a few of the well reputed religious institutions representing the entire spectrum of Muslim traditions in Pakistan affiliated themselves with the PMEB including the Barelvi oriented Jamiat ul Uloom Rasuliya in Faisalabad, Deobandi Jamia Abu Hurraira of Maulana Abdul Qayoom Haqqani in Nowshera and Jamat-e- Islami's Fikr-i-Maududi Institute (Candland, 2005) but affiliation process did not meet the set mark.

The government's set target of establishing Model Deeni Madrassas was also not met considerably as just three model DMs had been established two for boys at Sukkhar and Karachi and one for girls at Islamabad. Those three Model DMs were not given authority for financing or staffing for their efficient performance. The incharge of the Madrassa were puppet in the hands of PMEB in all administrative matters. This is one of the practices prevails in neo-patrimonial states as the ruler do not share the real executive power. The real power to make decisions in PMEB rested with the Chief Executive who was the big man handling overtly and covertly all the madrassa affairs himself. All three Model DMs were located in Hajj Directorate's Hajji Camps. So, during the Hajj season the campuses became quite noisy to such an extent that it became difficult to continue the educational activities. The Pakistan Army Rangers were occupying the building of the Hajji Camp at Karachi and the premises of Model Deeni Madrassa. There had been some misinformation from the government authorities that some more Model DMs would be established but officials of PMEB denied of having knowledge in this regard (Candland, 2005).

5.8 Madrassa Reforms Project (2002-03—2007)

In order to fulfill the aforementioned objectives, a five years project (2002-3—2007-8) was launched by the government at the cost of \$ 100 million aiming to facilitate 8,000 madrassas to teach English, Social Studies and General Science from primary to Secondary level and Economics, English, Computer

Science and Pakistan Studies at the Intermediate level with a purpose to integrate both systems of education in order to abridge the gulf between Madrassa Education and Formal Education system, to enhance communication with the ulama who had adopted formal subjects teaching along with the religious subjects, to arrange workshops to improve teachers' knowledge of the formal subjects, to provide one time grant to the madrassas in order to get their libraries and buildings well equipped and to provide them opportunities to get equipment necessary for the teaching of Computer Sciences (Ahmad, 2009). All these facilities were declared to be provided to those madrassa registered under Societal Act. Monera and Down (1991), rightly claim that a rational actor has consistent and stable preference orderings and if alternate options are given, they choose that one which gives them maximum utility. Adopting the same, General Musharraf preferred to reform madrassa by modifying their curriculum prior to 9/11 despite the fact that few other institutions of the state were in a more wretched condition. After the 9/11 incident, the madrassa remained the top priority but focus shifted from modification of curriculum to regulation of madrassas in order to get accommodation for his regime among the international community who were demanding so.

Besides the above given objectives, there were few of the components added in the MRP (2002, 3-2007) that included granting salaries to 32,000 teachers. 16000 teachers of formal subjects were granted @ Rs 3000 in 4000 madrassa at the primary level, @ Rs 4,000 to 12000 teachers in 3000 madrassas at the Secondary level and @ Rs 5000 to 4000 teachers of 1000 madrassas at the

Intermediate level for 3 years while the duration of the project was 5 years, cost of sports facilities, library facilities, textbooks, furniture to all madrassas would also be provided. It was decided that Computers, printers and computer labs would be provided to 1000 madrassas and vehicles would be provided to all five wafaqs. Each Education Department would provide 8 days training to 32000 teachers through workshops. The components further added that education departments of the federal and provincial governments were responsible for the evaluation of model madrassas and the Ministry of education would develop textual and instructional material of the formal subjects (Ali, 2009). The government planned to establish patron-client relations by disbursing money among madrassas which is also a distinguished feature of neo-patrimonial states. But, most of the madrassas did not show interests in getting economic benefits from the state.

It was expected that besides strengthening the communication between madrassas and the government, 1.5 million students of 8000 madrassas would be educated in formal subjects from primary to secondary level so that they would be able to continue their studies at the college and the university levels and 32000 teachers would get training to update their knowledge and to improve their teaching methodologies. The project would be helpful to eradicate sectarianism in the country which in return would harmonize the society (Ali, 2009). Education Minister Zubaida Jalal said that the task to complete registration of the new madrassas would be completed in a month. According to her, this step would open the doors of mainstream education for the madrassa students to make them

enlightened as extremism is a hurdle to development and "Enlightened Moderation is a key to Globalization" (Gillani, 2004).

5.9 Ulama's Response to Government Efforts

The Secretary General of Wafaq al Arabia Pakistan and convener of the alliance of all madrassa boards of different schools of thought in Pakistan, Qari Harif Jalundhari conveyed the point of view of all wafaqs and said in this connection that that they did not have any objection over uniformity and registration of Deeni Madaris but to treat these religious and welfare institutions equivalent with private schools and profitable business centres by entangling them into specific law was a quite awkward plan. He considered imposition of the same registration process for Deeni Madrais as well as private schools dangerous for the autonomy of Deeni Madaris. So, he conveyed that the government should continue registering madaris under Societal Act 1860. It should be remembered that the government stopped registration of madaris under this act in 1994 but for the registration of mosques the same act was adopted. So, the government should follow the same act and the madrassas already registered needed not to be registered again (Mahanama AL-Farooq Karachi, April 2002, 13). He believed that the MPP was a part of "global conspiracy to deviate us from our basic purpose" of teaching Quran and Sunnah and was not a sincere offer to help the Islamic institutions. Madrassas had never requested the government to help them to impart secular education as knowing its importance they were already imparting the modern education.

Dr. Carfaraz Naeemi, Principal Jamia Naeemia Lahore and Secretary General Tanzeem ul Madaris Pakistan said that the project had not been initiated by the Pakistan government as the US was behind the project with an aim to suppress the growing Islamic influence which was "resiliently rising" as a result of the US aggression on Afghanistan and got momentum after the US attack on Iraq. He said that our ancestors averted the same situation when the British colonists tried to suppress Islamic Education in the sub-continent and they moved to towns leaving the cities for the protection of the Islamic education system. The West had often attempted to undermine the Islamic values of morality, brotherhood and decency. In order to achieve its designs the West had always been very ambitious to introduce its cultural waywardness and obscenity as media in our society. Maulana Abbas Naqvi, Secretary General Wafaqul Madaris Al Shia believed that the madrassas would never accept any such aid that could curtail their independence and sovereignty and they would keep on resisting such efforts that curb their independence (Looney, 2003). The efforts to reform madrassa through the Reform Project were not welcomed by the madrassas as before being benefitted from the program the government had to scrutinize the academic activities of all madrassas and they had to undergo a security check to ensure that they were not involved in militancy (Bano, 2007).

5.10 Implementation of MRP

In 2005, under the Public Sector Development Programme the Ministry of Education was allocated Rs 4.520 billion for 59 on going and 18 new projects.

Again, a huge amount of Rs 1 billion were allocated to the on-going Madrassa Reform Project started in 2002-03 with an estimated cost of Rs 5.75 billion. In 2006, the government withheld funds due to extreme reluctant behaviour of the religious groups regarding reform project (Ali, 2009). By the year 2007, money had been disbursed to 70 madrassas while 130 were on gradually proceeding waiting list (Bano, 2007).

In the beginning of the MRP the government authorities felt the lack of communication between ulama and the government as the biggest hurdle in a way of the successful implementation of the project. With the establishment of Ittehad-e-Tanzeem-e-Madaris-e-Deeniya ---an umbrella Organizations of five wafaqs, i.e. Wafaq-ul-Madaris al Arabia, Tanzeem ul Madaris Ahle Sunnat, Wafaq-ul-Madaris Salfia, Rabitaul- Madaris-al-Islamia and Wafaq ul Madaris Shia in 2005, the government hoped that Tanzeem would serve as a communication source between the Madaris and the government as previously no systematic negotiations took place and there was a communication gap due to absence of any single and unified madrassa representative body. But contrary to government's expectations, the ITMDP refused to carry on negotiations with the government over reforms' issue objecting to deal with the Education Minister retired Lt. General Javed Ashraf Qazi, a former Director General Pakistan's Intelligence Agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) and Corps Commander (Fair, 2008).

The ITMDP preferred initiating own reforms or if negotiations with the government deemed necessary regarding reforms proceeding process then they would be with the Religious Ministry. Consequently, the Government had to

transfer the Madrassa Reforms from the Education Ministry to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Despite all those shifting of the projects from one ministry to another one the central authority rested with the President. In neo-patrimonial states even the cabinet meetings are of ceremonial nature where the ministers can not oppose or challenge any of the decisions of the central authority rather just show affirmations to keep enjoying their posts otherwise they lose their positions. In Musharraf's era too, all the ministries were just following the central authority's instructions without showing their own discretion and in this context education ministry and religious ministry served the same functions of protecting the interests of the regime.

5.11 ITMDP's Response over Demand of Alteration in Curriculum in Reform Plans

The ITMDP which was representing 14,000 madrassas in the state had decided to include five secular subjects in its curriculum for A'adadiya Doyem equivalent to matriculation from the academic year starting from Shawal in 2005. The Tanzeem's leadership had already showed willingness to introduce Pakistan Studies, English, Science, Urdu and Maths in an agreement with the government in September 2005. The members of ITMDP were of the opinion that it would pave the way towards the establishment of an independent board to handle the matters of all five wafaqs including their exams' matters. Many seminaries had hired the services of externals while number of religious institutions had made home arrangements to teach secular subjects. In return the government had backed out from its demand of disclosing the identities of their donors. That was

for the first time that ITMDP had assented by the agreement. Although on one side it supported the amendments in Societies Act while on the other side it was reluctant to register madrassas with the government (Mansoor, 2005).

The ITMDP demanded that the government should emulate the example of the UK and allow the formation of private madrassa boards. The members of ITMDP during their visit to the UK praised madrassa system prevalent there that consisted of private boards, practicing and functioning efficiently under a quality control institute and demanded same for Pakistan. They claimed that recognition of five religious boards would not be a burden on infrastructure as 40 education boards were already working in the state. If government could give recognition of a private board to Agha Khan Board then there should not be any problem to extend the same status to five religious boards (Seminar on Pakistani British Madrassas, 2006).

5.12 MRP Failed

According to the interviews of the authorities who were incharge of the madrassa programmes at the federal level, the program was facing a setback due to trust deficit⁶⁹ between the government and the ulama in context to the government's role in the War on Terror and its close associations with the US Government. The smaller madrassas which were willing to cooperate had to struggle more than the larger madrassas to get funds as the incharge of the Madrassa Reform Project believed that it was quite easy to deal with the larger madrassas as they had a reliable infrastructure as well as account system and their

performance could be judged easily while the smaller madrassas lacked any staff to maintain records properly. The project teams at the federal and provincial levels had very limited capacity regarding the implementation of the reforms project. At the federal level just four people were assigned the responsibilities to work and they were also given responsibilities of many other projects (Bano, 2007). The Madrassa reform project seemed to have met a debacle like all previous reforms initiatives after completion of five years tenure. The Ministry of Education had rightly accepted the failure as Dr Muhammad Hanif, the project Coordinator revealed, "in the last five years we reached out to only 507 *madrassahs*" (Farooq, July 2008, p. 7).

5.13 The *Din-i-Madaris* Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance, 2005

The 7/7 incident in London in 2005 once again turned the world's attention towards Pakistan's madrassas and international pressure started mounting on Pervez Musharraf to bring substantial changes into madrassa system in Pakistan to confine their autonomy. In order to accomplish the demand in its true letter and spirit it was necessary to make sure that each and every madrassa got itself registered. So, the government promulgated madrassa ordinance in August 2005. An attempt was made in 2002 to promulgate such sort of ordinance but failed due to lack of encouraging response from the ulama. Later, some amendments were made and in 2005 the ordinance was proclaimed. Below are the details of

proposed ordinance 2002 and The *Din-i-Madaris* Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance, 2005

a. Proposed Ordinance 2002

In June 2002, the cabinet approved a draft law for the registration and financial regulation of madrassa. Madrassa Registration with the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board and provincial boards was made mandatory and it was declared that madrassas failing to comply with that condition would either be fined or closed. The madrassas were made bound not to receive grant or aid from foreign sources⁷⁰. All the madrassas offering courses of formal subjects like Mathematics, Urdu, English and Science would receive funds from the government. Foreign students were to be required to receive No Objection Certificate from their respective governments before getting admission to Pakistan's madrassa. The Madrassas were given six months to follow the Ordinance (Riaz, 2008).

All the wafaqs, Tanzeems and madrassa boards harshly criticised the proposed Ordinance so, inspite of the cabinet's approval General Pervez Musharraf did not sign the Ordinance. As described earlier that in the neo-patrimonial states the cabinet meetings is ceremonial and real authority lies with the ruler who resists even delegating the trivial policy making tasks (Bratton & Walle, 1997). Same, despite the approval of cabinet the real authority holder did not sign and implement the Ordinance.

b. Madrassa Ordinance-2005

The *Din-i-Madaris* Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance, 2005 clearly provided that none of the madrassa would be operated without registration, every madrassa would report the details of the educational activities and performance to the registrar, every madrassa would allow to carry out audit of its account by an auditor and submit a copy of its audited report to the registrar, no madrassa would publish or teach any literature that foments militancy, spread religious hatred⁷¹ or sectarianism ("Societies Registration (Second Amendment) Ordinance 2005", section 21). The Ordinance shows President Musharraf's rationality to achieve legitimacy for his regime in the post-9/11 world.

5.14 Ulama's Response over the Madrassa Ordinance 2005

Maulana Fazlur Rehman, who was the Secretary General of the MMA and leader of Opposition in the National Assembly, rejected the Ordinance completely claiming that madrassa curriculum did not contain any material encouraging extremism and sectarianism. He declared that when madrassa had never received even a single penny from the government then it's an irrational demand that the details of their accounts should be disclosed. He added further that, "We have returned to Assemblies only with the force of these religious seminaries. If their independence or survival is threatened we will resign forthwith." (Lakshman, 2005, p.5)

Another noted leader of the religious parties Maulana Samiul Haq⁷², chief of his own faction of the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam, feared that Pakistan would become a secular state in case of dismantling the madrassa system. The government should not obey the US and the West regarding the Madrassa system rather it should

make an effort to uphold the freedom and character of the madrassas (Lakshman, 2005).

5.15 Implementation of the Madrassa Ordinance 2005

The government in 2005, made registration mandatory for all the madrassas after having a series of negotiation with the five wafaqs which was a representative body of over 16,000 madrassas. In order to satisfy the wafaq's leadership the government accommodated few of the reservations of five wafaqs and amended the ordinance even after it was passed. President Musharraf did want to turn the religious faction of society against his regime and for that purpose adopting rational approach for attaining the maximum interests he gave few concessions to madrassas between the first and second Ordinance. Moreover, when a state is politically stable the political rules of games are governed by established formal and informal institutions but neo-patrimonial states lack these practices. They keep on changing the rules and contradictions emerge frequently as to enforce which rules (Leftwich, 2006).

In Musharraf's era controversies in Ordinance 2005 were resolved as President adopted a rational approach and Ordinance kept on changing till became adjustable to prolong the regime. Madrassas were registered under the Societies Act of 1860 on voluntary basis until 1994 when the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto banned such registration process in order to curtail madrassa proliferation. The registration process under SRA 1860 was not an easy process. The madrassa administration was bound to make verification that the lands were legally held along with the certification from the special branch of police that the madrassa

would not be involved in illegal activities (Fair, 2008). Since then, the unregistered madrassas have mounted in number. Although, the madrassas registration was made obligatory by the government in 2005 with the condition that the madrasa in question would disclose their funding sources but later after a series of negotiations between government and the madrasa an amendment to the Societal Act 1860 was made in 2007⁷³. The Amendment compelled the madrassas to declare that no literature that promoted militancy or sectarianism would be taught or published in madrasa while in return government was bound to accept two demands of ITMD. Firstly, already registered madrassas did not need any further registration and secondly, the madrassas' funding sources needed not be disclosed while reporting financial information (Borchgrevink, & Harpviken, 2011).

Additionally, under the law there was no registration required for the new madrassas, the non-residential madrassas required not to be registered as they just required submitting annual report of their educational activities rather than over all activities and functioning (ICG, 2007). The amended Ordinance also contained several other concessions like madrasa got concession to "print publications comparing the various sects", as it was denied in the original Ordinance on the ground that it could promote hatred against other sects and religions (Bano, 2007). In the amended Ordinance the clause took the shape as:

"No Dzeeni Madaris shall teach or publish any literature which promotes militancy or spreads sectarianism or religious hatred provided that nothing contained herein shall bar the comparative study of various religions or schools

of thought or the study of any other subjects covered by the Holy Quran, Sunnah or the Islamic Jurisprudence” (Madrasa Societies (Amendment) Act, 2005: 21).

Finally, the amended ordinance did not announce to impose any punishments for those who failed to comply with it (Bano, 2007).

The registration process started after these amendments and the government decided to head towards the next step of madrasa reforms process that was madrasa regulation. The Ministry of Religious Affairs laid out a plan to give recognition to five existing boards, giving them a formal legal right to affiliate with the madaris of their own maslak and they would be allowed to give secondary school certificates acceptable to all the institutions of the state for the purpose of jobs or education. Each board would be responsible of introducing secular subject in its affiliated madrassas. The government wanted that the ITMDP would conduct the exams of secular subjects in all the madrassas of five Wafaq (Fair, 2008).

The registration of madrasa reached to 14,072 in 2007 which was 6,000 before the promulgation of Ordinance in 2005. Their curriculum was regulated by their respective boards without making any substantial changes as demanded by the state. A tremendous majority of the madrassas did not undergo any changes to their traditional curriculum (Ahmed, 2009).

Over the matter of expulsion of foreign students,⁷⁴ the number of madrassas refused to obey. They threatened that the forcible expulsion of the foreign students from the madrasa would create law and order problem for the state due to strong resistance by the madrasa students and authorities. So as a result, the

government did not seem to be active to expel the students from the madrassa in reality (Pakistan said to have backed out, 2006). Qari Hanif said in this connection that it was an honour for Pakistan that the foreign students after getting education from Pakistan's madrassas would serve in their countries as honorary ambassadors. In case, if foreign countries were reluctant to send their students to Pakistan, it was the duty of the government to convince them using diplomatic channels. It was the biased policy of the government to allow foreign students to get moderate education in formal education institutions and did not allow them access to madrassas. The government should facilitate the foreign students to get visa on urgent basis (Zaidi, 2013).

According to a report, the Federal government informed National Security Council that since the implementation of Ordinance, the total 447 students had been repatriated to their respective countries as their documents were incomplete while deporting of 784 students to their countries was in progress (Zaidi, 2013) which was never completed.

In the meantime, the government passed a bill regarding women's rights and a new public debate started over that bill and government's focus shifted from madrassas to women's rights as the government was unable to focus on more than one reform. In neo-patrimonial states the welfare programs are often done to achieve favours in return and the state in Musharraf's regime was not an exception to that.

5.16 Outcomes and Implications of the State-led Madrassa Reforms in Musharraf Era

When any public policy is initiated and efforts are made to implement it, outcomes are ought to emerge. Generally, the outcomes show whether the policy making falls in either of these categories: successful, partial successful or unsuccessful. When the policy making is successful or partial successful outcomes are always productive for atleast the satisfactory number of stakeholders. Madrassa reform plans failed to produce any constructive substantial outcomes rather left some insidious negative implications for madrassa system which proved to be even more damaging in the long run. Following were the outcomes of the reform plans in Musharraf era:

a. Defamed Madrassa

The madrassa reform efforts in Musharraf era tarnished the image of Pakistan's madrassa in the world, as they opened the channel of criticism on them because Musharraf using the state's resources rationally generated perceptions amongst the international community that despite his utmost desire and sincere and tireless efforts madrassa reform program failed due to intransigence on the part of ulama. So, the political, policy makers and literary circles of the world started finding links of the global terrorism with the Pakistan's madrassa through the eyes of the military leader General Musharraf who blamed madrassas to promote militancy not only on domestic level but also to regional and transnational levels. In short, the reforms proved to be damaging for madrassas as they defamed them across

the globe even in spite of the fact that in the five worst anti-western terrorists attacks- the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the Africa Embassy bombing in 1998, the September 11 attacks, the Bali Night Club Bombing in 2002 and the London Bombing in July 2005, involvement of madrassa graduates was rarely found. Almost all the master minds of those attacks were university degree holders and had hardly attended a madrassa. The madrassa did not provide "potential terrorists with the language and technical skills" required to hit the western targets (Bergen, & Pandey, 2002).

Neglecting the above mentioned facts, it was considered that Pakistan had a great security threat from the extremist Sunni Deobandi groups that were involved in promoting jihadi violence not only on the domestic level but also on regional and global levels. On the domestic level their jihadi violence was confined to the state but on the regional level it stretched to Afghanistan and India and on the global levels it encompassed the West, According to a report some extremist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jash-e-Muhammad were involved in violent activities in Kashmir and at the same time they were busy in promoting local and global jihad backed by Al-Qa'ida (ICG, 2009).

It was believed that "a significant minority" of madrassas was not only acting as recruiting centers for violent radicals but were also determined to harm the West through every possible means (Haqqani, 2004). Many of the Deoband and Ahl-e-Hadith madrassas in Pakistan support militancy. According to a survey, madrassa students were more inclined toward gender and sectarian intolerance and wanted solution of problems like Kashmir through war (Curtis, 2009).

It was claimed that the madrassas were contributing a lot in promoting militancy in Pakistan and they were equally dangerous for the Western countries as they were targeting NATO supply line frequently. It had been a misleading approach that madrassas were few in number in comparison to private and public schools so they must be ignored (Ali, 2009). Most of the madrassas were built on the state-owned land as many of them were illegally established where majority of the students had come from NWFP. In some areas the teachers and the students were found involved in sectarian clashes, political demonstrations, bombings and providing refuge to the suspected terrorists. Not all madrassas were directly engaged in violence but a huge number of madrassas were used to teach hatred against other sects and non-muslims. They considered violence permissible to bring political change in Pakistan, resolve issues with India, consider women as inferior and favour Taliban's model of Shariah enforcement (Ali, 2005).

It was generally believed that the Haqqani network had strong ties with Afghan Taliban. Haqqani madrassa provided sanctuary to other Punjabi Taliban Groups while Pakistani group Lashkar-e-Tayyaba had selected few of the targets including western targets. Majority of Taliban of Quetta Shura were Afghans who were scattered in their safe havens in the bordering province. It was widely believed that Punjabi Taliban were targeting few of the high value assets and leaders in Pakistan. Karachi's madrassa had a good number of foreign students from at least 29 countries, having no security clearance. The writers concluded that Madrassas of all sects including Ahle-Hadith and Salafi had been involved in promoting militancy across the world (Cordesman, & Vira, 2011).

In the aforementioned context PW Singer's study got a great fame which claimed:

45,000 schools in Pakistan having affiliation with the extremist religious political groups teach an inaccurate view of Islam. Hatred is permitted and murder of innocent people is allowed in the name of jihad. Suicide bombers are regarded as heroes and many of these radical schools included military training in their schedules. These schools were promoting radical Islamic militancy that produced transnational terrorists and conflict networks. Taliban's leadership and Al-Qaida's force to fight in Afghanistan was also a product of these Pakistan's radical schools. These madrasa administrations were regularly sending their students to Kashmir, Afghanistan, Chechnya and other parts of the world where the wars had already been declared as falling in the category of Jihad by the madrasa administration (Singer, 2001).

It was asserted that Pakistan had become a major international locus and hub of transnational Islamic networks and institutions due to distinct religio-cultural milieus. Some of the militant groups of Pakistan had formed their own madrassas where they promoted Islamic version based on their own ideology that included special reading of the jihad concept. The clerics and the students of the madrassas established in 1980's with the backing of the military during the Afghan war with the USSR were quite aggressive regarding the "betrayed" or reversal of the military leadership under General Musharraf to back the US and other western nations in the war against terror" (Reetz, 2009).

So, it can be concluded that the failure of reform efforts led the world's literary and policy making circles to portray madrassa as an institution where students, teachers and administration were more inclined to militancy and violence towards other sects and non-Muslims, where militancy is considered as the only mean to resolve the regional and global political problems of the Muslim world and moreover where the frequency of the ambitions to promote violence stretched beyond territorial constraints to the regional and transnational levels.

b. Division of Ulama on Political and Religious Basis

Musharraf's madrassa reforms drew a line between the political and religious interests of the madrassa based religious parties. On one side madrassas established their own forum, Ittehad-e-Tanzeem-e-Madaris-e-Deeniya to protect the interests of madrassas of all sects under one umbrella and ulama bitterly criticised the state for initiating madrassa reforms while few provided political support to the government by being a part of MMA –an alliance of religious parties who promised in their manifesto to recognize Quran and Sunnah's supremacy in the state, bring improvement in the life of women following Islamic teachings and formulate independent foreign policy (Jang Rawalpindi, 15 May 2002). Their manifesto guaranteed the rights of minorities and provided protection to their religious and social institutions. MMA showed impressive performance in 2002 elections and entered in Parliament as a third majority party winning 67 seats out of 342. MMA emerged as a majority party in NWFP getting 46 seats out of 97, 14 out of 48 in Balochistan and 7 and 10 seats in Punjab and Sindh respectively (Pirzada, 2008).

The political support of the MMA helped Musharraf to gain political interest on the national and international levels. The details are as followed:

i. Interests Achieved on the National Level

General Musharraf presented himself as a moderate ruler but rationally created MMA which had some influential madrassa-based parties and he engineered their huge representation in parliament and victory in some provinces in 2002 elections. MMA participated in 2002 elections as anti-Musharraf party and remained against LFO for fourteen months but later accepted LFO. MMA which was comprised of six parties' coalition, including two dominant madrassa based parties, having number of members benefitted from madrassa reforms as were declared eligible to contest elections and in return they helped to institutionalize the presence of army in Pakistan's political life through the establishment of National Security Council. Musharraf did not interfere in the MMA's government in NWFP and Balochistan. He kept the two most popular leaders of the two major political parties, PPP and PML-N⁷⁵, away from the country which resulted in their ineffective participation in the elections 2002. With the help of MMA General Musharraf managed to get the 17th Amendment passed which legalized him to serve as the Chief of the Army Staff till December 2004 (Saigee, 2009).

Although, there came few ups and downs between MMA and Musharraf relations as in 2005 the military rule used the Supreme Court to exert pressure on MMA to end boycott of NSC and disqualified madrassa degree holders from

running in elections without passing additional exams of English, Urdu, and Pakistan Studies (Grare, 2006) but soon the issues were settled and Musharraf regained the support of MMA.

MMA stayed firmly with the government and did not resign from assemblies even on public demands. Through madrassa reforms Musharraf used the madrassa based religious parties to sustain his regime as he found their opposition in the legislature and provincial assemblies as a better replacement of the well-organized political parties such as PML-N and PPP which were quite popular among the civil society. The fragile coalition helped Musharraf to retain his military rule as a reward for opening door for them to the assemblies through Madrassa reforms. When the religious parties got few seats in elections and they were in opposition, they had made the government contended as "the religious parties' low mass appeal makes them less threatening to the military establishment than the more popular PPP" (Grare, 2006, p. 5).

The Congressional Research Office briefed on Pakistan's educational reforms in 2004 stated, "Despite Musharraf's repeated pledges to crack down on the more extremist madrassahs in his country, there is little concrete evidence that he has done so." Quoting two analysts, the report further states,

"most of the madrassahs remain unregistered, their finances unregulated, and the government has yet to remove the jihadist and sectarian content of their curricula. Observers speculate that Musharraf's reluctance to enforce reform is rooted in his desire to remain on good terms with Pakistan's Islamist political

parties, which are seen to be an important part of his political base” (Kronstadt, 2009, p.5).

ii. Interests Achieved on the International Level

In NWFP, the MMA's government passed Hasba Bill which showed that they wanted to enforce such sort of Shariat which could promote Talibanization in the province (Saigol, 2009).

The rise of Islam in Pakistan had been felt a threat by most of the Western countries. There had been a common perception that the Islamists would take over the country as well as nuclear weapons and the only option available to contain them was Pakistan Army. But the Islamist threat was neither autonomous nor as great as assumed. The state was not at stake due to these Islamists as they had never posed a threat to challenge army's role as a center of power through political and military means. The Islamist organizations were used to fulfill army's ambitions "at home and abroad (Grare, 2005).

In Musharraf's regime all the secular forces, including journalists, feminists and PPP members were not allowed to protest and hold rallies while the anti-American Islamists were allowed to hold million men rallies which conveyed a covert message to the US that Islamists could take over the state if the military leader ruling the state was removed from the scene (Haqqani, 2005).

In reality, madrassas could never be a threat to Americans and the West. Madrassa education did not have any contents on politics so, it's quite a weak

suggestion that madrassa education and anti-Americanism and anti-westernism had a "direct causal relationship". Up till 1990, same curriculum was not promoting any hatred against the west and America, infact; these sentimental feelings were as a result of the Bush administration's policies towards the Muslim World (Ahmad, M. 2009). It was the wrong foreign policy of the government that instead of convincing the US that its policies towards the Muslim world had fuelled violence in the world, Musharraf government rationally blamed the madrassas and religious elements of the state as the major promoter of violence which showed that the facts were deliberately ignored.

Conclusion

The above given entire scholarly, semi-scholarly works and government documents depict that madrassa reforms in General Musharraf era fell short of achieving the conceived outcomes of bringing about substantial changes into madrassa system of Pakistan. There emerged three schools of thought depicting the reasons of the failure of the state-led madrassa reforms from achieving the desired goals in General Musharraf era. Masooda Bano, Salim H. Ali, Robert Looney belonging to the first school of thought believed that ulama's stubborn and reluctant attitude led the madrassa reform plans into twilight as most of them did not want madrassas' activities to be scrutinized by the state perceiving that act as undermining of their autonomy. According to them, the ulama wanted to retain their hierarchy and for that reason madrassas of all sects got united under the umbrella of the ITMDP to resist government's efforts collectively in this regard.

The second school of thought having the most notable among proponents Christine Fair believes that lack of trust between madrassa and state in the backdrop of the US-led War on Terror drove the reforms towards failure. On the other side the proponents of third schools of thought having scholars such as Christopher Candland and Mumtaz Ahmad believe that there were flaws left by the state on the implementation stage of the reform process. Though this study supported the third school of thought as the government did not provide the infrastructure required to meet the objectives of each of the reform plans but the proponents of this school of thought have narrowly presented their views focusing just on few of the surfaced flaws ignoring the broader frame work of policy perspective in the military regime. Moreover, all the above mentioned schools of thought have either misperceived the reasons of providing relaxations to the madrassa stakeholders in reforms programs by the state or have solely ignored the covert objectives of reforming madrassas. This is the pioneer study that explored the ways state having most of the attributes of patrimonialism became a fertile entity for the military ruler to achieve optimum political interests for the regime through the madrassa reforms.

The chapter using the supportive arguments put forth by Robina Saigol and Fredrick Grare, candidly illustrates that Musharraf exploiting neo-patrimonial features of the state rationally achieved bi-dimensional objectives through madrassa reforms; firstly carved out space for the religious parties' alliance MMA in the national politics which appeared a fragile opposition and occasionally came

up as his B-team in legislative processes. Secondly, defaming madrassas and ulama through reform plans he kept the international community refrained from thinking about his replacement with any other option as the only left option he cooked up was MMA----an anti-American Alliance, which was also a state's recipient.

When the debate of the first school of thought was probe further by the policy making and literary circles, madrassas were defamed for promoting extremism and terrorism on the domestic, regional and global levels by Saleem H. Ali, ICG Reports, P. W. Singer and Reetz. This study negates the extended debates of the first school of thought on the basis of Bergan and Panday's study that gives some facts shattering madrassas' association with the national and transnational militancy and terrorism.

The state-led madrasa reforms set the stage for madrasa-state relations in Musharraf era. Most of the primary and secondary sources demonstrate that the madrasa-state relations remained apprehensive throughout Musharraf era. But, by putting the jig-saw puzzles together, this chapter concludes that madrasa-state relations were not as bad as portrayed in the scholarly works. Infact, the madrasa stakeholders enjoyed highest constitutional posts ranging from the leader of opposition in legislative to chief ministers and ministers in the provincial cabinets. Additionally, the demands of the state regarding reforms were hardly met as madrasa did not undergo any major shift in their traditional curriculum and countless madrasas remained unregistered.

The first and second schools of thought mutually share the opinion that the state adopted a very flexible attitude towards reforms plans after being oppressed by ulama as it shifted the Madrassa Reform Project to Ministry of religious education on ulama's objection over the involvement of Education Minister (a former ISI Director) to the Project, did not implement the proposed Ordinance 2002, made adjustments in the reform Ordinance 2005 and did not impose any punishments for those who did not comply with even the amended Ordinance. This study removed the misconception that the madrassa-reform plans were watered down in Musharraf era due to ulama's extreme pressure rather the military ruler rationally gave free hands to ulama to counter the reforms in order to safeguard the centralization of his power.

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Chapter 6

A Comparative Critical Analysis of Madrassa-State Relations in General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf eras

Introduction

This chapter makes a critical analysis of the short comings of the madrassa reforms which directed the madrassa-state relations in General Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf era. As both the military rulers came into power dismissing the democratic government, so few of the commonalities including the influences of external and internal dynamics are traced in the chapter. The chapter gives an analysis of the Islamization and Enlightened Moderation Philosophies of General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf respectively as these were also the foundation stones of their reforms plans towards madrassas. The chapter keeping in view the policy perspectives explains the reasons of the failure of public policies. As the madrassa-state relations in General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf eras were revolving around the state-led madrassa reforms in both era so, the state's shortcomings on formulation and implementation stages of the madrassa-reforms policy are also given in details in the chapter.

6.1 Commonalities in Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf's Era

Some of the commonalities can be traced to the military regimes of General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf. In the beginning, both the military leaders presented themselves as actors playing roles like that of Cincinnatus—a key legendary hero of the Roman Mythology who was called upon twice when the Empire's existence was threatened due to law and order situation and in a period of social decay, to restore the glories of the Roman Empire by performing the assigned tasks relevant to civic services of rebuilding social norms and institutions (Liddell, 2002) Their views (as mentioned in chapters three and four) seemed to be harmonized with that of Cincinnatus in a way they tried to show that they were holding their positions as a service, not an opportunity and raised enchanted slogans of Islamization and Enlightened Moderation as the ideological foundations of their dreams for the recreation of their society. The antithesis was that the Roman hero did not seek to retain power as when his Empire needed his services he accepted tasks assigned to him and renounced power upon completion of those services and returned to his farm to continue his private life that he had before power was conferred on him but both the Pakistan's military rulers sought to retain their regimes through every mean and adopted rational approach to undertake their personal set goals in spite of their publicly made assurances to restore democracy as soon as their much needed services for the society would be accomplished.

For instance, Zia-ul-Haq categorically announced while assuming power on July 5, 1977 that new elections would be conducted within 90 days and power would be handed over to newly elected government soon after elections but later

decided to postpone elections with a purpose to hold the accountability of the overthrown civilian government and for launching and implementation of Islamization policy for the state and society. This tactical delayed time was rationally utilized by the military government in mobilizing its support through political right and Islamic fundamentalists and orthodox groups to sustain his regime by weakening PPP. Musharraf in order to consolidate his regime removed President Rafique Tarar from his post on June 20, 2001 and assumed the position besides being the Chief Executive and the Army Chief and prolonged his regime by conducting and winning uncontested controversial referendum in 2002. Planning to stay long in power he issued Legal Framework Order which gave some more authority including dissolving the National Assembly to the President (Pildat, 2013).

Pakistan is a country where political institutions are not very much consolidated, where there is low political culture (Finer, 1962) and where people have minimal awareness about even their fundamental rights, so it became quite easy for the military rulers to make the public a prey to their tempted plans and deceptive ideologies that were engineered to gain some of their personal political interests. President Musharraf and President Zia used philosophies to justify their steps taken in the domestic political set up to fulfill their political needs. In this context, Zia's apparent inclinations towards religious segments and Musharraf's towards liberal circles were quite obvious which were also reflected through their Islamization and Enlightened Moderation philosophies (Rehman, K, personal communication, 14 July 2014).

6.2 A Critical Analysis of Islamization and Enlightened Moderation

Philosophies

Before we proceed towards the critical analysis of the madrassa reforms initiated in both the regimes, it is deemed necessary to find the critical analysis of Islamization and Enlightened Moderation ---the banners under which reforms were introduced in both the regimes as these were also known as the ideological foundations of those reform plans.

The term "Islamization" was interpreted differently by different sects, communities and classes of society. It is as hard to find the exact theme of Zia's Islamization program as to find the central theme of post-modernist writer Samuel Beckett's 'Waiting for Godot'. The interpretation of Godot varies from reader to reader and critic to critic. They interpret it God, Christ, hope, death etc. but no one is sure what the Godot is? Similarly, Islamization Program of Zia was interpreted by a layman as an effort to show reflection of Caliphate in the state achieved on ideological basis. Few critics believe that Islamization meant promoting equality, pursuit of scientific knowledge and applying traditional moral principles to contemporary circumstances (Aijazuddin, 2004) & (Saeed, 1994). There was another perception that Islamization program was a temptation to the ulama to play an active role in Pakistan's politics which they had been seeking since long.

Whatever the Godot and Islamization are; one thing is quite clear that both are the symbols. Godot is used to express destitute feelings of the 21st Century's frustrated man who is not satisfied even in a mechanical age which has

made his life easier and Islamization expressed the destitute feelings of a military ruler seeking symbol for presentation of products and issues that could provide him maximum benefits to prolong his regime. In short, the Islamization Program initiated by Zia elevated him to a "shepherd guarding his flock of sheep". It was a confusing and shallow ideology as it was crafted and peddled rationally for the political purposes to weave the nation into a religious fabric which could be helpful to support his regime.

Musharraf's Enlightened, Moderation philosophy apparently seemed resembling Buddhist's philosophy. Gautama Buddha identified four Noble truths; the universality of suffering, cause, solution and ways to overcome it. He travelled for many years to teach his wisdom about the suppression of all desires and force of love. He taught humanity that to do a little good is a noble deed. A man cannot be a perfect one unless he treats his fellow beings with kindness and consoles the abandoned. He claims that his doctrine is a doctrine of mercy and healthy reality is the only remedy against the evil (Philosophy of the East & West, 1984). This surely seems parallel to Musharraf's two pronged strategy of Enlightened Moderation that advises Muslims to shun militancy and the West to solve all problems and provide socio-economic aid to the Muslim world. The Muslims are advised to promote mercy and the West to accept healthy reality. The military ruler General Pervez Musharraf in the wake of 9/11 attacks and onset of the War on Terror seemed to garner the international support for his military regime by replacing the Clash of Civilization with that of Dialogue of Civilization adopting the Buddha's approach of promoting love all over the world.

On an in-depth analysis, his two-pronged philosophy also seems to be shallow as one can find that by advising the Muslim world to "shun militancy and extremism" he accepted the West's indictments that Muslims were militants and extremists. Secondly, focusing much on socio-economic deprivation of the Muslim world and ignoring the true essence of Islamic teaching that urges religion as a source of economic and social uplift; his plea to the West for economic aid to the Muslim world left misconception that the biggest concern for the Muslim world was just their bread and butter and Islam is a religion where materialistic gains are more valuable even at the cost of morality. In fact, most of the religions of the civilized world, including Islam do not give primary importance to the absolute materialistic gains.

General Pervez Musharraf elucidated his philosophy also on several occasions as the Muslims should be moderate following their religion which was interpreted as they should adopt modernism in their approach towards all matters to adjust themselves in the contemporary world. It was a true fact that interpretation of his Enlightened Moderation philosophy aimed at complete transition of society from religious ideological basis to contemporary adjustments. But his ideology which had a reflection of Buddhist philosophy was quite contrary in implementation as he used force to settle even petty political disputes on the domestic level. In short, the true essence of his Enlightened Moderation philosophy seemed contrary to the real Islamic teachings and injunctions from all aspects.

The philosophies and ideologies put forth by Zia ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf were shallow in their true implementation. These philosophies were

precipitated by both the military leaders at that time when external and internal situations were not quite favourable for them to retain their rules. Zia deposed Bhutto who was quite popular among the Muslim world due to his pro-Arab, Pan-Islamic, and pro-Third World rhetoric and policies which gained boost after the OIC's Conference hosted by Pakistan in 1974. Bhutto was equally respected by the majority of Pakistanis due to his sympathetic policies towards the poverty stricken segment of the society and ambitious nuclear programme⁷⁶. So, Zia's move to take over power was not welcomed on the external as well as internal forums on a larger scale. Similarly, when Musharraf captured power by dismissing the 2/3rd majority holder Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, he was not warmly welcomed by the people of Pakistan and that act was not appreciated by the international community because few major powers of the world were trying to outdo one another in their efforts to replace autocracy with the democracy all over the world using all their diplomatic channels such as in Iraq and Cuba. Saddam Hussain and Pedro Castro were facing a huge pressure from the international community regarding the restoration of democracy in their states. Zia and Musharraf were quite troubled by the internal and external pressure mounted on them and in the midst of all those situations Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf used their philosophies as a tool to satisfy the domestic and international community respectively.

Islamization philosophy was quite helpful for Zia ul Haq to win support on the domestic level as he connected all his decisions, including playing an active role against communism and crushing the domestic pro-democratic forces as fight

against un-Islamic forces and trends to his philosophy while Musharraf's strategy was welcomed by the West and opened doors for him to recognize legitimacy and acceptability among the world community as he gave hope to them to eradicate the practices which had created Pakistan's image as slave to centuries old traditions, which dominantly promoted gender discrimination and hatred against the non-Muslims in the entire society⁷⁷.

Both the leaders readily picked up madrassa to reflect the practical implementation of their philosophies. No doubt education is the driver of change in any society and for that reason religious education along with its institutions was targeted for reforms in both the military regimes. Apparently their philosophies needed no further interpretations and elaborations as the terms themselves were depicting their meanings but in reality they were quite ambiguous as they seemed quite divergent to each other but were two sides of the same coin peddled to pursue a common goal of getting legitimacy for the military regimes in both eras.

6.3 Why Public Policies Fail?

The policy making towards madrassas in both the military regimes was formulated around their above mentioned philosophies. Again, not to forget the Rational Choice theory where instrumental actors pursue course of actions or policy options that will most likely maximize their own utility as mentioned in chapter one. Applying the Rational Choice Model to public policy making, it can be found that the government's policies generally fail due to three major reasons:

Firstly, Bureaucratic behaviour ---- focus of bureaucrats on narrow bureaucratic goals instead of social goals.

Secondly, Rent Seeking behaviour---- few groups of society attempt to gain privileges from government at the cost of society on the whole.

Thirdly, Political opportunism-- short-term decisions of the politicians to retain or gain political support through votes in the re-elections. These can also be gained through short term manipulation of political or economic variables to get re-elected. (Schilder: 2000, p. 23)

In case of the state's policy towards madrassa in Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf era 'political opportunism' seemed to be dominant as both the leaders made short term policies and sought support from the madrassa based religious parties directly or indirectly through the state-led madrassa reforms to sustain and prolong their military regimes and in return got elected through uncontested referendums held in 1984 and 2002.

Few of the high-ups of madrassas adopted rent seeking behaviour and gained privileges from the governments at the cost of interests of the major political parties such as PPP in Zia era and PPP and PML-N in Musharraf era which were the most popular political parties of the society. For example as mentioned in chapters 3 and 5, few of the renowned figures of madrassa availed seats in parliament and provincial assemblies after being declared as eligible to contest elections as a result of the state-led madrassa reforms in Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf's era.

6.4 Analysis of the State's Policies towards Madrassas in Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf's Era

This chapter also makes an analysis to find the facts of the failures of the state-led madrassas reforms initiated under the banners of Islamization and Enlightened Moderation in both the military regimes.

If a policy is flawed on the formulation stage then it cannot produce remarkable outcomes beneficial for maximum stake-holders no matter how remarkably it is executed. Similarly, incompetence of the working machinery at the implementation stage can lead even the efficiently and effectively made policy towards failure as authorities handling policy on this stage would be unable to fill the gap between formulation and outcome stages of the policy process. So, formulation and implementation processes are absolutely interlinked. Certain features traced to show flaws in the formulation and implementation of the state-led policy towards madrassa in both the regimes are given as:

i. Unclear and Ambiguous Objectives

Objectives serve as a nucleus of any policy making process. The entire formulation and implementation processes revolve around the objectives. Well-defined objectives facilitate the policy makers to frame policies accurately. Clear objectives provide precise and clear ranking of the set objectives which become quite helpful in policy implementation and evaluation (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 2005). A well-designed policy is executed perfectly which produces outcomes revolving around the pre-set objectives. One of the biggest flaws in the state-led

policy making towards madrasa in both the military regimes was ambiguity of objectives as shown in the formulation of Sargodha and Halepota Reports in Zia era, PMEB Ordinance and Madrasa Reform Project (2002-03—2007) in Musharraf era.

The central objective of the reforms initiated in both the regimes was integration of secular and religious system of education in order to bring the madrasa students into mainstream national life. Firstly, the state-led madrasa reforms largely failed to produce the conceived outcomes in Zia era, as even on the very initial stages there was a great ambiguity created whether through the state-led madrasa reforms, the state sought to integrate the formal system of education with that of madrasa according to the avowed essence of Islamization program or the state wanted to secularize and modernize the religious education system by integrating them into formal education system which meant the secularization and modernization of religious education institutions, not Islamization of society. For that reason the ulama of all sects were favouring reform programs in the beginning but later some of their renowned figures turned against them when the plan got a workable shape as mentioned in chapter 3. In Musharraf regime integration of two systems of education was perceived as secularization of religious education according to the philosophy of Enlightened Moderation which could be helpful for the madrasa graduates to opt for professions other than rendering mere religious services which generated perceptions that besides getting religious education the madrasa students would have to get command on secular knowledge too.

The world has made many-folds progress in all the branches of knowledge in comparison to the Golden Times of the Muslim world. With the enrichment in knowledge the sub-divisions of all subjects and areas have been made which means that the broader areas are narrowed down and much stress is laid on perfection of individual's narrow specialized areas. Although religious education in Pakistan has been unaltered for the last few centuries but it is considered as a special area of specialization which has no direct relevance with the formal system of education. In Pakistan's set up even a layman knows that as Medical Colleges produce doctors who provide treatment for physical ailment, in the same way madrassas are functioning to produce *Huffaz, Qurra, Ulama, Mudarrisean, Mufti, Mefassirean, Muhaqqiditeen, Mubalighheen* etc. who deal with the matter of religion and spirituality. In these conditions when sub-divisions of all areas of knowledge have been made and madrassas have also confined themselves to impart religious education, we cannot expect madrassas to produce Abu Mashar, Jabir Bin Hayan, Abu Mansur, Ibn Zakariya-ul-Razi, Abu Wafa, Al-Khawarzmi or Umer Khayyam who had command on diverse and multiple areas of knowledge.

No doubt Islam is a complete code of life and encompasses all the spheres of life, but in Pakistan's situation the policy makers failed to realize that the state was founded in the name of Islamic ideology and the inhabitants have strong affinity with the religion which was inculcated in them centuries ago with the advent of Sufis and establishment of madrassas in the sub-continent but nurtured and strengthened during the colonial rule when religion seemed to be the panacea

of all ills and miseries of the Muslim community. So, it was the same time period when a line was drawn between religion and other worldly affairs and a huge portion of the Muslim community preferred to take refuge in the religious realm to overcome their grieves emerged out of their lost glories⁷⁸. As in the light of the historic perceptions, separation of religious and worldly life nurtured during colonial era with the establishment of Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband and Ali Garh Movement in which former protected religious values and teachings and latter managed to secure politics and economy of the Muslims of the sub-continent, (Usmani, 2004) it can be found that the two systems of education have always believed to have different aims as in formal system of education the betterment of materialistic life seems dominant and modern nationalism is considered as the foremost task to achieve in order to retain the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state while religious education revolves around spiritual satisfaction and salvation in the eternal life and nationalism in Islam stretches beyond territorial limits as the concept of pan-Islamism replaces nationalism. So, absolute integration of the two systems seemed a far-fetched and exaggerated phenomenon.

The military rulers also failed to realize that in a society where people take food thrice a day to fill their appetite but to get spiritual appetite or purge their souls they offer prayer five times a day, where people are motivated to start every task in their daily life in the name of Almighty Allah and where people have strong feelings that their state was achieved on the basis of Islamic ideology on the most sacred day of the Islamic Calendar (27th Ramadan), there it would become quite difficult and unnatural to impose such plans that aimed to minimize

the influence if not respect of religious education in the entire society. In this context, no matter how much resources and energies were utilized to achieve a complete integration of the two systems of education, it would not be possible without achieving the consent and suggestions of the ulama.

There appeared some more confusion regarding the objectivity of the Ordinance in Musharraf regime. According to the Deeni Madaris Registration and Regulation Ordinance 2002, the DM would be controlled and supervised by the PMEBC which clearly showed that the purpose of the Ordinance was taking control of the madrassas and taking into consideration these objectives, the administration of madrassas clearly disagreed and strongly rejected the Ordinance. They held the opinion that this Ordinance was an extension of previous Ordinance and had strongly harmed the spirit of PMEBC Ordinance 2001 which aimed not to impose curriculum or force madrassas to get them affiliated with the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board rather aimed to establish Model Madrassas (Muhammad, N. Muhammad, D., Shafiq, & Shah, 2011).

There arose some confusions in even Pakistan Madrassa Education Board Ordinance 2001, as the term Board usually denotes the education level up till intermediate while the PMEBC was given task to cover the madrassa education up till Masters level and even to PhD level. So, the term like Commission could have been more understandable instead Board in the title of the Ordinance 2001 (Muhammad, N. Jan, Butt, & Shafique, 2011).

ii. **Authorities' Failure to Take into Account Real Problems of Madrassas**

In both the state-led madrasa reforms it was recommended in Halepota and Sargodha Reports in Zia era and PMEB Ordinance and Madrasa Reforms Project (2002-03--2007) in Musharraf era to introduce the secular subjects at the Primary, Middle and Secondary levels.

The policy makers did not realize on the formulation stage that madrasas had accommodated all categories of students including those who were mentally fit but physically handicapped or who inspite of their families' utmost struggle were misfit for private and government systems of formal education due to their slow learning capabilities. In Pakistan there are very few institutions of special education or vocational training⁷⁹ (limited to big cities) to accommodate those types of learners, so parents prefer to send their special children and their slow learners to madrasa so that they are not deprived of atleast getting knowledge of any sort helpful to build their professional career and mental growth. While suggesting syllabus for Deeni madaris, rationally it was not viewed critically that the slow learners who failed to perform in secular school system would be overburdened due to addition of some extra secular subjects into madrasa curriculum as the timings of the madrasa which was already more than that of school timings also seemed short to them to cover syllabus of religious subjects. Moreover, the blend of secular and religious subjects would surely produce a cadre of scholars neither experts in religious knowledge nor in worldly affairs.

The ulama held the opinion that the Quran, Sharia and Sunnah provide principles regarding all the aspects of life if these are interpreted correctly because

Islam is a complete code of life, so this noble task should be accurately performed by them only and that cannot be performed efficiently if madrassa graduates' attentions are diverted to the modern subjects.

iii. **Inappropriate Selection of Subjects and Material for Madrassa Syllabus**

The addition of economics, Political Science and English etc. did not seem to have any relevance with the integration of madrassa education system to that of formal education system. On the formulation stage selected material of the above mentioned secular subjects were recommended with the objective to enable the students to get admission in higher studies and adopt any professions other than just related to the religious affairs. In Pakistan competitive exams are criterion to get government jobs, especially relevant to teaching and higher studies. As according to the reforms the madrassa students would have to study few chapters of modern subjects in their curriculum and there was no modification recommended to limit the curriculum of competitive exams for jobs or higher studies keeping in view the selected chapters studied by madrassa graduates, so, there seemed quite a rare opportunity for the madrassa students to build their academic and professional career outside religious spheres on the basis of just selected material of secular subjects included in their syllabus. Addition of religious subjects in madrassa curriculum on the initial stage could tilt the focus of students towards gaining worldly knowledge more than the religious knowledge and there were always prospects that if variety of secular subjects like Urdu, Math, Science, Social Studies and English etc. were introduced in madrassas, the bright students would opt for preferably for the secular subjects due to their

variety and join public or private schools leaving madrassas which in other words means 'Brain Drain'.

iv. **Comprehension Problems Ignored**

In Pakistan where students often face the English language comprehension problem even after passing the graduation exams in the secular education system and in this condition it's quite unrealistic to expect that madrassa students would study English and teach it proficiently or play any role in the society concerning English language. In the state's formal system of education there is a common trend that number of students feel need of extra coaching of different subjects⁸⁰ like English, Math, Science on the primary level and English, Economics, Math etc. on the Secondary and above levels after school and college timings to comprehend concepts more clearly as majority of the teachers in formal system of education either due to lack of resources or incompetency are unable to make the concepts clear in the class rooms. Two things are quite understandable; firstly, if madrassa students who were studying free of cost in madrassa felt the need of extra coaching it would become an extra economic burden on poor families who had avoided formal education system due to its high expenses and secondly attending madrassa and then joining extra coaching centers for formal subjects would make students even more overburdened. So, that's the reason these were unacceptable to the madrassa authorities. Obviously, these subjects were new for the madrassa students and if these were introduced students would give more time to these subjects at the cost of timings of the religious subjects. In that way due to

lack of command in either area they would be unable to render services in secular as well as religious fields.

v. **Tedious Process**

Much of the delay in implementation stage made the process tedious as for instance initially an amount of 20 million was allocated for the program soon after the issuance of notification of PMEB Ordinance on September 8, 2001 but the amount was transferred wasting much of time in "typical bureaucratic codal formalities" on August 8, 2002 and occurrence of 9/11 incident soon exacerbated the situation (Muhammad, N. Butt, N. Ahmed & Omer, 2012) which offended the public generally and madrasa stakeholders particularly and led the madrasa reform plans towards failure in Musharraf era.

In Zia regime too, surveys and reports were concluded in 1978 and 1979 but the main objective of integration of religious system of education with the formal system could not have been initiated in its true essence until 1983 and even then it was implemented partially as discussed in chapter 3.

vi. **Inaccurate Statistics**

In a flawed policy often the procedures for implementation are not laid, correct facts and figures are not consulted then its practical implementation becomes a far-fetched phenomenon (Lorton & Rolph, 2000). There sorts of flaws in reforms formulation process were observed frequently in madrasa reforms programs launched by both the military governments which showed that they had rational approach to achieve some short-term political interests through madrasa reform programs. Whenever policy is made the total population for whom the

policy is being made must be considered accurately as the foremost measure. But the policy makers did not have accurate figures of madrasa population which showed their inefficiency to initiate and conclude state-led madrasa reforms.

The madrasa statistics varied from one government official to another in Musharraf's era and those not too with some narrow differences but with a huge margin of ranging for about 1% to 33%. The ICG's Report gave figures 33% of madrasa enrollment which was quoted in madrasa discussion widely across the world and even the government administration did not know the exact figures. The World Bank's study gave the figures of madrasa enrollment as less than 1%. This controversial statistics really became Achilles' heel in a way of the reforms' success as both the governments never had an idea that how much allocation of resources and working machinery engaged in implementation of reforms would be enough to get the expected outcomes in the prescribed time periods.

vii. Governments Failed to Define Problem

Professor Charles Lindblom said that the policy makers are never provided concrete and well defined problems rather they have to identify and formulate the problems before making policies (Anderson, 2014). In Musharraf era, the government failed to understand and justify the reasons of launching reform programs accurately.

Any public policy can only be addressed well if the problem diagnosis or issue analysis is correct. The government failed to diagnose whether the backwardness in religious education was the real dilemma or hurdle in making the society progressed and moderate and for that purpose reforms were necessary or

whether madrassa was a great threat to the international security so for that purpose the reforms were necessary. The state itself in Musharraf regime was confused to justify the reasons of the reforms introduction. At first it was quite focused prior to 9/11 that the reforms purely meant to serve the interests of the madrassa students but later made a shift in the stance and declared that the reforms meant to serve the larger interests of the international community as by eradicating the militancy preached in Pakistan's madrassa, transnational militancy would be overcome. Besides, the government failed to enlist priorities among madrassa curriculum, registration and regulation. PMEB Ordinance focused much on curriculum while the post-9/11 plans such as Madrassa Registration and Regulation Ordinance 2005 and Madrassa Reform Project 2002-03-2007 dominantly targeted registration and regulation of madrassas. Sometimes registration process seemed at the top of agenda and sometimes alteration in curriculum was made prior. Even if the reforms were well made their time and place seemed inaccurate or unsuitable. The government failed to define and justify the reasons of launching reforms in true terms.

In Zia regime too, one can find that the government failed to justify whether reforms were necessary for the betterment of the madrassa students so that they could participate in the matters of national affairs other than just performing their limited specific roles or under the Islamization program the madrassa reforms were necessary to purge the society by expanding the role of madrassa graduates in all the affairs of the state such as economics, politics,

education etc. So, the accurate motive of introduction of reforms was not clear either in Zia era or in Musharraf era.

viii. Mis-management of the Authorities

Sabatier and Mazamanian (2005) have found that one of the obstacles in the implementation stage is lack of coordination among all who are involved in implementation efforts. The Madrasa Reform Project (2002, 2003—2007) failed because of its horizontal and vertical division of responsibilities as it was divided among Ministries of Education, Internal affairs and Religious Affairs (Ahmad, M. 2009), horizontally and between provinces and federal governments vertically. All those involved in reforms process instead of showing their active involvement in the state-led madrasa reforms preferred to be away from the project, taking it as an extra burden on the ministries and provincial government departments. There was an extreme lack of coordination between the provincial and federal governments and even within the ministries of federal governments. The shift of reforms from Education Ministry to Religious Affairs Ministry and the indirect role of Internal Ministry meant the mis-management of government to implement madrasa reforms efficiently in Musharraf era (Fair, 2008).

The reforms were divided among different hands so that's why no one accepted responsibility of their poor implementation. There was no central body coordinating all the reforms process independently. Number of people from different ministries and bureaucracy were involved in reforms process but with limited power and defined boundaries while the real authority laid with the Chief Executive who was rationally more interested in presenting cosmetic

implementation as a great success to get legality from the international community for his regime. The reforms were not well comprehended by the authorities from top to bottom. The President or Chief Executive's objectives regarding reforms were quite converse on certain occasions to the officially stated objectives while at the lower level the government officials were pursuing for the goals interpreted by them individually. When one objective was to bring madrasa into mainstream no one knew exactly as how it would be achieved. None of the officials on the lower level knew how the reforms would be implemented in a coordinated way.

In Zia regime we can find that Zakat money was allocated to the provinces by the Center and their disbursement process was not well co-ordinated. The introduction of secular subjects was not planned well after getting ulama's consensus. The government authorities were heading towards their planned programs of addition of secular subjects in madrasa curriculum while the madrasa authorities of each sect were planning to adopt their own amended curriculum (Zaman, 1999). So, there was an extreme lack of coordination regarding reforms between the madrasa ulama and the government in Zia era.

ix. Contradictions in madrasa reform programs

In Zia era, it was claimed that autonomy of madrasa would be ensured but one can find that in reality many madrassas were made submissive through disbursement of Zakat money. In Musharraf's era too, PMEBO was full of contradictions as on one side it mentioned that the autonomous status of madrassas would be maintained but did not discuss the ways to retain their autonomy and on the other side the government itself was handling the

administrative matters like appointments of the administration of Model Deeni Madaris, and other affairs. In a neo-patrimonial state all the appointed members for of any committee or cabinet actually act as puppet while the real authority lies with the 'big man' who holds an unchallengeable authority. Same President Musharraf did not want to delegate authority over any matter specifically PMEB to any one rather preferred to keep that authority with the government.

Autonomy is directly proportional to administrative affairs. When an institution is claimed to be autonomous then it means that it is free to make decisions purely relevant to internal matters. The PMEO that sought to establish Pakistan Madrassa Education Board was not very expressly stated and promulgated as the status of Wafaqs and Tanzeems was not made clear whether they would be dismissed or if still existed then what their role would be in the presence of newly designed PMEB. It seemed that by establishing Model Deeni Madrassas the government was keen to reform the religious education in Pakistan instead of existing madrassas system because the reforms central objective was to provide a role model to the existing madrassas regarding curriculum. The setting of Model Deeni Madrassas was perceived as a challenge to the existing madrassa network and as interference in madrassas domain as they would likely act as a catalyst to diffuse the hierarchy of the ulama who were administration of their respective madrassas. In those conditions it was quite difficult that madrassas would retain their autonomy.

x. No Evaluation Report Published

Generally policies are not evaluated due to several reasons that include ; lack of time and resources, lack of skills and experiences, thinking it politically not wise as failure would be described and advertised, lack of appropriate necessary information and absence of authority or organization with sufficient mandate and required capacity in this regard (Dover & Handmer, 2012).

In Zia era no report appeared regarding the practical implementation of reforms about major issues such as facts concerning the consumption of money allocated to the madrassas from the Zakat. In Musharraf era too, if the government was sincere in implementation of Madrassa reforms then why the report (if any) regarding evaluation of Model Deeni Madrassas' performance and information about enrollment, building, teachers etc. in context to Pakistan's society was not made public.

Although all the aforementioned reasons for not holding evaluation of the madrassa reform policies in Zia and Musharraf era seemed more or less convincingly relevant but "thinking it politically not wise as failure would be described and advertised" seemed quite within the frame work of rational approach that both the leaders have adopted in the policy making towards madrassas in their respective eras.

xi. Madrassa Administration were Benefitted More than Students

Policies often fail when the central authority holder has some personal interests to achieve. Both the governments could introduce social reforms in any other sectors or institutions of the state for the welfare of the people but they rationally

preferred madrassas as they could be more helpful to sustain their regimes. Generally it is observed that the madrassa students are hard-liners towards attaining their goals. Majority of them are disconnected from the society and their surroundings are confined within premises of madrassa while their only source of reliable information is their teachers. Much of their time is spent with their peers and teachers who are also products of madrassas. So, their outlooks are always quite narrow. In Zia regime when Zakat money was disbursed to madrassas, their administrations utilized money on construction (Zaman, 1999) and attaining materialistic gains which became permanent assets of madrassas while to achieve standardization of madrassa education nothing was ever tried sincerely.

In other words the real meaning of madrassa was ignored which was not construction of building but which meant 'students and teachers, where students and teachers sit together, teacher starts teaching and students learning, that is known as madrassa, irrespective of whether it is under the shadow of a tree, desert, any island or a mountain's peak. (Usmani, 2007, p.33) Ignorant of the aforementioned injustices, the madrassa students were quite submissive to their administrations and they were ready all the time even to be martyred following their teachers' directions. Through the reforms the madrassa's high-ups were involved by the governments in national and international political affairs to win their support and to expand their influence in the areas where madrassa network was more functional particularly in rural areas. The state-madrassa relations turned to be patron-client relations (neo-patrimonial feature) through disbursement of Zakat money in Zia and through Madrassa Reforms Project in

Musharraf era where clients were given concessions at the cost of backing the military regimes in the state as mentioned in Neo-patriamonialim Theory described in chapter one. Although, for the time being some more job opportunities for the madrassa graduates were opened as a result of the new madrassa networks but in the long run unemployment of the madrassa graduates increased disproportionately in Zia era. The standardization of the curriculum was absolutely ignored by the madrassa authorities. It was the task that they could handle well but all five wafaq and tanzeemat failed to reach a unanimous syllabus for all the madrassas of Pakistan. In short, the real problems of madrassa students were ignored as the focus was on construction and influential posts for high-ups in regimes' political set-ups.

xii. Basic Needs of the Students Ignored

In Pakistan madrassas provide food, lodging and education to the orphans and deprived children who are a large segment of the society (Butt, 2012). In both the state-led madrassa reforms administrative matters and other issues relevant to the curriculum were rationally tried to be adjusted in order to shape the role of madrassa administration and graduates according to the state's desired perspective but nothing was suggested for the good nutrition of the students who were bound to spend much time in madrassa due to their tough schedule and lengthy timings which showed that the state was more interested in activating the madrassa graduates to play a vital role in political and social affairs leaving their personal benefits aside. If the reforms had been introduced purely for the benefits of the students then their food standard should have been given a central place in the

reforms because the mental health is directly proportional to physical health. Students' genuine problems were hardly addressed in reforms introduced in madrassa system of Pakistan.

xiii. Reforms were shaped and re-shaped to serve the State's Interest

On the implementation stage Zia government showed a great flexibility and declared madrassa degrees at a par with the degrees of formal education system without making any innovation. Even, the medium of instruction was not changed too. As a result few of the flaws emerged when these reforms were practically implemented as the state tried to achieve the pre-set objectives regarding madrassa reforms even without implementing the proposed reforms in their real spirit as mentioned in chapter 5. The recommendations on the formulation stage were not meeting the criteria of their feasible practical implementations that could bring a real constructive change into the madrassa system in Pakistan. In Zia regime the secular subjects which were given 33% weightage at the Primary and Middle levels were reduced to 12% at the Master level. So, in short imbalanced equity of degrees was made between madrassa education system and formal education system.

In neo-patrimonial states the central authority holder usually undermines the strategies that can likely threaten practices useful for him to retain the regime. As it was a long term project that required 16 years to launch and come into cycle but concessions made to the madrassa graduates turned it a short term project with limited objectives surrounding around goal of just turning madrassa manpower into loyal government servants who would take active part in the domestic politics

on one side and wage jihad in Afghanistan on the other side to serve the US interests which in return would provide legitimacy to the Zia's military regime on the international level. So, for that reason the lack of political will on the part of government at the implementation stage left the reforms plan unsuccessful.

In Musharraf era PMEBO failed as funds were received from the international community with the target of setting up thousands of madrassas throughout the country but only three were established and those too had not very encouraging enrollment. They were limited to Capital and a province and the government earmarked a little amount for them.

The state-led madrassa reforms revolved around short term political imperatives as out of the numbers of set objectives of madrassa reforms, the government rationally fulfilled just one bypassing the rest of objectives i.e. provided opportunity to madrassa graduates to play role in national affairs as their degrees were equalized to the formal system of education and they were allowed to contest elections. In other words outcomes were achieved even before implementation of reforms in their true essence. In a neo-patrimonial states the access to resources are always at the discretion of the ruler. As a result, the religious segment of society who was known as anti-Musharraf made a political alliance MMA and got benefits from the reforms directly as its members were declared eligible to contest the elections. Actually, Musharraf lacked insight and motivation as he knew that some 2 billion would be required to overhaul madrassa education system and the 5 million given by the US could hardly bring any remarkable change into madrassa education system. Musharraf rationally delayed

the reforms process and gave time to religious political parties to gain support from public and become a political power strong enough to make the US realized about the importance of Musharraf as his disappearance from the powerful Chief Executive's office could be replaced with madrassa based religious parties (Ahmad, personal communication on July1, 2014).

xiv. Relevant Stake Holders not involved

In Zia era ulama were rationally not appointed as heads of committees that were assigned tasks to propose reforms regarding madrassas. In all the madrassa reforms efforts during the Musharraf's era too, the government kept the relevant stakeholders at a distance⁸¹. The revision of curriculum which was a matter purely to be handled by the madrassa authorities dominantly was given to bureaucrats and others who had no knowledge about madrassa curriculum. In Zia era, the committee that was assigned to formulate reforms was comprised of just 1/3rd representatives of religious segments⁸².

In Musharraf era, it was assured that PMEBC would enjoy the status of an autonomous body while out of 21 members' Board there were more Secretaries of different provincial and Federal level ministries whose status was higher than the Chairman of any education board of the country so, they did not bother to attend the meetings of Board. Three members from the Ministry of Science and Technology were included in the Board who were bureaucrats rather than the experts in Science Education (Mukarram, N. Jan, Butt & Shafique, 2011).

xv. Hasty Decision to Contend the International Community

The Musharraf government instead of making long term policies for the madrassas relied rationally on short term policies that could produce some quick outcomes presentable as an achievement for the government to make its image better in the eyes of the international community. Instead of introducing any rules and regulations for already enrolled foreign students in Pakistan's madrassa the government directed the madrassa administration in haste to expel all the foreign students immediately. The restrictions imposed on madrassas to expel foreign students was made to satisfy the US and its allies that Pakistan's government was withdrawing the role of state's institutions in spreading suspected transnational jihad while the ulama considered that the Muslim Ummah stretched all over the world and were united far beyond the territorial restrictions and to expel the foreign Muslim students meant negation of the Islamic concept of Millat. In short, madrassa reforms initiatives in General Pervez Musharraf's era failed due to lack of political will of the state to handle the matters in an easy way.

xvi. Suspicion

Suspicion had been a dominant feature of the state-led madrassa reforms in Musharraf era.

a. Language of the Reforms evoked Suspicion

Although the money granted through the USAID for the Madrassa Reform Project made the reform efforts suspicious and all five Wafaqs refused to accept the money offered under the MTE but the language of the Madrassa Ordinance made it even more dubious in the post 9/11 era as it matched with the language of

the western discourse on madrassa in the post 9/11 period (as mentioned in Chapter 6) led the ulama to think that reforms were the brain child of the US and West and hence were a part of the global agenda of the west. Actually Musharraf had to deal on two platforms regarding madrassa reforms i.e. global and domestic. In order to satisfy the global actors who were encouraging and providing financial support to madrassa reform project, he harmonized his demands with that of the major donors of MRP. The repetition of no, none and other words that impose restrictions were frequently used in the Ordinance 2005. The words 'no', 'none' etc. are used to forbid someone who is under the absolute control of a commanding authority. On one side authorities considered madrassa as an autonomous entity but on the other side their commands of such sort nourished suspicions and made madrassa authorities furious enough to resist the government's plans regarding madrassas. The lexicon of his reform plans seemed a reflection of 9/11 Commission Report and the American officials' responses. As a result distrust bred between state and madrassa administration which further made the reforms uneasy to be implemented.

It was a very critical move from the government side to launch the reform project under the supervision of so many government departments. It should have been given just under the supervision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs with complete authority. The Deeni Madaris registration and regulations' process was not appropriate too as their demand for the establishment of independent boards for madrassas could have been fulfilled. The drop scene of the Lal Masjid episode

added fuel to the reforms failure as the public opinion turned against reforms and ulama of all sects got united over all matters of madrassa issues. There also arose a suspicion that the introduction of secular subjects in madrassa could loosen the grip of the madrassa administration over their staff as most of them were ignorant of those secular subjects and they were reluctant to add them with a fear of losing their autonomy.

5. Lack of Trust on all Levels

During Zia era madrassa and state had trust worthy relations and both were on the same page regarding some global affairs. There was an absolute lack of trust between madrassa and state during Musharraf era as it was believed by the religious segment of the society that the state-led madrassa reforms were introduced solely under the immense international pressure aiming to either eliminate madrassas from the society or to withhold their autonomy (Rehman, K. personal Communication, July 14, 2014). The reforms processes were initiated in both the regimes which were followed by their stiff resistance which ultimately led to either reversal or modification of those plans. In both the regimes it was perceived shortly after implementation that reforms mis-matched the genuine needs of madrassas or lacked their adaptability in the society, in particularly the existing formal educational set-up.

When Musharraf took over the charge of the government, he declared Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of Turkey as his role model whose religious reforms were disliked by the ulama on a larger scale. This generated perceptions that Musharraf was anti-Islamic which further got strengthened by few of his acts such as

extraction of words Islamic Republic from the oath for PCO judges as instead of Islamic Republic of Pakistan just Pakistan was used and extraction of Surah Touba from the curriculum at matric level and efforts to amend Hudood Ordinance (Muhammad, N. Khan, M. 2011). The moves on the part of government turned the ulama against the government.

One can find that the pre-9/11 approach was absolutely revolving around Enlightened Moderation and it aimed to modernize madrassas by altering their curriculum while the post-9/11 approach was around their management as institutions. The state-led labyrinth of reform initiatives were quite blurred as they lingered between education and management. The government aimed to improve standard of education in madrassa prior to 9/11 but after that it focused on just security perspectives. The pre-9/11 reforms generated suspicion in the society that the state sought to reform Islam using the tag of Enlightened Moderation to gain the support of the global powers while the ulama's suspicions regarding the post-9/11 reforms were nourished as a result of the US aid for the reform programs. They believed that the US wanted to reduce the threat of Clash of civilization and during the colonial era too efforts were made to abolish the religious system of education. It was believed that the West and the US wanted to remove the imprints of Islamic teachings as they feel threat to their glory from the Muslim world and for that purpose they use leaders like Musharraf to achieve their agendas. So, to blame ulama for being suspected of reforms did not mean that ulama's reservations were illegal rather the language of those reforms plans

expressed by the government and global scenario opened the doors of critical thinking for the ulama regarding reforms' facts.

In short, in Musharraf regime the reforms were suspicious for every one. The donors were suspicious of the presence of madrassa based religious parties in parliaments and their strong representations in the provincial assemblies which was made possible due to Musharraf's few concessions for the madrassa degree holders. The madrassas were suspicious of the government's close ties with the US and the West as each new reforms project followed the terrorists' attack such as 9/11 and 7/7. While the government was suspicious that the madrassa administration had reluctant attitude towards reforms as they posed challenge to state's writ. The suspicion was one of the dominant factors that had nurtured negative perceptions of each actor towards one another.

It is quite clear that the end of defective policies do not always fall short of achieving the desired goals rather they sometimes prove to be damaging which the worst picture of failures is. No doubt that the state affairs are run by the government within limits of constitution but one thing must not be ignored that policies are interrelated; one policy may create disequilibrium by harming other policies or become a source for the failure of other policies or itself meet the miserable end because of the other policies. It can be found that how some other policies relevant to foreign policy, security and religious affairs were affected directly and indirectly by the state's policies' towards madrassas in both regimes. The flaws left at the formulation and implementation stages in the state's policy

making tower's madrassas in both the regimes as depicted above clearly lead us to conclusions that they aimed at maximization of their personal political benefits in both eras and neo-patrimonial features of the state paved the way to achieve the desired goals of the state.

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Conclusions

This study has drawn four conclusions regarding the policy of the state towards madrassas in General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf era.

Firstly, this study negating all the scholarly and semi-scholarly works depicting that the state-led madrassa reforms policies in both the addressed military regimes failed claims that the madrassa reforms policy in both the addressed eras achieved the desired goals of the state. Objectives serve as a nucleus of any policy making process. The entire policy making process revolves around the pre-set objectives. Any public policy's evaluation is largely dependent on objectives. All the existed literature and primary sources have illustrated the objectives of the madrassa reforms plans in both eras that dominantly aimed bringing the madrassas into mainstream national life through reforms which were recommended to be achieved through integration of formal system of education with that of madrassa system. This showed that the central objective was comprised of two parts; as "why to reform and how to reform" madrassa. The first part scratches roles for them in mainstream national life and the second part carves out the ways to achieve the first part. Neither any scholarly study nor policy makers have explicated the term "mainstreaming" in Pakistan's context. (For example Prof. Niharrajan has elaborated the concept in Indian context as "territorial unit of India, democracy, secularism and planned economy of which

industrialization is the means and socialism is the goal are the four tributaries that constitute the mainstream of contemporary Indian life” (Mehta, 2006. P. 162). This is the pioneer study that claims on the basis of arguments that for the military rulers mainstreaming of madrassas into national life meant to create space for them in the state’s politics undermining other liberal political parties and groups (that could likely impose a threat to the regimes) to sustain their respective regimes. This study concludes that reforms policies in both eras were successful to achieve the targeted goals as madrassas’ influential figures were assigned roles in the state’s politics which also strengthens the assertion that for the military rulers mainstreaming meant to seek rational ways to strengthen military regimes in a patrimonial state. Infact, in a public policy ways of implementation have never been a constant phenomenon as these are subjects to change depending on the time and space. Furthermore, the flaws left at the formulation and implementation stages (mentioned in chapter 6) such as ambiguity in integration of madrassa education system with the formal education system, ignoring the real problems, basic needs and comprehension capabilities of madrassa students, inappropriate selection of subjects, lack of accurate statistics, failing to define madrassa problems in both eras, mis-management of authorities and shaping and reshaping reform plans provide strong constructive arguments to the claim that in both the regimes mainstreaming meant providing roles to madrassas in politics to serve regimes which were directly dependent on reform plans. All relaxations and flexibilities in reform plans served as a catalyst to give more political support to the regimes. The conclusions of chapters 4 and 5 referring to Fredrick Grare,

Marium Mefti, Rebina Saigol and ICG Reports besides others clearly showed that madrassa's renowned figures' political positions in both the military regimes were driven out of those flexibilities given to the madrassa graduates. The flaws left at the formulation and implementation stages were left rationally as they were irrelevant to the central objective of bringing "the madrassas into mainstream" the state sought to achieve.

Secondly, this study concludes that what was good for madrassa students and graduates or what were their real interests remained quite opaque and blurred throughout the Zia and Musharraf eras. Neither the state nor the madrassa administration had ever defined or elucidated the interests of the madrassa students or graduates. This is the pioneer study that pointing out the grey area strongly asserts that the interests of madrassa administration were by no way reflecting the interests of the other madrassa stakeholders particularly the students and graduates in both eras. In other words the interests of madrassa administrations and students were absolutely divergent and mis-matched each others. As shown in the conclusion of chapter 4, when on one side the madrassa and state were enjoying bi-lateral cordial relations in Zia era as their administration was exalted through reforms by opening new vista for them in politics which they had been longing for since the inception of the state while on the other side unemployed bulk of madrassa graduates unaware of any role if existed in the new political setup readily embraced the directions of the madrassa administration who were their teachers to wage jihad in Afghanistan to promote pan-Islamism which was taught to them as an important component of

Islamization. The contributions of madrasa graduates over the directions of their teachers who were state's recipients made Pakistan a major global player and in this way they rendered selfless services to enhance the military ruler's stature among the community of the nations who was already in a dire need of getting accommodation and legitimacy for the regime on the international level. Same, in Musharraf era too, the madrasa administration apparently showing inertia, resisting any transition or transformation in madrasa system or curriculum in the form of reforms were enjoying organic unity with the regime in the state's political setup by holding highest constitutional posts while defamation was brought to the students and graduates who were kept deprived of any sort of political or economic benefits. As concluded in chapter 5 that the key position holders in Musharraf era who were also running their respective madrassas did not impose any threat rather served as a shield for the military ruler on the international level as they were the only left (unsuitable) option for his replacement with the global power. This study concludes that neither the state nor the ulama who were administering madrassas were by any way seeking the real madrasa reforms beneficial for the students in the long run rather behind the curtain the economic and political gives and takes between the state and madrasa administration which was a clientelistic practice--- a hallmark of neo-patrimonialism was just tagged as madrasa reforms in both eras. In short, this study infers that the madrasa reforms policy in both the aforementioned eras served as camouflage for the policy of mutual concessions between the state and

madrassa administrations as the term madrassa practically excluded students in both the state-led reforms processes.

Thirdly, this study concludes that the state-led madrassa reforms in the addressed eras anchored the roots of some multifaceted problems in the society which kept on multiplying simultaneously and are existed as major threats to the very existence of the state even in the contemporary era. The study argued that the armed culture to which the Pakistani society was unfamiliar prior to 1980 was promoted in Zia era when in the name of jihad in Afghanistan under the banner of Islamization, a notable number of madrassa graduates and students were trained under the patronage of the army which left the mission unwrapped even after the Soviets's withdrawal. The same cult of Mujahideen who later strengthened themselves and managed to setup a 'state within a state' were exploited by the state's external enemies who united them under the flag of TTP and motivated them to wage jihad against the state to counter Enlightened Moderation (which was confined to just the President's office) and regain Islamization specifically after the Lal Masjid Operation. Additionally, the reforms in Zia era brought some new vertical and horizontal divisions in a society which was already divided on the ethnic basis. As concluded in chapter 4, the society in Zia era got divided on religious and secular basis vertically when some new adjustments shaped the politics of Pakistan to accommodate the religious segment and on sectarian basis horizontally as a result of favouring one sect and undermining another under the essence of Islamization. In other words, the very foundations of the society shattered due to reforms. In Musharraf era madrassas were rationally blamed for

the failure of reforms by the military ruler to such an extent that the West started considering Islam, militancy and madrassa—synonyms to one another which also left some long-lasting implications.

Fourthly, the present study concludes that rational approach of the military rulers and neo-patrimonial attributes of the state went hand in hand and left some wide ranging marks on the policy of the state towards madrassas in General Zia and General Pervez Musharraf era. The entire state-led madrassa reforms policy could be narrated as journeys of the regimes of rational military rulers from illegitimacy to legitimacy on the domestic as well as international levels in a neo-patrimonial state. One can find that in Zia era madrassas were owned and backed not only by the state but also by the global powers as shown in chapter 4 while the situation seemed to get exactly overturned in the post 9/11 era and they were disowned apparently even by the state as shown in chapter 5. The whole circumstances were created by the military rulers to exploit maximum out of various available options. Islamization and Enlightened Moderation were rational tools served as threshers to harvest the patrimonial features of state such as centralization of power, clientalism and access to state's resources. The ulama were the central facilitators through their overt and covert support in both eras for connecting the dots of rationality with that of neo-patrimonialism by the state to prolong the regimes.

From the above assertions it can be summed up that while it was expected by the madrassa students that the state-led madrassa reforms plans in General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf era would bring a constructive and substantial transition into madrassa system of Pakistan where madrassa products would avail

opportunities ranging from the labour market which demanded skills to the educational institutions that required developed intellectual human capital and from judges of the courts as in the medieval time period to the entrance in state's bureaucracies, the reforms in the dusk of political crisis and instability got mired into short term political interests of strengthening the regimes in return of economic and political interests for a limited representatives of influential madrasas even on the initial stages and henceforth fell short of achieving the conceived outcomes beneficial for the madrasa students and graduates in the long run.

Policy Recommendations:

1. Prior to initiating any reforms the government should collect statistics such as madrassa number and enrolment. Recently the current government has shown intentions to hold census and statistics relevant to madrassas can be collected side by side while processing census.
2. Material from subjects of formal education system for the madrassa must be re-organized in such a way that books of Urdu and English not only fulfil language requirements but also serve for giving knowledge about multiple areas such as social sciences.
3. The Islamic Studies department in all the universities should be compelled to reduce open admissions for the graduates of formal education system to half filling the half of strength with the madrassa students. This will help the madrassa graduates to get jobs relevant to Islamic studies easily. Additionally, private masters in Islamic Studies in Public universities must be banned so that quality and limited number of Islamic Studies experts are produced who get jobs easily.
4. After a *diploma* degree one subject can be made compulsory for specialization for the madrassa students from the subjects taught in the formal system of education other than the religious education and madrassa students must be facilitated to appear in board and university exams in that specific subjects along with just

English Compulsory paper. In this way they can get specialization in other subject in addition to Islamic Studies.

5. Basic needs of the madrasa students such as nutrition must be given due importance and either the state or madrasa administration must be declared responsible of fulfilling the basic needs of the madrasa students specifically those who are orphan or poor and are lodged in madrassas and sending madrasa students for collecting alms and donations from door to door must be discouraged and banned.
6. In any form of reform plans for the madrassas nothing concrete such as building or plots should be allocated to madrassas permanently as they become a permanent asset for the madrasa administration and their generations and are of less use for the enrolled students.
7. Reform plans must be handled in bits like modification in curriculum should be at the top of the list and once the frame work is prepared with consensus and trust is developed among all stake holders which can preferably be developed by assigning task of modification in curriculum to Ittehad-e-tanzeem-e-Madaris-e-Deniya, then registration and regulation processes should be initiated.
8. Evaluation report of every step of government's reform plans must be prepared and made public in order to improve and keep a check on the performance of the working machinery involved in implementation stages.
9. Some coordinated efforts should be made to implement madrasa reforms which can be done delegating complete authority to a committee working under the

Ministry of Religious Affairs with 2 representatives from each wafaqs and 2 educationists and three government officials.

10. Time frame must be mentioned for every reform's step in order to prevent the plan from being tedious.
11. Relevant expert authorities must be engaged in reform plans from the government side at every step of reform process such as those involved for modification in curriculum must not be assigned responsibilities for registration and regulation processes in order to minimize the chances of possible flaws at the formulation and implementation stages.
12. Selection of material from the syllabus of formal education system must be made primarily not for providing jobs in fields other than the religious studies rather usefulness must be preferred. Usefulness means giving a little knowledge of the globalized world to the students and make them enabled to give worth to all subjects and respect others studying subjects other than the Islamic Studies.
13. Objectives of the reforms must be stated clearly in order to avoid ambiguity on later stages and these must not be stated too high to be achievable which in other words meant that their practicality must be kept in view.
14. Besides efforts to create uniformity of syllabus in all the madrassas of Pakistan, the funding matters of all the madrassas should be handled through any proper channel which can be auqaf department where the responsibility to collect, provide and monitor funding could be assigned to the provinces retaining the essence of the 13th Amendment.

15. Efforts should be directed towards creating uniformity of curriculum between the madrasa education and Islamic Studies syllabus of the schools, colleges and universities.

Endnotes

¹ For more detail See Mumtaz Ahmad, *Madressa Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh*, 2005

² At the time of writing his book there were some 11 dictators ruling the states Pakistan, Egypt, Iraq, Thailand, Sudan, Spain, South Korea, Iraq, Portugal, Paraguay, El Salvador and Nicaragua were all under military rules. Finer;1962: 3.

³ In case of Pakistan professional pride in efficiency seemed dominant over sentiments as compared to Turkey or pre-war Bulgaria, Yugoslavia or Greece where states were the endowment of Army in true essence. Finer, 63. After the Wars against India in 1965, 1971 and Kargil conflict, the army has enhanced its role in politics of Pakistan claiming to be real saviour of the interests of nation.

² Herbert Simon used the term for deliberative and computational capacity. Another usage is people try to do the best in their particular circumstances. "doing ones best" is described as following incentives or adaptation in circumstances. See further *On the Limits of RCT* : Hodgson. Rationality means rational (efficient) means to achieve goals "maximizing output for a given input, or minimizing input for a given output". (Down 1957,5)

³The rational choice model is relevant to the current analysis as none of the particular goals of the theory are considered as universal.

⁴ When preferences and beliefs are left exogenous in Rational Choice Models, they are referred to as thin Models, see Ferejohn 1991, 282, Elster 1983: 1-2. Ferejohn refers to conventional Rational Choice when uses term thick rationality. While for the same meaning Elster uses the term "broad rationality". There is no terminological consensus over this term's usage.

⁵ Although it is not too uncommon for theorists to refer to "preferences" over actions, this usage is confusing, since it fails to differentiate between choices and the basis for those choices.

⁶ The term Neo-Classical Economics was coined in 1900 while the origin of the theory can be traced back to 1870's through the work of William Stanley Jevons, Leon Walras and Carl Menger. The theory's basic assumption is that economic decisions are made rationally on the basis of full informed evaluations in context to utility. (Colander: 2002)

⁷ In short, most recent study considers patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism as cause of economic stagnation, poor leadership and host of other problems. The scholars frequently use the terms to describe regimes, leaders and systems. (Pitcher A., Moran M., Johnston M., 2009, 'Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa', *African Studies Review*, Volume 52, Number 1, pp. 125-156).

⁸ Muhammad Khan Junego became Prime Minister of Pakistan after the election held on non-party basis in 1985.

⁹ The concept is often incorporated or equated to neo-patrimonialism. The concept provides traditional legitimation to the patron-client relation.

¹⁰ Zia nominated the entire Majlis-e-Shura in 1981 under presidential order. As a result limited political activities were resumed and that paved the way for National and Provincial Assemblies in 1985. www.na.gov.pk/en/content.php?id=75

¹⁴ The National Security Council was established in October 1999 under Chief Executives Order. It comprised of Chief Executive (Chairman), Chief of Naval Staff, Chief of Air Staff and other members appointed by the Chief Executive. The Council was established with a purpose to give non-binding advice to the Chief Executive over different areas such as governance, security and societal affairs. *Pildit Report: 2012*

¹⁵ The accumulation of Patron-client relations forms a pyramid like structure in a society in which patron stands at the top who distributes resources to clients who further redistribute the resources to clients and so on.

¹⁶ Formal institutions are explicit and concretized in written document and informal institutions are implicit and are based on unwritten understanding such as traditions, socio-cultural norms and routines. The formal institutions include for example constitution, commercial and civil service codes and procedures, laws and regulations, public events such as elections and physical structures such as legislatures, codes and ministries. (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002)

¹⁷ According to Freedon:

'A political ideology is a set of ideas, beliefs, opinions and values that (1) exhibit a recurring pattern, (2) are held by significant groups, (3) compete over providing and controlling plans for public policy and (4) do so with the aim of justifying, contesting or changing the social and political arrangement and processes of a political community'. Freedon, *Ideology*, p. 32

¹⁸ Wafaq-ul-Madaris-Al-Arabia, Wafaq-ul-Madaris-Al-Safia and Rabit-ul Madaris-Al-Islamia, Tanzeem-ul-madaris Ahle Sunnat and Wafaq ul Madaris Shia.

¹⁹ PNA was formed in 1977 just before elections against the Pakistan Peoples Party. The parties which were a part of the Alliance included JUI, JI, JUP, PDP, NDP, PML, PKT and TI. The alliance was made up of the parties having diverse ideologies. The religious parties seemed quite dominant so, the demand of enforcement of the Shariah in its true sense became quite frequent. In the elections held in 1977, PPP got 155 seats while PNA got 36 seats. The PNA rejected the election results and claimed rigging. They boycotted provincial Assembly elections and launched protests all over the state as a result the government arrested the PNA workers from the entire state. The Movement was later transformed into Tehrik-e- Nizam-e-Mustafa . the government impose Article 144 to cater the situation. Later lifted that and brought its supporter in the streets to show power. As a result armed clashes started which paved the way for Army's intervention in politics. Akhtar Hussain. Politics of Alliances in Pakistan 1954-1999. <http://eprints.hec.gov.pk/2646/1/2469.htm>

²⁰ The meanings of "political will" are quite vague that they do not help us to understand the political and policy processes. In order to make that useful we can make it narrow by defining it as an individual's determination to say or do something with the purpose to get the desired outcomes. [http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/Mis-SPC/R8236Appendix 3pdf](http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/Mis-SPC/R8236Appendix%203.pdf)

²¹ Syed Qutb is known as the ideologue of the Islamic political movements of the modern world. His theory of Jahiliyyah is viewed as a literary weapon s and a threat to not only Arab and the Muslim worlds but also a threat to the West as well. For more details See the Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006)

²² Ayatollah Khomeini was an Iranian leader who led Iran to revolution by overthrowing Pahlvai's Dynasty in 1979. He laid foundation of Islamic Republic of Iran and became Supreme leader.

²³ A theory presented by Samuel Huntington in 1993 that peoples religious and cultural identities would be a primary source of conflict in the post-cold war. For more details See Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization and the Re-making of World Order* (US: Simon and Schuster, 2007).

²⁴ Later ICG corrected the figures after mathematics mistake was pointed out.

³² For a comprehensive history of the genesis of the Assassins sect and Niizam-ul-Mulk's perception of their threat to the state See James Waterson, *The Ismaili Assassin: A History of Medieval Murder*, (London: Frontline Books 2000) and *Sacred Sword-Jihad in Holy Land 1097—1291*, (UK: Casemate Publisher: 2010) p 1--34

³³ Mamluk ruled Cairo, appointed administrative machinery but let the religious life of majority driven by ulama. For more detail See, Arthur Oldschmidt, Jr, *A Brief History of Egypt*, (US: Infobase Publishing: 2008)

³⁴ To know about reasons of fall of Mamluks See Michael Winter, Amalia Levanoni, *Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society*, (Brill: 2004)

³⁵ See Hodgson, *Venture of Islam*, III, for political thoughts of Akbar & and for divergent political theories of Mughal rulers see *Sources of Indian Tradition* 1 chapters XVI & VII by De Bary

³⁶ Darsi Nizami critics have enlisted few drawbacks as too much emphasis on means detracts the students from real aim and take means as end itself, knowledge for its own sake is ignored and completion of course does not ensure the highest attainment. For more detail See *History of Muslim Education, Volume 1, (712 to 1750 A.D)* in Hamiuddin Khan (All Pakistan Educational Conference: 1967)

³⁷ Shah Waliullah's contributions were equivalent to Farangi Mahalli Ulama for more detail about his contribution See Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India*, 35-37

³⁸ Hindus were closed to British and flourished in secular system as a result got opportunities of jobs more than the Muslims

³⁹ The Muslims had a great shock after mutiny in which some renowned figures were killed or executed for treason by the overnment, see *History in South Asia*, Francis Robinson, Oxford 2000, 138--155

⁴⁰ for more details see Francis Robinson, *The U'ema of Farangi Mahall*, 205--213

⁴¹ Few of the people opposed the style of organization which resulted in emergence of two major crisis; first emerged in 1876 which was related to building of school and second appeared in 1895, for this and response of its defenders See Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India Deoband*, 111--137

⁴² How this movement after passing through different stages ended on failure. for detail See Silk Letter Movement by I. Qasmi, 2013

⁴³ For a review of the history of the interaction between religion and politics in Pakistan See Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley University of California Press, 1962), Aziz Ahmad, "Activism of the ulama in Pakistan" in Scholars, Saints and Sufis, ed. Nikki R Keddie (Berkeley University of California Press, 1972).

⁴⁴ The relationship between Islam, Politics and the State during Ayub era can be divided into three distinct periods for more See Mumtaz Ahmad, Islam and the State of Pakistan edited by Mathew C Moen and Lowells Gustafson.

⁴⁵ There is also another view existed that Bhutto also tried to eradicate Ulama's views in politics and society. For more details see Mumtaz Ahmad, Islam and the State of Pakistan.

⁴⁶ For more steps of Islamization under Bhutto introduced in 1973 constitution See Jamal Malik, *Colonization of Islam*, 37, 38.

⁴⁷ Pakistan brought the cold war home by extending full support to the US and participating directly and indirectly in the war against Communist USSR in Afghanistan. See Making States Work: State Failure and Crisis of Governance. Edited by Simon Chesterman, etl. UN University Press: 2005. Pg 145--166

⁴⁸ Some critics have pointed out that Shariat Courts were quite submissive to the President like other institutions and their decisions had been endorsed by Zia. Islam and Politics by John L Esposito 175-186, Syracuse University Press: 1998

⁴⁹ Majlis-e-Shura included not only ulama but also feudal lords with a purpose to create social base for the military regime of Zia-ul-haq

⁵⁰ There was a time when the Muslims were dominating all spheres of knowledge. Due to their research and logic they familiarised the world with various fields of knowledge. Not only in Science but they flourished also in arts. they failed to retain their past glories due to eradication of the trend of science and logic from their societies. For more detail see Sscientific Research and Scholarly Writin in Islam Alpha Mahmood Bah (I University: 2001), Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology Frank Griffel Oxford University: 2009, The Classical Heritae in Islam Franz Rosenthal University of California Press: 197, Islamic Philosophy, Sscience, Culture and Religion, Felicitas Opwis, David Reisman, (Pril: 2011)

⁵¹ The Ordinance was passed through different stages before its promulgation. To know about the detail see *Issues in Global Aging* edited by Frederick L Aheam , (London: Routledge: 2014), 47--76

⁵² Few were given employment in Army as Khatibs of mosques and Imams but not so many could be adjusted in this institution too. Even in Akora Khattak madrassa the Army had to send a circular that motivated students and graduates to join army as a regular soldier to overcome employment issue of the madrassa –learned. (Jamal Malik)

⁵³ Religious parties such as JUP, JI and Anjuman Sipah Sahaba Party (ASSP) got more benefits on the domestic level which proved to be quite fatal for the society and the state. For detail see *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy 1971—1994*, Mehtab Ali Shah, (I B Tauris 1997) p 138-140, *Vying for Allah's Vote: Understanding Islamic Parties, Political Violence and Extremism in Pakistan*, Haroon K Ullah (Georgetown University:2013)

⁵⁴ The society was polarised bi-dimensionally as on one side the division between secular and religious and on the other side among the religious got deepened. For *Polarization of Society* See Tariq Rehman *Denizens of Alien Worlds. Abdur Rehman Dynamism of Pakistan's Civil Society: Religious-Secular Rivalry and its Resources.*

⁵⁵ How and why the Shia-Sunni conflict grew in Pakistan's society? For more details see *South Asia: Adaptation, Accommodation and Conflict* edited by Imtiaz Ahmed, Halmut Reifield Berhahn Books: 2004, 135—148 and *Religion and Violence in South Asia Theory and Practice*, John Hinnells, Richard King (Routledge: 2007) 149—155.

⁵⁶ Christopher Candland believes that militancy in Pakistan's madrassas can be traced in the colonial time period which originated due to British responses to political movements, Muslim Educational institutions and other sites of social power which were not under the state's control. Farooq Hasnat viewed that the Pakistani society was quite tolerant till 1980's even in spite of emergence of political crisis and mass movements against Ayub and Bhutto were devoid of violence. For more See *Religious Education and Violence in Pakistan*, Christopher Candland:2004 and *Pakistan* by Syed Farooq Hasnat, ABC-CLIO-2011 pg 119-142

⁵⁷ Zia-ul-Haq visited Iran in 1979 to extend his support to Shah of Iran. Later, he made few efforts to reconcile with Shias of Iran by accommodating Shias of Pakistan on some key posts in Government and Military but upon failure to get support and geo-political situations he

suppressed them to win the support and favors of the Arab world. For more details see *The Military Factor in Pakistan*, Ravi Shekhar Narain Saingh Singh, (Lancer Publisher: 2008)

⁵⁸ Deoband maslak was promoted in the overall society keeping minority sects, sub-sects and religions aside and in some cases they were tried to be suppressed. In some cases violation of human rights were clearly observed. For more detail see *The Christians of Pakistan: The Passion of Bishop John Joseph* by Linda Walbridge Routledge:2012

⁵⁹ To know more about Mawdudi's views See his books *Political Theory of Islam*, 1969, *Nation Rise and Fall Why?* 1975, *West Vs Islam*, 1976.

⁶⁰ For more details of JJ's support in framing policies in Zia Era see *Modern Islamist Movements: History, Religion and Politics*, Jon Armajani (John Wiley & Sons: 2011)

⁶¹ There existed another opinion that JJ's information Minister Mehmood Azam Farooqi launched an organized media campaign against Bhutto during his trial and the party celebrated his execution and even Jammat's head Maulana Mududi defended the military regimes four volume white paper against the PPP government and demanded ban on the PPP to participate in elections. For more details see *Pakistan between Military and Mosque*, Hussain Haqqani, Lahore Vanguard: 2005, 139

⁶² Pakistan First ideology was supplemented by Enlightened Moderation which was also considered as deviation of Pan-Islamic concept. For more details see (Marinos Diamantides and Adam Gearey: 2011) and Hilton L Root (*Alliance Curse*: 2011)

⁶³ Musharraf was equally distrusted by the domestic and international community for bringing war home due to his policies and joining hands with Jihadis respectively See *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam* Zahid Hussain: 2008.

⁶⁴ Enlightened Moderation Philosophy introduced by Musharraf encompassed many areas of society. The philosophy left some political implications for the state. For more detail see *The Musharraf Factor: Leading Pakistan to Inevitable Demise* (Abid ullah Jan: 2005) and *US Pakistan Engagement : The War on Terror and Beyond* (Touqir Hussain: 2009)

⁶⁵ The curriculum is believed to be centuries old which has resulted in stagnation of madrasa knowledge bringing backwardness. See Mumtaz and Rehamn (2004)

⁶⁶ Ulama had three major reservations regarding Model Deeni Madrassas. They were relevant to autonomy, revision of curriculum and registration process. See Religious Education Institutions: Present Situation and the Future Strategy, Khalid Rahman and Rashad Bukhari, IPS

⁶⁷ Few critics hold the opinion that aims of religious education vary from secular system of education while few believe that religious education encompasses both religion and worldly life. Philosophy of Education: An Encyclopedia, JJ Chambliss: 2013, The Islamic Education: The Philosophy, Aims and main Features, Raudlotul Firdaus Binti etl. International Journal of Education and Research, vol 10: 2013

⁶⁸ For the reasons of failure of PMEB Ordinance See Is South Asian Madrassa Teaching Terror (Jamal Malik). Continuity and Change (Muhtaz Ahmad:), Unfulfilled Promises (ICG: 2004)

⁶⁹ Few hold the opinion that madrassa reform project failed largely due to the lack of trust on all level specially ulama were seeing the reforms' process in context to experience in colonial history. See for example Islam and Modernities by Francis Robinson, Robert Looney, Azhar Hussain

⁷⁰ It was strongly believed that in addition to gathering money through endowments and charity, madrassas receive donations from Saudi Arabia and Arab World. For more details see Madrassa Education in Pakistan (Warren: 2009), CRS Report for Congress: 2003, C. Christine Fair, Madrassa Challenge: 2008, Paul M P Bell, Pakistan's Madrassas—Weapons of Mass Instruction?, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, March 2007.

⁷¹ Although madrassa authorities reject the claims that madrassas promote sectarianism but it can be found their existed some controversies regarding few of the beliefs among sects and sub-sects and kind of belief and heretical Beliefs are common practices along with the varied interpretation which likely become a source of promoting sectarianism and religious hatred. For more details see Denizens of Alien Worlds (Tariq Rahman:) Manazra is another way through which students learn the arts of debating about their sects and sub-sects beliefs. For more about Manazra See Barbara Metcalf

⁷² the head of JUI-S, also believed to be father of Taliban

⁷³ For more details see Public Policy: Formulation Implementation Analysis: Pakistan Focused (Sarfraz Khawaja: 2013).

⁷⁴ There were some 17,817 foreign students getting education in Pakistan's madrassas. For more statistics see Mumtaz Ahmad *Continuity and Change in Madrassas of Bangladesh and Pakistan*.

⁷⁵ Both parties could not perform and got and seats in the National Assembly, while MMA and PML-Q got surprised 45 and 77 seats respectively out of total 272. The seats won by MMA showed apparently that people were against Musharraf's pro-American policies. For more details See *Europa World Year, Taylor and Francis: 2004* The US turned towards Musharraf and supported his regime due to lack of alternatives For details see *A Perilous Course: US Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan (CSIS: 2007)*

⁷⁶ For more details See Syed Abdul Qudus, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Politics of Charisma, Pakistan: Progressive Publishers, 1994*

⁷⁷ For more detail See, Shaheen Sardar Ali, *Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities of Pakistan: Constitutional and Legal Perspectives*, Routledge, 2013, Tanweer Fazal, *Minority Nationalisms in South Asia* Routledge, 2013, *Crime Or Custom?: Violence Against Women in Pakistan*, Human Rights Watch, 1999

⁷⁸ For more details See, Francis Robinson, *The Ulema of Farangi Mahal 2007*

⁷⁹ For more details see Mustafa, Abbas, Saeed, 2005 *Enhancing Vocational Training for Economic Growth in Pakistan* *The Pakistan Development Review* 44 : 4 Part II (Winter 2005) pp. 567-58

⁸⁰ To know more about the factors and statistics relevant to private coaching of students see Bisma Haseeb Khan and Sahar Amjad Shaikh, *Analyzing the Market for Shadow Education in Pakistan: Does Private Tuition Affect the Learning Gap between Private and Public Schools?* *The Lahore Journal of Economics* 18 : SE (September 2013): pp. 129-160

⁸¹ For composition of committee See Khalid, 2005

⁸² For composition of committee See Halepota Report, 1979