



MS Thesis

INDIA'S EMERGING ROLE IN THE ASIAN REGION: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Submitted by: Aqsa Khalid


Reg # 9/FSS/MSIR/F13

Submitted to: Dr. Noor Fatima

Department: Politics and International Relations

Faculty of social sciences

International Islamic University Islamabad





Accession No TH:18937 v.34


MS
327. 549/054
AQI

- + Policy community - Pakistan
- + Foreign policy - "
- + Pakistan - Foreign relations - India
- + CPEC
- + Soft power
- + Hard power

Certification

Certified that contents and form of thesis entitled "INDIA'S EMERGING ROLE IN THE ASIAN REGION: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN" submitted by Aqsa Khalid Registration no. 9-FSS/MSIR/F13, have been found satisfactory for the requirements of the degree of MS/M.Phil Politics and International Relations

Supervisor:


Dr. Noor Fatima

Assistant Professor

Department of Politics and International Relations,
International Islamic University, Islamabad


Internal Examiner:


Dr. Sadaf Farooq

Assistant Professor


Department of Politics and International Relations,
International Islamic University, Islamabad

External Examiner:


Dr. Noman Omar Sattar

Director Area Study center

Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad


Dr. Noor Fatima
Acting Chairperson

Politics and International Relations
International Islamic University Islamabad


Professor Dr. Nabi Bux Jumani
Dean
Faculty of Social Sciences,
International Islamic University Islamabad

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my individual research work and has not been submitted to any other university for any degree.

DEDICATED TO MY PARENTS AND MY BELOVED NEPHEW

ARSH

Table of Contents

Contents	Page No.
<i>Abstract</i>	<i>i</i>
<i>Acknowledgement</i>	<i>ii</i>
<i>Abbreviations</i>	<i>iii</i>
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
1.1 Background	1
1.2 Research Question	4
1.3 Objectives	4
1.4 Theoretical Framework	4
1.5 Literature Review	9
1.6 Methodology	12
1.7 Significance	13
Chapter 2: Dimensions of Emerging India	15
2.1 Foreign Relations: A Strategic Approach to India's Rise	17
2.1.1 India in Asia: Allies and Contenders	18
a) Look East Policy	18
b) India and China	23
c) India and Russia	25
d) India and Afghanistan	27
e) India and Central Asia	31
f) India and South Asia	32
2.2 India and US	36
2.3 Economy	44
2.4 Hard Power	48
2.5 Soft Power	52
2.6 Technology	55

Chapter 3: Findings	59
Chapter 4: Analysis	78
Chapter 5: Conclusion	95
5.1 Recommendations	95
5.2 Conclusion	97
References	98
Annexure: Questionnaire	122

ABSTRACT

The study attempts to find out the perceptions of policy community in Pakistan on the rise of India as a regional power and its implications for Pakistan. The study is qualitative in nature and uses semi-structured interviews from representatives of policy community in Islamabad. Sample comprises of 15 faculty members from federal universities including International Islamic University, Quaid e Azam University and National Defense University, 10 representatives from the civil society organizations that are Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Institute of Regional Studies and Institute of Strategic, Studies, Research and Analysis and 5 officials from the Foreign Office of Pakistan. Purposive sampling technique was used in the initial phase of the data-collection, while towards the final phase, sample came to include a few key respondents based on snow-ball sampling technique.

The research finds that the policy community holds a definite opinion that India is on the rise as a major regional power - economically, politically, technologically and militarily - and that it has radical implications for Pakistan. However, when contrasted with the literature, these perceptions appear more radical than the data warrants, particularly as far as the economic and technological aspect of India's rise. The definitiveness of such opinion appears to have taken its color from the perception of implications that this rise may entail for Pakistan.

The study affirms the perceived security dilemma faced by Pakistan by the rise of its eastern neighbor across both eastern and western borders. This dilemma is lent credence to by India's heightened defense spending, which is likely to provide an impetus for Pakistan to reply in kind, thus causing Pakistan to shift its strategic resources from development to defense. It also points out the U.S. overtures to use India as a check to China by signing nuclear deals with India. The study concludes with practical recommendations for Pakistani academicians, practitioners and foreign policy actors to counter the implications posed by the rise of India in the region.

Key Words: Soft Power, Hard Power, Technology, Economy, Foreign Policy, CPEC, Gwadar port, Afghanistan

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank Almighty Allah, the most Beneficent and Merciful for giving me the strength to complete my thesis.

I am also thankful to my supervisor Dr. Noor Fatima who has always helped and guided me and provided me the right direction to carry out my thesis.

I owe special gratitude to my mentor Dr. Saif Malik who has always encouraged, appreciated and guided me in my academic journey so far. I am also indebted to his support and guidance during my thesis.

I am also thankful to my friends and respondents that supported me and cooperated with me during my thesis despite of their commitments.

Last but not the least, my special and heartfelt gratitude to my family as it won't have been possible without the immense support and prayers of my parents, my siblings and my brother in law.

ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BJP	Bhartiya Janta Party
BLA	Baluchistan Liberation Army
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CARs	Central Asian States
CBM	Confidence Building Measure
CECA	Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement
CEPA	Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
CFL	Cease Fire Line
CPEC	China Pakistan Energy Corridor
DPG	Defense Policy Group
FMCT	Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
FMS	Foreign Military Sale
IPI	India, Iran and Pakistan pipeline
IPL	Indian Premier League
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IN	Indian Navy
IONS	Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
IT	Information Technology
ITEC	Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
JTG	Joint Technical Group
LOC	Line Of Control
MFN	Most Favored Nation

MGC	Mekong-Ganga Cooperation
NASSCOM	National Association of Software and Services Companies
NSG	Nuclear Supplier Groups
NRI	Non-Residents Indians
OECD	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
SAARC	South Asian Regional Cooperation
SLBM	Sub-Marine Launched Ballistic Missile
SPA	Strategic Partnership Agreement
STI	Science, Technology, and Innovation
TAPI	Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UfC	Uniting for Consensus

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The last two decades have seen an enormous change in India's stature in the region. India since her inception was looking for some eminent role in the world affairs. However, the end of the Cold War provided a momentous start to India and since then India's stature in the world is showing an upward trajectory to growth. India's growing economy, cultural influence, technology, possession of nuclear weapons, and bilateral and regional ties in Asia and beyond Asia define India's emerging role in the region.

India during the cold war showed professed commitment to Non-Alignment Movement and estranged herself from the two powers rivalry. However, India's suspicions over growing commitment of USA and Pakistan drove India to bolster ties with Soviet Union. Despite India and Soviet Union relations, India's adherence to Non-Alignment Movement remained a marked feature of Indian foreign policy during cold war. The end of the cold war and the emergence of new world order changed the outlook of India's aloof stature and India's political and economic system have also transformed in consonant with the new world order. During the cold war, India promoted state led strategy of economic growth and an attempt by Rajeev Gandhi to liberalize the economy resulted in a fiscal crisis. However, later the successive governments of BJP and Congress have liberalized the economy, encouraged foreign investment and foreign exchange rules, removed tariff barriers and overhauled the country's monetary and fiscal policy (Haggerty & Hagerty, 2006). These reforms served as a premiere of economic boom in India. Since then

India's GDP is growing up and average annual growth rate exceeds 8 percent and poverty ratio in 2005 has been cut in half (Panagariya, 2008) and it is expected that India will jump from world's twelfth to the third largest national economy in coming decade (Picture and Potential: India Rising, 2007).

India explicitly declared her nuclear power status in 1998. The collapse of the Soviet Union which provided a tacit security guarantee to India and simultaneously China's emerging military and economic position and its robust military and missile technology assistance to Pakistan led India to abandon its covert nuclear program which it initiated in 1974 (Ganguly S., 2010). Since then India is establishing a robust missile program and enhancing her nuclear capabilities.

Democracy is a weapon of weak (Friedman, 2005) but a strong democracy is a symbol of power which is best elucidated in India's case. India's projection of soft power through democracy, movies, foreign aid, advancement in information and space technology provide an impetus for India's rising stature in the region.

With the end of the cold war and the emergence of new global order, India pursued more muscular and assertive foreign policy (Ganguly S. , 2010) which is evident in India's bilateral and regional ties with different states. India's cold war history was marked by frosty relations between USA and India. 9/11 incident and China's rising stature led USA to reshape her foreign policy towards South Asia (Fani, 2010) and particularly towards India. To strengthen their ties and India's position in the region, both, India and US, signed an arms deal in 2002 and later have signed Next Step in Strategic Partnership in 2004, a joint venture between India and the United States, where both parties agree to expand their cooperation in three specific areas: civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs, and high technology trade (Outlook , 2004) followed by civil nuclear deal in 2005.

Since then, the series of agreement have been embarked on to strengthen their ties and achieve the larger agendas in the region.

India, in 1992 initiated a “Look East Policy” that sought to expand its profile in Asia by establishing political and economic ties with East Asian states. From trade and economic collaboration, deterring China’s mounting presence in the region and to enhance its power in the Asia pacific, India has emerged as a ‘Pacific Player’ (III, 2009) and engaged the whole region in pursuing her multiple interests. India is also firming her hold in the North Asia by establishing relations with Central Asian states and Afghanistan. India’s commitment to Afghanistan cover its manifold interests in the region like to envelop Pakistan from both east and west, to find a route to Central Asian states and when USA forces leave Afghanistan, India wants to have her share in Afghanistan’s decision making (Price, 2013).

Although the robust growing economy and significant foreign stature of India is making her an influential power but having hostile neighbors are the major impediments to any country’s growth. India never has good relations with her immediate neighbors; Pakistan a nuclear power and China an emerging giant. India has fought full fledged wars with these two states in the past and border disputes with Pakistan and China impedes good relations between India and its these two neighbors. India’s foreign policy’s major part is characterized to contain these two states in a way that both states will no longer hamper her rising role in global politics. India has successfully designed a policy where terrorism has surpassed Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan and world powers are more eager to deal terrorism at first place (Cohen, 2001). To balance China, India is engaging the rivals of China by forging bilateral and regional ties. However, India’s rising stature and Security Council’s seat can only be guaranteed if India sought smooth relationship with China and Pakistan (Cohen, 2001).

1.2 Research Questions

1. What is the perception of India's emerging role among policy community in Pakistan?
2. What are the implications of India's rising power on Pakistan as perceived by the policy community of Pakistan?
3. How can Pakistan balance India in the region?

1.3 Objectives

1. To find out and analyze the perception of India's emergence as a rising power among the policy community in Pakistan.
2. To study the implications of India's growing power on Pakistan among the policy community.
3. To arrive at strategies for the policy makers in Pakistan to deal with the challenges posed by India's rise.
4. To bridge the gap between Academicians and Practitioners as regards the normative outlook relating to India and the implications of its rise on various aspects of Pakistan's foreign and domestic policy.

1.4 Theoretical Framework

Realism is an approach to International politics which has been evolved through the series of analysis, discussions and examining the existing realities. Realism explains that how human nature placed constraints on international politics and the anarchical structure propels states to pursue their self-interests. This self-interest led to the possession of power. So precisely realism at its core talks about the "egoism" and "anarchy" that propels states to acquire "power".

The realism can be traced back to the ancient time of a Greek philosopher Thucydides. Though the content and writings are not found in its original form but there are reliable translated books that describe the Thucydides realist ideas. Thucydides also considers the human nature as evil. According to him "...human nature being as surely made arrogant by considerations, as it is awed by the firmness" and also "human nature always rebelling against the law and now its master, gladly showed itself ungoverned in passion, above respect for justice and the enemy of all superiority" (John H. Finley, 1951). Thucydides pointed out that the main reasons of war between Athens and Sparta. According to him the acquisition of more power by Athens over Sparta, self-advancements by leaders of Athens and insecurity and struggle to maintain that power by Sparta were the main reasons of war (John H. Finley, 1951). The failure of Melian Dialogues, according to Thucydides, reflect the anarchy or lawlessness on the one side and lust of power on the other side.

The western philosophers that contributed to the realism after Thucydides are Machiavelli in sixteenth century and Thomas Hobbes in the mid-seventeenth century. Machiavelli also considered human nature or generally men, egoistic, evaders of danger, eager for gain, violent and savage. Among such type of people, according to Machiavelli, security and acquiring power are paramount concern for Prince and so "the prince should have no other object, nor any other thought, nor take anything else as his art, but the art of war" he believed that the selfish human nature of men can only be tamed by taking ferocious means or by adopting wars as he experienced that all the armed prophets conquered and all the unarmed prophets were ruined (Donnelly, 2000). Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan published in 1651 also gives an insight about realism in seventeenth century. The selfish nature of man, anarchical world and competition between them depict the fundamentals of realist school of thoughts that were present and discussed in the seventeenth century. Hobbes talked about

three fundamental assumptions that all men are equal, secondly, they all interact in anarchy and last there is competition and diffidence between them. Assessing Hobbes theory in the present realists' realm the contemporary Realists also discussed that human nature is driven by competition, and those who are not reputed are in a competition with reputed ones and have-not are in a competition with haves (Donnelly, 2005). Hobbes believed that international anarchy will persist and states have formed a political structure to ensure the security and well-being of the civilians without altering the international structure and in this anarchy, great powers states; the states that can inflict damage, are equal and have not states are equal that will further maintain the international anarchy (Donnelly, 2005).

The modern world experienced the emergence of Realism with the end of the second World War when Liberalism, a dominant approach at that time to study international relations, got a blow with the eruption of second world war. The World War challenged the very notion of liberalist that international system can be governed by laws. The Realism thus gained prominence with the writings of E H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau. Both E H. Carr and Morgenthau drove their ideas from the Reinhold Niebuhr, an American theologian, who in his book "Moral Man and Immoral Society" published in 1932 highlighted that how "power sacrifices justice to peace; peace within the communities and between the communities" (Donnelly, 2000). E H. Carr in his book "The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations" challenged the notion of liberalist idea of harmony of interests between states as it was only preached by privileged ones in the world to preserve their own interests and dominant position. He rather mentioned that there is a conflict of interests in the world which creates dissatisfaction among states and leads to war (Carr, 1946). He further stated that there are not universal moral values and justice is often cloaked under the self-interests of the people and hence, preached by

them. Hans. J Morgenthau in his book “Politics among Nations: Struggle for Power and Peace” contributed in the realm of international politics by developing realism into a comprehensive international theory. He placed human selfishness and lust to acquire more power at the center of his ideology and the main cause of conflict. According to him, the desire to dominate is the constitutive element of all human association from family to the states (Morgenthau, 1948). He further said that International politics like all politics is the struggle for power and is the only mean to achieve the desired end and the world whose aspiration is only power, the only way to survive is either by balance of power or by international law which is not capable of keeping power in its peaceful bounds. (Morgenthau, 1948). Morgenthau in the second edition of his book gave six principles of realism and hence structurised the Realist theory. Summarizing the six principles he propagates that politics is an autonomous discipline and power or interests is the central concept in it and states pursue their national interests that are defined in terms of power which are above any ethics or morality (Morgenthau, 1954).

The classical realism of Carr and Morgenthau was challenged in 1950's and 1960's when there was an influx of literature and theorists in international relations that adopted scientific methods in their writings. Also the Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane presented the other approach in international politics with their writings on complex interdependence. At that time Realism rhetorics seemed to fade away. However Realism came back with the ideas of Kenneth N. Waltz, who in his book “Theory of International Politics” regenerated Realism which is now known as Neo-Realism or Structural Realism. He did not refute the core principles of classical realism but somehow sidelined the classical Realist conception of human nature. Waltz rather believed that it is the international structure rather than human nature that emerges from the interactions of states and propels states to take certain actions and also constrains their actions (Waltz, 1979). According

to him the states differ in their functions and distribution of capabilities and like classical realists he believed that international system is anarchic but believed that states have to adopt the principle of self help to survive. He further stated that in this anarchy, states balance each other rather band wagon as bandwagoning with great powers will give weaker state a power that may in the future be used against the great power. The relativity of power requires states to “be more concerned with relative strength than with absolute advantage” (Waltz, 1979). Precisely the Structural Realism concludes that in anarchy states tend to balance both internally by reallocating their resources and externally through alliances or other formal and informal agreements (Donnelly, 2005). Waltz did not outrightly exclude cooperation but rather he believed that anarchic world reduces the cooperation as cooperations deliver unequal gains.

The Asian power structure defines Indian aspirations in the region. The Asian power structure where India is competing its two historical rivals; Pakistan and China, explains and justifies Indian actions in and outside the region. The phenomenon of balancing by reallocating the internal resources was quite evident in Indian case. The economic crises in 1990's followed by new economic policies; from socialist economic system to the liberal market economy, transformed the Indian economic system and has placed India as a rising power in the region. The economic reforms, relations with China, Japan, US and the India-US nuclear deal depict that India is balancing its power in the region viz a viz other powers (Mohan C. R., 2006). The nuclear tests of 1998 created fury in the whole international system about India but these tests depicted that how India interpreted the balance of power and regional security conditions (Efstathopoulos, 2011). The decision by India to go nuclear depicts not only India's aspirations to emerge as an influential player but also the competition and insecurity by its two rivals in the region. The nuclear tests allowed India to approach its territorial problems with greater “self assurance and pragmatism”

(Mohan C. R., 2006). The growing insecurities in the region and securing its interests, India joined hands with US. India and US also signed nuclear deal in 2005 to serve their interests in the region and maximise India's power. India joined hands with US not only to counter China's growing power in the region but also this cooperation helped India to secure its stance on the Kashmir issue (Cohen, 2001). India is also balancing and securing its interests by establishing relations with Japan, East Asian states and also with China. India has also cooperated with China in order to neutralize it in conflicts with Pakistan and other smaller neighbors (Mohan C. R., 2006). But when it comes to face rising China itself, this structural reason led India to forge security cooperation with US, the distant superpower and South East Asian states to compete with China for not gaining excessive influence in India's neighborhood (Mohan C. R., 2006).

1.5 Literature Review

"South Asia In World Politics" by Devin T. Hagerty provides a comprehensive analysis of South Asian politics. This book not only deals with two major powers of the region i.e. Pakistan and India but also the other small states in the region. Furthermore, the book provides a good analysis of South Asian issues that are of international concerns. However, India's leading role in the region has not been analyzed in full context and what impact it could create on immediate neighbors and on the region as a whole. (Hagerty D. , 2006)

"India: Emerging Power" by Stephen Philip Cohen is regarded as an extensive research that encompasses almost every little detail that could count in the emergence of India as an influential power. India's geostrategic position, factors that paved the way in Rising India, relations with China, Pakistan and USA, India as a nuclear power and India as a military power are the chapters giving comprehensive understanding of what title suggests (Cohen, 2001).

Manjari Chetterji Miller takes a bold step in his article “*India's Feeble Foreign Policy: A would-be Great Power resists Its Own Rise*” and explains the fact that the “Rising India” has never been used by the Indians themselves but by the West particularly USA. It's USA that wants India to play her role in global affairs and that has only fraught India to defend this stature (Miller, 2013).

“*International Relations of Asia*” is a comprehensive book on Asia. It elaborates the rising powers of Asia like India, Japan and China and their bilateral and regional ties with other states. The book also covers how globalization is transforming the international Politics of Asia. Moreover, a portion of the book also covers that how extra regional powers are maneuvering in Asia and balancing the power equation (Shambaugh & Yahuda, 2010).

“*Delhi's Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, “Look East,” and India's Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific*” and “*Indian Strategic Thinking About East Asia*” highlight India and East Asian states relations and the dynamics of these relations (III, 2009).

“*Asia's Giants: Comparing China and India*” is a book that provides a comparative performance of both China and India. How these two states are emerging on international arena and how would be they in the future? The overall book delivers a good piece of literature but author overtly or covertly excluded Pakistan from India's politics and literature. India's and China's past, present and future cannot be explained without discussing Pakistan (Friedman & Gilley, 2005).

“*The Indo- US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan*” like its title describes the US India strategic partnership after cold war and according to the author that this strategic partnership especially the India-US civil nuclear deal will have serious repercussions for Pakistan.

“*India the Great Giant*” by Arvind Panagariya is a good book providing details of Indian economy and its pitfall in the postcolonial Era. India's economic reforms in every decade with problems like

poverty and inequality and trade and economic liberalization policies have been discussed by the author (Panagariya, 2008).

Explaining US and India strategic partnership, "*US- Indian Strategic Cooperation in 21st Century: More than Words*" is a detailed study that how India and US are venturing their geo political interests. Their bilateral relationship is a clear indication of India's security concerns and US objectives in the region. India-US military cooperation and cooperation to counter terrorism are given special importance. Limitations in bilateral relation between both states and future of these bilateral ties have also been discussed (Ganguly, Shoup, & Scobell, 2006).

"*Trapped Giant: China's Military Rise*" provides that how China's rise has started a competition in Asia mainly with India and Japan. China has encountered both states, India on territorial dispute and Japan in the East China Sea and China's growing military and economic capabilities directly threatens these two states. This rise of China according to the author has disturbed the balance of power in the region (Holslag, 2010).

"*India as a Nuclear-Capable Rising Power in a Multipolar and Non-Polar World*" is a good analytical work that describes the transformation of the world from bipolar to multipolar system based on a more complex and nuanced network of middle powers, rising powers, least-developed nations, failing states, and non-state actors. However, the two trends multi-polarity and non-polarity can be framed in South Asian region. India's nuclear capabilities are not a threat to Pakistan and China if they have not been used by India at first place but these weapons are meant to foster the regional growth and prosperity. US-India military cooperation could have adverse reaction on the region but not on the nuclear buildup. However, author ignored the fact that Asian region is a hub of competition among major powers and enhancing nuclear capabilities by one state will shake the balance of power in the region and will infuriate the rival states (Kraig, 2009).

1.6 Methodology

The study attempts to find out the perceptions of policy community in Pakistan on the rise of India in the global politics and its implications for Pakistan. It is pertinent that the term “policy community” is unpacked and slightly narrowed down here in view of limited time and resources at the disposal of this study. Although term includes all the stakeholders that exert direct or indirect influence in the formulation and execution of a certain type of policy, for the purpose of this particular study, we shall restrict it only to include the Senior Officials¹ from the Foreign Office of Pakistan, and academicians and practitioners representing various universities, think-tanks and civil society organizations.

The study will be carried out within the framework of cross-sectional research design. Although the prime focus will rest with the qualitative methods but in general, the study will deploy both qualitative and quantitative methods for data collection. Semi-structured interviews will be carried out from the respondents who shall include 15 faculty members from International Relations Departments from Universities² in the Federal Capital which include International Islamic University, Quaid e Azam University and National Defense Universities, 10 representatives including Executive Directors and Senior Managers from 3 Civil Society Organizations working on Peace Studies and South Asian Studies in Islamabad which are Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Institute of Regional Studies and Institute of Strategic, Studies, Research and Analysis, and 05 respondents from the Foreign Office of Pakistan. The respondents will be selected primarily through purposive sampling technique and will expand to include other relevant respondents at later stages of research through snow-ball sampling technique. Recent government publications on

¹ 19th scale and above foreign officer holders

² After a preliminary search, I have found that there are three public sector Universities in Islamabad which presently offer International Relations as distinct discipline. I will study the International Relations Department in all the universities on population basis

both sides of the border (India and Pakistan) shall also be a vital source of data for the purpose of study. The study is expected to complete within 3 months after the date of approval from the department.

The delimitation of the study is the time constraint which restrict the research work not to cover the other major developments that have happened after 2013 and are therefore, not the part of the research.

1.7 Significance

The thesis projects itself as a piece mainly in applied research. Theoretical contribution of the thesis to the overall body of knowledge will be, at best, minimal. The thesis ventures to find out the perception of policy community in Pakistan about the rise of India as a major economic and political player in region and its implications for Pakistan.

Firstly, it shall produce evidence on what the policy community, or at least a carefully selected representative section thereof, really thinks on the subject. It will be a valuable contribution towards the major stakeholders - including but not restricted to National Security Agencies, Trade Unions, Academic Community and Civil Society – in as much as it offers to guide their undertakings in view of the possible shifts in Pakistani foreign policy towards India.

Secondly, the study will help bridge the gap between the academic and practitioner community by informing each with respect to the views held by the other. In other words, the findings from the thesis will inform academic analyses, undertaken in form of research at the universities, of the ground realities as viewed by the senior officers in the foreign office, and alternatively it will attempt to shape the worldview of these officials in light of latest models on Global Geopolitics,

International Political Economy and etc. – prisms through which largely the academicians view the global reality.

Finally, as the research on India as a promising regional giant and its implications for Pakistan is a relatively uncharted territory, the research will attempt to highlight further areas where enhanced understanding could result in better foreign policy formulation and execution towards India in particular and the region in general.

Chapter 2

DIMENSIONS OF EMERGING INDIA

India's reticent status has undergone a rapid transformation in international community since the end of the cold war. India, since then, has been sprouting up as one of the emerging powers along with China, Russia and Japan in Asia. There is, nevertheless, a scholarly division on unequivocal rising stature of India to call its a pacific player (Scott, 2007) or a major power that could alter the present balance of power in the Asia Pacific (Pant H. V., 2007). However, India's concerted efforts drawn in military and nuclear arsenals, robust economic and foreign policies, soft power projection and technology are all the dimensions in which India is emerging in Asia.

Ever since the partition in 1947, India has always been trying for some new role in Asia (Cohen, 2001). The quest to play some eminent role was evident when India joined Non-Alignment Movement during the cold war to lead the third world nations and estranged herself from both super powers' ideological orbit. This Non-Alignment policy of India also stressed anti colonialism, by far something against the interests of many Western and European powers including USA (Cohen, 2001). Despite the fury of the European states, India somehow managed to get a prominent position in United Nations to support self-determination for the colonized states. These kinds of ventures by India to acquire high stature in the region did not appear fruitful for India and circumscribed India's foreign and economic policies during the cold war. Later in cold war, India's socialist leaning clearly demarcated the Indian camp i.e. the Soviet bloc and resulted in frosty India-USA relations. USA also because of lack of cultural ties, paucity of economic and strategic ties, neglected India during cold war (Ganguly, 2010). Thus, during the entire cold war India could not manage to gain the influence it was looking for.

The conclusion of the cold war resulted in the transformation of entire international order. The world witnessed the demise of Soviet Union in consonance with the emergence of a sole and unimpeded superpower, the USA. This transformation of the world from bipolar to unipolar changed the mindset of the Indian strategic thinkers that Non-Alignment has lost its significance and continuous adherence to it will endanger Indian national interests. Moreover, with the presence of two contending rivals in the region, Pakistan and China, with whom India had fought full-fledged wars during cold war, New Delhi has no choice but to abandon her professed but muddled adherence to Non-Alignment at the end of the cold war. India at that time not only abandoned its futile efforts to assist third world states but also its assertive efforts for global regimes to redistribute the world's resources and rather directed all its efforts on domestic economic development, enhancing military capabilities and to attain the status of a great power in the international system (Ganguly, 2003/04)

Indian policy makers strongly believed that economic, foreign and political endeavors during the cold war that proved to be strategic fiascos to India, needed drastic reformation and with the end of cold war and more precisely with the demise of Soviet Union, India cannot get along with the same deteriorating relations with USA. India's foreign policy makers recognized that Russia will not be able to side India on Kashmir stance, to be a counterweight to China's growing power and sell weapons to India at the same concessional rates (Ganguly, 2010). At the same time India faced an economic crisis in 1990's which convinced the policymakers that the country's economy needed a huge reformation. This was the time when New Delhi made huge shifts in both economic and foreign policies. India then established foreign relations with United States, Israel, European Union, Japan and economically stable states of East Asia (Ganguly S., 2003/04). The quest to rise in the region continued and India joined the club of Nuclear weapons states by conducting nuclear

tests in 1998. These nuclear tests were followed by imposition of sanctions by the international community on India which however, later were lifted.

India's long held desire to emerge as one of the major powers in the region was further facilitated by USA as China appeared as a strategic competitor for both India and US in the region. To balance China in Asia, US is building India in Asia (Tellis A. , 2007). Both countries also signed nuclear agreement and agreed to enhance the cooperation in all directions. This cooperation is enhancing India's stature economically, strategically and militarily in the region and beyond. Other than strong economic and foreign policies, India is enhancing its soft power and hard power simultaneously which are helping India to emerge in Asia.

2.1 Foreign Relations: A Strategic Approach to a Rising India

The end of the cold war which resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the mindset of the foreign policy establishment in India that it needed a massive realignment of its foreign policy. During the cold war, India, had shown a professed commitment to non-alignment and kept herself away from superpower ideological fray. However, contrary to the real essence of the non-alignment, India tilted towards Soviet Union during the cold war which resulted in a frosty relation with USA. The demise of Soviet Union at the end of the cold war made it clear to the India that it had to end up the self-imposed Non-Alignment and should elevate India's regional and international stature and include USA and other regional powers in Indian foreign policy calculus.

Demise of Soviet Union was also accompanied by devastated downfall of Indian economy at the end of the cold war. When Southeast Asian states and China were making progress, India was under the shackles of self-imposed Non-Alignment which restricted it to participate in global integrated economy and resulted in a low economic growth (Ganguly, 2003/04). India's experience

with new economic policies in early decade of 1990's and the participation in the global financial institutions, earned it a steady upward shift in Indian economy. Indian's policy makers then realized the importance of participation in global economy and since then economic interests of India define India's foreign policy and security objectives in the region and beyond. The end of the cold war thus, provided a momentous start to India to redefine its role in Asia by establishing relations with Asian states and other regional and global powers to achieve the larger Indian ambitions.

2.1.1 India in Asia: Allies and Contenders

India's profile has largely been elevated in Asia Pacific since the last two decades. Following the regional and global strategic trend, in which China is emerging as a sole power in Asia by focusing on its socio-economic progress, then Japan which is regaining its stature in Asia by dropping its military reticence and with the presence of USA as global hegemon in the region, India is shaping its foreign policy (Pant H. V., 2007). India has also devised a comprehensive and strategic foreign policies to deal with Pakistan in South Asia by establishing friendly relations with South Asian states and Afghanistan. Despite the growing partnership with US, India is the largest procurer of Russian weapons. To fulfill its energy requirements India is also establishing ties with rich Central Asian States. India's deftly devised foreign policy in Asia, thus, is enhancing India's profile in the region.

a) LOOK EAST POLICY

Throughout the cold war, India shunned the Southeast Asian states and did not pay much attention to establish relations as India was the proponent of Non-Alignment movement. In 1960 there were certain proposals from inside and outside of the strategic circle in India to fill the power vacuum created by British withdrawal from the east of the Suez and there was a likelihood that China may

exert influence (Brewster, 2014). These proposals were neglected by India as being the proponent of Non-Alignment and relations deteriorated when India provided sea support for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (Ganguly, 2010). Despite the profound religious and cultural associations between Southeast Asian region and India, the relations never flourished during cold war. Southeast Asian dominant religions Buddhism, Sufi Islam, Hinduism were largely derived from India and likewise the cultural influence that has been depicted in Southeast Asian nation's language and mythology (Brewster, 2014). India also has a border contiguity with only one South East Asian state that is Burma and maritime borders with three states that are Burma, Indonesia and Thailand. At the end of the cold war India has no territorial and border disputes with any of the Southeast Asian state yet no state acquired any prominence in Indian foreign policy objectives during the cold war.

With the end of the cold war, more precisely with the end to Non-Alignment movement, Indian Prime Minister at that time Narasimha Rao introduced "Look East" policy which was meant to explore new markets and attract investment. According to her "The Asia Pacific region would be the spring board for our leap into the global market place" (Haokip, 2011). India and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1992 took a bold step to bolster their ties when India became the sectorial partner of ASEAN followed by full dialogue partner in 1995. Since then the trade and economic activities between ASEAN and India didn't have any pause. Although the potential trade between India and ASEAN is relatively low when compared to the other economic partners but it is growing meaningfully. ASEAN has become one of India's largest trading partners in recent years and trade with ASEAN increased from \$7.13 billion in 2000 to \$76.26 billion in 2012 and there are expectations that trade will reach to 201.784 billion dollars by 2018. (De, 2014). India has also signed the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with

ASEAN states and bilateral agreements with each state to enhance economic cooperation (Das, 2013). India's growing economic and geo-political interests appeared as strong drivers to propose the Free Trade Area in ASEAN summit in 2002 which was later concluded in 2012 (Das, 2013). The Indo-ASEAN bond that at start only initiated to bolster economies of both India and ASEAN, lately has not been restricted only to economy but areas of cooperation diversified with India's growing economy and globalization. This cooperation was well depicted in Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) that was signed between India and ASEAN in 2000 to enhance the cooperation in tourism, culture, education and transport. In 2002 India became a summit level partner and in the following year became the first non-ASEAN member to accede the ASEAN treaty of Amity and Cooperation. In 2004 a long-term Indo-ASEAN plan of engagement was elucidated in ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity. Year 2005 was marked by historical development in India's 'look East' policy when India participated in first East Asian summit, a major step in India's long term desire to play a role as a major power in the region (Michael, 2013).

After the event of September 11, 2001 when terrorism emerged as a global phenomenon, India and ASEAN states also faced certain insurgent movements in their own states. ASEAN-India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism was signed in 2011 to cooperate on curbing the terrorism. Since then anti-terrorism cooperation has also acquired an important strand in India and ASEAN relations (Acharya A. , 2006).

India and ASEAN relation is not only restricted in economic sphere rather defense cooperation is paramount in their many strategies like India is providing military training to various ASEAN states (Das, 2013). India and ASEAN states are also collaborating in Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program to enhance defense cooperation along with other

economic cooperation. India is also providing ASEAN states with defense supplies and certain agreements between ASEAN states confirmed the future cooperation in defense sector (Jha, 2011). India is also conducting joint naval exercises bilaterally with each South East Asian State and in the collaboration with ASEAN states and other than these naval exercises India is providing “training, helping with evacuations, engaging in peace keeping, peacemaking, peace building and peace enforcement, and fostering multilateralism through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)” (Das, 2013). With these growing activities in Indian Ocean, India has assumed the role of providing security to ASEAN states in Indian Ocean. As Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh in an address stated that “We have also sought to assume our responsibility for stability in the Indian Ocean Region. We are well-positioned, therefore, to become a net provider of security in our immediate region and beyond” (Hindu, 2013)

With other prospects of cooperation in trade, terrorism, defense and culture, curtailing China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia has remained the marked strand of India’s inclination towards Southeast Asian states which was complemented by growing India-US security relationships (Brewster, 2011). Southeast Asian states also see India as a potential balancer of China’s growing influence in the region (Acharya A. , 2003/04). India’s look east policy with the support of both BJP and Congress parties of India has become an institutionalized component of India’s foreign policy (Ladwig, 2010).

India’s ambitions to influence the region by look east policy is not constrained to only Southeast Asia but Japan acquires a paramount significance in India’s foreign policy. During the cold war, relations between India and Japan were basically economic as India was the beneficiary of Japanese aid. Indo-Japan ties gained a new momentum in 1990’s because of India’s pragmatic foreign policy and insistent economic growth (Ganguly, 2010). India’s relations however, got a

hard power, has signed Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2008 to enhance the security and defense cooperation (Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India, 2008). In the annual summit of 2011 the prime ministers of both states pledged to expand the areas of cooperation including maritime security and freedom and safety of navigation (India G. o., 2011). Both countries also signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2011 to eliminate the tariffs between India and Japan up to 94% in 10 years. As a result of this trade flow immensely increased between two states and India's trade to Japan exceeded from 352 billion Yen in 2005 to 690 billion Yen in 2013 and Japan's trade to India grew 388 billion Yen in 2005 to 839 billion Yen in 2013 (Japan-India Relation, 2016). India's security ties with Japan will definitely augment India's naval power and economic power to the point that it can influence the multipolar maritime balance between Japan, China and United States and it will help India to forge its desire of multipolar Asia (III, 2009).

b) India and China

India and China's relations have always been plagued by the historical border dispute and mistrust. Despite the various attempts by both India and China to sort out the border issue, the mistrust however, persisted and overshadowed their bilateral cooperation. Both states fought a full-fledged war in 1962, in which China was declared as a winning party. The scars of this war were not even faded when both China and India again went on a verge of war in 1986. These kinds of belligerent adventurism by both states further strained their relationships despite the regular Special Representatives talks on border issues. The relations remained frosty until in 1988 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi paid a visit to China to improve bilateral ties. The visit resulted in a series of bilateral high level discussions on bilateral trade and diplomatic cooperation (Ganguly, 2010). As a result two agreements on Confidence Building Measures (CBM) were signed in 1993 and

1996 respectively in which both parties ensured the peace on the line of actual control along India and China border.

Despite these advents of CBMs, India and China relations are always fraught with mistrust due to historical border dispute and later developments in the international system. India and China's border dispute always appeared as a main irritant when it comes to normalization of bilateral relationship. Territorial disputes always paramount their bilateral cooperation and aggravate the mistrust. As in 2006, the disagreement emerged on the eve of Chinese President's visit to India when Chinese claimed that whole Arunachal Pradesh belongs to China (Rediff, 2006). Both India and China is unwilling to resolve their border dispute because of their respective strategic interests and power projection in the region (Bhattacharya, 2010). Second issue that hamper their bilateral cooperation is realignments in the region. India is skeptical over China and Pakistan's cooperation where China has apprehension over Indo-US growing partnership and their respective nuclear deals. India's former ambassador to China, C. V. Rangnathan, made a remark that "China's assistance to Pakistan to develop nuclear and missile technology to being Pakistan's biggest supplier of conventional military weapons is an obstacle to building trust between the PRC and India" (Rangnathan, 2002). Third, economic development and demand for energy resources like hydro-carbon from third party entangled them in a competition (Ganguly S., 2010). Last, both India and China are in an inexorable competition over their image as a regional power. India and China, both are entangled in a zero-sum game where one state's gain is considered as loss of the other state.

Though above factors restrain both China and India to forge a long term strategic partnership but the economic interdependence in the present globalized world led both states to sideline their bilateral disputes and foster economic cooperation. Despite India's statements where China

appeared as a major impetus behind conducting the nuclear tests, India's nuclear tests rather paved the way for mutual cooperation as at that time China realized the India's growing prowess in nuclear technology, IT and budding partnership with US over the nuclear issue (Mohan C. R., 2009)

The economic interdependence led both states to foster economic cooperation which had its roots in 1984, when both states signed the protocol on economic cooperation and granted the status of Most Favored Nation (MFN) and established Joint Working Group to enhance their cooperation in trade and commerce (Jain, 2004). As a result, the trade between both states increased from 265 million US dollars in 1991 to 3.6 billion US dollars in 2001 (Jain, 2004). Year 2003 saw a historical development in the bilateral relations of India and China when Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee paid a visit to China. In his visit, China accepted the Indian sovereignty over the Sikkim territory and India accepted Tibet as an autonomous entity of China (Razdan, 2003). The bilateral border trade and economic cooperation were among the major agreements signed during this visit. Chinese premier Wen Jiabao paid visit to India in 2005 to further strengthen the economic and hi-tech corporation between China and India (Embassy C. , 2005). Despite the standoffs in relations between India and China during 2006 and 2013, bilateral trade grew at a record scale. India and China's bilateral trade that was just 2.92 billion US dollars in 2000, has reached to 41.85 billion US dollars and made the India as a largest trading partner to China surpassing US, and India-China bilateral trade for 2013 were recorded as US\$ 65.9 billion (Embassy I. , n.d.). Analyzing the growing economic trend between India and China, it has been suggested that it could surpass the US-China trade as India-China bilateral trade is growing three times the pace US-China trade is happening (Wang, 2009).

Economic cooperation though is showing a positive trend but it has always been marred by the baggage of irritants both states have kept with them. India's rise and its UNSC seat in future, will largely be defined by its relations with China.

c) India and Russia

India and Russia enjoy the most cordial relations throughout their history till present. Since the inception of India till present the relationship is moving smoothly without any hiccups. The end of the cold war though witnessed the lack of convergence in their bilateral relations which were overcome latterly. India and Russian cooperation is not only confined to one specific area rather both states cooperate in the field of economy, political, security and technology.

India's professed commitment to non-alignment kept it away to fall in any super power orbit. However, the US's profound relations with Pakistan during the cold war and China's growing power dragged India to join hand with USSR. In the meantime, Russia supported Indian stance over the Kashmir issue and accepted that Kashmir is a part of India while it kept a neutral stance on Indo-China conflict (Pant H. V., 2013). Russian support to play a mediating role in India-Pakistan conflict was highly considered by Indians. In the late 1960's, Russia emerged as a second largest trading partner and topmost defense supplier. Both states also signed Indo-Soviet treaty in 1969 which were meant to refrain both states from supporting and entering an alliance which is against any other state. This treaty further strengthened their ties as for India it would balance the support of China and US in Indo-Pakistan conflict and would generate the Soviet support to India in UN. During the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, India gained the full support of Soviet Union because of this treaty. Both states showed their professed commitment to one another during the cold war as India was among few states which supported Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (Chakravarty, 1984).

Post-cold war era transformed the whole international structure in which Soviet Union was disintegrated and US has emerged as a sole super power. The changing realities provided both states to redefine their relationship. For Russia stabilizing its economy and regaining its influence appeared the paramount concerns. However, for India the end of Soviet glory pushed it to normalize relations with US. The uncertainty in their relationship continued till Putin became the president of Russia in 2000. He reinvigorated its ties with India, China and Japan. It was this time when Putin established the strategic partnership with India. For Russia, India seems to be a lucrative state which is providing bigger markets to Russia and will help it to regain its posture, but for India, Russia not only suffices its defense capabilities but also provides support against Kashmir issue, countering terrorism, providing energy, to access Central Asian States and in future the alliance may help to balance US. To strengthen their ties both states initiated the "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership" in 2010.

India depend heavily on Russia for its defense needs. It is their defense ties that has bounded both states in a strategic bond. India almost carry out the 70 percent of its defense imports from Russia which in turn strengthens Russia's economy. After the end of the cold war, when Russia was trying to regain its economic strength it was India and China that strengthen Russian economy as 800 of its defense companies kept on working and provided military hardware to both states (Chenoy, 2010). India and Russia both shared the "institutional mechanism" of transferring high level technology which are used in the joint production. These joint ventures have enabled India to indigenously produce weapons which will enhance its defense and will not burden its economy (Pant H. V., 2013). Both states are recently on the defense endeavors in recent years which include "a new \$2.34 billion contract for the refit of the Gorshkov aircraft carrier; a \$1.2 billion deal to procure 29 additional MiG 29 K naval fighter aircraft; and an agreement for an additional 40 Su

MKI fighters for the Indian Air Force. The contract for the preliminary design of the fifth-generation fighter aircraft has been signed between India's Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)" (Pant H. V., 2013).

Relationship between both states rely heavily on the defense cooperation. There are less economic ventures by both states as compared to China and Russia which are emerging as the largest trading partners. Both states are taking initiatives to expand their trade. Russia and India are also collaborating in the energy as India needs Russia to fulfil its energy requirements. Indian oil and gas companies are collaborating with the Russian GAZPROM to initiate the energy programs. Russia and India's relations are still growing in the defense sector and both maintained a stance to support one another in the international forum. Despite the growing Russia-China ties and India-US relations, both states pledge to foster their ties which eventually is developing and enhancing India's stature in the region.

d) India and Afghanistan

India has always been enjoying close historical and cultural ties with Afghanistan. India in 1951 joined the Treaty of Peace and Friendship to cement its historical ties. India, during the cold war was forging the policy of Non-Alignment and Afghanistan to some extent also followed the movement and stayed away from the two super power adversaries during that time. Afghanistan, during cold war, also managed to enjoy the perks in the form of economic aid from both US and Soviet Union. However, due to Soviet Union generosity in providing economic and military aid to Afghanistan, it fell in the orbit of soviet bloc and latterly was invaded by Soviet Union. After the invasion of Soviet Union, India supported the newly formed government in Kabul by Burhanuddin Rabbani until when the Taliban took over most the Afghanistan's control. The reason of supporting that government of Afghanistan by India was primarily that since Pakistan, according to India, was

creating troubles for India so India decided to support the rivals of Pakistan (Swami, 2008). When Taliban took over the Burhanuddin government, India along with Iran and Russia supported the Taliban's against group, The Northern Alliance with monetary and material aid (Rashid, 2002) as for India the Kashmiri mujahedeen got trained in Afghanistan by Taliban which deteriorated the situation in Kashmir. After the Taliban government was uprooted, India's engagement with Afghanistan became multi-dimensional (Basu, 2007). India not only supported the first Bonn Conference which laid stress on the governing structure of Afghanistan but India also reopened its consulates that had been closed during the Taliban regime. Afghanistan also welcomed the Indian engagement in Afghanistan as it needed the economic and material aid to rebuild its infrastructure and Afghanistan at that time saw India as a sole counterweight to Pakistan's influence in the Afghan politics (Pattanaik, 2012).

India also counts Afghanistan as a strategic priority for securing some political and economic agendas. For India, helping the war-torn Afghanistan is its responsibility as a regional power (Pant H. V., 2010). India through Afghanistan wanted to counter Pakistan's growing influence in Afghanistan. India has never supported Taliban regime which enjoyed friendly ties with the Pakistan. Pakistan has apprehensions on India's growing immersion to Afghanistan which through the lens of Pakistan will be an attempt to destabilize Pakistan by encircling it (Joshi, 2010). Secondly India views Afghanistan as a gate way to central Asian states that will also elevate its influence in these states. Energy rich states of Central Asia and presence of China in central Asian states dragged India to exert its influence beyond its border and such possibility will never turn into reality without having good terms with Afghanistan. To have uninterrupted relationship with Afghanistan and Central Asian states without seeking support from Pakistan, India is building Chahbahar port that will link India to Iran and Afghanistan and from there to Central Asian states.

Having immense influence in Afghanistan is part of the India's larger agenda to have greater role in the regional affairs. India wants to play a role of a regional police that could stabilize the region and Afghanistan fit well in this scheme of things. By providing economic aid to Afghanistan, India wants to project itself as an economic sufficient state that could assist the neighboring impoverished states and it will help the rest of the world to assess the Indian capabilities as a great power (Pant H. V., 2010). India's engagement with Afghanistan is primarily based on the India's soft power approach to achieve the larger economic agendas. India by using economic reconstruction of Afghanistan is generating the "political capital" which eventually would help to develop historical ties with the people of Afghanistan including Pashtuns and this economic reconstruction will create the stakeholders in Afghanistan which will support and sustain the Indian presence in the region and transform the overall regional security environment in India's favor (Pattanaik, 2012). India had also made considerable efforts to make Afghanistan a member of the SAARC for garnering economic benefits. This Indian move will help India to resolve the issue of free trade and transit of goods issue across the border and it will also help to gain access to Central Asian States (Pant H. V., 2010).

India and Afghanistan's relations since are free of any contagious border dispute or any other political rivalry, relations improved immensely and India, right now is the sixth largest donor to Afghanistan. India is also campaigning the medical mission in Afghanistan's different cities providing free medicines and till now 3000,000 patients have been treated (Pattanaik, 2012). India is contributing extensively in Afghanistan since 2001 and till now it had contributed 2 billion US dollars for the reconstruction of Afghanistan (Pattanaik, 2012). Its reconstruction efforts include the mega 218 km Delaram-Zaranj Highway or A71 which connects Afghanistan with Iran and provides India a shortest way to transport its goods to Afghanistan. Afghanistan's new

parliamentary building is also being constructed by India. India is also contributing in the project of Salma Dam which has officially named as Afghan-India friendship Dam to strengthen their ties. This dam will generate electricity and also will be used for irrigation purposes. India is also aiding Afghanistan in developing its institutional capacity. India is providing training to more than 700 Afghani's diplomats, doctors, lawyers, teachers and many more. Afghanistan's growing TV networks and telephone exchanges are also the result of India's contribution in these sectors. India also provides 1000 scholarships to Afghan students. These kinds of gestures is elevating India's profile in Afghanistan and will help India to reap certain benefits which any military and political endeavors cannot secure. India, at present, is not opting for providing or sending military troops to Afghanistan. Military assistant to Afghanistan is out of the question because US will not favor that move by India keeping in view the sensitivities of Pakistan (Pant H. V., 2010). Therefore, India rather than having physical presence in Afghanistan opted for providing training to Afghan army and signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) which will provide "training, equipping and capacity building programs for Afghan national security forces" (Gupta, 2010) and because of this agreement 30,000 Afghan's had flown to India for training.

India's influential role in Afghanistan is so far, a successful move from India to emerge as a significant player in the region and serve its interests in the region.

e) India and Central Asia

Central Asia has remained out of the policy options of India till 2000. Energy rich Central Asian States (CARs) could not turn India's head towards them in the presence of hostile Afghanistan. However, the events of 9/11, economic and strategic interests and countering terrorism are the major events that transform the Indian approach towards CARs. India also realizes that its growing economy and military power and its ambition to emerge as an Asian Pacific power will be

facilitated by establishing good relation with Central Asian States. Moreover, Indian policy makers realized that India need to establish relation with resource rich CARs to counter the Pakistan's and Chinese influence in these states.

India after the end of the cold war was experimenting some serious foreign policy and economic change. The new economic policies in India with changing world order challenged Indian policy makers to dig out certain options that ensure India's prominence in the world affairs. Presence of Taliban government in Afghanistan and Pakistan's support to the Taliban regime and their direct influence in Kashmir and Central Asian States were the daunting challenges for India to reach to Central Asian states. However, events of 9/11 and operation against Taliban in Afghanistan provided India a positive momentum to have its foothold in Central Asia. Establishing good relations with Afghanistan is among the priority of India to counter terrorism in its own state and to reach Central Asian states (Blank, 2003). India then established relations with Afghanistan and provided it with financial support to smooth the way to Central Asia. India also realized that political relations are not possible without economic integration of CARs. To operationalize the policy of engagement India hosted visits of several CARs states presidents in 2003 and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid a visit to central Asian states in 2002 which resulted in almost 10 trade agreements of Indian textiles, pharmaceuticals and electronics industries in the same year (Akbarzadeh, 2003). Due to the Indian growing demand in energy, Indian domestic Oil and Natural Gas Company has acquired the shares of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan gas reserves (Laurelle & Peyrouse, 2011). India was also keen to operationalize the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan (TAPI) gas pipe line which so far has not seen to be operationalized due to regional politics between India Pakistan and Afghanistan.

To strengthen ties with CARs, India is also establishing the defense relationship with CARs. India supported the of US military bases in Central Asia and established its own base in Tajikistan and later assisted and trained the Tajiks personnel (Akbarzadeh, 2003). India, to enhance its ties with central Asian States have also initiated “Connect Central Asia” policy in 2012 which was meant to “pro-active political, economic and people-to-people engagement with Central Asian countries, both individually and collectively” (Government of India, 2012).

India's relations with Central Asian States depict its larger aspirations of emerging as regional player in Asia (Blank, 2003). Though the pace to get a strong foothold in the region was constraint by having no border contiguity which India is trying to outdo by establishing closer ties with Iran and by constructing Chahbahar port which if done, would have acted as a catalyst to India's aspiration as a major power.

f) India and South Asia

India enjoyed a considerable influence among the South Asian States except to its only rival in region Pakistan. India's border contiguity with South Asian States, its huge size, booming economy, nuclear weapons have made India a lucrative partner to smaller states of South Asia. For smaller states of South Asia, India is regional power (Cohen, 2001). India among the South Asian States enjoy cordial relations with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Though the issue of illicit trade of goods, the transportation of drugs and immigrants are the problems with Bangladesh but still both states have friendly relationship. It is the India in 1971, which helped Bangladesh to gain independence. Sri Lanka and India also enjoy healthy relations despite the past hostilities on the issue of Indian support to Sri Lankan rebel group LTTE (Liberation of Tamil Tiger Elam).

India and Pakistan's relations have always been fraught with mistrust and wars. India despite its bigger size, large economy and huge material resources has also felt insecure from the smaller Pakistan and the reasons to this insecurity are historical, ideological, strategical and domestic reasons that aggravate India's insecurity with Pakistan and Pakistan's concern with India (Cohen, 2001). For India, it was Pakistan in the South Asia that could halt the India's emerging role not in the region but in the overall world (Cohen, 2001). The reason was rooted in the protracted conflict of Kashmir between these two states which has given rise to numerous other host issues with the time. Despite certain efforts by international community, the conflict lingers on and loom heavily in their bilateral relations. Both states fought four wars in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999 respectively. The collateral damage in these wars could not resist both states to resolve the conflict but rather the rivalry has acquired a nuclear dimension and both states now possess considerable nuclear weapons to deter other states' belligerent actions. So far, the acquisition of nuclear weapons has stalled the prospect of future war yet it cannot be denied. This rivalry has ceased the possibility of any bilateral cooperation between India and Pakistan. India viewed Pakistan as the only state in the region that could halt its rise in the region. The human rights violation in Indian-held Kashmir by India has always remained a concern of the international community which affect India's status internationally.

The root cause of the conflict can be traced back to the partition time when both states gained independence from their British colony. However, the Kashmir, a Muslim majority area ruled by Hindu ruler was not given to either Pakistan and India. The respective claims on Kashmir by both India and Pakistan dragged them to their first war in 1948 which ended with a UN mandated cease fire. The Cease fire Line (CFL) divided the Kashmir between India and Pakistan and India as a result acquired two third of the Kashmir and remaining went to Pakistan. The second war of 1965

was also fought over Kashmir and ended up with the Tashkent Declaration where both parties agreed to respect the CFL, will establish peaceful relations and return of the territories captured during the war (Council, 1966). The third India and Pakistan war that took place in 1971 was not over Kashmir, rather it's a civil war which with the intrusion of India led into a full fledged war followed by the creation of a new state Bangladesh which formerly was the part of Pakistan. The war ended with the Shimla Declaration in 1972 where both parties, India and Pakistan agreed to the end war and the CFL was however, changed to Line Of Control (LOC) which clearly demarcated India's and Pakistan's territories. The last so far conflict over Kashmir is the Kargil crises of 1999 when Pakistani forces intruded the LOC. This was the first war fought between both states after both states gone nuclear. The eruption of the war between India and Pakistan was of great concern for the international community that it may not turn nuclear (Chaudhary, 2009). However, it was these nuclear weapons that confined and restricted the war to infantry and artillery operations (Chaudhury, 2009). With US mediation, the Kargil crises reached to its culmination and both states withdrew their forces across the line of control.

A year before the Kargil conflict both India and Pakistan conducted their nuclear test. India conducted five nuclear tests and Pakistan thus conducted 6 nuclear test balancing the India's first test in 1974. These detonations resulted in the imposition of sanctions on both states. However, in February 1999, the Prime Ministers of both states signed the Lahore Declaration in which both states agreed to the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute and also agreed to "take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict" (NTI, 2011). These CBMs faced a major blow with the initiation of the Kargil crises.

The year 2001 saw again an initiation of CBMs when President of Pakistan General Pervz Musharraf met Indian Prime Minister in Indian state Agra to reconcile their mutual differences. Like Previous CBMs, the Agra Summit also ended up on the difference of opinions on Kashmir but both states agreed to hold further high level meetings (BBC, 2001). The same year was marked by the deadly attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001. India blamed two militant group of Pakistan Lashkar e Taiba and Jaish e Muhammad and demanded extradition of the terrorists. India also launched Operation Parakram, a military stand off when armies of both states mobilized across the border. Both forces remained on the verge of the war for 10 months. The US and Britain government's however, eased the situation between both states and both states withdrew their forces in October 2002. This was the longest stand offs between both the militaries after 1971 war. India's strategy to a long standoff is to persuade US to pressurize Islamabad to stop cross border terrorist activities (Hagerty D. T., 2006). In 2003 and 2004, the initiation of cease fire accord and process of composite dialogues respectively, again paved the way towards normalization of relations between both states. The composite dialogues were aimed at tackling the key contentious issues between two states and these are "peace and security, Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, the Wular barrage/Tulbul navigation Project, Sir Creek, terrorism and drug trafficking, economic and commercial cooperation, and the promotion of friendly exchanges" (Chaudhary, 2009). The dialogues of 2004 ease up the tensions between both states and agreed to open the borders across LOC, bus service between India and Pakistan, opening of consulates and several other CBMs were taken to ease the tensions between India and Pakistan (Misra, 2004). These CBMs were stalled when India was rocked with firing and blasts in different sites, killing at least 163 people in 2009. India blamed Pakistan for sponsoring this act of terrorism. India thus suspended the peace talks with Pakistan. Both states till now have not been engaged in any concrete peace talks. The issue

and allegations of state sponsoring terrorism by both states have ceased the peace process and has made the region an utmost concern for the whole world.

2.2 India and US

Indian aspirations to play a major power role in Asia will only be facilitated in strengthening her ties with US. Most of the cold war witnessed the chilly relations between the US and India as throughout the cold war India followed her Non-Alignment movement and did not join any super power bloc. Despite the professed commitment to Non-Alignment, the socialist contours in Indian politics, Indian leaders favored Soviet Union over US during the cold war. This socialist disposition of India got a major blow when Indian ally Soviet Union made a failed venture in Afghanistan which resulted in the culmination of cold war and recasting of new world order, from bipolar to unipolar. India at that crucial time realized that successor state Russia will not be able to support her defense and economic needs and it was need of the time to accept the preponderance of US in international system. That was the time when India imperceptibly started to move towards US nevertheless, it was a challenge for India to come in terms with US in the presence of her old waning ally, a new Russia.

In the same time, after the cold war, in the early 90's India underwent a serious economic transition when the Indian prime minister of that time Narasimha Rao introduced the economic liberalization, an attempt made to take the country out of shackles of socialist type of economy that had seized the growth of Indian economy and widened the economic disparity in India during the cold war. Indian economic reforms required the engagement with other states and organizations including IMF. This was the time when Indian's trajectory to economic growth demanded India to come in closer terms with US and meanwhile these Indian economic reforms came in concomitant with US

President Clinton's policy of "engagement and enlargement" (Hagerty D. T., 2006). Indian Prime Minister Narisihma Rao paid a visit to US in 1994 in which the stress had been made to strengthen economic ties between India and US. The visit appeared as a quick start to US-India bilateral relations that spurred the series of multiple agreements including tentative military to military relations. The "Agreed Minute on Defense Relations," established under Kicklighter Proposals in 1994 is considered as a mile stone in Indo-US military relations. This Agreed Minute established Defense Policy Group (DPG), The Joint Technical Group (JTG) and Executive Steering Group to enhance the bilateral military cooperation among both states. During 1995 till 1998 both US and India collaborated under these groups and conducted joint naval exercises in Malabar, joint military training and India acquired submarines, pilotless aircrafts and military hardware as US International Military Education and Training (IMET) budget doubled during that time (Fair, 2004).

The following years of cold war truly depicted the Indian efforts of normalizing her relations with the sole superpower US. India seemed to have realized that no bilateral relations could be more significant to India than with US and the greater role India assumed to play in Asia is considerably dependent on amenable course of actions with US (Ganguly, 2010). In the efforts to embark on friendly relations that are free of the turbulent differences shared between US and India, India normalized her relations with Israel, a US ally, and established full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 (Rubinuff, 2006).

The bilateral relationship though was turning gradually towards normalization but USA's concern and continued stress on India to manage human rights violation in Kashmir and non-proliferation issue had remained the main irritants in US-India bilateral relationship. This short-term normalization faced a major rift when a new government in India 1998 led by Bhartiya Janta Party

(BJP) took over and conducted series of nuclear tests in Pokhran. These Indian detonations were followed by Pakistan's nuclear tests making South Asia a nuclear hub and proliferation issue a paramount concern of USA in the region. The result to that detonations was not but imposition of sanctions from US on Pakistan and India. The phase of normalization of relation between US and India had turned in a complete deadlock after nuclear tests of India. India, at that time were viewed by some Americans as a strong military opponent that may in the future would join hands with Russia and China to directly challenge the hegemony of US (Cohen, 2001). However, none of these perceptions were materialized and the deadlock didn't last long. In a matter of fact these nuclear tests provided a paradigm shift in US-India bilateral relations. A series of dialogues spurred between US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh in June 1998, a first step towards "strategic engagement" a term coined in these dialogues, between India and US (Talbott, 2004). These dialogues though remained indecisive and neither US convinced India to sign CTBT and nor India got a status of nuclear weapon states. However, these dialogues convinced both US and India to end up the past baggage of differences they had held for each other and move towards the greater common strategic, economic and political interests (Malik, 2006). Both states came even closer when after four months of these nuclear tests Indian Prime Minister Vajpai paid a visit to US and declared US and India as "Natural Allies" (Nayyar, 1998).

India-US rapprochement was further strengthened when China emerged as a common threat for India and US in the strategic environment of Asia. US, after the cold war had established somehow friendly relations with China but China's growing influence and human rights violation in Tehran in 2000 had made India more attractive to US (Cohen, 2001). The changing of geo-strategic environment in Asia where China is emerging as a rising power, US had to take measures to

counter China's rise in the coming decades. The strategy US adopted was to engage China at the same time by enhancing the powers of the other states that are neighboring to China and this requires the strengthening partnership with Japan as well seeking new partners like India (Tellis A. , 2007). For India, China is not only a state it has only hostility but a competitor that could hinder its aspirations in the region. Many official statements by Indian politicians also declared China as a potential threat to India like the Indian defense minister in BJP government at that time declared China as number one threat ((Retired), 2006). Even in the letter, issued to US by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, the nuclear tests were justified by declaring China as a principle security threat to India ((Retired), 2006). Moreover, in a complex security paradigm that was emerging in Asia where if both China and India continue to rise, there is a likelihood of evolving a security competition between India and China in the future and to counter this security rivalry, India is enhancing her power by joining hands with US (Pant H. V., 2009). China's growing influence and its containment thus, has brought India and US more close than ever in the history.

Indian diaspora in US appeared as an economic and political asset in facilitating rapprochement between world's strongest democracy, US, and world's largest democracy, India. A large number of Indian middle class residing in US enhanced the Indian clout and created an enduring impact in reshaping the image of India in US. The migration trend of Indians to US started in late 70's when Indian doctors, engineers, students and business community started to move to US (Cohen, 2001). This Indian community gradually accrued and formed the second largest immigrant group after Mexico in US (Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, 2015). This Indian diaspora at any given time can influence the US policy in favor of India. After the Indian Nuclear explosions, when sanctions were imposed on India by US, Indian diaspora played a crucial role in relaxation of sanctions by frequent visits of President Clinton White House (Cohen, 2001). Indian diaspora thus, has not

improved the image of poverty ridden India to a corporate India but is also acting as a lobby by funding Indian Caucus in House of Representative and Senate. This caucus facilitated and boosted the role of Indo- US partnership during the US led war on terror and influenced to condition the US aid to Pakistan (Jaffrelot, 2009). US and India nuclear deal was also a result of this Indian diaspora and their influence in both Houses of US that had made the process to a successful end (Jaffrelot, 2009).

US policy makers and think tanks also encouraged the mutual process of enhanced cooperation between India and US during the 90's decade (Cohen, 2001). The writings of these policy makers and think tanks laid stress that US should give more importance to India as a strategic partner and should come up from the ill nuances of the past. These reports further suggested the government of US that imposition of harsh sanctions will further deteriorate the present situation rather government should opt for presidential visits and should adopt a strategy where security concerns should not acquire the paramount position in their bilateral discussions that it would surpass the bilateral economic and political issues (Cohen, 2001). These writings also managed to change the perception of Clinton's regime to come in good terms with India. Even later in era of Bush administration the writings of the officials played a crucial role in lifting the sanctions against India and presented India as an Asian power and eventually paving and evening out a way for nuclear pact between India and US in 2005 (Tellis A. J., 2005).

The start of the new century and new US government brought new hopes in Indo-US relations. India-US relations during that time acquired that robustness it has never had before. The US perception about India on Kashmir issue was remarkably changed when US intervened in Kargil crises between India and Pakistan and demanded Pakistan to withdraw its forces from Kargil and maintain the sanctity of line of control between India and Pakistan. This was the first time when

India got a direct support from US on Kashmir issue ((Retired), 2006). The past grievances and hostile perceptions were further wiped away with the President Clinton visit to India in 2000. President Clinton envisaged that the trip would provide the new level of engagement between US and India and would enhance the US influence in the region (Talbott, 2004). Both governments did not sign any formal agreements yet the utility of the trip cannot be undermined as both states got a breakthrough in their future relations and had set a direction to cooperate on issues like promotion and expansion of democracy, countering terrorism and global economic order (Cohen, 2001).

The new government in US, headed by President George W. Bush continued the legacy of the Clinton's government of enhancing ties with India. India's unconditional support to US after the attacks of 9/11 on US, incited a stronger partnership and the sanction imposed by US was lifted gradually and finally all were withdrawn completely after 9/11. Both states also shared a vision of elimination of Jihadi movements and Islamic extremism occurring in South Asia which demanded a strong cooperation between India and US. Despite Indian concerns on US perks offered to Pakistan and Pakistan's role in war on terror led by US, India-US partnership flourished unlike past (Ganguly S., 2010). This growing partnership between India and US gained a further momentum when India and US moved a step ahead in their bilateral ties and signed a "Next Step in Strategic Partnership" in 2004. This partnership was aimed at to cooperate on four crucial areas concerning the growing needs and status of India. Both states agreed to foster cooperation in these four areas: civilian nuclear technology, civilian space research programs, high technology trade and missile defense program (Vajpaei, 2004). The following year was marked as historical year in US-India partnership when President Bush declared India a responsible nuclear state that should enjoy all the advantages as enjoyed by other nuclear states and declared a land mark agreement of

Civilian Nuclear energy (Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 2005). The deal signed in 2005 was ratified in 2008 after a deft and prolonged debates in US and Indian national governments. This agreement stipulated that India would detach its military nuclear program from civilian nuclear energy and put her civilian nuclear energy plants under the scrutiny of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This deal has also lifted the moratorium of nuclear trade by all powers including US, to India. This nuclear deal gave India a status of responsible nuclear state, a status India is trying to acquire since the inception of her nuclear program. From estranged democracies (Kux, 1993), both states set a path for strategic partnership. The culmination of “strategic partnership” between India and US and the tenacious and prolonged legislation process this deal encompassed, showed that how US is engaging India as a rising global power and a trust US has in India as a global partner (Pant H. V., 2009). The nuclear pact between India and US spurred economic and defense cooperation that eventually would elevate India’s profile. Both states initiated joint military exercises, including navies, army and air force exercises, exchange of equipment and personnel and cooperation in the production of new weapons. Though such type of exercises were initiated after the end of the cold war however there was an inertia of developing this cooperation at larger scale due to the past grievances particularly by nuclear proliferation issue. This nuclear agreement had drawn both states out of their dubious past and made defense and economic cooperation inevitable. The advent of the Malabar exercises, joint naval exercises between India and US, that initially started in 1994 have turned more robust since the commencement of this deal. US conducts more military exercises with India than with any other state (Agrawal, 2011). Both states till 2013 have conducted fifteen Malabar Naval Exercises since 1994 (Sinha, 2016). In 2013 both India and US held joint military exercises and this time in US in Fort Bragg where 400 Indian army personnel

held joint exercises with US forces (Times of India, 2012). Lt Gen Francis J Wiercinski, the commanding general of US Army Pacific in Hawaii asserted that the India and US have a “budding relationship” and this exercise will provide an opportunity for both states to conduct bilateral operations, exchange ideas and creating friendly atmosphere of working side by side (Times of India, 2012). Arms sale between India and US has been increasing 1.9 US dollars per year and India in 2011, with 4.9 billion dollars has emerged as a second highest Foreign Military Sale (FMS) customer for the US which include the sales of air crafts, radars and specialized tactical equipment (Sinha, 2016). Along with this defense cooperation both states are forging a fervent economic partnership that could strengthen India against other rising economic powers in the region. The President Obama’s visit to India in 2010 where he declared India as an “Indispensable Partner” for US and showed paramount concern for economic cooperation and deepening trade ties with US including enhancing US business in India. Bilateral trade between India and US expanded from 19 billion US dollars in 2000 to 95 billion US dollars in 2013 and joint efforts by both states to facilitate investment will generate economic growth, create job opportunities and ultimately prosperity of both states (US Department Of State, 2014).

India despite of its choppy relations with US during cold war has now emerged as an “indispensable partner” to US on the variety of issues. India and US both shared common goals of promotion of democracy, hedging China, combating terrorism and most significant to elevate India’s posture in the region. US unlike past, now overtly support India’s bid for United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which if done would have made India in a group of a powerful states. The Indo-US nuclear deal and US support to India on various prickly matters not only provide an impetus to both India and US to achieve their larger agendas in the region by extending their cooperation but also is enhancing India’s profile in the region.

2.3 Economy

Indian economy is third largest in the world in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) while it stands tenth worldwide in terms of nominal GDP. It is a member of BRICS – an association of five emerging economies of the globe including Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa – and the G-20 countries. Its economy has been growing at a steady rate of over 7% since 2014 with an average annual growth rate of 5% as opposed to 2.2% posted by United States (Bank, 2015). It is forecasted that growth of Indian economy will surpass that of China in next three to five years. While Chinese economy is predicted to hover around 8%, it seems well within India's grasp to post double digit growth rate over next few consecutive years (Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003). India's prime advantage, which seems to have turned the table for its economy were the economic reforms of 1990s. Many argue, based on GDP that the growth had begun earlier in mid-80s, but there is a general agreement that post-90's India witnessed unleashing of the pent-up commercial potential buried deep under the weight of stringent regulatory policies. "License Raj," was the term used to describe the regulatory regime in the country. It was a system of such tight state regulation of business activity that it seemed that "businessmen could not even pick their teeth without a license" (Economist, 2010). The abolition of License Raj, however, involved the risk of cannibalization of local industry by foreign firms. Despite opposition from various quarters, liberalization policies were adopted. Indian companies were forced into a cut-throat competition with international companies. Many have discovered that they can compete; many are still learning (Oswal, 2010).

A number of Indian firms have gone global in pursuit of benefits promised by globalization, and in the process reinvented themselves into world-class organizations (Khanna & Palepu, 2006). Arcelor Mittal is Indian-based, world-largest steel firm with its operations housed in Luxembourg.

Bharti Airtel – a telecom firm – with a strong 140 million subscriber-base in India is exponentially expanding in African continent. Tata Motors is a global brand with world's cheapest \$2000-car to its credit. Tata is also renowned for its luxury brands such as Jaguar and Land Rover. These are just a few cases to drive home the point that economic liberalization fundamentally altered the outlook of Indian economy. The economic gamble paid off, and its dividends still keep pouring into the economy with positive forecasts for many years to come (Economist, 2010).

Indian domestic market is also lucrative for local and international firms. It has a strong and growing base of middle-class consumers whose preference leans more in direction of cheap rather than fancy goods (Economist, 2010). Local and international firms are having to utilize a hefty portion of their R&D budgets in “Frugal Innovations,” that might allow them to reach the broadest base of potential consumers (Rathore, 2008).

Another advantage that has the potential to translate into massive dividends for India is that of demography. 800 million, roughly two-thirds of the population, is under 35 years of age (Khambatta & Inderfurth, The Emerging Indian Economy, 2013). India is forecasted to inhabit the highest number of youth – 700 million out of 1 billion-plus - in any country across the globe till 2050 (Singh).

It is interesting to note that the median population age of OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) countries is on the rise. The corresponding fall in workforce in OECD countries is notwithstanding the current lax in immigration. There must be a massive influx from elsewhere, including South-East Asia, in order to sustain their growth and productivity. India is expected to have an additional 47 million people in the labor market while the OECD countries will face shortage of manpower to shoulder their economy (Singh).

A corollary of demographic dividend in terms of expansion of workforce is the expansion of consumer market as well. India's 20-35 age-groups will stand around 325 million - roughly 25% of the population – by 2020, and will represent a growing consumer market for domestic as well as foreign goods and services. According to estimates, middle-class in India is expanding by 30-40 million people each year with tremendous rise in consumption patterns of items associated with rising incomes, such as motorbikes, cars, televisions, mobile phones and etc. In fact, there is a striking contrast on the consumption patterns on Indian populace in post-reform period (1990-2004) as compared to pre-reform period (1970-1991). In the pre-reform period, expenditure on food items increased from 46% to 51%, while the expenditure on non-food items – such as mobiles, televisions, motor cars etc. – declined from 54% to 48%. However, in the post-reform period, the expenditure on food items stooped from 50% to 35%, while that on non-food items surged from 50 to 65%; a text-book case for change in consumption patterns associated with increase in incomes (Sethia, 2013). Coupled with vibrant consumer financing from Indian banking system, the growth in consumer market is expected to boost further in coming years.

Previous experience around the globe indicates that alongside increase in consumer spending, the demographic shift will result in rise in national savings as well. India's national savings, 23% at present, are expected to rise to 30% as she reaps the benefits of positive shift in demographic indicators (Shukla, 2010).

Outsourced labor is yet another dimension in which India has tremendous potential to serve untapped markets. It is estimated that Indian outsourcing services help their foreign clients save up to USD 1.5 billion each year through leveraging cheap local labor. The biggest chunk of this savings goes to General Electric, whose CEO Jack Welch is said to have coined the 70-70-70

principle³. U.S. financial and banking sector saves 7-10% of their cost as compared to their European competitors by outsourcing components of service delivery to India each year. Alone in last four years, U.S. financial sector has saved around USD 6 billion by outsourcing to India. It is estimated that for every USD 1 off-shored to India, U.S. economy derives value of USD 12-14 (Swaminathan, 2009).

Notwithstanding all this, experts on the opposite side of the spectrum argue that despite its massive growth rate, India cannot surpass China to be a regional, much less a global, power. They point out that China's economy is four times larger than that of India. Even at a very fast rate of growth, it will take years before India starts to portray the economic expansion that mirrors that of China (Madhavan, 2015). Just to compare, critics point out the comparison between India and China on various socio-economic indicators (Branigan & Arnett, 2014):

Sr. No	Particular	China	India	Remarks
1	Life Expectancy	75	66	Source: World Bank
2	Percentage of Female Parliamentarians	25	8	Source: Inter-parliamentary Union
3	Number of Olympic Medals	88	6	Source: BBC
4	Fertility Rate (Births per woman)	1.7	2.5	Source: World Bank

³ That 70% of the work at G.E. will be outsourced to outside suppliers; 70% of that will be given overseas; and 70% of that will be given to India.

5	Adult Literacy	96.5	71.2	Source: UNESCO
6	Female to Male Labor Participation	0.84	0.41	Source: International Labor Organization

Critics also point out that a youth population is not an unqualified blessing. Particularly, in case of India, 92% of the workforce is either self-employed or employed by the informal sector where the working conditions are inferior to international norms and standards (India G. O., 2015). This has serious implications on the productive capacity of the workforce employed. Secondly, a sizeable portion of Indian workforce is uneducated and unskilled. All the potential that is accrued to India owing to shift in global demographics will go to waste in absence of penetrating and cross-cutting reforms aimed at creating an educated and skilled workforce (Ojha & Singhal, 2016).

2.4 Hard Power

India, finally has embraced the principle that acquisition of hard power is a pivotal factor in its quest to emerge as a major power in the world. Since India's independence India is engulfed in the security dilemma having Pakistan and China as its potential rivals in its neighborhood. In the presence of these rivals India has never abandoned modernizing its military capabilities. However, a choice of going nuclear by India was initially remained ambivalent during the reign of Indian prime minister Nehru who was against nuclear weapons. Meanwhile during that time India simultaneously fought wars with Pakistan and China where other than one with Pakistan India faced a defeat in all which strengthened the ground for India to go nuclear to preserve its security needs. However, the ambiguity to go nuclear or not pertained till in 1974. But under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi India detonated a nuclear test and claimed it as a peaceful nuclear test (Cohen, 2001). After the nuclear detonation, India covertly dragged the nuclear mission without any

acknowledgement and latterly in 1998 India detonated five nuclear tests at Pokhran declaring itself as a nuclear weapon state.

In the presence of two potential rivals, Pakistan and China, and their growing mutual security partnership and the demise of Soviet Union; an Indian ally during cold war, raised concerns for the Indian nuclear strategy makers to end their equivocal nuclear posture and emerge as a nuclear weapon state (Ganguly, 2010). The members of the BJP government of that time also believed that going nuclear will preserve the Indian larger economy and great civilization and culture and would help India to rise as a major power (Cohen, 2001). India contrary to that justified the nuclear tests as a response to growing Chinese influence and declaring China as a potential nuclear and security threat to India. The nuclear detonations by India faced serious criticism from the whole world and sanctions were imposed on India. However, later the sanctions were lifted right after the 9/11 incident.

Indian nuclear program since then has acquired more robustness and Indian nuclear capabilities has grown massively. At present India has 100-120 stockpiles of nuclear warheads (Norris, 2106). India has also produced “540 kg of weapon grade plutonium” (Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, 2015). India’s fighter bomber aircrafts constitute the “backbone of Indian operational strike force” and Two or three squadrons of Mirage 2000H and Jaguar IS/IB aircraft are believed to have nuclear capabilities that allow India to conduct nuclear strike in Pakistan and China (Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, 2015). India is also upgrading its aircrafts that have been purchased during cold war from Soviet Union and recently from Britain and France to enhance its nuclear capabilities. Land based nuclear missile is the other area in which India is progressively mounting its nuclear capabilities. Right now, “India has four types of land-based nuclear capable missiles that appear to be operational: the short-range Prithvi-2 and Agni-1, the medium-range

Agni-2, and the intermediate- range Agni-3. At least two other longer-range Agni missiles are under development: the Agni-4 and Agni-5" (Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, 2015). India was also on a secret mission of developing a cruise missile capable of both conventional and nuclear warheads. India is leaping ahead in developing its nuclear Sub-Marine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) capabilities. The nuclear submarine named Arihant was in production since 1984 and in 2012 it has started successful sea trials (Hagerty D. T., 2014). Arihant will soon be commissioned to Indian Navy that will ultimately enhance India's nuclear capabilities. The news of developing second nuclear submarine was also in the air however, there has not yet been any confirmation about it (Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, 2015). Indian short-range ballistic naval missile and K-15 and K-4 nuclear submarine missiles are also believed to increase India's strategic deterrence.

Table 1.1 below illustrates the complete picture of India's nuclear capabilities (Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, 2015).

Table 1. Indian nuclear Zoom out (Ctrl+Minus)

TYPE	NATO DESIGNATION	NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS	YEAR DEPLOYED	RANGE ¹ (KILOMETERS)	WARHEAD X YIELD (KILOTONS)	NUMBER OF WARHEADS			
Aircraft									
Vajra	Mirage 2000H	~32	1985	1,850	1 x bomb	~32			
Shamsher	Jaguar IS/IB	~16	1981	1,600	1 x bomb	~16			
SUBTOTAL			~48			~48			
Land-based ballistic missiles									
Prithvi-2	N.A.	~24	2003	250	1 x 12	~24			
Agni-1	N.A.	~20	2007 ²	700+	1 x 40	~20			
Agni-2	N.A.	~8	2011 ³	2,000+	1 x 40	~8			
Agni-3	N.A.	~4	2014 ⁴	3,200+	1 x 40	~4			
Agni-4	N.A.	N.A.	(2016)	3,500+	1 x 40	N.A.			
Agni-5	N.A.	N.A.	(2017)	5,200+	1 x 40	N.A.			
SUBTOTAL			~56			~56⁵			
Sea-based ballistic missiles									
Dhanush	N.A.	2	(2013)	350	1 x 12	2			
K-15	(Seagika)	(12)	(2017)	700	1 x 12	(12)			
K-4	N.A.	N.A.	?	~3,000	1 x ?	N.A.			
SUBTOTAL			(14)			(14)			
TOTAL									
~106 (118)⁶									

1 Range listed is unrefueled combat range with drop tanks.

2 Agni-1 first began induction with the 334th Missile Group in 2004 but did not become operational until 2007.

3 Agni-2 first began induction with the 335th Missile Group in 2008 but did not become operational until 2011.

4 The missile and warhead inventory may be larger than the number of launchers, some of which can be reused to fire additional missiles.

5 The number in parentheses includes 12 warheads possibly produced for the first SSBN for a total stockpile of roughly 118 warheads.

India's show of hard power is also manifested in its growing activities in the Indian Ocean. Primarily the focus is on maritime projection of power and India is aspiring to be one of a dominant power and security provider (Hornat, 2014). India's concern to exert influence through maritime power emerges due to four basic reason: one is economy based; as without growing economy it is hard for India to be a major power and for a sustainable economy India is trying to keep the trade

flow smooth; second is to avoid cross border terrorism; thirdly competition with Pakistan and lastly growing Chinese influence in the region (Scott, 2013). Indian Navy (IN) is playing a pivotal role in countering these threats for India to emerge as a maritime power in the Indian Ocean region. India for the very first time has created an Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) to foster cooperation among the littoral states of Indian Ocean. IN is also improving its defense capabilities and right now it possesses 150 naval ships that make it a largest Asian navy followed by China and Japan (Brewster, 2015). India is also formulating naval battle groups that include air crafts and nuclear sub marines and these aspirations are evident as when former Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Mehta once said that India is forming a grand navy which is “capable of influencing the outcome of land battles and performing a constabulary role in the Indian Ocean region” (Brewster, 2015). India is conducting joint military exercises to elevate its present stature as a maritime power. India is conducting joint exercises with US, Russia, Japan, Oman, Brazil, Australia and UK. India is also adopting the policy of establishing good relations with smaller states near coastal like Mauritius, Singapore and with rising powers like Brazil and Australia to carry out smooth trade (Scott, 2013). Through the demonstration of hard power to the world India is emerging as an influential power not only in the region but in the whole world.

2.5 Soft Power

According to the former UN Under-Secretary-General Shashi Tharoor:

“When India’s cricket team triumphs or its tennis players claim Grand Slams, when a Bhangra beat is infused into a western pop record or an Indian choreographer invents a fusion of Kathak and ballet, when Indian women sweep the Miss World and Miss Universe contests or when Monsoon Wedding wows the critics and Lagaan claims an Oscar nomination, when Indian writers win the Booker or Pulitzer prizes, India’s soft power is enhanced” (Tharoor, 2008).

India's projection of soft power in the present globalized world has elevated India's profile substantially in the world. Joseph S. Nye, who has coined the term soft power, explained the term as "It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced" (Joseph S. Nye, 2004). India's diaspora, democratic values, and culture have substantially enhanced and legitimized India's soft power.

Indian diaspora abroad has emerged as a substantial resource for India's projection of soft power. The trend of migration from India as the wage laborers for British empire started during nineteenth century. Later in the twentieth century rather a richer and educated class migrated to US, Canada and Australia and played a pivotal role in the managing and enhancing India's political clout (Hymans, 2009). Indian diaspora has helped Indian government to have positive foreign policy outcomes (Hall, 2012). Like Indian diaspora in the late twentieth century managed to portray the positive image of India by lobbying with US policy makers and helped the both countries to sort out the past baggage of differences both states had for each other and emerge as a "natural ally" in the contemporary world politics.

According to the Indian Ministry of Overseas affairs that there are around 25 million Indian diasporas present in different countries of the world. The Indian diaspora not only enhanced the India's position in the region but also strengthened Indian economy. The remittances collected from the Non-Residents Indians (NRI) were used during the foreign exchange crises by the Indian policy managers to shore up Indian reserves and according to the World Bank report in 2014, the remittances from the Indian Overseas Community was the highest as 70 billion dollars followed by China at 64 billion dollars (Singh N. , 2015).

Political system of any state can be a source of soft power. The institutional structure of India in the form of democracy, secularism, federalism and the three-language formula are the sources of power of attraction (Paul T. V., 2014). After the end of the cold war, along with emerging strong economy and acquisition of advanced nuclear technologies, India's long and strong democracy emerge as major component that elevates India's profile. It is this democracy of India that had been highlighted as a sole reason that attracted US towards India in the initial years of Indo-US rapprochement. The same democratic political system of India has made her globally attractive and influential viz a viz competition with China (Joseph S. Nye, 2004). Despite holding the unprecedented record of democratic values as a decolonizing state, India is also contributing UN Democracy Fund established in 2005 for the promotion of democracy and is right now the second largest contributor followed by US to strengthen the rule of law and the electoral process of the states (Mohan A. , 2013).

Other than promoting democracy, India from the largest recipient of global foreign aid during the cold war has become gradually a donor state after the end of the cold war. The Indian growing economy and strong democracy provide Indian foreign assistance a solid legitimacy which eventually bolster India's soft power (Rani D. Mullen, Summit Ganguly, 2012). This foreign aid by India to developing states are meant, at one hand, to project soft power and on the other hand, to achieve the larger strategic objectives in the region, opening its market and to meet the growing energy requirements. Like the development of Chahbahar Port in Iran by India, which will serve India to have a direct access in Afghanistan and Central Asian states, truly depicts India's soft power and strategic objectives. Also, India other than promoting democracy in Afghanistan is also providing logistic and financial assistance to Afghanistan by developing infra structure, roads, dams and by providing scholarships to Afghani students. This soft power projection in Afghanistan

will allow India to confront Pakistan on the western side, and on the northern side to curb Chinese influence in the neighboring states, India is encouraging aid programs in Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh (Rani D. Mullen, Summit Ganguly, 2012).

India is also projecting its soft power through the promotion of its culture via Indian movies. India produces more movies than Hollywood or any other film industry in the whole world (Joseph S. Nye, 2004). These movies are equally liked in Asia, Africa, Middle East and at present successfully grasped the interests of western countries (Paul T. V., 2014). Other than movies Indian cuisine, Yoga, Indian Premier League (IPL) and Indian music are the other forms of soft power that are enhancing India's clout internationally.

2.6 Technology

Technology is considered as one of the major source of national power by the International Relations theorists, that will not only spur economic growth and prosperity but also enhance the states' clout in the world. Technological innovations are considered as pivotal source for the states to rise like Germany in the late nineteenth century emerged as an economic power because of "institutional innovations" and later in the start of twentieth century till now, US rose to power not merely because of its massive economy but because of the technological innovations in space, mass production and countless other technological efforts at its disposal and later Japan, after second world war, dominated the automotive industry and information technology (IT) so massively that it was expected that Japan may took over US economy (Kennedy, 2015)

India's technological aspirations and achievements are elevating the graph of India as an emerging power in the world. The technological innovations got a boost when India experienced a new liberalized economic policy in 1990's (Greenspan, 2004). Since then India's technological

progress shown an upward trajectory to growth. The main areas are primarily the information technology and space technology that have not only boost Indian economy but also raised the Indian stature as a technological power in the whole world. Understanding the crucial role of science and technology in any country's growth, The Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2013 launched a new policy Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) to place India 'among the top five global scientific powers' by 2020 and to reach that end, country's research and development spending had been doubled (Kennedy, 2015). Under this plan the government aimed at promoting the scientific research and development by forming new institutions for scientific research, planning at national and academic level to enhance the scientific research skills and by developing center of excellence to enhance India's hard power capabilities (Khan G. A., 2016). As a result, India's contribution to high profile scientific journals had been augmented from 2.5 to 10 percent after this policy and at present India ranked at number 10th position in terms of scientific publications. (Kennedy, 2015).

India's efforts and success in the field of science and research is not limited to one specific area rather it has been disseminated in all fields ranging from agriculture to pharmaceuticals, from health to space research and from IT to nuclear research. India, at present, is among the top five nations in space explorations. It is this sector along with IT that has enhanced India's stature in the field of technology. Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), formed in 1969, has number of achievements at its credit. Mission to the moon in 2008 and discovery of water on the lunar surface is also credited to ISRO. India's successful landing on the Mars has made her among the group of elite members of nations. ISRO other than space expeditions, is also generating revenue for India. India's satellite launching service has generated the revenue of 216 million dollars in 2012 to 2013 which is expected to grow by 15 percent in the coming years (Ramachandran, 2014). Polar Space

Launch Vehicle (PSLV), is the renowned satellite of India with smaller payloads, is facilitating many states for launching their satellites in the orbit for telecommunications, weather forecasting and broadcasting and is earning profit to India.

Other than space technology, India's information technology is not only elevating India's clout in the world but also a massive source of India's growing economy. The former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee once said that "IT is India's tomorrow" (Greenspan, 2004). This statement is not an exaggeration when India's progress in IT sector is analyzed. National Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM) was created at national level in 1988 to foster the IT sector. However, the boom to the IT sector was first noticed after the economic reforms of India in 1990's when the policy of liberalization facilitated the IT sector of India and India became the hub of IT activities. The only one Indian city Bangalore is estimated that there are over 1300 IT firms, 600 cyber cafes, 800 hardware firms and 120,000 IT professionals (Greenspan, 2004). Indian IT industry has changed the old image of poverty ridden India to a global player with best technology solutions, entrepreneurs and professionals (Pande A. , 2014). Indian IT sector is one of the fast-growing sector of the Indian economy. It grew at the rate of 30% between 1990 and 2000 and 5.4% growth in 2010 which increased to 9% in 2012 (Pande A. , 2014). IT sector of India is also a major component of Indian export. It accounted for 69 billion US dollars of export in 2012 which was 16.3 % more than the previous year (NASSCOM, 2012). The exports were merely 4 million dollars in 1980's and at present it grew massively. The domestic IT industry has also shown the tremendous efforts to improve the government efficacy as it earned 918 billion Indian Rupees in 2012 which is 16.7 percent more than the previous year (NASSCOM, 2012). The IT sector of India act as a growth catalyst for not only Indian economy but also to the social sector as it promotes the education sector, one of the emerging sector of India, and providing the largest

number of jobs to the Indian nationals. This IT sector employed 2.8 million professionals and provided more than 230,000 jobs in the overall country, which is the largest number of employment by any sector (NASSCOM, 2012). Thus, India's remarkable progress in the field of science and technology has elevated India's posture in the whole region as an emerging technological power.

Chapter 3

FINDINGS

As discussed earlier that this study is qualitative in nature and semi structured interviews have been conducted among the policy community in Islamabad. The questionnaire annexed provides the list of the questions that have been asked from the respondents.

Regarding the first question about the India's rise in the region, there has been generated a mixed response from respondents. However, majority of the respondents agreed to the fact that India is rising though the determinants of rise vary among the respondents. India's rise, according to many respondents, is because of its monetary strength. Though the respondents agreed on the fact that India is rising economically yet there have been found certain qualms in their statements. As according to one respondent though India is rising economically but to what extent it will sustain, is again a question as Indian economy from 2009 to 2014 has declined but its defense budget is incessantly increasing. One respondent also argued that with the current BJP government, it is difficult for India to sustain that economic strength and preserve the notion of Rising or shining India. Indian poverty and violation of human rights issues make 'Rising India' a contentious notion. India, according to other respondent is acquiring monetary strength but poverty and population explosion by leaps and bounds could halt the India's progress. The rise of India, to a certain degree, is stunted to because of the domestic economic compulsions that India has, as India on the one hand is entering many agreements but on the other hand the major projects that could facilitate India's rise are on the verge of termination. Like there was a chance of India, Iran and Pakistan pipeline (IPI) but that appears to have receded now.

Few respondents also accredited India's rise to its technological advancement. According to them, India's IT industry is growing at a rapid pace but others denied it by naming India as an exclusively trading nation. According to one respondent India is rising strategically as India is a cohesive state and thus India is rising as a 'state'. Couple of the respondents argued about the projection of India's soft power, image, ability of self-projection and potential that are playing a role in enhancing India's clout all over the world. With constant determinants of power like geography and demography weight, according to one respondent, what appears to enhance India's stature with its growing economy is its acceptability as a leading major power in the world. India is also a nuclear power and has been absorbed in some of nuclear nonproliferation regimes that destined India to play a role of major power in the world so Rising India is not a conception that has been crafted by Indian government but they have overplayed it.

Though many respondents believed that India is rising but at the same time many respondents compared this rise to other states. According to them, though objectively India is rising but when analyzing this rise in relative terms like to the other major powers of the region like China and Japan than India may not attain and sustain same level of progress enjoyed by other regional powers in the coming decade. India is far behind economically, technologically and militarily when we compare it with other powers of the region.

India's rise is also associated with US that it is the US which is facilitating India's rise in the region. All respondents to a certain extent agreed on the fact, when asked the second question, that US is playing a significant role in facilitating India to rise its stature in the region. However, there is a difference of opinions on the part that why is US supporting India. Many are of the view that US wants India to grow militarily and economically because in this way it could get an opportunity to play some role vis a vis China which is not like a hard balancing but soft balancing or in other

words a hedging against China. They further stated that whole logic of building India in Asia is that there should be a parallel rise of another power in Asia against China so there should be a natural balance. As when US is supporting India, India is unlikely to play a very secondary role and it is evident to US also. India and US are supporting each other for their own interests primarily to hedge China in the region, so it is US which is building India in Asia and ultimately it favors India. US and India jointly are exerting their power in Indian Ocean by carrying out joint military exercises. These naval exercises are basically the exposition of power to China that US has an influence in the region where Chinese trade, energy, and exports are carried out. Such type of exercises will make India grow in its size to stand against muscular China. India on the other hand needs US to grow militarily and economically to pursue its regional aspirations of dominating the region and stand out against Pakistan and China.

One view that US is helping India to rise in the region is that the term India the great power was in fact coined by Americans because American thinks India, if India is a great power, it would be able to check Chinese rise. So, one should not underestimate the allegiance and support of US to Indians to rise as a great power. According to one view, US is supporting India because both US and India have same interests; interests to contain China and have influence in the whole region of Asia. US came first in the region because of Afghanistan but when it got a foot hold in the region it moved ahead further to cement its steps in the region by containing China and India fits in this scheme of things. India fits in US's plan because India is a Capitalist state and can better even out the way for US to achieve its agendas in the region. So, US is propping up India as a major subcontinental power by using shared norms of democracy and capitalism to accomplish the bigger agendas in the region.

Respondents while stating US backed process of India's rise affirmed their stance by quoting different statements of US presidents, officials like there was a famous statement by Hillary Clinton, when she was a foreign secretary of US and visited India stated that it is in American interest to facilitate the rise of India. Then statement of President Obama in which he declared India as an indispensable partner and these statements assert that it is a US backed process of India's rise.

According to few respondents, US's President, officials and mainstream authors blatantly favor India's rise. Their statements and writings are the clear depiction of United States covert and overt moves to assist India to rise as a major power in the region. According to them US has more tilted towards India as compared to Pakistan. US in the last decade tried to maintain a policy of hyphenation, i.e. treating India and Pakistan at par with each other and the US in the past used to take into consideration Pakistan's sensitivities while dealing with India. But now such policy is over. Ever since the President Bush came into power he made it a point that India and Pakistan, as far as US policy is concerned are delinked. US inclination towards India is also evident in nuclear deal between India and US. In the future, if the new silk route; a geo political strategy that United States wanted to introduce in this region, It is expected that India would relatively have a significant role to play as compared to Pakistan. US in Pakistan's case is following, to a certain degree, a carrot and stick policy in which hitting Pakistan while carrot being offered to India, which, without any doubt favors India.

One view that came across while explaining India's rise favored by US explains that, US can move ahead to facilitate India in two ways; one, America can transfer technology to India and it would be a leap forward to India because the technology that India could achieve in next twenty-five years, US will provide that technology to India right away and can give a jump start to India.

Secondly, America can recognize India as a great power and can invite India to participate in the strategic dialogue. At present, it seems that apparently, America wants to keep India, Australia and Japan in a consultative group against rising China. Furthermore, there are two major power blocs North America and Europe. Both have technology and capital. There is no other market other than these two that have huge purchasing power and if India gets the market there, it could get technology, capital and market, in fact then India will have everything that states' need to grow.

India and US nuclear deal is a part of the US venture to make India a stronger competitor in the region. There were mixed opinions found when asked a third question about the nuclear deal between India and US and its relative impact on balance of power in the region viz a viz Pakistan. Most of the respondents agreed that this deal has ramifications for Pakistan by disturbing the present balance of power in the region whereas only few responded that it will not create a huge disparity in terms of balance of power equation between India and Pakistan. One view about the Indo-US nuclear deal and its consequent disturbance of balance of power in the region is that US is trying to build India for her own interests and US-India nuclear deal was very much part of that. US and India nuclear deal was not only a defense pact but it is a comprehensive deal which encompassed larger strategic partnership in nuclear arsenals, defense cooperation, space, agricultural, economic, energy and information. India and US have shared notions of democracy and liberal values and both have discussed these shared notions as the main driving force behind this nuclear deal and also made them "Natural Allies" in their competition with China. On the other hand, there was a debate about US decline against China in the future and China has surpassed US in purchasing power parity. In this situation, US will be needing economic markets and India's insecurities in the region towards Pakistan and China has made her a lucrative partner

to US. This Nuclear deal will not only help US to stabilize its own economy but will make India stronger in the region which resultantly will disturb the balance of power.

There are also other views voiced during the interviews about holding the conviction that the deal will disturb the balance of power in the region particularly for Pakistan. One among few is that the deal will disturb the balance of power in three ways. First is by “extending recognition”. Since nuclear weapons maintain the balance of terror and avoids war. The ‘recognition of the nuclear weapons’ is what actually matters as this recognition gives your weapons a political contestation in which it can be utilized and also recognizes your status. US has done this to India and made it a part of supplier group and India can now legitimately exist in the civilian nuclear arena as a legitimate nuclear power. America has given this status to India by undermining the nuclear nonproliferation regime which is a favor to India and eventually will disturb the balance of power. Secondly, the balance of power will be disturbed is by “technology transfer” to India. This nuclear technology can make India’s weapons more effective and useful which eventually will have more estimated killing power comparatively. Whereas, Pakistan always tries to balance India’s quantity with its quality. Pakistan used to come up with better skill manpower that were trained from west and the equipment Pakistan used to take were more sophisticated. Balance of power is disturbed, as India with this technology transfer, will have this edge over Pakistan. India has been offered this sophisticated technology which in the long run, not in the short run will disturb the balance of power as India will have an edge over the quality of weapons too. The third aspect of disturbance of balance of power is that Pakistan knows that it cannot solely and quantitatively balance India so Pakistan always invites third party and usually it invites America and China. The balancer Pakistan had in the past i.e. US, is now with India. US has not completely sidelined Pakistan but rather has become neutral to Pakistan and has preferred to make India its strategic partner over

Pakistan. The other debate able issue pertinent to disturbance of balance of power is that since India has become a part of nuclear weapon club, India would have wide options and offers available at its disposal to buy and sell nuclear weapons or sophisticated technology whereas Pakistan would be left with limited choices which if analyzed has the potential to disturb the balance of power between India and Pakistan.

In support of the argument that Indo-US nuclear deal will disturb the balance of power in the region, one view is that weaponization of India, and both in conventional and nuclear domains will upset the balance of power in region. US- India nuclear deal since is lopsided, it clearly favors India. This deal allows India to spare its domestic fuel to build or to multiply its nuclear force furthermore it is a nuclear deal between India and US but in effect it is a deal between India and all other nuclear power states as all other countries including Australia, Russia, Japan, Germany and France are signing nuclear deals with India and this is a force multiplier for India and threat multiplier for Pakistan. India's nuclear arsenals as a result are growing in strength and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals do not receive any foreign assistance so naturally it will remain far behind than that of India. India and Pakistan's unresolved disputes and a present hostile leadership in India and then the major powers of the world treating India as a nuclear preferential country in terms of nuclear trade, all this will disturb the regional balance of power. Another view is this, that this deal has already disturbed the balance of power in the region as Pakistan is not willing to lift its objections from the initiation of dialogues in Geneva on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) because Pakistan thinks that Indo-US deal has made the field so much rough and it is heavily tilted in India's favor. Indo-Us nuclear deal is not only that it will help India to have a greater access on fissile material which will ultimately lead to the enhancement of the Indian nuclear arsenal.

There are also contending opinions that though not completely but partially denied that the nuclear deal will have any impact on the balance of power in the region. One view is that since India and Pakistan are nuclear weapon states but they have not yet developed nuclear submarines. The delivery mechanisms that India and Pakistan have, they don't matter much, primarily because if it comes to a conflict, no matter what India gets from United States, the focus essentially is going to be on the nuclear submarines. So, India-US nuclear deal will not disturb the balance of power unless US or any other nuclear state would help India to build nuclear submarines. The other view expressed was that Indo-US nuclear deal will not affect the existing balance of power in the region apparently. But by knocking the holistic approach then Indo-US nuclear deal has the potential to disturb the existing balance of power structure. As this deal, has been contributing in India's rise and power structure for instance, with the Indo-US nuclear deal first India will get a benefit that it will get a nuclear fuel from the nuclear supplier nations but on the other side it receives uranium for its own nuclear weapons. More important is that it has opened India to the international markets which directly or indirectly will increase India's popularity. Indo-US deal has also improved the stature of India because after this deal, India has been treated by international community as a responsible nuclear weapon state so politically and diplomatically the nuclear deal has contributed in elevating India's stature. American companies after this deal has received directions from their government and they are investing in India. So, India US nuclear deal has economic impact, political consequences, and diplomatic advances for India. So putting them collectively, the deal has an impact on balance of power because India and Pakistan they are strategic competitors and between them it's the balance of power which creates a strategic equilibrium and on the basis of that strategic equilibrium Indo-US nuclear deal has an impact but not destabilizing impact on the strategic chess board between India and Pakistan because Pakistan's nuclear program is indigenous

and is gradually growing as compared to India but these kinds of deals have negativity in strategic power structure in a region. Summing up the deal though has economic, political and diplomatic ramifications for Pakistan but it will not disturb the balance of power rather it will provoke negativity. However, there are very few respondents who denied that there exists any balance of power between India and Pakistan with a view that India is far stronger than Pakistan.

India's emerging status has made India to demand a share in power with the other powerful states of the world in the United Nation Security Council. In response to the fourth question about India's bid to acquire seat in UNSC in future and whether Pakistan is raising its concern on this matter, almost all respondents agreed to the point that India will not get a seat in United Nations Security council and only one among them favored India's bid for UNSC. Majority also agreed that UNSC needs a restructuring but accommodating India in this structure is an open-ended debate. One view denying India's claim of UNSC seat is that India is not yet abided by UN resolution on Kashmir and ongoing conflicts of India with neighboring states nullify the Indian claim of attaining the veto power in UNSC.

Other views are that since there is a debate in UN Security Council for its restructuring and might be continued till there is an international consensus merging around some criteria. Americans though are supporting India but it is not enough. The military, monetary and IT level proves that India is rising but other developments are not good enough that India will acquire the status of UNSC member. These determinants, India is trying to exploit in its favor, are not very conducive for its entry in the UNSC. One respondent believed that since UNSC membership is based on the victors of the Second World War, India was the colony at that time, including India in UNSC means altering the UNSC charter.

According to one view generated during interview is that there are lot of potential candidates to acquire UNSC seat and each represent different scenario and different world views from different blocs of world. Alone, there is not only India as the aspiring member of the UNSC but there are other contenders also. Given the proclivity of P5 that UNSC should not expand as far as permanent membership and veto wielding powers are concerned and arguing on this reality and scenario, India, in near future will not be going to get a seat but if UNSC expands and India gets a UNSC seat, it will be not only India but other countries as well. Japan and Germany that are far more developed than India and if they have not acquired a seat how could India will be able. Other candidates, in the category of India, are South Africa and Brazil. One respondent during discussion stated that in the presence of China and Russia and Pakistan's strong stance with other states in UN, it is hard for India to pursue her goal of gaining UNSC seat.

One participant however, favored India's bid for UN Security Council seat with a view that only that way India could behave as a responsible state in the region and will avoid intimidate behavior with neighboring states.

On the reply to the second part of the question about Pakistan's response against India's UNSC seat majority were of the view that Pakistan should strengthen its polity and economy and can mobilize a lobby with China against India for not to get a veto wielding seat in UNSC. One participant claimed that Pakistan has already joined hands with many states to raise its concern.

Emergence of India in the Asian region could have dire implications on Pakistan, according to many respondents, when asked the fifth question about the possible implications of India's rise on Pakistan. As according to the one respondent the strategic disparity between India and Pakistan is a dynamic process which means that since India is economically stronger than Pakistan and with an increased defense spending by India, Pakistan has to ensure the credible minimum deterrence.

And certainly, when focus on India's rise than it undermines and generates security dilemma for Pakistan because with the fast-growing economy of India automatically its defense budget will increase and this increased defense budget is alarming for Pakistan as it will increase conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan. So, Pakistan's economy is unable to compete with India's economy because in case of India, its economy is growing and Pakistan's economy is the victim of war on terrorism so that is why there is a disparity.

One respondent finds India's growing influence in Afghanistan a serious threat to Pakistan. India is though not present militarily but if it happens it would have serious implications for Pakistan. Many respondents blamed India for sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan particularly in Baluchistan and FATA. These covert operations by India are meant to destabilize Pakistan internally so that it could not rise as Indian competitor. India wants Pakistan to be economically, culturally and socially weak so that it cannot rise against India.

Some respondents have shown the concern that might happen in the future because of India's rise. Like according to one view that rising India will sabotage the Pakistan's stance on various international forums on many contentious issues in future. The other view is that India in the future may act as regional hegemon and if India behave like regional hegemon, it would definitely have implications for Pakistan. India is still behaving like a regional hegemon but partially as India is creating sub regional platforms within SAARC. India has been able to exert influence in Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives and Afghanistan. So, India is trying to encircle Pakistan and if India rises objectively, and becomes able to offer economic incentives to neighboring countries of Pakistan, then it will have serious implications for Pakistan.

In reply to the sixth question about the Indian policy of encirclement of Pakistan by having immense influence in Afghanistan and normalizing relations with China and its implications on

Pakistan, mixed opinions have been found. Some respondents agreed that India's involvement in Afghanistan and China could have implications for Pakistan. However, some denied that it could bring any severe consequences to Pakistan. As one respondent said that India's involvement in Afghanistan is dependent on the government in Afghanistan. Like Karzai was anti Pakistan and is very prone to India and under his regime it was nearly impossible that Pakistan and Afghanistan could have come on good terms. The new government in Afghanistan may have soften its stance against Pakistan. However, according to one view that India and Afghanistan's relations are not subjected to any political change in the government unless there happens a grass root political change in Afghanistan. As the present government of Ashraf Ghani and previous government of Hamid Karzai, both were the part of Northern Alliance and India supported that alliance so if the members of Northern Alliance would continue to assume power, there is a minimum chance of Pak-Afghan good relations.

According to one respondent India is not only encircling Pakistan with Afghanistan and China but India is also enhancing its maritime capabilities and developing Chahbahar port which could endanger Pakistan's interests. The other view found which is concomitant to the above view is that, India is encircling Pakistan by establishing economic and political ties with the members of the South Asian Regional Cooperation (SAARC), hence capitalizing its stakes in the region which can be mobilized against Pakistan and by doing that India is thwarting Pakistan's efforts of regional integration of reaping benefits at the level of SAARC which is a serious implication for Pakistan. By having immense influence in Afghanistan, India is fermenting troubles in Baluchistan and FATA. One respondent contested the term "encirclement of Pakistan" and rather believed that it is actually "isolation of Pakistan" which India is doing by establishing relation with Afghanistan, Iran and China.

Majority of the respondents have negated that Indo-China partnership could pose any challenge to Pakistan. According to one view India and China's partnership is based on some mutual benefit which cannot hinder the Pakistan and China's smooth relationship. However, one respondent showed utmost concern with a view that the growing Indo-China partnership could have blunt off the historical tussle between India and China and China may have bent over its stance of India's seat in UNSC which if were done, would have detrimental implications on Pakistan.

The seventh question about the impetus of heightened defense budget by India and its implications on Pakistan generated mix response from the respondents. Many among the respondents strongly believed that power should be balanced by power which means that Pakistan should enhance its defense spending to maintain the balance of power. Whereas some believed that Pakistan, instead of spending on defense, should focus on the economy, exploring energy resources and solving the internal crises of Pakistan. One respondent also said that the increase in defense budget by one state will simultaneously increase the defense budget by other state which eventually will start an arm race in the region and is detrimental for Pakistan with its present economic conditions. Pakistan whereas, should focus on to strengthen its economy. One respondent also suggested that with an increased focus on economy, promoting social cohesion and increasing the diplomatic clout of Pakistan, Pakistan can place a check to India's rise. Along with focusing on economy, Pakistan, however, should also maintain a moderate level of preparedness so in case of any belligerent adventurism from India, Pakistan can counter it.

One view expressed during the interview is that, India's increase in defense budget will exacerbate the present security dilemma for Pakistan and if Pakistan ignores the military buildup by India, then certainly Pakistan will face the consequences. The strategy states usually adopt is to engage their rival state in the arms race and try to exhaust them through this race by over-burdening their

economies and India is using the same strategy with Pakistan. Whereas, Pakistan should not be allured by India's defense budget as India's defense budget is more than 40 billion today and if added 10 billion US dollars more, as according to IISS 2014, India would be having 50 billion US dollars defense budget and Pakistan's recent total budget is of only 66 billion US dollars and for defense Pakistan allotted 7.6 billion US dollars, so it is difficult for Pakistan to check Indian's increased defense spending. Pakistan on the other hand is trying to manage this asymmetrical ratio with its own limited resources as Pakistan is increasing its military strength through nuclear weapons and this is a mean by which Pakistan could keep a check on nuclearized environment created by India where both Pakistan and India are nuclear powers, strategic competitors and the strategic parity between them is based on the balance of terror and not by matching one by one. And Pakistan has adopted a very rational policy that it shouldn't be going or ending up an arms race but wherever there is a gap, Pakistan tries to fill it with nuclear potential and that is the only mean available to Pakistan. Pakistan should also not solely rely on alliances as they do not secure long term advantages.

Talking about the impetus behind this increase defense spending by India, one view expressed is that India is the largest procurer of arms and the reason to this are manifold; first, India wants to dominate the region, secondly India wants to threaten Pakistan and lastly India is taking cue from US. As Russia and China are the major powers in the region and India wants to show that it is parallel to them. One respondent explained the impetus of India's growing defense budget as part of its modernization trend and India's defense budget has no connection with Pakistan. India increases its defense budget every year and it has resources available because India's economy is doing so well. It is unrealistic to expect that India will not spend a part of its growing wealth on their defense needs. And Indian argument is that they do not have to contend only Pakistan but

also has to contend with China. So, India is manipulating the joint threat of China and Pakistan for its advantage and Pakistan should not involve in the arm race but rather focus on the domestic issues.

The next question about the Pak-China partnership and its implications on India's hegemonic design in the region has also come up with mixed opinions by respondents. However, partially every respondent believed that Pak-China partnership is irritating India but at the same time believed that this partnership will not be a long-term solution for the Pakistan's current problems. As one respondent stated that Pak-China partnership should be taken as a step to develop Pakistan's economy. China's interests in developing relations with Pakistan and also with India specifically define China's economic interests. India and China relations are touching 100 billion and Pakistan and China are only at 15 billion which are expected to grow to 30 to 40 billion. Pakistan should focus on cultivating more economic ties with China and should use this partnership to strengthen its economy.

One respondent asserted that it does pose a challenge because India sees this relationship, between Pakistan and china, as an immediate threat to its own interests. India has worked a lot to weaken Pakistan and is successful in it too. India has fought three wars with Pakistan to weaken its state and economy. India is trying to do everything that can weaken Pakistan as weak Pakistan suits India's interests. A strong, vibrant and growing Pakistan that will emerge because of Chinese cooperation is not in India's interest. Therefore, India has apprehensions on this Pakistan and China's economic deal. Even if this deal does not pose any challenge to India's hegemonic design, India perceives that it does. It seems that anything which benefits Pakistan, will be perceived harmful for India. Basically, both countries are locked in a zero-sum game that is a gain of one is another one's loss. China-Pakistan economic corridor has created a storm in India and statements

emanating from top leadership of India in last four five months is reflective of what India is feeling and therefore does not want to see CPEC coming to fruition. India perceives that if this project comes through, India will suffer a huge setback not because India would lose something but Pakistan will gain.

Majority of the respondents believed that Pakistan should establish relations with Russia while few expressed that it may not be possible because of the India and Russia relations when asked the eighth question about the India and Russia's growing distance and Pakistan and Russia's new partnerships. The growing distance between India and Russia, according to the few respondents, is because that Russia has lost its utility as it had during cold war. India's inclination towards west particularly to US also led Russia to think of expanding its market other than India. Pakistan should capitalize this growing distance and materialize the helicopter deal and JF thunder engines sales. Russian Government has also not objected to initiate the arm sales with Pakistan. Pakistan in the future can also acquire less sophisticated technology from Russia and can utilize it to develop indigenous capabilities.

One respondent claimed that the major problem between Russia and Pakistan is the lack of cultural unanimity and history of frosty relations. Other respondent found that Pakistan appears less lucrative to Russia than India because of its small market. India whereas, has a huge market and appeal more to Russia. Pakistan should offer certain benefits to Russia like Pakistan may give Russia an access through warm water by adopting tactical diplomacy and normalizing relations with Afghanistan. India is also suspicious and worried on Russia- China growing partnership and Russia-Pakistan ties will definitely be viewed as a threat by Indians.

In response to the question about balancing India, many options for Pakistan have been highlighted by the respondents. But the prime focus of majority of the respondents has been on the point that

Pakistan has to keep its house in order to balance India's rise. Pakistan must ensure its internal stability to counter the external threat. The fractionalization and fault lines along ethnic and sectarian lines must be addressed and centrifugal tendencies in Pakistan like in Baluchistan and at times in Sindh, like in Karachi must be neutralized. Respondents emphasized this point with a view that in the presence of strong Pakistan, India cannot rise and only a weak, divided and truncated Pakistan will make Indian hegemony feasible. So, Pakistan should resolve these issues and India should not be given a chance to spoil the sensitive issues of Pakistan.

Respondents were also of the view that Pakistan should strengthen its economy. One view to strengthen Pakistan's economy is by promoting bilateral trades with South Asian States other than India and also with the Central Asian states. The other view regarding strong economy is that Pakistan since is a nuclear state which itself guarantees security. The nuclear weapons give states' time and space and provide diversities in a way that it provides states to work on knowledge base economy, technology and education to adopt sophisticated technology and to avoid dependency on other states.

According to one respondent since India has a huge economy as compared to Pakistan and India wants Pakistan to enter in an arm race which will weak its economy but Pakistan should not enter in the arms race so that it should not be crushed by an arm race avalanche. Pakistan should develop its indigenous capabilities at the conventional level instead of purchasing military hardware from abroad. Pakistan is relying on nuclear potential which is indigenous as the Nasr missile and Azm e Nau series of exercises reflect Pakistan is able to manage and can pose check to India's rise which has a military dimension for Pakistan, and Pakistan through limited conventional cum nuclear resources is very comfortably maintaining it.

A strong foreign policy by Pakistan can pose a check to Indian rise. This view has been expressed by majority of the respondents. All the respondents emphasized that Pakistan should establish more firm relations with China to neutralize the Indian hegemony. Pakistan has to ensure and cooperate with China on the economic corridor in Gwadar as it will not bolster ties with China but also provide a boost to Pakistan's economy. One respondent also believed in establishing ties with Afghanistan and Iran in order to check India's rise. Couple of the respondents also believed that Pakistan should adopt a calculated foreign policy to engage South Asian States either through bilateral trade or by some other means to counter India's rise in the South Asian region. Establishing relations with US on new terms, is also a view expressed by one respondent to balance India. Pakistan has to make it realize to Washington that the US lopsided policies towards India are not good. Since US needed Pakistan in Afghanistan and in central Asia and this time Pakistan needs US as the war on terrorism with its ups and down is still lingering on because Taliban are there, Al-Qaeda though in a weaker shape is there, ISIS is there and it may spread its tentacles in South Asia. So, Pakistan has to lobby with Washington to get her policy objectives in Asia, Middle East and for this US has to keep the sensitivities of Pakistan and one of the most sensitivities of Pakistan is India.

There are diverse opinions formed in response to the question about India's insecurities with Pakistan to establish normal relations. As according to one respondent the biggest Indian insecurity is that since the inception of Pakistan, India thinks that it is the successor of British Raj and is a big state as compared to Pakistan. Establishing normal relations with Pakistan means that India is accepting Pakistan as an equal sovereign state. Pakistan on the other hand is also not accepting India as a major power or superior in fact Pakistan says we are sovereign equal states and should establish relationship. This sense of equality increases Indian insecurities with Pakistan.

One respondent also said that India's insecurities are not many with respect to Pakistan but it comes from two sources. One is India's perception that Pakistan's military is pursuing anti-India agenda. So, this perception is the biggest threat or insecurity to India viz a viz their own effort to emerge as a power. This perception though has a historical truth that Pakistan is always challenging Indian hegemony and Pakistan is big enough not to be coerced by Indians but is not strong enough to play the role of equalizer and this is the dilemma of India viz a viz Pakistan. So, Indian thinks if they isolate Pakistan through a proxy war by helping non-state actors operating from Pakistan and this way can contain Pakistan. Any alliance between China and Pakistan which is directing against India would also be a source of insecurity for India.

Couple of the respondents however, shared similar thoughts in describing India's insecurities. According to them the insecurities lies in their perceptions that Indians have always been invaded in the history either by Muslims or by West and their security has been breached by these invasions. The other Indian insecurity is that Pakistan got independence by tearing India apart. The great India was divided and despite Indian efforts and wars, it cannot retain it. This notion is very much present in the present government of BJP ideology and they want to retain the Indian past glory.

Chapter 4

Analysis

Analyzing India's economy, its disposition of soft and hard power, its technological advancement, and relations with states, India's status in the region is rising. Though solely any factor cannot contribute but rather it's a combination of these factors that are defining India's emergence. Many respondents accredited India's economy as a primary factor that favored Indian rise. Though economy paid a pivotal role in determining the power of the states but other sources of power like soft power, hard power, technology and states' foreign relation contributed equally for the state to emerge (Cohen, 2001). India's economy boomed after the economic reforms of 1991. Since then it has shown a tremendous rise with an average growth of 8% per year. The growth crossed the double digit during 2005-2006 and 2007 to 2008 (Firstbiz, 2014). However, the following years have shown the down ward trend in the Indian economy. As one of the respondent expressed that if India could maintain its economic growth, only then it could elevate its stature. However, the 2013 showed the worst decline in India's growth since 2002 as it reached down at 4.6 percent in 2013 (Today, 2013). If Indian economy will not sustain their economic growth rate in future, it would be difficult to maintain the present stature. As when comparing Indian economy with its other potential rival in the region, that is with China, India stood at 9th largest country economy in the world whereas China is 2nd largest economy with GDP of 5.06 and 2.39 times more than India in both nominal and purchasing power parity (IMF, 2015).

The pioneer of the term 'soft power', Joseph S. Nye defines the term that "It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the

eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced" (Joseph S. Nye, 2004). During the interview respondents expressed that India is enhancing its soft power as to be recognized by the whole world. Indian diaspora has emerged as an influential soft power tool for India that has not only raised India's stature but also has contributed to Indian economy (Singh N. , 2015). Democracy of India is another soft power tool which is giving India a preferential stature over China (Joseph S. Nye, 2004). Indian movies, culture, its diplomacy all are the factors enhancing India's stature. India's rising naval power and nuclear capabilities also provide it an edge over many Asian states. India is enhancing its maritime capabilities to emerge as a dominant power in the Asia (Hornat, 2014). India's maritime trade, development of nuclear sub marines and joint naval exercises are aggravating India's posture in Asia. Technology appeared as another factor that is placing India among the rising powers. India is progressing enormously in IT and space technologies. Indian IT sector contributes the highest in Indian economy and exports. Space advancements by India has also placed it among the member of the elite group of nations. The space technology is also generating revenues for India and elevating India's stature (Ramachandran, 2014).

Other than India's economy, technology and soft and hard power, relations with US has helped India to rise on the Asian map. Cold war witnessed the frosty relations between India and US. With the end of the cold war, the past hostilities between India and US also concluded and rather the culmination of cold war offered new avenues to both states where their interests converge on variety of issues and paramount among is the interest to counter China in the region. There is evidence in the literature that the strategic partnership between India and US lies in the mutual interests of shared notion of promoting democracy, curbing terrorism and countering the emerging influence of China in Asia and beyond (Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup, 2006).

US- India rapprochement was never possible without the concerted efforts of US policy makers. US policy makers favored India in their writings and proceedings and paved the way for India and US to come in the closer terms. As one respondent emphasized that policy makers, strategists, writers and analysts favored India-US rapprochement in their writings and convinced both governments to come in closer terms, literature also suggest that. As Cohen in his book “Emerging India” articulated that analysts and policy makers convinced US governments that it had not given enough significance to India in the past decades and it is the need of the time to carry out presidential visits to India and to discuss the economic matters other than proliferation (Cohen, 2001). The book “Emerging India” that was published in 2001, the author Stephen Cohen discussed that US should offer certain incentives to India which according to him would be like recognizing India’s nuclear program and providing civilian nuclear energy to India (Cohen, 2001). US, later in 2005 offered same incentives to India under NSSG. Ashley J. Tellis who held an influential position in US government also presented India as a ‘global power’ in his writing and paved the way for Indo-US nuclear pact in the Bush regime (Tellis A. J., 2005). The writings of these analysts thus have made the Indo-US cooperation inevitable in the present world.

Study finds out that statements by US officials also proved that US is backing the process of India’s rise and affirm the claim of one respondent. These statements came after the end of the cold war when the whole international structure was transforming. The first official statement came in 2002 by US President George W. Bush which called India “a growing world power with which we have common strategic interests. Through a strong partnership with India, we can best address any differences and shape a dynamic future” (Bush, 2002). US Ambassador David Mulford wrote: “It is now official. It is the policy of the United States to help India to become a major world power in the 21st century” (Mulford, 2005). US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2005 also stated

that it was a US policy “to help make India become a major power in the twenty-first century”.

Later president Obama in the joint session in 2010 titled India as an ‘indispensable partner’.

The shared interests of democracy, countering terrorism and thwarting the China’s rise in the region has made India a potential partner to US in Asia. US is promoting India in Asia as a democratic counterweight to China (Rubinuff, 2006). To further strengthen US-India ties and make India an influential state in Asia, US signed the nuclear deal with India in 2005. The study finds out that the India-US nuclear deal was very much a part to define India’s emerging role in the region and to serve India and US interests’ in the region. As many respondents agreed that deal will benefit India, literature also suggests that the deal has political, economic and diplomatic gains for both India and US (Paddock, 2009). A joint statement by both governments also stated that “Civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India will offer enormous strategic and economic benefits to both countries, including enhanced energy security, a more environmentally-friendly energy source, greater economic opportunities, and more robust nonproliferation efforts” (India M. o., 2007).

While analyzing the literature and respondent’s views, it has been found that the Indo-US nuclear deal has certain economic and diplomatic implications for Pakistan. US companies with other members of Nuclear Supplier Groups (NSG), as a result of this nuclear deal, are investing in India’s big nuclear market that will not only rise India’s diplomatic stature but is also economically advantageous for India, US and NSG states’ (Bano, 2015). Such kind of economic and diplomatic asymmetry between India and Pakistan that is expected to emerge as a result of this deal will disturb the balance of power. It is for this reason Pakistan refused to sign Fissile Material Cut-Off treaty (FMCT) as also highlighted by one of the respondent. According to Pakistani officials the problem with FMCT is “Indo-US nuclear deal” which allow India to have many sources of buying

fissile material to make new bombs whereas Pakistan has no such sources (Krepon, 2012). Pakistan apprehensions will only be sort out and Pakistan will lift its veto on FMCT if US will offer same nuclear deal to Pakistan as offered to India (Krepon, 2012). Pakistan's head of joint chief of staff Tariq Majeed quoted in a conference that for Pakistan, FMCT is unacceptable as it was Pakistan specific (Khan I. A., 2010).

The Indo-US nuclear deal has also technological ramifications for Pakistan in the balance of power structure between India and Pakistan. The technology transfer to India has appeared as one of the major concern for Pakistan among majority of the respondents. Literature also affirms their stance as the nuclear technology, India will obtain as a result of this deal, will be used to upgrade nuclear plants that are of low grade and this advanced technology will help India to produce nuclear technology at higher pace (Paddock, 2009). The Indo-US nuclear deal since offers India with advanced technology will qualitatively improve India's nuclear warheads and delivery mechanism and eventually disturbs the deterrence in South Asia and this deal, according to one analyst, will augment "Indian capability to have preemptive attack against Pakistan" (Khan Z. A., 2013).

The deal has also political implications for Pakistan. Politically the deal is advantageous to India and will create a disparity in terms of balance of power in the region. This political concern was paramount in the ideas generated from the respondents. They viewed that the deal grants India a status of a responsible nuclear weapon state. USA has also accepted India as a nuclear weapon state and in a joint statement issued by Indian and US Presidents, US confirmed that India has emerged as a responsible nuclear weapon state to US which should enjoy all the benefits as other nuclear power states enjoy. (Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 2005). India-US nuclear deal thus has recognized India as a nuclear power, a status India was trying to acquire since long. India's recognition as a nuclear weapon state goes in

conjunction with its global aspirations to emerge as a global power. This nuclear deal, thus, is giving India several political leverages over Pakistan which include the acceptance of India as a great power, to exert influence in the whole Asia and to be a desirable partner by both great powers and rest of the states (Blank, 2007).

One clandestine aspect of this deal would be the use of the technology acquired in the formation of nuclear submarines. One respondent also showed concern that the balance of power will be disturbed if any state develops a nuclear submarine, the facts however, found from the presents literature affirm that India is developing submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The program was initiated in 1984 and nuclear powered submarine Arihant has initiated sea trials in 2012. India's top missile scientist Dr Avinash Chander told that the submarine is ready for installation after some ongoing sea trials (Luthra, 2014). If India operationally deployed its nuclear submarine with nuclear warheads, India will be the first nuclear weapon state that despite being the non-signatory of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)⁴ "to field a sea-based nuclear deterrent using ballistic missiles" (Hagerty D. T., 2014).

This nuclear deal is though disturbing the balance of power politically, economically and technologically, there is a fear that it will also initiate an arms race in the region. According to Mushahid Hussain, a Pakistani Senator, India-US nuclear deal will destabilize the region by creating a disparity in conventional and non-conventional arm race between India and Pakistan and accelerate proliferation (Hussain, 2006). Though Indo-US nuclear deal stipulates that it is a civilian nuclear deal but there are apprehensions that the deal may increase the Indian military nuclear stockpiles. India in the future may speed up the fissile material acquired under civilian nuclear deal for its nuclear weapons as some of India's nuclear reactors are not under the inspection

⁴ An agreement by United Nations General Assembly on the "prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons" for more information visit <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npu/2005/npttreaty.html>

of International Atomic Energy Agency (Hagerty D. T., 2014). There is also a fear that India may exploit this nuclear and space technology to be used in the development of nuclear weapons as India did in the past (Khan Z. A., 2013).

There is also a debate that India is emerging as one of the potential candidate for UNSC because of its growing posture. In the response to the question about India's bid to acquire permanent seat in UNSC, there has been found less affinity between the literature and the respondents' views primarily due to the bulk of Indian authors supporting the India's quest for the permanent membership of UNSC. This ethno-nationalism has been seen in most of their writings claiming that India's demography, democracy, rising economy and technological advancements ensure India to be a permanent member of UNSC (Mathur, 2005). According to one Indian author that India's peace keeping role in United Nations affirms Indian claim to be the member of the veto wielding "P" members of the UNSC (Yadav, 2014). However, the rest of the world authors and respondents believe in the restructuring of the UNSC. There paramount concern is about the restructuring of UNSC and to discuss the complexity of the procedure involves in restructuring and accommodating new members and omitting old ones. Madeleine Albright, the former US secretary of state and US ambassador to the UN, expressed her views on restructuring of the UNSC as "The reality is that finding a way to do so is like trying to solve a Rubik's cube...the Rubik's cube continues to shift—and yet the council's membership is unchanged" (Inderfurth, 2013).

According to one respondent, if India acquired a permanent seat in UNSC, it would act as a responsible state in the region and will avoid intimidate behavior. However, the facts showed that when India was elected as a non-permanent member of UNSC in 2011-2012, and labeled that tenure as a "rehearsal for permanent membership", India was unable to contribute substantially on various issues including terrorism in neighboring states (Srinivasan K. , 2013). India during that

period of her membership also appeared incapable of presenting an original strategy on various diplomatic issues (Rohan Mukherjee, David M Malone, 2013). In reality, India during the so-called rehearsal period failed to act as a viable candidate for permanent member of UNSC and has made its future role obscure in the council. According to one author that inclusion of India and other states in UNSC will polarize the debate on contentious matters and the demand of permanent seat of UNSC is nothing but a self-interested move by states to acquire power (Nadin, 2016).

It has also been found that Pakistan is raising her concerns on India's bid to acquire the permanent seat in UNSC in various international forums by joining hands with other states. Pakistan along with Canada, Italy, South Korea, Mexico, Spain and several other states have joined hands together under "Uniting for Consensus" (UfC) group to oppose the idea of restructuring of UNSC. This group has expressed the fear that UNSC would lose its efficacy with the inclusion of more states in its permanent group and hence, making Indian inclusion in the UNSC unlikely in near future (Cioreiari, 2011).

Study also finds out that the India's emergence as a major regional power has placed certain serious political, economic, security and diplomatic implications for Pakistan. Indian growing economic prowess and its projection of soft power is evident with her deftly move to crawl eastward and cement its feet in the Pakistan's neighboring state, Afghanistan. Indian policy of developing infrastructure in war torn Afghanistan and financial aid in many sectors have raised Indian clout in Afghanistan. But this growing influence of India in Afghanistan is exacerbating the security situation in Pakistan. Indian presence on eastern and western borders will entangle Pakistan in a security situation in which Pakistan has to secure its both borders. The previous foreign minister of Pakistan Shah Mahmood Qureshi also underlined this security dilemma and said that "If you want Pakistan focused more on the (threat from extremists along the Afghan border) west, then we

have to feel more secure on the east. There is a linkage there." (Qureshi, 2009). Former President Gen. Pervez Musharraf said that "The danger for Pakistan is... the Indian influence in Afghanistan" and also "That is another danger for the whole region and for Pakistan because Indian involvement there has an anti-Pakistan connotation. They (India) want to create an anti-Pakistan Afghanistan" (AFP, 2014). By having strong foot hold in Afghanistan India is carrying out the clandestine activities by sponsoring the terrorism in Pakistan's province Baluchistan which are meant to destabilize Pakistan. Former Interior Minister Rehman Malik blamed India after brutal massacre of 20 laborers in 2009, and said that "India is involved in Baluchistan unrest through Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) (Haider S. F., 2015). There have been found strong evidences of Indian involvement in Baluchistan and FATA region which government of Pakistan assured to share with international community. The United States Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel also accused India that India is using Afghanistan as a "second front" against Pakistan and because of the fragmented relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan, India is taking advantage of it and "India has over the years financed problems for Pakistan on that side of the border, and you can carry that into many dimensions" (Dawn, 2013). India is spending around 14 billion dollars in Afghanistan particularly to carry out the terrorist activities in Pakistan (Tirmazi, 2015). Pakistani officials in their statements have multiple times accused India for sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan from across the border.

Study also finds out that India's is not only expanding its influence in Afghanistan but simultaneously in Iran also to isolate Pakistan. India's construction of roads and Chahbahar Port will cement the footholds of India in the neighboring states of Pakistan and this infrastructure development will be the source of connectivity between India, Iran, Afghanistan and many other states. These kinds of developments are beneficial for India to have an excess to Afghanistan and

Central Asian markets for its goods without seeking help from Pakistan (Pant H. V., 2010).

Whereas, by having immense influence in Afghanistan, India wants to spoil the Pak-Afghan relations to avoid Pakistan to get an access to Central Asian States via Afghanistan and keep her deprived of economic and political gains from the energy rich Central Asian States. This is a diplomatic maneuver by India to have influence in Afghanistan, to engage Iran and develop ties with China to strategically isolate Pakistan.

However, even though India and China economic partnership is growing steadily in the recent decade and the volume of trade between India and China is greater than the volume of trade carried out between Pakistan and China, analyzing the trend generated from respondents and literature, there has not been seen any serious implications of India and China economic partnership for Pakistan. In establishing relations with Pakistan and India, lies the China's own economic interests. For China, Pakistan symbolizes its economic growth and a check on India and US rise in the region (Ali, 2012). So, China at no point will take any decision that will hinder its stakes in Pakistan.

Indian economy as compared to Pakistan is showing the upward trajectory to growth. This economic prowess by India is manifested in the increased defense spending by India. Study finds out that this economic prowess and resultantly an increase in the defense budget by India is also having security and economic implications for Pakistan. India and Pakistan are simultaneously increasing their defense budget in response to the other. Indian GDP growth is on average 7 percent and its defense budget is 8 times the size of the Pakistan's economy and with the continuous increase in India's defense budget, it is expected that it will become the third biggest country in terms of defense expenditure in 2020 and will spend 70 billion US dollars on defense spending in 2020 (Monnoo, 2016). India's arms imports increased 140 percent within a decade from 2005 till 2014 and during the last five years the imports were 3 times larger than China and Pakistan (Singh

S. , 2015). Such type of increased defense spending by India will exacerbate the security and economic situation for Pakistan in the region (Haider M. , 2016). Pakistan's economy as compared to India cannot afford high defense spending. But an increase in defense spending by India leaves no choice for Pakistan but to increase its defense budget. As one respondent also believed that Pakistan has to increase its defense budget as a response to India's increased budget. An increase in the defense spending by Pakistan as compared to India is not huge but Pakistan is trying to maintain defense spending to the point where it can deter India against any belligerent move (Iqbal, 2015). This increase in defense spending by Pakistan also constrain Pakistan to spend on the developmental projects that will be beneficial for Pakistan in long run.

India is also massively contributing in defense modernization process. One respondent also expressed that the increase defense spending is part of the Indian modernization process. India is expected to sign the contracts of billion dollars for the modernization process like India is “expected to sign the \$15-20 billion contract for 126 French Rafale fighters and signed contracts for 22 Boeing AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters (\$1.2 billion); 15 Boeing CH-47F Chinook heavy lift helicopters (\$1.4 billion), and six Airbus A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport (\$1.0 billion)” (Behera, 2013). Such type of upgradation though is a part of India's modernization process but will disturb the power equation in the region.

India's stature in the region is technologically, militarily, economically, and politically rising and is placing serious consequences for Pakistan. Pakistan is however, keen to balance India's rise in the region. On the political front, Pakistan is balancing India's rise with its growing partnership with India's other competitor in Asia, China. Pakistan and China partnership is described as “Higher than mountain and deeper than Oceans”. The relationship between Pakistan and China goes back to 1955 when prime ministers of both states pledged to foster a bilateral relationship.

Since then the relationship showed an upward trend and right now both states are engaged in a strategic partnership in almost all sectors, from infrastructure to telecommunications, from social development to strengthening economies and now the mega project CPEC (China Pakistan Energy Corridor) in which China is investing 45 billion US dollars. CPEC is about 3000 km long project that will be consisting of highways, pipelines, railways and will connect China to the rest of the world. Pakistan and China's cooperation, through CPEC, will help Pakistan primarily to strengthen its economy. Pakistan is facing a huge problem of energy deficiency. The large part of CPEC investment is in the energy sector which is 75% of the total share which will account over 16,000 MW, diverse renewable and conventional power projects and will double Pakistan's installed capacity (Singh Z. D., 2015). CPEC will also result in an expected 15 percent increase in GDP of Pakistan by 2030 which will narrow down the economic gap between India and Pakistan and other South Asian states will also look to China for monetary support other than India which will directly threaten Indian aspirations in the region (Ashraf, 2015).

The social aspect of Pak-China economic corridor will help Pakistan to bring social cohesion as the mega project is building in Baluchistan which eventually will help to diminish the apprehensions of the Baluch people by providing them with jobs and better infrastructure.

If both China and Pakistan properly executed this investment plan it would not only improve Pakistan's infrastructure, economy and provide new business opportunities to both states but also provide a countervailing power to Pakistan against India's rising military and economic prowess (Masood, 2015). Hence this partnership will strategically help Pakistan in almost all dimensions. India's maritime capabilities are growing steadily. The Pak-China economic corridor will be a blow to Indian growing maritime aspirations and India fears that the CPEC project will augment the China's and Pakistan's control in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea where India enjoys

exclusive control (Pande S. , 2015). Secondly Pakistan through this project can also balance India's growing maritime power as China will provide submarines to Pakistan which will "strengthen Pakistan's maritime capability in anti-submarine, anti-surface warfare, intelligence-gathering and strategic deterrence, and play an important role in the defense of the Gwadar and Karachi ports" (Masood, 2015) and this has caused anxiety to Indians. The CPEC project since runs through the areas of the Pakistan occupied Kashmir, for India, this project will be detrimental to India's claim over these areas. India feared that the infrastructure developed would have strategic implications for India as it may be used for the military purpose by Pakistan and development in these areas affirms that China has accepted Pakistan's claim on this disputed territory (Pande S. , 2015). In fact, India sees this project with its "zero sum mind set" as also said by one respondent that India perceive that CPEC will benefit Pakistan which on a strategic calculus is India's lose. So, Pakistan-China cooperation is viewed as a threat to India for its future aspirations to emerge as an only power in South Asia and Indian Ocean (Chopra, 2015).

Study also revealed that a strong and proactive foreign policy by Pakistan can also help to balance India's rise. Many respondents also expressed that Pakistan by establishing relations with regional and neighboring states can balance India. Pakistan and Afghanistan particularly in a need to establish good relations as the cold relations between these two states halt Pakistan's economic progress, social cohesion and appeared as an utmost source of turbulence in Pakistan in the form of growing militancy (Felbab-Brown, 2015). The deteriorated relations with Afghanistan further cripple Pakistan's efforts to foster ties with energy rich Central Asian states. Since Pakistan and Afghanistan are the largest trading partners and by expanding trade and political relation Pakistan can counter India's growing presence in Afghanistan and can mitigate the consequences of covert Indian presence in Pakistan (Zulfiqar, 2015). So, Pakistan and Afghanistan friendly relations will

facilitate both states' economies and help to bring peace in the region which will favor both states. The other state, to which Pakistan shares border contiguity, is Iran. Pakistan and Iran has not yet developed any meaningful strategic ties. Growing India-Iran relations would have negative implications for Pakistan. Relations with Iran also acquire the significance for Pakistan in a way that Iran provides an alternative route to central Asian states other than Afghanistan (Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe, FDI, James Brazier and Lilit Gevorgyan, 2011). Pakistan and India are the two influential regional states among SAARC member. Indian growing economy and military strength has made it a lucrative partner for SAARC members states and they already consider India a regional power (Cohen, 2001). To mitigate the Indian influence, Pakistan must engage SAARC states to acquire the preeminence in the region. Relations with SAARC states could also help Pakistan to strengthen its stance against India on various issues in international and regional forums.

Pakistan has most of the time since its inception had enjoyed cordial relations with US. Be it the cold war or US led war on terror, Pakistan has remained the US ally. However, the start of the millennium witnessed the US tilt towards India and signing of nuclear deal between both states caused apprehensions for the Pakistan. Pakistan has raised its concerns over the India-US growing partnership and demanded US to sign the same kind of nuclear deal signed with India to neutralize the asymmetry which was however, overturned by US (Shuja, 2007). In the back drop of US-India growing partnership, Pakistan has to maneuver a policy that will promote the healthy relations with US even after the complete withdrawal of US forces from the Pakistan neighboring state, a concern also expressed by one of the respondent, because failure to do, will alter the balance of power in the favor of India (Blank S. , 2007).

From the cold war till now, India enjoyed the veto over Russian procurement of weapons. Around 70 percent of India's arms are from Russia. The changing regional dynamics in which India and US have emerged as a strategic partners and India's profound inclinations towards west have provoked the Moscow to look for more trading partners in the region. Russian gas company GAZPROM also showed interests in sorting out the energy crises in Pakistan and the development of TAPI pipeline (Blank S., 2012). As many respondents expressed that Pakistan should cultivate their ties with Russia with more vigor and should strenuously engage Russia to balance the Indian growing influence. Both Russia and Pakistan signed a "milestone" defense cooperation to bring peace and stability in the region and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif expressed that both states should foster multi-dimensional relationship including defense cooperation (Dawn, 2014). Pakistan has to try to cultivate ties with Russia and opt a meaningful strategy to operationalize the ongoing discussions on the defense cooperation. The Pak-Russia alliance would have the potential to counter India's growing aspirations in the region.

Central Asian States also acquire a distinctive place in Pakistan's strategic calculus. However, lack of border contiguity and turbulent Afghanistan always hinder Pakistan's stakes in Central Asia. Relations with energy rich Central Asian states will not only boost Pakistan's economy and suffice energy needs but also will help Pakistan to balance India (Roy, 2006). Pakistan is establishing closer ties with Central Asian states to forge these interests in the region. Efforts like TAPI, CASA-1000 energy project, Pakistan's efforts in inclusion in SCO and Pakistan's support to Central Asia in logistic and infrastructure showed that Pakistan is more interested in establishing relations with Central Asian states.

Pakistan's economy is growing at an average rate of 4.4 percent in terms of GDP and Indian economy is growing at an average rate of 7 percent, which is higher than Pakistan (Bank, World

Bank, 2014). The reasons to this low economy rate of Pakistan is due to the “uncertain political and economic environment caused by old-fashioned economic growth strategy” (Rizvi, 2015). By improving economic condition, Pakistan can rise. Moreover, Pakistan by developing its indigenous capabilities can also counter the Indian rise. One respondent viewed that development of Nasr missile and Azm e Nau exercises are determining that Pakistan with limited capabilities are posing check to Indian rising capabilities. These developments by Pakistan were meant to counter the Indian Cold Start Doctrine ⁵ (Jamal, 2010).

Though the study finds out that India is rising and it is posing challenges to Pakistan but simultaneously it has been also figured out that Pakistan has all the potential to counter India's belligerent actions taken to make Pakistan economically, politically and socially weak. By adopting strong foreign policy and by converging its resources for the development of economy and society, Pakistan can balance India.

⁵ Indian Army announced a new offensive doctrine in 2004 intended to allow it to mobilize quickly and undertake limited retaliatory attacks on its neighbor, without crossing Pakistan's nuclear threshold. Source: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/17972/cold_start_for_hot_wars_the_indian_army's_new_limited_warDoctrine.html

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 Recommendations

- There is no doubt in it that India's stature in the region is rising but the literature, academician, practitioners and government officials have so far not talked about that "Rising India" itself is a problem for Pakistan which need to be addressed and dealt at all levels other than "balancing India".
- The proactive foreign policy and diplomacy by the government of Pakistan can ensure to achieve long term strategic objectives in the region and outside. The study finds out that Pakistan lacks in the formation and execution of such foreign policies. Pakistan should make concerted efforts for the development and implementation of the foreign policy. Such kind of foreign policy will also help Pakistan to present its stance on various regional and international organizations which Pakistan at present lacks.
- Relations with neighboring states should be established as an utmost priority. After establishing relations, Pakistan should also focus on to sustain these relations for securing long term advantages. Pakistan should primarily, focus on establishing good and meaningful relations with Afghanistan and Central Asian states by enhancing cultural and people to people contact with Afghanistan and Central Asian states and should initiate programs of granting scholarships to their students which eventually will help Pakistan to maintain a soft image in these states.

- Diasporas abroad are the asset to any state to portray their image. Pakistani diaspora all over the world can represent the positive and soft image of Pakistan and Pakistani government has to make efforts to facilitate the diaspora abroad in doing so.
- India and Pakistan should make efforts to initiate the trade relations between them like China and India are engaged in trade despite of their differences. These trade relations will mitigate the threat perception of India about Pakistan.
- Developing healthy relationship between academicians and practitioners is the need of the time. Academicians should inform the government of Pakistan about any regional incident and its respective implications on Pakistan through their writings and government should appreciate the inputs of the academicians.
- Practitioners whereas, should also facilitate and organize conferences at regional at international level to disseminate the positive image and developments in Pakistan that will help to change the perception of Pakistan abroad.

5.2 Conclusion

The study finds out that there is a concomitance among policy community and literature about the India's rise in the region. India's economic and political growth, its technological advancements, projection of its soft power, US interests in the region and unconditional support to India and India's concerted efforts in military and nuclear arsenals are enhancing India's profile in the region. However, this rise is notwithstanding the need for immediate improvement of various macroeconomic indicators and technological advancement.

This rise of India has serious implications for Pakistan. Firstly, India's growing presence in Afghanistan is a major concern for Pakistan. Think-tanks, security establishment and majority of academicians in the country view eastern and western borders as volatile due to this presence, and

for good reason. Pakistan has been facing turbulence on both borders for over last many years. The security dilemma faced by the country is further deepened in view of increased defense allocation by its eastern neighbor. Pakistan with a comparatively much smaller allocation for defense – yet lion's share of the total budget – is indisposed for an arms race of conventional sorts. The expanding allocation to the defense has security as well as economic implications for Pakistan. The increase in defense spending by India is likely to result in a subsequent rise in Pakistan's defense budget at the cost of Pakistan's economy, thus potentially straining the ever-tense civil-military relations in the country. In this context, Pakistan can largely rely on its nuclear capability for ultimate deterrence. Even that has come under question since the stern posture assumed by India emerged post Indo-US nuclear deal. This nuclear deal not only affords political leverage to India over Pakistan but it has security and economic implications as well. Transfer of technology to India will enable it to bear out its energy requirements and is likely to be used to develop sophisticated weapons which will disturb the balance of power in the region.

To balance growing Indian prominence, Pakistan should focus on its economy to yield long term benefits. Moreover, Pakistan should also focus on cultivating its ties with China and various regional forums, particularly Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Pakistan has to take concerted efforts to operationalize CPEC successfully as it appears to provide lucrative opportunities to Pakistan to balance India economically, politically and strategically. Pakistan should also establish relations with neighboring states to mitigate the India's influence. The study finds out that though India is emerging in the region, Pakistan is equipped to balance India by leveraging and strengthening diplomatic relations abroad and harnessing indigenous economic potential at home.

References

(Retired), M. G. (2006). An Overview of Indo-US Strategic Partnership: A Rollercoaster Of a Relationship. In B. S. Summit Ganguly, *US-India Strategic Cooperation Into the 21st Century: More Than Words*. New York: Routledge.

(2004, January 13). Retrieved from Outlook : <http://www.outlookindia.com/article/Next-Steps-In-Strategic-Partnership-With-USA/222620>

Acharya, A. (2003/04). Will Asia's Past Be Its Future? *International Security*, 28(3), 149-164.

Acharya, A. (2006, August). India and Southeast Asia in the Age of Terror: Building Partnerships for Peace. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 28(2), 297-321.

AFP. (2014, Novemebr 18). *Musharraf Warns Off Proxy War with India in Afghanistan*. Retrieved August 19, 2016, from The Express Tribune: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/792985/musharraf-warns-of-proxy-war-with-india-in-afghanistan/>

Agrawal, S. (2011, 06 21). *India and the United States: A new Partnership*. doi:10.1080/03932729.2011.576171

Akbarzadeh, S. (2003). India and Pakistan's Geostrategic Rivalry In Central Asia. *Contemporary South Asia*, 12(2), pp. 219–228.

Ali, K. (2012, December 4). *Will China-India Relations Dent Pak-China Relations?* Retrieved June 1, 2016, from The Express Tribune: <http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/14568/will-china-india-relations-dent-pak-china-relations/>

Ashraf, S. (2015, June 25). *The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: India's Dual Dilemma*.

Retrieved August 20, 2016, from China-US Focus: <http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-indias-dual-dilemma/>

Ayres, A., & Mohan, C. (2009). *Power Realignments In Asia: China India and United States*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Bank, W. (2014). *World Bank*. Retrieved from https://www.google.com.pk/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&ctype=j&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=ny_gdp_mktp_kd_zg&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:PAK:IND:USA&ifdim=region&hl=en&dl=en&ind=false

Bank, W. (2015). *GDP Growth Rate (Annual %)*. Retrieved August 20, 2016, from World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2015&locations=IN&start=2012>

Bano, S. (2015, June 22). *Pakistan: Lessons from the India-US Nuclear Deal*. Retrieved April 22, 2016, from The Diplomat: <https://www.google.com.pk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&act=8&ved=0ahUKEwiAxdHCorHMAhUDwxQKHebQAr8QFgghMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fthediplomat.com%2F2015%2F06%2Fpakistan-lessons-from-the-india-us-nuclear-deal%2F&usg=AFQjCNGr3k5TfCtHfgEDmu4LN>

Baruah, A. (2000, November Saturday, 11). Mekong-Ganga Cooperation in place. *The Hindu*. Retrieved from <http://www.thehindu.com/2000/11/11/stories/01110003.htm>

Basu, P. P. (2007). India and post-Taliban Afghanistan: Stakes, Opportunities and Challenges. *India Quarterly*, 63(3), pp. 84-122.

BBC. (2001, July 17). *Kashmir Issue Blocks Summit Deal*. Retrieved March 24, 2016, from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1442622.stm

Behera, L. K. (2013, June 4). *India's Defence Budget 2013-14: A Bumpy Road Ahead*. Retrieved April 2, 2016, from Institute for defense Studies and Analysis: http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasDefenceBudget2013-14_lkbehera_040313

Bhattacharya, A. (2010, September). Sixty Years of India–China Relations. *Strategic Analysis*, 34(5), pp. 678–682.

Blank, S. (2003). India's Rising Profile in Central Asia. *Comparative Strategy*, 22(2), pp. 139-157.

Blank, S. (2007). The Geostrategic Implications of the Indo-American Strategic Partnership. *India Review*, 6(1), pp. 1-24.

Blank, S. (2012, June 6). *Russia's Quiet Rapprochement with Pakistan*. Retrieved August 21, 2016, from The Jamestown Foundation: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39462&cHash=5b6b42ed51bdca5f6c99f16220dc2a87#.V8L5zih97IU

Branigan, T., & Arnett, G. (2014, September 16). *China and India - 13 charts that show how the countries compare*: *The Guardian*. Retrieved August 21, 2016, from The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/sep/16/china-and-india-13-charts-that-show-how-the-countries-compare>

Brewster, D. (2011, December 19). Indian Strategic Thinking about East Asia. 34(6), 825-852.

Brewster, D. (2014). India's Engagement with Southeast Asia: Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia. In I. Hall, *The Engangement of India: Strategies and Responses*. George Town: Georgetown University Press.

Brewster, D. (2015). Indian Strategic Thinking About the Indian Ocean: Striving Towards Strategic Leadership. *India Review*, 14(2), pp. 221–237.

Bush, G. W. (2002, June 1). *Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power*. Retrieved from Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/articles/092002_security_strategy.htm

Carr, E. H. (1946). *The Twenty Years' Crises 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (Second ed.). London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd.

Chakravarty, S. (1984). Indo-Soviet Summits. In V. Bhatia, *Indo-Soviet Relations: Problems and Prospects*. New Delhi: Humanity Press.

Chaudhary, R. R. (2009, May). India's Nuclear Doctrine: A Critical Analysis. *Strategic Analysis*, 33(3).

Chaudhury, R. R. (2009). India vs Pakستان. *The Rusi Journal*, 154(4), pp. 60-65.

Chenoy, A. M. (2010). India and Russia: Allies in the International Political. In P. Stobdan, *India-Russia Strategic Partnership: Common Perspectives*. New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Chopra, A. (2015, November 18). *Road to Gwadar: China's Global Reach and its Implications for India*. Retrieved August 21, 2016, from DNA: <http://www.dnaindia.com/india/standpoint-road-to-gwadar-china-s-global-reach-and-its-implications-for-india-2146301>

Cioreiari, J. D. (2011, June 11). *India's Approach to Great Power Status*. Retrieved 2016, from The Fletcher Forum Of World Affairs:
<http://fletcher.tufts.edu/FletcherForum/Archives/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/Fletcher%20Forum/PDFs/2011winter/Ciorciari.pdf>

Cohen, S. P. (2001). India Rising. In S. P. Cohen, *India Emerging Power*. Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution.

Council, U. N. (1966, March 25). *United Nations Peacemaker*. Retrieved from http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IN%20PK_660110_TashkentDeclaration.pdf

Das, A. K. (2013). Soft and Hard Power in India's Strategy towards South East Asia. *India Review*, 12(3), pp. 165-185.

Dawn. (2014, November 20). 'Milestone' military Pact Cooperation Signed with Russia. Retrieved August 21, 2016, from Dawn: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1145786>

De, P. (2014, December). *India's Emerging Connectivity with Southeast Asia: Progress and Prospects*. Retrieved 5 18 , 2015, from ADBI Working Paper series: <http://www.adbi.org/working-paper/2014/12/19/6520.india.connectivity.southeast.asia/>

Dittmer, L. (2005). *South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan and China*. New Delhi: Pentagon Press.

Donnelly, J. (2000). *Realism and International Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from <https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=509idQ4icxIC&pg=PA39&lpg=PA39&dq=machi>

avelli,+AND.+ (1970) +The+Discourses&source=bl&ots=O9-
OcBylCl&sig=932vxdUSJjMUDz_B01jI7UHjmhk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj30_u
nsb7QAhWB0RQKHUB1ABIQ6AEISTAJ#v=onepage&q=machiavelli%2C%20AN

Donnelly, J. (2005). Realism. In A. L.-S. Scott Burchill, *Theories of International Relations* (pp. 29-52). New York: Palgrave Mcmillan.

Economist. (2010, September 30). A bumpier but Freer Ride.

Efstathopoulos, C. (2011, April). Reinterpreting India's Rise through the Middle Power Prism. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 19(1), pp. 74-95.

Embassy, C. (2005, April 11). *Wen Jiabao Addresses the China-India Business Cooperation Conference*. Retrieved May 21, 2016, from <http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/ssygd/t191503.htm>

Embassy, I. (n.d.). *Economic and Trade Relations*. Retrieved from Embassy Of India: Beijing: <http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId=97&SubMenuId=0>

Fair, C. C. (2004). *The Counter Terror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India*. Retrieved March 24, 2016, from Rand: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG141.pdf

Fani, M. I. (2010). The Indo- US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan. *Pakistan Vision*, 10(2), pp. 131-159.

Felbab-Brown, V. (2015, May 4). *Pakistan's Relations with Afghanistan and Implications for Regional Politics*. Retrieved August 21, 2016, from Brookings: <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/assets/research/pubs/2015/05/04-pakafghan-felbabbrown/04-pakafghan-felbabbrown.pdf>

<https://www.brookings.edu/research/pakistans-relations-with-afghanistan-and-implications-for-regional-politics/>

Firstbiz, T. (2014, August 15). *From 1947 to 2014: How the Indian Economy has Changed Since the Independence.* Retrieved March 19, 2016, from F.Business: <http://www.firstpost.com/business/data-business/from-1947-to-2014-how-the-indian-economy-has-changed-since-independence-1983853.html>

Friedman, E. (2005). Why Democracy Matters. In E. Friedman, & B. Gilley, *Asia's Giant*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Friedman, E., & Gilley, B. (2005). *Asia's Giants: Comparing China and India*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ganguly, S. (2003/04). India's Foreign Policy Grows Up. *XX*(4).

Ganguly, S. (2010). The Rise of India In Asia. In D. Shambaugh, & M. Yahuda, *International Relations Of Asia*. New Delhi: Pentagon Press.

Ganguly, S., Shoup, B., & Scobell, A. (2006). *US- Indian Strategic Cooperation in 21st Century: more than words*. New York: Routledge.

Green, M. (2010). Japan in Asia. In D. Shambaugh, & M. Yahuda, *International Relations of Asia*. New Delhi: Pentagon Press.

Greenspan, A. (2004). *India and the IT Revolution: Networks of Global Culture*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gupta, A. (2010, October). *Strategic Partnership with Afghanistan: India Showcases its Soft Power*. Retrieved May 15, 2016, from Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis:

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/StrategicPartnershipwithAfghanistanIndiaShowcasesitsSoftPower_agupta_101011

Hagerty, D. (2006). *South Asia In World Politics*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Hagerty, D. T. (2006). Are We Present At the Creation: Alliance theory and the Indo-US strategic convergence. In B. S. Sumit Ganguly, *US-Indian Strategic Cooperation Into the 21st Century: More Than Words* (p. 18). New York: Routledge.

Hagerty, D. T. (2014). *India's Evolving Nuclear Posture*. Retrieved April 28, 2016, from The Nonproliferation Review: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10736700.2014.1072990>

Haggerty, D., & Hagerty, H. (2006). India's Foreign Relations. In D. T. Hagerty, *South Asia in World Politics*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Haider, M. (2016, April 5). *India's Growing Military Spending Threatens Pakistan: says NSA Janjua*. Retrieved June 5, 2016, from Dawn: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1250121>

Haider, S. F. (2015, May 5). *Is India Fueling Unrest In Balochistan*. Retrieved August 21, 2016, from The Express Tribune: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/880897/is-india-fuelling-unrest-in-balochistan/>

Hall, I. (2012). India's New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power and the Limits of Government Action. *Asian Survey*, 52(6), pp. 1089–1110.

Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris. (2015). *Indian nuclear forces, 2015*. Retrieved July 21, 2106, from Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbul20>

Haakip, T. (2011). India's Look East Policy: Its Evolution and Approach. *South Asian Survey*, 18(2), pp. 239-257.

Heilmann, S., & Schmidt, D. (2014). *China's Foreign Political and Economic Realitions: An unconventional Relations*. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.

Hindu, T. (2013, May 23). *India Well-positioned to Become Net Security Provider in our Region and Beyond*. Retrieved from The Hindu:
<http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/india-wellpositioned-to-become-net-security-provider-in-our-region-and-beyond-pm/article4742174.ece>

Holstag, J. (2010). Trapped Giant. *Adelphi Papers*(50: 416), 75 — 108.

Hornat, J. (2014). *The Power Triangle in the Indian Ocean: China, India and the United States*. Retrieved from Taylor and Francis Group:
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2014.974507>

Hussain, S. M. (2006). Pakistan's Quest for Security and the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal. *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, XVIII(2), 117–137.

Hymans, J. E. (2009, July–September). India's Soft Power and its Vulnerabilities. *India Review*, 8(3), pp. 234-265.

III, W. C. (2009, May 28). Delhi's Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, "Look East," and India's Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific. *Asian Security*, 5(2), pp. 87-113.

IMF. (2015, April). *World Economic Outlook Database*. Retrieved March 14, 2016, from International Monetary Fund:
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=31&pr.y=106>

6&sy=1980&ey=2020&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=924%2C534&s=NGDP_RPCH%2CNGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC&grp=0&a=

Inderfurth, A. K. (2013, August). *The UN's 'Rubik's Cube: ' Security Council Reform*. Retrieved June 11, 2016, from Centre for Strategic and International Studies: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/FINAL%20August%202013_WadhwanChair_USIndiaInsight.pdf

India, G. o. (2011, December 8). *Vision for the Enhancement of India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership upon entering the year of the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations*. Retrieved June 20, 2015, from Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India: <http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/15683/Vision+for+the+Enhancement+of+IndiaJapan+Strategic+and+Global+Partnership+upon+entering+the+year+of+the+60th+Anniversary+of+the+Establishment+of+Diplomatic+Relations>

India, G. o. (2012, June 12). *Keynote address by MOS Shri E. Ahamed at First India-Central Asia Dialogue*. Retrieved May 14, 2016, from Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India: <http://www.meaindia.gov.in/Statements.htm?dtl/19791/Keynote+address+by+MOS+Shri+E+Ahamed+at+First+India+Central+Asia+Dialogue>

India, G. O. (2015). *Economic Survey 2014-15: India Budget*. Retrieved August 21, 2016, from India Budget: indiabudget.nic.in/es2014-15/echapter-vol2.pdf

India, M. o. (2007, July 27). *Joint Statement by Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Minister for External Affairs and Dr. Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State - India and United States Complete Civil Nuclear Negotiations*. Retrieved from Ministry of External Affairs: Government Of India: <http://www.meain.in-focus-article.htm?18811/Joint+Statement+by+Shri+Pranab+Mukherjee+Minister+for+External+Affairs+and+Dr+Condoleezza+Rice+US+Secretary+of+State++India+and+United+States+Complete+Civil+Nuclear+Negotiations>

Iqbal, K. (2015, June 8). *Defence Budget Analysis*. Retrieved June 6, 2016, from The Nation: <http://nation.com.pk/columns/08-Jun-2015/defence-budget-analysis>

Jaffrelot, C. (2009). The India-US Rapprochement: State-driven or Middle Class-driven? *India Quarterly*, 65(1), 1-14.

Jain, B. M. (2004, April). India-China Relations: Issues and Emerging Trends. *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 93(374), pp. 253–269.

Jamal, A. (2010, May 7). *Pakistan's Ongoing Azm-e-Nau-3 Military Exercises Define Strategic Priorities*. Retrieved August 21, 2016, from The Jamestown Foundation: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36355#.V8LQCSH9601

Japan-India Relation. (2016, February 3). Retrieved May 24, 2016, from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html>

Jha, P. K. (2011, January). India's Defence Diplomacy In Southeast Asia. *Journal of Defence Studies*, 5(1), pp. 47-63.

Jha, P. K. (2011, January). India's Defense Diplomacy In South East Asia. *Defence Studies and Analyses*, 5(1). Retrieved from http://www.idsia.in/system/files/jds_5_1_pkjha.pdf

Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova. (2015, May 6). *Indian Immigrants in the United States*. Retrieved April 2016, from Migration Policy Institute: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/indian-immigrants-united-states>

John H. Finley, J. (1951). *The Complee Writings of Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War*. New York: Random House.

Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India. (2008). Retrieved June 29, 2015, from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/prm/0810/joint_d.html

Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. (2005, July 18). Retrieved from US Department of State: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/2005/49763.htm>

Joseph S. Nye, J. (2004). *Soft Power: The Means to Success In the World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

Joshi, S. (2010). India's Af-Pak Strategy. *Rusi Journal*, 155(1), pp. 20-29. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071841003683393>

Kavalski, E. (2010). *India and Central Asia: The Mythmaking and International Relations of a Rising Power*. New York: Tauris Academic Studies.

Kennedy, A. B. (2015). Powerhouses or Pretenders? Debating China's and India's Emergence as Technological Power. *The Pacific Review*, 28(2), pp. 281-302.

Khambatta, P., & Inderfurth, K. F. (2013). *The Emerging Indian Economy*. Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Khambatta, P., & Inderfurth, K. F. (2013). *The Emerging Indian Economy*. Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Khan, G. A. (2016, April 2). *Science and Technology: Key Elements of India's Growth*. Retrieved July 20, 2016, from Arab News: <http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/904236>

Khan, I. A. (2010, June 18). *World Must Accept Pakistan as Nuclear Power*. Retrieved May 1, 2016, from Paksitan Defense: <http://defence.pk/threads/world-must-accept-pakistan-as-nuclear-power-gen-majid.62307/>

Khan, Z. A. (2013, January). Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal: The Gainer and the Loser. *South Asian Studies*, 28(1), pp. 241-257. Retrieved from South Asian Studies: http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/17_V28_1_2013.pdf

Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. G. (2006, October). *Emerging Giants: Building World-Class Companies in Developing Countries*. Retrieved August 20, 2016, from Harvard Business Review: <https://hbr.org/2006/10/emerging-giants-building-world-class-companies-in-developing-countries>

Kraig, M. (2009, May). India as a Nuclear-Capable Rising Power in a Multipolar and Non-Polar World. *Strategic Analysis*, 33(3), pp. 365- 380.

Krepon, M. (2012, February 14). *Pakistan and the FMCT*. Retrieved May 1, 2016, from Dawn: <https://www.dawn.com/news/695613/pakistan-and-the-fmct>

Kux, D. (1993). *Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, 1941–1991*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.

Ladwig, W. C. (2010). India and the Balance of Power in Asia Pacific. *Joint Force Quarterly*(57), 111-119.

Laruelle, M., Huchet, J.-F., Peyrouse, S., & Balci, B. (2010). *China And India in Central Asia: A New Great Game?* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Laurelle, M., & Peyrouse, S. (2011). *Mapping Central Asia: Indian Perspective and Strategies*. Wey Court East: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Retrieved from https://www.google.com.pk/?gws_rd=cr,ssl&ei=y_C6V4qUDMT_aJe2jZgE#q=wey+court+east

Luthra, G. (2014, February). *India's indigenous n-submarine to start deterrence patrols from 2015*. Retrieved April 28, 2016, from India Strategic: http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories3173_Indias_first_N-submarine_to_start_deterrence_patrols_from_2015.htm

Madhavan, M. C. (2015, January). *Can India catch up with China: The Hindu*. Retrieved August 21, 2016, from The Hindu: <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/comment-can-india-catch-up-with-china/article6757519.ece>

Malik, V. P. (2006). Indo US Defense and Military Relations: From Estrangement to Strategic Partnership. In B. S. Sumit Ganguly, *Emerging India* (p. 88). New York: Routledge.

Mansingh, L. (2007, January). India–Japan Relations. *IPCS Issue Brief*(43).

Masood, T. (2015, April 21). *China's Landmark Investment In Pakistan*. Retrieved August 22, 2016, from The Express Tribune: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/873627/chinas-landmark-investments-in-pakistan/>

Mathur, S. (2005, September). *Voting for the Veto: India in a Reformed UN*. Retrieved June 11, 2016, from <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/565.pdf>

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Michael, A. (2013). *India's Foreign Policy and Regional Multilateralism*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Miller, M. C. (2013, May/June). India's Feeble Foreign Policy: A Would-Be Great Power Resists Its Own Rise. *Foreign Affairs*.

Misra, A. (2004, April). Indo-Pakistan Talks 2004: Nuclear Confidence Building Measures (NCBMs) and Kashmir. *Strategic Journal*, 28(2).

Mohan, A. (2013, September 20). *India and the United Nations: The Quest for Equity*. Retrieved May 30, 2016, from Ministry of External Affairs: <http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?22231/India+and+the+United+Nations>

Mohan, C. R. (2006, July-August). India and the Balance of Power.

Mohan, C. R. (2009). The Evolution of Sino-Indian Relations: Implications for the United States. In A. Ayres, & C. Mohan, *Power Realignments In Asia: China, India and United States*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Monnoo, D. K. (2016, May 25). *Pakistan's Defense Budget*. Retrieved June 2, 2016, from The Nations: <http://nation.com.pk/columns/25-May-2016/pakistan-s-defense-budget>

Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). *Politics among Nations: Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A Knopf.

Mulford, D. C. (2005, March 31). *US-India Relationship to Reach New Heights*. Retrieved from Times of India.

Nadin, P. (2016). *UN Security Council Reform*. Retrieved June 11, 2016, from
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=P2SaCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA70&lpg=PA70&dq=peter+nadin+un+security+council+reform+india&source=bl&ots=OzlXtabH56&sig=WvkxcBFfXrPTsY0kkfcy_XneobE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwilpbXHrKbNAhWBIBQKHWJpCjIQ6AEILDAD#v=onepage&q=peter%20nadin%20&f=false

NASSCOM. (2012). Retrieved July 20, 2016, from <http://www.nasscom.in/indian-itbpo-sector-revenue-estimated-cross-usd-100-billion-mark>

Nayyar, K. p. (1998, September 29). *Vajpayee describes India and US as natural allies*. Retrieved March 24, 2016, from The Telegraph: <http://www.hindunet.org/hvk/articles/1098/0010.html>

Norris, H. M. (2106). *Status of World Nuclear Forces*. Retrieved July 21, 2106, from Federation of American Scientists: <http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/>

NTI. (2011). *Lahore Declaration*. Retrieved from Nuclear Threat Initiative:
<http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/lahore-declaration/>

Ojha, N. P., & Singhal, M. (2016, March 22). *The economic growth trajectory of India and China: Live Mint.* Retrieved August 21, 2016, from Live Mint:

<http://www.livemint.com/Politics/dlpKXKCzc7x1nSuMi8yOCN/The-economic-growth-trajectory-of-India-and-China.html>

Oswal, P. (2010). The Internationalization of Indian Firms: Strategic Issues, Organizational Transformation, and Performance. *The Internationalization of Indian Firms: Strategic Issues, Organizational Transformation, and Performance*. Dufourstrasse, St. Gallen, Switzerland.

Paddock, C. (2009). *India-US Nuclear Deal: Prospects and Implications*. Retrieved April 28, 2016, from

https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=ZNmokBSwPJsC&pg=PA140&lpg=PA140&dq=india-us+nuclear+deal+implications+for+pakistan&source=bl&ots=gVYcXnCbVs&sig=XU6bqG_b6Jzqx8AlkiSFdQUPSPc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj12PfmorHMAhUDVxQKHeN-BWc4ChDoAQhKMAg#v=onepage&q=india-

Panagariya, A. (2008). *India The Emerging Giant*. New York: oxford University Press.

Panda, A. (2014, October 18). *Meet India's New Nuclear Cruise Missile*. Retrieved July 21, 2016, from The Diplomat: <http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/meet-indias-new-nuclear-cruise-missile/>

Pande, A. (2014, May 12). *The Role of Indian Diaspora in The Development of The Indian IT Industry*. doi:10.1080/09739572.2014.911446

Pande, S. (2015). *Sino-Pak Strategic Relationship: Implications for Pakistan*. Retrieved August 21, 2016, from Scholar Warrior: http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1942499114_Sino-PakStrategicRelationship.pdf

Pant, H. V. (2007, July 13). India in the Asia-Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China. *Asia-Pacific Review*, 14(1), 54–71.

Pant, H. V. (2009). The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics. *Asian Security*, 5(3), 273–295.

Pant, H. V. (2010, June 23). India in Afghanistan: A Test Case for a Rising Power. *Contemporary South Asia*, 18(2), pp. 133-153. doi:10.1080/09584931003674984

Pant, H. V. (2012). *The Washington Quarterly*, 35(1).

Pant, H. V. (2013). India-Russia Ties and India's Strategic Culture: Dominance of a Realist Worldview. *India Review*, 12(1), pp. 1-19.

Pattanaik, S. S. (2012, July-August). India's Afghan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism. *Strategic Analysis*, 36(4), pp. 569–583.

Paul, T. (2006). *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry*. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press.

Paul, T. V. (2014, April). *India's Soft Power in a Globalizing World*. Retrieved May 30, 2016, from Current History: http://www.academia.edu/6683974/Indias_Soft_Power_in_a_Globalized_World

Picture and Potential: India Rising. (2007). *The Washington Quarterly*.

Price, G. (2013, April). *India's Policy towards*. Retrieved from http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Asia/0813pp_in diaafghanistan.pdf

Qureshi, S. M. (2009, October 3). *India Needs to Justify its Large Presence in Afghanistan*. Retrieved May 20, 2016, from Embassy of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan: http://embassyofpakistanusa.org/news378_100409.php

Ramachandran, S. (2014, October 13). *India's Impressive Space Program*. Retrieved July 20, 2016, from The Diplomat: <http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/indias-impressive-space-program/>

Rangnathan, C. V. (2002). The China Threat: a View from India. In H. Yee, & I. Storey, *The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality*. London and New York: Routledge.

Rani D. Mullen, Summit Ganguly. (2012, May 8). *The Rise of India's Soft Power*. Retrieved May 30, 2016, from Foreign Policy: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/08/the-rise-of-indias-soft-power/>

Rashid, A. (2002). Introduction: Afghanistan Holy Warriors. In A. Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Rathore, R. S. (2008). *Case Studies on MNCs in India: The Competitive Strategies*. Hyderabad: The Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India.

Razdan, M. (2003, June 23). *India, China Sign Accord: Agreement on trade through Sikkim*. Retrieved May 21, 2016, from Indian Tribune: <http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030624/main1.htm>

Rediff. (2006, November 16). *Why China Claims Arunachal Pradesh*. Retrieved May 4, 2016, from Rediff News: <http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/nov/16sld1.htm>

Rehman, I. (2009, May 28). Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India's Counter-Containment of China in Asia. *Asian Security*, 5(2), pp. 114–143.

Rizvi, A. (2015, January 2). *Pakistan's Economic & Financial Problems & Global Outlook 2015*. Retrieved August 21, 2016, from LinkedIn: <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/pakistans-economic-financial-problems-global-outlook-2015-asad-rizvi>

Rohan Mukherjee, David M Malone. (2013, July 20). *India and the UN Security Council: An Ambiguous Tale*. Retrieved June 11, 2016, from Economic & Political Weekly: https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/Mukherjee_Malone_EPW_0.pdf

Roy, M. S. (2006, October). *Pakistan's Strategies in Central Asia*. Retrieved August 20, 2016, from Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis: http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/PakistansStrategiesinCentralAsia_msroy_1006

Rubinuff, A. (2006). Incompatible Objectives and Shortsighted Policies: US Strategies Towards India. In B. S. Sumit Ganguly, *US- Indian Strategic Cooperation Into the 21st Century: More Than the Words* (p. 49). New York: Routledge.

Santos-Paulino, A., & Wan, G. (2010). *The Rise of China and India: Impacts, Prospects and Implications*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Schaffer, T. C. (2005, December 16). India as a Global Power. *Deutsche Bank Research*.

Scott, D. (2007). Strategic Imperatives of India as an Emerging Player in Pacific Asia. *International Studies*, 44(123), 123_140.

Scott, D. (2013). India's Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean – Securing the Waves. *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 36(4), pp. 484–511. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.728134>

Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe, FDI, James Brazier and Lilit Gevorgyan. (2011, September 24). *Pakistan Refocuses Attention towards Central Asia*. Retrieved August 21, 2016, from East Asia Forum: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/24/pakistan-refocuses-attention-towards-central-asia/>

Sethia, S. (2013). ACCMAN Journal of Management. *GYANPRATHA-ACCMAN Journal of Management*. Retrieved from Publications: ACCMAN.

Shambaugh, D., & Yahuda, M. (2010). *International Relations Of Asia*. New Delhi: Pentagon Press.

Shuja, S. (2007, February 17). *Pakistan feels jilted by US-India nuclear deal*. Retrieved May 1, 2016, from News Weekly: <http://newsweekly.com.au/article.php?id=2960>

Shukla, R. (2010). *How India Earns, Spends and Saves*. New Dehli: Sage Publications.

Singh. (n.d.). *Anglais: Senate*. Retrieved August 21, 2016, from Senate: https://www.senat.fr/international/anglais/intervention_singh_anglais.pdf

Singh, N. (2015, August 31). *Diaspora Could Become Vehicle of India's Soft Power*. Retrieved May 29, 2016, from Hindustan Times: <http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/diaspora-could-become-vehicle-of-india-s-soft-power/story-8hdAohe2gzeDPhdVb2mx0M.html>

Singh, S. (2015, March 16). *SIPRI Data Shows India World's Biggest Arms Importer at three times of China*. Retrieved June 6, 2016, from The Indian Express:

<http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/india-remains-worlds-biggest-arms-importer-sipri/>

Singh, Z. D. (2015, April 23). *China Gambles Big In Pakistan*. Retrieved August 21, 2016, from Outlook: <http://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/china-gambles-big-in-pakistan/294110>

Sinha, A. (2016). Partial Accommodation Without Conflict: India as a Rising Link Power. In T. V. Paul, *Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present and Future*. Cambridge University Press.

Smith, K. (2012, July). India's Identity and its Global Aspirations. *Global Society*, 26(3), pp. 369-385.

Sokolski, H. (2007). *Gauging US-Indian Strategic Cooperation*. Strategic Studies Institute.

Srinivasan, K. (2013, January 23). *Image With No Definition: India at the UN Security Council: a retrospect*. Retrieved June 11, 2016, from The Telegraph: http://www.telegraphindia.com/1130123/jsp/opinion/story_16467700.jsp#.V2Cdvyh9600

Srinivasan, R. (2005). An Indo-Japanese Strategic Alliance.

Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup. (2006). Introduction. In a. A. Sumit Ganguly Brian Shoup, *US-India Strategic Cooperation Into the 21st Century: More Than Words*. New York: Routledge.

Swami, P. (2008, July 9). *Making The Water Boil in Afghanistan*. Retrieved July 29, 2016, from The Hindu: <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/making-the-water-boil-in-afghanistan/article1292793.ece>

Swaminathan, J. M. (2009). *India's Economic Power: Fiction or Future*. Singapore: World Scientific.

Talbott, S. (2004). *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy And The Bomb*. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Tellis, A. (2007). India in Asian Geopolitics. In P. Nanda, *Rising India: Friends and Foes*. New Delhi: Lancer.

Tellis, A. J. (2005). *India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States*. Retrieved April 14, 2016, from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis.india.global.power.final.pdf>

Tharoor, S. (2008). India as a Soft Power. *India International Centre*, 35(1), pp. 32-45.

Times of India. (2012). Retrieved from India US to Hold Joint Military Exercise at Fort Bragg: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-US-to-hold-joint-military-exercise-at-Fort-Bragg-in-2013/articleshow/17044407.cms>

Tirmazi, A. (2015, January 5). *Indian Sponsored Terrorism in Pakistan*. Retrieved May 20, 2016, from The Islamabad Post: <http://islamabadpost.com/2015/01/indian-sponsored-terrorism-in-pakistan/>

Today, B. (2013, December 6). *Economy Grows at Slowest Rate in a Decade in 2013*. Retrieved March 19, 2016, from Business Today: <http://www.businesstoday.in/topics/year-2013-roundup/economy-logged-lowest-decadal-growth-rate-in-2013/story/201787.html>

US Department Of State. (2014, July 31). Retrieved April 10, 2016, from U.S.-India Trade and Economic Cooperation: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/230048.htm>

Vajpaei, A. B. (2004, 1 13). *Next Step in Strategic Partnership with USA*. Retrieved from Outlook: <http://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/next-steps-in-strategic-partnership-with-usa/222620>

Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.

Wang, A. K. (2009, September 1). *China and India: Greater Economic Integration*. Retrieved May 21, 2016, from China Business Review: <http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/china-and-india-greater-economic-integration/>

Wilson, D., & Purushothaman, R. (2003). *Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050*. New York: Goldman Sachs.

Yadav, M. K. (2014). *India's Quest for United Nations Security Council Permanent Seat with Special Reference to its Peace Keeping Credentials*. Retrieved June 11, 2016, from Research India Publications: http://www.ripublication.com/gjps/gjpsv1n1_01.pdf

Zaman, R. U. (2006). Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture. *Comparative Strategy*, 25(3), pp. 231-247.

Zulfiqar, S. (2015, October 7). *Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations*. Retrieved august 21, 2016, from IPRI: <http://www.ipripak.org/pakistan-afghanistan-relations/>

Annexure

QUESTIONNAIRE

- 1- In your opinion, is India's status in the region rising?
- 2- How is Indo-US partnership playing a role in India's rise in the region?
- 3- How could Indo-US nuclear deals disturb the balance of power in the region?
- 4- Will India be able to get a seat in UNSC in future? And Is Pakistan raising its concerns on various international forums? If yes then in which forums?
- 5- What could be the possible Implications of India's rise on Pakistan?
- 6- What are the implications of India's policy of 'Encirclement of Pakistan' that India at present is pursuing by having immense influence on Afghanistan and normalizing relations with China?
- 7- What is the Impetus for heightened defense budgets and its implications for Pakistan? How can Pakistan counter increased defense spending by India? By increasing defense budget or some other mean?
- 8- Is there any substance in speculations of growing distance between India and Russia? If yes, can Pakistan capitalize on it? If yes, to what extent and in which sectors?
- 9- Could Pak-China partnership pose any challenge to India's hegemonic design in the region?
- 10- How could Pakistan balance India's rise?
- 11- What are India's biggest insecurities while normalizing relations with Pakistan?