International Islamic University, Islamabad
Faculty of Islamic Studies (Usuluddin)
Department of Al-Aqeedah and Philosophy (AP)

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The Concept of Truth in Pragmatism and Logical Positivism: A Comparative and Critical Analysis from an Islamic Perspective

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of
The Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Philosophy

By
Enver Xhiha

Supervised by
Prof. Dr. Ahmad Muhammad Gād Abdul Rāziq
Head Dep. of Aqīdah and Philosophy
Faculty of Islamic Studies (Usuluddin)



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Members of Examining Committee

Dr. Muhammad Tufayl
External Examiner

Dr. Nabil al-Fūlī
Internal Examiner

Prof. Dr. Ahmad Muhammad Gād Abdul Rāziq
Head Dep. of Aqīdah and Philosophy
Faculty of Islamic Studies (Usuluddin)
Supervisor

To my Parents

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ملخص البحث

عنوان البحث: "مفهوم الحقيقة في الفلسفة البراجماتية والوضعية المنطقية: دراسة نقدية مقارنة"

تأخذ مشكلة الحقيقة مكانة متميزة في الفلسفة الغربية الحديثة والمعاصرة، على مستوى فلسفة التحليل اللغوى وأيضاً على مستوى ما يسمى بالفلسفة العلمية التي تهدف إلى أن تكون اللغة التي يستخدمها الباحثون في أبحاثهم لغة علمية، وهنا تنوعت اتجاهات هذه الفلسفة في التحقق من صدق العبارات اللغوية، وفقاً للخلفيات التاريخية التي انتجت هذه الفلسفة أو تلك، ومن هنا فإن مشكلة الحقيقة تتصل اتصالاً وثيقاً بفلسفة اللغة وكذلك فلسفة العلم.

ولقد حاول هذا البحث أن يتناول هذا الموضوع في اتجاهين فلسفيين أساسيين في الفلسفة الغربية الحديثة والمعاصرة: أحدهما الاتجاه البراجماتي، والثاني، الاتجاه الوضعي المنطقي، ولم يكتف البحث بذلك، إذ أنه تناول بالإضافة إلى ذلك مشكلة الحقيقة في الفلسفة الإسلامية، وهنا تناول الفلسفة البراجماتية والوضعية المنطقية من رؤية نقدية إسلامية.

ولقد جاء هذا البحث في مقدمة، وتمهيد، وثلاث فصول، وخاتمة، وأخيراً قائمة المصادر الأساسية التي اعتمد عليها البحث.وفي المقدمة تناول الباحث أهمية الموضوع، وأسباب اختياره، وإشكالية البحث، والمنهج المتبع في الدراسة، وخطة البحث. وفى التمهيد تناول الباحث مشكلات البحث بصفة عامة، وجاء الفصل الأول بعنوان:" مفهوم الحقيقة في الفلسفة البراجماتية"، والفصل الثاني بعنوان: " مفهوم الحقيقة في الفلسفة الوضعية المنطقية"، والفصل الثالث بعنوان:" مفهوم الحقيقة في الفلسفة الإسلامية: دراسة نقدية تحليلية للفلسفة البراجماتية والوضعية المنطقية". ثم جاءت الخاتمة التي رصد فيها الباحث أهم النتائج التي وصل إليها في بحثه، وأخيراً جاءت قائمة المصادر التي اعتمد عليها الباحث في دراسته.

Transliteration Table

ا	a	ذ	dh	غ	gh	ھ	h
ب	b	ر	r	ف	f	ھ	ph
پ	p	ز	z	ق	q	ھ	th
ت	t	ژ	ṛ	ک	k	ھ	ṭh
ٹ	ṭ	ز	z	گ	g	ھ	jh
ث	th	ژ	zh	ل	l	ھ	ch
ج	j	س	s	م	m	ھ	dh
چ	ch	ش	sh	ن	n	ھ	ḍh
ح	ḥ	ص	ṣ	ں	ṇ	ھ	ph
خ	kh	ض	ḍ	ہ	h	ھ	kh
د	d	ط	ṭ	ی	y	ھ	gh
		ظ	ẓ				

Long Vowels

ا		ā
ا		ā
ی	ِ	ī
و	ُ	ū
و	(URDU)	ō
ے	(URDU)	ē

Short Vowels

ـَ	a
ـِ	i
ـُ	u

Diphthongs

و	ـَ	(ARABIC)	aw
		(PERSIAN/URDU)	au
		(TURKISH)	ev
ی	ـَ	(ARABIC)	ay
		(PERSIAN/URDU)	ai
		(TURKISH)	ey

Doubled

وّ	ـُ	uww/uvv
یّ	ـِ	iyy

Letter ء is transliterated as elevated comma and is not expressed when at the beginning.
Letter ع is transliterated as inverted comma.
ق as Arabic letter is transliterated as q, and as Persian/Turkish/Urdu letter as ḳ.
و as Arabic letter is transliterated as w, and as Persian/Turkish/Urdu letter is transliterated as v.
ۃ is transliterated as aẗ in pause form and as at in construct form.
Article ال is transliterated as al- ('l- in construct form) whether followed by a moon or a sun letter.
و as a Persian/Urdu conjunction is transliterated as -o.
Short vowel ـِ in Persian/Urdu possessive or adjectival form is transliterated as -i.

Transliteration Table*

*This Transliteration Table is taken from the scholarly journal of *Islamic Studies* published by Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad.

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Preface

Truth as a philosophical subject has attracted the attention of intellectuals in the past and present. From the simplest man to the most knowledgeable, in very simple matter to more complicated, man always faces the same challenge, the Truth. If a considerable number of people, in the medieval centuries, use to believe that earth was in shape of plate, it was the search for the truth which brought them to the real fact. From here, truth appears to be the spirit of knowledge and the spirit of science, as only through the search of it humanity has come where it belongs today. This means not that the humanity knows little from the truth and every new thing to be discovered annihilates the past. Truth is a long chain of facts, logical and empirical, which through their proper use discovers what we not know. The real clashes to come out today, from the modern thought, begin with the reevaluation of the past believed truths. In other words, the study of truth today is another face of new search to discover the limits of right and wrong thinking in human being. If the truth, from the past, was crystallized from time to time or from age to age, can we still believe that the procedure is still in the continuum, or with the science we are at the end of the truth discovery? Thus, the best answer to this question is given through the approach study of current modern philosophies. Modern philosophies, by closing truth at the bottom of science, with a lot of confidence in the science and its subject study attempted to bring the history trip of truth at the end. Thus, the importance of this study begins exactly from here. In other words, the subject study of truth, in this thesis, is an attempt to crystallize the manner modern school of thought, with an extreme confidence in the reality, attempts to end the historical continuous journey of truth.

Pragmatism, 19th -20th century school of thought, born in the science revolutionary era, had to turn their attention toward the science and scientific methodologies. Practically, for pragmatist school of thought, the reality is a place where the ideas are formed and where they are verified. Considering science as the

best achievement of human to corporate with reality turns out to be that the most reliable tool to corporate with ideas verification process, truth, should be the science.

In other words, the reality, for pragmatists, was an institution for ideas formation, and the science was the most reliable tool for studding reality. Which means that the truth, for pragmatism, was the science and at mean time it was a verification mechanism for every idea, whether it is true or false. The matter does not ends with this simplicity. The real ambiguity in pragmatism theory starts with the attempt of defining the meaning of 'reality'.

Considering man's world of ideas more than what we find in the reality, pragmatists had to expand meaning of reality, from 'what we see and feel immediately' , known as ontological ideas, to 'what we know and do not see immediately', to abstract ideas. Where do pure logical ideas stand, and what are the metaphysical ideas? Pragmatist had to avoid the answer of any of these questions, and considered them ideas which hold values only because they work well for man.

Logical positivist,[1] the second school of thought to march with great expands and effect on the philosophical and scientific ideas, learned from mistakes of the previous philosophies, in particularly his sister school, pragmatism. The unsolved matter of the meaning of reality and many difficult questions to oppose pragmatism about other real ideas, out of the empirical world, and the matter of common sense and common language, made the Logical positivist approach the subject of truth with different angle. It is not the reality what we have to argue upon, asserted logical positivist. The reality is just there and no one doubts about it, but the real question which must concern us all, is the manner we understand reality and the way we express it. Logical positivist believed that the controversial meaning, other philosophies had gone through, is not due to the inability to enclose metaphysics into their philosophies, but the real controversy begins with

[1] Began in the early 1920 with the establishment of the so called Vienna circle by Moritz Schlik in association with Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Herbert Feigel and a number of mathematicians and scientists.

giving to metaphysics a place among other real ideas. 'The house exists' and 'God exists' have almost the same structure, or grammatical form, but deep inside they are different. The 'house' is a word known and seen by everyone, but God is a meaning we cannot prescribe it in the reality. Thus, for positivist, the second sentence is just meaningless and does not require any discussion. Similarly, for logical positivist, the metaphysical ideas can not be part of any reality; they are only meaningless expressions which are not worthy of any verification process. Thus, preliminary to any proceeding of verification of any idea, according to logical positivists, we have to analyze the ideas meaning in accordance with his indication in reality. Moreover, if idea fails to have any inidication in reality, it is considered as false or meaningless idea.

Are all factual meaning verifiable in reality? Is it possible to verify every word in accordance with reality without any other relation? Do we have to consider all unverifiable meanings in reality as false? What is the meaning, is it a mere name, or a proposition? All these questions and many more to come in this research paper demonstrate the inefficiency of the positivist to maintain within their materialistic world what the truth is.

Muslim thought, to begin with the first revelation, Quran, supported with broad tradition of Prophet p.b.u.h. has given to humanity the philosophical and scientific consciousness. Mind creativity within Muslim Ummah, which led to the formation of independent Muslim thought, was nothing more than a confidence with the truth of the Qurān and Prophet's tradition, both to call for the balanced way of thinking and analyzing. While saying 'the balanced way of thinking' we mean the proper embellishment of facts, whether they are logical or ontological.

If western philosophies have pursued extreme paths, arguing whether the reality is the source of knowledge or the reason, Muslim thought, with the confirmation of both traditions, had given the deserved place to each factor to serve man's cognition process. Reality and five senses to bring reality to the stage of knowledge could not be avoided from the reason ability to analyze them and rise up the relation and laws to decide over reality. Language on the other side, as

the significant expression tool, was considered more than external expression. Moreover, meaning of words, categorically, were considered as context, construction as well as the tradition, all to determine the real meaning of a word.

Truth, as the process of verification, was a joint mechanism of entire these elements, in addition to others experiences, without what no science neither philosophy on earth could have accomplished the current level. From Muslim thought approach of truth, we detect the precise and broad comprehension of the subject, beside the very natural and accepted manner of illumination. In addition, every subject of philosophy and science, were in past, are in present, and will benefit in the future from Muslim thought diversity, and this is what we are going to witness it practically through our work.

i. Statement of Problem

Covering this much importance in the topic of philosophy, the truth in other words is considered as the crown of the every theory in every school of thought. Only with the accomplishment of theory of truth, we can identify to which category a particular school belongs and what are the methodologies implemented. Thus, including this much importance, the discussion of truth has attracted the attention of many philosophers, especially the modern schools. Not suddenly these schools had to emphasize on the Truth, but the success of science led them rethink and assume the implementation of the same profundity in order to solve once and forever abstract subjects as; religion, morality and logic. If the science was the center for the elaboration process, they had to turn all of their analyses toward the materialistic evaluation.

Pragmatist school of thought, the first philosophy to begin in our thesis, by defining truth as every idea formed and verified in the factual world or reality, before giving any explanation on the manner truth is verified, has given a broad treatment to the ideas formation.

The elaboration of the formation of ideas in the pragmatism, will explore the nature of this philosophy and the methodology they follow in elaborating the

idea. Thus, it was a necessary step for us to describe what the idea is before we expand our theses on something we have not explained enough. On the other hand, while initiating our theses with the ideas formation we will automatically answer many crucial terminologies in the subject of truth. Subsequently, we will be able to obtain what is the meaning of reality and the manner that particular philosophy understands it and, accordingly, assemble their arguments.

Soon after the elaboration of ideas formation, types of ideas, in second section, assist at the exploring of ideas. Types of ideas are an indisputable segment to be included in the topic of truth, as only through it we can identify how ideas are divided, and what verification process is applied to each of it.

Third necessary section included in pragmatism thought is about elements of ideas verification. The elements for ideas verification, in more specific manner, explore entire mechanism of theory of truth. The verification process of ideas, virtually, makes clear the divergences between the philosophies. And from here only we can attain the most miniature difference even between schools of same character, as positivists and pragmatist.

The similar method applied to explain the standpoint of pragmatist on the subject of truth follows the Logical Positivism. In addition, the broad discussion of the logical positivist in the matter of semantics, as the significant element for truth verification, has obligated our research to include the language as the verification element for ideas verification in Logical Positivism.

The critics and comparative study of our research paper begin with Muslim thought formation of ideas, to extend with the types of ideas and their verification process. This chapter, necessary, had to include meaning formation, types and their relation to ideas. Beside, the research had to include the definition and their types in order to observe the manner Muslim thought crates relation of meaning with other things, thing that misses in western thought. In order to follow the matter of similarities and differences between Muslim thought, pragmatism and logical positivism, we have given continues signals in each part they take place throughout our research. Including many divergences, especially in the matter of metaphysical

facts, critics, in the third chapter as well as in the second part of the third chapter, were necessary characters to be referred to.

Unlike many studies of Muslim thinkers in the topic of truth, the critic, to prevail the last chapter, begins with a positive answer to western understanding of religious truth. In other words, while saying the positive, we mean the study which explores what the truth is in Muslim thought, rather than what is not. Moreover, our thesis is an attempt to illustrate the methodology to attain truth's understanding and verification process in Muslim thought, and the manner we can correct other philosophies inaccuracy.

ii. Review of Literature

Fortunately, theory of truth had gone through many studies from pragmatism, positivism and Muslim school of thought. All these schools discussed in detail major arguments of theory, but majority of these studies encompass at pro or anti arguments. And this is characterized as western type survey.

Muslims survey, by studding the topic of truth in both philosophies, presented in form of detailed research or present in form of articles, deals with theories main indication coming from founders of Pragmatism Positivism without forwarding analyses to discuss the methodological defects with other methodological solutions as is the case matter with philosophy of Descartes, Kant, Hegel and Marx.

The second dilemma of Muslim writings is the limitation of survey in the article type of work which cannot be as the scientific research. Among the articles written on the topic of truth are many, but some who have attracted my attention are as below:

- Muhamad Fathee Shentee, *Al-Marifah*, (Cairo: Daru al-Thakafah, 1981), where the author very briefly covers the topics main contents by forwarding pragmatics and positivist main founders, their arguments and raising some objection on the main definition of truth according to these two schools, but the book is not specified as the research on the truth.

- Andrey Smirnov, *Truth and Islamic Thought*, A Companion to World Philosophies, ed. E. Deutch and R. Bontekoe, Blackwell publishers, 1997, pp.437-447, is a scientific article where the author historically discusses the theory of truth among the classical school of thought. The article is an description more than analytical explanation of topic.

- The article by Abdurrahman Badawi in his book (*Al-Madkhal al-Jadid fi al-Falsafah*), where the author very briefly describes main western schools to contribute in the topic of Truth. However, the work of scholar does not prove to be specified study of Truth as it is written in few pages to leave the open opportunity for more detailed studies in future.

- Brooke Noel Moore and Kenneth Bruder , *Philosophy The Power of Ideas* (USA: Mcgraw Hill, 2002). The book is the complexity of philosophical theories according to the historical arrangement. Here, the pragmatic and positivism theory of truth occupies important place but the authors escape from the detailed arguments as the text is not specified to the theory of truth.

- Donald Davidson, *Truth Rehabilitated*, this essay examines the scepticism about the concept of truth in the past century. It argues that although correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, and epistemic theories of truth are all failures, this does not mean that the concept of truth can be dismissed as a useless concept. In fact, the concept of truth plays a key role in understanding the world and the minds of agents.

- Denton Loring Geyer, *The Pragmatic Theory of Truth as developed by Pierce, James, and Dewey*, (Theses for the degree of Phd, 1914). Theses attempts to explore the general meaning of truth in Pragmatism according to these three scholars, but as the topic is written in very early age where the pragmatic was still in the development process, the author could not include the latest development of topic. Beside, the topic detects more the divergences between these philosopher than standing to explain what the truth is in pragmatism theory and the manner it is formed or verified.

In addition, though claimed that the theory contains nothing new within, I still believe that the Muslims have left a lot with them to show the humanity the real meaning of truth, and the best way to realize it is by writing only.

iii. Methodology of Research

Methodology to be applied in my research paper is constituted from three main parts:

- **Descriptive:** the descriptive part of topic throughout the theses is an attempt to elaborate all viewpoints of these three schools of thought in the topic of truth. While working in the descriptive process we intend to stand more at the exactness of transmitting the data according to original resources, in accordance with general elements related to the beginning of the theory, its founders and the current condition.
- **Analytical:** the analytical part, which forms a very sensitive part of our theses, is a major element which will explore the majority of third chapter, and most of the fourth. Unlike many attempts and research paper written about the truth in Muslim thought, our theses will attempt to explore what the truth is, in Muslim thought, rather than what it is not. Thus, in order to analyze the manner truth is obtained from Muslim thought, we will have to go through many logic and language details. In addition, with the analytical analyses, in last two chapters, related to Muslim understanding of truth, we will employ different analyses to examine the correctness or defects of pragmatic and logical positivist school of thought.
- **Critical:** It is the main and most significant part of our research to emphasize on illuminating and correcting the inaccurate and perplexities of pragmatic and logical positivist theory. The critical elaboration will be supported with implementation of logic, language and detailed comprehension of topic from many classic and contemporary Muslim thinkers. As the topic is related to many logical and language terminologies, the critic will be enriched with same terminologies beside additional critic from our own comprehension of topic.

iv. Thesis Organization

Thesis is divided into three chapters and conclusion. Each chapter is divided into different section. And each section is interrelated to the followed section in rational relation.

Chapter I (THE NATURE OF TRUTH IN PRAGMATISM).

This chapter attempts to illustrate the main indications of Pragmatic school to the preliminary elements of truth foundation and its verification process. First Part of the first chapter, 1-Ideas in Pragmatic Thought- in order to clarify the meaning of ideas which is related to the subject of Truth has been divided into two sections, **a)** Ideas Formation in Pragmatism **b)** Types of Ideas in Pragmatism. Both section demonstrate in detail the manner ideas are formed and their types. Second part of first chapter, 2- Factors and elements of ideas verification and their relation to truth and false-indicates to explore the essentiality of the topic of truth which begins with the verification elements.

The verification elements of Truth in Pragmatism are organized according to the main characters highlighted in the Pragmatism theory, which starts with: **a)** Humanism and Experience, **b)** Workability and Expedience, **c)** Belief and Satisfactory Feeling. And **d)** Truth and False and their Relation to Ideas Verification, which attempts to clarify once again the relation of truth as a subject with the verification elements of truth.

The chapter is concluded with a conclusion which highlights the main points of topic and concludes the results achieved from the ends of subjecet of truth in Pragmatism theory.

Chapter II (THE NATURE OF TRUTH IN LOGICAL POSITIVISM).

Similar to the first chapter it attempts to explore topic of truth from the well know empiricism school of thought, logical positivism. Being essentially significant to understand the topic of Truth, the first part 1-Ideas and Truth in Logical Positivism Thought- is divided into the two parts **a)** Ideas Formation in Positivism and **b)** Types of Ideas in Positivism.

The second part, 2-Factors and elements of ideas verification and their relation to truth and false, related to the verfication process in Logical Positivism point of view, begin with: **a)** Meaning and its Statement, **b)** Semantic and Modal Logic Truths. After the verification of meaning with language mechanism, logical positivism forwards the third element **c)** External and Empirical Facts. The last section, **d)** Truth and False and their Relation to Ideas Verification, will demonstrate the position of Truth between these factors.

The chapter is concluded with a conclusion which will highlight the main points of the topic and at mean time the results achieved from Truth understanding and comprehension in Logical Positivism.

Chapter III. (The Nature of Truth in Muslim Philosophy: A Critical Study of Pragmatism and Logical Positivism).

Is an attempt to explore a general manner of Muslim thought comprehension of Truth. The first part, 1- Ideas and Truth in Muslim Thought- is divided into: **a)** Ideas Formation in Muslim Thought, **b)** Types of ideas.

The second part, 2 -Factors and elements of ideas verification and their relation to truth and false in Muslim Thought- is an attempt to present the manner Muslim thought understands the ideas and their verification characters.

Muslim thought verification process starts with **a)** Reason. With the elaboration of the reason, in the second part, it will be included **b)** Language, semantics and their profundity in Muslim thought. This part particularly attempts to explain the importance of language and semantic in Muslim thought. This part also includes: **i.** Types of Meanings, **ii.** The definition. Both characters explain enough the importance of the language in Muslim thought. **c)** Truth and False and their Relation to Ideas Verification: once again will reconfirm the main segments to form the understanding of Truth in Muslim thought and will attempt to highlight similarities and dissimilarities with two previous philosophies.

The third part, 3-Analyses and Critics- will endeavor to give a broad picture of analyses and critics of the Pragmatism and Logical Positivism. This section has been divided into three part and conclusion: **a)** Meanings Formation and Their

Relation to Reality and Ideas, b) The Metaphysical Meanings and c) Meaning and Verification Process in Logical Positivism.

Thesis is concluded with: Conclusion, Table of Contents and Bibliography.

Introduction

It is not necessary to posses an extraordinary skill to be able to understand the major reason of human thought divergence and discrepancy. With a very short glimpse is enough to understand that human divergences initiate while attempting to make something right. As the ideas and thought are the first thing man starts and attempts to make it right, from here exactly began to argue the matter of truth and its accomplishment. Thus, if the subject of truth starts with the discussion of ideas, automatically, it will be part of the well known topic of philosophy, known as epistemology. Not this merely, but epistemology is a general word to describe the manner man know things, the manner it discusses and way he transmits them to others. However, while we discuss about the truth,[2] it appears to be as a mind mechanism to bring man ideas into the laboratory of evaluation and verification process. In other words, if the subject of epistemology deals in selection of ideas, truth deals with their verification. Hence, truth, in very technical definition, is a scanning department where ideas go through for their verification process. If the idea is verified according to the mechanism of truth laboratory, the idea is considered as true, and if it fails the idea is considered as false.

It was an easy task to understand what epistemology is and what truth does, but who arranges the truth functioning system and in what approach is it done? As the matter of fact, as everything needs a cause in this world, the truth process also requires an arranger or manager of its mechanism. So, the mechanism of truth functioning is man's reasoning. Nevertheless, we mentioned in the begining that human thought while seeking the right thing or right reasoning they differentiate. If the ideas differ, and if truth mechanism system is formed from the ideas, means that truth system can hold opposing views. Therefore, how can they arrange the truth mechanism function in one perfective manner? Did this really occur? If truth is the verification mechanism exempted from any false idea, how is possible to be another form of mechanism with what we cannot attain a truth, rather we are

[2] The truth here is mentioned as a process not as terminology. However, different definitions of truth will be given according to every philosophical school of thought discussed within the thesis.

receiving perplexities and additional differentiations? Where we have to look for as a solution and how can we solve this matter?

As the matter of fact, the straight answer to all this questions is not an easy task, as the answer here means a solution. But while looking into the track of philosophy schools development, humanity cannot achieve the ideal truth to bring all man together in harmony. Thus, the latest philosophies of modern thought considered that solution to the matter of truth arrived with the raise of science and technological development. According to these philosophies, science succeeded to bring peace of mind to humans, and only the results from it might be considered as true. What is the science? And did the science touch every corner of epistemology, or give solution to every idea of human being? No.

The nature of science was not to converse the ideas and the manner they collaborate with each other, but it was there to study the seen and the manner it functions. Is the human being only the seen? Doubtless, the human is not only the seen, but is a more complex creature, capable of coping the seen with his sense, elaborating with reason and assemble and talk about things which are not comprehended with sense.

Therefore, the science is man's discovery to offer a particular solution. In other words, man constructed the science to easy recognize the reality around him and him as well.

However, to the large extent, science succeed to study human, confirm their ability to cognize and corroborate with the reality, as well as bring laws and hypotheses upon other occasions which are still not seen. Surely, in the objective world, science also succeeded to overcome most of the idealistic and sophistic notions, but it was not supposed to go for metaphysical meaning as they are beyond the science capacity.

In this regard, being unable to continue its journey, the science had to be defined as: the mechanism study of the objective world which does not recognize anything behind the seen. Alternatively, from the science perspective, everything behind the reality has to be defined as theories which are neither true nor false.

The inability of science to cover man completely is a failure for science. However, it is considered as a failure according to those who believe on the metaphysical values and standards but not from materialistic philosophical schools who maintained every part of their thinking at the institution of science. This confidence and trust at the applied methodologies of science, led many thinkers of nineteenth and twentieth century to believe that the ontological facts are real, and scientific methodologies are the trustiest form of human thinking.

On the other hand, the contemporary philosophical thought led us to raise the voice of truth and reaffirm that science represents one part of truth, and the other should be left to religion, as will be seen throughout the thesis.

Chapter One

The Nature of Truth in Pragmatism

I. Ideas in Pragmatic Thought

Introduction

Truth, reality, working of ideas, satisfaction, belief, and other similar conceptions are not unfamiliar for the student of philosophy. The realm of these conceptions speaks volumes and contributes richly to the formation of deep meanings and thoughtful discussions. But their meanings —simple and ordinary at the first look— deal with the most magnificent subject of human thought, namely: truth. Not out of sudden the truth gained a prominent place in modern philosophy. Achievements of modern science and their threat to classic ideas on one hand, and the effort of classic philosophy trying to safe its values under the name of absolutism and rationalism on the other, harassed the roots of truth and its destiny in the coming period.

With the raise of organized science discoveries the line of disputes and divergence between classic advocates and new pioneers of science and modern thought became more obvious. Thus, modern thought reaffirmed that rationalism and absolutism by keeping human thought in the illusions, under control of his blind ego and inexperienced thoughts were as threats to the advancement of human thought[1].

From this approach, modern philosophies questioned the possibility of true and correct cognition of man. And from here, the topic of truth became the step or measurement for further advancement and improvement of subject of epistemology.

Despite being considered as an ordinary-in meaning-and not oblige any important discussion, the subject of truth have explored many discussions in each and every school. And from here, by attempting to represent and solve the subject of truth, the question on the meaning of truth may still perplex many ordinary minds. Is it sufficient to relay on the ordinary evaluation of truth, the way many

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[1] See: F. C. S. Schiller, "Empiricism and the Absolute" in *Mind*, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 55. (Jul., 1905), pp. 348-351.

people want to understand? Yes, it might be for those who look at a universe as an ordinary mechanism, but not for those who observe it as a complexity full of facts and realities. From this perspective, the question of truth enlarged tremendously in the study of philosophy greatly that it came to be a part of many surveys and developed different feature and names like, truth of ideas, truth of belief, truth of reality etc.

After all, philosophical schools conducted many efforts to prescribe the verification mechanism and out of what truth verification procedure is consisted. And particularly, the process of truth verification and the elements to form it came to be the only significant, or the only element for the divergence of many philosophical schools among them.

Considering the truth as the essence and target of philosophy schools, pragmatism-the materialistic philosophy of nineteenth-twentieth century-conducted many efforts in the subject. Thus, in this chapter we are to elaborate the manner idea is formed in pragmatism thought, the manner it is considered true and by what method or procedure it's verification process proceeds in order to assemble the truth, and why is it so.

a) Ideas Formation in Pragmatism

Philosophy schools emphasize constantly that human knowledge is framed by two main factors, known as subjective and objective.[2] The objective factor is not what pragmatist is concerned as it is considered the world of sensation, intrinsic and the world of common sense and is mostly agreed on it as *prima facie*. Moreover, what pragmatism is concerned with, in this regard, is the subjectivity and the manner it functions in the formation of ideas or thoughts.[3] Thus, from the

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[2] See: F. C. S. Schiller, "Empiricism and the Absolute," p. 348.

[3] But as a word, feeling is more general and most agree to use it as such in order to avoid disputes. See: William James, *The meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism,'* (London, New York, Bombay and Calcutta: Longmans, Green and Co, 1909); In John Dewey's beliefs and realities word 'feeling' is replaced with *Thinking Desire*, but which shares the same meaning with word feeling in James terminology: "Desire is but the self-consciousness of defect striving to its own termination in

subjectivity point of view, pragmatism attempts to elaborate the manner in which cognition[4] emerges, the elements it contains and repercussion it implies.[5] Moreover, considering the pragmatism as the materialistic philosophy, the word subjectivity may contradict their materialistic principle. Obviously, as pragmatism asserts, the subjectivity is not related to any fact which is independent of any relation, but it is the preliminary nature of human cognition which is known as the process of *feeling* or the sate of consciousness.[6]

If the word *feeling*-which characterizes the objectivity in pragmatist thought-has a comprehensible meaning, it raises many divergence and disputes among other scholars and critics. Because, the word *feeling* includes not only what is known objectively-as pragmatism asserts-but also what is known transcendentally. Moreover, pragmatism specifies that use of the word *feeling* is not related to reality or object but it is a bare and natural meaning related to the very first consciousness of human being.[7]

Is it possible to imagine thought or cognition detached from the object? In other words, is it possible for human being to feel or learn something out of the universe or existence?[8] "For him to know there must be something to be known,"[9] is what James answers.

The idea Q for instance- whatever it is- might be for someone an empty feeling, but as it exists somewhere it must be connected to a particular thing or

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perfect possession, through perfect knowledge of perfect being," John Dewey, "Beliefs and Realities," *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 15, No. 2, (Mar, 1906), p. 119.

[4] See: "Cognition is a function of consciousness," James, *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 1.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., p. 2: See: Charles S. Pierce, What Is a Sign, *Written: 1894* < http://www.iupui.edu> Retrieved on: January. 2008.

[7] See:James, *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 2. "In short our inquiry is a chapter in descriptive psychology,- hardly anything more," Ibid., p. 3.

[8] "Through out the history of philosophy the subject and its object have been treated as absolutely discontinuous entities; and thereupon the presence of the latter to the former, or the apprehension by the former of the latter, has assumed a paradoxical character which all sorts of theories had to be invented to overcome", William James, A World of Pure Experience, First published in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1, 533-543, 561-570, p. 5.

[9] James, The meaning of Truth, p. 5: "The pathway, the tendency, the corroborating or contradicting progress, need not in every case be experienced in full, but I don't see, if the universe doesn't contain them among its possibilities of furniture, what *logical material for defining* the trueness of my idea is left", Ibid., p. 173.

being, as our feeling recognizes it and gives it presence in our thought. Otherwise, the *feeling* cannot be considered an idea, instead would be a dream or illusions and false [10](segment to be evaluated in coming part). As a practical example of the feeling functioning process, pragmatism mentions the imagination of different colors on our mind. The colors, for pragmatism understanding, are attributes and subjective matters whose conception lays in its conceived facts and it could not make any sense if they are not brought in reality or existing facts.[11] Likewise, pragmatism makes reality as our warrant for calling a feeling as cognition. But what becomes our warrant for calling anything reality[12], or make *feeling* as the proper tool of cognition?

Despite proceeding with idealistic expressions as *feeling* and meanings, pragmatism while believing that "the faith of the *present critic* or *inquirer* only can be warrant for reality", once again turns to real materialistic manner of thinking.

> And whatever he contemplates to be a reality and regard like it, he must admit the feeling to be truly cognitive, though the realities of this year might be the illusions of the next.[13]

Simplier, the feeling is true if the person sees as such and contemplates it, though admitting the liability to err. From here, the second question would have helped us to delve into a great detail of how feeling can outline for us the reality?

As an introduction James asserts that those who call for transcendental or idealistic knowledge only, in this case, there cannot be any consciousness. And the perception detached from all factual relations, or as he asserts "left out of the heap-we call mind-and being out of all relation, the idea has no qualities, is simply

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[10] Ibid., p. 6: "Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself. It is absurd to say that thought has any meaning unrelated to its only function", Charles S. Pierce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", Popular Science, Monthly 12 (January 1878), pp.286-302, p. 6.

[11] See: Pierce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", pp. 6-7: Pierce, "What Is a Sign", p, 4.

[12] See:James, The meaning of Truth, p. 6: "By realities or object here we mean either things of common sense, sensibly present, or else common sense relations, such dates, places, distances, kinds, activities", Ibid., p. 79.

[13] Ibid., p. 6.

nothing".[14] Thus, the function of *feeling* here is accidental synthetic, not analytic, and falls outside not inside its beings. Or, it is the door to the cognition, "and through what we approach and know reality". [15] Hence, it means that the *feeling* in pragmatism theory cannot make a discovery.

Coming to the question raised above, pragmatist understanding of *feeling* in above explanation is an approach which makes it contain characteristics different from what a realist thinks. In pragmatist comprehension, *feeling* is not source of knowledge but it is only the tool by which things are targeted and recognized. Feelings, pragmatists assert "are what God bestowed upon humans to know the reality and work with it"[16] as the feel of thirst that makes him discover oceans and rivers for example.[17] And what is most important, feeling makes him share same meanings and get the same results.[18] The function of feeling is described from James as:

> The feeling is like gun shots, if there is something to be felt or hit, they hit and know, but if there is nothing to be felt or hit they discharge themselves.[19]

Subsequently, it is like we only know what feeling offers to us. In other words, it is a kind of programmed system we target only what feeling knows as target. For pragmatist, *feeling*, however introduces and brings us into relation even with abstract meanings of different *eject realities*. It is a bridge for proper cognition

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[14] See:Ibid.,p. 10: "True knowing is, in fine, not substantially, in itself, or 'as such', inside of idea from the first, any more than mortality as such is inside of the man, or nourishment as such inside of the bread. Something else is there first that practically makes for knowing, dying or nourishing, as the case may be. That something is the 'nature' namely of the first term, be it idea, man, or bread, that operates to start the casual chain of processes which, when completed, is the complex fact to which we give whatever functional name fits to case", Ibid., p. 176: "The one thing that stands out is that thinking inquiry, and that knowledge as science is the outcome of systematically directed inquiry", John Dewey, "Beliefs and Realities", p. 122.

[15] See: James, The meaning of Truth, p. 16.

[16] See: Ibid., p. 3.

[17] See:Dewey, "Beliefs and Realities", p. 123.

[18] "The activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man escape the predestinate opinion", Pierce, "How To Make Our Ideas Clear", p. 11.

[19] James, The meaning of Truth, p. 17.

and true evaluation. The toothache (known as an eject reality, not seen in the reality) is known from every one even if it is someone else feeling, because we share the same *feeling* ground. At this stage, someone's toothache feeling is true feeling for him as it is for others, and we cannot turn blind to believe it.[20]

The confidence of Pragmatism in the feeling as an indispensable element of cognition goes on with other arguments and supportive elements as well. "All feeling is for the same action, all feeling result in action", says James.[21]

We gesture toward the same objects, and we act toward the same fire in the same way,[22] and only in this way we believe we are thinking alike. We see each other looking at the same object, pointing at them, and thereupon we hope and trust that all of our feelings resemble reality and resemble each other's feelings as well. But, for pragmatism, resemblance of each other feelings is a thing we can never be theoretically sure.[23]

However, pragmatism asserts that:

> Whatever the theories may ad or say, men who see each other's bodies, sharing the same space-earth- splashing same water, eating out of the same dish..., will never practically believe in a pluralism of solipsistic worlds.[24]

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Hitherto, the feeling was discussed as the first cause of cognition in the mediate relation with reality or the object. An additional picture, where *feeling* plays an important factor in the process of true cognition is when ideas or thoughts have a particular resemblance outside or object but cannot be recognized as true.

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[20] See: Ibid., p. 23: Ibid., p. 187-188.

[21] See: Ibid., p. 23: "Suppose that we say a man is prudent. Concretely, that means that he takes out insurance, hedges in betting, looks before he leaps. Do such acts constitute the prudence or are they man qua prudent? Or is the prudence something by itself and independent of them? As a constant habit in him, a permanent tone of character, it is convenient to call him prudent in abstraction from any one of his acts, prudent in general and without specification, and to say the acts follow from the preexisting prudence. There are peculiarities in his psycho-physical system that make him act prudently; and there are tendencies to association in our thoughts that prompt some of them to make for truth and for error. But would the man be prudent in the absence of each and all of the acts? Or would the thoughts be true if they had no associative or impulsive tendencies?) , Ibid., p. 149-150: Pierce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", p .4-5.

[22] See:James, The meaning of Truth, p. 24-25.

[23] See:Ibid.

[24] Ibid., p. 26.

And those ideas conquer wide locus in our thoughts, as ideas related to dreams and illusions. Do the ideas related to dreams and illusions have to be considered as objective ideas, according to pragmatist example of Q, mentioned above? In here we are discussing about an idea which has resemblance outwardly, but it can have many different resemblances. In other words, the idea is cognized from feeling and is related to immediate facts, but the object in particular is not clear. How can we acknowledge that the felt idea here is real and true, or it is only fiction, desire or illusion? And in what manner we can bring it to the level of considering it as true or to the level of common knowing or common conginition which targets only the reality and utter common sense.

The personality of Ivanhoe in Walter Scots novel story (an imaginatory figure in a book), for example, makes the reader to wander what personality the writer meant in particular, in the objective world. Here James asserts that, the stories or fictions are not pure story, and these types of acquaintance have "the dynamic relations with the world common of all readers".[25]

In order to upgrade this idea to the level of true and accepted idea, the pragmatist suggest to bring the picture of Ivanhoe form the story and ask what author meant by it. Meanwhile, there should be an attempt to find a resemblance outside in the world of reality and refer to same reality. As the result of the upgrading idea from the imaginative part to the factual and practical, James asserts that:

> "In case the feeling resemble reality but doesn't operate it's a dream, but if operates without resemblance it's an error"[26]

Thus, with this explanation pragmatist failed to answer how every idea, as Q for example, is related to some existing thing as we can know or feel it. But they gave a very good explanation by classifying some type of ideas as imaginative, illusion or error. Moreover, for pragmatism, conditioning that every idea we have in our mind-whether it is an objective idea or feeling idea, like the toothache or the

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[25] James, The Meaning of Truth, p. 27.
[26] Ibid., p. 28.

picture of Ivanhoe in the novel, or any dream- have to be related to reality, is a very broad and tough presumption. And comprehension of this fact in this manner, form pragmatists, comes from the fact that man cannot know what does not exist in the objective world (the explanation of what will be given later on).

Hence, *feeling*, in pragmatist understanding, forms the world of ideas but it will not raise any reality or true cognition unless it is in touch with the world of sensation and perception, which pragmatist considers as the world where ideas are made true.[27] But, in order to understand the manner ideas are related to objective facts we owe a wider explanation to the question of what pragmatism means by *reality*, an element which particularly remains relevant, as this word can have different meanings. Subsequently, pragmatists claims to be more concerned with facts than theories. For, it defines reality as *the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed by all who investigate.*[28] "These realites are the mother earth, the anchorage, the stable rock, the first and last limits, they are terminus quo".[29]

For Pragmatist, Newton saw the handiwork of God in the Heavens as the Paley saw it in the kingdom of animals, there were no image connected with the words of heavens or handiwork or God, they were words merely,[30] this is all mind-stuff. But how these merely words or mind stuff can get us to the reality and give us true feeling and guarantee common cognition. In other words, how can someone be sure of getting right what Newton or Paley meant by their world? The answer to it goes back to the very beginning and devoted principle of *sensation* and *sensational* perception which leads the pragmatist believe that his thought, Newton's or Paley's, and all others clashes or agrees all together.

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[27] "I myself have grown accustomed to the words 'percept' and 'concept' in treating of the contrast but concepts flow out of percepts and into them again. They are so interrelated, and our life rests on them so interchangeably and indiscriminatingly, that is often difficult to impart quickly to beginners a clear notion of the difference meant", William James, Some Problem of Philosophy, "*A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy*, (New York: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1968), p. 47.

[28] "...is what we mean by truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality), Pierce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", p. 11.

[29] James, The Meaning of Truth, p. 39.

[30] Ibid., p. 34.

The pragmatist attempt to demonstrate each and every part of two people world and find resemblance within and out of their worlds because"...*we believe our percepts are possessed by us in common*".[31] And pragmatists believe the percepts being possessed as a common notion because the percepts of everyone seem to be changed in consequence of changes in the percepts of someone else.[32] There cannot be a discussion about others feeling, unless there is something in common to share and talk about, and our percepts are the best to ensure that feeling proceeds in common.

However, this is how the *feeling* is known to be an accurate function in the formation of ideas, insure the proper cognition and work as the common cognition in the first chapter of pragmatism epistemology. In addition, this is how the world of ideas is crystallized to the level of true knowledge and lead toward the truth which contains within multiply functions of different realities.

Hence, pragmatist explained the relation of feeling, as the factor in the formation of ideas, with objective immediate ideas and objective non-immediate ideas as the toothache or the picture of Ivanhoe in the novel.

The *third* picture of feeling functionality is its relation with abstract realities- different from eject realities elaborated above- which are possible of verification but away of our present cognition. From here, the relation between reality and feeling has created different system of evaluation for different schools of thought. In addition, their relation to one another and the question of which is the cause of other was the main reason to split between the pragmatists and others. And for some the relation between these two was question mark if any one of them is related at all to the other, as we find it present in some extreme schools like idealistic, solipsistic or materialistic. Moreover, calling *abstract realties* as a *reality* led pragmatists to reconsider their approach on the meaning of reality and the relation between it and feeling.[33] Thus, considering the reality as the concept to

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[31] See: Ibid., p. 36.
[32] See: Ibid., p. 37.
[33] See: Pierce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", pp. 14-15.

include the present and absent, as idealist agreed on, was not an easy task for the empirical radicalism of pragmatists. In order to solve this confusion, pragmatists have approached the subject by stressing on the first causes of knowledge as a key solution to this problem.

Pragmatists assert that, there are two ways of knowing things, 1) knowing immediately or intuitively and 2) knowing them conceptually or representatively.[34] From here, knowing things before our eyes is categorized under the intuitively knowledge, and this is mainly how we know. But knowing the tigers now in India for example or the scholastic system of philosophy[35] is categorized as the representatively or symbolically, or as mentioned above the abstract knowledge. In other words, pragmatist claims that the absence of realities from our eyes or feeling makes the reality abstract. Subsequently, as mentioned above, the perplexed question discussed here is the possibility of attaining cognition confidently from abstract realities and in what manner that idea can be considered as the proper and objective idea. Also a great mystery made here is the manner we can place the presence in absence.[36]

The rectilinear argument on this issue, for pragmatist empiricism, is quite vague. For the fact that the object is not seen (tigers in India for example), and as such leaves the possibility of knowing things out of reality or object. This annihilates the very basic principle of empirical realism of pragmatism, and opens a door to mystery and metaphysics. In reply to this, pragmatists advocate that, "knowing tigers in India have nothing to do with the world of inner mystery".[37] And to know an object here is to lead to it through a context which the world supplies. This means that knowing events of facts away of presence limitation is not an idealistic idea but it is the *reality* itself. Thus, tigers even not being seen immediately still makes us define them as different from other animals, because in this information it is reality which supplies us and not an imagination. But in order

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[34] See: James, The meaning of Truth, p. 43.
[35] See: Ibid., p. 43.
[36] See: Ibid., p. 44.
[37] See: Ibid.

to be confident about the abstract ideas obtained right, beside the objective facts which were a primary part for ideas formation and confirmation, pragmatists conditions *experiencer mental history*.[38] As per *experiencer mental history*, these are known as the ideas experienced and narrated to us from others direct experience, and in this type there should not be any divergence, as this is the process everyone should relay on. Beside, pragmatist assert that there could not be possible having a genuine present if the past is inaccurate, (here we are discussing the real facts or objects which fall under the abstract type of ideas transmitted to us in form of narrations).

However, factors of knowledge, in pragmatist theory are limited into two characters, feeling and reality. And pragmatist concludes that in order to obtain an idea, the cognition should be attributed or qualified as existence, coming from the experiencer mental history or his objective facts. In addition, though the object of the final opinion depends on what opinion is, "yet what that opinion is does not depend on what you, I, or any man thinks".[39]

As a conclusion, the idea formation in pragmatism theory is a complexity of ideas compatible to reality, in its wide meaning, in association with other dynamics within the universe of existence, be they abstract, present or actual.[40]

b) Types of Ideas in Pragmatism

The general structure of theory, according to pragmatism, emphasizes on the significance of declaring that the cognition or knowledge has outset origins and

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[38] "How is the world made different for me by my conceiving an opinion of mine under the concept 'true'? First, an object must be findable there (or sure signs of such an object must be found) which shall agree with the opinion. Second, such an opinion must not be contradicted by anything of which I am aware", Ibid., p. 275.

[39] Pierce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", p. 14.

[40] "...for, if truth and knowledge are terms correlative and interdependent, as I maintain they are, then wherever knowledge is conceivable truth is conceivable, wherever knowledge is possible truth is possible, wherever knowledge is actual truth is actual", James, The meaning of Truth, p. 296: "Our ideas must agree with realities, be such realities concrete or abstract, be they facts or principles, under penalty of endless inconsistency and frustration", James, William. *Pragmatism's Conception of Truth.* Lecture 6 in Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking, (New York: Longman Green and CO, 1907), pp, 76-91, p. 81.

those outset origins are the only providers in our thoughts.[41] In other words, the ideas are the mere reflection of the outside existence within us.[42] Thoughts or ideas continue clashing with reality till they get self-sufficient to cause the formation of new ideas or thoughts.[43] As the ideas develop and continue to corroborate with an earlier one the *idea felt* is formed. What is the *idea felt*, and what is its status in pragmatism? In fact, *idea felt*, being formed from the direct reflection of reality appears to be a true knowledge or true cognition. From here, pragmatists have put lots of efforts to prescribe the nature of *idea felt* and the difference between it and genuine or true cognizant thoughts.[44] A very ordinary explanation to it is that, in case the idea is disconnected from the reality there can be no pretence of knowing. Thus, in pragmatism understanding, the *idea felt* represents the reality or the true cognition only if it represents reality or objective world. The reason why turns to the very fact that the knowledge of sensible relation, in pragmatism thought, comes to life, or into the appearance only inside the tissue of experience. And these experienced ideas are the only credited and validated ideas. In other words, knowledge or ideas of sensible relation is *made* up of relations that unroll in time, is what pragmatists claim.[45] This means that pragmatism does not accept any

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[41] "Have we not explained that conceptual knowledge is made such wholly by the existence of things that fall outside of the knowing experience itself -by intermediary experience and by a terminus that fulfils? Can the knowledge be there before these elements that constitute its being have come? And, if knowledge be not there, how can objective reference occur?" See: James, "A World of Pure Experience", p. 9.

[42] Under the subheading of pragmatist account of truth, James argues that "ideas are so much flat psychological surface unless some mirrored matter gives them cognitive lustre. This is why as a pragmatist I have so carefully posited 'reality' ab initio, and why, throughout my whole discussion, I remain an epistemological realist", James, The Meaning of Truth, p. 195: "the idea itself, if it exists at all, is also a concrete event: so pragmatism insist that truth in the singular is only a collective name for the truths in the plural these consisting always of series of definite events; and that what intellectualism calls the truth, inherent truth, of any one such series is only the abstract name for its truthfulness in act, for the act the ideas there dolead to the supposed reality in a way that we consider satisfactory" Ibid., p. 202.

[43] See: Ibid., p. 106: James, "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth", p. 77, Ibid., pp. 76-91.

[44] "The key to this difficulty lies in the distinction between knowing as in transit and on its way", William James, A world of Pure Experience: First published in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1, 533-543, 561-570, p. 9.

[45] See: James, The meaning of Truth, p. 106: Ibid., p. 138: Ibid., pp. 269-270.

intuition or non-experienced ideas. And the *ideas felt* seemed to be formed from the mere abstract relations are another reflection of the reality or objective world.

From the objective procedure of ideas formation, ideas in pragmatist theory are divided into two types, 1) ideas *knower* and 2) ideas *known*. Both terms demonstrate almost the same meaning as their source is reality and objective cognition, except the difference they have in time.

The *knower* is defined as: ideas existing within us from the reflection of the outside world but which are in a kind of ambiguity, waiting to be verified or experienced. In other words, in my understanding, the ideas *knower* are nearer to represent the immediate *ideas felt*, mentioned above. While the ideas *known* are: the finale stage or (*terminuses*) which operates through the intermediaries and direct experience from where the idea is granted as verified and true.[46]

This evaluation of the idea felt, with both types, one waiting to be verified and the other verified, evidently is the opposite of the *transcendentalism* or *intellectualism* theory which declares the possibility of inner knowledge and which gives the mind the ability of clarity by a self- transcending leap.[47] From these point of view, *transcendentalism* or *intellectualism* attempted to divide the *known* and *knower* in two different concepts,[48] calling the *knower* (the inner idea) as the knowledge source and the *known* as the knowledge support. However, intellectualist or transcendentalist classification is insignificant for the radical empiricism of pragmatism.[49] For pragmatism, idea formation is the process which

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[46] See: Ibid., p. 106: Ibid., p. 126-127: "Without such intermediating portions of concretely real experience the pragmatist sees no materials out of which the adaptive relation called truth can be build up", Ibid., p. 238.

[47] See: Ibid., p. 102.

[48] "Intellectualist persuasion, is that to know a reality, an idea must in some inscrutable fashion possess or be it. For Pragmatism this kind of coalescence is inessential", Ibid., p. 212- 213:
"Our Pragmatist view, on the contrary is that truth relation is a definitely experienceable relation, and therefore describable as well as namable; that it is not unique in kind, and neither invariable nor universal", Ibid., p. 233.

goes through experience or intermediary relations only. Only through that system the idea is created and through it is again verified.[50]

Therefore, the idea *known* (after verification), or terminus after the verification process, substitutes the idea *knower or transaction*. Moreover, the verified and experienced ideas form an inclusive apprehension and proper knowledge are called as the ideas true.[51] Apparently, pragmatist credits the idea *knower* as unattainable through any actual or *direct verification* in their terminus.

On the other hand, idea known, being at more considerable condition among other schools, made pragmatism emphasize more on the ideas *know* (the verified ideas) than ideas *knower*. In this regard, pragmatists asserts that ideas *knower* are created in form of imaginative thinking to target the symbols or signs[52] out of present time and place. These imaginative ideas or the *ideas knower*- though being formed as the reflection of the objective world- yet create sort of difficulties as under what types should be categorized, true or false. How these ideas are processed and upraised to the level of true and verified ideas in accordance with pragmatism conditions? As pragmatism cannot desert objective thinking they have to get back there to find resemblance and here James firmly claims that:

> Most thought paths, it is true, are substitutes for nothing actual, they end outside the real world altogether, in wayward fancies, utopias, fictions, or mistakes. But when they do reenter reality and terminate therein, we substitute them always, and with these substitutes we pass the greater number of hours.[53]

As the results of the substitution of idea with reality is attained the verified and experienced idea. In this manner the substituted idea assists the process of

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[50] See: Ibid., p. 107: "True in the mystical mongrel sense of an identitasphilosophie they need not be; nor is there any intelligible reason why they ever need be true otherwise than verifiably and practically", Ibid., p. 214.

[51] See: Ibid., p. 112: "Knowledge of sensible realities thus comes to life inside the tissue of experience. It is made; and made by relations that unroll themselves in time. Whenever certain intermediaries are given, such that, as they develop towards their terminus, there is experience from point to point of one direction followed, and finally of one process fulfilled, the result is that their starting point thereby becomes a knower and their terminus and object meant or known", James, A World of Pure Experience, p. 6.

[52] See: Pierce, "*What Is a Sign*".

[53] James, The meaning of Truth, p. 113.

continuity by what is returned again to imply it as the experience for other ideas circled on the other paths but having in common the same direction.[54] The verified and experienced idea is considered as the hypotheses or a verified theory for the verification of other ideas to run in the same path.

> As matter of fact and In general way the paths that run through conceptual experiences, that is, through thoughts or ideas that know the things in which they terminate, are highly advantageous paths to follow. Not only do they yield inconceivably rapid transition, but owing to the universal character they frequently possess and to their capacity for association with one another in great system.[55]

In addition, the idea *knower*, is a step to the expectance of ideas which are part of reality but not under immediate experience, like mortality for instance which is known virtually before it is certified to be actually known.[56] These kinds of ideas initially develop the conciseness of sustaining the support, valuability and consideration of other thoughts to come which share the same terminus. In this system, pragmatist believe to built the pass out by moving next to next in many directions and yet being in the same path.[57]

In concluding, very precisely, both mentioned types of ideas, start with the first contact with reality and in their development process they are verified from the same source. Though unable to have facts always in stock to verify each idea, pragmatist cannot avoid from their empiricism theory at any coast by making the reality the only source and the only target where ideas are brought to exist.

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[54] James, The meaning of Truth, pp. 111-112: "Surely for understanding what the word 'true 'means as applied to a statement, the mention of such workings is indispensable. Surely if we leave them out the subject and the object of the cognitive relation float-in the same universe, its true, but vaguely and ignorantly and without mutual contact or mediation), Ibid., p. 219: "We relate one abstract ideas with another, framing in the end great systems of logical and mathematical truth, under the respective terms of which the sensible facts of experience eventually arrange themselves, so that our eternal truths hold good realities also", James, A new name for some old ways of thinking, p. 81: William James, A World of Pure Experience, p. 5.

[55] James, The meaning of Truth, pp. 112,113: "Why should we not equally trust the truth of our ideas? We live on credit everywhere; and we use our ideas far oftener for calling up things connected with their immediate objects, than for calling up those themselves), Ibid., p. 164.

[56] Ibid., p. 115.

[57] Ibid., p. 112.

II. Factors and elements of ideas verification and their relation to truth and false

Introduction

While discussing the formation and the types of ideas, necessarily we have mentioned the verification process as the form or process which makes the types of ideas appearance more obvious. But the obviousity of types of ideas is not sufficient to explain the significance of the verification process. In contrary, the verification process is more complicated than considering the idea to be true if it reflects in the reality or objective world. Thus, pragmatist school of thought, as well as other schools, while considering ideas as verified, and true or false had to face real challenges. From this point of view, predominantly, we may observe the difference of pragmatism and other empiricist school of thought, which primarily looks similar, but in this part they fall apart to follow different paths. What is the verification process and in what method pragmatism considers idea as verified? Or what tools are implemented in the verification process? The answer to all this questions will be explored in the coming section.

a) Humanism and Experience

The notion of humanism, used in pragmatism theory as the verification tool, is not a new term to come with pragmatists, but is a well known philosophical terminology which assembles somehow a philosophy school. But what did the pragmatists proposed by humanism while using it as the verification tool?

Humanism, for pragmatism, is in fact more like one of those secular changes that come upon public opinion over night, like changes from aristocracy to democracy from classic to romantic.[58] Moreover, pragmatist presents the humanism as the wind directed by a *human being*. It is a property possessed by humans mentally and physically, according to the *facts* and their *causes*, and results

[58] See: Ibid., p. 54.

out of what are unquestionable. In a sense that, what human obtain as right or wrong, universally, with joint *facts*, it has to be accepted as such.[59]

How pragmatism came with such a conclusion?

Pragmatism believes that human assumed the anatomy of the world to be logical, and its logic is that of university professor. And up to about 1850 almost every one believed that science claimed truth were exact copies of a definite code of non human realities,[60] or known as the natural laws.

> But this believe has upset us nowadays with appearance of too many geometrics and many other logics and so many chemical and physical hypothesis. Which in one way or another show that even the truest theories are all human device and not a literal transcript has dawned upon us.[61]

Thus, the scientific hypothesis were understood as bare human theories, and scientific laws were treated as so much conceptual shorthand; true so far as they are useful but not farther,[62] or not in long terms. This type of elaboration of humanism and this uncertainty on the reliable scientific laws, as well as constant pressure of non-exactness of experience might work well for the intellectual progress.[63] But, the way out of this ambiguity, pragmatist suggest, was not to be tolerant of symbols, approximation, plasticity, as intellectualist suggest, but instead caring the reproduction, exactness, and rigorousness[64]as the assessment of ideas.[65] Despite these challenges, how humanism and experience together could protect the

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[59] "Pragmatist means men's opinion in the flesh, as they have really formed themselves, opinions surrounded by their causes and the influence they obey and exert, and along with the whole environment of social communication of which they are a part and out of which they take their rise), Ibid., p. 269.

[60] Ibid., p. 58.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid: "It is to be doubted whether any theorizer today, either in mathematics, logic, physics or biology, conceives himself to be literally re editing process of nature thoughts of God. The main forms of our thinking, the separation of subjects from predicates, the negative, hypothetic and disjunctive judgments, are purely human habits", Ibid., p. 60.

[63] See: F. C. S. Schiller, "Humanism, Intuitionism and Objective Reality", Mind, New Series, Vol. 18, No. 72 (Oct, 1909), pp. 570-575, p. 572.

[64] James, *The meaning of Truth*, p. 58.

[65] "Why should he assume that experience necessarily forms a whole before he has got it all together, that it forms a system before he has traced it out, that the system is perfect (in any but a verbal, intellectualist sense]before he has tried it)", F. C. S. Schiller, "*Empiricism and the Absolute*", p. 351.

empirical regiursness and exactness of thought and how it could handle and overcome the intellectualist progress of truth?

Truth will not be copying nature's laws, pragmatism asserts, but in order to bring clearer result it must collaborate with reality.[66] And in this manner only it can guarantee the continuity and thinking in liberated system, the way which cannot be stopped but possible to be controlled and organized properly.

It gave the impression as pragmatism was about to break deep frozen meaning and argument of wide understanding of humanism, its relation to reality and to the truth. But, the raised questions at the: collaborating, clearer, nature and the meaning of reality-terms that prove to be vague-send pragmatist back to the preliminary definitions of these terms. It sent them back because the truth, for pragmatism, "must bring clear thoughts, as well as clear way to action".[67] Thus, pragmatists suggest defining each of these notions according to the results and the consequences according to the *common sense* understanding, which they regard it as the foundation of humanism.[68] And here, it will observed that one way of understanding the humanism is understanding the common sense, the infrastructure of what is formed through the common action and joint understanding of values. On the other hand, *common sense*, though being a uncertain method for a final decisions, yet, for pragmatist is considered as a proper mechanism for ideas verification. Thus, beside knowing the results what the commons sense, and reality offers, the verification, for pragmatist, is a necessary step. In this regard, William James asserts that:

> To give theory plenty of rope and see if it hangs itself eventually is better tactics than to choke it off at the outset by abstract accusations of self contradiction.[69]

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[66] James, The meaning of Truth, p. 60: "It is assuming merely that the nature of things is revealed empirically in its behavior, and that therefore to understand it , we should do well to make the most extensive study of that behavior", F. C. S. Schiller, "*Empiricism and the Absolute*", p. 361

[67] See: James, *The meaning of Truth*, p. 60.

[68] See: Ibid., pp. 61-63.

[69] See: Ibid., p. 61.

In other words, despite the definite inaccurancy of the humanism or the common sense, pragmatism still consider as strictly suggested that the theory going through the process of verification and human experience is more accurate, than calling a theory true with presupposed judgments, and non-experienced laws, as some intellectualist practice. In addition, the experience is a way out of these abstract evaluations, because "experience is a process that continually gives us new material to digest".[70]

The devotion and strong feelings of pragmatists, and their deep trust in *common sense* and human intellectual abilities-as the source of true ideas and true solutions-later on develops by stressing that only present appearance of ideas and the manner the present experience explores them can assess the acknowledgment of something truly. But this does not mean to limit the truth only in current time or space, as the humanism and common sense, for pragmatism, is a reliable verification element.[71] What man have done in past in their discoveries is undeniable part of mans experience, it cannot be regretted, it is part of experience.[72] But, by limiting the truth in a current time and present experience, pragmatism means only taking the experience into consideration to obtain clearer and more reliable idea.[73] Substantially, pragmatism believe that any denial of any previous experience would lead to skepticism, which again will contradict the very elementary principle of pragmatism.

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[70] James, The meaning of Truth, p. 61:. "Experience, as we know, has ways of boiling over, and making us correct our present formulas", William James, A new name for some old ways of thinking, p. 85.

[71] "I have already insisted on the fact that truth is made largely out of previous truths", Ibid., See: F. C. S. Schiller, "*Empiricism and the Absolute*", p. 361.

[72] James, The meaning of Truth,"*Humanism and truth*", p. 62: "The overwhelming majority of our true ideas admit of no direct or face to face verification-those of past history, for example, as of Cain and Abel. The stream of time can be remounted only verbally, or verified indirectly by the present prolongations or effects of what the past harbored. Yet if they agree with these verbalities and effects, we can know that our ideas of the past are true, as true as past time itself was, so true was Julius Caesar, so true were antediluvian monsters, all in their proper dates and settings, that pat time itself was, is guaranteed by its coherence with everything that's present, true as the present is, the past was also), William James, A new name for some old ways of thinking, p. 82-85.

[73] James, The meaning of Truth, p. 63.

However, in its accessible form humanism represents experience in its pristine purity.[74] Relatively, pragmatist asserts that human being is the observer which looks for things to get attached with, for, he corresponds with anything he comes into relation as (things, demands, propositions), by coping, producing, not contradicting or creating relation. In this way he collaborates and cooperates with reality and things. If ideas is formed in this system, it cooperates with other ideas, and harmoniously prolong experience itself to lead toward the verified or true idea.[75]

Rapidly used, humanism and experience, in order to attain the manner they collaborate mutually, require one step more of explanation. If the experience and humanism are the basic elements for idea verification, the whereabouts or the present reality, being their acting foundation are still a perplexed matter. In other words, the common sense and humanism represents the ability to verify abstract realities, which, on the other hand, contradicts the radical empiricism of pragmatism. In this way the *whereabouts*, in pragmatism theory are brought to the level to include the present reality, seen or felt, and the abstract. Thus, pragmatism had to elaborate and illustrate this confusion with more constructive demonstration.

Hence, in order to avoid the solipsism to come out of the rejection of common sense, they had to accept *whereabouts* as something to represent both worlds, that of direct experience and outside of it. Pragmatist asserts that, the common sense or humanism, though seem to shift us toward abstract evaluations which are outside of present thought, humanism does not take them outside of experience.

> And reality taken as experience, its determinations for us are in any case adjectives which our acts or judging fit to it.[76]

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[74] See: Ibid., p. 64.
[75] See: Ibid., p. 67.
[76] See: Ibid., p. 68.

In other words, for pragmatist, the reality taken as the experience cannot be detached from its continuous character, which includes present and past. But in James understanding, it is an adjective to exist which our acts come to fit to it.

Obviously, humanism, in the verification process, obliges direct analyses through the door or experience, as it obliges the search of hearts and minds by forcing and applying analyses and making them as the order of the day, while altering as little as possible the old.[77] Thus, humanism is considered as the experimentally verified, and facts of what are in connection with reality. On the other hand, the humanism is considered as a natural force or push which man is powerless[78] toward it, as it drives the belief toward the particular direction, giving always impression that the truth is what is lived or experienced directly. Moreover, for pragmatism, humanism is a system which frames the human thought in the experience and not beyond, and adopts the truth only in its confines. It is a simple definition of objects and realities human are face to face in most self-effacing way, out of any approximation and transcendent judgment.

But how, practically, humanism manages to work out only within the present reality with no any approximation and transcendent judgment, while, on the other hand, it is well known fact that there are many ideas which cannot be verified experimentally or by common sense?

As a matter of fact these questions could not flee pragmatists attention. As the result of what they accomplished to join part of transcendent meanings as the part of the direct experience which differs only from the observer perspective. From one perspective, the philosopher which elaborates these facts as transcendental facts, and on the other it is an ordinary observer to look at it as the attainable and simple facts. Both cases, in pragmatism, form nothing transcendental and abstracts. In other words, in the example of transcendental ideas, by bringing transcendent analyses, it is philosopher who makes the proposition transcendent. For instance, the dog which is seen as a hairy, barking and jumping animal, and

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[77] See: James, The meaning of Truth, p. 65-66.
[78] See: Ibid., p. 69.

those are real dog, is full of presence for common sense.[79] Philosopher observes the dog as a combined object, and transcendentally attempts to analyze it as something formed out of cells. The elaboration, which brings out other abstract terminologies beyond immediate observation. And in this manner it calls it as the verified and cognized idea. But a common man, on the other hand, looks at the same object out of these transcendental relations.

Hence, the difference of an ordinary observer or common cognition, which represents the humanism and philosopher, is only that philosopher divides the percipient into small details, from where they attempt to verify ideas. But finally the ordinary man and philosopher see same dog or object, there is no collision between them.

Moreover, pragmatist believe that, from humanist point of view there is no absolute transcendence even about the more absolute realities conjectured or believed in.[80] Though the atoms and cells, mentioned in the above example, may never attain to man's direct means of perceiving are still defined conceptually and conceived as kind of experience.[81] Thus, whereabouts, from humanism perspective, are always defined as a terminus within general possibilities of experience in shape of sensation at which the practical man habitually stops, while philosopher projects a "beyond" in the shape of more absolute reality.[82]Thus, in pragmatist understanding, truth grows up instinctively inside every human life, "even while staying at home".[83]

Eventually, truth verification process assisted by humanism is still in deep vague. As professor Taylor asserts that humanism system of verification in pragmatism makes anyone believe anything pleases him and call it as a truth.[84] Beside, some intellectualist claim that instead of making truth what one pleases to

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[79] See: Ibid., p. 129-130.
[80] See: Ibid., p. 130.
[81] See: Ibid., p. 131.
[82] See: Ibid., p. 132: "Total conflux of the mind with the reality would be the absolute limit of truth, there could be no better or more satisfying knowledge the that", Ibid., p. 156-157.
[83] See: Ibid., p. 70.
[84] See: Ibid., p. 71.

consider, we should think that there are absolute sailing direction decreed from outside and independent chart of voyage which the truth is directed from. And this absolute laws independent of human intervention are kind of port from where truth is directed.[85] In other words, the intellectualist assert that there is outer system designed in particular way to guide us toward a particular destination in absolute way, thus, there is no choice for humans except to admit reality as it is.

In replying to the second objection raised by intellectualists pragmatists assert that:

> The adversaries forgot to mention that even the absolute voyage and designed sailing directions or as called pre-human standards of truth being designed to follow, the only guarantee that we shall in fact follow them lays in our human equipment. Beside the fact that devote believers in absolute standards must admit that men fail to obey them.[86]

As such, the concrete truth for pragmatists will always be that way of thinking in which the various experience most profitably combine.[87] Once again to close the truth edges into the particular directions and to answer partially to Taylors as well as intellectualist objection James claims that:

> The true is the opposite of whatever is instable of whatever is practically disappointing, of whatever is useless, of whatever is lying and unreliable, of whatever is unverifiable and unsupported, of whatever is unreal in a sense of being of no practical account.[88]

Hence, from the above truth evaluation process, from the meaning of humanism and experience, it appears that truth in pragmatist point of view is the experiment, in the broad meaning, in form of common cognition, or personal experience. Moreover, truth contains nothing considered as intelligible facts or

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[85] See: F. C. S. Schiller, "*Empiricism and the Absolute*", p. 348.

[86] James, The meaning of Truth, p. 72.

[87] Ibid., p. 73:. "It is because of this infinite progressiveness that no knowledge is logically absolute", F. C. S. Schiller, "*The Working of Truths and Their Criterion*", *Mind*, New Series, Vol. 22, No. 88. (Oct, 1913), pp. 532-538, p. 534: Ibid., 535-536: "It is fallacious therefore, to claim, ultimate reality for anything that is not known or knowable and useful in operating on our apparent realities", F. C. S. Schiller, *Empiricism and the Absolute*, p. 357.

[88] James, The meaning of Truth, p. 76.

ideas which have no resemblance outside on the objective world like mathematic or geometric theories. Thus, pragmatism in respond claim that the reasonable imagined forms, particularly like triangles, square, etc, they are all relations of comparison[89] which cannot be regarded as true knowledge even if it is presented in the form of truest formulas unless they are joined with truest experimental comparisons outside the idea. Otherwise, in case of submission to any of these reason formulas, with no any experimental comparison, would be considered as blindly declaring the approval of one mathematical theory, as of Jewons for instance over the Booles.[90]

Considering the fact that James regarding the sources and the trueness of mathematical or reasonable truth is not sure. Beside, he claims to be ignorant of the development of mathematics. But he believes that if his opinion on this regard would be true would have solved the difficulty perfectly.[91] In other words, the entire process of knowledge in pragmatism is the process of copping fulfilled through sensation or perception and it is this process merely what associates mans knowledge with the future and past realities.[92]

Truth appears to be only experimental or only sensational; even though there still remains lots of concern at the manner they apply it to each and every type of idea verification. On the other hand, pragmatist expressed a dubious stand point regarding the attainability of absolute truth with experience or humanism. And the main reason for it is that, "the fundamental fact about our experience is that it is a process of change",[93] and owing to the fact that all experience is a process of change, no point of view can ever be the last one. However, pragmatists agree in

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[89] See: Ibid., p. 83.
[90] See: Ibid.
[91] See: Ibid., p. 84.
[92] See: Ibid., p. 87-89.
[93] See: Ibid., p. 89: "The relation to its object that makes an idea true in any given instance, is, we say, embodied in intermediate details of reality which lead towards the object, which vary in every instance, and which in every instance can be concretely traced", Ibid., p. 235.

long run that it is useless to resist experience's pressure,[94] "that the more of it man have, better position they stand, in respect of truth".[95]

Thus, humanism of pragmatism is willing to let finite experience be self-supporting instead of calling for absolute, fixed and finished abstract realities, as understood by some humanist's school of thought.[96]

Hence, pragmatism attempts to create truth within reality and call humanism and the experience the only certain elements to disclose the correctness or incorrectness of the idea, be they from past or present.[97] As such it is humanism and experience as a solution to join the humanity in every step and grow within them not beyond. Subsequently, humanism and experience are the only elements to afford satisfaction, as the truth within two factors is self discovered and self evaluated. And truth within two factors, merely, simplifies the past and takes confident step for the future step. As it is not humanism and experience to deny the very important factor of intellect mutation to ideas,[98] but instead of saying as the intellectualist say, 'the understanding makes the object', humanism of

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[94] "Among these, of course, the instability of 'fact' and the constant transformation and transvaluations which the 'facts' undergo in the growth of knowledge, the impossibility of reaching any 'fact' that can seriously claim to be absolute or absolutely independent, and of sharply distinguishing between fact, interpretation, theory, hypotheses, and fiction, would be found to relevant, and fatal to the simple-minded dogmatism of common-sense", F. C. S. Schiller, "*Truth, Value and Biology*", The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method, Vol. 17, No . 2 (Jan. 15, 1920), pp. 36-44, p. 38-39.

[95] "That some men, having had more experience, are therefore better authorities than others; that some are also wiser by nature and better able to interpret the experience they have had; that its is one part of such wisdom to compare notes, discuss, and follow the opinion of our betters; and that the more systematically and thoroughly such comparison and weighing of opinions is pursued, the truer the opinions that survive are likely to be", James, The meaning of Truth, p. 270.

[96] See: Ibid., p. 92.

[97] "One of Pragmatism's merits is that it is so purely epistemological. It must assume realities; but it prejudges nothing as to their constitution, and the most diverse metaphysics can use it as their foundation", and, "The whole originality of pragmatism, the whole point of it, is its use of the concrete way of seeing. It begins with concreteness, and returns and ends with it", James, The meaning of Truth, p. 215-216.

[98] "Personality and choice cannot be disavowed. They pervade all knowing and participate in building up objects. But does it follow that therefore knowledge can have no objective significance and meaning?", F. C. S. Schiller, "*Humanism, Intuitionism and Objective Reality*", p. 574.

pragmatism ascribes this function to the whole man as the inheritor of all ages, and explains in detail how he does it.[99]

b) Workability and Expedience

Another significant matter which has been always a part of dilemma between others and pragmatism is the workability or the 'agreeing' of idea and the expediency of it.[100] In fact, this has make many of pragmatism critics assume that pragmatism is philosophy of the workers, farmers, doctors, and others who expect the immediate utility.[101] This is not what pragmatism means by workability. Instead what they suggest by workability and expedience is something more than that.[102] It is the idea as the whole with outward effects, resemblance, workability, whereabouts, and the entire system of physical or psychological relation within reality or existence, in active and practical notion.[103] In other words, workability, in pragmatism, means something unimagined out of the universe, and which is only possible of description. Beside, it something which not only exists in meanings or the universe of ideas, but also it works, creates images, thoughts and overall satisfaction in the belief and knowledge. Thus, the precise and concise way

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[99] Ibid.: "Hence the question arises how false and error are to be detected and conceived. And to this question the humanist epistemology gives the only answer in existence. Its answer is the only real, because it is the only one which discriminates between' truth' and a reality which excludes and one that includes 'error' and reality", Ibid., p. 575.

[100] "Having said that true is 'the expedient in our thinking', I am rebuked in this wise by another learned correspondent: 'The word expedient has no other meaning than that of self interest. The pursuit of this has ended by landing a number of officers of national bank penitentiaries. A philosophy that leads to such result must be unsound", James, The meaning of Truth, p. 209: "Pragmatism defines 'agreeing' to mean certain ways of 'working', be they actual or potential", Ibid., "*The meaning of the word Truth*", p. 218. See: James, A new name for some old ways of thinking, p. 76-77: F. C. S. Schiller, "*The Working of Truths and Their Criterion*", p. 532-533.

[101] "When Dr. Schiller speaks of ideas 'working' well, the only thing they think of is their immediate workings in the physical environment, their enabling us to make money, or gain some similar 'practical' advantage. Ideas do work thus, of course, immediately or remotely; but they work indefinitely inside of the mental also", James, The meaning of Truth, p. 184-185.

[102] "It is not true that I derive the essence of truth from its working...", F. C. S. Schiller, "*The Working of Truths and Their Criterion*", p. 533.

[103] "To copy a reality is, indeed, one very important way of agreeing with it...", James, A new name for some old ways of thinking, p. 82: "Not only does Prof. Taylor appear to confuse the proposition that every (valid) thought aims at a practical end with the assertion that it aims at moral goodness, but he has not realize that the position he has to refute is that *the intellect itself is practical throughout*", F. C. S. Schiller, "*Empiricism and the Absolute*", p. *361-362.*

of prescription of pragmatist theory of workability and expedience revolves around epistemological dualism of common sense.[104] Which means that what is known to me should be known to anyone at same time.[105]

On this regard, in order to clarify more the notion of workability and expedience, James argues that:

> When we said that truth of belief consist in its 'working' value, etc; our language evidently was too careless, for by 'practical' we were almost unanimously held to mean opposed to theoretical or genuinely cognitive, and the consequence was punctually drawn that truth in our eyes could have no relation to any independent reality, or to any other truth, or to anything whatever but the acts which might ground on it or the satisfaction they might bring.[106]

Subsequently, not only pragmatism critics but them as well do feel that the argument on the workability and the expedience needs more references and warranty to deliver clear message as how it functions, and the manner to get it right. In respond the argument does not exceed three working references. THAT the thing is, WHAT it is, and WHICH it is.

The mentioning of such references, in pragmatists understanding, is very important for understanding word 'true' and its working or agreeing. "And excluding them out of prescription we are in vague and ignorantly without mutual contact or mediation". [107]

Thus, the meaning of workings, as they represent a practical and experiential relations related to the actual things, cannot in fact mean something absolute as the truth in pragmatism is the process of changes,[108] but it should be

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[104] See: James, The meaning of Truth, p. 217.

[105] "I contend that you cannot tell what the word 'true' means, as applied to a statement, without invoking the concept of the statements workings", Ibid., p. 221.

[106] Ibid., p. 206-207: "Again, by the practical one often means the distinctively concrete, the individual, particular, and effective, as opposed to the abstract, general, and inert. To speak for my self, whenever I have emphasized the practical nature of truth, this is mainly what has been in my mind", Ibid., p. 209-211.

[107] Ibid., p. 218-219: "... but you cannot define what you mean by calling them true without referring to their functional possibilities", Ibid., p. 220.

[108] "We find that in point of fact it is 'Truth' that changes and 'Errors' that persist unchanged from age to age...",F. C. S. Schiller, "*Truth, Value and Biology*", p. 40.

understood as way out of ambiguity and temporary solution. Once again, always remembering that it is not working of ideas that decides what the truth is, but its correlation with other supportive elements is what makes the pragmatist conclude the matter to be true or not, and this always to mean limited truth not absolute.[109]

What makes the critics of pragmatists think that the workability of ideas and expedience means consequence, and *per se* an expedience or utility?

Every idea or thought, from pragmatist point of view, is a personal experiment. The experience or the experiment is regarded as successful or failed according to the consequences of that experiment. On the other hand, as the term *success* is more appropriate with word true, and *failure* is more appropriate with the word false, thus, working or the idea means success and at mean time true.[110] In other words, the workability, expedience or the success of ideas is nothing more than experimentally verified idea, or the idea which succeed in the test of experiment.

> The working is of course a concrete working in the actual experience of human beings, among their ideal, feelings, perception, beliefs and acts, as well as among the physical things of their environment, and the relations must understood as being possible as well as well as actual.[111]

In addition, pragmatists do not forget to mention that there are numerous cases where the obtained truth does not exhibit any obvious working or value. From here, they assert that every truth should contain obvious working value within itself, even if they are not obvious. Clarifying more the relation of the working with truth, pragmatism states out a very known comparison as, "Every truth works and all what works is true" which for them are two propositions to require a proper explanation. And any misperception of this two propositions will

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[109] See: F. C. S. Schiller, "*The Working of Truth and Their Criterion*", p. 534: " It is because of this infinite progressiveness that no knowledge is logically absolute", Ibid., p. 534, Though, *psychologically* considering the possibility to obtain an absolute truth, yet pragmatists is logically strained to accept the possibility of change and limit the truth in present and not absolute", Ibid., 535.

[110] See: Ibid., p. 534.

[111] James, The meaning of Truth, p. 262: "when I call a belier true, and define its truth to mean its workings. It is a belief about object...", Ibid., p. 279.

perplexes the proper comprehension of workability and expedience.[112] As per first proposition, "every truth works", shows that the idea in order to be true should have workings outside. And the second, "all what works is true", asserts that it is working that decides what the truth is. Thus, the second part of proposition does not disclose entire meaning of truth. Because, it might be assumed that the workings or the experimental success of idea are only illusions of truth and not reality. Or it can work today but we cannot guarantee to work absolutely.[113]

Hence, truth requires other and continuous processes of verification as experience in addition to other pragmatic condition. For, the working, or the experimental success of the idea practically, is considered as truth.

But not every idea which seems to work outside is considered true. For pragmatism, sometime the ideas might work practically but still it can be illusions, or may work only temporarily. Due to this fact, pragmatism is criticized as the philosophy which cannot distinguish between true and false absolutely, and the philosophy which cannot rely even at their empirical foundations. And to some extent they also agree about it.[114]

However, in pragmatism theory, in this way merely is believed that man thinks properly, imagines right, comes to agreement easily, and creates the exact notion for the future understandings and proper thoughts. And this will be as the foundation for the truth evaluation, including imaginative and theoretical aspects. From here, pragmatist concludes that in this way merely man will be getting the right temper to believe, think and guide right and no more ascetics or absurdity will have place to misguide man's trust in what they see, think or believe as true.

c) Belief and Satisfactory Feeling

The concept of *belief* and the *satisfactory feeling* are treated, in particular, as two main inner factors which have an impact on establishing stronger concept of

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[112] See: F. C. S. Schiller, "*The Working of Truth and Their Criterion*", p. 534.
[113] See: Ibid., p. 535.
[114] See: Ibid., p. 535: "Because of this infinite appetite progressiveness that no knowledge is logically absolute", Ibid.

truth as the property of experience. No doubt, they seem to be two idealistic notions as their infrastructure is not reality but concept. By attempting to be as two idealistic notions, they annihilate the essentiality of empiricism in pragmatist theory, and alter the conception of experience and its necessity in truth evaluation.[115] But, these two concepts do not involve pragmatism theory with something out of their principles. Quite contrary, these two concepts give stronger support to the pragmatist theory. As *belief* and *satisfactory feeling*, in pragmatism understanding, are not *beliefs* or the *satisfactory feeling* of bare idea, but belief and satisfactory feeling of the collaboration of idea with reality, present or actual.[116] Satisfaction particularly, pragmatists believe, is not an abstract satisfaction felt by unspecified being, but is assumed to consist of such satisfactions (in the plural) as men concretely finds existing actually in their beliefs.[117]

Still, considering these two concepts as the elements for ideas verification might create an ambiguity in the process of truth evaluation, and create perplexity for the critic. No doubt this ambiguity has troubled pragmatist, however, they have not avoided the explanation to it. Instead, they have offered a very detailed concept to theory, starting from the limits of theories requirements and its content as well as its relation to truth.

Considering the belief as more perplexed concept, pragmatists forwards the explanation of it over the satisfactory, despite the belief understanding is related to the comprehension of satisfactory feeling. In this regard, Charles, S. Pierce asserts:

> Images pass rapidly through consciousness, one incessantly melting into another, until at last, when all is over it may be in fraction of a second, in an hour, or after long years we find ourselves decided as to how we should act

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[115] James, The meaning of Truth, p. 154: "And if the satisfaction are the marks of truth's presence, we may add that any less true substitute for such a true idea would prove less satisfactory" and" I am postulating that the satisfaction grow pari passu with our approximation to such reality". Ibid., p. 158.

[116] "He find first that the idea must point to or lead towards that reality and no other, and then that the pointings and leadings must yield satisfaction as their result", James, The meaning of Truth, p. 191.

[117] Ibid., pp. 192-193.

> under such circumstances as those which occasioned our hesitation. In other words, we have attained the belief.[118]

In the relation to reality, which in pragmatist theory already includes all, the idea must swallow and absorb belief. In other words, the idea formed must produce psychologically, mechanically or logically kind of a belief, according to its own nature.

> Must in any case, instead of acquiring aid and support from belief, resolve it into one of its own preordained creatures, making a desert and calling it harmony, unity, totality.[119]

From here, in pragmatist comprehension, beliefs form and judge the agents who entertain them and insist upon them. They are of things supplied from immediate meaning. In this regard Dewey asserts that, "to believe is to ascribe value, impute meaning, assign import".[120]

Hence, the belief, in pragmatist assertion, is not a clear notion, as it makes us assume and wander whether it is something already existing, which appears while the ideas take place satisfactory. Or, whether it appears as a result of the idea presence and its logical relation with something. Thus, in reply to this perplexity they have to claim that, "the human world, whether or not, has core and axis and has both presence and transfiguration". It means *here* and *now*, not in some transcendent sphere.

Subsequently, belief concretes and regulates the terms of contacts with object.[121] In addition, formed thoughts and beliefs attained afterwards result in action, and these actions are the strongest argument for the belief's support, particularly this is what pragmatist mean when they say that every belief results in action. As such, in pragmatism acting means believing. In order to act, formed thought need to go through the process of consciousness which collects those forms in long or short run and translates them into the habit which instructs that

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[118] See: Charles S Pierce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", p. 4.
[119] John Dewey, "*Beliefs and Realities*", p. 115.
[120] Ibid.,p. 113.
[121] See: Ibid.,p. 114.

on such occasion someone should behave as such. The created habits are merely collection of verified beliefs which push forward in action and agreement with reality, in the sense of presence or absence. Thus, thoughts or ideas, in pragmatism thought, are treated as a thread of melody running through succession of our sensation.[122]

> In general, the belief is the demi-cadence which closes a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life...[123]

Moreover, the experience of man's life reflects to the birth of ideas. These ideas continually develop in the circle of mind and thought system to give sometime impression to the thinker as if they are true. How sure are we that these ideas are true? Here pragmatists, as usually, seek entrance to the main gate of experience or the originality of ideas. If the idea finds resemblance outside it is considered true, and that idea should automatically create the satisfactory feeling and immediate belief that the idea is true, and such idea will be granted for true.[124] In this way it is attained the belief that the idea exists in reality and a belief is granted for true.

Hitherto, the above mentioned was objective part of belief which requires kind of explanation to the the realtion of it with satisfactory feeling. The coming question may perplex the issue of the objectivity of the belive, as facts are not always in stock, but most of the time they are absent of concepts.

Thus, it is indispensable to go one step ahead in order to clarify the other part of belief which is known as the belief in absolute and metaphysical facts. The

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[122] Pierce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", p. 5: "In the realm of truth processes facts come independently and determine our beliefs provisionally. But these beliefs make us act, and as fast as they do so they bring into sight or into existence new facts which re-determine the beliefs accordingly. So the whole coil and ball of truth, as it rolls up is the product of a double influence..., Truth is the function of the beliefs that start and terminate among them", William James, A new name for some old ways of thinking, p. 86.

[123] "We have seen that it has just three properties: First, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and third, it involves the establishment in our nature of rule of action, or, say for short, a habit", Pierce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", p. 4.

[124] James, The meaning of Truth, p. 89-91:" His idea has, in each case, brought him into closer touch with reality felt at the moment to verify just that idea. Each reality verifies and validates its own idea exclusively; and in each case the verification consists in the satisfactorily-ending consequences, mental or physical, which the idea was able to set up", Ibid., p. 237.

belief in the absolute and metaphysics occupies a significant place in human life and particularly as an element in his satisfactory feeling. Beside, it also led to many critical discussions among different schools in western thought. The main cause of these disagreements comes out as a reflection of the question of possibility to attain true belief and right satisfaction in the world, what for pragmatism is absurdity. For sure, the belief formed in the light of metaphysical 'facts', or more precisely, those beliefs formed as the result of human thinking-desire or wish- detached from the immediate experience, as supported from the idealist or intellectualist, are unanimously refuted from pragmatist thought. In other words, being different from the notion 'belief' used above interrelated with the immediate realities or action, the metaphysical belief, pragmatists assert, is described by the idealist as the relation of thought with the idea of whole,[125] which-in its pristine purity-has nothing to do with parts, and as such it is a priori truth not corrupted from the part.[126] In addition, intellectuals believe that these beliefs are true and independent from any experience or any fact. Or, these beliefs are the only elements which can bring satisfactory feeling to the human as they contain absolute elements within and are not related to any change or opinion whatever it may be, and this is the purity and perfection what every human being can accept it. However, pragmatists argue that belief in absolute or as they call it, a metaphysical belief, which reflects nowhere in the reality or the world of facts, and it is not possible of any evaluation, is nothing except illusions of human being. And as such cannot provide any satisfaction to anyone.[127]

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[125] See: F. C. S. Schiller, "*Empiricism and the Absolute*", p. 368: "But will not those who desire real answers to the real questions of life more and more audibly protest against the imprisonments of all human thought in the dismal void of the conception of a Whole which can neither be altered not improved, and demand the liberty to think the world nor improve as one in which progress and goodness can be real?", Ibid., p. 370.

[126] See: Ibid.

[127] "But what we still want to know is whether this claim can be sustained, whether reality will actually conform itself to our conception, whether the meaning we attribute to them is actually true", F. C. S. Schiller, "*Empiricism and the Absolute*", p. 366.

In addition, pragmatists argue that "the belief in absolute contains fear and avoidance from the experience".[128] And therefore, it is of no use to postulate an ***absolute***, because, as conceived, it cannot explain the facts of experience which are in the continuous change. Or, pragmatists suggest that there must be postulated an ***absolute*** which is plastic, not rigid, and not subversive of the 'appearances' in which we live. But the proposal of pragmatist to the solution of the metaphysical belief will be unanimously refuted from intellectualist.[129]

> Why should he assume that the experience necessarily forms a whole before he has got it all together? That it forms a system before he has traced it out, that the system is perfect (in any but a verbal, intellectualist, sense) before he has tried it?[130]

Again, how are beliefs to be dealt with when they disclaim any connection with action, and profess to be purely 'theoretic'? But here it is part of their case that, being purely theoretic, they ought not to be acted upon. Thus, pragmatists believe that testing of beliefs by action fails in the case of complete intellectualism, and for the same reason, the plastic absolute suggested by pragmatist is nothing than nonsense suggestion. In addition, they claim that the complete *intellectualism* is extremely rare, and even the theoretical belief is the process which develops through action and reality.[131] To simplify the case from a possible misconception, pragmatist insists that, it is not satisfactory and belief what makes particular idea true.

> Is not clear that not the satisfaction which it gives, but the relation of the belief to the reality is all that makes it true? Suppose there were no such reality, and that the satisfactions yet remained; would they not then effectively work

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[128] "When we have seen that there is no such thing as 'pure reason' we can no longer define the rationalist as one who is guided by it, it becomes necessary to re-determine his essential type of mind in pragmatic terms. And when we make a psychological study of his character and his works, we shall find that his master passion is not so much a love of reason as a *fear of experience.* I should define him, therefore, as essentially a person who *will not trust experience*, who wants at all costs to be insured against the risks, surprises and novelties of life, and to feel that, in principle, nothing can occur which has not been provided for in the closed circle of existence", Ibid., p. 368.

[129] See: F. C. S. Schiller, "*Empiricism and The Absolute*", p. 368.

[130] Ibid., p. 351.

[131] See: F. C. S. Schiller, "*Truth, Value and Biology*", p. 42.

> falsehood? Can they consequently be treated distinctively as the truth builders?[132]If there is to be truth, it says, both realities and beliefs about them must conspire to make it; but whether there ever is such a thing, or how anyone can be sure that his own beliefs possess it, it never pretends to determine.[133]

Plainly, the satisfactory feeling and belief collaborate in same line to assist each other's existence and to be the warranty for the true cognition of idea. But, pragmatist asserts that, not always the satisfactory feeling is a warranty for the existence of idea or leads to the practical belief, as we saw it in their argument with metaphysical belief. But on the other hand, true cognition is an attribute of our belief, and the belief is an attribute which follows satisfaction. Thus, in order to explain this perplexity, as how is possible the satisfactory feeling find the belief in the matter of the metaphysical and abstract idea, pragmatist had to consider and assert that metaphysical beliefs and satisfactory feeling are to some extent related to factuality or the objectivity. In this regard, pragmatist asserts that:

> The ideas around which the satisfactions cluster are primarily hypotheses that challenge or summon a belief to come and take its stand upon them.[134] As such the satisfactory feeling leads to belief, which again is interrelated with the reality. But the interrelation with reality is a necessary step, otherwise the issue will not be clear as what satisfaction or what belief it is talked or discussed about.[135]

But, if the assumed reality is cancelled from the pragmatist's universe of discourse, he would straight away give the name of falsehood to the remaining beliefs in spite of all their satisfactoriness. For him, "there can be no truth if there is nothing to be true about".[136] In addition, the following consequences of belief

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[132] James, The meaning of Truth, p. 194: "It is the inherent relation to reality of a belief that gives us that specific truth satisfaction, compared with which all other satisfactions are the hollowest humbug. The satisfaction of knowing truly is thus the only one which the pragmatist ought to have considered", Ibid., p. 194: F. C. S. Schiller, "*Empiricism and the Absolute*", p. 367.

[133] James, The meaning of Truth, p. 197: "We trade on each others truth. But beliefs verified concretely by somebody are the posts of the whole superstructure", William James, A new name for some old ways of thinking, p. 80.

[134] See: James, The meaning of Truth, "*Pragmatist Account Of Truth*", p. 199.

[135] Ibid., "*M. Hebert on Pragmatism*", pp. 241-242.

[136] See: Ibid., "*Pragmatist Account Of Truth*", p. 195.

and satisfactory feeling systematically lead to what pragmatism call, *good consequences*, which has been point of clash and misunderstandings between pragmatism and other schools of thought, in particular Bertrand Russell who claims that pragmatist before cognizing the truth have to cognize good consequences. But James responds to him asserting that:

> Good consequences here are not proposed by us merely as a sure sign, mark, or criterion, by which truth's presence is habitually ascertained. Though, they may indeed serve on occasion as such sign; they are proposed rather as the lurking motive inside of every truth-claim, whether he obey it blindly.[137]

Thus, in conclusion, the beliefs are categorized into two types, 1) the one which represents the belief, as Pierce described, related to the cognition of reality and interrelation with it, 2) Metaphysical belief,[138] which according to Dewey stands always in contrast with passionless reason which functions in pure knowledge, not logically effected from human being.[139] Both beliefs, pragmatism believe, serve the humans crucial matter, the desire. But the belief of faith is what looks toward the absolute far from the real, while the belief of modern absolutism looks toward the facts and reality. Hence, the first, pragmatist assert, is more human and more supportive for the human desire as it fulfills his desire completely.[140]

d) Truth and False and their Relation to Ideas Verification

With its own methods, pragmatism richly contributed at the subject of truth while discussing it from an ordinary aspect, and approaching it from the

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[137] "They are proposed as the causa existendi of our beliefs, not as their logical cue or premise, and still less as their logical cue or premise, and still less as their objective deliverance or content. They assign the only intelligible practical meaning to that difference in our beliefs which our habit of calling them true of false comports", James, The meaning of Truth, "*Two English Critics*", p. 273.

[138] "The world of immediate meanings, the world sustained in beliefs, is to be sorted out into two portions, metaphysically discontinuous, one of which shall alone be good and true reality, the fit material of passionless, beliefless knowledge; while the other part, that which excluded, shall be referred exclusively to belief and treated as mere appearance, purely subjective, impressions of effects in consciousness or as that ludicrously abject modern discovery- an epiphenomenon", John Dewey, "*Beliefs and Realities*", p. 116-117.

[139] See: Ibid., p. 119.

[140] See: Ibid., p. 120: James, The meaning of Truth, "*Pragmatist Account of Truth*", pp. 189-190.

perspective of empirical and objective facts, though asserting that these methods or evaluations are old procedure transformed into new mechanism. However, this school of thought deserves gratitude for the manner it approaches the problem, raises its importance once again among other philosophical topics, and the manner it discloses its components to join it to modern thought and science development. This was perhaps, in pragmatism assumption, the only way this subject could make sense after a prolonged silence in the world of 'absolutes' and idealities which followed the human thought development for decades.

Eventually, approaching the concept with the definition of theory and essential meaning, thus, approved definition of Truth in the pragmatic school of thought is; "A property of certain ideas in agreement with reality",[141] as the opposite of it, false, is defined as, "Their disagreement with reality".[142] Accordingly, from what was mentioned, truth contains characteristics as:

1) Truth happens to an idea.[143]
2) Truth of an idea is not stagnant property inherited in it.[144]
3) Idea is made or becomes true by events.[145]
4) Truth is the process of verification.

Since truth is property of idea, pragmatist attempts to offer wider explanation of the manner truth functions or occurs. As seen above, truth is a complex process interrelated with other processes or as called events which according to pragmatist are known as the processes of verification.[146] Calling it the

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[141] James, The meaning of Truth, *The Meaning of Truth*, p. v.

[142] Ibid., p. v:"Truth, as any dictionary will tell you, is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their 'agreement', as falsity means their disagreement, with 'reality'. Pragmatist and intellectualist both accept this definition as a matter of course", William James, A new name for some old ways of thinking, p. 76.

[143] See: William James, A new name for some old ways of thinking: "*Pragmatism conception of truth*", p. 78.

[144] See: James, The meaning of Truth, p. vi.

[145] See: Ibid.

[146] "True is the name for whatever idea starts the verification-process, useful is the name for its completed function in experience", William James , A new name for some old ways of thinking, p. 79.

process of verification does not entangle the progress in frustration,[147] but, pragmatism claims that it will adapt life to reality and bring our ideas nearer to their requirements.[148]

> So that when we have once directly verified our ideas about one specimen of a kind, we consider ourselves free to apply them to other specimen without verification.[149]

In this way man are neat to justify different occasions and be in touch with reality and its object. For, this entire process is an experience or verification which makes the formulas correct.[150]

If the truth is what experience yields, and what object or reality defines,[151] what is the difference between pragmatist and some anti-pragmatist who claim the same thing? James claims that from this discussion he wants to prevail the theory called Radical Empiricism,[152] which in his view consist of three main characteristic:

1) It consist of postulate
2) Statement of fact
3) Generalized conclusion.

These three points according to James mean as per their lining.

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[147] See: James, The meaning of Truth, p. vii: "So long as the existence in the empirical world exists, and a satisfactory passage through it between the object and the idea is possible, that idea will both be true, and will have been true of that object, whether fully developed verification has taken place or not", Ibid., p. 165.

[148] "The idea is thus, when functionally considered, an instrument for enabling us the better to *have to do* with the object and to act about it. But it(idea) and the object are both of them bits of the general sheet and tissue of reality at large; and when we say that the idea leads us toward the object, that only means that it caries us forward through intervening tracts of that reality into the objects closer neighborhood, into the midst of its associates at least, be these its physical neighbors, or be they its logical congeners only), James, The meaning of Truth, pp. 140-141.

[149] See: William James, A new name for some old ways of thinking, p. 80.

[150] See: James, The meaning of Truth, p. vii: Ibid., p. 170-171.

[151] "Whoso tells us of the one, it is then supposed, must be telling us of the other; and a true idea must in a manner be, or at least yield without extraneous aid, the reality it cognitively is possessed of", James, The meaning of Truth, p. 196.

[152] "To be radical, empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude any element that is directly experienced. Empiricism is known as the opposite of rationalism. Rationalism tends to emphasize universal and make wholes prior to parts in the order of logic as well as that of being. Empiricism, on the contrary, lays the explanatory stress upon the part, the element, the individual, and treats the whole as the collection and the universal as an abstraction", William James, A world of Pure Experience, p. 1-2.

The *postulates* shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience,[153] (here the philosopher should be empiricist together with his definitions of facts). On the other side, things of the un-experienced nature may exist as libitum, but they form no part of the material for philosophic debate.[154]

The second called the *statement of fact* is that the relation between things, conjunctive or discunjunctive, matters as much as the things themselves.[155]

The last, the *generalized conclusion* is therefore the part of experience to be hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves part of experience[156] (which means that the entire process is turn into the experience). And the truth of relation is that it has definite content and that everything in it is experiencable, [157] and the knowing process grows up to be a reflection process as well as the true ideas or true knowing.[158]

Conclusion

Ideas, in pragmatist theory, are complexion of long procedure, formed inside the reality according to man's perception power. And the developed ideas leave the question to what extent the ideas are true. The concept which is not yet solved from the pragmatists.

The whole originality of pragmatism is to use concrete way of seeing. It begins with concreteness and returns and ends with it.[159] In other words, ideas must have resemblance outside, or in pragmatists comprehension they are considered as the reflection of the reality. Moreover, with the reflection of reality we have obtained the first step in thinking process, which does not stop at their cognition

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[153] See: James, The meaning of Truth, p. xii

[154] See: Ibid.

[155] See: Ibid.: F. C. S. Schiller, "*Truth, Value and Biology*", p. 40.

[156] See: James, The meaning of Truth, p. xiii.

[157] See: Ibid.,p. xiv: "My thesis is that the knowing here is made by the ambulation (opposite of saltatory or the intervening part of experience within time or space) through the intervening experience,...Idea, it is cognitive only when taken in conjunction with intermediate (those intermediaries determine what particular knowing function it exerts) experiences that it gets related to that particular object", Ibid., p. 138-141.

[158] See: Ibid., p. 145.

[159] See: James, The meaning of Truth, p. 216.

merely, but they develop in continuation. The continuity of the ideas formation contributes toward the connection of other ideas, from there we get the complexity of ideas. Hence, ideas that succeed in the process of verification within the bounders of experience are recognized as working ideas which bring up the satisfaction and believe.

Though containing slight difference among four pragmatist scholars, the ideas foundation, among all four, is kind of biological and objective process.[160] And humanism, which in James understanding was expressed as the common sense, was granted as the only tool to differentiate between truth and false. But Dewey and Schiller, with slight exception believe that, it is the object form where the idea is formed and it is the science and instrumentalism which decide the truest form of ideas and their workability in the more complex forms. Which again emphasizes on the humanity but in more technical terminology. Moreover, they all agree, with no exemptions, that difference between true and false is not absolute.

On the other hand, truth, in pragmatist school is not a limited concept between two extremes only, but it has grades, as 1) less true if the idea is simple and works only in common sense or resemblance outside in the objective world-what James and Pierce support-and 2) more true if idea is verified experimentally-what Dewey and Schiller say. Thus, in the second level of true ideas, science is the only mechanism which conducts the process of verification. As such, truth in pragmatists point of view starts with negative statement, as, *nothing is accepted as truth unless it works*, and *nothing works unless it is experienced*, and today the only authority to decide is owned by science.[161] Pragmatism, or pluralism which pragmatism defend, in long run, does not guarantee an absolute ends or absolute hypotheses. Likewise, their truth is changeable and can have different results-which is the opposite of religious and rationalist's truth. And according to many

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[160] See: F. C. S. Schiller, "*Humanism, Intuitionism and Objective Reality*", p .572.
[161] See: F. C. S. Schiller, "*The Working of Truths and Their Criterion*", p. 536.

critics, pragmatism is verified as a certain willingness to live without assurances or guarantees.[162]

To admit as pragmatists do, that their theory is liable to correction, as the correction process involves the use of an ideal standard.[163] In addition, pragmatism asserts that, no one needs to dogmatize about the consensus of opinion in the future being right- he needs only postulate that it will probably contain more of truth than any ones opinion now.[164] Which means that, pragmatists do not talk about theories being true or not in the future. But what concerns them is their actual or present truth, supported by the verification condition. Theories absurd of evaluation or verification might be the future truths, but if they are not included as actual facts, according to pragmatism, they remain false.

To conclude, the characteristics of true ideas in pragmatism are as follow:

1) True ideas lead us into useful verbal and conceptual quarters as well as directly up to useful sensible termini.

2) They lead to consistency, stability and flowing human intercourse.

3) They lead away from eccentricity and isolation from foiled and barren thinking.[165]

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[162] See: James, The meaning of Truth, p. 229.
[163] See: Ibid., "*Abstractionism*" p. 263.
[164] See: Ibid., p. 271.
[165] See: James, A new name for some old ways of thinking, p. 83.

Chapter Two

The Nature of Truth in Logical Positivism

I. Ideas and Truth in Logical Positivism Thought

Introduction

Thought expansion among philosophical schools is a general characteristic which modifies and changes many judgments within a particular school, and sometime appears to be the cause of growth to new schools. Being defined with a particular definition and particular foundation, many of these schools by the passage of time alter in their own principles or in some explanationary propositions. Further, from this thought evolution we acquire different routes to take philosophy from one stage to another, the latest school to retain the argument of the old one. This thought instability is a characteristic of modern thought.[1] After all, an impression is created that we are presented only with fallacious formulation of ideas and nothing to persuade us think that philosophy made any progress whatever.[2]

Although these difficulties and suspicious questions going through the expansion of philosophies, the philosophy still strikes to be at the the stage with other sciences and have a word at least on the methodology of science, or what we are about to discuss in this chapter, recognized as the logic of meanings and their verification principles. At first, it is very common to ask, why to start with the formation of ideas, and where the ideas formation is included in the matter of truth and false. And it is very common to be unable to find a connection between the ideas formation process with the title of this chapter.

In fact, the formation of ideas aims to illuminate the very basic structure of the school itself, as well as elucidates the approach they pursue while elaborating other parts of their topic. Or what Schlick asserts;

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[1] See: Moritz Shlick, *"Positivism and Realism"*, originally appeared in Erkenntnis III (1923-1936), reprinted in *Philosophical Papers*, Volume II, (1925-1936), from Vienna collection. Copyright, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1979, p. 37: Moritz Shlick, The Turning Point in Philosophy, in, A.J. Ayer, Logical Positivism, (*New York*: The Free Press, 1959), p. 53.

[2] See: Ibid.

> For us it is self-evident that the problem of the basis of knowledge is nothing other than the question of the criterion of truth.[3]

Thus, in order to realize what methodology a particular school follows in ideas verification and under what type of groups they are classified-segments which assemble theory of truth-we are relating our discussion to the process of ideas formation at the beginning, to follow with classification and later with verification process. With verification process, particularly, we will be able to obtain clearly what methodology the school of thought applies and accordingly what group of philosophy it belongs, a realist, idealist any other school of thought.

While verifying the idea, logical positivism, similar as pragmatism, confirm the importance of ideas formation as the very basic element for verification process. Again, with same methodology as pragmatic philosophy, logical positivist-known as the materialistic school of thought-applies the verification of ideas only on the 'given'. In other words, the 'given', in logical positivist, symbolizes the reality or the factuality. And only the notion of 'given', in the formation of *ideas*, will elucidate the reason why this philosophy, in ideas verification process, conditions simply these methods.[4] After the formation of ideas, it is the verification process of these ideas which shifts our topic to the aimed end, which is truth or falsity of these ideas.

All important attempts to understand the theory of knowledge grow with concerning the certainty of human knowledge. In return, this certainty cannot be comprehended unless we realize what the truth is, and the manner it is verified.

Realizing what the truth is and the manner it is verified, in return, is a problem which originates from the aspiration of absolute certainty[5] and daily uncertainty to come from the assumtion that the insight of daily life and science can be only probable. Beside the fact that, even the most general results of

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[3] See: Moritz Shlick, The Foundation of knowledge, in, Alfred Ayer, Logical Positivism, p. 213.
[4] "Thus, philosophy is no longer viewed as a domain of knowledge in its own right, on a par with, or superior to, the empirical sciences", Rudolf Carnap, "The old and New Logic", in, Ibid., p. 133.
[5] See: Moritz Shlick, "*The Foundation of knowledge*", in, Ibid., p. 209.

science, which all experiences confirm, can have only the character of hypotheses. Thus, the search for unshakeable and indubitable foundation of certainty, on which the structure of our knowledge could rest, has again and again stimulated philosophers since Descartes. [6] Indeed, though less obvious, but it has been stimulating since ancient times. And from here, the topic of truth has gained the significant character in logical positivism as well as other philosophies.

a) Ideas Formation in Logical Positivism

The concept of ideas formation has explored plenty of efforts among different schools in different stages of thought including the current. And all different approaches to the theory of epistemology start from here exactly.

Moreover, what makes subject of ideas formation more complex and in continues disputes is the extreme conflict between two poles, whether the ideas are empirical or from rational resources. However, the core matter of this disputes springs from the very well known fact that it is impossible having every part of our knowledge constructed purely and merely on the mentioned resources. And for this mere reason we notice that a very detailed proposition in the elaboration process in these schools knows to fill up lots of pages but still with lots of perplexities and non-solved problems.

As a significant element, these misperceptions and conflicts could not discourage philosophers from elaborating in detail what way we should pursue to attain the certain knowledge and what elements must be applied.

Thus, ideas formation in logical positivism, perhaps not with similar strength as in other schools, still has remained as the crucial part in their philosophy. In addition to the fact that, unlike pragmatist school, for logical positivists the matter of obtaining knowledge is more as a psychological matter, and what concerns them more is the verification of ideas which is logical and

[6] See: Ibid.

synthetical dilemma. Obviously, to meet up with radical empiricism[7] of logical positivists, defined under the logical and synthetic ideas, is a very ordinary challenge. And every chapter of their analyzes express the fundamentals and commitments to the empirical facts.[8]

> For the empiricist doctrine to which we are committed is a logical doctrine concerning the distinction between analytical proposition, synthetic proposition, and metaphysical verbiage; and as such it has no bearing on any psychological question of fact.[9]

In other words, the ideas formation in logical positivist are elucidated as the empirical elements which in their foundation recognize no other sources or foundation. But what makes logical positivist in this regard different from other empiricist, will be elaborated in further paragraphs.

Moreover, while stating their first principle that there are no objects whose existences are indubitable,[10] which may perplex the impression of their empiricism, they abandon to make any *general* accepted concept under the immediate sense-experience *only*.[11] At mean time calling for mere logical or idealist evaluation is illogical or a wrong concept in their theory. In other words, unlike other empirical philosophies, in particular pragmatism, logical positivists due to a very fact that the sense-experience are not always in stock and are always in the process of change, refute to rely at the immediate sense-experience or the

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[7] "The proceeding formulations of the principle of empiricism and of the empiricist meaning criterion provide no more, however, than a general and rather vague characterization of a basic point of view and they need therefore to be elucidated and amplified", Carl G Hempel, "The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Posititvism", p. 109.

[8] "For we have seen that our claims to empirical knowledge are not susceptible of a logical, but only of a pragmatic, justification", Ayer Jules Alfred," *Language Truth and Logic*", (London: Victor Gollangz Ltd, 1962), p. 120.

[9] Ibid., p. 122.

[10] See: "And this means that our empirical knowledge can not have a basis of logical certainty", Ibid., p. 121.

[11] "This conception of elementary statements was exposed to attack on various grounds. There were some to whom it seemed that no empirical statement could be incorrigible, in the sense required. They were therefore inclined to maintain either that one could be mistaken about character of ones present experience, so that the statements which purported to record it were fallible like the rest, or that these "direct records of experience" were not genuine statements, since they purchased their security at the expense of sacrificing all descriptive content, Ibid., p. 18.

object merely. On the other hand, excluding the ideas from the actuality completely leads as well to the acceptance of idealist ideas which allows the existence of ideas in transcendent or abstract world, and involve into the metaphysics or nonsense. Thus, logical positivists oppose any opinion which claims the formation of thought independent of sense-experience,[12] or considering the object merely the only source for the idea formation, as the empiricist states.

It is quite ordinary for the reader to face thought contradiction in the above mentioned paragraphs, an element which makes positivist conscious as well. For, avoiding the surface illumination, logical positivist prefer going into the matter immediately and clarify how the sense-experience, the tool for the ideas formation, gets into relation with object and how the idea gets to be formed.

Being an empiricist school, the ideas formation in logical positivism begins with the first elements of mans cognition, the sense-experience and sense-content. Being a very connected and interrelated notion, sense-experience, for logical positivist is not an object, but a factor from which entails the existence of sense-content.[13] Hence, the sense-experience in logical positivism can be replaced with the notion 'feeling', used in pragmatism thought, and so far contains the same characteristics. On the other hand, sense-content, logical positivist claims, is different from asserting the presence of material things.[14] In their apprehension, the object is asserted to exist with the presence of sense-content. In other words, sense-content is conformity of the object and not the opposite. Beside it, there

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[12] "We, however, are obliged to mention material things when we wish to describe certain sense-contents, because the poverty of our language is such that we have no other verbal means of explaining what their properties are", Ibid., p.67: "Accordingly we define a sense-content not as the object, but as a part of a sense-experience. And from this follows that the existence of sense-content always entails the existence of a sense-experience", Ibid., p. 122.

[13] See: Ibid., p. 122.

[14] "In using the material mode of speech we run the risk of introducing confusions and pseudo-problems", Rudolf Carnap, "*Psychology in Physical Language*", in, Alfred Ayer, " *Logical Positivism*", p. 165.

cannot be any logical explanation of occurrence of any cognition out of sense-content and sense-experience.[15]

Moreover, while debating more in detail the characteristics of sense-experience and sense-content whether they are physical or mental concepts, logical positivist ignore to apply any of these characteristics, for the fact that none of these questions is capable of being solved by any empirical proof.[16] But it can be analyzed by the subject relationship of sense-experience and sense-content to one another. As a general comprehension the presence of sense-experience entails the presence of sense-content.[17] Or the sense-content cannot exist if there is no sense-experience.

Thus, unlike empiricist, the logical positivist asserts that, despite the fact that sense-content cannot, by definition, occur without being experienced, and despite that material things are constituted by sense-experience, it is a mistake to conclude, as Berkley did, that a material thing cannot exist unperceived.[18] For the fact that sense-content, referring to material thing, need not necessarily express categorical propositions; they may be hypothetical (perceived indirect material things).[19] Moreover, any attempt to definitely close the relation and the gap of mind and object, logical positivist assert that it will be to replicate the same mistake previous philosophers did. In other words, it will be making it the metaphysical argument which leads us nowhere.[20] Rather, logical positivist claim that, no one should think of any priori mental element to precede the sense-content as it again has nothing to do with real philosophical matter.[21]

Thus, in logical positivist, it is senseless to discuss if the sense-content or sense-experience are the mental or physical, because all this are logical construction. And dividing between what is mental and what is physical is like

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[15] See: Alfred Ayer, "*Language Truth and Logic*", p. 123.
[16] See: Ibid., p. 123.
[17] See: Ibid., p. 122.
[18] See: Ibid., p. 140.
[19] See: Ibid., p. 141.
[20] See: Ibid., p. 124-125.
[21] Ibid., p. 125.

dividing between different logical constructions.[22] Moreover, these two elements, mind and object, are not constructed out of sense-content but in them, so the exact distinction what is mental and what is physical is very difficult.[23]

Moreover, logical positivists attempt to obtain real factors which form the very subject of human nature, what logical positivists call *self*. The *self* here is the profound matter of human cognition, or it is the element which makes many to dispute over the matter of cognition. Very precisely, the self and its definition decides the nature of what Descartes tried to prove, the truly cognition and the common sense, which was discussed in the above chapter while discussing the pragmatism point of view.

For the empiricist theory, self formation and the manner other people have an impact on the self of human, is still unclear. Is the man self dependent in the empirical world, or he carries within some other characters which push him toward to be himself? In this regard logical positivists assert that, if man except that he is only self able to drive the formation of self, than it will be easier for the metaphysician to support the resurrection of self in other world, is what positivist asserts.[24]

From here, logical positivists discuss the connection of one-self to historical other self and how we get connected along with the option of being disconnected or self independent from each other. Furthermore, they propose that, if self is independent from each other than everyone's self-content and self-experience must be different from others sense-content, and in this way it is very natural to not recognize or believe on other presences or experience. Surely, it is known that any refusal of others experience is solipsism. And the solipsism is refuted from the philosophical point of view. On the other hand, if the common self is taken into the regard, than, for logical positivist it becomes a metaphysical

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[22] See: Ibid., p. 123.

[23] "And, indeed, we have previously shown that the proposition that mind and matter are completely independent is one which we have good empirical grounds for disbelieving, and one which no a priori argument could possibly serve to prove", Ibid., p. 142: Ibid., p. 124.

[24] See: Ibid, p.122.

proposition which cannot be proved empirically with certainty.[25] Instead, it will be a confuted matter which requires the complete agreement of thoughts, free of any self-contradiction. Surely, logical positivist asserts that, the complete agreement of thoughts, free of any self-contradiction is what the actuality disapproves it.

If every mans experience is to his own only, according to logical positivists assertion, how is it possible to discharge the solipsism out of this theory and at mean time prove the existence of other man experience?

> For, if he is to avoid the metaphysics, he must define the existence of other men in terms of *actual* and *hypothetical* occurrence of certain sense-contents, and then the fact the requisite sense-contents of occur in his sense-history gives him a good reason for believing that there are other conscious beings besides himself.[26]

Unlike pragmatism, logical positivism in this regard proves the common sense cognition from the self point of view, but this time with different terminology calling it as phenomenalism.[27] And here the factor for the common sense formation or phenomenalism and the self or the personality is the sense-content and it's essential tool, sense-experience. In other words, unlike pragmatist, the common sense in positivist turns to be totally a skeptical matter and it functions only with the permission of sense-experience of every person own capacity. In other words, we only confirm other self and other sense-experience, because of our own self-experience or self-content, but never because of trust we should have in others self experience. Thus, self and every self in

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[25] See: Ibid., p. 128.

[26] Ibid., p. 131.

[27] "In epistemological discussions, it is frequently assumed that the ultimate evidence for believes about empirical matters consists in perception and sensations whose description calls for a phenomenalistic type of language", Carl G Hempel, " *The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning*", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Posititvism", p. 110: Ibid., p. 117: " It must be made clear, finally, that our phenomenalism is compatible not merely with the fact that each of us has good reason to believe that there exist a number of conscious beings of the same kind as himself, but also with the fact that each of us has good reason to believe that these beings communicate with one another and with him, and inhabit a common world", Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 131: Rudolf Carnap, "Psychology in Physical Language", in, Alfred Ayer, " *Logical Positivism*", p. 168.

logical positivism thought is his sense-content or his sense-experience.[28] From here, logical positivist gives more elucidated description of the sense-content and its relation to idea. But the word idea is not used with same principle as in pragmatism. In their dictionary they have replaced it with sense-content, which use to refer to the immediate outer data as well as 'introspective' sensation.[29]

Here, sense-content, in logical positivism, is the idea itself as well as a detection tool of information for a common-sense agreement or phenomenalism, which both with sense-experience together form the self of every man. In addition, only by sense-experience we can possible verify the existent material things.[30]

Elucidating more the characteristic of the interrelation of this sense-experience with ideas, logical positivist assert that what makes someone belief that a thing exists is not the fact but his sense.[31] Moreover, the way we describe and talk about sense-experience is talking about the material thing which for every one is the factual fact, and this is done through perception.[32] But how sure are we that we are defining same thing, or how two sense-experiences resemble one another to be proof for the existence of common sense?[33] In this regard Ayer asserts that:

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[28] "For we do not hold, as he apparently did, that the self is an aggregate of sense-experiences, or that the sense-experience which constitute a particular self are in any sense parts of it. What we hold is that the self is reducible to sense-experience, in the sense that to say anything about the self is always to say something about the sense-experiences: and our definition of personal identity is intended to show how this reduction could be made". Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 128.

[29] See: Ibid., p. 53.

[30] See: Ibid.

[31] See: Ibid., p. 50.

[32] "Alternatively, the basic empirical vocabulary of an empiricist language might be constructed as consisting of phenomenalistic terms, each of them referring to some aspect of the phenomena of perception or sensation", Carl G Hempel, " *The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning*", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Posititvism", p. 117.

[33] Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 65: "Since other people cannot sense my sense-data or share my thoughts or feelings, they cannot verify the statements that I make about them: neither can I verify the corresponding statements that they make about their experiences. And if I cannot verify them, I cannot understand them either. To this extent we inhabit entirely different worlds. What can be verified, however, is that these worlds have a similar structure, Alfred Ayer, "*Logical Positivism*", p. 18-19.

> Sense-experience resemble in their tactual or visual if they are directly continuous or when they belong to successive members of series actual and possible sense-fields.[34]

In other words, sense experience resemble if they are expressed directly from their actual or present field feeling, though, for logical positivist, there happen to occur some insignificant differences.[35]

> What matters is that the structure of our respective worlds is sufficiently alike for me to be able to rely on the information that he gives me. And it is in this sense only that we have a common language; we have, as it were, the same canvas which each of us paints in his own private fashion.[36]

Certainly, as every idea, logical positivist asserts that sense-contents have their level in confirmation, 1) as those to express stronger and exact proposition, 2) and those expressing weaker proposition. Sense-content expresses the exact and certain idea if they are visual or tactual propositions, or they are direct factually propositions.[37] On the other hand, the ideas are considered as weak if they express the probable propositions, like the probability of the atoms or molecules presence, or the propositions regarding the past of future truth whose verifiability stand on the rationality of hypotheses.[38] As for the sense-content of taste and smell which are assigned to material things, in order to achieve resemblance are classified by tactual sense-content.[39] So, whenever logical positivist talk about the coin being round, it is not assertion that is round because of sense-content says such, as large amount of its verified ideas are in memory which may not confirm the same certainty of the particular thing twice in the same profundity. But what we assert is that the coin is in itself round (with the confirmation of sense-content) and the logical assertion or phenomenalism, which asserts profoundly the same thing. Likewise, with whiteness of paper, even it may not appear to be

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[34] "The depth of a visual or tactual sense-content is as much a sensible property of it as its length or breadth", Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 66-67.
[35] See: Ibid., p. 65: "All that I am left with is the apparent harmony of our behavior", Ibid., p. 19.
[36] Ibid., p. 19.
[37] See: Ibid., p. 67.
[38] See: Ibid., p. 50.
[39] See: Ibid., p. 67.

always white for some people at the meditate occasion.[40] In other words, things are as they are not because we see them as such, though it is an indispensible fact, but they are such because of their own existence, stabilized and formed in the form of sense-content ideas.

Hence, logical positivists declare to be empiricist having full confidence in the existence, but they differ from empiricist while refusing to accept only the seen as the only argument for our sense-content, because the ideas are true even they are not directly experienced, as it the matter with ideas in other minds, or past and future ideas with some reservation.

In addition, unlike idealist they do not give to the mind merely authority to decide if the idea is true without factual or empirical facts verification. As the conclusion logical positivists assert that the idea expresses no any fact if it is not verified empirically or factually. For, it is characteristic of an empiricist to eschew metaphysics, on the ground of that every factual proposition must refer to sense-experience.[41]

Once again, the ideas formation in logical positivism as mentioned starts with empirical foundation. But different from other empirical schools, the ideas formation are not totally related to the immediate sense-experience or observation only, as there is no warranty that the immediate sense-experience coincide always with the facts given. And any blind acceptance of sense-experience as the only source of our ideas will lead to acceptance of something out of certain or out of the immediate facts which may open a way to the acceptance of metaphysical ideas. As well as calling for the diversity of ideas and experiences different from person to person and different self, may again lead to the metaphysics, as the rules will be neglected and every person thought and view may be right, which is against many philosophical schools.

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[40] See: Ibid.

[41] "For the admission that there were some facts about the world which could be known independently of experience would be incompatible with our fundamental contention that a sentence says nothing unless it is empirically verifiable", Ibid., p. 71-73.

Accordingly, logical positivists suggest that the ideas have no other source except the sense-experience and observation. But once they attempt to work as immediate fact, we do not need the immediate observation process as they are considered a verified sense-content. And it is that logical relation as a verified authority.

Hence, entire ideas after their verification are established as verified ideas, and as the sense-content ideas they play a logical role for other ideas verification in the future or past. But still the formation of ideas and their main source, or the question of primary proposition is a vague and a dispute subject among positivists.

b) Types of Ideas in Logical Positivism

Similar to other modern materialistic philosophies, logical positivism likewise represents the materialistic thought and deep confidence in the seen along with extreme opposition to everything known as metaphysics or transcendent. While opposing the transcendent and the metaphysics, logical positivism had to hold very firmly to their empiricism principles. At mean time, in order to survive the challenging ideas of metaphysics and similar thoughts and combine it with their materialistic thought, they had to look for a common ground. Thus, in the elaboration of the types of ideas will be elucidated the way they have attached their ground to idealist thought and still remaining confident to their empirical principles. Beside it, the discussion about types of ideas it is where logical positivist begin with the materialistic thought.

One of most challenging and crucial ideas to face not only positivist but all materialistic philosophies, including pragmatism in the above chapter, are the *priori ideas* or as they are called, the priori or analytical evaluation truths. *Priori ideas*:[42] are all indirect ideas which seem to be factual truth but they are not. The reason why they are not, is that, for logical positivist, they may create the

[42] " But, as we have already mentioned, and shall later show, an a priori truth is a tautology", Ibid., p. 47.

possibility to consider the metaphysical ideas as true. In other words, in this part of ideas are included all human thought discoveries which are independent of any *direct* factual or sense-content, which according to positivist are: (1) Logic, (2) Mathematic, with branches like Geometry, Arithmetic etc, and (3) Each and every idea which is independent of direct facts or observation as metaphysical facts.[43] However, all these type of priori propositions are called as analytic propositions[44] and stand as the opposite to synthetic.

However, calling positivists as empiricists, does not mean that they ignore the psychological belief and their being facts, as we will observe that these types of ideas are commonly associated with their empiricism.[45] At mean while, even if logical premises were true, as they are the foundation of logical positivist, they are established through their relation to the observation process only, or synthetic facts but in different logical forms.[46]

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[43]"The fundamental tenet of modern empiricism is the view that all non-analytic knowledge is based on experience. Let us call this thesis the principle of empiricism. Contemporary logical empiricism has added to it the maxim that a sentence makes a cognitively meaningful assertion, and thus can be said to be either true or false, only if it is either 1) analytic or self-contradictory or 2) capable at least in principle, of experiential test. According to this so-called empiricist criterion of cognitive significance, many of the formulations of traditional metaphysics and large parts of epistemology are devoid of cognitive significance-however rich some of them may be in non-cognitive import by virtue of their emotive appeal or the moral inspiration they offer", Carl G Hempel, " *The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning*", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Posititvism", p. 108: " If neither of these courses proves satisfactory, we shall be obliged to admit that there are truths about the world which we can know independently of experience: that there are some properties which we can ascribe to all objects, even though we cannot conceivably observe that all objects have them", Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 72-73.

[44]" In other words, the truths of logic and mathematics are analytic propositions or tautologies", Ibid., p. 77.

[45]"If the empiricism is correct no proposition which has factual content can be necessary and certain", Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 71-72.

[46]"Finality is a very fitting word to characterize the function of observation statements. They are an absolute end. In them the task of cognition at this point is fulfilled that a new task begins with the leasure in which they culminate, and with the hypotheses that they leave behind does not concern them. Science does not rest upon them but leads to them, and they indicate that it has led correctly. They are really absolute fixed points; it gives us joy to reach them, even if we cannot stand upon them", Moritz Shlick, "*The Foundation of knowledge*", in, Alfred Ayer, " *Logical Positivism*", p. 223: "It is clear that any such concession to rationalism would upset the main facts of this book. And thus the whole force of our attack on metaphysics would be destroyed", Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 73.

However, formal logic and mathematic ideas, which appear to everyone to be necessary and certain, is where logical positivist encounter difficulty.[47] But despite they empiricism principles to claim that anything nonfactual cannot be necessary and certain, as it is the matter with the mathematic and logic, theoretically logical positivist are obliged to admit some truths about world which we know that are independent of experience.[48] Not avoiding much from their empiricist principles, they consider these two elements, mathematic and logic, to be reason supremacy which introduces us with the world of facts far from our observation. In other words, in logical positivism, the subject of these two types of ideas is the introduction to material and sense-content free of observation.[49] From here, it was Mill the first to discuss about the contingency of mathematical and logical result, who concluded that the mathematical and logical ideas were not necessary or certain. And he concluded that they were mere hypothesis, but the difference between it and the scientific hypothesis was in degree not in kind.[50]

Logical positivists disagreed with Mill that the status of mathematic and logic is similar to that of empirical hypotheses, or that their validity is determined in the same way.[51] In fact, they are independent of experience and they do not owe the validity to empirical verification. In addition, math and logic are discovered through inductive process, but any attempt to confute them with factual argument will be wrong. Asserting this, logical positivist refutes declaring that a particular mathematical theory is false empirically. 5 pair of shoes makes 10 shoes, which mathematically is expressed as $5x2=10$, cannot be empirically false or wrong if one the shoe misses. The same situation includes the logic, like in the example of excluded middle, as something should be either right or wrong or true or false, nothing in between, and later attempting to implement the same law on

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[47] See: Ibid., p. 72.

[48] "It is clear that any such concession to rationalism would upset the main argument of this book", Ibid., p. 73.

[49] See: Ibid.

[50] See: Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 74.

[51] See: Ibid., p. 75.

the factual thing which may include the excluded middle, as in the language construction.[52]

> The experience gave very good example for the universality of mathematic and logical truth, but we had never guarantee for their future certainty, so they remain such only for actual present and past.[53]

As the support to their theory and the difference in some minor matters, logical positivist mention Kant who asserts that we cannot claim that entire knowledge can be originated from the experience. At mean while, Kant asserts that, it does not mean that the mathematic and logical facts we are born knowing those, as idealists claim. They have to be learned as other subjects, like physics and history, and they have been discovered by the system of syllogism and inductive process tested in more than one case.[54]

Moreover, beside the detailed conversation on the nature of these ideas or they nature on the world of their factuality, logical positivist considers that the mathematical and logical theories are tautologies. Contributing at this opinion, logical positivists argue with the explanation of Kant who divides the tools to lead to the formation of math and logic into 1) analytical: which expresses nothing new for the thought, except what is seen as an immediate reflection, and 2) the synthetic proposition, on other side, which contributes by adding the predicate, which has not been thought.[55] In other words, logical positivist takes these two notions as two different types of ideas, build at the interrelation of each other.

'All bodies are extended', is a logical analytical fact which expresses nothing new for the thought, except vindicating something already known and seen. Or $7+5=12$, is as a fact on the ground that the concept of twelve was by no means already thought in merely thinking. "All bodies are heavy' as a synthetic example, is considered as a new thought which went through the verification

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[52] See: Ibid., p. 76.
[53] See: Ibid., p. 74.
[54] See: Ibid.
[55] See: Ibid., p. 77: " For since the existence is not a predicate, to assert that an object exists is always to assert a synthetic proposition: and it has been shown that no synthetic propositions are logically sacrosanct", Ibid., p. 121.

process in order to be concluded. In other words, both mathematical and logical express nothing unknown for the thought, but at least synthetic can add something new, is what Kant asserts.[56]

But according to Ayer, Kant could not differentiate between analytic and synthetic ideas. The example of 7+5=12 is not something intended to be such, and it is a psychological example. It can be an analytical according to the later (12+5=17, for example), as well a synthetic for the previous. At mean time we can think 5 and 7 without thinking of 12, so it appears to be self-contradict. 'All bodies are extended' on the other hand is a logical example, for the fact that there are not definite facts for such end.[57]

In order to avoid the perplexity of difference between the analytic and synthetic, and avoid the contradictious fact, as which is logical proposition and which psychological, and also avoid considering a proposition as a synthetic or analytical for the further one, or being analytical or logical merely, Ayer offers new definition of both analytical and synthetic. Defining the analytical ideas as: the proposition whose validity depends on the definition of the symbols it contains, and synthetic ideas as: whose validity is determined by facts of experience.[58]

However, according to positivist, the philosophy couldn't distinguish precisely between analytical and synthetically proposition from their logical, psychological or factual point of view as they are interrelated in the way that it is very difficult to draw an obvious line. Instead, positivists suggest that, analytical proposition should deal with the definition of the symbols merely. On the other hand, synthetic must conclude if proposition validity is determined by the facts of experience or not.

Thus, for logical empiricist, some sentences can be analytically true without demanding any factual prove, like "either some ants are parasitic or none

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[56] See: Ibid., p. 77.
[57] See: Ibid., p. 78.
[58] See: Ibid.

are", which logically is true, as we know that a thing either has to be or not, there is nothing in between. Beside the fact that this proposition provides no fact or reality of ant's world at all.[59] But when we say, "there are ants who have established the system of slavery" is a synthetic proposition which expresses something empirical, it cannot only be thought, but has to be observed and verified.[60] Hence, the verification process of proposition concerned with logical sentences and symbols is an analytical field and no experience can confute them. In addition, logical positivism emphasizes on the fact that, saying that analytical proposition express no factual facts does not indicate their being senseless as the metaphysical ideas.

'Nothing can be colored in different ways at same time with respect to the same part of itself', according to positivist it is not a nonsense example, but also nothing in it expresses anything about the properties of any actual thing, for, it is analytical.[61] Similarly, if saying that, 'all French are Britons, and all Britons are European, than all French are European. This example, for Ayer, expresses nothing actual but only the way 'if' and 'all' are used analytically.[62] Likewise, according to Ayer the analytical proposition are not empty facts like claimed from Kant, but they can, to some extent be the source of knowledge.[63]

> But we notice that there is a reason in which it might be assumed them to add nothing to our knowledge. For, they tell us only what we may be said to know already.[64]

As the result, the analytical proposition task, in Ayer's opinion,[65] is to save thought from the logical mistakes and proper way the symbols like, 'all', 'or', and

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[59] "And this applies to all analytical propositions. They none of them provide any information about any matter of fact. In other words, they are entirely devoid of factual content. And it is for this reason that no experience can confute them", Ibid., p. 79.
[60] Ibid., p. 78-79.
[61] Ibid., p. 79.
[62] See: Ibid.
[63] "They call attention to linguistic usages, of which we might otherwise not be conscious, and they unsuspected implications in our assertion and beliefs", Ibid., p. 79-80.
[64] Ibid., p. 80.

'not' should be used so they don't lead to any senseless tautology and wrong ends.[66]

In addition, coming back to the mathematical results, according to Ayer they are analytical. And if we think for geometry, the part of it is classified as a synthetic form of mathematic, but the propositions of pure geometry are analytical.[67] Despite the fact that it is considered by some as the priory knowledge, however, geometry does not contain any fact. For the reason that, if they were priori necessities they had to be for all, which in fact does not indicate to be as their principles are in change. Thus, they are recognized as analytical proposition merely, not synthetic as Kant suggested, in other words they are tautologies, logical positivist assert.[68]

After all, logical positivist asserts that there is a priori knowledge of *necessary proposition* merely, or priori ideas, but everything is formed from understanding the way logic functions, not from the synthetic propositions as Kant asserts.[69] In other words, the priori knowledge is considered as mere definitions taken from the consequences of the factual indicators, and which by time several of it might have to be proved being wrong.[70] If the analytical ideas are mere tautologies why they are not *refuted*?

Logical positivism claim that, the reason why they cannot be refuted is the very fact that they do not make any assertion about the empirical world, they are mere ideas.[71] In other words, the only reason we cannot refute the analytical

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[65] But Ayer, while elaborating the anlalytical ideas, dose not represent the real logical positivism point of view, which is know for its critical narrowness regarding these ideas.

[66] See: Ibid.

[67] See: Ibid., p. 82-84.

[68] See: Ibid., p. 84.

[69] See: Ibid.

[70] "Whether geometry can be applied to the actual physical world or not, is an empirical question which falls outside the scope of geometry itself. There is no sense, therefore, in asking which of the various geometries known to us are false and which are true. In so far as they are all free from contradiction, they are all true", Ibid., pp.82-83.

[71] "And just as the validity of an analytical proposition is independent of the nature of external world, so it is independent of the nature of our minds. It is perfectly conceivable that we should have employed different linguistic conventions from those which we actually do employ", Ibid., p. 84.

proposition that 5+7=12, is the only fact the 5+7 is the synonym of 12, in other words it is that linguistic proposition which compels us to do so. Similarly, the eye doctor being synonym with 'oculist' and the same explanation holds good for every priory truth.[72] Ayer asserts that all priori truths or analytical truths are accepted for two reasons;

1) For the fact that they do not make any assertion about empirical world.[73]

2) They, in expressing their truths contain synonyms as an explanation.[74]

> As Wittgenstein puts it, our justification for holding that the world could not conceivably disobey the laws of logic is simply that we could not say of an unlogical world how it would look. And just as the validity of an analytical proposition is independent of the nature of external world, so is it is independent of the nature of our minds.[75]

In other words, it is the natural necessity upon us to think and believe in particular way, but always under the conditions in here, nothing from the outside.[76]

Once more, Mathematic, Geometry or Logic functions, is the maintenance of particular paths which assist us to save some of our analytical result which in their absence would have been very difficult to achieve those. But, this means not make them priory truths, for the reason that they are formed gradually in steps. And logical positivist believe that if human being was able to see wider picture of things at once it would have been clear for him that several of mathematical and logical proposition are tautologies of some synonyms which contains nothing factual or new within, but are only expressed with different synonyms. 91x79=7189 for example, is beyond the scope of our immediate apprehension, so it is mathematic and arithmetic that brings this result together

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[72] See: Ibid., p. 85.
[73] See: Ibid., p. 84.
[74] See: Ibid., p. 85.
[75] Ibid., p. 84.
[76] "We see, then, that there is nothing mysterious about the apodeictic certainty of logic and mathematic", Ibid., p. 85.

so there cannot be any mistake. In other words, 7189 is just a synonym of 91x79, it is nothing new or factual inside, it is bare tautology.

> And tautologies, though they may serve to guide us in our empirical search for knowledge, do not in themselves contain any information about anything out of matter of fact.[77]

Ayer asserts that if those calculations were carried out mechanically it was very easy for us to make a slip and contradict ourselves, and this accounts for the mathematical and logical 'falsehood'.[78] Hence, there can not be any priori knowledge of reality, and all these logical facts are human discoveries which develop by time and their only concern is attaching synonyms to their theories whether it is in the shape of numbers or words merely.[79]

Thus, if asked, what are those books full of logic and mathematic, what are there to express, if not any reality than what?

Ayer asserts that they are there:

1) To help human mind find synonyms of the things he knows already.[80]

2) Complete this task easily and with fewer mistakes.[81]

3) Create out of this synonyms laws which can help us follow the particular procedure in our thinking.[82]

Obviously, remembering that these laws are nothing more than the power of human reason, limited and capable of developing according to new discoveries and new tools.[83]

It is noteworthy to mention the *third type* of ideas which have explored masses of consideration in logical positivist, known as the metaphysical ideas.

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[77] Ibid., p. 87.

[78] See: Ibid., p. 86.

[79] "It is easy to see that the danger of error in logical reasoning can be minimized by the introduction of symbolic device, which enable us to express highly complex tautologies in a conveniently simple form", Ibid.

[80] See: Ibid.

[81] See: Ibid.

[82] "To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology. And tautologies, though they may serve to guide us in our empirical search for knowledge, do not in themselves contain any information about any matter of fact", Ibid., p. 87.

[83] See: Ibid., 85-86.

Unlike two above mentioned, the analytical and synthetical, the metaphysical is only mention to indicate strongly their empirical assessment on the two above as only reliable type of ideas.

Many have declared that the doctrine of metaphysics is false, since it contradicts the empirical knowledge. Others have believed it to be uncertain, on the ground that its problems transcend the limits of human knowledge. Many anti-metaphysician have declared that occupation with metaphysical question is sterile.[84] As a matter of fact, one of the crucial disputes and divergences among philosophers is the meaning of metaphysics and the manner it can be defined as a proper notion which keeps standing in the philosophy field, particularly after the scientific revolution and the development of human thought.

From here, many ask that does it have to be the meaning of metaphysics always something to transcend reality or the world of science and commons-sense.

> Believing in metaphysics is a logical error rather than conscious desire which springs from the believers, but someone can still be metaphysician without believing in the transcendent reality.[85]

Thus, according to logical positivists, the metaphysical believers are of two types or groups. Coming to the first group of the metaphysicians, those to believe in the transcendent reality, logical positivist, in order to avoid obscurity and clarify more the source of this belief, prefers asking preliminary questions as: from what premises they have deduced this belief? Probably, the answer would return to the sense evidence. But if asked for valid reasoning process, probably there would not be one, as there is no empirical either existence premise to support him on that, logical positivist stresses.[86]

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[84] See: Rudolf Carnap, "The elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analyses of Language", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Positivism", p. 60.

[85] Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 33.

[86] See: Rudolf Carnap, "The elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analyses of Language", in, , A.J. Ayer " *Logical Positivism*", p. 72-73: Ibid., p. 33.

To break the silence, on the other hand, the believer in metaphysics has to claim that those premises he has deduced it from the intellectual intuition, which enabled him to know the facts unattained from the sense-experience.[87] But according to logical positivist, every respond from same angle would be considered a metaphysical argumentation as there are not such empirical or experienced facts to support any of his assertion.[88] In addition, the metaphysical ideas, in logical positivism, are by no means regarded as the *ideas* or cognitive thoughts, but we see it necessary to mention it as they have explored lots of discussion and disputes, where not only protest their embracement, but take those as the step to strengthen the empirical assertion on the analytical and syntactical ideas, as merely true.

Finally, positivists believe that the modern logic has given a sharp answer to the validity and justification of metaphysics. But having many and complex construction of metaphysical ideas touching the roots of the philosophy itself, positivist are obliged to follow unique evaluation method to come out with very distinguished manner and pure of any metaphysical notion, which caused lots and long procedures and efforts, to succeed to large extent but with lots of uncertainty and puzzlement.[89] On the other hand, if we attempt to go with more concrete steps for an exact difference between metaphysics and the science, as two opposite poles in logical positivism, they assert that the scientific facts are appearances traced in reality and immediately known to us, while metaphysics reality is referred to them in the circuitous route.[90]

From here, the main and first factor to distinguish the metaphysics from the science is the reality, which is defined as non-transcendent being. And,

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[87] See: Ibid., p. 34.

[88] See: Ibid., p. 34-35.

[89] "With the elimination of metaphysics, the Viennese positivists hoped that they had also put the theory of knowledge behind them, but in this they were deceived. The first source of trouble was the notion of elementary statement. Both their character and status became a matter of dispute", Alfred Ayer " *Logical Positivism*", p. 17.

[90] See: Moritz Schlick, *"Positivism and Realism"*, p. 37.

accordingly, 'only the given is real' (or only the given exists).[91] So, affirming the reality as able of creating transcendent meaning, like realist claim, or having the transcendent existence like metaphysics or idealist claim, is an easy task for logical positivist to annihilate. Beside this, instead of talking about metaphysics as non-empirical and nonsense ideas, logical positivist suggest for the search of more practical things which are circled on the meaning of statements and their elucidations. For instance, the statement 'principle'-in the sense of principle of 'being' not principle of knowledge or axiom- is one of examples brought up by logical positivist to demonstrate the language error committed by metaphysicians. Moreover, logical positivist claim that various metaphysician offer an answer to the question which is the highest "principle of the world", (or of things, of existence, of being), e.g. water, number, form, motion, life, the spirit, the ideas, the unconscious, activity, the good, and so forth.[92] Logical positivist claim that in order to discover the meaning of the word principle in this metaphysical question we must ask under what condition a statement 'x is the principle of y' would be true, and under what condition it would be false.[93]

Logical positivist presupposes that, the metaphysician reply would be approximately that, 'x is the principle of y' is to mean, 'y arises out of x' or the 'being of y rests on the being of x'. All this words or sentences in logical positivists thought are ambiguous and vague.[94]

In addition, logical positivist assert that, words here would have the clear meaning, if observed empirically that a thing 'x' is followed by the things or processes of kind 'y'. But the metaphysician, they assert, does not mean this observable relationship, because their assertion would be of the empirical or physical type, thing that metaphysicist do not aim. Thus, consequently, the idea which is used from the metaphysicisan does not exist, as there is nothing of this

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[91] See: Ibid., p. 39.
[92] See: Rudolf Carnap, " *The elimination of metaphysics*", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Posititvism", p. 65.
[93] See: Ibid.
[94] See: Ibid., p. 65.

type within empirical and observed facts.[95] Moreover, for logical positivist, word 'principle' despite taken from the Greek meaning "principium" which is derived from its original meaning as a 'beginning', it has been given new meaning in the metaphysics which makes it a priori beginning, and it remains meaningless as long as no method of verification can be described.[96] Similarly, similar evaluation is implied to the word 'God', which unless is verified with the experienced being, or material thing, or in the form of 'x is God', which is unacceptable from the metaphysician point of view, the word is meaningless.[97]

For, Ayer asserts that:

> It is characteristic of an empiricist to eschew metaphysics on the ground that every factual proposition must refer to sense-experience.[98]

Thus, in order to end disputes among philosophers in lots of subjects, positivist suggests establishing a purpose and method of a philosophical enquiry.[99] In this regard they believe that what has contributed as much as anything to the prevalent misunderstanding of the nature of philosophical analysis is the fact that propositions and questions which are really linguistic are often expressed in such a way that they appear to be factual.[100] Being not factual they lead to the embracing of many metaphysics in the philosophical field.

Logical positivists, due to the wrong perception in their formation of ideas-topic to be elaborated in the coming section-not only theoretically, but practically attempted to attend the clarification of metaphysical ideas

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[95]"In early days of the Vienna Circle, a sentence was said to have empirical meaning if it was capable , at least in principle, of complete verification by observation evidence; i.e., if observational evidence could be described which, if actually obtained, would conclusively establish the truth of the sentence, Carl G Hempel, " *The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning*", in, Ibid., p. 110: Rudolf Carnap, " *The elimination of metaphysics*", in, Ibid., p. 65.

[96] Rudolf Carnap, " *The elimination of metaphysics*", in, Ibid., p. 65-66.

[97]Rudolf Carnap, " *The elimination of metaphysics*", in, Ibid., p. 66-67.

[98] Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 71: " So that an utterance is by us accounted metaphysical only if it is neither a tautology nor yet capable of being substantiated to any degree whatsoever by any possible observation", Ibid., p. 136.

[99] Ibid., p. 33.

[100]"For it is absurd to suppose that the provision of definitions, and the study of their formal consequences, involves the nonsensical assertion that the world is composed of bare particulars, or any other metaphysical dogma", Ibid., p. 57-58.

methodologically being wrong and false, even while forming sentences or proposition.

II. Factors and elements of ideas verification and their relation to truth and false

Introduction

The empirical principle of logical positivist appears once more while arguing with the opinion, which is refuted essentially, that none immediately existing objects should be empirically verified[101]. Further, they state that such verification is considered not as a true proposition but as a priori proposition, and no empirical proposition can be defined by any priori but by pragmatic justification only.[102] In here positivist claim to be devoted empiricists, but to some extend differs from other empiricists assumptions, as mentioned above. Thus, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the practical verifiability and the verifiability in principle,[103] as a verification of the back side of moon, for instance.[104] In here, for logical positivist, the proposition is verified in principle not practically. But the metaphysical examples, like the 'Absolute enters into, but

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[101]"...the occurrence of certain sense-experience will itself constitute the only proof of their existence which is requisite or obtainable: and the question whether the appropriate sense-experience do or do not occur in the relevant circumstances is one that must be decided in actual practice, and not by any a priori argumentation", Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 121.

[102]"I still think that the empirical statements must refer to experiences, in the sense that they must be verifiable: but the reference need not be ot eh experiences of any one person as opposed to any other. But to acknowledge that this attempt to "neutralize" the verification principle meets with considerable difficulties of its own", Alfred Ayer, "*Logical Positivism*", p. 119: Alfred Ayer," Language Truth and Logic", p. 120.

[103]" As has been emphasized in empiricist literature, the term "verifiability" is to indicate, of course, the conceivability, or better, the logical possibility of evidence of an observational kind which ,if actually encountered, would constitute conclusive evidence for the given sentence; it is not intended to mean the technical possibility of performing the tests needed to obtain such evidence, and even less does it mean the possibility of actually finding directly observable phenomena which constitute conclusive evidence for that sentence-which would be tantamount to the actual existence of such evidence and would thus imply the truth of the given sentence", Carl G Hempel, " *The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning*", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Posititvism", p. 111.

[104] See: Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 36.

is itself incapable of evolution and progress', not only in practice is unverified but in principle also.[105]

Another further differentiation positivist make on the verifiable sentences is their division into strong and weak. The proposition is strong verifiable if it is conclusively established in the experience, and it is weak if it is considered probable verifiable from experience. 'All men are mortal', or 'the body extends in heat', as laws, are not all the time verifiable practically, although they are applied to infinite cases. Thus, for positivist, if they are considered as probable truths, than it must be allowed to accept metaphysics law as the experienced laws or probable truth.[106] In here, logical positivist attempts to find different solution. As mentioned earlier they consider them as 'weaker' propositions, whose verification rely on the probable verifications.[107]

Thus, in here we are to evaluate the verification process in logical positivism thought in detail, with its different types and manners, and the way it explores their empiricism in every part of it

a) Meaning and its Statement

Logical positivism believe that one of the chaotic states of philosophy is its acceptance of formulas without a careful assessment to their meanings,[108] or believing that by philosophy only we can discover what is real.[109] This believes, for logical positivism, are considered as the key problem to all our thoughts disputes in the ideas verification process.

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[105] See: Ibid., p. 36.

[106] See: Ibid., p. 37.

[107] See: Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 38.

[108] "It was one of the most serious errors of former times to have believed that the actual meaning and ultimate content was in turn to be formulated in statements, and so was representable in cognitions. This was the error of 'metaphysics' ", Moritz Shlick, "*The Turning Point in Philosophy*", in, " Logical Positivism", A.J. Ayer, p. 57.

[109]"On the contrary, we have been at pains to show that a great deal of what is commonly called philosophy is metaphysical in character", Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p.51: "But with regard to the proposition of philosophy this can never be the case. For, as we have seen, the function of the philosopher is not to devise speculative theories which require to be validated in experience, but to elicit he consequences of our linguistic usages", Ibid., p. 133.

> Actually, by philosophy analyses we cannot decide whether the state or record is real or not, but we can only determine what it means to claim that it is real,[110] and if particular matter IS or NOT real will be determined by the daily life experience or science.[111]

From here, as the first attempt to solve the matter of dispute from the meaning perspective, logical positivist questions whether the meaning can be attached to reality or the external world, or not? Yes, they claim. But only and only when we are certain that the meaning is clear to us, only then we are in position to state firmly and accurately or negatively.[112] But how the meaning is made clear to us?

In their assertion, meaning is made clear by the state of affair merely (the objectivity of meaning). In case there is no state of affair to be obtained, only then the claim is false. Thus, the meaning of a word in relation to the state of affair provides meaning to the proposition.

Hence, in order to avoid indefinitely defining words, logical positivist suggests that they should be pointed out directly, the act which takes place through pointing or showing. At the end, by the process of defining it is arrived at the bottom of final words which cannot be defined but only indicated directly.[113] And this process in Carnap's terminology is called as 'protocol sentences'.[114]

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[110]"The great contemporary turning point is characterized by the fact that we see in philosophy not a system of cognition, but a system of acts; philosophy is that activity through which meaning of statements is revealed or determined", Moritz Shlick, "*The Turning Point in Philosophy*", in, " Logical Positivism", Ayer, p. 56.

[111] See: Moritz Schlick,"*Positivism and Realism*", p. 40: "Philosophy merely shows him that experience can justify his beliefs", Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 48: "Every science, (in so far as we take this word to refer to the content and not to the human arrangements for arriving at it) is a system of cognitions, that is, of true experiential statements. And the totality of sciences, including the statements of daily life, is the system of cognitions", Moritz Shlick, "*The Turning Point in Philosophy*", in, Alfred Ayer " *Logical Positivism*", p. 56.

[112]"What have been considered such up to now are not genuine questions but meaningless sequences of words. To be sure, they look like questions from outside, since they seem to satisfy the customary rules of grammar, but in truth they consist of empty sounds, because they transgress the profound inner rules of logical syntax discovered by the new analyses", Moritz Shlick, "*The Turning Point in Philosophy*", in, " *Logical Positivism*", Ayer, p. 56.

[113]"For if, say, I give meaning of my words through explanatory statements and definitions, that is by help of other words, one must ask further for the meaning of these words, and so on. This

With the elucidation of meaning in proposition is obtained the possibility to differentiate between the true and false,[115] two terms to be evaluated in coming section. In addition, it is obtained the possibility of shifting from meaning to the exact data and from there toward the process of verification.[116] Once again, logical positivist firmly states that "the *meaning* of every proposition is ultimately determined by the 'given' alone".[117]

Likewise, logical positivist emphasizes on the meaning of statement which is brought up by testing.[118] If the testing entails the same meaning for true as for false than according to logical positivist the proposition is empty, has no meaning in it, in other words it conveys nothing. "And the testable difference is present only if there is difference in the 'given'".[119] But a statement or a question is at times called meaningless if it is entirely sterile to assert or ask it. For instance, the question like: "what is the average weight of those inhabitants of Islamabad whose telephone number ends with 3, or a statement which is quite obviously false like "in 1910 Vienna had 6 inhabitants" or about a statement which is not just empirically, but logically false, as a contradictory statement as "persons A and

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process cannot proceed endlessly. It always comes to an end in actual pointings, in exhibiting what is meant, thus in real acts; only these acts are no longer capable of, or in need of, further explanation", Moritz Shlick, "*The Turning Point in Philosophy*", in, Alfred Ayer " *Logical Positivism*", p. 57.

[114] "Regardless of this diversity of opinion it is certain that a sequence of words has a meaning only if its relations of deducibility to the protocol sentences are fixed. Whatever the characteristics of the protocol sentences may be: and similarly, that a word is significant only if the sentences in which it may occur are reducible to protocol sentences", Rudolf Carnap, "The elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analyses of Language", in, Alfred Ayer "*Logical Positivism*", p. 63.

[115] "The act of verification in which the path to the solution finally ends is always of the same sort: it is the occurrence of a definite fact that is confirmed by observation, by means of immediate experience. In this manner the truth (or falsity) of every statement, of daily life or science, is determined. There is thus no other testing and corroboration of truths except through observation and empirical science", Moritz Shlick, "*The Turning Point in Philosophy*", in, Alfred Ayer, "*Logical Positivism*", p. 56.

[116] See: Moritz Schlick,"*Positivism and Realism*", p. 41.

[117] See: Ibid., p. 41: " The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability..., if he knows what observation would lead him, under certain conditions...", Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 35.

[118]"We inquire in every case what observations would lead us to answer the question, one way or the other; and, if none can be discovered, we must conclude that the sentence under consideration does not , as far as we are concerned, express a genuine question, however strongly its grammatical appearance may suggest that it does", Ibid.

[119] See: Moritz Schlick,"*Positivism and Realism*", p. 41.

B are each a year older than other". Though the sentences, in the mentioned examples, are really meaningful, here they are pointless anywhere and as such are considered as false. For positivists, only meaningful sentences are divisible into (theoretically) fruitful and sterile, true and false.

What do we do with the meaningless sentences and how they are considered as such? In the strict sense, however, a sequence of words is meaningless if it does not; within a specified language constitute a statement. For logical positivists, it may happen that a sequence of words looks like a statement at first glance," in that case we call it a pseudo-statement".[120]

So, for logical positivist, it is the meaning the door to the testing and proper verification of statement.[121] But the meaning process does not entangle the process of verification,[122] because even in meaningful unverified statements, the statement might stay logically true but not factually.[123] Moreover, logical positivists state that, the statement which claims that, 'within every electron there is nucleus, which is always present but produces no affects outside and its presence it not discernible', requires the question in its meanings. Probably the answer would be that the meaning declares that there is something existing in electrons. But this respond, or particularly this 'something' which is discussed about in the sentence would have immediately made the sentence meaningless and purposeless, as its verification is logically and factually impossible.[124] For, no effects of any kind proceed from this 'something' in the sentence. In these similar events, for logical

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[120] See: Rudolf Carnap, "*The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language*", in, "*Logical Positivism*", Alfred Ayer, p. 60.

[121] "Either we have this meaning, and then we know what is meant by the statement, or we don not posses it, in which case mere empty words confront us and as yet not statement at all. There is nothing in between and there can be not talk of the probability that the meaning is the right one", Moritz Shlick, "*The Turning Point in Philosophy*", in, Ibid., p. 59.

[122] "A word which (within definite language) has a meaning, is usually also said to designate a concept; if it only seems to have a meaning while it really does not, we speak of a "pseudo-concept", Rudolf Carnap, "*The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language*", in, Alfred Ayer, " Logical Positivism", p. 61-62.

[123] See: Moritz Schlick, "*Positivism and Realism*", p. 41.

[124] See: Ibid., p. 42.

positivists, it is the science as an activity to verify and testify the statements.[125] But in order to get testifying right, the sentence should contain proper meaning within.

What then does it mean to claim that the pointer of meanings indicates a particular scale or should point them out directly? The answer to this cannot be nothing else whatever but a reference to the occurrence of certain data or a certain sensation. And true or falsity of this statement, for logical positivism, depends in the occurrence or non-occurrence of these references, and this is admitted generally and especially by physicist.[126] On the other hand, the verification of meaning, for Ayer, should mean more than pointing that the pointer stands at a certain mark on the scale, and more than the presence of certain sensations (namely, the presence of a certain state-affair in the external world).[127] As the science says always more than what is verified practically, logical positivists make these act as a guilty of inconsistency-as mentioned in the case of simultaneous which is too vague and suspicious if anything lies behind it.[128] In other words, for logical positivist, having the science step forward in the assumptions requires proper statement or meaning verification-not the pointer at certain mark- in order to prevent any possible error to occur in the coming evaluations of their hypotheses.[129] Always to remember that, for logical positivist, many science propositions are merely the provisions of *indefinitely* many possible propositions, and it is acknowledged, indeed, that even the most assured proposition of science have always to be regarded merely as hypotheses, which

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[125]"It is clear, and is so far as I know disputed by no one, that knowledge in life and scence in some sense begins with confirmation of facts, and that the :protocoal statements" in which ths occurs stand in the same sense at the beginning of science", Moritz Shlick, "*The Foundation of knowledge*", in, Alfred Ayer, " *Logical Positivism*", p. 210.

[126] See: Moritz Schlick, "*Positivism and Realism*", p. 42.

[127] See: Ibid., p. 43.

[128] See: Ibid.

[129]"The content, soul and spirit of science is lodged naturally in what in the last analysis its statements actually mean; the philosophical activity of giving meaning is therefore the Alpha and Omega of all scientific knowledge", Moritz Shlick, "*The Turning Point in Philosophy*", in, Alfred Ayer, "*Logical Positivism*", p. 56.

remain open to further definition improvement.[130] In addition, there should never be taken in concern the relation of data and their consequences by a single isolated verification, instead, what everyone should know from the physical facts is that they exist in long chain relation, and the science should seek this definite relation of these consequences. However, the best element to achieve this target is by expressing proper meaning of the proposition we are talking about, and get it to other proposition of the same elements or meanings. In this way merely, logical positivist believe to attain interrelated and exact link of data and continue forward or even backward there in the historical facts.[131]

To underline the importance of meaning of statements logical positivists call for the description of difference and similarity of two green color papers, which despite being present on scale and pointed, they still form a perplexity. For, doubtless, every man would agree on the sameness of both greens, but once we bring only one green and ask anyone else to describe for us it may bring different description. Hence, in order to save inner meaning we go for the exact notion and utter description statements.[132] But, logical positivists keep replicating that the meaning of a physical statement is never, definitely, defined by a single isolated verification.

Why the expressions have to be different and why the statements have to be different. Isn't there a common sense to raise collective meanings of our statements?

In this regard, logical positivist believe that, though with very perfect methods to describe the way of universal consciousness, science failed to do that, as well as show us the precise ending that all feeling resemble each other.[133] For, if

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[130] See: Moritz Schlick, *"Positivism and Realism"*, p. 44.

[131] See: Ibid., pp. 43-44.

[132] "One must bear in mind that it is a matter of the ultimate basis of knowledge of *reality*, and that it is not sufficient for this to treat *statements* as, so to speak, 'ideal construction' (as one used to say in Platonic fashion), but rather that one must concern oneself with real occurrences, with events that take place in time, in which the making of judgments consists, hence with psychic acts of 'thought', or physical acts of 'speaking' or writing'", Moritz Shlick, *"The Foundation of knowledge"*, in, Alfred Ayer, *" Logical Positivism"*, p. 211.

[133] See: Moritz Schlick, *"Positivism and Realism"*, p. 45.

the feelings are different from person to person in order to escape from the solipsism pluralism, logical positivist calls to the theory of meaning and definition of each and every man experience and verification. In this way, they emphasize that the *exact* and *detailed* common cognition or common feeling is a confuted matter and the attempt to bring such a result from the science and other surveys, as the common feeling, is meaningless. For the fact that, every man might have different conception while defining and elaborating, but they cannot have totally different meaning while observing.[134] For, to get the right meaning of each proposition it must be started with meanings of the statements and their verification. And, for positivist, in this way merely the meaning can be communicated. Subsequently, while elaborating the common-sense or phenomenalism of meanings, for logical positivist, the avoidance from mutual contradiction, on one hand, and the possibility to share in our daily basis on the other, makes all meanings verified. Because if there was a non-verified meaning, that would have created a contradictious evaluations, as in case of *metaphysical ideas*.

Again, positivists assert that, in the level of a single word not as a statement or proposition, everything we talk, we say or behave contain a meaning within, because we continuously act and interact. But in the statement and proposition perspective, in order to get clear and exact understanding of meanings, they must be formed in the verified properties and exact meanings. And meaning verification, in logical positivism, is applied in order to differentiate between two things, 1) the logical impossible meanings, on one side, and 2) empirical incapable on other. According to the first the proposition can have no meaning if it is not logically proved but might contain meaning if it is empirically incapable.[135]

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[134] See: Ibid., p. 46.

[135] "As our formulation shows, the empiricist meaning criterion lays down the requirement of experiental testability for those among the cognitively meaningful sentences which are neither analytic nor contradictory; let us call them sentences with empirical meaning or empirical

b) Relative and Modal Logic Explanation of Sentences

Before we proceed with the elaboration of the relative system of sentences and the manner they are adjusted, which has covered lots of discussion in logical positivism, we see more useful to start with logical explanation of sententeces. And at mean time, logical explanation, will assist to make simpler for us to understand the exact mechanism of the semantic solution to the sentences and their foundation.

Logical analyses of sentences pronounce the verdict as meaningless if any alleged knowledge pretends to reach above or behind experience. This verdict hits, in the first place, any speculative metaphysics and any alleged knowledge by pure thinking or by pure intuition that pretends to be able to do without experience. Logical analyses of sentences, by means of special inferences, equally is applied to the kind of metaphysical prepositions which begins with experience and attempts to acquire knowledge about the meanings which transcendents experience.[136] In other words, here logical positivist attempt to show the logical defects of the sentences, beside meaning (semantic) defects which was elaborated in the above section, so there is no way to commit any of syntax or logical errors.

More precisely, modal logical segments are sentences verified with semantically rules alone with no reference to extra linguistic facts.[137] Afterwards, the equivalence process of logical truths is extended to their designators other than sentences alone.[138] Words like, *nothing, absolute, beyond existence*, in logical positivism, are senseless and the example whose validation rotate in the logic,

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significance", Carl G Hempel, "The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning", in, Alfred Alfred Ayer, "Logical Posititvism", p. 109: Moritz Schlick,*"Positivism and Realism"*, p. 46.

[136] See: Rudolf Carnap, "The elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analyses of Language", in, A.J. Ayer " *Logical Positivism*", pp. 76-77.

[137]"A sentence says nothing unless it is empirically verifiable", Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 73.

[138]"The new method allegedly consists in doing away with the 'traditional' assumption that linguistic expressions name concrete or abstract entities and in replacing it with the ascription to them of intensions and extensions. Since, however, they are said to 'designate' their intensions and extensions ,it is not clear that the change is more than nominal", A.J.Ayer, *"Philosophy In The Twentieth Century"*, London, Counterpoint, Unwin Paperbacks (Boston, Sydney), 1982, p. 157.

syntax or grammatical error.[139] In particular, mostly the logical mistakes of sentences are made without any obvious grammatical and meaning mistake, which give the impression to the listener that the sentence is completely correct.

Coming back to the word 'nothing', logical positivist elaborates it from different angles, upraising different questions, as 'what about this nothing', 'does the nothing exists only because of Not', 'where do we seek the nothing, 'where do we find nothing', and lots of similar questions which attempt to vindicate the logical error to veil the meaning of the word 'nothing' in the sentence.[140] In addition, logical positivists state that, the answer to the question, 'what is outside', as 'nothing is outside' is a logical error. And it becomes logically error due to assertion of the nothingness as a notion of 'being' which is a logical mistake. As, for logical positivists, nothingness has no existence in its own but in relation with other acts or beings only. Thus, the sentence would be logically right if stated as 'there is nothing', which asserts that 'there' in a particular place. As, in this manner the word 'there' conditions the presence of something somewhere which, is nothing. [141] Similarly, logical positivist believe that many other daily expressions commit same logical errors, and it is from here where many metaphysical or senseless meanings appear and give the impression as they express and talk about the reality and the 'given' only.

Moreover, the logical explanation of sentences, on other hand, includes the method of 1) extension and 2) intension. As such it is the process of modifying and extending certain customary concepts, especially those of class and

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[139] See: Rudolf Carnap, "The elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analyses of Language", in, Alfred Ayer, "*Logical Positivism*", p. 74-76: Carl G Hempel, "The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Posititvism", p. 112.

[140] See: Rudolf Carnap, "The elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analyses of Language", in, Alfred Ayer, "*Logical Positivism*", p. 70.

[141] "The absolute is perfect' and 'Nothingness nothings' cannot be translated into and empiricist language because their key terms are not definable by means of purely logical expressions and observation terms", Carl G Hempel, "The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Posititvism", p. 118: Rudolf Carnap, "The elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analyses of Language", in, A.J. Ayer, Logical Positivism, pp. 71-72.

property.[142] Beside, being a system of collection of designators,[143] it includes declarative sentences, individual expressions[144] and predicators including abstract expressions.[145] In addition, the sentence is said to be *extensional* if further use of it or replacement with other designator transforms the whole sentence into the equivalent one. And the sentence is said to be *intentional* if the sentence is not extensional but its intention is the same of that of designator, and if the replacement of the designator by an L-equivalent (logical equivalent) transforms the whole sentence into the equivalent one.[146] At the end, the equated sentences into their extension (if two designator are equivalent) and intention (if they are moreover L-equivalent) are used for further equally extension and intention in further apply. For instance, the semantical concept of truth has its explicandum the concept of truth as used in everyday language and in all of traditional and modern logic.[147] A sentence is Logically true (l-true) in a semantical system (S) if and only if sentence is true in semantical system in a such a way that its truth can be established on the basis of the semantical rules of the system alone, or what the Leibiniz stated: 'what must hold in all possible worlds, [148]without any reference to extra linguistic facts'.[149]

Since our state-description represents the possible worlds, for logical positivist, this means that a sentence is logically true. But this is a very superficial

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[142]"These extensions are designed to include in the realm of cognitive significance various types of sentences which might occur in advanced scientific theories, or which have to be admitted simply for the sake of systematic simplicity and uniformity, but on whose cognitive significance or non-significance a study of what the term 'intelligible assertion' means in everyday discourse could hardly shed any light at all", Carl G Hempel, "The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Posititvism", p. 125: Rudolf Carnap, Meaning And Necessity, A study In Semantic and Modal Logic, (Chicago Illinois: The University Of Chicago Press), p. v.

[143]"The term *'designator'* is *introduced* for all those expressions to which a semantical meaning analysis is applied, the term will be used here especially for sentences, predicators (i.e., predicate expressions), and individual expression", Ibid., p. 2.

[144]"Carnap insists that his intentions, including the idividual concepts, are not mental constructs. They are objectively real", Alfred Ayer, Philosophy In The Twentieth Century, (London, Boston, Sydeny: Counterpoint, Unwin Paperbacks, 1982), p. 158.

[145] See: Rudolf Carnap, Meaning And Necessity, p. 1.

[146] See: Rudolf Carnap, Meaning And Necessity, p. 2.

[147] See: Ibid., p. 8.

[148] See: Ibid., p. 10.

[149] See: Ibid.

way of elaboration the logically true sentences. Moreover, this leads to the following definition that; a sentence is true if holds state description (outside), which includes the first part of the title.[150] For, whether this state-description is true or not, depends upon the facts of the universe. Therefore, in this case, even if sentence is true, it is not possible to establish its truth without reference to facts.[151] If we want to determine the truth-value of 'Bs', we have to go beyond the mere semantical analysis to the observation of facts.[152] Carnap, for instance, in order to elaborate the extensional and intentional meaning process brings up the sentences which have in common their class with other sentences, like saying, human and featherless biped. [153] They both belong to same class by sharing same meaning.[154] But still, for Carnap it is unclear under what condition properties are usually regarded as identical. As such it will be vague if we regard a property as identical if it is shown with logical means alone without a reference to the facts and proper semantic code evaluation.[155]

Carnap wants to say that, not always the similar meaning or excepted meanings logically indicate the same meaning in facts. As the sentence, 'human is featherless biped' is not the same with the 'human as a rational animal'. In other words, he suggests that we should go for sharp and exact division of sentences and their meaning into the classes they belong to, even though they may express the same meaning and factual one. But for the sake of clarification and avoidance of any perplex or metaphysical possible meanings, logical positivist suggest the usage of obvious and apparent meanings, as well as symbols.[156] Thus, the meaning of sentence, as they are taken from the facts, should again be turned toward they

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[150] See: Ibid., p. 10: "He again follows Frege in crediting the sentences with sense. Though, as we have seen, he calls these snese intentions, and speaks of their designating propositions, whereas Frege has them naming thoughts", Alfred Ayer, "*Philosophy In The Twentieth Century*", p. 159.
[151] See: Rudolf Carnap, Meaning And Necessity, p. 11.
[152] See: Ibid., p. 12.
[153]"Carnap claims to develop a new method for analyzing the meanings of linguistic expressions as well as to lay a semantic foundation for modal logic", Alfred Ayer, "*Philosophy In The Twentieth Century*", p. 157.
[154] See: Rudolf Carnap, Meaning And Necessity, p. 18.
[155] See: Ibid.
[156] See: Ibid., p. 25.

proper and exact logical meaning they are supposed to have in the sentence. Practically, Carnap suggests using the extension and intension terminology as designators to hold different path but one target.[157] In other words, logical positivist suggests that, we do not have to limit the usage of logical syntax and their expression into one way merely, but it can have different ways and manners. For them, the significance relies at the corresponding of meaning and being sufficiently in agreement with the other meaning which exists outside in the world of facts.[158]

If the predicators with the help of logical particles are known according to observation and experience, like the red color for example, later, it is possible to compound predicators out of the given and verified predicators.[159] Then, no longer the compound of predicators are dependent on our observation.[160] To understand predicator 'human', for example, we must understand the components of predicators. If someone mentions the sentence 'human' and 'twenty high feet' we will easily understand that there is no such component of these predicators in the world. So, mentioning such preposition is not meaningless, as it contains meaning, but it is non factual one.[161] Further, the exemplification in experience is required only for primary predicators, with the help of which others are interpreted.[162]

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[157] See: Ibid., pp. 18-19: " Carnap claims that every designation, as he calls it, refers both to an intention and an extension", Alfred Ayer, "*Philosophy In The Twentieth Century*", p. 157.

[158]"The intentional entities to which individual constants or descriptions, predicates, and declarative sentences are respectively said to refer are individual concepts, properties and propositions, the corresponding extensions being individuals, classes and truth-values", Alfred Ayer, "*Philosophy In The Twntieth Centry*", p. 158.

[159]"Since all defined term can be eliminated in favor of primitives, these rules stipulate in effect that a language L is empiricist if all its sentences are expressible, with the help of the usual logical locutions, in terms of observable characteristics of physical objects", Carl G Hempel, "The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Posititvism", p. 117.

[160] See: Rudolf Carnap, Meaning And Necessity, p. 20.

[161] "The fault of our language identified here lies, therefore, in the circumstance that, in contrast to a logically correct language, it admits of the same grammatical form for meaningful and meaningless word sequences", Rudolf Carnap, " *The elimination of metaphysics*", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Posititvism", p. 69: Rudolf Carnap, *Meaning And Necessity*, p. 21.

[162] See: Ibid., p. 21.

> Whatever is said in this book about properties may be wrong, but it has at least cognitive content. This follows from the fact that our statements belong to or can be translated into the general language of science. We use the term 'property' in that sense in which it is used by scientists in statements of the following form...[163]

Thus, Carnap suggests that the semantic properties merely are not sufficient to declare the proposition as true or false except if we turn to facts verification and differentiate those exemplified by facts from those which are not. Which means that the logical positivism deals only and only in the terms used from the language of science, and are understood by it merely, and deals not with hypostatization, known as the theory of idealist which claims that the meaning are formed in the world of ideas.[164]

Thus, as mentioned above, for logical positivist, it is to philosophy to provide definitions for the solutions of problems. But the definitions used in philosophy are not what we find in the dictionaries, known as *explicit definitions*, instead logical positivists call those as the *definitions in use.*[165]

If we are to simplify the *explicit definition* and its difference with definition in use, according to logical positivist the *explicit definition* is: finding to a word a synonym. By synonym here they mean a different word with same meaning, which after utilization entails the same meaning, and if it is denied contradicts the assertion of other meaning. Like sentence 's' entails sentence 't', while sentence 't' if used deduces the same proposition like sentence 's'. And the proposition 'p' follows the proposition 'q', while the denial of 'p' contradicts the assertion of 'q'.[166]

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[163] Ibid., p. 22.

[164]"At same time he rebuts the charge of hypostatization. As I understand it he says, a hypostatization or substantialization or reification consists in mistaking as things entities, which are not things", Alfred Ayer, *Philosophy In The Twntieth Centry*, p.158.

[165] See: Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p.59

[166]"A person S tests (verifies) a system-sentence by deducing from it sentences of his own protocol language, and comparing these sentences with those of his actual protocol. The possibility of such a deduction of protocol sentences constitutes the content of a sentence. If a sentence permits no such deduction, it has no content, and it is meaningless", Rudolf Carnap, "*Psychology in Physical*

While, with *definitions* in *use*, logical positivist, means not producing synonyms but the sentences equal to those, or in other words translating those sentences while the meaning will remain as it is.[167] 'The round square cannot exist' is equal to 'no one thing can be both square and round', or 'the author of Waverley was scotch', is equivalent to, 'one person, and one person only wrote Waverley and that person was Scotch'. By these examples logical positivist shows the manner we can define the sentence in use with different sentence, but still with same meaning,' and thus, they furnish us with a definition of these phrases in use'.[168]

If we are looking for straight explanation to this process, is like giving explanation to the sentence with other words.[169] But, logical positivism state that, in order to be able to define symbols which occur in them it is required proper understanding of symbols.[170] Thus, for logical positivism, beside the meaning clarification, in order to avoid any misunderstanding and any obscurity in the symbols,[171] as well as insure that the meaning of sentences do correspond, it is up to philosophy to offer the clear explanation of synonyms. From here, for logical positivist the sentences are considered to be corresponding if in the replacement process they still give same meaning. But the complexity starts in the usage of signs like 'is', which takes place in different forms, thus, again it is up to philosophy to explicit their meaning and avoid ambiguity.

'He is the author of that book', and 'a cat is a mammal', if translated it is obtained that the word 'is' has no function in the sentence. As in the first example we say that, 'he only wrote that book, and second, 'the class of mammals contains the class of cats', but the class of mammals contains other animals as

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Language", in, Alfred Ayer, " *Logical Positivism*", p. 166: Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 60.

[167] See: Ibid., pp .60-61.

[168] "The effect of this definition of descriptive phrases, as of all good definition, is to increase our understanding of certain sentences", Ibid., p. 61.

[169] "What was required was translation of sentences containing such phrases which would reveal what may be called their logical complexity", Ibid., p. 62.

[170] See: Ibid., p. 61.

[171] See: Ibid., p. 62.

well.[172] Thus, in both examples 'is' is an ambiguous symbol so we don't have to be confused. What it must be differentiated, logical positivist suggest, is a difference between symbol which in other word is the meaning of sentence or the message it delivers, in one side, and the sign which is the object itself or as known as self content, on the other.

In other words, when logical positivism speaks of a object 'b, c, d' being element of 'e' they don't mean they are necessary part of each other as the hand being part of body, but they mean that sentence where 'e' is mentioned can be translated into any other sentence which does not contain 'e' but do contain symbols 'b, c, d' for example. Or, it can be translated into other sentence which contains one of the characters the sentence 'e' is constituted,[173] the process which is done with revealing their logical complexity.[174] Moreover, logical positivists state that one must be aware of not making out of the logical construction the fictitious, like perplexing meaning of 'English state' and the word 'table' for example, and making out them sense-contents. Because the word 'table' can be described as a word to stand for sense-content not explicitly defined, but in use, but English state, though to express a meaning cannot be defined.[175] In this way, while talking about the symbol 'table' in one language, logical positivist state that it can always be translated with other words related to the table, even without mentioning the word table. For example, defining as, 'it is a standing thing with four legs made for this purpose'. But, this does not mean that we can substitute the sense content symbol for the symbol 'table' in the original sentence. For, even if we try to substitute original sentence with other sense-content symbol, the last sentence will be mere nonsense.[176] For, despite the fact that some may think that the definition is merely the logical fictitious, logical positivist believe that the main reason behind it is not to replace the sense-content but to enable us to

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[172] See: Ibid., pp. 63-64.
[173] See: Ibid., p. 63.
[174] See: Ibid., p. 62.
[175] See: Ibid., pp. 63-64.
[176] See: Ibid., p. 64.

translate the sentences of a certain type in order to reconfirm its objective meaning.[177]

Hence, positivists apply the translation of sentence as their double verification to reconsider if the idea is real objective or sense content, so all what has to do with metaphysical meaning should vanish from the use.[178] To not forget that, logical positivist states that the *definition in use* is not applied to merely linguistic proposition having no sense-content like the definition of 'what is the nature of material things', which looks like factual proposition but it is not. But the definition in use is applied to those sentences which we can find resemblance outside and translate it to other similar contents, because the sense-content explains the relationship of symbols and not the properties of the things which the symbols denote.[179]

Remembering the fact that logical positivist are aware of fact that lots of symbols is difficult to translate to other similar symbols due to the lack of symbols.[180] "So when we talk about the symbols we talk about the principles of this construction".[181]

Another very important point, mentioned in logical positivism is the meaning delivery of a sentence in accordance with the factual. For them, frequently, while defining the meaning with other *definition in use*, the symbol does not convey the exact performance because of its weak synonym of it.

The sentence, 'p is a law of nature', for instance, is equivalent to 'p is a general hypothesis which can always be relied on'. But the word 'law' in the first sentence is much stronger and may give different and stronger meaning to the

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[177]See: Ibid.

[178]"In effect therefore, the translatability criterion proposes to characterize the cognitively meaningful sentences by the vocabulary out of which they may be constructed, and by the syntactical principles governing their construction", Carl G Hempel, " *The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning*", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Posititvism", p. 117.

[179]"What the positivist suggests is defining the symbols directly or translation into other proposition about the relationship of symbols themselves". Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", pp. 64-65.

[180] See: Ibid., p. 65.

[181] See: Ibid., p. 65.

listener than the second sentence. Despite the fact that the first sentence sense-content is false, as according to logical positivist there are no law in nature and the idea in this sentence is nonsense and not experimentally proved one.[182]

Once again, logical positivism states that the definitions in the area of semantical evaluation increase our understanding and clarify for us if the sentences refer to material things or no.[183] Hence, the philosophies concern, in logical positivism point of view, is the sentences elaboration in accordance with empirical facts, starting from their meaning. For, if the meaning does not entail the proper symbol related to any empirical fact, and is not equivalent with other sentence to deduce the same fact, than no further meaning is required.[184]

c) External and Empirical Facts

The external in logical positivist view has two meaning, 1) in daily use and 2) as a technical term in philosophy. In daily expression the notion external covers all what is seen, touched, or anything in existence which even the child asked about can easily know.[185] Or with different expression, it stands as the opposite to the internal which covers memories, thoughts, dreams, wishes and other similar statements.[186]

Schlick asserts that, "the words, actuality, reality, or existence are not properties". In other words, saying that dollar is circled and dollar in my pocket is the actual, are two different logical statements.[187] As the matter of fact, Schlick, as his other associates wants to draw a distinction line between what is known by certainty like the matter of actuality in the above example as well as less certainty, if we do no mistake with dollar expression being circled. In other words, for

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[182] See: Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 69.
[183] See: Ibid., p. 68.
[184] See: Ibid., p. 69.
[185]"How does it happen, then, that these questions about existence have given rise to philosophical dispute?", Alfred Ayer, "*Philosophy In The Twentieth Century*", p. 160.
[186] See: Moritz Schlick,"*Positivism and Realism*", p. 50: "An internal question is one that can be settled by giving examples of the sort of entity of whose existence is under discussion", Alfred Ayer,"*Philosophy In The Twentieth Century*", p, 161.
[187] See: Moritz Schlick,"*Positivism and Realism*", p. 47.

positivists, the presence of dollar in my pocket is always stronger notion than the adjective of it being circled. As for someone it can be different, maybe not exactly round, but it cannot ever be claimed to be absent or not existing.

From here, the verification of ideas in logical positivism, as seen so far, as in every other materialistic and empiricist philosophy starts with reality and the sensational perception, giving less attention to the evaluation of their external attributes like white, round, bitter, which, according to them, are the main mistakes of the metaphysical elaborations.[188] Thus, the cognition or sense-content starts with very essential attribute of the fact which as mention is its own existence.

> What gives one the right to believe in the existence of a certain material thing is simply the fact that one has certain sensations: for whether one realizes it or not, to say that the thing exists is equivalent to saying that such sensations are obtainable.[189]

In addition, as facts evaluation should end at the external observation merely, they contain the necessary meanings to entail other parts of their existence, even if it is deficient to our immediate observation. Like the back side of moon, front side of what obliges to believe in it, or existence of atom or molecules whose direct experience is not required for any empirical verification, for instance.[190] In both examples, logical positivist attempt to be both empiricist as well as including the indispensable logical analyses which do not annihilate their empiricism fundamentals. Moreover, the verification process, logical positivist stress, must go through the law and regularities in order to differentiate between it and illusionary or hallucinations meaning.[191] And this process is fulfilled through law governed connection of perception.[192] Thus, according to

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[188]"So that those who raise questions about Being which are based on the assumption that existence is an attribute are guilty of following grammar beyond the boundaries of sense", Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 43.

[189] Ibid., p. 50.

[190] See: Moritz Schlick,"*Positivism and Realism*", p. 47.

[191] See: Ibid., p. 47.

[192] See: Ibid.

logical positivist, those who assert the existence of facts out of their existence or reality are just folly.[193] Moreover, even the one who attributes the existence of those facts or their cognition to the ideas of God, does not reject reality but rejects to understand at all.

Coming to the verification of the external proposition, 'the castle is in the park', for example, logical positivist asks whether the castle can be there the night we cannot see it. Undoubtedly, they reply, as the castle cannot be built in one night.

> And this indicates not only that it was yesterday, but the castle was there for years, hence since before we were born, and this is valid for every tree and house we see or know, in past or future existence.[194]

For, logical positivist affirm that these things 'exist independently of us', or as mentioned above by Schlick that the reality is not proposition, and through it we can perfectly distinguish things dependent on us, like not being able to see the wall, or seeing the black spot but still knowing that the wall is there.

Beside simplicity of daily use of the meaning of external, science on the other side while looking into the proton or atoms looks with the same verification eye as looking at trees and mountain, with not a single doubt, and this is the philosophical meaning of external. Moreover everything the scientist talks about is all empirical, there is nothing metaphysical, is what logical positivist claim as a support to Kant theory.[195] But logical positivist, unlike realist or physicist, does not limit the world reality only in the external world. As for the them- as mentioned above-the transcendent or unseen like atom, is real (to not perplex between the meaning of transcendent which might mean being behind and being unknown, used as a metaphysical notion, and this is what logical positivist refutes). In other words, the division of the world into the

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[193] "I must confess that I should charge with folly and reject a limine every philosophical system that involved the claim that clouds and stars, mountains and sea, were not actually real, that the phusical world did not exist, and that the chair against the wall ceases to be every time turn my back on it", Moritz Schlick, Ibid., p. 47.

[194] See: Moritz Schlick, *"Positivism and Realism"*, p. 50.

[195] See: Moritz Schlick, "Positivism and Realism", p 51.

accessible and inaccessible has no place in their theory, as everything we see and are not able to see in the reality is described as the existence. Hitherto, metaphysical world exists not in logical positivism thought, as metaphysical realism cannot be actually tested or verified.[196] Moreover, they state to metaphysicians that: Your words assert nothing at all.[197] In here, logical positivist does not contradict metaphysicians, but he says: I do not understand you.[198] Or talking about some other world impossible of any verification has no meaning according to logical positivist.

Hence, the very principle of positivism to be as a foundation of their theory is what Ayer asserts;

> There is no absolute standard of rationality[199], just as there is no method of constructing hypotheses which is guaranteed to be reliable. We must trust the methods of contemporary science because they have been successful in practice.[200] If in the future we were to adopt different methods, then beliefs which are now rational might become irrational from the standpoint of these new methods. But the fact that this is possible has no bearing on the fact that these beliefs are irrational now.[201]

As seen, the empirical or existence facts have a great impact on the verification of the proposition, or it can be declared that they are the key of verification process in general, but not in long terms. How logical positivist explain this?

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[196] See: Ibid., p. 53.

[197] "They show how easy it is to write sentences which are literally nonsensical without seeing that they are nonsensical", Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 44.

[198] See: Moritz Schlick,"*Positivism and Realism*", p. 54: " A truth to which Bradley gives a special twist in maintaining that the man who is ready to prove that metaphysics is impossible is a brother metaphysician with a rival theory of his own", Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 34.

[199] "For when we come to define 'rationality' we shall find that for us 'being relational' entails being guided in a particular fashion by past experience", Ibid., p. 50: "For we define rational belief as one which is arrived at by the methods which we now consider reliable", Ibid., p. 100.

[200] "But as we shall argue presently, many terms even of the physical sciences are not so definable; hence the criterion would oblige us to reject, as devoid of cognitive import, all scientific hypotheses containing such terms-an altogether intolerable consequences", Carl G Hempel, "The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Positivism", pp. 118-119: Moritz Shlick, "*The Foundation of knowledge*", Erkenntnis, Volume IV, 1934, in, Ibid., p. 220-222.

[201] Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 100.

Actually, the empirical propositions with their reliability, in logical positivism still, in way or another, are hypotheses and contain contradictive elements for the further one, and this is the essence of their theory. In addition, they claim that the only things to be free of contradiction are tautologies.[202] For, in order to classify the empirical proposition, logical positivism asserts that:

> Some philosopher call for a 'ostensive' type of empirical proposition which are directly recorded as an immediate experience, in other words what are not analytical hypotheses but absolutely certain, or what they suggest they should be purely demonstrative in character, and so incapable of being refuted by any subsequent experience.[203]

Ayer denies that any synthetic proposition can be 'ostensive', because of the fact that while pointing out to any synthetic fact we express it. While expressing, it is impossible to point out at something without describing it or saying say something about it. Thus, in describing process we classify the proposition in one way or another. Then, while describing we go beyond what is given immediately. For, the synthetic proposition cannot be ostensive, is what logical positivist assert.[204]

The example Ayer gives in this regard is observation of the white color which may look as such for me, but legitimately it may not be as seen.

Here again Ayer asserts firmly that;

> In denying the possibility of ostensive propositions, we are not of course denying that there really is 'given' element in each of our sense-experiences. Nor we are suggesting that our sensations are themselves doubtful. Indeed such suggestion would be nonsensical. A sensation is not the sort of thing which can be doubtful or not doubtful. A sensation simply occurs. Doubtful are the propositions which refer to our sensations, including the propositions which describe the qualities of a presented sense-content, or assert that a certain sense-content has occurred. To identify a proposition of this sort with sensation itself would be a gross logical blunder.[205]

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[202] See: Ibid., pp. 93-94.
[203] See: Ibid., pp. 90-91.
[204] Ibid., p. 91.
[205] Ibid., p. 93: Ibid., p. 39.

Ayer wants to say that, defining the sense-content proposition with same sensation or sense-content, is like doing same thing twice. So, in order to be sure that the proposition is really sure, we have to define it with something out of it. Beside the fact that the sensation cannot be a certain source for verification. As mentioned above, all empirical proposition to some extent are hypotheses which may be discredited in the actual sense-experience.

Further on Ayer asserts that;

> And the propositions in which we record the observation that verify these hypotheses[206] are themselves hypotheses which are subject to the test of further sense-experience.[207]

So according to logical positivist in each phase of verification we apply same observation process, not because they don't believe on the sense-experience but they want to reconfirm those hypotheses by new experience in order to be reassured, and this is applied for the sake of their pragmatist background.

Thus, in each step occur new hypothesis which will require new verifications and so on so far the processes will continue.[208] And this how the hypotheses get into the relation with empirical facts and their verification process.

Coming back to hypotheses, they are not only proposition or only the elements we have to verify, but they are complexes of different factors which start as a theory and later are verified with observation which again may be the cause for born of another hypotheses and so on.

Having hypotheses free of contradiction, for logical positivist, is similar of having the law for further process of verification.[209] In verifying process of

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[206]"Roughly speaking all what we mean by saying that an observation increases the probability of proposition is that it increases our confidence in the proposition, as measured by our willingness to rely on it in practice as a forecast of our sensations, and to retain it in preference to other hypotheses in face of an unfavorable experience", Ibid., p. 100.

[207] Ibid., pp. 93-94.

[208] See: Ibid., p. 9.

[209]"For it will be shown that all propositions which have factual content are empirical hypotheses; and that the function of an empirical hypotheses is to provide a rule for the anticipation of experience", Ibid., p. 41: Ibid., p. 95.

hypotheses, the sense-experience merely cannot abandon a law of hypothesis. In other words, if the observation fails to verify those, means not that the hypotheses have to be rejected or considered as false, the observation process not constantly has the exact ends.[210] From here, the observation process in logical positivism does not contain an exact factuality in general evaluations. In addition, for logical positivist, as mentioned above, the observation or self-experience are considered as a hypotheses, in a sense that they may be true today and different tomorrow. At mean while, the hypotheses should be not rejected with the *single* observation, as mentioned, it relates to possible error. But in order to preserve the hypotheses, "we may run new observation or we transform the results to some new hypotheses".[211]

Another significant and very sensitive element to mention is the difference between analytical propositions, whose verification requires observation process-like the proposition on the *laws of nature*-or verifying the past or historical proposition, both, to be crucial elements in the idealism thought. And, on the other hand attempting to make out of them laws for the verification process itself, which cannot be abandoned with the observation but needs plenty of effort in order to change, and understand the manner they interrelate with the empirical verification process.

However, in logical positivism a long debate about the possibility of verifying the past or historical proposition and considering them as experienced facts to be as the verification elements for truth evaluation, still goes on.[212] Logical positivists suggest that, verification of past propositions when they are joined with other present premises they entail same observation facts. On the other hand, Ayer states that "the present observation facts may not be always a necessary condition for the truth of the past facts". [213]

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[210] See: Ibid., pp. 94-95.
[211] See: Ibid., p. 95.
[212] See: Ibid., p. 5.
[213] See: Moritz Shlick, "The Foundation of knowledge", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Positivism", pp. 219- 223: A. J. Ayer, "Verification and Experience", Published in the, "Proceeding of the

Moreover, for logical positivism, conditioning same condition of present for verification process of past is a very difficult charge to assert, as even the present conditions are remote facts. However, logical positivist asserts that, events although being remote, are observable in principle, and same thing would have been in past. From here the argument of analogy is supported as a fact with little uncertainty, and common or joined experience is still a vague matter.[214]

Coming back to above analytical example on natural law, logical positivism believe that it cannot be considered as a common idea, not hypotheses as well, but a proposition to require actual and direct verification. And the disputes on this proposition are the best indication to support it being a tautology and not an observable empirical law. Hence, logical positivist claim that, "those laws cannot be for someone synthetic or empirical laws and for some other analytic laws".[215]

How the necessary relations considered as hypotheses can be in fact plain tautologies, as on the above example the 'natural law'? Or be for someone a synthetic proposition and for some other tautologies?

"All man are mortal", logical positivism states, is a necessary thing, for someone a synthetic proposition, but at mean time for someone else is a tautology. As the mortality is not something to contain the meaning alone but exists because of the word 'man'. In different expression, with the word mortality, in logical positivist, we are only explaining the word 'man', but with another simple characteristic of him.[216]

Aristotelian Society", Volume 37, 1936-37, pp. 236-237: Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 19.

[214] "It is not logically inconceivable that I should have and experience that is in fact owned by someone else", "I have come to think that this reasoning is very dubious. For while it is possible to imagine circumstances in which we might have found it convenient to say of two different persons that they owned the same experience, the fact is that, according to our present usage, it is a necessary proposition that they do not; and since this is so, I am afraid that the argument form analogy remains open to the objections that are brought against it in this book..." Ibid.

[215] See: Ibid., p. 95.

[216] See: Ibid., pp. 95-96.

Why they bring up the hypotheses? The answer is "that they help us maintain predicted consequences of the particular experience in the future".[217] And the validity of an empirical hypotheses or proposition is tested by seeing whether it fulfills the function which it is designed to fulfill or not.

From here, with the theory of probability, logical positivist close the angles of the external verification process, where they conclude that the proposition have to be verified experimentally in order to be hypotheses for the future anticipated experiment, be these theories personal or universal.[218]

As a conclusion the past, history and future hypotheses if they are verified form actual experience they are relevant to different situation not because of rational or logic necessity but because of their verification.[219]

Here Schlick claims:

> However we may twist and turn, it is impossible to interpret a reality-statement otherwise than as fitting into perceptual context.[220]

In other words, even if talk about percept and meaning, it is reality what we are talking about, as our perceiving is what reality is and our reality is what our perceiving is, is what logical positivist state throughout of these sentences.

d) Truth and False and their Relation to Ideas Verification

As mentioned above the verified ideas in logical positivism shift to the next level to be hypotheses for next ideas verification process. And the false proposition, from logical positivist point of view, is what contains meanings but lacks of facts verification or claims the opposite of true meanings.

> For, it is easy to see that the purpose of a 'theory of truth' is simply to describe the criteria by which the validity of the various kinds of

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[217] See: Ibid., p. 97.
[218] See: Ibid., p.101.
[219] See: Ibid.
[220] Moritz Schlick, "Positivism and Realism", p. 49.

> proposition is determined. And all proposition are either empirical of a priori, and have we have already dealt with it.[221]

Ayer asserts that there cannot be anything false different from the true, as the false has some existence. But what makes the proposition false is lack of verification with experimented facts, but even though, false result might remain hypothesis for the future verification. From here, we may conclude that logical positivist stand point in the matter of false is simple.

It was elucidated that logical positivist concern was the meaning of the sentence, in here also, before proceeding to any factual verification of true or false they ask, what we mean when we mention the word truth. The definition of it has to be given in accordance with the principles of logical positivist who asserts doing it through the *definition is use*, which means translating in other sentence where the word truth is not used.[222] In addition, they claim that everything starts with proposition which contain the elements and meaning together with symbols,. The word 'I am ill' in every language contains the same message, or it is same proposition. Not because of the word but because of particular signs in it.[223]

So according to Ayer, saying that a proposition 'p is true' is superfluous or extra with no meaning in it, like saying that 'Queen Anne is dead' is true. The word true here asserts nothing in particular, it is just superfluous. Similarly the sentence 'oxford is the capital of England', claiming to be false, is just saying that 'oxford is not the capital city of England'. Thus, to say that the sentence is true, in language, is to assert it, and to say false is to assert its contradictory, in other words they here are only as marks of assertion and denial.

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[221] "But first of all we ought, perhaps, to justify our assumption that the object of a "theory of truth" can only be to shown how proposition are validated. For it is commonly supposed that the business of the philosopher who concerns himself with "truth" is to answer the question "what is truth" and that it is only an answer to this question that can fairly be said to constitute a "theory of truth". Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 87.

[222] See: Ibid., p. 88.

[223] See: Ibid.

In this case, for logical positivists, it is senseless asking to analyze the process of truth as philosophers do.[224] Saying that the 'p' is true is only asserting to be such, nothing new. And the truth, according to logical positivist, is the soul analyses of sentences which can be translated into the sentences which do not mention the word true inside.[225] Or, more plainly, *the idea is true if expresses meaning in accordance with the symbols outside and at mean time the idea is false if expresses the meaning not in accordance with the symbols outside.*

Here positivists point out that, "the traditional conception of truth as a 'real quality' or a 'real relation', like pragmatist says for example, is due, like most philosophical mistakes, to a failure to analyze sentences correctly.[226] Moreover, what most of them talk about is what makes a proposition true or false, instead, what they really have to look for is getting the proper meaning for the proposition. However, in logical positivism, a proposition is not made true by being believed in it but by being verified or analyzed.[227]

So, the criterion for the truth or falsity of proposition, in logical positivism, consist of the presence of specific data if true and non presence of data if false, in specific condition.[228] And to state the circumstances under which a proposition is true is the same as stating its meaning and nothing else.[229] It is the meaning which is to be verified, and if the meaning is right than the concluded results will be right.

The analytical propositions, as very crucial proposition in logical positivism thought, are false if they are contradictory. But while validating the empirical or synthetic proposition we cannot say that the proposition is false because it is contradictory, as the proposition may be free of contradiction, and still be false.

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[224] Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", pp. 88-89.
[225] See: Ibid., p. 89.
[226] See: Ibid.
[227] "A proposition is said to be 'true' when it is 'verifiable in principle; when we know the conditions which , when realized, will make verification possible", Carl G Hempel, " *The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning*", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Posititvism", p. 112.
[228] See: Moritz Schlick, *"Positivism and Realism"*, p. 40.
[229] See: Ibid., p. 41.

Asking what makes a proposition false in here, logical positivists claim that, not because it is formally defective, but because it fails to satisfy some material criterion, which is up to philosopher to discover these criterions.[230]

In other words, to acknowledge the true from the false is not enough to rely only at the reality given, but to examine the relations of those propositions which can be done only by the examination of their meanings. On other hand, the false as well have existence outside but what makes it false is not its existence but the non capable verified relations it contains. Hitherto, the matter of truth and false has preoccupied the philosophers for a long time, but the matter of truth or false is not something superfluous, except what the verification of the statement and their proper meaning contains in the sentence, whose answer is always in there, primarily in the relation with the 'given'.[231]

Conclusion

Logical positivist status is formed on the below mention principles;

1) No metaphysics.

2) No transcendent ideas.

3) No priori knowledge of reality.

4) No generalization of empirical facts (as it may lead to the embracement of metaphysics).

5) No probability propositions.

From here, logical positivist verification process unlike other philosophical schools start with verification of sentence and the meaning of it, taking into account whether its meaning is in agreement with the empirical facts or contain analytical validity or not.[232] As a preliminary approach, according to

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[230]"One way answering this question is to say that it is the philosophers business to test the validity of our scientific hypotheses and everyday assumptions", Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 48: Ibid., p. 90.

[231] See: Ibid., p. 89.

[232]"In this way every word of the language is refuced to other words and finally to the words which occur in the so-called "observation sentences" or "protocol sentences". It is through that the

logical positivist, the process of verification can be performed to furnish us with criterion whether or not the sentence is literally meaningful.[233] But how and when the sentence is literally meaningful according to logical positivists?

The sentence according to logical positivist has literal meaning if and only if the proposition expressed has analytical meaning or it is empirically verifiable.[234] This would entail that the proposition in order to express whether the sentence is true or false it must contain meaning.

Ayer states that; "A sentence which does not express either a formally true proposition or an empirical hypothesis is devoid of literal significance".[235] Accordingly, this indicates that this utilization of verification only may depart many of meaningless propositions out of field of verification, as it occurs with the psychological statements. But what Ayer asserts on this regard is that the sentence expressing nothing does not indicate that the proposition is empirically unverifiable, but they are psychological statement which they do not prefer going through it, as it is the matter with 'putative proposition'.[236]

Although saying that the sentence is meaningless, positivist state that it expresses something, even that something is what makes it meaningless and afterward unverifiable.[237] In addition, what positivists suggest with word proposition or sentence is the meaning or contents of meaning which even translated contain the logical system and will deliver the same meaning in every language. If the word 'q' is entailed by the proposition 'f ' for example, it indeed

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word acquires its meaning", Rudolf Carnap, "The elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analyses of Language", in, Alfred Ayer " *Logical Positivism*", p. 63.

[233] See: Alfred Ayer, "Language Truth and Logic", p. 5.

[234] "In the case of analytical statements it is well known that the question of their validity constitutes no problem. They hold a priori; one cannot and should not try to look to experience for proof of their correctness for they say nothing whatever about objects of experience. For this reason only "formal truth" pertains to them, they are not "true" because they correctly express some fact. What makes the true is just their being correctly constructed i.e. their standing in agreement with our arbitrarily established definitions", Moritz Shlick, "The Foundation of knowledge", in, Alfred Ayer, " Logical Positivism", p. 223: Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 5.

[235] See: Ibid., p. 54.

[236] See: Ibid., p. 6.

[237] See: Ibid.

claim that the sentence 'q' can validly derived from the English 'z' which expresses 'f '.[238] However, logical positivist believe that, it is the meaning merely what makes the sentence or proposition logical and analytical, not in one language but in every language. And as the result, all sentences which has delivered the same meaning can be replaced with different words in different language.

Additionally, one of very crucial matters which logical positivist claim is distinguishing between the word proposition where the sentence expresses factual facts, and the word statement where it is discussed as a bare logical meaning with no any factual expression.[239] For, the verification process in logical positivism starts with statement rather than sentences which express them. Hence, the statement is held to be literally meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable,[240] with no regard on how the sentence is formed and what language.

From here, the verification process according to Ayer is divided into two types, 1) strong one and 2) the weak one. A proposition is said to be verifiable in the strong sense if and only if its truth could be conclusively established in experience. As the weak one if it is possible for experience to render it probable, and rendering them probable has expanded the attention of logical positivist in the process of verification.[241]

Other important fact to mention is that all empirical hypotheses in logical positivism are the subject of change. And No truth of proposition could be established for ever, neither would. For, the division of verification proposition

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[238] See: Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 6.

[239]"In other words, the cognitive meaning of a statement in an empiricist language is reflected in the totality of its logical relationship to all other statements in that language and not to the observation sentences alone", Carl G Hempel, " *The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning*", in, Alfred Ayer, "Logical Posititvism", p. 124: Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", pp. 8-9:., "Ayer replaces the word 'experimental proposition' with the word 'observation statement", Ibid., p. 11.

[240] See: Ibid., p. 9: "In this version, then, the principle is that a statement is verifiable and consequently meaningful, if some observation-statement can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises, without being deducible from those other premises alone", Ibid., p. 11.

[241] See: Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", pp. 9-11.

into the strong and weak is purposeless, as there is no impossibility that the further experience will not go against the previous one.[242]

Another difficulty on the process of verification according to Ayer occurs in empirical proposition whose verification is in vague. And the vague element on the verification process starts from the fact that those propositions are verified with observation or the occurrence of particular sense content, but the test has indefinite number or manner to be applied, according to their condition.[243]

As the result, with all this long explanation procedure of explanation, the statement is directly verified if itself is an observation statement or is in conjunction with one or more observation statement.[244] And the statement is indirectly verifiable if in conjunction with certain other premises entails one or more verified statement, and secondly if the statement is in conjunction with the premises that are not analytic, or directly verifiable.[245] And the reason why is: that the joining in indirect verifiable statement, the premise to contain analytic statement, lays on the fact that the scientific theories not always have observable facts, but in order to be verifiable at least they should be analytical.[246] Thus, these facts, logical positivists claim, remain in the dictionary of indirect verifiable fact to be distinguished from the metaphysical unverifiable facts.[247] Or, in other words, the indirect verifiable facts to contain analytical premises are taken into the consideration as they contain the possibility of verification process,[248] while the metaphysical facts do not.

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[242] See: Ibid., p. 9-10.

[243] See: Ibid., p. 12.

[244] See: Moritz Shlick, "*The Foundation of knowledge*", in, Alfred Ayer, "*Logical Positivism*", pp. 219-221.

[245] See: Rudolf Carnap, " *The elimination of metaphysics*", in, Ibid., pp. 67-68: Alfred Jules Alfred Ayer, "*Language Truth and Logic*", p. 13.

[246] See: Ibid., p. 13.

[247] See: Ibid., p. 14.

[248] "However different therefore "confirmations" are from analytic statements, they have in common that the occasion of understanding them is at the same time that of verifying them: I grasp their meaning at the same time as I grasp their truth", Moritz Shlick, "*The Foundation of knowledge*", in, Alfred Ayer, " *Logical Positivism*", p. 225.

Further, logical positivist in order to not entangle the verification process with meaningful statement they offer the explanation of the 'meaning'. Moreover, the sentence might not be entailed from the observation facts and it might not contain any analytical fact, but still be meaningful. And this is what Ayer calls the 'literal meaning', beside the 'factual meaning', which is proclaiming that the statement is meaningful only and only if satisfies the process of verification.[249] How these statements are formed, and how we give them meaning?

Unlike pragmatism which starts with the formation of ideas and they make the empirical facts as the only resource to ideas, logical positivist start with the 'priory proposition' or 'fundamental statements', as called in the Carnaps terminology,[250] which they define it as the language symbols to form meaning in the words and express reality. These priori meaning can be direct empirical facts[251] and sometime analytical facts.

If A is earlier to B and B is earlier than C, A is earlier than C automatically, and no need for empirical facts on this regard.[252]

However, logical positivist asserts that it is not a sensation to be doubtful but the proposition and the way we talk about that proposition. It is from there where people distinguish and form their perception and concepts about truth and false.

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[249] See: Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 15.

[250] See: Rudolf Carnap, "*The old and the new Logic*", in, Alfred Ayer, " *Logical Positivism*", p. 133: Rudolf Carnap, " *The elimination of metaphysics*", in, Ibid., p. 67.

[251]"Let us formulate this criterion as follows; A sentence has empirical meaning if and only if it is capable, in principle, of complete refutation by a finite number of observational data", Carl G Hempel, " The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning", in, Ibid., p. 113.

[252] See: Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 17.

Chapter Three

The Nature of Truth in Muslim Philosophy: A Critical Study of Pragmatism and Logical Positivism

I. Ideas and Truth is Muslim Thought

Introduction

If philosophy with mere freethinking and full embracement of reason attempts to obtain and define the truth, likewise, Muslim thought with very affluent support from its revelation and constructive freethinking have presented to humanity identical evaluation elements to attain and understand the truth.[1]

On the other hand, we cannot avoid a harsh reality to include numerous among Muslims who state that freethinking in Islamic thought is not an essential component but it is a character imported from others. Assertion of these minority Muslim thinkers attempts to consider the reason and freethinking as the recording device or the stagnant mechanism.[2]

Contrary to these weak assertions, Muslim thought contributed a lot in the field of freethinking and attempted to involve it in each part of its disciplines,[3] including logical and actual subjects. Moreover, Muslim thought along with proper understanding of religious essentiality on one hand, and liberty of reason on the other has established the principles of truth and detailed mechanism in its verification process. The verification process in Muslim thought, as a mechanism of truth innovation, begins with full submission and trust in reality to pursue necessary aspects of syntax, meanings of words, in addition to the logical process.

With coming elaboration of Muslim contribution to the subject of truth and its fundamentals will be elucidated that western philosophies assertion about religions, in general, as false and meaningless, is an unverified conclusion. This respond is not executed from the unsupported reason, but particularly from detailed and proved one.

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[1] Cf: Muhammad Sayyid al-Jalaynd, *Nadhariyat al-Mantiq bayna Falasafat al-Islam wa al-Yunan: Dirasah Muqaranah li Khasai's al-Burhan al-Falsafi wa 'l-Qur'an* (Cairo: Matba'at al-Taqaddum, 1986), p. 141.

[2] See: Muhammad al-Ghazali, *Ilellun wa adwiyatun*, p. 36.

[3] See: Abu Alyazeed Al-'Ajami, *Nadharutu Fi Almarifa Al Insaniyyati Bayna Al Fikri Al Islami wa Al Falsafati Al Garbiyyati*, p. 158.

I deem that after the discussion about the Islamic approach of truth and its verification elements will still remain a gape for many questions about the proofs and detailed verification of entire religious experience, the task which will require unlimited research, and probably make the proofs almost impossible.

But, in order to maintain an equal evaluation of subject and solve the problem essentially, we prefer elaborating, comparing and criticizing it from the same foundation and principles of pragmatism and logical positivism. In this way we can obtain the divergences and similarities between all three characters.

a) Ideas Formation in Muslim Thought

While in western philosophies the estimation of the formation ideas alters according with different schools of thought, in Muslim thought the evaluation of ideas formation takes different assessment. Obviously, in Muslim thought we are not able to find extreme poles to make this variety or disputes as obvious and profound as in western schools. Nevertheless, there are minor divergences on the branches not in essence of Muslim thought. The reason emanates from the fact that Islamic thought is founded at the principles of Qur'an guidance and the tradition of prophet, two factors to bound and save Muslim thought from essentially deviation. Despite diverging to some extent, these thoughts cannot exceed their insightful confines.

However, the general conclusion of the Islamic thought in ideas formation begins with a principle which considers the mind as an empty puddle or the white page,[4] constructed to know and collect information.[5] In addition, it gives to it the ability to classify and form different forms of thoughts and ideas[6]

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[4] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 203.

[5] See: Al- 'Ajami, pp. 172-176; Ahmad Fuad Basha, *Falsafatu Al- Ulum bi An- Nadhrati Al-Islamiyyati* (Cairo: Cairo University, 1984), p. 22; Abdurrahman Hasan Almaydani, *Dawabitul al Marifa wa Usuluf al Istidlal wal Munadharah*, (Damascus: Dar al-Kalam, 1988), p. 17.

[6] Almaydani, p. 17; Al Ajami, p. 174.

independent from the object,[7] which are considered as the main factor in ideas formation.[8]

In the contrary, those who do not agree with what we just pointed out, I would like to guide them to revelation, where Allah says:

﴿ وَٱللَّهُ أَخْرَجَكُم مِّنۢ بُطُونِ أُمَّهَٰتِكُمْ لَا تَعْلَمُونَ شَيْـًٔا وَجَعَلَ لَكُمُ ٱلسَّمْعَ وَٱلْأَبْصَٰرَ وَٱلْأَفْـِٔدَةَ ۙ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَشْكُرُونَ ﴿٧٨﴾ ﴾ النحل: ٧٨

"And Allah has brought you out from the wombs of your mother while you know nothing. And he gave you hearing, sight, and heart that you might you give thanks (to Allah)". (Al-Nahl, 78)[9]

If the mind in Muslim thought is considered an empty page, according to the meaning of verse, and the location where ideas are formed, what are the factors to determine their formation?

Unlike the western thought, the elaboration of ideas formation in Muslim thought takes wider range than that of materialism or intellectualism. Thus, I would not hesitate to assert that the term "formation", in Muslim thought terminology, would not explore entire meaning of ideas formation. For the fact that in Muslim thought a large part of ideas are explored from the inner intuition process, [10] which definitely does not contradict their assertion that man knows from nothing. However, we are focusing in the explanation of this part particularly for the reason that the word 'formation' in general means the appearance of something non-present or nonexistent to existence. While in Muslim thought, the necessary intuitive ideas, or known as the imaginative or inner ideas, most of the time their *immediate* resource cannot be attained.[11] The

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[7] See: Al-'Ajami, p. 177; Rajih Abdulhamid al-Kurdi, *Nadhariyatul Marifa Bayna Al-Qurani Wa Al-Falsafati* (Riyad: Maktabat al-Muayyad, 1992), p. 628.

[8] See: Ahmad Fuad Basha, p. 13.

[9] The English tranlsation of the Qur'an used throughout this thesis is that of Dr. Muahmmad Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali and Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, *Interpretation of the Meaning of The Noble Quran in the English Language* (Riyad: Dar al-Salam, 1996).

[10] See: Al-Imam Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, *Kitab al-'Arbain fi Usul al-Din*, Ed. Ahmad Hijazi Al-Saqa (Beirut: Dar al- Jil, 2004), p. 463; Al-Kurdi, pp. 33-39.

[11] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 141.

necessity idea that 'part is always smaller than big' or the idea asserting the 'impossibility of something existing and non-existing at mean while' for instance is a proper explanation of it.[12]

Would this elucidation perplex the materialistic part of Muslim thought and their parallel lines between pragmatist or logical positivist? Probably yes, as the inner world expresses no meaning for these two materialistic philosophies. Thus, to avoid the imbalanced expansion of the issue from what was discussed in the previous chapters, and considering the prevailed elaboration of Muslim thought, which mostly begins with the empirical arguments to include the abstracts lately, we approach the subject from same angle

Obviously, from what we are about to demonstrate, we perceive that Muslim thought elaboration on the formation of ideas, unlike other philosophies, is very ordinary. Moreover, whatever has been assumed in this field, from the previous scholar to trail the current thinkers, pursue identical path. Nevertheless, we cannot interpret the simplicity of ideas formation from Muslim point of view unless we discuss the elements or factors to indicate their formation. For, the general factors in the formation of ideas in the Muslim thought are:

1. Sense:[13] (known as five senses,[14] by which we cognize the world of empirical facts). While elaborating the factor of *sense* in the process of ideas formation and the manner it establishes the formation of knowledge,[15] Muslim thought brings up the simplicity in every step, to carry their evaluation to the same category with any realist or materialist philosophy.[16] Thus, Muslim's thought general elucidation of *sense* suffices to be a profound explanation of the ideas formation process without a single ambiguity.

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[12] See: Al-Ajami, p. 174.

[13] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 208; Awdullah Jaad Hijazi, *Al-Murshidu As-salim fi Al-mantik Al-hadith wa Al-Kadeem*, (Cairo: Daru at-Ṭib'ah al-Muhammadiyyah, 1964), pp. 200-201; Al-Imam Abu Manṣur Al Maturidi, *Kitabu Attawhiid*, Ed. Fathullah Khalif, (Cairo: Darul Aljamiat Almisriyyah, 1983), pp. 7-9; Al-Maydani, p. 17, see also, Ibid., p. 127; Ibid., p. 201.

[14] See: Al-razi, p. 463.

[15] See: Al-razi, p. 463; Ahmad Fuad Basha, p. 22.

[16] See: Al Ajami, p. 145.

> It is true that soul in the beginning is more attached and inclines to what sense offers to it. Because the sense it is the first to proceeds and it is what soul starts with. In this way, the soul keeps loading with the necessity and the sense laws until the reason develops...[17]

However, it will be noteworthy to mention practically under what terminology Muslim thinkers demonstrate the ideas formation from the sense point of view.

While elaborating the sense in Muslim thought we obtain that everything empirical, beside general terminology of 'sense', is used the terminology of induction process (al-Iṣtiqrā)[18]. Through the entrance of *induction*, particularly, we obtain the meaning of *sense* virtually in a wider sense. From here, next to the essential and extensive meaning of *induction* process, as e general notion to include everything sensual, which stoutly is embraced from the western thinkers as the significant tool of science and the only voice for ideas verification,[19] we find it as very significant factor in Muslim thought as well. In addition, considering the *induction* process involved in the direct elaboration of reality, we perceive Muslim thinkers dedication and the dependence on it in large number of cases.[20]

We detect that many Arabic language regulations, grammar and poetry are entailed from maximum and comprehensive implementation of the *induction process* (*al-Istiqrā*). As well as numerous jurisprudence and Islamic law regulations,[21]and many scientific discoveries on different fields, like chemistry, medicine, physics, astronomy and many other scientific subjects, without what today's science would not be at the current level, are all the outcome of induction and its appropriate understanding in Muslim thought.

Consequently, the *induction* process (*al-Istiqrā*) being an indispensible element of sense outcome was an essential element for Islamic thought

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[17] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 141.

[18] "The induction process is the joint of indispensible parts to obtain the agreed and common whole notion", Hijazi, p. 177.

[19] See: Isma'il Salah Abd al-Hak, *At-Taḥlil al-Lugawi Fi al-Madrsat al-Oxford*, (Lebanon: Daru At-tanwir, 1993), p. 49; Al- Jalaynd, p. 243.

[20] See: Al Ajami, p. 132.

[21] See: Al-Maydani, p. 217; Ibid., pp. 189-190.

development. All of it, as mentioned earlier, highlights the fact that the seen and the actuality never created ambiguity or any perplexity for Muslim thought.[22]

Not supporting any materialistic philosophy, but merely due to the principle of the Islamic theology (*al-Aqidah*) which consider the seen and creation as true and the real deeds of God. In addition, any contradiction on this would straightly oppose the genuine meaning of the Qur'an itself which is considered as an order of seen and its systematization.[23]

﴿ أَوَلَمْ يَرَوْا كَيْفَ يُبْدِئُ اللَّهُ الْخَلْقَ ثُمَّ يُعِيدُهُ ۚ إِنَّ ذَٰلِكَ عَلَى اللَّهِ يَسِيرٌ ﴿١٩﴾ قُلْ سِيرُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ فَانْظُرُوا كَيْفَ بَدَأَ الْخَلْقَ ثُمَّ اللَّهُ يُنشِئُ النَّشْأَةَ الْآخِرَةَ ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ ﴿٢٠﴾ ﴾ العنكبوت: ١٩ ـ ٢٠

"See they not how Allah originates the creation, then repeats it. Verily, that is easy for Allah. Say: 'Travel in the land and see how (Allah) originated the creation, and then Allah will bring forth the creation of the Hereafter. Verily, Allah is able to do all things".(Al-Ankabut: 19-20)

Including the directive to have a look on the creation of God, this verse is another command for implementation of the induction process in our daily life, which also forms the first type of the induction process known as the direct inductive process or *sufficient or perfect induction process* (*al-Istiqrāu al-Tām*).[24] In other word, the *sufficient or perfect induction process* (*al-Istiqrāu al-Tām*) is a direct form of observation, as the observance of day light by sun raise and the night by sun set. The second part of this verse next to the order of observance on the direct facts, as we agreed to call it as an direct induction, clearly conducts the reason toward the accomplishment of better performance on the discovery of indirect related facts.[25] The indirect related facts, in addition to direct inductive facts mentioned in the first part of verse, gives another meaning to the induction process to form the second type of it under the terminology of *imperfect or*

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[22] See: Abdulhamid al-Kurdi, pp. 71-74.
[23] See: Al Ajami, p. 146.
[24] See: Ibid.
[25] See: Hijazi, p. 128.

insufficient induction process (*al-Iṣtiqrāu al-Nāqiṣ*)[26], like commencing that the day is the result of sun raise and the night of sun set.

The sufficient or perfect induction, being the essential fact for Muslim thought, is just an established notion. However, we have to stop for a while to prescribe the *insufficient induction process* (*al-Iṣtiqrāu al-Nāqiṣ*), as an indispensable factor of sense process, in order to observe its implementation in many matters impossible of direct verification. At mean while, prescribe the manner it yields skeptical outcomes, for pragmatist and logical positivist, and the reason why it is considered as a methodology possible of change to bring ambiguous consequences.

The *insufficient induction* process, for Muslim thought, similar to perfect induction process, is a reliable process which proves that there are enough elements to rely on the results coming from it. The results coming out of *insufficient induction* proves exactly that there are laws to route the system. Moreover, if the *insufficient induction process* verifies even partially a particular law, does not mean that entire of it has to be abandoned, as it is usually practiced from the pragmatist and logical positivist. It can only be abonded and disapproved with another necessary direct or immediate fact, as these two philosophies condition for other verifiable empirical ideas. Moreover, the rejection of any *insufficient induction* (*al-Iṣtiqrāu al-Nāqiṣ*) outcome would be straightforward in contradiction with philosophical principle which asserts that *the ignorance of part does not include the denial of all* (*'ademu al- Wijdān lā yastalzimu 'adem al- Wujūd*).[27]

For, by relying on the process of *imperfect induction* we have embraced nothing of the abstract or metaphysical ideas. On the contrary, we have achieved to enlighten the part of the world which materialist ignores to talk categorically. In addition, it is unanimously known that avoidance from exploring a fact, direct or indirect, makes someone more abstract than idealist or others are claimed to

[26] See: Ibid., p. 190.
[27] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 210.

be. However, we are aware that it cannot be relied on *insufficient induction* to entail other similar whole and perfect induction laws, but at least it cannot be refuted as they might work well as hypotheses.[28] Moreover, they have proved to assist at many new discoveries now and in the past.

The best prove and the very significant matter of *insufficient induction* to prove our statement is the *causality* (*al-Ilal*).[29] The causality (*al-Ilal*), according to materialism and particularly positivism, despite being functional at the majority of things, yet cannot reach the level of *perfect induction*. From where, these two philosophies conclude that the causality contains no meaning. On the other hand, any attempt to demonstrate the incorrectness of *insufficient induction* without going into the factual details- in case of the causality-would be considered as the *insufficient induction* decision itself.

Likewise, denying something with a proof of a same category may be considered as a tautology or cycle (dawr), [30] which is unanimously denied by all. In other words, by denying the *insufficient induction*, in the case of the causality for example, with the same argument as the insufficient induction itself would make the existence of thing the cause of its own creation. And this is known as cycle (dawr), which unanimously opposes entire logical and scientific facts.

Thus, the evidence of the logical positivist or any other who opposes the insufficient induction process is not enough to rely on it, as their negation is not enough to ignore the imperfect induction and consider it as the week proof. From here, the inductive process is *one element* in the process of ideas formation, attached to the direct empirical facts. Probably not obvious much, but here we attempt to elucidate the method sense or induction process-the insufficient and sufficient-form the empirical type of ideas, which are unobservable by our direct or actual observation.

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[28] See: Al-Maydani, p. 208.
[29] See: Hijazi, pp. 196-97.
[30] See: Al-Maydani, pp. 323-324 ; Hijazi, p. 195.

For, by considering the outcome of *insufficient induction* process as verified and reliable, Muslim thought approaches pragmatism closely and logical positivism partially. Saying positivism partially, we indicate that *insufficient inductive* ideas in positivism are highlighted as the verified ideas if they are logically supported only, like the 'castle', which beside its presence needs to be supported by logical laws, as logical positivist assert.[31] Nevertheless, once we attempt to bring a general conclusion over this type of insufficient induction ideas as laws, logical positivists classify them as pure metaphysical ideas. Unlike pragmatists, whose trust on the insufficient induction process lays on the current verification but disagree claiming any absolute outcomes over their presence due to kind of uncertainty.

Muslim thought on the other hand has to conclude their pure and factual insight of the *insufficient induction* possible of absolute. With a confirmation that any compromise on any empirical facts cognized from the objective world and agreed on it by common sense,[32] even partially, would lead to the solipsism, element denied unanimously by all.[33]

With the conformity of the seen Muslim thought illustrates real understanding and proper cooperation with facts, in full agreement with the common sense and priory with science, whose infrastructure is formed on the *sufficient* and *insufficient induction.*

2. Feeling:[34] (man's inner world constituted of factors as, pain, happiness, love, hates, etc, cognized from the relation with reality)[35]. Feeling here is more as the synonym of the same terminology used in pragmatism theory, but with an exception added from Muslim thought which makes the *feeling* in number of occasions more as the causal (musabab) matter than the cause (sabab), as proved by pragmatism. In other words, *feeling* in Muslim point of view only in

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[31] See: Isma'il Salah Abd al-Hak, p. 49; Al- Jalaynd, p. 243.
[32] See: Abu Mansur Al-Maṭuridi, "*Kitabu Attawhiid*", p. 3.
[33] See: Al Ajami, pp. 139-140.
[34] See: Al Ajami, pp. 150- 153.
[35] See: Al-razi, p. 463; Al-Maydani, p. 17, see also, Ibid., p. 127; Cf., Al- Jalaynd, p. 153.

relation with reality is able to structure the idea. In a sense that, in order to cognize what the love is, for instance, he must go through the experience practically,[36] the dynamic to make some of Muslims thinkers more materialist than pragmatists.

> Thus, there is no meaning of knowledge only what is perceived in our souls in accordance with what we know from the sense. And if there is no such cause occurred we cannot have expression to express nothing on that particular cause...[37]

Asserting this, Muslim thought does not exclude the abstract or inner feeling ability.[38] In contrary, we notice that revelation and many other types of inspiration-which form an inner or abstract type of ideas-play an essential part on forming the abstract ideas in Muslim theology and philosophy.[39]

Pragmatism on the other hand, being close to something similar, is perplexed whether the inner feelings-which lead to inner ideas-deserve to be elected in the range of ideas or not. Thus, due to their presence as ideas, the pragmatism articulates inner feeling ideas from the usefulness point of view, as psychologically true not factually. However, positivism on the other hand ignores to take any advantage of inner feeling type of ideas, but categorize it as the senseless form of ideas, argument which places this matter in ambush demanding a detailed study. But, yet we consider pragmatist to have closer approach to Muslim thought in *feeling* elaboration process than logical positivists do.

3. Others experiences:[40] (what is narrated in form of ideas or thoughts un-experienced immediately from us)[41].

Previous philosophies, in particular positivism, approached this terminology with very dubious understanding,. While Muslims thought and

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[36] See: Ahmad Fuad Basha, p. 26.
[37] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 143.
[38] See: Ibid., p. 270.
[39] See: Al Ajami, p. 141; Al-Kurdi, p. 664.
[40] See: Abu Mansur Al-Maṭuridi, p. 7: Al- Jalaynd, p. 265.
[41] See: Al-razi, pp. 296-304; Hijazi, p. 208; Al-Maydani, p. 17; Ibid., p. 134; Al Ajami, p. 128; Ibid., p. 142; Abu Mansur Al-Maṭuridi, p. 3.

pragmatists approach, on others experiences, is an undisputable matter from where they begin with as a key element for ideas verification process, subject to come in coming section.

Moreover, others experiences, significant character to raised up the infrastructure of the common sense and *humanism* in pragmatism,[42] is more as a logical character rather than empirical. In other words, asserting that others experience is more a logical character, means that others experience is not proved experiencaly to be a cognized idea by everyone. But supporting others experiences is a necessary logical connection which obligates us to claim so. In addition, others experiences being a key matter to establish common sense and the infrastructure of humanism, any denial of it would be considered as pure solipsism,[43] the argument which is supported by Muslim and pragmatists.[44] But logical positivists differs with Muslim thought on the matter the what worked for others in past does not necessary mean to work for us in present.

However, Muslim's approach toward others experience is another significant element to establish the notion of humanism and common sense, both to represent the wide and proper understanding of naturality and human soul. From this angle, Muslim thought, and to large extend pragmatism, have avoided all types of solipsism other philosophies have not been able to avoid, in particular positivism as we already mentioned. With full confidence in others experience Muslim thought, as well as every reasonable human being, builds the foundation for the ideas formation.

4. Pure reason:[45] The segment which progress further only after completion of basic ideas, from where it promotes different commandments. For instance, the prevention of joining two contradictory things at one time and at one place (Jam'a al-Naqiḍayn), 'impossibility of assembling anything with no

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[42] See: Al-Kurdi, p. 613; Ibid., p. 660.
[43] See: Abu Mansur Al-Maṭuridi, p. 8.
[44] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 160.
[45] See: Ahmad Fuad Basha, p. 18; Abu Mansur Al-Maṭuridi, p. 4; Al-Kurdi, p. 627; Ibid., p. 652; Al-Maydani, p. 129; Al- Jalaynd, p. 155.

cause or assembler', 'deduction of part from the whole', 'one is quarter of four',[46] and many other necessity plausible activities which will be mention in further elaboration of subject, prove practically the functionality of pure reason in the ideas formation.

While the *induction process*, in the elaboration of *sense* and its application in Muslim thought, was another terminology to express direct or indirect empirical facts, in this part it is noteworthy to mention *deduction process* (al-qiyās) as the part of pure reasonable activities and an indispensable element in ideas formation in Muslim thought.

While studying in detail the element of *deduction* (al-qiyās) it is impossible to not get astonished with the study and classification of Muslims, and long dedication they have given to it. But why the *deduction* process included in the section of ideas formation?

Obviously, the *deduction* process (al-qiyās), according to many materialistic philosophies, to include some Muslim philosophers, does not entail any new idea but it is a logical mechanism to merge cognized ideas into another acknowledged circle. Moreover, it is also very ordinary for a pragmatist and logical positivist to consider these ideas contributing with nothing new in the process of cognition. In addition, according to these two schools, outcomes of the *deduction* process (al-qiyās) cannot be considered as new ideas but a different expression for already known facts.

In contrary, Muslim thought asserts that the *deduction* mechanism signifies what is known with certainty, and supplements new idea in relation with other facts[47] which might not be obvious, but the new idea is to appear. With identical accent of positivism, to some degree, I agree that *deductive process* (al-qiyās) to some extent reconfirm the known, similar to synthetic and inductive practice.[48] But on the other hand, it locates and orientates the ideas which are

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[46] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 155.
[47] See: Al Ajami, p. 144.
[48] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 142.

hidden from our observation. In this form, the deduction process of empirical facts differs from mathematical and similar characters which only confirm what is known or seen, but only with different expression. Moreover, the deductive mechanism highlights something which is a synonym or different expression of what is known, but hidden as un-cognized idea. Saying for instance that 'every body is formed' is a very known fact. But it might not be known to everyone that 'every formed body is current (*hādith*). As well as it might not be known the meaning of *current* (*hādith*) unless we create sort of connection between three things, the body, it's being formed and meaning of current, consequently non related to each other *necessarily*.[49] Having a new idea, via deduction process applied in the relation of these different elements we have obtained a new idea. Whether mathematics and similar subject, considered as a tautology from logical positivist point of view, comes with necessary consequence attached to the prior propositions in form of synonyms or different expressions.

Furthermore, from the outcome of deductive process we sustain another consequent deduction ends. Like for example, If 'every body is formed', we extract that every formed body needs the former or the cause to be formed, as it is something changing, and change cannot attain by itself. From this deduction process, known as the causative deductive mechanism (Qiyās al-Illah or Qiyas al-Dalālah)[50], we have been enlighten with a new idea or evidence, both empirical and logically indispensible. Hence, in the elaboration of these four characters in ideas formation, Muslim approach is characterized with a balanced approach of evaluation to represent the reality and reason both as two main elements in ideas formation.[51]

Moreover, the idea formation in Muslim thought emerges with an empirical mechanism or sense which proceeds through the deductive process. Further, mind with its potentiality continues in constructing new ideas

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[49] See: Abu Mansur Al-Maṭuridi, p. 12.
[50] See: Hijazi, p. 173; Al-Maydani, p. 279.
[51] See: Al-Maydani, p. 17.

independent of other three mentioned elements with the help of pure reasoning or the deductive process.[52] These new independent constructed ideas involve all types of analytical ideas like different mathematical outcomes[53] and different imaginable ideas not presently available in the direct objective world, as the necessity of the causality (al-musabab) of each existing thing, for instance.[54] From here, the process of deduction is fulfilled according to the reason modification with sensational and objective world.

For, by obtaining different form of ideas with the help of four mentioned factors, the process of knowing is completed, or the idea is to originate or initiate. This process or this progression is called as the process of cognition, or in Muslims scholar terminology (*al-Idrāk*).[55] The cognition (*al-Idrāk*) is defined as: obtaining of every idea or figure in our mind, whether it is positive negative, or it is verified as the idea according to reality or not. In other words, this is what the Muslim scholars call *knowledge* (*ilm*). However, in order to avoid the possible ambiguity we prefer using the Knowledge terminology only for the factually verified ideas, according to the logician practice.[56]

b) Types of Ideas

It was demonstrated that Muslim scholars, in very eloquent manner, discussed the formation of ideas from every possible angle and the way the ideas perform proper argumentation system. Obviously, if we are seeking for a summarized form of the ideas formation in Muslim thought, it can be reviewed into two main components, 1) empirical and 2) logical, which will be expanded into more detailed subject to be discussed in this section.

Taking widely, the entire elaboration of the ideas formation aims to demonstrate that Muslim thought is not bounded only in the *seen*, as other

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[52] See: Al Ajami, p. 174; Al-Maydani, p. 17.
[53] See: Al-Maydani, pp. 195-196.
[54] See: Al Ajami, p. 138; Al-Maydani, p. 18.
[55] See: Al-Maydani, p. 22.
[56] See: Ibid., p. 22

materialistic school, but gives to the mind ability to corroborate with the *sense* as well as form other ideas out of sense scale to be considered as true ideas.

Alongside, Muslim thought, in general, believes that ideas, preliminary, are assembled according to object as they very first source,[57] with the assistance of mind and its supervision, which in some materialistic schools has not any deliberation. From here, by the above considered and generally anticipated elements in ideas formation in Muslim thought, outcome two main types of cognized ideas.

First, known as the *empirical ideas* which are the reflections of *seen* and objectivity.[58] The empirical ideas in Muslim thought, with simplicity in their mechanism, are divided into two main types:[59]

1. Conceptual, *at-Taṣawur*, (The ideas which has no any influence to assert their true or wrongness).[60]

2. Confirmative, *al-Taṣdik*, (The ideas which dictate the thing with positive or negative command, be it true or false).[61]

These two types of ideas, if we attempt to draw a parallel meaning with pragmatism terminology, convey identical matching with *known* and *knower* types of ideas, or with analytical and synthetic ideas in positivism terminology.

It may be not a proper way to illustrate these two ideas jointly, but in order to obtain the best and specific results on the descriptive difference of these two types of ideas we have to elaborate it side by side.

Thus, first segment to be possessed in idea formation mechanism is obtaining the preliminary form of it. The preliminary form of this idea represents the main figure to unite with the characters already present or newly formed in our mind. And if the new idea formed in our mind is nonrelated to any character

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[57] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 142.

[58] See: Ibid., p. 142.

[59] " And this division is connected directly to the levels of existence, as Gazali pointed out in his book " Mieyarul Al-ilm" and many other books", Al- Jalaynd, p. 142; Hijazi, p. 41.

[60] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 142. Al-Taftazani, p. 7-10; Al-razi, p. 463, Al-Maydani, p. 18.

[61] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 8; Al-Maydani, p. 18; Al-razi, p. 463; Al- Jalaynd, p. 142.

or function, it is considered as the conception idea (*at-Taṣawur*).[62] For instance, thinking about Socrates as a mere name and not as a philosopher. From the Muslim thought point of view, the terminologies (*al-Mufradāt*) merely are defined as conceptual ideas.

The moment the conceptual idea has created a clear character and is involved in relation with other new characters or ideas already present, it moves to the level able of conveying positive or negative meaning. And from this process we obtain the confirmative ideas (al-Taṣdīk).[63] Shifting to the next phase of relations with other ideas merely, or by taking a decisional form, these ideas are considered as the confirmative (al-Taṣdīk).[64] Ideas like snow, cold, hot, fire, beautiful and many other words are only conceptual ideas (at-Taṣawur), originating from empirical facts but conveying no message in their own. As soon as they are understood and interrelated with other related ideas they become confirmative (al-Taṣdīk), like 'the snow is cold' or 'the fire is hot', for example.[65]

Hence, we have attained the *first type* of ideas, the empirical ideas, along with two main types, conceptual and confirmative. However, empirically formed ideas assemble paths or relations to other ideas from what originates the second type of ideas.

The *second* type of idea is known as: *Analytical ideas*. Analytical ideas, unlike the empirical ideas which convey or translate only the seen, form unique arrangement of relations of empirical ideas and reason. In here, with the illustration of analytical ideas is revealed the Muslim approach toward the arrangements of ideas indications, which at mean while demonstrates that reason facts emerges from the pure logical aptitude. Moreover, with the analytical ideas we obtain another important fact, accepted partially from pragmatism and positivism, that the reason or mind is sufficient to upraise non-immediately experienced facts at the level of empirical facts. Particularly, while demonstrating

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[62] See: Hijazi, p. 52.
[63] See: Al-Kurdi, p. 37; Al-Maydani, p. 19.
[64] See: Al-Maydani, p.18.
[65] See: Ibid., p. 19.

Muslim's insight on the reason and its potency being proof to the non-immediate facts, it appears very evidently that it is regarded as a very competent cognitive tool.[66] In this regard, Muslim thought indicates that the reason and its evidences are as true as the mediate and empirical facts.

It might be a confused concept for some materialist but not for the pragmatist and logical positivist. For whom, the *reason* despite being a mirror to reflect the outside ideas and maintain it according to the rules designed, yet is considered as a capable mechanism to deliberate the idea trueness. All this argumentations would not make any sense unless we elucidate Muslim point of view and disclose the path they peruse, beside figuring out the minor difference they have with two above philosophies which will be elaborated in further illustration.

The essential point agreed among Muslims is that empirical and analytical facts support one and only element, the reality. And the reality in Muslim thought, as well as pragmatism and logical positivism, is an empirical and verified concept which requires no proof for its truthfulness. Thus, in Muslim thought we come across the assertion that from the empirical facts we obtain necessary relative forms of ideas, which we agreed to call analytical ideas. Afterwards, the empirical ideas in relation with reason aptitude are translated into similar necessary relations to form other mere rational facts, called as rational or analytical ideas.

The ideas created from relations of empirical facts forms the *first type* of analytical ideas known as *empirical analytical ideas*, which differs from mere reasonable or *rational analytical ideas* to form the *second* type of analytical ideas.

The first type, *empirical analytical ideas*, containing almost the same essence of what one realist or materialist may think, and particularly what pragmatism propose, yet do creates a perplexity while calling them as new and independent ideas. In their understanding the analytical ideas, in general, are

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[66] See: Ibid., p. 111.

formed and constructed in the shape of necessary cognitive ideas from empirical immediate facts directly.[67] Beside the logical positivist assertion that any analyzes behind the seen is considered as a metaphysical idea. In other words, from pragmatists and logical positivist point of view considering the empirical analytical ideas as independent ideas makes no sense, as this type only translates what we already know. For them, for logical positivist predominantly, they form a circle and lead to metaphysical elaboration.

Muslims analyzes and understanding of the *empirical analytical ideas*, the *first type* of analytical ideas, includes only rational ideas which are equal to empirical facts. Or which are from the same source as the empirical ideas, but they represent the necessary analytical idea in form of relations. Asserting for instance that 'if the light is present the sun raises',[68] is not an abstract analytical proposition to commence inwardly by mere logical pattern, as logical positivism asserts, but they are two relational empirical facts related conditionally to each other and obtained from immediate observance. In other words, the appearance of light with sun rise is a conditional affair[69] acknowledged from the object data merely, but expressed as an indispensable analytical analyze which conditions the appearance of light each time when the sun rise is there, even in the lack of its observance immediately. From here, from the immediate observation of the empirical facts, to form the empirical analytical analyses, we arise the relations to form new and independent ideas as:

- If the sun is in the sky, day is present.[70]
- If the day is present, sun is in the sky.
- If the sun is set, daylight is not present.
- If the night is there, sun is set.[71]

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[67] See: Al Ajami, p. 137.
[68] See: Al-Maydani, p. 112.
[69] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 85.
[70] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 85; Ibid., p.114.
[71] See: Al-Maydani, p. 112.

And similar to these analytical ideas, from external facts, we obtain numerous other analytical relations, all in the character of new ideas.

Moreover, in order to elucidate practically the manner Muslim thought attain the analytical ideas from the empirical facts to be true and independent types of ideas, we have dedicated a detailed explication on the types and the indication of these ideas. Hence, *empirical analytical* ideas from the Muslim thought are organized into the coming types:

1. *Necessary plausible ideas entirely in agreement with the reality*: 'The crow feathers are black', is an instance to explain the meaning of a fact that whenever the crow is mention necessarily means that they must have black feathers.[72]

2. *Plausible ideas relative to the fact from the causative perspective* (al-Asbāb wal Musabbabāt): 'The decrease of water temperature below zero freezes the water' is another example to elucidate the meaning of causative plausible ideas, which conditions the freezesness of water with the decrease of temperature below zero.[73]

3. *Plausible ideas requisite to reason necessity merely*: 'If a thing exists it cannot be absent'.[74]

Moreover, Muslim thought did not mention the above type of analytical ideas with no purpose. Nevertheless, these types of empirical analytical ideas contain solution to many delicate problems discussed in pragmatism and positivism point of view. In here, we will illustrate the manner they contain solution to many problems.

The *first type* of empirical analytical ideas demonstrates that 'the crow being black' is an factual reality which forms no ambiguity. But when we entail the analytical decision out of it as 'whenever we talk about the crow it must be black" it forms abstract and factually unsupported idea, which is asserted as false

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[72] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 11 ; Al-Maydani, p. 113.
[73] See: Al-Maydani, p. 113.
[74] See: Al-Taftazani, 12; Al-Maydani, p. 113.

from the positivism point of view. The reason they consider it as an unsupported factual idea is that we are deducing the abstract decision able to abandon with the presence of white crow, which exists virtually. However, I assume that the example might not be an appropriate one, but Muslims thought with these types of analytical ideas intend to add the necessary conditional ideas, considered to some degree from both philosophies, as part of analytical process to explore and confirm the idea of *common sense*. It might be not clear the interference of *common sense* and it's importance particularly in this type of idea, but we must point out that humanity agreed that crow is black everywhere and we do not need a detailed experience for each and every one of it, the condition which is always forwarded from logical positivists. Secondly, the new analytical logical result is accepted and can be relied on it.

The *second type* of empirical analytical ideas-plausible ideas relative to the fact from the causative perspective-although elucidated with a modest example yet from inside emanates the crucial meanings which explore the key and very responsive problems from all three philosophies. It signifies the matter of *cause* and *causality,* regretted from the positivism under the pretext of consisting perplexed meanings. In other words, for logical positivist the *causality* and the manner it assembles the necessity conditional ideas can only be hypotheses which requires verification process at each instance we point out. Moreover, one of the factors which perplexed logical positivist to appeal exact relation of *cause* and *causality* are the natural laws, which neither for Muslim nor for pragmatism formed any perplexity to be acknowledged after the verification process.

In this regard, Muslim thought had and still uses this part of analytical reasoning by adding to it another supportive explanation to explore the significant meanings as the part of necessary conditional ideas. In other words, Muslim thought with the conditional analytical type of ideas attempts to identify the necessity of existence of one side attached to the other side necessarily. But, some conditional necessity analytical ideas are impossible imagining different from what they exist. In other words, they have to be imagined as they are

virtually with no compromise in it. Thus, we may support logical positivist and assert that not always water might freeze under zero,[75] as this is possible of change. But we can never ever assert that the day may appear without sun, or sun appears without day. Or assert that the house is assembled with no master or thoughts are formed without a thinker.[76] The *cause* and *causality* exists and functions as a law in nature, with no regard if it forms a factual reality for us or no.

As per *third type* of empirical analytical ideas-the plausible and rational ideas merely- assembles the *second type* of mere analytical ideas mentioned previously, defined as pure analytical ideas but appraised to the level of true ideas only with verification process, as they are constructed on principles. These principles are regarded as empirical from the pragmatism point of view, and pure rational from logical positivist point of view. But yet there is a wide discussion among these two philosophies as to what level we can confirm pure analytical ideas- second type of analytical ideas- being true and what level of verification process it is required. However, Muslim thought has given a very detailed study to these ideas, and has used them in every scientific part of their discoveries, the element to be illustrated while discussing the mere *mere reason evidences* in coming section.

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[75] See: Al-Maydani, p. 118.
[76] Ibid., p. 117.

II. Factors and Elements of Ideas Verification and Their Relation to Truth and False in Muslim Thought

Introduction

We have clearly enlightened that ideas in the Muslim thought are either empirical to include two types- conceptual (al-Taṣawur) or confirmative (al-Taṣdiq) on one hand- or analytical in form of empirical facts or pure rational on the other. However, Muslim philosophical thought dedicated a long work course at the possibility of achieving to these ideas the status of true ideas. As the matter of fact, the empirical ideas do not compose any dilemma for the Islamic thought. Nevertheless, real obstacle commence with verification of imaginary and analytical ideas as they include non-factual reality. For, in order to raise the un-factual analytical ideas from unverified to the verified types of ideas, Muslim philosophical thought follows several paths. Always keeping in mind that in order to make these ideas possible of verification, Muslim thought emphasizes on the *common sense* evaluations, which to large extend is considered as the main foundation for the ideas verification. Obviously, along with common sense there are included several other process which resemble those in pragmatism and positivism.

First, preliminary definition of terminology (al-Mufredāt). This method is used in order to express clear and cognitive meaning for those who are not able to experience mentioned terminologies.[77] In other words, like the positivism inclination, this is the settlement of definition of terminology (*Kawlan Sharihan*)[78] so the idea conveys the exact meaning toward what is aimed for.[79]

Secondly, obtaining the standards or criteria of idea to define it theoretically. This part of verification process is an logical activity or the analytical system of verification. In this verification process we have involved the

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[77] See: Al Ajami, p. 135; Al-Maydani, p. 24.
[78] See: Hijazi, p. 69.
[79] See: Ibid., p. 68: Al- Jalaynd, p. 178.

reason, from where we get verified theories or hypotheses by what we can use to verify even the inexperienced ideas. Hence, these types of verification process, common sense, definitions and logical evidences or hypotheses complete the entire verification process in the Muslim philosophical thought.[80] Considering the reason as an easy and more summarized element we would start with it.

a) Reason

Reason is the great instrument in man's possession, by what he discovers things around him, in the past and future. When we say *things* from the Islamic point of view, unlike western philosophies, we mean everything is ***known*** and *discussed* on the boundaries of physics and metaphysics,[81] or in other words everything empirical or non-empirical. Thus, the Islamic thought has given a distinguishable significance to the mind as the tool for the proper cognition.[82] This importance emanates direct from Qur'anic verses and the prophets tradition,[83] where those to embrace it are praised as rights doers, and those to depart it are called as sinners or ignorant.

Qur'anic preliminary discussion about mind's importance starts with the alertness to those who dare to speak or say anything without a proper understanding.[84]

﴿ وَلَا تَقْفُ مَا لَيْسَ لَكَ بِهِۦ عِلْمٌ ۚ إِنَّ ٱلسَّمْعَ وَٱلْبَصَرَ وَٱلْفُؤَادَ كُلُّ أُو۟لَٰٓئِكَ كَانَ عَنْهُ مَسْـُٔولًا ﴿٣٦﴾ ﴾ الإسراء: ٣٦

"And follow not (O man i.e., say not, or do not or witness not) that of which you have no knowledge. Verily, the hearing, and the sight, and the heart, of each of those ones will be questioned (by Allah). (Al-isra: 36)

Secondly, God's verse about the non-equality of those who know and see and those who are blind.

﴿ قُلْ هَلْ يَسْتَوِى ٱلْأَعْمَىٰ وَٱلْبَصِيرُ ۚ أَفَلَا تَتَفَكَّرُونَ ﴿٥٠﴾ ﴾ الأنعام: ٥٠

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[80] See: Ibid., p. 25.
[81] See: Al-Maydani, p. 11.
[82] See: Al Ajami, p. 130.
[83] See: Al-Maydani, p. 11.
[84] See: Ahmad Fuad Basha, p. 21.

"Say: Are the blind and the one who sees equal? Will you not then take thought? (Al- An' am: 50)

Thirdly , God's call for specific thinking on the self, and the creation of the heaven and earth and what is between them.

﴿ أَوَلَمْ يَتَفَكَّرُوا۟ فِىٓ أَنفُسِهِم ۗ مَّا خَلَقَ ٱللَّهُ ٱلسَّمَٰوَٰتِ وَٱلْأَرْضَ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَآ إِلَّا بِٱلْحَقِّ وَأَجَلٍ مُّسَمًّى ۗ وَإِنَّ كَثِيرًا مِّنَ ٱلنَّاسِ بِلِقَآئِ رَبِّهِمْ لَكَٰفِرُونَ ﴿٨﴾ ﴾ الروم: ٨

"Do they not think deeply (in their ownselves) about themselves (how Allah created them from nothing, and similarly He will resurrect them)? Allah has created not the heavens and the earth, and all that is between them, except with truth and for an appointed term. And indeed many of mankind deny the Meeting with their Lord".(Al-Rūm: 8)

Likewise, we come across 18 ayats to speak on the thinking and mind, beside more than 50 other Qur'anic verses to assess or criticize those who avoid embracing proper thinking or the using the reasoning.

﴿ ۞ إِنَّ شَرَّ ٱلدَّوَآبِّ عِندَ ٱللَّهِ ٱلصُّمُّ ٱلْبُكْمُ ٱلَّذِينَ لَا يَعْقِلُونَ ﴿٢٢﴾ ﴾ الأنفال: ٢٢

"Verily, the worst of (moving) living creatures with Allah are the deaf and the dumb, who understand not (i.e. the disbelievers).(Al- Anfal : 22)

Also the verse that asserts:

﴿ كَذَٰلِكَ يُبَيِّنُ ٱللَّهُ لَكُمْ ءَايَٰتِهِۦ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَعْقِلُونَ ﴿٢٤٢﴾ ﴾ البقرة: ٢٤٢

"Thus Allah makes clear His Ayat (Laws) to you, in order that you may understand". (Al-Baqarah: 242)

Obviously, from the above Qur'anic verses we perceived the magnitude of mind in the acknowledgments of facts, both empirical or the analytical. For, unlike western philosophical thought, particularly pragmatism and positivism, Muslim thought while approaching the reason or reasonable thinking, as a significant verification segment, have settled limits or the field of ideas where the reason might take part as the verification tool.

- *Mere reason evidences*: Like the 'necessity of the occurrence of life if there is a move' and 'the causer if there is a cause', etc,[85] the effects of what are purely analytical. The reason here treats the empirical evidences but the relations here are not synthetic but analytical, if expressed with the positivism terminology. In verifying these types of ideas from reason perspective, we explore the hidden relations.[86] The cognition of these relations is a type of the verification for other ideas related to these thoughts. For example, 'the necessity of the causer in each cause action', factor which may not be obvious from the empirical evidence unless we approach it with reason or analytical course of action.

- *Natural evidences*: at what reason got not any direct implication, or the ideas here have no rational explanation. They are there because of the natural system they were designed to function like the face redness while being sick, the burning of fire or the sweetness of honey.[87] In other words, reason only obtains relations between two factors and is able to verify when one or two of them occur. But the relation here is non-related to any obvious and reasonable cause. Thus, they are considered as true ideas only when they take place in the way they are supposed to occur. By the classification of reasonable verified ideas Muslim thought proofs the detailed and distinguished study of the subject.

Why emphasizing on the division of ideas able of verification from reason point of view while in western empirical schools-as pragmatism particularly- it is sufficient to mention that fact are the mere resources of them?

Leaving aside the source of the ideas and their types, Muslim thought came up with the classification of ideas from the reason verification ability, being essentially empirical,[88] in order to avoid any possible error to result from the present connection among ideas. Most rotatable mistake from all materialistic

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[85] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 152; Cf., Al-Maydani, p. 26.
[86] See: Abdulhamid al-Kurdi, p. 57.
[87] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 152; Cf., Al-Maydani, p. 26.
[88] See: Ibid., p. 36.

philosophies is admitting the "existence" of a thing without a cause, which is included under the type of reasonably impossible ideas.[89]

Moreover, in order to avoid any possible reasoning error to lead to the ignorance of this relations in the empirical facts, which are acknowledged only from the reason or point of view, and be able to obtain the verification accurately from the present relations in the empirical facts, *pure reason relation* ideas are divided into:

a) Particular Ideas (al-Juzī) - it is every acknowledged thought which is limited to one person, or what does not accept any communion in the mind.[90] In other words, it is every thought whose verification cannot define more than one individual, as personalities like, Salih, Yakub, etc. Even if containing similar names, reason denies having second person with same personality, despite the fact that they might share many similarities.[91]

b) Concept Ideas (al-Kullī)- it is every acknowledged thought that does not exclude the possibility to be joined from other ideas.[92] Although the actuality proves that those ideas are available only in one thing, or there is not even a single one.[93] For example, the names like: man, animal, star, sun, moon, creator from the nullity, etc. Mentioned names like the sun, moon, though are proved to be only singular thing still are considered as *whole ideas* as reason does not abstain the possibility of having more than one sun and one moon.[94] Similarly, 'the *creation from nullity*- though practically there cannot be any creation without a Creator.

Thus, the complication of concept ideas (al-Kullī) and their relation to the reason and its verification process obliges the detailed explanation. For, in order

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[89] See: Ibid.
[90] See: Muhammad Nur al-Barkhashani, *Tas-hīl al-Mantik*, (Karatchi: Bayt al-Ilm, 2004), p. 37.
[91] See: Sead Al-Ddin Ibn Omer al-Taftazani, *Tahdhibu Almantik*. Sharh. Abdullah Ibn Fadlullah al-khabisi, (Cairo: Daru al-Sadah, 2005-2006), p. 28; Al-Maydani, p. 35.
[92] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 28; Al Barkhashani, p. 37.
[93] See: Al-Maydani, p. 35.
[94] See: Al-Taftazani, pp. 54-55; Al Barkhashani, p. 40.

to avoid the possible complication in the verification process they have been categorized into different types.

First: The concept ideas (al-Kullī), absurd to exist any of its kind practically, like the existence of any partner or associate with God.[95]

Second: The concept ideas (al-Kullī), imaginable to exist as an idea, but there is no such thing practically, like the existence of griffin (anka).[96]

Third: The concept ideas (al-Kullī), possible to exist more than one thing or object, but practically there is only one of that type, sun, moon and man for example.[97]

Forth: The concept ideas (al-Kullī), absurd to exist more than one type, like the Creator to create from the nothingness.[98]

Fifth: The concept ideas (al-Kullī), imaginable to exist in the unlimited number, but practically they are in the limited number, like the stars, man, and different planets.[99]

Sixth: The concept ideas (al-Kullī), possible to exist in the unlimited number, and actually existing in the unlimited number. Like the unlimited knowledge of God or the number itself.[100]

These classifications of ideas from the reason perspective have no place in western philosophical thought. If we try to mention in the systemized way the reasons, they would be as follow:

- In pragmatism, the reason is only the mirror to reflect our outside world. Thus, whatever we know and acknowledge is the reflection of our objective world. For, first, second, fourth and sixth types of rational ideas have no place in their thought as they express abstract possible ideas only and are false.
- In positivism, the reason only reflects our outside world but still there is a large space left to reason analyzing ability from where appear pure

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[95] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 28; Ibid., p. 71; Al Barkhashani, p. 40.
[96] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 29; Ibid., p. 70; Al-Maydani, p. 36.
[97] See: Ibid.
[98] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 29; Al-Maydani, p. 36.
[99] See: Al Barkhashani, p. 40; Al-Maydani, p. 36. Al-Taftazani, p. 29.
[100] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 29; Al-Maydani, p. 36.

analytical ideas, which are discussed on the long range in their thought. For logical positivist, the ideas under the first, second, four, and six are mere analytical ideas with no any relation to the objective world, thus they are considered as unreliable ideas. And any rational verification process is a meaningless and false operation.

As the matter of fact, the classification of ideas into particular ideas (al-Juzī) and concept ideas (al-Kullī) from reason verification perspective is a very precise way of ideas classification which includes what is empirical and what abstract or imaginable. The empirical part in its straight form assembles no any dispute with the western philosophical thought but the abstract or imaginable ideas are refuted under the pretext of idea false. But the abstract ideas, verifiable from the reason perspective, structure a significant establishment for the Muslim philosophical thought. Where and how can we obtain a common ground between these schools?

Initially, mind and reason in Muslim thought although regarded as an information collector or recorder it is granted to the deserved level. Reason, in Muslim thought, is able to analyze and cognize things which are beyond its immediate objects.[101] The element supported from the western thought as well but with different terminology. This imaginable plausible ideas, as mentioned previously, are supported from pragmatists and considered as verified ideas if originate from the past and supported by common sense. While from logical positivists are considered only as logically true ideas if related to facts.

However, Muslim scholars did not cross the limits of empirical knowledge to bring up senseless forms and figures in the philosophical stage, as the logical positivists and other materialistic philosophies assert, but they confirm the ability of reason to construct ideas which are able to be verified practically but require time to be proved and verified. And here we have mathematical and logical mechanism to tell us that reason and mind can protect human from wrong

[101] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 152.

calculations and save their thinking, and this is what the humanity practically have done throughout different ages till today.

Hence, it is possible for a western philosopher to arise the above mentioned example of griffin (*Anka*) as a counter respond to Muslims and others who endorse the reason ability to verify the ideas or forms which had never existed and never will be existing in our practical world. In fact, the examples of '*Griffin*' and the '*Creator* creating from the nothingness', if we suppose that they are both reasonable verifiable, are not highlighted as the verified ideas but as reason possible imaginable ideas. Attempting to be of the same profundity, the example of Griffin here differs from that of Creator or God. As the Creator or God, is possible of being true from the relations to exist in creation and necessary relation to explore some of His attributes. But the *Griffin* existence will remain as an imaginable idea unless there is an actual effect or bearing whose verification depends on the objective world. Moreover, classifying mind possible ideas in the above mentioned types means not taking them into account as true. But by obtaining entire types of ideas from the objective and actuality point of view as well as from the reason or mind point of view we create evident and apparent line between them.

From here, the cognition from the reason verification point of view in Muslim thought, as we elaborated in the above examples, is surrounded in the three main types; 1) the necessary, 2) possible and 3) impossible type of ideas. Definitely, muslim thought have divided these ideas into these categories from the reason relation apprehension of reality, no other. In other words, if the reality confirms and affirms that a thing is unimaginable *to not exist*, instantly the reason will categorize it as the necessary verified idea. And if it is affirmed as the idea possible, to be or not to be, or waiting to be verified, the reason will categorize it as possible idea. As well as, if it is impossible to exist in actual world or not supported by any sign of its existence, causality or impact in the reality the idea is considered as the idea impossible or absurd. Though, the third type of idea

has no place in the existence, but for the sake of exactness it has been given a logical place to be considered as logically present but neither true nor false.

Hitherto, we came across the manner Muslim thought has classified the reasonable ideas into detailed types, to explore their reality and connection to their verifiability reasonably, as well their necessary relation among each other or with an outer factor, which as mentioned previously western materialistic philosophy failed to do so.

b) Language, Semantics and Their Profundity in Muslim Thought

With the formation of ideas from the mention resources and interrelation of them in different forms we express them, and by expressing ideas we obtain the proposition. Moreover, the proposition here is the combine of different ideas declaring positively or negatively the presence of something, or giving different attributes to relation of these ideas to each other.[102] In other words, proposition is the dynamic to contain and express the particular idea which may be true or false.

True or false proposition is not our concern in here, as it will be elaborated later on. What we are about to stand at more is proposition formation and the manner words, as the foundation of proposition, express meanings and develop into the idea which will obtain possibility to be as the proper and meaningful sentence acknowledged commonly by all.[103] *Snow is the frozen water,* is a proposition but formed from the conception or idea water and being *frozen*. In other words, it is the join of two ideas, the conception (al-Tasawur) and the confirmative one (al-Taṣdīk).[104]

Hence, from language perspective, the proposition related to words and meanings are divided into: 1) subject matter (al-Mawdū), as the word *snow* in above example. And attribute (al-Mahmūl) as the word *frozen water* in the same

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[102] See: Lutfi Abdul al-Baīd, *Falsafatu Al-majaz Bayna Albalaghati Alarabiyyati wa Al-Fikri Al-Hadith*, (Cairo: Maktabah al-Nahdah al-Misriyyah, 1976), pp. 105-107.
[103] See: Hijazi, p. 41; Al-Maydani, p. 59.
[104] Ibid., p. 20.

example, in both forms positive and negative.[105] Particularly, from these two conceptions emanates the fundability of words and meaning in Muslim thought.

Thus, the language as an important mechanism for verification of the ideas has been carrying plenty of importance in Muslim thought. [106] Majority of early Muslim scholars, like Farabi and Ibni Rushd for instance,[107] in order to have an accurate meaning and specific definition of the segments they think and discuss about have made unique effort in defining each and every important word, particularly in the field of philosophy and Kalam.[108]

It is sufficient to mention the very significant instruction of the Islamic jurisprudence which says that, "the matters are what objectivism and real meanings expresses and not mere words and subjectivism" (al-'ibretu bil-hakāik wal Me'anī, wa laysa bil Alfazi wal Mabānī).

From here, the language and its terminological formation institute particular attention from the Muslim scholars, where not only they attempted to define each and every key word related to the different key subject, but entire Islamic disciplines are assembled on the definition and proper understanding of words, or what is known as (al-Beyān). Words which have an apparent and obvious meaning were called as true or actual meanings (al-Me'anī al-Hakikiyyah). While those to contain metaphoric meaning, were called as allegoric or imaginative meaning (al-Majāz).[109] Always keeping in mind that false and wrong meanings, frequently used in Muslim thought, stand as the opposite of true meaning and metaphoric meanings. I have pointed at the metaphoric meanings in the same column with true meanings, as in majority of occasions the metaphoric (al-Majāz) expresses true meanings but with different expressions. And considering them as false meaning would make many true meanings called as

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[105] Ibid., pp. 20-21; Ibid., pp. 71-72.
[106] See: Lutfi Abdul al-Baīd, p. 1; Hijazi, p. 41.
[107] See: Azzawawi Bagwarh, *Al-Falsafah wa Al-Lugah- Ankdu Al-munatif Al-Lugawii- Fi Al-Fasafah Al-Muasirah*, Daru At-Taliati, Beirut, 2005, p. 34.
[108] See: Lutfi Abdul al-Baīd, pp. 20-22.
[109] Ibid., p. 1; Ibid., p. 167; Al Barkhashani, p. 32.

false, which was a common mistake commited by logical positivists.[110] In addition, as mentioned previously, in order to have an equivalent study with previous philosophies, initially we will attempt to postpone what is considered as imaginative (al-Majāz) for a later evaluation.

As per true and actual meaning, Muslim thought have classified it according to the originality or reference of they fundability. Thus, this type is classified under the terminology of Founding Semantics (al-Delālah al-Waḍ'iyyah) which is defined as: meaning of linguistic terms conducted according to what people have agreed on.

From here the Founding semantics or (al-Delālah al-Wad'iyyah) is divided into two types[111]:

- Non phonetic or non literal semantic- (al-Delālah al-Waḍ'iyyah gayra al-Lafziyyah)[112]- the meaning of anything in the character of a sign, picture, or sound of bell for example.[113]
- Phonetic or literal founding semantics- (al-Delālah al-Waḍ'iyyah al-Lafziyyah)[114]- the location of meanings to the words according to the semantic founding, formed with actual or metaphor meaning.[115] And this type includes three other groups:[116]

1) The correspondence meaning (Dalalah al-Muṭābakah)- the meaning of the word placed according to its actual or metaphor indications. The indication of word *human* to the word *rational animal*, for instance. Or the meaning of the word *lion* for the *brave man* as the metaphor meaning.[117]

2) The partial meaning (Dalah al-Taḍammun)- the meaning of the word partially to its indication. It is called (al-Taḍammun) or the comprehension

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[110] See: Lutfi Abdul al-Baīd, p. 182.
[111] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 71, Al-Maydani, p. 27.
[112] See: Hijazi, p. 43.
[113] See: Al Barkhashani, p. 21; Al-Maydani, p. 27.
[114] See: Hijazi, p. 43; Al Barkhashani, Baytu Al-Ilm. Karatchi, 2004, p. 21.
[115] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 16; Al-Maydani, p. 27; Hijazi, p. 44.
[116] See: Hijazi, p. 44.
[117] See: Lutfi Abdul al-Baīd, pp. 11-16; Hijazi, p. 44; Al-Maydani, p. 28; Al Barkhashani, p. 22.

meaning, as only the part among the complete meaning is understood, or only the part of it is sought to be known. For instance, the indication of the word human being as an animal or being able to speak is limited partially only at the differences of the main characteristics of things. If asked if the human is animal or inorganic body, the answer will be partial as only animal.[118]

3) The engaged meaning (Dalah al-Iltizām)-the indication of the word on the meaning out of the meaning engaged to it rationally or actually. Like the indication of the word human to his writing or knowing ability which is not mention but consequently understood as the indication meaning out of it.[119]

In order to expand the relation of different words which contain the whole meaning even when they are related to the partial meaning in form of positive and negative conjunction an extra detailed classification of meanings is added. This might seem to be useless, but when we approach carefully appears that Muslim thought by this study attempted to protect expressions from the possible errors. Saying that 'some animals are not human', for instance, means that some of them are animal, and that is human being. Or positively, saying that, 'some animal are all human', which in other expression elucidates the fact that humans are animal as they belong to family of animal.[120] In both examples, positive and negative words, the Muslim logician and jurisprudence scholars, beside the exploration on the usage of the word 'some', came out with a principle that 'indefinite noun in the negative context comes with general meaning' (al-Nakirah fī ṣiyāki al-Nafyi te'am).[121]

Logical positivist might ask, in this regard, as what is the benefit of expressing propositions in this ambiguous way where there are much easier ways to utter meanings, as it emerges while translating those words into other sentences with different words? Moreover, are the logicians perplexing the

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[118] See: Hijazi, p. 44; Al-Maydani, p. 29; Al Barkhashani, p.22.
[119] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 19; Hijazi, p. 44; Al-Maydani, p. 30; Al Barkhashani, p. 22.
[120] See: Al-Maydani, p. 104.
[121] Ibid., p. 106.

matters and rather coming with meaningless proposition, as the logical positivist assert?

As the matter of fact, in these and many other proposition types, where are discussed in detail all type of expression formation, Muslim scholars attemted to prevent the wrong and multifunctional usage of meaning which may lead to ambiguous or false meanings. Thus, they attempt to clarify the usage of conjunction in the general and partial proposition in all possible forms, negative, positive and conditional types. In the example, 'Some men are not horse', or some 'some horse are not man',[122] the proposition appears to affirm that 'many of man are horse'. But before proceeding further with any such verdict it must be clarified the meaning of the word 'some' in the sentence, and this is what the logic stands for. Or explaining the word 'some' in accordance to its actual meaning used in the sentence, free from its general meaning. Because it's meaning is enough to affirm a fact that some people are not horse, without a conditional meaning attached to it, as some other must be. In other words, the word 'some' includes 'whole' meaning even if specified as a 'partial' meaning and does not contain any contradiction. It is true that 'some people are not horse', beside that the *All* cannot be primarily. In this sentence the word 'some' gives the meaning of the whole. And it is unanimously agreed that what is determined for the part ought to be determined for the whole. In other words, once we have acknowledged that some of men are not horse, automatically we have been affirming about entire human spice, which includes all of them. And the negativity of second part, the word horse or the 'conveyed meaning (al-Mahmūl)', excludes all type of man, as it contains general meaning.[123]

In here as we saw practically that the negative whole meaning of conveyed word (al-Mahmūl)[124] gives us the general meaning to the subject word or matter

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[122] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 31; Al-Maydani, p. 106.
[123] Ibid., p. 106.
[124] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 66.

(al-Mawdū)[125] which in the previous example is 'man'. The meaning which would not be that easy to take it out without a proper translation and proper breakdown into the meaning of logic construction of words, which again is neglected from logical logical positivists.

Hence, with proper elaboration of the words we obtain proper and systemized meanings, as well as organized, true thoughts and verified ideas. Despite the fact that they appear to contain wrong and false meaning but they are true, as seen in the mentioned examples. In this manner, we get to know the importance of Muslim thought effort on the language and semantic study.

Another significant point emphasized from Muslim thought in the logic construction of words, which may assist to solve much misconception in positivism, is the meanings available only in the positive form which can be expressed in the negative form, as it will abort its own meaning and bring up contradiction meaning. For instance, we can say that '5 multiply 5 is equal to 25',[126] but we can never structure this sentence in any negative form.[127]

Hence, Muslim thought analyzes about the meaning verdict and the way it functions in relation with other meaning, from the logical or outer support, explain how significant understanding of words and their perception was for them. Next to this, we observe that many matters should not stop in their outer understanding and be considered as meaningless, as logical positivist in many cases do. Nevertheless, we have to translate them into other meaning and explore their genuine meaning in more ordinary form if they do not seem so. In this regard, Muslim thought understanding of meanings is a very best conclusion to express the fact that logic is a confirmation of facts and additional mechanism to save the reason from possible errors. Thus, we are obliged to include the types of meaning, elaborated in detail from Muslim point of view, to perceive the manner they work as the element for ideas verification.

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[125] Ibid., p. 66; Lutfi Abdul al-Baīd, p. 97.
[126] See: Al-Maydani, p. 107.
[127] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 78.

b. 1. Types of Meanings

Words in Muslim thought transfer us toward the next level to elaborate the concept or meaning[128] and their relativity to the facts, from where they are formed and cognized as proper and true meanings. But before elaborating types of meaning it is noteworthy to mention two general types of words under what are classified entire types of meaning:

- Partial words (al-Lafzu al-Juzī)- what is to provoke or agitate the meaning in our mind which we do acknowledge from the word itself, for example the words like Makkah, Omer ibn Al-khattab, or Islamic University.[129]
- Whole words (al-Lafzu al-kullī)- words to agitate objective characteristics in our minds without raising the detailed segments of that word, for example the word city, to include many things inside as roads, citizens, etc.[130]

Considering meaning as a delicate matter, Muslim scholars have categorized it into different levels. The classification avoids any possible disorder to occur on meanings cognized with inevitability and those known as metaphoric meanings.[131] In addition, the classification clarifies the meaning of those which share different meaning with other words, the factor which may create vey easily disorder or perplexity in more delicate matters, as we observe in western thought.

It may be not yet clear for someone how the meaning classification may avoid perplexity and where lays its importance. But sorting meanings into different types is another way of proving the manner humans reason functions, acknowledges and organizes thoughts and ideas, and proving the matter of *common sense*, as a very sensitive point refuted by western thought. However, in demonstrating and arranging types of meanings[132] we are about to distinguish common and joined ideas approved by humans in general. It is noteworthy to

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[128] See: Lutfi Abdul al-Baīd, p 97; "The meaning or concept is: the particular understanding which the word raises in our mind"; Al-Maydani, p. 45.

[129] See: Lutfi Abdul al-Baīd, p. 98; Hijazi, p. 49; Ibid., p. 53; Al-Maydani, p. 45, ; Al Barkhashani, p. 29.

[130] See: Hijazi, p. 49; Ibid., p. 53; Al Barkhashani, p. 29; Al-Maydani, p. 45.

[131] See: Lutfi Abdul al-Baīd, pp. 12-13.

[132] See: Al-Maydani, pp. 57-58.

mention all thirteen types of meanings approved by Muslim scholars,[133]but being more precise we will mention only those who might concern us here and have been the center of disputes and divergences among the western schools of thought, positivism particularly.

1) The collusion meanings (al-Tawāṭu)[134]- the meaning of a word agreed by all. Like the word *dot* or *point* which is cognized unanimously to be a meaning for a thing which has no length and no depth. Or the meaning of a word *man* which raises no disputes on its meaning but is unanimously agreed upon.[135]

We have highlighted this point among others for the fact that the existence of collusion meanings (al-Tawātu) in western thought, particularly in positivism where these matter are discussed in detail, have been the center of perplexity and dispute. The collusion meanings (al-Tawātu) are not refuted but there is one side exploration of their meanings. In other words, logical positivist claim that these meanings affirmation cannot be under the apprehension of everyone to point out on them as such, but it is the science effect with its objective laws to decide if the meaning is true or not. Logical positivist while pointing at the science did not mean something out of man ability, but they indicate that meaning should not be verified on the level of personal evaluation of words. From here, the difference of these three schools, being minor between pragmatists and Islamic and considerable between logical positivists, again raises many other questions.

Logical positivist, while restricting the trueness of meaning from mans possession to the discovered equipment by him, makes the results tight with the causes, which in here is the science and not the causer which is man himself.

Surely, they yield this under the pretext that human might be deceived by his limited cognitive and perceptual ability. While Muslims deliberation on the other hand signifies that, the agreement or the collusion (al-Tawātu) of human in

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[133] See: Ibid., pp. 47-58.
[134] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 143; Hijazi, p. 50.
[135] See: Al Barkhashani, p. 31; Al-Maydani, p. 51.

general is sufficient to raise a meaning or an idea to the level of true meaning even if they are limited to a particular time or place. The *collision meaning*, in the manner Muslim thought has used, supports the pragmatist terminology of *common sense*. The importance of this terminology in the Muslim thought is not only used in here but it is applied in each and every idea evaluation and verification. Without what it would have been impossible to create the empire of Islamic science. And opposite to it lays the solipsism, which in any form, literal or logical, cannot establish any reality or any knowledge.

2) Suspicious meanings (al-Tashkīk)[136]- it is meaning which in different occasion raises divergences instead of the conventions. For instance, the word *white* which possesses levels and is given different meanings occasionally as *whiter* and *less white*, or as snow white or paper white, etc. Similarly, the word *light* which is described in degrees and levels as lighter and less light.[137]

The suspicious meanings (al-Tashkīk) has taken the attention of many Muslim scholars. As, any misconception of suspicious meanings (al-Tashkīk) conducts to solipsism and impossibility to attain exact and demonstrative knowledge, as well as agreement between facts,[138] as will be seen in the below explorations. From this perspective, the elaboration of the suspicious meanings, from Muslim thought point of view, is another example to prove the detailed and the importance Muslim scholars have given to the meaning and its proper classification.

3) Synonym meaning (al-Tarāduf)[139] - different words which are engaged and convey synonym meanings, for example the word *man* and rational animal.[140] Synonym meaning (al-Tarāduf) is significant for the fact that the word is able to be translatable into the different words, but what engages them in the translation process is the inner meaning or known as logical meaning taken from different

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[136] See: Hijazi, p. 50.
[137] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 24-25; Al-Maydani, pp. 51-52.
[138] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 145.
[139] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 144.
[140] See: Ibid., p. 52.

relations, the element which was permanently dismissed from logical positivists thought. Despite that the Muslim's apporoaching to synonym meaning (al-Tarāduf) is dismissed from logical positivist point of view, yet we find it available elucidated under the terminology of *definition in use*, elaborated in detail in the above section.

4) Subscription meaning (al-Ishtirāk)[141]- the similar word engaged in different meanings, for example the word *Ayn* in Arabic which contains more than one meaning, claiming to be a word for an eye, spring, sun, and in this way in many other words available in the dictionaries.[142] The importance of this meaning as the previous one appears while elaborating the words to express a reality but at mean time include other expressions which gives us the impression that limiting meanings to one type of words only, as logical positivist suggest, is a perplexed and difficult theory, as will be seen in coming analyses.

5) Contrast meanings (al-Taḍād)- words which are unable to be joined at the same time and at the same place in the same meaning. For example the *black* and *white*, both being contradict words containing different meanings.[143] But there is a possibility of joining these words in the same place and same time only in negative form, like not white and not black but red for example.[144]

The above-elaborated types of meanings demonstrate the accurate illustration of Muslim scholars and their approach toward proper understanding of words and idea structure within. Attentively, Muslim thought forms no dispute with any of the meaning mentioned in the above examples. But while metaphysical meanings are analyzed, to make obvious other part of possible world which occupies a large place in human life and which reflects meanings on the world of facts, it becomes the center of disputes to be faced by Muslim thought. These meanings cannot be disregarded without explanation on its

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[141] See: Isma'il Salah Abd al-Hak, p. 49; Al- Jalaynd, p. 243; Al- Jalaynd, p. 143; Hijazi, p. 51.
[142] See: Isma'il Salah Abd al-Hak, p. 49; Al- Jalaynd, p. 243; Lutfi Abdul al-Baīd, p. 11; Al-Taftazani, p. 25; Al-Maydani, p. 52; Al Barkhashani, p. 30.
[143] See: Al-Maydani, p. 54.
[144] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 33; Al-Maydani, p. 54.

establishment and their essentiality. Because only in this way we can affirm that we are studding and analyzing mans nature properly.

Does ignoring every metaphysical meaning, as western thought performs,[145] means avoiding to study and understand mans nature? In fact, it cannot be asserted with certainty, but on the other hand disregarding to understand what man mean with the words like *God*, *cause*, *ethics*, etc, leave us to wander that they ignore their evaluation. Hence, by avoiding to offer any elaboration on the mentioned, as the logical positivist carry out, with no plausible explanation, means that they are ignoring it.

The meaning of "*Nothingness*" one of the examples frequently brought from logical positivists to explain the error meaning of metaphysics, is a logical error. According to their assertion, there is nothing in existence called "*nothingness*" and the usage of the word in this form makes is just meaningless. Likewise, they attempt to demonstrate language as possible logical error. But logical positivists have to remember that the word '*nothingness*' is one language example and unable to demonstrate any thought or logical error, or demonstrate any pure metaphysical meaning attached to it. Moreover, in demonstrating the word '*nothingness*' with another synonym we obtain the word "*non presence*", and the opposite of it the word "*presence*" which is actual and full of reality and meaning. Thus, the words "*nothingness*" cannot be a logical error, as logical positivist asserts, but a syntax problem which attached to another synonym obtains a full meaning.

The detailed exploration of these types of meaning has been elaborated under the *contradiction meaning* (*al-Tanākuḍ*),[146] which has two forms. One to express the opposite of other meaning, as the words *existence* the opposite *nullity* or *nothingness*, which is refuted from the logical positivist point of view. And second form of explanation, which explains the meaning to be the opposite of other meaning with the negative *conjunction*, as the *life* and *nonlife*, or *existence*

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[145] See; Isma'il Salah Abd al-Hak, p. 257.

[146] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 32 ; Ibid., p. 94; Al Barkhashani, p. 92.

and *nonexistence*, both acceptable from the logical positivist point of views, [147] though they have not yet agreed what the meanings really are.

For the sake of elucidation, I would ask the logical positivist if the word *nonexistence* is an acceptable opposite word of the word *existence*. Probably the positive answer would be unavoidable, as both have place in the factuality and possibility. Hence, we affirm that words are possible to be used wrongly but their outward illustration, like logical positivist practice, cannot influence the idea to the level to consider them false. Thus, for the meaning exactness it can be relied at the word itself, as we perceived on the above examples, but beside it needs a thought or logical assistance as an outward assistance, as Muslims presented here. In addition, the explanation of the types of meanings and the manner they are verified to be source of the proper ideas verification require another significant point added on the relation of meanings, similar to synthetic and analytical ideas, referred in logical positivism. Some of these meanings might be used as clarification for the relation between the analytical and the synthetic words, the character which supports what Ayer settled as a respond to Kant, mentioned on the above section. For, the meanings relations in Muslim thought are:

1) Similarity meaning (al-Tamāthul) - the dedication of meaning to another meaning to resemble on the result, as the 5 multiplies 5 being equal to the 25.[148] On my opinion, this type of meaning is equivalent to the synonym meaning. Thus, this represent the fact that the analytical ideas or meanings are another explanation of synthetic ideas, as the 5x5 being analytical is another expression of 25 being synthetic.

2) Additional or attached meaning (al-Idāfah)- it is attached necessary meaning obtained from a word or idea related to. As obtaining the meaning of father from the presence of son and the opposite.[149] The *additional meaning* (al-Idāfah) asserts very significant and sensitive point. It patterns the matter of cause

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[147] See: Al-Maydani, p. 55.
[148] See: Ibid., p. 56.
[149] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 36; Ibid, 52; Al-Maydani, p. 56.

and causer (al-Sabab wal Musabbab) which are considered as the nonsense from the logical positivist point of view. However, the additional meanings (al-Idāfah) in the Muslim thought form a very significant element where entire abstract and non-experienced ideas or meanings locate logical evaluation and proper explanation, which again finds no place in logical positivist point of view.

Moreover, next to the above example we will not oversight if we mention other similar example of the additional meaning, as the *little* and *lot* and the meaning of the *up* in accordance with the necessary meaning of *down* or the father being bigger than son, etc.[150] Thus, the *additional meaning* rationally supports and denotes the necessity of many other abstract notions. It supports the meaning of word *existence* with its opposite word *nullity*, whether we accept it to exist for real or we deny it. Furthermore, any compromise in the categories of additional meaning (al-Idāfah) will conflict the logical necessities, and this is what logical positivist should be aware of.

In this manner Muslim understanding of language and their logic relation takes a very wide range to answer many unrelated thought errors brought up by logical positivist, as the pioneer of the syntax and modal logic in the western thought. Likewise, from this elucidation of the topic we observe the manner Muslim thought is capable of giving a detailed reply to everything considered as a metaphysical and nonsense, but in fact these evaluations are full of facts and reality.

b. 2. The Definition

Similar to logical positivist, Muslim thought as well brought the definition mechanism as another tool to support and illustrate the essence of meanings. The definition terminology brought up by Muslim thought, which is applied according to the meaning in accordance with the reality is known as (Muarrifat) or definition of the words.[151] However, if the meaning of word, in its external

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[150] Cf: Al- Jalaynd, p. 152.
[151] See: Hijazi, p. 70.

form, fails to explore what we attempt than we apply more detailed version of the meaning elaboration (Muarrifat) which explores meaning with different words or expression. The definition (Muarrifat) in Muslim thought approaches almost the notion of *definition in use* in positivism theory, which practically contains similar motives. Defining 'man' with the characteristic of animal, for instance, is only the *partial* definition of him and includes other species of animals. Thus, the definition in this case is considered as incomplete definition.[152] If we define the word *fire* with something burning, cannot be considered as a definition of a word, as the meaning here is not what we intend to know. In other words, instead of defining a word we are creating more perplexed meanings.[153] How sure are we that the meanings obtained are the real meanings, and how do we verify those? Elaborated in every chapter of logical positivist analyses, the answer to these questions concerned Muslim thought also.[154] Which again demonstrates Muslim logician's detailed study of words and their meaning verification process.

For, to explore and verify those meanings, Muslim thought have upgraded the terminology of definition (al-Muarraf). Moreover, the definition or (*Muarraf*) had to be classified into seven specific categories. Mentioning all types of definition would have enriched our topic, if mentioned in detail with definitions and explanation specified for, but considering it as something which would not exceed any thing in addition we are obliged to skip with exteriorly explanation only. Thus, the definition types in Muslim thought are:

1) The complete Definition (al-Had al-Tām)[155]: it is what defines a word with complete elements included in its prescription, as the definition of 'man' by the 'rational animal'. The definition which includes entire elements and complete attributes of man, excluding everything possible to join it.[156]

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[152] See: Al-Maydani, p. 60.
[153] Ibid., pp. 61-62.
[154] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 177-178.
[155] See: Al Barkhashani, p. 56; Hijazi, p. 73.
[156] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 32; Al-Maydani, p. 63.

2) The partial definition (al-Had al-Nākis)[157]: it is the definition of a thing to mention only some elements or attributes to differentiate between it and other things, as the definition of the man with him being rational being.[158] In here, the rationality of the man is a very close attribute of him to distinguish him from other living things.

3) Whole description (al-Rasm al-Tām)[159]: it is the definition inclusive from one side and particular from the other, as the description of the word 'man' with him being rational animal laughing with intensity.[160] The element what distinguishes between him and all other animals on one side, as well as join him with all others of his kind on the other (laughing with intensity).[161]

4) Deficient description (al-Rasm al-Nākiṣ)[162]: it is the definition of an attribute mentioning only his specified elements of it, as the ability to obtain knowledge and write for 'man'.[163] The element which introduces only mans ability without mentioning other more general and whole elements, as rationality or animalistic side for example.

5) Literal definition (al-T'arīf al-Lafzī): it is the definition of word with other different word synonym to it, acknowledged to the definer. As defining the word lion in Arabic known as *Asad* with *Kusurah*, the synonym to it.[164] This type of definition is specified in the positivism thought as the very significant for the fact that many words in order to obtain proper and verified meaning have to be translated into other synonym words. In Muslim thought this type of definition is applied for the verification of words which appear to be clear but indeed are very perplexed, as the word 'nothing', in the logical positivist example.

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[157] See: Hijazi, p. 73; Al Barkhashani, p. 57.
[158] See: Al-Maydani, p. 64.
[159] See: Al Barkhashani, p. 57; Hijazi, p. 73.
[160] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 81; Al-Maydani, p. 65.
[161] See: Al Barkhashani, p. 80.
[162] See: Hijazi, p. 74; Al Barkhashani, p. 57.
[163] See: Al-Maydani, p. 66.
[164] See: Lutfi Abdul al-Baīd, p. 3. Hijazi, p. 51; Ibid, p. 71.

6) Illustrative definition (al-Tarīfu bi al-Mithāl): the definition of word with other words as an illustration of it, as defining the word noun with the examples like Ali, Yasser, etc.[165]

7) Partition definition (al-Tarīfu bi al-Taksīm): it is the definition of a word by pointing out parts or segments categorized under that particular word, as categorizing the noun, pronoun and verb under the meaning of a word.[166]

Hence, Muslim approach to the demonstration of language in general and the words formation in particular, including types, meaning verification demonstrates the significance of this subject. Beside the fact that study of language and the meaning of words is not something new for Muslim thought, but has followed its development in every step and in each and every detail of its subjects. How Muslim thought have practically utilized these type of definition in different subject will be elaborated in the section of Truth and false and their relation to ideas verification.

c) Truth and False and their Relation to Ideas Verification

If we attempt to define the word 'Truth' in Muslim thought we have to look for a very conclusive definition which Muslims themselves have not thought about. Thus, we will not deliberate a true meaning of Truth, from Muslim thought point of view, if we limit it to the facts only, like the representationalist do, as this will be a partial meaning only. Neither we will define it truly if we suffice with the logical relations of ideas and meaning, as again it will be considered one side exploration of truth in Muslim thought. Thus, before any explanation I would prefer giving a simple definition of truth in Muslim thought from the manner I have understood it is.

Thus, the truth in Muslim thought, in my understanding, would be defined as: Ideas and Believes represented empirically or supported logically in form of expressed relations or meanings agreed over by man in common".

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[165] See: Al-Maydani, p. 66.
[166] Ibid., p. 67.

From the above demonstration, it was obvious that Muslim thought is a form of a broad school to include all possible forms, elements and factors for a proper type of knowledge. In this way, it had never been a dilemma for any type of knowledge segments, particularly the empirical one. As we went so far to emphasize and signify that actuality and reality, in Muslim thought, are the core matter of the religion infrastructure from where they started all types of ideas evaluation as well as the language and syntax construction.

Many sensitive matters on the above section were mentioned superficially to attempt to distinguish the similarities more than dissimilarities of these three schools, pragmatism, positivism and Islam. However, in this section we attempt to demonstrate practically the dissimilarities on the very sensitive matters between these schools. Thus, to all those similarities which are numerous between Muslim thought and particularly with pragmatism, we have seen that the 'seen' forms no perplexity for any of these three schools. But what alters these three philosophies are various metaphysical notions, particularly mentioned in positivism, which we are about to explore in this section. From here, we will not overestimate if beside the detailed elaboration of the mentioned topic and particularly the empirical examples, which enclosed almost complete illustrations, we highlight few metaphysical or abstract meaning which are considered as the senseless meanings in pragmatism and positivism thought. And at mean while we observe what and how the truth is obtained in Muslim thought.

Practically, the susceptive points in two western schools begin with words of sensitive type like Ethic, Believe, God, and many other of same relations which contain no any immediate empirical resemblance in the objective world and are defined as metaphysical and abstract meanings to include no truth within.[167]

Before we proceed with any evaluation and verification progression of these types of words, it is worthy to mention that the entire western schools, regarding these meanings, share identical opinion and almost same terminology,

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[167] See: Isma'il Salah Abd al-Hak, p. 243.

over all logical positivists. Thus, the proceeding illustration of words, at their verification process, will have an equal and identical study to prevent any misconception or unfairly comparative study of these words.

Hence, under the laboratory of Muslim classification of meanings and words type demonstration, the verification of the above words, in accordance with Muslim understanding of Truth would be as per follow:

a) *Ethic, ethical*: It is a conception word (al-Tasawur). At mean while, it is a confirmative word, if founded in relation with other words. For instance, in the sentence as *Ethic is a good attitude*. In addition, it is a *whole* or genious word (al-Lafz al-Kullī) and the synonym (al-Tarāduf) which have many other words and meanings to be expressed in, as good, moral, etc. Moreover, it stands as the contrast meaning (al-Taḍād) to the opposite word *nonethical* or *wrong*, if we go for the antonym of it. Furthermore, other significant element which attracted the attention of logical positivist, is the contradiction meaning (al-Tanākud). Which different from logical positivist, in Muslim thought is formed by the indication of the negative conjunction (Harf al-Selb).[168] Moreover, the ethical's contradiction meaning is non-ethical (Lā Akhlākī), which also describes a present and a particular act in the reality. Furthermore, the word *ethic* is opposite of the contrast meaning (al-Tadād) which cannot be applied in every type of meaning, as the word '*nothingness*', using it as the singular entity to express full meaning. As 'nothingness' cannot exist in its own and at mean time be the opposite of the word *presence*. For instance, if we use to say that 'there is something', to confirm the presence of something somewhere, as the logical positivists assert, we cannot apply on the opposite saying that *there is nothing*, because *is* and *nothing* are two opposite words and as such cannot be joined to express one reality at mean time. Instead, we say *it is not present*, by contradiction meaning (al-Tanākud), as Muslims suggested.

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[168] See: Al-Taftazani, p. 72; Al Barkhashani, p. 79.

Coming back to our point, we say that the addition of *contradiction meaning* (al-Tanākud), supported by Muslims, will solve many ideological problems which the logical positivist left unsolved or considered it as senseless notion containing no fact within, element which will be discussed further while elaborating the collusion meaning (al-Tawātu) and the suspicious meaning (al-Tashkīk).

The word *ethic* from the Muslim point of view is categorized as the similarity meaning (al-Tamāthul). Which automatically if pointed on something as ethical we do understand it as a whole word formed from many other particular things, as charity, respect, love, care, etc. Thus, according to me it is a mistake to assert that word *ethic* beside all those synonyms, in the outside world, has no resemblance outside and as such must considered as the metaphysical and automatically refuted meaning.

The additional meaning (al-Idāfah), beside other types of meanings, elucidates that the word *ethic* must be connected to deeds, as the presence of son which conditions the presence of father, for instance. Which again explores its practical meaning, as whenever there is a word *ethic* we are talking about an action not about any abstract element. Moreover, while discussing the word *ethic* from the *collusion meaning* (al-Tawātu) point of view the opposite of what will be the suspicious meaning (al-Tashkīk), we face the core matter of the dispute, where the logical positivist take start in analyzing and elaborating the abstract and metaphysical meanings. Thus, having this point to express the common sense estimation, as well as being the compound decision on what the ethic is, the logical positivist assert it as the senseless word having no meaning practically.

I would seek an answer from logical positivists if I could ask them that, if the word *ethic* contains abstract meaning will it still remain a senseless expression to contain an ambiguity or no meaning within?

The answer to this question would be estimated from the logical positivist point as much as from the Muslim point of view if the evaluation is done through similar ways of verification and similar terminology. We mentioned that one of

meaning verification process in the logical positivist theory was using *definition in use* terminology, whose task is translating the word into other translatable word of the same meaning. In other words, by the definition is attempted to obtain proper cognitive meaning from other more explicit words know to all. In here, with some addition to the subject of definition from the Muslim point of view, we will attempt to explore the meaning of word *ethic* and give it the meaning it deserves.

Therefore, the word ethic in accordance to complete definition (al-Hadd al-Tām) is a moral deed or moral action. Which according to the *literal definition* (al-T'arīf al-Lafzī), *illustrative definition* (al-T'arif bi al-Mithāl) or *partition definition* (*al-Tarīf bi al-Taksīm*), the word ethics is another expression of words: moral, good deed, hospitality, forgiveness, respect, as well as punishment-if we mean the protection of other rights-etc.

Logical positivist again ask here as, according to what we regard something as ethic when we do still dispute on many ethical facts to be ethical at all? The answer to this question would be given when we discuss on other verification elements in Islamic thought. But very precisely, I would ask pragmatist as well as logical positivist that, if the ethic is not hospitality, charity, forgiveness, respect, as well as punishment, to all those who contradict the code of general interest and property and the sense of humanism, than what else it would be? If this is ignored as well, than they have to seek help from humanism of pragmatist and try to get out of their solipsism and skepticism.

For, the word ethic or ethical, is practically a defined code in many other detailed definitions and synonym and meanings. Which, if translated into other words would give many practical understandable and practically verified deeds and meanings. Or, the ethic is the synonym of each and every act or attribution, like not lying or not killing or whatever each and every man feels to be wrong or right thing in general. However, the word ethic which includes all this translatable synonyms does not necessitate the presence of only one word from the objective world to be translated in, as the logical positivist suggest. As, that

would be impossible and extract the meaning of many words used from us in daily language. However, the matter still remains dubious, or it is not raised to the level of conformity or necessity from all people, or it is not yet the absolute and agreed concept.

Thus, if we start discussing one by one the subject matter of the word ethic, we find that each and every element of it is bounded with common acknowledged notions. Each and every one of it have direct resemblance in the objective world. Alternatively, every word of it contains a notion understandable and translatable in other empirical notion to not create at all any complexity for any conscious rational being, and why would for any pragmatist or logical positivist, for instance.

God: like many other metaphysical words, by deforming it's meaning as a result of wrong conception, was misused and considered as senseless. Similarly, as every other religious word, the word God in particular has been taken into account as a word to express no reality and no exact facts, instead expresses confusion and ambiguity. If asked more in detail the reason why, the answer, logical positivist asserts, would tell that the name itself expresses no reality or we do not know any personality existing with such name, even if exists. In other words, He is unknown to many of us, is what they assert. Additionally, for them the name God raises uncertainty and undefined meanings which gives not exact explanation of His attributes. In this regard, logical positivists assert that if God is a thunder, idol or any object that everyone can recognize and see it than we can easily agree that the name Gog assert a thing known for all.

In here, according to me, we are facing not only meaning and expression errors, which we are about to discuss, but at mean time there are analytical problems which need reconsideration and reevaluation of it. As per meaning and expression problem, which is our objective in this section, ranking the word God as senseless word, to expresses no reality, is the materialistic evaluation which confiscates from this word all other connection it has with the outside word. The second thing to demonstrate the methodological problem is that the evaluation of

word is not done through syntax principles, which logical positivist use through evaluation of many other words. Logical positivist might answer that the word does not deserves any syntax evaluation unless it exceeds the materialistic evaluation process. But this respond will not be enough to justify their logical errors included in the process. As via syntax evaluation, as we are about to see, we come to discover words connection with reality or object. Therefore, ignoring or superseding one process over other will not assist on anything, but complicate the evaluation process and keep us wander on the truth of something which bounders us, but what we do not want to observe it or take into consideration.

Thus, from the Muslim elaboration point of view, the word God is: a conception word (al-Tasawūr). At mean while it is a subject (al-Mawdu) in every sentence no matter where used. It is a particular word (al-Lafz al-Juzī), beside being a collusion meaning (at-Tawātu) and synonym meaning (al-Tarāduf) to 100 other synonyms mention as the attributes in religious resources and supported with their reflection in each and every thing in the existence.

I do not mean here to say that God is everything neither something, but I state that everything is a reflection of Him. If we obtain the translation of the word God in the existence, it is this existence and everything in it a translation of each and every attribute of Him.[169] Is not enough for the logical positivist to obtain God's knowledge from the exact system the universe functions and the manner human grows and logical positivist himself thinks and speaks. Not being sentimental, but instead of translating the name of God to one singular thing to be understood and gain meaning for a logical positivist, we are translating it into million other actual attributes. Not defining His entity but his work which is a reflection of his attributes and at mean time the translation of Him. Can this still compound the logical positivist, as the word God includes many components? Or is this translation considered as the refuted one as it does not fulfills the syntax or materialistic condition of translation of word to other empirical words? I

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[169] See: Al Ajami, Daru Al Kutub, Cairo, 1993, p. 126.

advocate that, logical positivist cannot and will not refute it as the word has many empirical and rational translations to be translated to. Moreover, any attempt of that kind might tremble their principles.

For, I suggest that, if logical positivists do not find a single word to translate the word God, they should come up with another type of meaning called as *weak type of meaning* or the suspicious meaning (al-Tashkīk) as Muslim called it. And in this way everyone is free to decide for his own the strength of meaning according to his personal reasoning. Exactly as we practice while demonstrating the level in a particular thing, as whiter or less white. The core point at *weak type of meaning* or the suspicious meaning (al-Tashkīk) is to agree on the whiteness of that thing and not on its degrees or attribute. Moreover, this is what logical positivists suggests with the example of presence of coin in the pocket. Similarly, the notion 'God' is know to everyone with some difference in the degree. Therefore, it is up us to upgrade this notion to the level of more understandable meaning, and probably this will have enough space in the future science debates as well. Moreover, the additional meaning (al-Idāfah) express a very significant detail which conditions to the name of God the creation or causality.[170] In other words, whenever it is mentioned the name God it follows many other facts from His creation, as the necessity acts of His existence. Thus, the translation of name God to other attributes, from the reality and empirical facts,[171] will give us the illustrative definition (āl-T'arif bi al-Mithāl) and introduces us with other synonyms attached to this meaning, as a Creator, Sustainer, etc.

As a conclusion we assert that empirical words in the Muslim thought construct no complexity in maintaining their explanation.[172] On the other hand, abstract or metaphysical words similarly form no any complexity due to they translatable ability into other empirical words and meanings, via the synonym or

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[170] See: Isma'il Salah Abd al-Hak, p. 243.
[171] Ibid., p. 49.
[172] See: Abdulhamid al-Kurdi, p. 73.

definitions, as we saw in the above demonstrated examples. Hence, the answer to the logical positivist on the manner abstract worlds may be explained does not exceed their principles, as we demonstrated in the above mentioned illustration. Moreover, I do agree that not every abstract word can be explained with the mentioned principles, as many of those are attached to the imaginary thought to acknowledge no principles, as the fiction or emotions. As a result, those known as cognitive and translatable should be classified into specified group, so no perplexity may occur in their evaluation process. Consequently, this is the practical analyze to elaborate the Truth of some metaphysical ideas in the Muslim thought which demonstrates that the abstract and metaphysical words and meaning are not senseless but they are full of facts and understanding. But the only way to come to their Truth and verification is exploring their inner meaning and their relations with other fact, in form of other meanings or logical relations.

Conclusion

From the mentioned it was acknowledged that the knowledge in the Muslim point of view was the assembly of three elements, natural resources with no mind reference in it, merely mind resources, and the signs formed from the man perspective which forms the language or expression terminology at mean time.[173]

Coming to the detailed explanation of cognition, it has been divided into the necessary cognition, what mind requires not any argument for its cognition, in other words it is naturalness or obtained by intuition.[174] Most of these thoughts are obtained as the sense intermediaries and the empirical facts. In the western terminology this type of cognition is known as the synthetic or empirical one. On the other hand, lays the theoretical or abstract cognition which is obtained from analytical thinking or cogitation thinking and the observations of facts, by

[173] See: Al-Maydani, p. 26.
[174] Ibid., pp. 22-23.

what we shift from know to the unknown.[175] This type of cognition in the western terminology is known as the analytical thinking, particularly in the positivism thought, and as the imaginative thinking in the pragmatism.

Muslim thought is another school of thought which steps on every thing know from the facts to consider the reality as unanimous and indispensible facts of their thought. Confidently we use the word unanimously, as Muslim thought foundation, Qur'an and sunnah, two main resources of Islamic thought, didn't allow any deformity or extreme elaboration in the infrastructure of Muslim thought foundation, neither from mind nor from fact point of view.

It was very clearly elaborated the manner Muslim thought approached the formation of ideas. It were these two main sources, reality and reason, the starting point for Muslim thought, and it is from here mostly where they had to return to confirm the truthiness of their judgments. Thus, in Muslim thought we distinguished the balanced evaluation of two elements, mind and empirical facts. But with access to some imported philosophical impact Muslim thought inclined toward the preference of one element over other. But again we observe that this is done through the gate of the Islamic principles and their foundation. Mind and empirical facts are only there for the conformity or verification of seen and understand their relation to other things or elements.[176] While coming across the Qur'an, the expression of mind and empirical facts are limited and not always lead to wanted results. In many ayats we notice that the empirical facts mentioned to attract the intention of man toward the creation of God, end with the uncertain notion (Lealle) "it might", as it might lead you on the straight path, and so on.[177] Observing from the philosophical point of view, from intellectualist and realist, means that arguments cannot be absolute as the disputes keep going on. And these disputes explore to us the actuality that, facts even they exist and are cognized from every human cannot afford to assemble or convince them in

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[175] See: Al Ajami, p. 138; Al-Maydani, p. 23.
[176] See: Ali Abdul al-Fattah al-Maghribi, *Al Mufakkir Al Muaasir Al Islami Mustafa Abdu Rrazik*, (Cairo: Darul Mearif, 1987), p. 60.
[177] See: Abdulhamid al-Kurdi, p. 464.

same level.[178] Again, this does not mean that man is not prepared to believe or see facts, as some scholars try to argue. But, this tells us that reason's nature makes possible the man to see what he wants to see. The man may accept the presence of things but it may miss the relations, which is an absent notion. And every absent notion, naturally, forms difficulty for human limited reason. But the cognition of absent is not impossible to reach, even if it is acknowledged partially. And if it is known partially means that it is possible. And one thing cannot be impossible and possible at mean time.

If we claim that truth is only what is in agreement with directly verified fact from reality, than the sentence 'Zayd is standing' containing every real and true meaning, can easily be considered the metaphoric word if not observed at the moment. From here, conditioning to the true word the reality or immediate actuality merely makes their meaning limited to the present only and requires a verification process for every word, and this is nothing than a pure skepticism. On the other hand, taking into regard every word to be apparent and clear one, it might lead to another extreme and consider all metaphoric words as real. If the matter goes in this manner, where are the limits of what is known as true or metaphoric?[179] Furthermore, if we assert that on the opposite to every real or true word stands the false one, we have complicated the matter as what is exactly the true and what false word.

However, some of the logical positivist asserts that, events although being remote, are observable in principle, and same thing would have been in past. From here, the argument of analogy is supported as a fact, with little uncertainty, and common or joined experience, in logical positivists, still remains as a vague

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[178] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 141.

[179] See: Lutfi Abdul al-Baīd, 11: "It is not logically inconceivable that I should have and experience that is in fact owned by someone else", "I have come to think that this reasoning is very dubious. For while it is possible to imagine circumstances in which we might have found it convenient to say of two different persons that they owned the same experience, the fact is that, according to our present usage, it is a necessary proposition that they do not; and since this is so, I am afraid that the argument form analogy remains open to the objections that are brought against it in this book..." Alfred Ayer," *Language Truth and Logic*", p. 19.

matter.[180] While Muslim thought, in ethics verification, proceeds from the reality[181] and reason relations, logical positivist start form the language to raise up the confusion and uncertainty.

Thus, in respond we say that it is reality which gives meaning to the language and not the contrary. But logical positivist seems that many ideas start from the language point of view and ends at the language meanings.

Instead of the discussion about the mind possibility to obtain knowledge from the reality, or if the mind has any place in any logical relation, Muslim thought discussed more the relation of mind with reality and other elements which the simple thinking is not able to grip.[182] This is what makes Muslim thinkers different form western thinkers in general.

Some of Muslim scholars, in particular Kindi, agrees that sensual knowledge is not stabile,[183] as the sense and reality changes always,[184] and this is what pragmatist and logical positivist assert. But this means not to be the skepticism of rationalist, but explores the weak side of human being and make him search for other supportive element to attain the truth.

Beside this assertion, we notice a serious Muslim concern with language and proper understanding of words and meanings which was taken as a supportive element for ideas verification. Different from pragmatism and positivism, Muslim thought is more concern with meaning and intention rather than words and external expression.[185] In this regard Gazali asserts that:

> The knowledge is what is stabilized in the soul and understanding and not in the words and expression, as the words and expression are only signs of what is settled in souls from the infinite meanings.[186]

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[181] See: Al Ajami, p. 127.
[182] See: Ahmad Fuad Basha, p. 22.
[183] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 141.
[184] See: Al Ajami, p. 145.
[185] See: Al- Jalaynd, p. 145.
[186] Ibid, p. 150.

While, in case of logical positivist they usually stop on the general expression without going into the intention,[187] which most of the time leaves us with many confusion about the meaning of words. Thus, in numerous cases we obtain that Muslim thought has many solution to many problems refuted from the logical positivist point of view.

Hitherto, from the elaboration of Muslim thought about the entire knowledge procedure we obtain that Islam is not the religion of believe and meanings only, but primarily it is the religion of reality and deeds along with being the religion of logic and understanding.[188] And this way it represents most itself as the religion of workability and success in both world, here and hereafter.

3. Analyses and Critics

A) Meanings Formation and Their Relation to Reality and Ideas

After a long elaboration of ideas and their relation to the meanings and the manner language assist in the verification process of truth, the subject might have taken us to different angles and we could not have seen the exact relation of meanings and ideas. Thus, in here we are dedicating a more detailed prescription which clarifies what perplexed between the language, and also reconfirm that the language is tool, and meanings represent the ideas.

While elaborating the relation of words and meaning with reality Aristotle claims that words which prescribe only the present and the seen like the words 'man' and 'white' with no any relation or expression to decide over something a law or meaning cannot be considered as true or false.[189]

Generally, in my point of view, no human being can understand anything if the meaning is not approached toward him either from a sign he already knows

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[187] See: Ismail Abdil Al-hak Salah, p. 283.
[188] See: Ibid., pp. 127-128.
[189] See: Azzawawi Bagwarh, *Al-Falsafah wa Al-Lugah- Ankdu Al-munatif Al-Lugawii- Fi Al-Fasafah Al-Muasirah*, Daru At-Taliati, Beirut, 2005, p. 23.

or from other things related to that thing which he already has good information about. The best example to prove this is human ideas development process. We can not attempt try to teach a child what is astronomy unless and until he knows what planet or what stars are. Thus, muslim scholars had given many efforts to define and simplify every key element the of meanings and words. But still for some, the matter of language or expression is not clear as what language is exactly.

In my opinion the language is thought or logical process expressed with different forms of noises which humans agreed upon. While saying this, first thing to come to our mind is the manner language, being a product of ideas only, can have an effect in other minds. As the matter of fact with the expression of a particular word in particular manner, we have expressed a meaning or the idea.

Meanings or ideas, which contain a particular message, make the listener percept it and organize it according to his understanding, and his previous ideas present in his thought. If the listener got all what is said in his mind, the message is conveyed and the understanding occurs. Moreover, in this system we have obtained an understanding process. If the listener lacks of those ideas or information send to him, understanding cannot occur or there occurs a misunderstanding. Hence, to those who see that language has an impact in thought, we support it is an undisputable matter. But the language itself, with no particular idea or meaning, cannot have any impact on any thought. Only if that is done with the permission of understanding and the presence of those ideas available in mind.

The word 'krrrrrrk' may have a meaning if the speaker clarifies it to what he means with other familiar words or meaning. But we cannot explain to a small child that this word is a name of some angel unless and until we explain to him what angel is or means.

If we agree that the language is the expression of ideas with different voices, how sure are we that the language will deliver the exact meaning we need to convey?

There are given many efforts to stabilize the proper expression process, as it is very common that someone while expressing something in his mind comes to the meaning and understandings which he never meant to say. For example, saying that 'his face was red' might be understood that he was sick, ashamed or angry. But does it mean that the language is working here independently and is leading to the born of new ideas? No, because we agreed that there can occur no understanding in any form unless there is an idea present to link what was heard and what is stocked in mind. In other words, New understanding, to appear as such, is not what the language brought it up, but is again what we according to our capacity of understanding understood. On the other hand, it is very possible that for someone may be only one idea and for some other more than one. What is going on here is that elasticity and ability of human to understand and get more than one thing at once. Was it able that the same expression be understood before it was expressed? In other words, understood as a mere idea before expressing it? Surely yes.

Another significant questions, which prevailed all our theses, to come to my mind is that from where a child comes to know things. Do humans collect and form their ideas all from what is seen only, or he can come to the idea from the language in form of new information never heard before? As the matter of fact, as I mentioned above, human gets to know many things from what he hears from others in form of language or expression. Like when we say that the 'world is current'. Obviously, it is not possible for someone to see practically this conclusion with bare eyes, but he gets to know from the proposition linked with different facts. Is it possible to assert that it was the expression to bring him a new idea? No, as this is not a language conclusion as well as not a mere meaning, but it is a logical conclusion to come up from understanding of relations of things. In other words, from the speaker point of view it is a logical conclusion. As per listener point of view, where it seems that expression or language taught him something new, independent of his own experiment and observance, it is his acknowledgment with the reality preliminary and his familiarity with all those

expression practically which made him learn something new. In other words, language here was nothing more than a tool. A tool which share similarity with the language of all animals but to contain logical and analytical ideas or meanings after each and every expression. From here, the language can be a tool for ambiguity of idea like the usage of word ' al-wujuud' instead of saying 'al-mawjuud', or for the explanation like the translation of word 'is' which means a presence into Arabic 'huwa',[190] dependently on the power of meaning we gave to the words. Thus, Socrates did not allow the sophist to confuse the pure meaning of things and ideas with the confusion of words, but he went so far to define every meaning according to the logical cognition in agreement with the reality and common nature of every man. In addition, we are not surprised to know the ambiguity of the first translation of Aristotle books at the time of Ibni Rushd.[191] The translation of this book was done word by word from Greek to Arabic but still the meaning was not conveyed. And the only reason was not the language but the lack of idea translation in those sentences.

Likely, the segment of translation or the allegoric meanings in Islamic thought is nothing more than closing of ideas or meanings to the edge of more understandable ideas. It may seem that in the case of the comment of Quran (Tafseer) the language acts independently to move the ideas to different directions. But such claim will lead to the possibility of unlimited meanings of language. For, what makes us understand a particular meaning is not a word but the idea present in my mind and shared in common by others as well, though the expression may be translated into different languages.

The debate on the essentiality of language, meanings and their relation to ideas was and still is a very complicated matter which could not find any precise solution till now, but I still support the idea that there can not be a fundamental difference between the idea and the language.[192]

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[190] See: Azzawawi, pp. 43-44.
[191] See: Ibid.,. 39-42.
[192] See: Azzawawi, p. 65.

However, once we have solved the approach of ideas formation, automatically we have come to the solution of the language formation, which has been a center of many discussion for centuries.

B) The Metaphysical Meanings

If the meaning of a word represents an idea, what are the metaphysical meanings or ideas? How positivist and other have mistaken on them? And are the meanings all empirical to represent only the seen or they represent wider understandings?

Kant asserts that the metaphysics are notions empirically impossible of verification but not logically, as every thing logically impossible is impossible to be acknowledged.[193] Yes, if we consider that words formation are only empirical and no other element can indicate in meanings formation except the reality, it would be ordinary to agree that the word 'metaphysic' means nothing more than something unrealistic.[194] But we all know that the elements of word formation are more than empirical facts. It is not the language what makes the word meaningful, but it is that meaning of idea formed in relation with different elements, inner or outer, internal or external.

Considering language foundations as empirical, according to positivist's empirical understanding of ideas formation, seems that it attempts to create a second barrier between the empirical thought and metaphysical ideas. But the language, as I expressed, is only a tool to express things, but what brings things up is the **mind** and **understanding of the meaning**, which comes only from the pure reason. If this is so, why do we have to call on the verification process only from the language forms where there are many other forms of elaboration?

Thus, W. Barnes in this regard asserts that, "what they-logical positivist-called the wrong usage of language (metaphysics) indeed it is a new form or

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[193] See: Zakke Najeeb Mahmood, *Mawkif min Al-Metafizika*, (Cairo: Daru Ash-Shuruk, 1983), pp. 82-83.
[194] Ibid., p. 84.

language usage".[195] If logical positivist asserts that every word, expression or meaning is formed from the reflection of reality or external world, the word metaphysics must be then be formed from the same resources. In contrary, if they regret that the metaphysics is not formed as the a result of an external reflection, than we must agree that mind or reason is capable of forming other ideas than the factual or external one. And these ideas, as the positivist agree, are like the musical notes having a meaning but not reality.

Does the word metaphysics have to be disconnected from any relation and convey no message? Is it unscientific conclusion to admit that the metaphysical meaning runes out of any relation and the people has accepted for entire centuries without any understanding or comprehension. Moreover, how is it possible to think that metaphysical discussions start from no meanings and goes to no meanings?

After all this questions, I do agree that the word metaphysics, if we analyze as a mere word, has no resemblance in the outside world. But the word 'philosophy' is nothing better than the word metaphysics, as there is nothing in particular as the sign or object to point at, according to positivists condition, that these object is philosophy. But we can only discuss it as a notion in relation with different ideas and different facts. Likewise, the word metaphysics is of no use detached from its empirical relations or references having in the objective world. We can very easily talk about the metaphysics without mentioning the same word. As we can very simply start each metaphysical notion from physics and bring it up to another end of physics, to connect at the end with a necessary relation behind this relations. Which though ignored by positivist empirically does not mean that they are ignored logically. This necessary logical relation have to be named and discussed about. Other wise would remain as facts without names. They have to be named or elaborated not for the reason that we have

[195] See: Zakke Najeeb Mahmood, p. 84.

chosen to speak or decided if they are to exist or not, but because our reason and thinking flows toward them and stops at them, either we want or not.

Furthermore, the very profound discussion, of positivist and all philosophers, for centuries shows that human mind attempts to approach and understand this reality present somewhere. As well as our discussion about it also is sufficient to demonstrate its existence which has to be named in way or another. Otherwise, the materialists, who claim that metaphysics hold no meaning, have to keep quite and speak nothing about. Moreover, every word of them may contradict their assertion and will define the meaning of something which has no meaning, and this is for sure a pure tautology

Positivists as well as Zakee Najeeb Mahmood, one of the prominent Egyptian scholars, have attempted to reply on these comments by claiming that "many people think that the presence and the extraordinary usage of the word metaphysics in daily language and many dictionaries probably gives meaning to this word, but no word is a proof for a thing to exist".[196] In addition, Zakee Najeeb Mahmood asserts that, in comparison with the word 'orange' which has a resemblance in the outside world, either it is in relation with other words like bitter, red or big, or it is mentioned in the singular form, still contains a meaning. But the word metaphysics has no meaning at all as nothing resembles such a thing in the existence.[197]

The mistake positivist and Zakee Najeeb Mahmood did was that they started analyzes of the word metaphysics from the singular form of it. But as soon as we consider the word metaphysics as a general word with many relations and understanding and consider its evaluation from the lower to the upper level we will obtain its real meaning. In addition, from the word evaluation perspective, positivist, consider metaphysics as something opposite to reality or factuality.[198] As the matter of fact, there has never been any denial of any factual fact from the

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[196] See: Ibid., p. 105.
[197] Ibid., pp. 106-107, see also: Ibid., p. 124.
[198] Ibid., pp. 108-109.

metaphysics point of view. Rather, any attempt to perform anything alike would lead to the annihilation of the metaphysics itself. The abstract part of the metaphysics which materialist usually talk about is only the last level of metaphysics, or the peak which links between the seen and the unseen, or the present or non-present.

Moreover, another misperception of the metaphysics, from the positivist point of view, comes from considering words to exist independently out of the perception or thought. In this regard, they think that many bring wrong decision and trust in metaphysics from the wrong conception of words.[199] But we have clearly pointed out that words and meaning are only the perceptions translated or named with different tones which can not lead to any misconception unless we allow it occur.

As the conclusion, positivist must classify the metaphysical understanding of words related to the imaginative thinking merely, as the existence of Griffin, and the Islamic form of metaphysics to be full of relation and the empirical translation where the belief (al-yakeen) of every Muslim is formed necessarily.

Moreover, we do not have to enter into the relativity of meaning to reality, and words to object in matters like metaphysics or 'evil' and 'good' when this notion where, are, and will probably work well in accordance of each and every human in past,[200] present and future. Furthermore, I do agree with pragmatist that the working of ideas practically are much important than their empty analyzes as true or false ideas from the language or empirical perspective.

C) Meaning and Verification Process in Logical Positivism and Their Relation to Reality

Spinoza, being convinced with mathematical conclusions, asserts that the truth is only what mind or logic demonstrates, not what is in agreement with reality, as logical positivist or pragmatists say. 'Ali is at home' can be a true

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[199] Ibid., p. 107.
[200] Ibid., p. 118.

sentence, but its truth cannot be the matter of factual verification due to the impossibility of verifying each and every word practically.[201] Beside, if we attempt to verify with empirical language Ali's non-presence at home will categorize the sentence as false, though he might be in the garden.[202] Thus, only logic, independent of the reality, is capable to proof that the person we are asking for is not present only at home but he might be somewhere else, and his absence semantically means not that he is dead or not existing anymore. This also proofs that reason only can be a deep and real tool for verification, whether a thing is factual in past, present or future.[203] Even though, Spinoza, went so far that he considered the logic as an independent form of thinking unrelated to reality but to not contradict reality.[204]

Logical positivist, on the other hand, representing unique materialistic school of thought, consider the logic and the mathematic as the unrelated ideas to facts which expresses only the tautology and what we already know. But the real obsession is that logic by all means is present in reality and expresses facts present in form of relation without contradiction and properly comprehended by all.[205]

In this regard, a concern expressed by Bertrand Russell is about things related to reality but factual facts confuses the understanding, as when we talk about things to exist in existence but not in our belief. Like when we say that I Believe or I Love, matters which are not possible of any factual verification, for the fact that they are relative to the feeling. On the other hand, going too far as positivist went, and considering the reality as a mere reason invention and the only element to verify the meanings and ideas, is a claim which describes not the real nature of logic. To not underestimate the reality, but even while discussing about the real existing things in the factual words we come across many

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[201] See: Isma'il Salah Abd al-Hak, at-Tahlil al-Lugawi Fi al-Madrsat al-Oxford, (Lebanon: Daru At-tanwir, 1993), p. 33.
[202] Ibid., p. 110.
[203] See: Yahya Huwaydi, *Fi al-Falsafati Ilmul al-Mantik*, Al-Falsafatu Al-Wadiyyah Al-Mantikiyyah Fi Al-Mizaan, (Cairo: Maktabatu An-Nahdah Al-Misriyyah, 1971-1972), pp. 32-35.
[204] See: Huwaydi, pp. 35-36.
[205] Ibid., p. 52.

misconceptions as what that real thing exactly is. The word 'house', being very familiar to everyone might very easily perplex someone while trying to define the 'paper house' as the house. As the immediate question to follow will be how the 'paper house' can be called as the house when no-one is able to live inside. Which means that the house is not what we look but what we want to define it. And the definition we have given to the house-the place to live-is not from the outlook of it or the presence of it, but from the logical relation we have come to know.

Moreover, the cave which does not look at all as normal house, for many others can be called a house. In other words, the house here, in form we know it is not a word or meaning reflected from outside, but it is our logic who made it and formed according to the relations and objects outside. Thus, by understanding the logical relations between things or understanding the nature of it we bring the notions and different definitions to toward the comprehension.[206]

Do positivist have to add anything on what we just mentioned? Yes, the positivist, while speaking about the meaning and reality of names and signs, we obtain that they consider every name to be enough to represent a meaning in the outside world. Like when we say 'Socrates' everyone must know that it is a name of human being, or when we say Beethoven every knows that it is a name of a compositor and so on so far. Accordingly, from the positivist understanding, every name while expressing a fact somewhere, whether that fact is true or false, verifies itself. On the other hand while mentioning the name 'soul' or 'metaphysics', according to positivist, they are meaningless as they do not express any fact or any factual meanings, and we can not assert neither to be false nor true.

As the matter of fact, positivists perplex between the sentence and the propositions and play with them in manner suits them.[207] Not every name can represent a thing or a sign adequately to be enough for entire relations it contains. We all know that Iliad was written by Odysseus, but only the name Iliad is not

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[206] See: Isma'il Salah Abd al-Hak, p. 130.
[207] See: Huwaydi, p. 74.

enough to introduce us to Odysseus, neither the opposite. Thus, we need other propositions and relations to broaden and clarify the meaning in order to prevent other possible meanings to occur. If we are not able to represent a thing to the name like 'soul', do have to believe that human is soulless? The answer to this question goes back to main unsolved problem of the profound meaning of name and what it represents, the segment which positivist could not give any reasonable explanation.[208] Moreover, positivists insist in defining the core meaning of name as a 'preliminary element which allows not any division'. In other words, this name is called a preliminary name. The preliminary names which in logical positivists accepts no partition, though they claim to be pure of any relation, are all relative to something and formed from different relations. In Bertrand Russell point of view the preliminary names are what God taught Adam, if translated in the religious form of explanation. The apple, as a name, was known to Adam not as a whole apple known to us, but as an element formed from different factors, sugar, skin, seeds, etc.[209]

However, if we go into deep elaboration of these unsolved or undivided name, in positivist thought, we see that they are also formed from the relations. For instance, sugar is not only name of one thing but it is a name of many element and likewise the skin, seeds, etc. Thus, pure names, which positivists claim[210] to exist, are all things formed from different relation of things and propositions.[211] Beside, asserting that names, in they unsolved or preliminary forms, are only what represents the real things, led positivist to the declaration of **abstract names,** which have no existence in the real world. Moreover, reflecting on the pure names as the main segments to form our meanings and ideas, in very perplexed manner, would upraise the positivist as the more idealistic philosophy than what they claim to be. In addition, would perplex the epistemological matter

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[208] See: Ibid., pp. 85.-86.
[209] Ibid., p. 87.
[210] Ibid., p. 87; Isma'il Salah Abd al-Hak, p. 67.
[211] Ibid., p. 75.

itself and the manner human knows.[212] Logical Positivist, on the other hand, cannot claim that these names are the mental fact as they form the abstract meanings which express no facts in reality. In addition, they can not assert to be factual facts, as these pure names is impossible to find in reality.[213] From here, the very main issue of the epistemology, particularly in the theory of Witgenstain and Russel, is not solved at all.[214]

For positivist, the name 'table' is not a real name of an original thing we should seek to verify, as it is not an original, preliminary or component of the name due to many components in it. For, in positivist point of view, the 'table' is only the mental relation present in form of independent characters but formed with the power of logical relations thinking. Thus, the name 'table' cannot express the factual fact positivist would like to express it.[215]

Moreover, even while elaborating the propositions which convey meanings and logical relations, Wittgenstein claim that they prescribe no any factual reality in the outside world, but they are logical relations only,[216] like numbers for example. Thus, any attempt to verify them as the true or false would be a useless attempt, create no results, and make the true and false propositions all false.

How positivist thought of solving the matter of the true and false proposition? In order to solve this subject they follow their logical anatomism of ideas,[217] which is prescribed as: the mechanism of going to the unsolved part of parts or element of elements, and bring it to the level of whole idea expressed in the form of proposition. Nevertheless, as this matter is almost impossible to be completed for each proposition,[218] they suggest of taking the general meaning of

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[212] Ibid., pp. 90-94.
[213] Ibid., p. 174.
[214] Ibid., p. 102.
[215] Ibid., p. 101.
[216] See: Huwaydi, pp. 121-123.
[217] See: Isma'il Salah Abd al-Hak, p. 74.
[218] See: Huwaydi, pp. 173-174.

that proposition, from the proper language analyses,[219] and observe if the parts of that proposition are connected to reality or facts, directly or indirectly.

On the other hand, Carnap, one of the founders of the logical positivism and the active member of the Vienna Circle, by taking advantage of the Wittgenstein theory, in order to solve the preliminary name theory, purposed the imaginative form of language. If Wittgenstein considered that names and propositions, we use to express facts, are only logical relations which represent not the real things, Carnap on the other hand asserts that the verified language (*Lugat At-tasawur*) which we are using to express this facts should also avoid explaining names or propositions, as they represents not the real things. Carnap asserts that, "Silver necklace" is not a real and verified form of expression, but it will be a real and verified form of expression if we say that, "a long colored chain which contains similar characteristics of silver formed on the similar protocol jointed together".[220]

Why this prolonged protocol of expression to express a very simple thing? Carnap asserts that the physical language is not a real language but it is an imaginative language,[221] which express no fact but only mere relations of these things in the way we see with bare eye, as we observed in the example of table and house.

Thus, in order to maintain the verification process in accordance with their principles, they divided the verification process into two types, the external and internal.[222] The external part of verification is not difficult to be obtained, as it is every expression or part of meaning obtained or present in the factual reality.

The second type, known as the imaginative type, which is considered as the main verification process, involves the process of elaboration of things in their pure form free of any relation. But the second form of verification is almost impossible to be achieved, as the every thing attempted to be verified requires

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[219] Ibid., p. 124.
[220] Ibid., p. 164.
[221] See: Huwaydi, p. 165.
[222] Ibid., p. 172.

another verification process for another part included in the verification process, and so on. 'The key is made of iron', with indirectly verified process means, 'a key is pressed toward the piece of magnates' and 'the magnates draw an iron toward itself' and so one. The entire process of verification requires the verification of the key to be iron in order to be attracted, which in every step makes tougher the verification process. In other words, the perplexed verification process in this form is almost impossible. In addition, deeper we go with logical positivism microscopic manner of verification more away we go from the absolute truth and from achieving the real meaning of things. Not because we do not believe in the applied scientific methodology of meanings, embraced strongly by positivist, but positivist more information more suspectful they get.

The reason why the positivist went so far, emerge to be only materialistic reason. Moreover, most obvious reason is to narrow the gate of the metaphysical understanding and consider it out of any relation which cannot express any fact[223] but only imaginative meanings which cannot be seen,[224] or what the positivist call it with 'Logical fictions'.[225]

But from their logical anatomism constructed on the materialistic means they are drawn in the idealism, solipsism and skepticism of its worst kinds. And instead of understanding what the word means practically, the oxford school as well as logical positivist questioned the manner it is used. Obviously limiting the meaning of the word only to its current usage and not what it means is considered one side elaboration of word and blinds it proper usage.[226]

One of the main problems discussed from the Wittgenstein and Schlick is if the language is an expression of different occasion with the meanings taken from the objective world, or they are signs to express meaning coming from the inner world? If the words were mere meanings or expression in correspondence

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[223] Ibid., pp. 163-164.

[224] "Names in the Wittganstain point of view do not contain any characteristics nor relations...subject of the Wittganstain is a metaphysical subject", Huwaydi, p. 108.

[225] See: Huwaydi, p. 100.

[226] See: Isma'il Salah Abd al-Hak, p. 51.

with what we see or know from outside than how man would be able to talk and express things which are not seen yet or not discovered yet, argues Shlick who disagrees with Wittgenstein in this regard.[227]

Moreover, deeds are another confusion for ideas verification process, for some philosophers which consider them as words or expression. Meanings as, 'I promise you' or 'I worn you' in the Armson point of view has to evaluated according to the tradition and the place where are used.[228] In many places the manner they organize the marriage ceremony in order to consider someone married contains no meaning for some other tradition. In this case the mere expression ' I marry' you has no any actual and real meaning unless it is joined with other elements to realize it. In other words, expression of deeds (al-edai) which are considered in Austin's vision as the verified words, in Armson vision need to be reconsidered according to other conditions applied in them from different factors, be them traditional or personal. Armson asserts that we can can ask in Turkish language how can we say 'cat is on the table', but we can not ask 'how can I get married in Turkish', but we ask 'how can I get married in Turkey'.[229] In other words, we ask how to perform a deed and not how to translate a deed.

We may say for example that, 'I am trying to proof to you that...', or 'I am warning you', but we cannot say that 'I am convincing you', or 'I am scaring you', as we cannot know how we are convincing someone or scaring someone.[230]

But we can not ignore that tremendous effort of logical positivist school to demonstrate the possibility of meaning verification with factual facts. The element which highlighted e simplicity on one hand and a very confusable discussion regarding the metaphysical meanings, which are evaluated as meaningless.

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[227] Ibid., p. 67-67.
[228] Ibid.,pp. 176-178; Ibid., p. 187.
[229] See: Isma'il Salah Abd al-Hak, p. 177.
[230] Ibid., p. 205.

And from here, having many empirical, historical as well as future ideas unable to be verified absolutely, brings the verification process of logical positivist to the edge of the solipsism.[231] Likely, conditioning the verification only to words leaves the positivist in front of very big uncertainty and ambiguity as not every word can have meaning as a mere word.

Conclusion

Through entire expansion of this subject we have observed the manner the twentieth century schools attain to maintain a materialistic evaluation of word and meanings in order to differentiate once and forever between the factual and metaphysical meanings. Their attempt is proposed in different angles, to start with definition of the empirical language which for some, like Moor, is the ordinary language and for some other, like Wittgenstein and Austin, is every language to contain meanings or proposition verifiable from the outset perspective. But for Ayer, the latest to come, the verified language, to stand as the opposite of metaphysical language, is only what contains meanings either present meanings in outside world or at least is connected to the reality or outside world from any angle.

More precisely, while elaborating the common language, we saw that it is a very contradictive understanding which requires many conditions as tradition, manner and the occasion where these meanings were used, all to perplex more and more the verification process, instead of simplifying it. Analyzing Wittgenstein's and Austin's (to bound the verification process at the expression, intention[232] and impression or effect)[233] together with Ayer's point of view, which is known to be more scientific and entirely dependent on facts or reality, contradictions were still evident. One of the most contradictive element was whether to what level the verification process is required. Whether it is required

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[231] Ibid., pp. 275-276.
[232] Isma'il Salah Abd al-Hak, p. 283.
[233] Ibid., p. 205.

for the word, sentence or proposition? In other words, what is is the thing to be in conjunction with reality, are these meanings merely or the expressions or ideas?

Ending the verification process at the words merely made them more confused as very limited words are simply verified from the facts straight away.[234] In addition, pointing out every meaning of a word at something outside does not entail any meaning, as the mere word 'dog' or 'Cairo'.[235]

After all, the effort of materialistic philosophies in order to offer an explanation to the verification methodology they have perplexed initially what the word 'meaning' is. But the struggle against the metaphysical notion never stopped, and all these schools have to come with different restriction, which in every step they have come forward, it has conducted them in contradiction.

Hence, the inability to conclude with certainty the possibility of verification process empirically made more difficult for the materialistic schools to conclude on the falsity of metaphysical notion. Moreover, I see that this empirical verification process of the words cannot have an exact conclusion as the words are only a group of voices to express an idea which sometime expresses exact and some other inexact things.

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[234] Ibid., pp. 285-286.

[235] See: Azzawawi Bagwarh, p. 23.

Conclusion

Conclusion

Schools included in the elaboration of the theory of Truth highlighted for us a fact that the truth is not only what we know currently but truth is wider and much inclusive. The pragmatic and logical positivistic advancement into many different theories and hypotheses, within their schools, supports the claim that truth is not yet established definitely, and as long as human life continues, there must be adjustments. However, we have seen that there are many efforts toward it.

Pragmatist theory even if it seems to be a very practical theory, we cannot ignore their inner or subjective approach. As the matter of fact, the idea or thought, in pragmatic theory, if it finds compatibility within itself the belief occurs, and in next stage leads to action.

Likewise, the ideas are converted into the action. A very significant point to be mentioned here is that, the ideas verification process, in pragmatism theory, starts with reasoning process itself. If the idea is formed to be convincible, than the process of believe occurs, as the subjective element, and in the third procedure, with the occurrence of the belief, the action occurs. This is the process where the idea is translated into the action or verified as true. But what makes the idea be verified as true in order to bring the belive to occur, is still the question pragmatist have not agreed yet, but in general it is the reality or the ideas which resemblance outside. By splitting the verification of idea and the ideas into different independent parts, out of any relation, pragmatist school ends in the tautology and circle. At the end of the process, ideas turn to be impossible to be verified with the empirical facts, or they attempt to be as logically non-verified and so on. Arguments will never stop, unless we apply a healthy process of Muslim's elaboration of ideas. The process which includes all possible and unavoidable parts of the ideas formation factors, and adds to its verification a very important factor known as the *common sense* which represents the entire voices of

humanity, and the factor which is much easy to function properly and truly with the science advancement.

Logical positivist, on the other hand, is an unavoidable fact to prove that within it we feel many extremes. Sometime it makes us feel that their theory is a worst type of radical empiricism and some other, while discussing about the mere names definition and originality, we feel that they fall into the worst type of idealism.

Hence, in order to achieve easier way of avoiding the clashes over the truth, we have to benefit from Muslim thought elaboration of truth and divide the truth of things into two categories, 1) what is known and seen factually, 2) and what cannot be seen factually. The first is possible to be defined according to the common experience and common cognition with sense and reason together. And the second, to include believes, ethics and many abstract things, cannot be verified with the descriptive things, unless and until have embraced the reason and take into consideration logical relations. But the real truth or absolute truth which might bring man into one place or harmony to believe firmly in one thing as being truth, that is an impossible thing, but possible in the hereafter.

Moreover, we cannot avoid answering the question of what false is. The false, in my humble opinion, cannot be prescribed as the opposite of truth. If the truth is descriptive, false cannot be absent as the false would not have existed, and its definition would have been a very easy task. But from the actual discussion on false we observe that false is not that easy task to define it. Terminologically, false is the opposite of truth, but virtually is not, as the false also has an existence in the outside world. And the real problem among scholars in the past and western thought do not start with not defining truth properly, as truth is full of presence and easy to discover, but the real problem is by not defining what false is. Thus, if the false is not the opposite of truth and cannot be discovered with the discoverence of truth, I suggest that the contemporary philosophical thought should work hard in defining and treating it from every aspect. Out of these challenges, going on, false seems to be more as the subjective matter, not present

in the object. It is more like the confusion or perplexity of seeing, understanding, clarifying and defining. And from here we see that false is more a subjective matter, related to the misuse of rationality and logic rather than the thing itself.

Thus, logic is a very necessary element to protect the mind from errors, which means protecting the truth, and avoid the mistakes, which makes a thing false. Does not this look as the contradiction with what we just said, that false cannot be as the opposite of truth as the false also exists? Surely, from the existence or distinctness point of view, false also exists, but from the clearness point of view, the false is a logical relation merely, which needs to be improved by logical relations merely not by a thing itself. Saying that the word 'ethic' is false because of the misspresence of the word ethic in the reality, cannot be considered as false, as positivist apply. But it is that logical relation which makes that word 'ethic' false or true. Now the question at the bottom to solve to matter of false is that; who and from where man learns and gets this logical relations to consider something false?

If false is not related to a presence of a thing or it's non-presnce, as this might create many true things false, than, it have to be something else. That else, we are talking about, are the logical analyzes, some of what are formed with learning, if they are in relation with the inductive process, and some other we cannot find any relation with the present reality, which means that human being is born with them, is what Muslim thought supports.

After this prolonged discussion, if I am asked to define the word Truth and False, in one paragraph, I would define the **truth** as: what we think, believe, speak, and act descriptively and logically elaborated accurately. This definition includes pragmatist, logical positivists and Muslim understanding of truth.

And **false** is: what exists in the reality descriptively, but wrongly elaborated logically. This definition makes the truth compatible with false in existence, but logically incompatible. As truth is, if logically elaborated accurately, and false wrong logically elaborated.

Hence, all these debates in the theory of truth show that human being is not material as it is not soul, but it is a combine element of soul and material, limited with limited abilities to cognize and live with reality. Moreover, the topic of truth can be considered as the significant element to show that Man's teacher is not the man himself, as he comes here with all this knowledge equipments, but the only teacher of him is The Knower of Universe (Al-Ālīm). And with the detailed study of the manner man known's and segregates his ideas according to the truth and false, though far, he can discover and know his God. If we want to elaborate more the last point, how man can discover his God. Man has to look into his logical power, sense, and language ability to know the past, present, future and all man's feeling and logics whenever they are. If we condition the presence of one factory to produce one brand of computer which works everywhere the same, don't we have to condition for this beautiful man's structure one Creator who made him work in the same way everywhere.

Thus, the theory of truth in these pages formed an impression that the humanity is in need of many serious efforts to veil the approach toward more liberal explanation and consider the humanity as something more complex than flesh and blood and consider the reality more than what we observe or see.

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