

**SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
BRITISH PUNJAB: ANALYTICAL STUDY OF
UNIONIST LEADERSHIP, 1935-1947**



RESEARCHER:

MUHAMMAD IRFAN HASAN **DR. MUJEEB AHMAD**
REGD. NO. 18-FSS/PHD HIS/S15 **ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR**

SUPERVISOR:

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY & PAKISTAN STUDIES
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY
ISLAMABAD

2022



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REGD. NO. 18-FSS/PHDHIS/S-15**

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in the Discipline of History at the Faculty of Social Sciences, International Islamic University, ISLAMABAD

**DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY & PAKISTAN STUDIES
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
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ISLAMABAD**

2022



*In the name of Allah,
the Most Beneficent,
the Most Merciful*

ABSTRACT

The British annexed Punjab in 1849 and maintained the *status quo*. The society was organized on the basis of tribal values and brotherhood in the Punjab. The political and administrative support of the British established the respect of the feudal families.

Beside the main-stream political parties, the regional parties like *Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam*, *Khaksar Tehrik*, *Hindu Mahasabha*, and *Akali Dal* having their deep impacts on the consciousness of the common masses and the developments of the politics in Punjab. The most prominent political party in Punjab, the Unionist Party was founded in 1923 at Lahore. The Party leadership, like of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Mian Fazal-i-Hussain and Sir Chhotu Ram played their due role in the socio-political developments of the Punjab.

The Unionist Party owed its eventual success in the 1937 Provincial Assembly elections. The Unionist ministry accommodated all the communities within its cabinet. The World War II brought supplementary difficulties to the Unionist Party because of the economic dislocations it created. By 1944, the Punjab was badly affected by inflation and shortages of consumer goods and the main sources of army recruitment were exhausted. The Muslim League successfully exploited the discontent created by such deteriorating conditions in the province.

The WW II damaged the Unionists' position, and the British decision to leave India dealt it a crushing blow. The Unionists saw in the British departure a unfaithfulness of their loyalty and a poor return for their contribution to the war efforts.

This study is an attempt to highlight the Unionists' leadership and their contribution to socio-political developments in Punjab in the colonial period. It provides assessment on the socio-political developments under the British Raj as well as the Unionist leadership.

DECLARATION

I, Muhammad Irfan Hasan, hereby declare that this Thesis has been put in writing by me in its entirety on the basis of my research work under the guidance of my supervisor Associate Professor Dr. Mujeeb Ahmad, Department of History & Pakistan Studies-Faculty of Social Sciences, International Islamic University Islamabad.

No portion of this research has been copied from any source. Thumbs down part of the research, presented in this Thesis, has been submitted before for any degree or qualification in this or any other university or educational institution.



MUHAMMAD IRFAN HASAN
PH.D-HISTORY
REGD. NO. 18-FSS/PHDHIS/S-15

FORWARDING SHEET

The thesis titled "Socio-Political Developments in the British Punjab: An Analytical Study of Unionist Leadership, 1935-1947" put forward by Mr. Muhammad Irfan Hasan, Registration No. 18-FSS/PHDHIS/S15 in partial fulfillment for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History has been successfully completed under my supervision. I am satisfied with the excellence of scholar's research work, and he is now allowed to get this.



DR. MUJEEB AHMAD
RESEARCH SUPERVISOR

ACCEPTANCE BY THE VIVA-VOCE COMMITTEE

Title of Dissertation: **“SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BRITISH PUNJAB: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF UNIONIST LEADERSHIP, 1935-1947”**

Name of Student: **MUHAMMAD IRFAN HASAN**

Registration No.: **18-FSS/PHDHIS/S-15**

Accepted by the Department of History & Pakistan Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, International Islamic University, Islamabad, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in the Discipline of HISTORY

VIVA-VOCE COMMITTEE

Professor Dr. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal

Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, International Islamic University, ISLAMABAD

Associate Professor Dr. Mujeeb Ahmad, Chairperson, Department of History & Pakistan Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, International Islamic University, ISLAMABAD

Associate Professor Dr. Mujeeb Ahmad, Department of History & Pakistan Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, International Islamic University, ISLAMABAD
(Supervisor)

Professor Dr. Abdul Rauf, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Peshawar, PESHAWAR
(External Examiner-I)

Assistant Professor Dr. Fakhar Bilal, Department of History, Faculty of Social Sciences, Quaid- I- Azam University, ISLAMABAD
(External Examiner-II)

Assistant Professor Dr. Abdul Zafar Khan, Department of History & Pakistan Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, International Islamic University, ISLAMABAD
(Internal Examiner)

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Muhammad Irfan Hasan

ABBREVIATIONS

AHI	Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam
AIMC	All India Muslim Conference
AIMEC	All India Muslim Educational Conference
AIML	All India Muslim League
APC	All Parties Convention
APMC	All Parties Muslim Conference
CP	Central Provinces
FMA	Freedom Movement Archives
FR	Fortnightly Report
IAR	Indian Annual Register
INC	Indian National Congress
IOL	India Office Library
IOR	Indian Office Research
NAI	National Archives of India
NDC	National Documentation Centre
NPP	National Progressive Party
N.W.F.P.	North-West Frontier Province
PLA	Punjab Legislative Assembly

PLAD	Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates
PLC	Punjab Legislative Council
PLCD	Punjab Legislative Council Debates
PPML	Punjab Provincial Muslim Legislative
SGPC	Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee
U.P	Utthar Pardesh

GLOSSARY

<i>Abadkar:</i>	- Settler
<i>Abiana:</i>	- The irrigation charges
<i>Ajlaf:</i>	- Low born doing menial jobs
<i>Ashraf:</i>	- Nobility (among the Muslims)
<i>Auqaf:</i>	- Trust (singular <i>waqf</i>)
<i>Bania:</i>	- Hindu trading caste
<i>Baraka:</i>	- Charismatic power believed to flow from a sufi saint to his descendants, could also be invested in his belongings.
<i>Barani:</i>	- Cultivation depending on rainfall
<i>Batai:</i>	- Division of crop produced by tenant
<i>Benami:</i>	- Factious; used here in relation to transactions of money lending and sale/purchase of land so to subvert and circumvent provision of law.
<i>Biradri:</i>	- Literally 'brotherhood', patrilineal kinship group
<i>Chak:</i>	- Small town organized village
<i>Crore:</i>	- One hundred lac or ten million
<i>Darbar:</i>	- The court or levee of a ruler
<i>Dargah:</i>	- Tomb, shrine of a sufi saint
<i>Dehat/Dehati:</i>	- rural, belonging to rural area
<i>Fatwa:</i>	- Ruling; also, direction given by a Muslim judge or theologian or even important leader on points of Islamic law, dimensions usually vary from technical interpretations of the Holy texts to political objectives.
<i>Gaddi nashin:</i>	- Successor of the office of a saint
<i>Ghaddar:</i>	- Actually meaning traitor, but more commonly applied to those who betray a wider cause, be it community, religion, union, etc.; applied here by Muslim League leaders on Muslim Unionists who did not support the two nation theory.
<i>Gurdwara:</i>	- A Sikh place of worship
<i>Halqa-bandi:</i>	- Land demarcation
<i>Hartal:</i>	- Strike, cessation of all business activity as a form of protest
<i>Idgah:</i>	- where Id prayer are held.
<i>Imam:</i>	- One who leads the prayer
<i>Ijaradars:</i>	- The lease-holders

<i>Izzat:</i>	- Prestige, honour, respect
<i>Jagir:</i>	- The grain of land in lieu of military/political service
<i>Jagirdar:</i>	- The holder of a <i>jagir</i>
<i>Janglis:</i>	- Uncivilized people
<i>Jathas:</i>	- Armed group
<i>Jehad:</i>	- Essentially an Islamic term, meaning a holy war for the cause of the faith.
<i>Jhatka:</i>	- A term applied to slaughtering of animals of consumption by a single stroke, differentiating it from the Muslim method where the animal is usually beheaded slowly. The reference here is related to the Sikh community's demands upon the Unionist Premier Sikandar Hayat.
<i>Kafir:</i>	- Essentially an Islamic term used to categorize those who are not followers of Islam; infidels or non-believers.
<i>Kallar:</i>	- Salinity
<i>Kamins:</i>	- A lower stratum of society
<i>Khanqah:</i>	- Hospice, A mystic seminary of the early sufi saint
<i>Khatri:</i>	- Commercial caste of the Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab
<i>Kirar:</i>	- A Hindu moneylender in South-Western Punjab
<i>Kirpan:</i>	- A kind of dagger, possessed by Sikhs for self defence
<i>Kshatri:</i>	- One of the superior castes among the Hindus
<i>Lakh:</i>	- One hundred thousand
<i>Lambardar:</i>	- Village headman
<i>Lathi:</i>	- A baton
<i>Mahajan:</i>	- Hindu moneylender
<i>Mahant:</i>	- A presiding head a Hindu or Sikh religious order
<i>Maktab:</i>	- Primary school attached with a mosque
<i>Malikana:</i>	- Fee paid in recognition of proprietary title
<i>Mandi:</i>	- Market
<i>Murid:</i>	- A term used to describe people who were the follower of various sufi saints <i>pirs</i> ; very common in Punjab particularly in what to-day forms Pakistan; many leading <i>pirs</i> had lakhs of <i>murids</i> from different religions, but mainly Muslims.
<i>Maulvi:</i>	- Theologian, well versed in the Quran, essentially Muslim.
<i>Panchayat:</i>	- A village council of arbitrators, earlier composed of village elders, but at present a symbol of the highly effective form of grass-root democracy in India; the word is derived from <i>panj</i> (five) because in earlier times the

councils usually had five members; no legal powers to adjudicate matter but usually decides on the basis of tradition, amicability, harmony, normally petty matters.

Patwari: - An official of the government hierarchically at the lower of the revenue administration but by being constantly in direct contact with the people, a vital role, symbol of government authority for the common man.

Pir: - Sufi saint, a revered religious leader or spiritual guide; in Persian meaning elder, played an extremely important role in British policy of collaborative rule in Punjab; associated with mystical powers, both healing and spiritual.

Rais: - Was a kind of little prefixed to the name similar to chaudhary or malik symbolizing wealth and in colonial Punjab also influence and status; usually supporting of both the British and the Unionist Party.

Sahukar: - wealthy; mainly moneylenders; reference here relates to their responsibility for the debt-ridden plight of Punjab's peasantry.

Sajjada nishin: - Person in-charge/custodian of Sufi shrine, of the seat of prayer; supposed to have the mystical powers of the person whose shrine they look after; most of them had intensive influence both religious and socio-political; most were major collaboration of British Colonial Rule.

Sardar: - Leader, usually associated with feudal societies.

Sarpanch: - A head of *panchayat*

Shamilat: - The village common property

Shariat: - Islamic jurisprudence

Shuddhi: - Purification movement launched mainly by Arya Samaj to reclaim those Hindus who had converted to other relations mainly in the closing years of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth; main centers of activity were in Punjab and focus of the movement was against Islam.

Sisilah: - A Sufi term essentially meaning a link; relevant mainly in the context of the *sajjada nishins* who provided a mystical connection between the murid and the Sufi saint.

Sufaid posh: - Refers to a middle class/a man of average income

Swaraj: - Self-rule

Tabligh: - An Islamic religious movement seeking conversion; also religious preaching.

Taluqadar: - Administrator/owner of a *Taluqa* or *jagir*

Taqavi - Loan advanced for agricultural development

Tehsil: - Revenue sub-division of a district under a subordinate but influential officer, *Tehsildar*.

Thana: - Police Station under the in-charge known as *thanedar*; the most important part of the chain of civil administration.

Ulama: - Religious scholars

Urs: - Death anniversary of a saint

Waqf: - Endowed property

Warabandi: - The distribution of water to cultivators

Zaildar: - Subordinate revenue officer who performs his duties in a zail

Zamindar: - A landowner

INTRODUCTION

The colonial period of the British government in the subcontinent had imperative role in the socio-political developments particularly for the British Punjab. In this aspect, the study explores the analysis on the Unionists political party way of government, leadership, infrastructure to combat with the rival parties and their protagonist approach to the rural politics at the time of the British rule. This research study proposes valuation on the socio-political developments under the British Raj in Punjab province as well as define the role of the Unionist Party leadership. It also deliberated the ups and downs of the Unionist Party.

Punjab province, because of the socio-economic and geo-political formation, had been the most important part of the Sub-continent of India. Punjab was the last province which amalgamated into the British Indian Empire. The Punjab, “being the main gateway into India, was fated to the perpetual field of battles and the first home of all the conquerors.”¹ It was also directed as a “non-regulation” province under the British rule.² Punjab is famous for its agriculture, social ethos and Sufi-oriented culture.

The Punjab word is taken from Persian words *Panj aab*, literally means the five waters land. It has been unparalleled in the history of the Indian subcontinent as it has been the meeting place of diverse people and cultures. British Punjab was distinct because of its religious and geographical diversity and its geographical position regulates much of its historical importance. Owing to its geographical locus of being too closer to the north-

¹Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs: 1469-1839*, Vol. I (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 13.

²Tan Tai Yong, *The Garrison State, The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 18.

west frontier of the Indian Sub-continent, the Punjab had been administered by succeeding conquerors who assaulted India through its historic gate, the Khyber Pass.³ Geographically, it was distinguished by four natural divisions. The Indo-Gangetic plain lay in the east,⁴ the Himalayan Division in the north,⁵ the Sub-Himalayan area in the centre,⁶ and North-West dry area in the west.⁷

The total area of the British Punjab in 1921 was 99,486 square miles.⁸ The Muslims constituted 50.6 per cent of the population, (12,955,141) the Hindus 35.7 per cent (9,125,202) and the Sikhs 12.1 per cent (3,110,060).⁹ The Muslims were numerous in the North-West Dry Area, with a minimum strength in the Himalayan division. The Hindus were abounded in the Indo-Gangetic plain but weakest in the North-West Dry Area. The Sikhs population were half of the Muslim population in number. In the North-West Dry Area, the Muslims were 61 per cent of the population whereas Hindus and Sikhs being 27 and 10 per cent respectively.¹⁰ Socially Hindus were governed by a strict caste system which divided them into rigid compartments. The geographical location of the Punjab was such that on its north lay the Frontier Province, Kashmir, Ladakh and Tibet and beyond the deserts of Turkestan.¹¹ On the west, it was bounded by Afghanistan and Baluchistan and

³Qalb-i- Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab 1921-47* (Lahore Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd.,1992), p.1.

⁴The area stretching from Gujranwala to Gurgaon with cities of Lahore and Amritsar.

⁵Comprising hill states of Simla and Chamba.

⁶The area stretching from Attock to Hoshiarpur.

⁷The area stretching from Mianwali in the north, Montgomery (now Sahiwal) in the west and Dera Ghazi Khan in the south.

⁸*Census of India 1921*, Punjab states the area of Punjab was 136,905 sq. miles.

⁹*Census of India 1921*, Punjab and Delhi of the remaining 2 per cent, the Christians comprised the largest number, the rest being Jains, Buddhists, Parsis and Jews *ibid.*, pp. 87-90.

¹⁰*Census of India 1921*.

¹¹S.Qalb-i-Abid and Massarat Abid, *Punjab Politics Dyrachy to Partition* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 2002), p. 3.

beyond that Iran. To the north were Sindh and Rajputana and in the east by the United Province.

The Punjab was governed by the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh (1780-1839) quite aggressively. He defeated all his opponents, subjugated Jhang and invaded the Multan, ultimately attached it with his dynasty. After the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839, there started an epoch of uninterrupted conspiracy and bloodshed in between the different competitor of authority. In 1848, the Governor of Multan, Mul Raj (1814-1851) was ordered by the British to step down on the charges of mismanagement. The Mul Raj with the help of Sikhs resisted but ultimately withhold. At that time the British Government claimed complete hold of the Punjab and the annexation was declared on 29 March 1849¹², after defeating the Sikhs. The British preferred traditional administrative set-up to direct rule which moved them to collaborate with the agricultural class. The political and administrative support established the respect of the feudal families who remained unrivaled power of the region during the British Raj.

Lord Dalhousie designated a board of administration, coincided with three members Henry Lawrence (1806-1857), John Lawrence (1811-1879), Charles Mansel (1806-1886). The Board was repealed, and the management was delegated to a first chief commissioner John Lawrence.¹³ The Punjab was given the absolute status as a province in 1859 and Lawrence appointed its first Lieutenant-Governor.¹⁴

Subsequent the insertion of the Punjab was disunited into seven divisions and twenty-four districts; every division was oversighted by a commissioner and every district

¹²Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab 1921-47*, p. 2.

¹³N. Khilnani, *British Power in the Punjab* (Bombay: Asia Publication., 1972), p 65

¹⁴S. Q. Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab 1921-47*, p. 2.

was by a deputy commissioner. After the territorial adjustment the province kept five divisions and twenty-nine districts. Every district was split into 3 to 7 Tehsils; every Tehsil was controlled by a Tehsildar and his staff. The Lieutenant-Governor had the authority of chief civilian officer in-charge of the Punjab administration.¹⁵

The system of administration which commonly denoted as the “paternal system” the “regulatory system” and the “government without law.”¹⁶ The British strengthen their administration in the Punjab through social and political changes. The pastoral character of society was invigorated and nurtured with the help of conferring proprietary prerogatives to the peasants and amalgamated rural nobility into the administration system. The political and administrative support gained through the feudal families remained tattered power of the region during the British Raj.¹⁷ The society was organized on the basis of tribal values and *baradirism* in the Punjab. The political system was established on the basis of tribal values, social status, castes and cooperation to strengthen their rule. The British not only recognized the social-political importance of the local tribes in the Punjabi villages but also sought their cooperation to strength their government by channelizing their competency and efficiency. They relied on tribal and caste system rather than communal loyalties.

Possession of land was considered the main source of political power and influence in the Punjabi villages. The *zamindars* were in majority possessing big lands. People were depending mainly on them for the necessities of life. In the British Punjab, the local *pirs* and feudal class worked as a backbone of the British administration. The British

¹⁵J.M. Douie, *The Punjab, North-West Frontier Province and Kashmir* (Cambridge, 1916), pp. 212-223.

¹⁶N. G. Barrier, “Punjab Politics and Disturbances”, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, (Duke University, 1966), p. 3.

¹⁷Zarina Salamat, *The Punjab in 1920's. A Case Study of Muslims* (Karachi Royal Book Company, 1997), p 11.

administration in colonial Punjab, also takes a lot of benefits from the local and traditional leaders of society just like *zaildar* and *sufedposh*, which were already doing work under the administration in the wake of socio-political developments.

They prolonged their dominance with the help of land-owing class, martial races, *biradism*, social elites, *sajjadar nashins* and *pirs*. The Punjab was basically an agricultural province. Especially, the land-owing peasantry was the backbone of Punjabi society, which mostly belong from village community. It was need of the time to make the village system hardened to get control over the local community. So, the land-owing class, social elites and *sajjadahnashins* and *pirs* were appointed as *zaildars*, honorary magistrates and district board members. The British also deployed officials (*lambardar*, *patwari chowkidar*) to collect revenue from the villages.¹⁸ The British set up boards at the district place and afterwards deployed this exercise to the *thesil*.

Lord Ripon (r. 1880-1884) initiated the local self-government system in urban and rural locality of the Sub-continent. The Punjab was not too much refined in comparative to other provinces and was not practiced a Legislative Council until 1897. A Punjab code, manifesting plateful persisting customary civil laws and the criminal code during the residency was preserved. One of the inspiring executions of the British administration was the conception of a colossal scheme of irrigation canals.¹⁹ These canals changed the deserts like Lyallpur into irrigated lands called---canal colonies. The British administration paid heed towards advancing the railways and roads. They also delivered in the field of education as well as in political activities.

¹⁸Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab*, p. 31.

¹⁹Siani, *The Social & Economic History of the Punjab* (Dehli: Shell Sithl, 1975), pp. 206-13.

The landed elites had shown that they could perform equally important role of the state's military intercessors in the recruiting grounds of the province. The military importance of these rural allies, first highlighted during the 1857 mutiny, was once again emphasized during the First World War, when they played a major part in the mobilization and control of the greatly expanded recruiting base in the Punjab. All this was to have an important bearing on political developments in the Punjab after the war. When post-war constitutional reforms created new opportunities for political power in the provinces, the Punjab government sought to ensure that power would be developed to their traditional rural-military allies. The landed elites, for their part, took the occasion to exert their influence as the state's military brokers to stake a claim in the newly emerging structures of political power in the province consequently, political reforms in the Punjab came to be heavily biased in favour of these landed elites, and this was to lay the foundation of almost three decades of their dominance in the politics of colonial Punjab, and thereafter. From 1920 onwards the landed elites constituted a majority in the successive legislative councils in the Punjab, and in 1923 they coalesced into the Punjab National Unionist Party, which dominated provincial politics 1947.

During the colonial era, Indian Sub-continent divided into multi-party system at national and regional levels. Beside the main-stream political parties, the regional political parties like *Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam*, *Khaksar Tehrik*, *Hindu Mahasabha*, and *Akali Dal* having their deep impacts on the consciousness of the common masses and the developments of the politics in Punjab. The most prominent political party in Punjab, the

Unionist Party emerged in 1923 at Lahore.²⁰ The Party came into being under the leadership of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan (1882-1942), Mian Fazal-i-Hussain (1877-1936) and Sir Chhotu Ram (1881-1945). The leadership of the Unionist Party advocated the interests of the Punjabi communities, rural uplift and betterment of the peasant's rights and properties. Its establishment remained very significant in the scenario of the political organization in Colonial Punjab till 1947.

The society of the Punjab leads by the traditional and accustomed leadership with endowments like extraordinary education, holding of land, social status, lineage background had withheld symbolic fascination. On the same pattern and lines, the leadership of the Unionist Party stands on conventional and orthodoxies.

The present study seems in the first instance study of the most prominent leadership (Fazl-i-Husain, Chhotu Ram, Sikandar Hayat and Khizar Hayat) of the Unionist Party from 1936-to 1947. They organized the rural group into a Fazal-i-Hussain and Chhotu Ram chalked out the party manifesto which clearly showed the objectives like, encouraged the lower farmers, sect and *baradari* work development, to combine all the communities, improve their status of Hindus and Sikhs, to protect all lower communities from moneylenders, preserved the Punjab Alienation Act, work for the welfare of the peasants, exempted them from the taxes in bad days, rural class was given a legitimate share in the provincial government. landlords, agriculturalists and local *Pirs* of the different communities paved the way for the socio-political mobilization in their entity. The identification of the dominant majority in Legislative Council by its association with the

²⁰Muhammad Khurshid, *Feudal Ascendancy and Role of Sir Fazl-i-Husain in the Punjab Politics (1901-1936)* (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 2014), p. 115.

agricultural tribes thus became a central feature of provincial politics in the Punjab after the formation of the Unionist Party.²¹

Unionist Party in colonial Punjab also takes a lot of benefits from the local and natural leader of society just like semi-official post of the *Zaildar*, headman and *sufedposh* which were already doing work under the administration in the socio-political mobilization.²² Earlier efforts to organize the province's landowners also involved cross-communal cooperation.²³ Chhotu Ram most of the time addressed crowds of peasants for hours on end without the use of microphones. Money lenders were the key ailments in colonial period. Mian Fazl-i-Husain put the party to the service of Muslim interests. His introduction of communal quotas for admission to Government College Lahore and Lahore Medical College (40 per cent Muslim, 40 per cent Hindu, 20 per cent Sikh) created a storm.²⁴

Mian Fazl-i-Husain participated in Punjab and Indian politics for thirty years. His name is associated with a record of arduous and fruitful legislative work and administrative improvement. He was the chief force propelling, restraining and piloting his country at many decisive moments. Mian Fazal-i-Hussain died in 1936. Sikander, emerged as a new leader of Unionist Party in Punjab.²⁵ The new ministry which came on the throne on 1 April 1937 bore many hallmarks of what theorists of consociational democracy would call a grand coalition. Sikander accommodated all the communities within his cabinet. Sikander sought to establish a network of Unionist branches which would create a locus of power of

²¹David Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam Punjab and the Making of Pakistan*, (London: I.B Tauris & CO LTD, Publishers 1988), p.36.

²²Ian Talbot *Punjab and the British Raj 1849-1947* (New York: The Riverdale Company, 1988), p.75-76.

²³*Ibid.* p.78.

²⁴*Ibid.* p.94.

²⁵Ian Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 87.

the rural notables. He holds *Zamindara* League meeting at Mamdot Villa at Lahore, about 200 leading landowners attended. With branches throughout the province for the protection of the rights and interests all owners of land, peasants, proprietors and tenants in the province. Early in 1937, Unionist Government launched a six-year social rural programmes to improve social life just like, medical centers, schools, model farms and improved situation and drainage system, is called generally 'Golden Acts'.²⁶ Sikandar introduced the Punjab Alienation of Land Second Amendment Act and the Registration of Money Lenders Act in a bid to curb the moneylender influence. It was estimated that over 700,000 acres of land would be returned to its original owners. They appointed agents in the villages who were members of the statutory agricultural tribes and asked their debtors to transfer the land in the name of the agent so that it never legally passed out of agriculturalist hands.²⁷

Khizar oversaw a reform of the *Panchayat* system. However, resulted in the fact that by 1939 there were still only 1142 *Panchayats* for a total number of 36,000 villages in the Punjab. He saw in the terms of the need of the peasant to have an increasing share in the political life of the country.²⁸

In August 1945, Khizar's Government published five-year plan which consist of, 100 crores for construction work, spent on over 200 separate schemes of irrigation projects to the development of fruit growing and bee keeping societies, provide employment for ex-servicemen of post-war, provide them improved seeds, agricultural implements, and equipment at concession rates. He also provided with grants for the setting up of cottage industries for training of teaches and vets and for the establishing of sheep breeding units

²⁶Ibid., p.98

²⁷Talbot, *Punjab and the British Raj*, p.118.

²⁸Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*, p.102.

free of cost.²⁹ But Unionist popularity declined with the widespread shortage of consumer goods, increase in the agricultural prices, economic control, heavy burden of unconditional support of Army recruitment for war. War dominated all aspects of the life of the common masses of the Punjab. General Sales Tax, and the Agricultural Market Tax imposed to meet the situation. By December 1945 wheat, maize, and gram had virtually disappeared from the open market. Death of Sir Chhotu Ram, Sir Skindar Hayat Khan which severely undermined its unity. Muslim League took advantage of the unpopularity and growing divisions within the Unionist Party. Pakistan Rural Propaganda Committee was erected by the Muslim League. Its main task was to tour the villages enlightening the Punjabi peasants about demand for Pakistan. Muslim League leaders launched a direct and straightforward ideological assault on the position of Unionist Party in the mid of 1940. The Muslim Leagues blamed that the Unionists was the product of the symbolic link world (*dunya*), having no symbolic link with the faith (*din*). League won over the support of the landlords, and *pirs* which ultimately weaken the rural strength of the Unionist Party. Anger of rural Unionist supports joined the League. Ultimately, the Punjab Unionist Party burn to ashes, and at the end Khyzar Government resigned in March 1947.

The party flourished under the charismatic leadership of Fazl-i-Husain. After him the leadership of the party was not able to express fresh stipulations of the society and charisma constituted to be annihilated. The leadership of the Unionist Party faced the leadership crisis. After the demise of Fazl-i-Husain his successor Sikandar Hayat never more

²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 142.

possessed a particular leadership of the party. Tug of war among the various factions in the Unionist Party forfeiture the party a lot. The party squeezed in the social footings.

The Unionist Party leadership as compared to other party leadership like Muslim League and Congress. could not deliver a proper message to the rural areas of the Punjab. While the other political party's leadership working hard to kneel down the Unionist leadership. At the same time the Unionist Party leadership not follow the adequate strategies to combat the rival parties in Punjab. The Unionist party leadership was not active. That was why they could not articulate the changing political scenario in the Punjab. The Unionist leadership was in the government from 1937 to 1947 onwards but not been able to pour out clear-cut solution of the basic needs and problems of the common masses in the rural Punjab. The Unionist leadership left the vacuum in the political atmosphere of the Punjab, which were filled by the other political party's leadership. The Unionist Party leadership failed to come back upon their shortcomings, so the party vanished from the political scene forever.

1 Scope and Significance of the Study/Research

The proposed study is an attempt to record the history of the socio-political developments in the British Punjab and the Unionists way of government, leadership, and infrastructure to combat with the rival parties in the colonial period. The comprehensive type of study on the Unionist party digs out the factual and authentic validity to condor the platform approaches towards real and solid footings. The current study lies in the fact that it is first study at Ph.D. level which provides assessment on the socio-political developments under the British Raj as well as the Unionist Party leadership. It also brings to the fore the ups

and downs of the Unionist Party.

2 Statement of The Problem

The study focuses on the postulation that the Unionist Party came into view as the principal political party in the Punjab for all communities, irrespective of their religion in the colonial era. The basic philosophy behind the establishment of the party was the protection of the rights of the rural farming communities against the money-lenders. The traditional landlords and the *Pirs* working under the British administration provided bed of roses for the Unionist Party leadership in the wake of socio-political developments in colonial Punjab.

3 Review of The Literature

Many Pakistani and foreign scholars have written authentic work on the socio-political developments in the British Punjab.

Ian Talbot in *Punjab and the British Raj 1849-1947* discussed the culture of the Punjabi people, their identity; how the British combat the communalist threat and on what grounds they adopted the policies of divide and rule? To what extend the British gathered the people under the doctrine of socio-political developments to strength their rule? Author discussed the Unionist Party's leadership and socio-political developments in rural areas. The basic epistemology of the Unionists leadership discussed quite diligently and in its actual sense.

Khizar Tiwana the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India by Ian Talbot discussed on the politics of Sir Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana who played a key role in

limiting the Muslim League's influence in the Punjab from 1942-47. Khizar countered the Pakistan demand with his own vision under the banner of the Unionist Party. The opening section is on the Tiwana politics and assesses the impact of later politics in the colonial period. It then examines the political context provided by Punjab politics.

David Gilmartin in his work, *Empire and Islam Punjab and the Making of Pakistan* explained the utilization of Islamic theory to usurp the local communities. Gilmartin elaborated in detail on the socio-political developments of Unionist Party leadership. This book examines the problem through a detailed study of Muslim politics in the Punjab. Gilmartin argues that an understanding of Muslim politics in this period depends on an understanding of the close interaction between the ideology and structure of the British colonial empire on the one hand, and the structure of Islamic organization and ideas on the other.

Abdullah Malik in his book, *Punjab ke seyasi tahrikaian* discussed the political parties established in colonial Punjab. A comprehensive analysis erected among the political parties which were *Rashtriya Sawak Singh*, *Tahrik-i-Ahrar* and *Khaksar Tahrik*. Author also throw light in his one chapter on the different aspects of the Unionist party leadership.

Abdul Hameed in his work, *Muslim Separation in India a Brief Survey 1858-1947* discussed the political and social dissimilarities among the different communities in the Indian Sub-continent. The work outstandingly focused on the political dimensions of the Muslims politics in the colonial Punjab. Author in his work presented the factual and authentic study which is helpful to understand the psyche of the political parties.

Tan Tai Yong in *Garrison State: The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947*, examines the processes by which the politics and political economy of colonial Punjab was militarized by the province position as the sword arm of the Raj and divide and rule policy. The militarization of the administration in the Punjab was characterized by a conjunction of the military, civil and political authorities.

Khalid Bin Sayeed in *Pakistan: The Formative Phase* discussed the different aspects of the Muslim separatist movement that eventually created Pakistan. In addition to the basic theme of the Muslim nationalist movement, Khalid Sayeed has also focused on the working and development of the British vice-regal system and argues that the vice-regal system in Pakistan inherited from the British sustained Pakistan through the on-going political and cultural tensions that it has faced ever since its establishment.

Samina Awan in her book, *Political Islam in Colonial Punjab: Majlis-i-Ahrar, 1929-1949* discussed the party politics in Colonial Punjab. Samina Awan gleaned new information about strengthening the relations between *Ahrar* and Jinnah in mid-1930s. According to her, *Ahrar* leaders held several meetings with Jinnah before the 1937 elections. Samina Awan discussed the transformation of Punjab from a bastion of the Raj to a sword-arm of Pakistan Movement. The noteworthy work having center of attention on the comprehend Punjab's politics of the last two decades before partition.

K. K. Aziz in his book, *Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-1958* has discussed that the democracy and clean politics were not struggling to be born in Pakistan alone. Author elaborated the history, aims and objectives of the parties, its conduct and behavior. The work is also helpful in understanding the basic theme and socio-political developments of the Unionist Party leadership in the Punjab during the British Raj.

K. K. Aziz in *Making of Pakistan (A study in Nationalism)* intricate all aspects like historical factors, political factors, religious factors, and cultural factors in making of Pakistan. The work is mainly focused on the two-nation theory. Author throws light on Unionist Party leadership politics and its contribution and developments in the wake of political and social mobilization.

Muhammad Arif in his book, *Journey to freedom* explained how the political and communal thinking developed under the colonial Raj? Author converse all the laws, legislations and reformation of the British Government which were helpful for the breed of the political activities. Sir Fazal-i-Hussain took benefit of these reforms and established the Unionist Party under the entity of the British administration. The Unionist Party was organized on the basis of the tribal values and *bradarism* (brotherhood).

The Forgotten Ram: Lore and Legend Of Sir Chhotu Ram by Divyajyoti Singh is a quasi-fictional biography centered on the stalwart peasant leader Chaudhary Chhotu Ram. Book illustrates the political scene of the day where Chhotu Ram's Unionist Party came with a thumping majority, changing the established equation between the farmer and the Raj forever. Though an eminent part of the lore in Haryana, Chhotu Ram has been relegated from mainstream historical accounts.

Sir Chhotu Ram: Shakhiyat Aur Mission by Rajwanti Mann is an attempt to defend Sir Chhotu Ram. His best known contribution in the 1930s was to end century old debts of farmers. A good number of Haryana leaders swear by his name and try to make political capital. Controversies dogged this leader who was a Minister in Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan's government. Whether one liked or disliked him, he could not be ignored. The fate took an

unfortunate turn and after Chhotu Ram's death due to high fever and fatigue, Jinnah was able to make a rapid headway in Punjab politics, breaking the secular bond that Chhotu Ram, Fazal-i-Hussain, Sikandar Hayat, and Khizar Hayat had built dedicatedly over decades.

Syed Qalb-i-Abid in his book, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 1921-47* consider the pros and cons of the Punjab Muslim League struggled almost for four decades in order to become a vibrant and formidable political organization. This was a period when the Unionist party founded by Fazal-i-Husain ruled the Punjab with the support of landed gentry and their supporters in Hindu and Sikh communities of the Punjab. The Punjab Muslim League existed in name only at least for two decades. Author discussed the political dimensions and opinionated approach of the regional parties in colonial Punjab.

Ayesha Jalal in her book, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand For Pakistan* that examines Jinnah with the context of the All-India Muslim League. Through-out British early twentieth century order to undermine the nationalist politics under the banner of Indian National Congress or the Muslim League. Author clearly discussed the political legislation; the Unionist Government acts and their performance.

Ashiq Hussain Batalvi in *Hamari Qaomi Jadojahd Part I, II, III and IV May 1938 to December 1944*, highlights and thrash out each and every aspect about the political activities in a sophisticated way. Author considered 1935 Act to be flexible to entertain and ease the handsome portion of the local community provide a opportunities to contest the coming election. The book examines the Unionist's Government in the Punjab under the

Sikandar Hayat and its policies. On the whole book pouring out the clear-cut policies of the Unionists and its developments for the mass mobilization.

Syed Shameem Hussain Kadri in his book *Creation of Pakistan* deliberates about the prospects and ideologies which were adopted in the continuation for the creation of Pakistan. A detail work erected on such footings and in-depth enquiry presenting a good quality work on all circumstances upon which Unionist party established. Author talked over on the formation of Unionist Party under the leadership of Sir Fazal-i-Hussain and Sir Chhotu Ram. Moreover, a lot of information profoundly confers on the Unionist approach substantially the period of Sikandar Hayat.

Safdar Mehmood in his work, *Muslim League Ka Dour i Hakumat 1947-1954* weigh up the issues and basic developments of All India Muslim League in the defined period. The policies of Sikandar Hayat implemented in the enumerated era. Author gleaned information on the causes and reasons of Unionist Party's decline.

Syed Hassan Riaz in his work, *Pakistan Naguzeer Tha* paid attention to the prospects and solid justifications behind the establishment of Pakistan. Author elaborated the formation and the socio-political developments of the people in rural areas of the Unionist party in Punjab under the siege of the *biradrizm*, and tribal entity.

Khalid Mehmood in his autobiography, *Main Nay Pakistan Bantay Dekha* concentrated upon the print media information. Author mentioned the life story of Quaid-e-Azam and resolution of Pakistan. Author also discussed the political activities of the Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan and its Government inclination and orientation in the colonial Punjab.

Ishitaq Hussain Qurashi in his book, *Struggle for Pakistan* profoundly considers the pros and cons of the basic theme and norms of all the acts and legislations in the colonial era and drew a sketch on the election activities. Author chew over the political parties in the British era paid special attention towards the Punjab political Unionist party leadership and its way of Government.

Khalid Shams-ul-Hasan in his work, *The Punjab Muslim League and the Unionists* discussed on the Punjab Muslim League and the Unionist Party's leadership politics. The basic theme and ideology for the formation of the Punjab Muslim League and the Unionist Party elaborated on solid footings. The comparative study of the two parties erected on authenticity and provided a comprehensive work.

The Nation That Lost Its Soul by Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan contemplated on all the issues and activities at the time of partition of the Indian Sub-continent. Author painstakingly stressed on the factual study in the British era of the socio-political developments quite comprehensively. In his discussed mainstream leadership of Unionist Party in Punjab, according to its real ethos and ideology.

Nick Lloyed in his book, *The Amritsar Massacre the Untold Story of One Faithful Day* gave an explanation all the aspects and proceedings occurred at the time of the *Amritsar Massacre*. The Amritsar Massacre was the message from the British Government that they crush the political activities and movements which were going on at the time with iron hands. Author with deliberate stances explained what the effects on different groups and politics were.

Seeta M Roy in *Punjab Ke Inqalabi Tehrikein 1906-1946* discussed on the freedom

movements in the Punjab in a painstakingly under the British Raj. Author with gleaned stances observed the insurrection and revolutionary movement and changes in the Punjab, including details of his own exile from Indian soil. Jallianwala Bagh massacre in Punjab's, non-cooperation movement, gurdwara reform movements, including and especially division has been entrusted pen on the Punjab event.

Amarjit Singh in his work, on *Punjab Divided, Politics of the Muslim League and Partition 1935-1947* analyses the growth of the Muslim League and demand of Pakistan in between 1935-47. This exercise has resulted in highlighting certain trends which have been so far either ignored or underplayed. This study also reveals that the *Pirs* and *Sajjada nashins* of the Punjab, who were influential opinion makers and leaders, further strengthened the cause of the Muslim League. This study shows that the Muslim League presented Pakistan to the Muslim Punjab as the panacea of all Muslim grievances; both perceived as well as genuine which resulted in a meteoric ascendancy of the League in Punjab and its communal agenda eventually led to the partition of the province.

M J Awan in his book, *Tehrik e Azadi Mian Punjab Ka Kirdar 1857-1947* gave an explanation and thrashed out on the Punjab administrative system and the freedom movements in the Colonial era. Author pondered on the establishment and the materialization of the Unionist Party leadership and its ideology in a veritable and legitimate manner.

Muhammad Ahsan ul Haq and Muhammad Shafiq Alvi in their work on *Tehrik o tarikh-i-Pakistan* discussed the ideologies and movements concerned with the establishment of Pakistan. The authors converse on the National and Regional parties in the colonial period and crowning movements the factors involved in the mobilization of

Unionist party in substantial and tangible essence.

India As I Knew it: 1885-1925 by Michael O' Dwyer gave a piece of information on the Indian religious, cross-communal and socio-political thoughts with poles apart characteristics during the Colonial era. The author explained the British Government's agrarian policies in the wake of socio-political developments in the Punjab.

Gopal Madan in his work, on *Sir Chhotu Ram: A Political Biography* discussed Sir Chhotu Ram emerged as a man of great intellectual, one who has concern for the poor people whether they belong to any caste or community or religion. Sir Chhotu Ram did a lot for the poor and downtrodden. He was one of the influential leaders of the Unionist Party in Punjab, who have done wonders for the poor peasants.

Azim Hussain in his work, *Fazl-i-Hussain, A Political Biography* discussed the life of Mian Fazal-i-Hussain who believed in democratic institutions and was deadly against unconstitutional agitation and activities. Author gave a glean instances on the prospects that how Fazal-i-Hussain was able to dominate the political stage of the country for over a decade.

Iftikhar Haider Malik in his work on *Sikandar Hayat Khan 1892-1942: A Political Biography* is a comprehensive document on the history of the Punjab with special reference of Sikandar Hayat. Author discussed on social and political role in the province as well as at national level. Write systematically described all the events of the Punjab in the wake of Sikandar Hayat's premiership.

Gandhi Rajmohan in *A History From Aurangzeb to Mountbatten* traces history during the most tumultuous phase from the death of Aurangzeb, in the early eighteen

century, to its brutal partition in 1947. Author pinpointed on the great events of the time in the region the battles and tragedies that routinely disrupted the lives of ordinary Punjabis, the Great Rebellion of 1857 and its effect on Punjab, imperialist mechanism, the influence on the people by leaders of the independence movement like Gandhi, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Lala Lajpat Rai as also key regional figures such as Fazal-i-Hussain, Master Tara Singh, Sikander Hayat, Khizar Hayat.

Essays in the Social History of Modern India by Ravinder Kumar throw light on the national movement in India is comparable in complexity and human impact to the transformation of Russia or China in the 20th century. The essays in this volume touch on various facets of this historical phenomenon over the past century. Ravinder's efforts trace out the social and political dimensions in the colonial Punjab.

Politics of Sharing Power: The Punjab Unionist Party 1923-1947 by Reghuvendra Tanwar discussed on the rural socio-political mobilization of the Unionist Party in the colonial Punjab in the wake of Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. Author presented his analytical point of view on the Unionist party leadership, organizational structure, its socio-political formation and reasons behind its downfall.

Ajeet Javid in *Left Politics in Punjab 1935-47* considers the pros and cons on the British policy were deployed and erected forcefully on the common masses and local tribes. The out-come of the policies was the formation of the feudal and aristocratic class. In the meantime, a handsome majority were criticizing on the British polices and explorations in the rural areas. A complex political formation was taking birth in Punjab which was seeded

and guided by influential resourceful aristocrat's leadership. Thus, they were educated, ambitious and rich. They started taking interest in Punjab Politics.

Imran Ali in his book, *The Punjab under Imperialism 1885–1947* discussed that the Punjab experienced significant economic growth under the British rule from the second half of the nineteenth century. This expansion was founded on the construction of an extensive network of canals in the western parts of the province. The ensuing agricultural settlement transformed the previously barren area into one of the most important regions of commercial agriculture in South Asia. This comprehensive survey of the British rule in the Punjab demonstrates that colonial policy making led to many of the socio-economic and political problems currently plaguing Pakistan and Indian Punjab.

Emergence of Pakistan by Choudary Muhammad Ali in this book attempted to describe the history behind the partition of India. Author might have been tempted, in the later years, to retract some of the things he has said regarding Pakistan. It seemed to the Muslim leaders of the time that they were creating a utopian society whose values were based on Islam. Author gave explanation between the years 1946-48 although the last two chapters deal with economics, financial, administrative, and political problems.

Massarat Abid and Qalb-i-Abid in their book, *Punjab Politics Dyarchy to Partition* deliberated work on both the political developments as well as formation of the political parties in the colonial Punjab. Authors did comprehensive study on the nature and working of political parties as a part of political developments. The phenomenon of political developments in this work is treated as a negative force exhausting the province on communal lines resulting in to its partition on communal lines in 1947.

After reviewing the literature, we cannot deny the fact that very little work has been accomplished on the socio-political development in the British Punjab and in the same context on the Leadership of Unionist Party. My research work will observe all the stances through the deep insights and with the authentic consideration on the socio-political developments in the British Punjab: analytical study of Unionist leadership from 1935 to 1947.

4 Objectives of The Research/Study

1. This study provide a comprehensive account of data on all the major episodes and dimensions on the political issues as well as on the social aspects under the British in the Punjab.
2. It illuminate not only the sagacious perspectives of the British Raj but also point out their policies of divide and rule.
3. It describe all the main trajectories and issues of the Unionist Party leadership which faced from other political parties leadership.
4. It also highlight the myth upon which the Unionist Party was established and all the factors and elements behind the scene.
5. This study are to observe all the stances relating to the Unionist leadership with curiosity and dig out the actual essence which established the theoretical work on its solid footings.

5 Research Questions

- a. How the British Government changed the socio-political scenario in the Punjab?
- b. What were the ideology and aims of the Unionist Party?

- c. How the Unionist Party's leadership emerged and became influential?
- d. How and why the Unionist Party leadership became successful mostly among the rural community?
- e. How the Party leadership interacted with other Muslim and non-Muslim political parties?
- f. To what extent the Unionists and its government delivered for the Punjab?
- g. What were the main issues of the Unionist Party leadership which faced from other political parties leadership?
- h. To what extent the Unionists were responsible for the partition of the Punjab?

6 Research Methodology

The present research is relying on historical, scientific, systematic and qualitative methodology and an objective analysis of the Unionist leadership politics in colonial Punjab. As per the nature of the present research, the deductive logic of enquiry is used for an empirical observation of the political behavior of the society and its study in depth. The same criterion is applied on the behavior of the socio-political party leadership and its observation. The literature and sources utilize for such study based on truth-seeking material.

The information would glean through primary, secondary and tertiary sources. The primary sources include debates, documents, newspaper, correspondence, diaries, resolutions etc. The secondary sources comprise books, articles and monographs etc.

7 Primary Sources

Primary resources are following:

1. Jinnah Papers
2. Fatima Jinnah Papers.
3. Jenkins Papers
4. Rees collection
5. Record of the meetings of Unionist Party.
6. Record of the meetings and Resolutions of Punjab Muslim League.
7. Mountbatten Papers.
8. Transfer of Power Papers.
9. Proceedings of Punjab Legislative Assembly.
10. Congress Resolutions on Punjab.
11. Debates, documents, newspaper, correspondence, diaries, resolutions.
12. Annotated correspondence based on Shamas ul Hasan collection. Vol I-V

This information was retrieved through following resource centers.

1. Post Graduate library, G C U Lahore.
2. Main Library, University of the Punjab.
3. Punjab Public Library, Lahore.
4. Quaid-i-Azam library, Bag-e-Jinnah Lahore.
5. National Library of Pakistan, Islamabad.
6. DRSM Library Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
7. Library, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad.
8. Library, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Islamabad.

9. Library of History Department, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
10. Central Army Library of Rawalpindi.
11. National Archives, Islamabad.
12. Punjab Archives, Lahore.
13. Central Library, G.C.U. Lahore.

8 Organization of Study/Research Outlines

The first chapter deals with socio-political developments under the British Punjab 1935-1947. The second chapter deals with Unionist Party's Ideology, Organization, Reform and Socio-Political Developments. The third chapter deal with the contribution of the mainstream leadership of Unionist Party 1935-1947. The fourth chapter deals with the Unionist Leadership: Escalation and Descent of Unionist Party.

CHAPTER- I

SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BRITISH PUNJAB: 1849-1947

Punjab was the last province to be annexed by the British. The British annexation of the Punjab was a shattering blow for the Sikh community. The Punjab Province was governed by 12 *misls* of Sikh before the complete British Raj in the Subcontinent.³⁰ These *misls* were not devised intentionally at one specific point of time but they progressively grown over a spell of time³¹. The most pivotal Sikh ruler Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780-1839) was affiliated to *Sukarchakia misl*. The Punjab was galvanised into militarised state under the Sikh ruler, Ranjit Singh.³² After Ranjit Singh, followed, a period of continuous intrigues and bloodshed among the various contender of power.³³ Kharak Singh (1801-40) was not a notable person and very much obsessed with opium. He usually passed his time in futile and extravagant activities. After him his son Naunihal Singh (1820-40) came in power in Punjab. He was a very competent ruler. But he was not a good son, because he did not pay heed to his father's medical treatment. After the death of Naunihal Singh, his mother Rani Chand Kaur (1802-42) pronounced herself ruler in place of her son.³⁴ She was defeated on January 17, 1841, by Sher Singh (1807-43) and announced himself the Maharaja of Lahore. Rani Chand Kaur got murdered in June 1842. Sher Singh was incompetent to run the government affairs. After his assassination, Hira Singh (1816-44)

³⁰These *misls* (tribes) were known as *Ahluwalia, Bhangi, Phulkian, Kankeya, Ramgarhia, Sukarchakia, Dulelwala, Krosinghia, Singhuria, Nishania, Nakkais and Shahids*. See Verma, H.C., *Medieval India, Vol* (Delhi: University Press, 1993), pp. 737-38.

³¹Chhabra, G.S., *Advanced History of the Punjab, Vol. II* (Ludhiana: Parkash Brothers, 1966), p.18.

³²J.S. Grewal, *The Sikhs of the Punjab* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 99-115.

³³S Qalb-i-Abid, MassaratAbid, *Punjab Politics Dyrachy to Partition* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 2002), p. 3.

³⁴K.S Narang, *History of the Punjab 1500-1858* (U.C. Kapur and Sons: New Dehli, 1969), p. 355.

came in power.³⁵ After the demise of Hira Singh, Jawahar Singh came on the throne. At the end of Jawahar Singh, Lal Singh came in power as a *Wazir* and fought the first Sikh war against the British in 1846.³⁶ The Sikh power disintegrated and bifurcated, which paved the way for Punjab annexation. Within ten years of Ranjit Singh's death, Punjab was taken over by the British, who had already established their direct and indirect political control over the rest of the Indian subcontinent. The subsequent discontent in the Punjab encouraged the British, to annex the region, which they gained after two successive military attempts against the Sikhs in 1845 and 1848 respectively. After the second Sikh war against the British the whole of the Punjab came under the entity of East India Company.³⁷ On March 29, 1849,³⁸ the last Sikh Darbar was held at Lahore. Dalip Singh (1838-93) and the Council of the Regency³⁹ signed their submission to the East India Company. After the annexation of Punjab, the British established a board of administration to run the province on administrative lines.

The landed gentry of the Punjab played a dynamic role in the annexation. They also provided support to usurp the Mutiny of 1857 in British India. The landed aristocracy with the help of British enhanced its control over the rural peasantry through different tactics such as subservience to the landowner, *biradri*, influence, kinship and *piri-muridi*. These supporters of government established some associations such as the Association of

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 356.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

³⁷ Ian Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj 1849-1947* (New Delhi: Riverdale Company, 1988), p. 33.

³⁸ Qalb-i-Abid, *Punjab Politics Dyrachy to Partition*, p. 3.

³⁹ The following members of the Regency accepted and signed the submission on the part of the minor Maharaja Dalip Singh: Raja Tej Singh, Raja Dina Nath, Bhai Nidhan Singh, Faqir Nurddin, Sardar Ganda Singh, Agent of Sardar Sher Singh, and Sardar Lal, Singh, Agent of Sardar Attar Singh. Foreign Secret Consultation. No. 21. April 28, 1849. Quoted in Malik, *A Book of Reading on the History of the Punjab*, p. 179.

Aristocracy and Punjab Chiefs Association.⁴⁰ The rural structure in the West Punjab, a tribal based, depended on the local political influence of the landed aristocracy. Their source of strength was the Land Alienation Act of 1900 which had restricted the non-agricultural population from acquiring land in the rural areas.⁴¹

1.1 Measures taken by the Board of Administration

A board of administration was established in 1849, which consists of three members Henry Lawrence (1806-1857), John Lawrence (1811-1879) and Charles Mansel (1806-1886)⁴² holding absolute executive, judicial and military authority at the discretion of Governor-General. For administrative purposes, the province was divided into seven divisions and twenty-four districts: each division was controlled by a commissioner and each district by a deputy commissioner. The divisional headquarters were located at Ambala, Jullundur, Amritsar, Lahore, Multan, Rawalpindi and Leiah. The province retained five divisions and divided into twenty-nine districts.⁴³ The Deputy Commissioner had discretionary powers in his district. He had collector and judiciary powers too. Magistrates, District Staff, a Judge, Several Assistants and Extra Commissioners worked under him. Each district was divided into three to seven Sub-Collectorates called *tehsils*; each *tehsil* had a *Tehsildar* and his staff.⁴⁴

⁴⁰Iftikhar Haider Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan: A Political Biography* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, 1985), p. 21.

⁴¹P.H.M. Van den Dungen, *The Punjab Tradition: Influence and Authority in Nineteenth Century India* (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1972), pp. 109-195.

⁴²Henry Lawrence, the soldier statesman and a well known administrator who had most intimate knowledge of the Sikh character, John Lawrence, younger brother of Henry Lawrence and a distinguished civil servant who had valuable experience in the revenue settlement and Charles Manse, a covenanted civil servant who had a high reputation as one of the ablest financiers in India. Syed Muhammad Latif, *History of the Punjab: From the Remotest Antiquity to the Present Time* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1891), p.574.

⁴³P.A.R (1921-22) Vol. 1, pp.369-385. Quoted in Qalb-i-Abid, *Punjab Politics: Dyarchy to Partition*, p. 4.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

The lieutenant-governor (a chief civilian officer) was in-charge of the Punjab administratively. He exercised his powers with the help of his secretariat, consisting of secretaries, under-secretaries, and a chief secretary. The government of Punjab had three main branches, Executive, Judicial and Revenue. The revenue branch was controlled by the financial commissioner, the most influential person after the Governor. The executive, too, had some revenue and criminal powers, but the judiciary was mainly under the chief court divisional, session and district judges.⁴⁵

The British government focused their attention to the agriculturists and announced a new revenue valuation. Regular settlements of their lands for the time-period of 15 to 30 years were taken under control. The most significant part of this settlement was the summary assessment based on average revenue of the previous 3 to 5 years on their testimony.⁴⁶ The assessment was made on the authentication of headmen and bookkeepers of the village. Due to the assessment, the agriculturists suffered a loss of indirect income and sharp deterioration in the prices of the agricultural commodities and hit the peasant's economy hard.⁴⁷

With the new legislation of the British Government, the land began to hold value as a security against loans, *etc.*, added to the depressions of the agriculturalists.⁴⁸ The village money-lenders, the *Bania*, who was wiser than the agriculturalists, had become beneficiary

⁴⁵James Douie, *The Punjab, North Frontier Province and Kashmir* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1916), pp. 212-223.

⁴⁶Baden-Powell, *The Land system of British India II* (Delhi: Low Price Publications, 1892), p. 543.

⁴⁷Malik, *A Book of Reading on the History of the Punjab*, p.183.

⁴⁸S.S. Thorburn, *The Mussalmans and the Money-lenders in Punjab* (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1886), pp.1, 40-51.

of this situation. This resulted in the regular allocation of land from its owners, the cultivators, to the shrewd bankers with the help of the British courts.⁴⁹

A Punjab Code, embodying much of the customary civil and criminal law of the province was prepared. The preliminary task of the new government was to enhance the resources of the Punjab, to construct canals, and to pave roads. A strong body of military police and different civil and intelligence forces network were introduced to control the security measures and implement policies in a smooth way.⁵⁰

The Punjab government modernised the institutions; roads were made, canals were designed, schools, dispensaries and jails were established in all districts. The civil and criminal law was adopted, changed the currency, taxation on trade was detached; and a regular settlement was commenced.⁵¹ The area of NWFP was also part of the Punjab; subsequently separated in 1901 by the Governor-General Lord Curzon (1899-1905), to establish the North West Frontier Province.

1.2 Abolishment of the Board of Administration

In 1853, Lord Dalhousie abolished the Board of Administration. He appointed Sir John Lawrence (1853-1859) as Chief Commissioner — head of the administration and agent to the Governor-General of India at Lahore which was a provincial headquarter. He considered the uprising as military mutiny and observed that after the separation of Delhi (1911): “The Muhammadan soldiers and population became actively hostile than the

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁵⁰Malik. *A book of reading on the history of The Punjab*, pp 185-186.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p.186.

Hindus. This indeed is easy to understand, fanaticism and ferocity being specially inculcated by the tenets of their religion.”⁵²

John Lawrence was assisted by a Judicial Commissioner acting as Justice Minister, and a Financial Commissioner controlling fiscal matters whereas, a Chief Engineer was deputed for public works.⁵³ Punjab headed by a commissioner who had several districts in his jurisdiction and every district was headed by a Deputy Commissioner. The district was the key unit of administration, with all sorts of authorities. Three fourth portion of the population in Punjab were affiliated with agriculture. The continuation of little prices, added to their depression. To safeguard the interest of the peasant proprietors, their holdings were registered, and their rights recorded.⁵⁴

1.3 Socio-Political Developments in the British Punjab

1.3.1 Land Ownership

Punjab was basically an agricultural province. The landholding peasantry was backbone of Punjabi society, and its support was essential for the British rule. The landownership was a transferable commodity, in the British rule. The political, economic and social changes in the land revenue settlement provided a compact and systematised arrangement of landownership. The British management built up system of private landownership and collected the revenue straight from the proprietors of land. The landholder categories were

⁵²Kaye and Malleson, *History of the Indian Mutiny, 1857-58. Vol. V* (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1911), p. 355.

⁵³*Selection from the Records of the Government of India Foreign Department, General Report of the Administration of the Punjab Territories, 1854-1856, No XVIII* (Calcutta: 1856), p.3 (National Documentation Centre Islamabad, NDC). Quoted in, Muhammad Khurshid, *Feudal Ascendancy and Role of Sir Fazl-i-Husain in the Punjab Politics (1901-1936)* (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 2014), p. 30

⁵⁴*The Second Punjab Administration Report* Quoted in N.M. Khilnani, *British Power in the Punjab 1839-1858*, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1972), p.138.

sub-divided into landowners, tenants, jagirdars and others. The tenants divided into two major categories, tenants with and without obligation to pay rent. Tenants paying rent were further divided into tenants with and without occupancy rights. The Tenancy Act of 1887 defined the rights of the cultivators in the Punjab.⁵⁵

According to J. Wilson:

The tenants with right of occupancy are protected by law from arbitrary ejection of enhancement of rent, and their position is very secure one. The tenants-at-will may have ejected or may have their rent enhanced at the will of the landlords, the only protection given to them by the law being that, if ejected, they can claim compensation for improvements, and if they broke up the land from waste, compensation for disturbance also.⁵⁶

The British policy in the Punjab was the outcome of two factors: the necessity of the strong government as dictated by geo-political requirements, and the need to evolve an administration 'suitable to simple agricultural people.'⁵⁷ The British administrators, made the landowners more authoritative. In the similar procedure, they even reimbursed the *jagirs* to the Sikh chiefs. The Punjab annexation was also consummate with the blessings of the feudal chiefs. Later, "the peasant proprietors and 2500 big landlords proved to be the political conservation and an inexhaustible source of man-power for the British army."⁵⁸ The Muslim feudal lords just like Noons and Tiwanas were staunch supporters of the Sikhs.⁵⁹

⁵⁵Irfan Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963), pp. 317-50.

⁵⁶Note by Mr. J. Wilson, *Settlement Commissioner Punjab*, November 30, 1900 (NDC, M.U.Acc.No. 959) Quoted in, Khurshid, *Feudal Ascendancy and the Role of Sir Fazl-i-Husain in the Punjab Politics (1901-1936)*, p.43.

⁵⁷S. S. Thorburn, *The Punjab in peace and War* (London: Atlantic, 1986), p.16.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p.73.

⁵⁹Emmett Davis, *Press and Politics in British Western Punjab 1836-1947* (Delhi: Academic Publications, 1983), p.6.

1.4 Social Development

Punjab had a distinct significance in the sub-continent history because of its economic, social, and political importance. The population composed of various ethnic and religious groups, with the bulk divided into Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs. Before British invasion, Punjab had never enjoyed a settled government. The English denoted social setup to extend their rule in India. The British attitude of controlling Punjab politically developed the source of the *Biradarism*.⁶⁰ The basis of caste and *biradari* deliberation were also considered by colonial administrators while portrayal district and sub-district administrative boundaries.⁶¹

1.4.1 Martial Races

The British cooperated with the chieftains the Mazaris, Legharies, Mamdots, Khans of Kasur, Noons, Maliks, Khattars, Syed, Qureshis, Gilanis, Gardezis, Qizilbashes, Khars, Daulatans, Gurmanis, Raos, Chhathas, Cheemas and Tiwanas offered their allegiance to the *Raj*.⁶² The chiefs were given jagirs and invested magisterial powers in their respective estates.⁶³

The landed aristocracy played an effective role in the socio-political relationship of the people of Punjab and British. The notion that certain social groups, or “races” in India, namely the Sikhs, Punjabis, Pathans and Gurkhas, were inherently better warrior than the

⁶⁰ Andrew, R Wilder, *The Pakistani Voter. Electoral Politics and Voting Behaviour in the Punjab* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.178.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Andrew J. Major, *The Punjabi Chieftains and the Transition from Sikh to British Rule* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), p.79.

⁶³ Krishna Kapur, *A History of Development of Judiciary in the Punjab, 1884-1926* (Lahore: Punjab Government Press, 1928), p.26.

others. These races were popular amongst British soldiers in the nineteenth century, that in India “certain clans and classes can bear arms; the others have not the physical strength necessary for the warriorship.”⁶⁴ The belief that “martial” qualities were inherent in an individual belonging to a group eventually developed in a racist recruiting doctrine known as the “martial race theory.”⁶⁵ The ideology of the “martial race” was, in a way, a reflection of wider British perceptions of the Indian society. Interestingly, behind the official rhetoric about the favoured “martial races,” there was no delusion amongst the military authorities that the army in India was essentially an alien mercenary the one which served the state “when all is said and done, for the monthly wage, the other pecuniary wages and the pension.”⁶⁶

1.4.2 Creation of Ruling Elite/Social Elites

The Punjabi chiefs and landlord’s loyalties with the British made them more powerful in provincial politics and administration. The British cultivated good relations and collaboration with the native Sikh rulers, local chiefs and landlords. The support was rendered by these sections of society for maintaining law and order in the province. As for the case, “From the 1860s onwards, the British were constantly searching for allies amongst the region’s rural population.”⁶⁷

In that political astuteness, “Gifts of squares of land and honours of distinction such as ‘Sardar Bahadur’ and ‘Rai Bahadur’ were bestowed on the chiefs, landlords and priests,

⁶⁴G.A. MacMunn, *Armies of India* (London. Adam and Charles Black, 1911), p. 129.

⁶⁵David Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), pp. 10-43

⁶⁶Note by E.H.H. Collen, 3 November 1900, in Punjab Revenue and Agricultural Proceeding ‘A’, March 1902. IOR. P/5842. Quoted in Tan Tai Yong, *The Garrison State, The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 79.

⁶⁷Ian. Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj 1849-1947* (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1988), p.49.

and also conferred the honorary official positions of distinction like that of Honorary Magistrate, *ilaqadars*, *inamdar*s, extra-assistant commissioners, *Zaildar*, *Lumbardar* etc.⁶⁸ *Zaildars*, *Lumbardars* held hereditary offices and these petty influential persons assisted government officials at the local levels as intelligence-cum-law and order agents. This process of social engineering led to the emergence of a new class of loyalists which worked for the stability of the British. This class enjoyed a prestigious position in the society.⁶⁹ The British facilitated the new elite to enhance their position of authority in the new set-up. The landed gentry was now recruited to assist the administration. A well settled peasantry was another element of stability to the British rule. The recruits in the army included Hindu Dogras, Sikh Jats and Muslim Rajputs. They served British at Flanders; the deserts of Arabia and in the bush of East Africa in the First World War.⁷⁰ The concern of the British for the landed elite, and the political motives that underlay these grants, found in the following expression in 1913:

This class is in comparison with others is declining in wealth and influence owing to various causes, such as the recurring partitions in each generation of ancestral lands and in some cases even of jagirs, the simultaneous rise of a prosperous middle class, and the growing wealth of the peasantry. Little has been done for them in various colonisation schemes compared with what has been done and what it is proposed to do for the peasantry, and the present scheme offers one of the few opportunities still left for assisting them and strengthening their position.⁷¹

1.4.3 *Sajjadanashins and Pirs*

The *Pirs* exercised marvellous influence over the rural community because most of the villages were ignorant, illiterate and unaware of the true Islamic values. The rural society was tribal in structure and with less religious bias. The urban and rural Islamic

⁶⁸H. K. Puri, *Ghadar Movement: A Short History* (New Delhi: National Book Trust, 2011), p 47

⁶⁹Imran Ali, *Punjab under Imperialism, 1885-1947* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.75.

⁷⁰Farooq Ahmad Dar, *Communal Riots in the Punjab 1947* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, 2003), pp.1-2.

⁷¹RS to RAS, GOI, 2 October 1913, Confidential; in BOR H/251/476 B, p 209. Quoted in, Ali, *The Punjab under Imperialism*, p. 77.

values also differed because, in rural areas, the institutions of Islam were influenced by their customs and traditions. The *pir* of 19th century in Punjab had played significant role in spreading Islam and led to the conversion⁷² of the Punjabi tribal societies. With the passage of time the *Sajjada Nashins*, known as *pirs* turned into a worldly force and catered more to their own needs at the cost of the spiritual values. The rural Muslims showed deep attachment with the *khangahs*. These shrines simply served as intermediary links which drew the masses into an Islamic cultural system with the hereditary *baraka* or religious charisma supposed to have passed from the saints to their successors.

In south-west Punjab, in particular “the *Sajjadanashins* played an important administrative role as *Zaildars*, honorary magistrates and district board members.”⁷³ From 1880 onwards, these *pirs* exercised tremendous political control, as in every election, they could send to the assemblies and local bodies, the representatives of their own choice. In Multan district, the Qureshis who held the famous *Suhrawardy* shrine of Baha-ud-Din Zakariya (1170-1262), while the *Gilanis*, who had the *Qadri* shrine of Musa Pak Shaheed (d.1592) occupied a position of exceptional influence as opponent groups. For instance in 1869, when Makhdum Shah Mahmud died, “It was the Deputy Commissioner, who was called upon to perform the *dastarbandi* ceremony signifying official recognition of the heir.”⁷⁴ Most of the *Sajjadanashines* were drawn into administrative field when Fazl-i-

⁷²The process of conversion has generally been credited to be the work of the great sufi saints of the Delhi Sultanate period, particularly Baba FaridShakarganj of Pakpattan and Shaikh Baha-ud-din-Zakariya of Multan. There is little evidence to suggest that the conversions were accomplished by religious teaching or by active proselytization. Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, *The Life and Times of Shaikh Farid-ud-Din Ganj-i-Shakar* (Lahore: Idarah-i-Adabiyat-i-Delhi, 1947), p 107.

⁷³*Jhang District Gazetteer*, 1930, Superintendent, Government Printing, Volume 32 of Punjab District Gazetteers: Part A, Punjab (India), pp 58-60; *Muzaffargarh District Gazetteer*, 1931, Superintendent, Government Printing, Volume 34 Issue I of Punjab District Gazetteers: Part A, Punjab (India),pp. 75-77; *Multan District Gazetteer*, 1923-1924. (Reprint. Sang-e-Meel: Lahore, 1926), pp 106-110.

⁷⁴Lepal H. Griffin and Charles F. Massy, *Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab*, Vol. II (Lahore: Govt. Printing, 1940), p. 307.

Husain began to organise the rural bloc in the Punjab Legislative Council (PLC), they joined him as his close supporters.⁷⁵ Fazl-i-Husain knew that villagers obeyed religious heads because of their blind faith in the *pirs*. David Gilmartin described: “For the rural revivalists, the Unionists offered no special religious appeal, but the tacit support of most was won either indirectly, through their personal ties to landed Unionist politicians in the localities, or else by reason of the lack of an acceptable religious alternative which did not threaten the structural and administrative bases of their position in rural society.”⁷⁶

Except Fazl Shah, (1854-1935) all other prominent *pirs* rendered their unconditional support to the Unionist Party because his maternal uncle, Raja Ghazanfar Ali was contesting election from Pind Dadan Khan on the Muslim League ticket. Fazl Shah of Jalalpur was the only leading *pir* to oppose the Unionists. Fazl Shah subsequently switched allegiance when Sikandar offered him a parliamentary secretary-ship.⁷⁷ Makhdum Murid Hussain Qureshi long-time sympathizer of the Unionist Party during the early 1930s wrote pamphlets echoing ideology of the Unionists.⁷⁸ As the *pirs* and landlords had a unique position in their constituencies, they need not hold mass meetings or rallies. According to Talbot: “They would act as brokers in the localities, mobilising their kinsmen, *murids* and clients to vote for the Unionist Party in return for its promise of access to governmental patronage.”⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Among the twenty-seven Muslim rural members, five were more influential *pirs* – Syed Ghulam Muhammad Shah of Jahanian Shah, Ali Haider Shah of Sanjgani, Syed Muhammad Husain of Multan, and Syed Husain of Rajoa. David Gilmartin, Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab, *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 13, Issue. 3 (March 13, 1979), p. 102.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 504.

⁷⁷ Talbot, Khizar Tiwana, p. 95.

⁷⁸ Gilmartin, *Tribes Land and Religion in the Punjab* (Berkeley: University of California, 1979), p. 191.

⁷⁹ Talbot, *Punjab and the British Raj*, p. 112.

1.4.4 Hydraulic Society

A hydraulic society (also known as a hydraulic despotism, or water monopoly society) is a social or government structure which maintains power and control over access to water. It arises through the need for flood control and irrigation, which requires central coordination and a specialised bureaucracy.⁸⁰ Agricultural colonisation had a deep impact on the position of both state and people in the Punjab. The state enjoyed special authority in a hydraulic society such as the canal colonies. Not only it did control the source of agriculture, canal water but it had complete rights over the way the land was to be disposed. These areas being categorised as crown or state wastelands. The greater strength of the state, its “entrenchment” in society, arose out of its pivotal role in this region of hydrological agriculture.⁸¹

Access to colony land affected the distribution of economic and political resources among the people of the Punjab. Those who obtained land strengthened their position in society, while those who were excluded from this new resource suffered a relative weakening of their status. Benefits occurred equally to the commercial elements that traded in agricultural products and the bureaucracy that managed this hydraulic society. These differentials in the terms of trade between social classes were also embodied in the concept of “entrenchment.” The impact of agricultural colonisation on Punjabi’s society is examined with the participation of the landholding peasantry, the landlords, the bourgeoisie and the rural poor.⁸²

⁸⁰Wifogel Karl, *Oriental despotism: a comparative study of total power* (New York: Random House, 1957), p. 78.

⁸¹Ali, *The Punjab Under Imperialism*, p. 62.

⁸²Andre Betonille, *Studies in Agrarian Social Structure* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 87-89.

1.5 The Land Alienation Act, 1900

As pointed out by Van Den Dungen, "The core of the Punjab tradition undoubtedly lay in its reliance on the loyalty of the village proprietors."⁸³ Since the last two decades of the nineteenth century it was clearly observed that the growing peasant indebtedness and land alienation in the province. When debt or mortgages could not be repaid, agricultural land fell into the hand of the money-lenders. Gradually, as more and more peasants fell into debt, the volume of land alienation from the peasants to urban money-lenders increased.⁸⁴ According to Malcolm Darling, "Due to the changed legal position of the cultivator, the mortgage rose from 165,000 acres (1875-78) to 385,000 (1884-85)."⁸⁵ After 1880 there was a considerable increase in land sales in the Punjab, but much of this alienation was forced rather than voluntary. Trevask is rightly concluded that "a peasant proprietor can only be prosperous if he has sufficient land of his own to cultivate."⁸⁶

Eventually, the government decided in 1900 to take the drastic step of passing the Land Alienation Act, which prohibited the transfer of land to non-agricultural classes.⁸⁷ C.M. Rivaz⁸⁸ (1845-1926) was largely responsible for the drafting and enactment of the Alienation Bill. He strongly urged that the government should take firm step to forbid all transfers of land by mortgage or sale. The Act forbade the passing of land from agriculture

⁸³Dungen, *The Punjab Tradition*, p. 11.

⁸⁴Khurshid, *Feudal Ascendancy and the Role of Sir Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 69.

⁸⁵Malcolm Darling, *The Punjab Peasants in the Prosperity and Debt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), p. 174.

⁸⁶Hugh Kennedy Trevaskis, *The Punjab of Today. An Economic Survey of the Punjab in Recent Years. 1890-1925. Vol. II* (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), p. 14.

⁸⁷The non-agricultural classes consists on the Hindu group (businessman, traders etc), who lived in towns. They purchased lands and did not cultivate it. Most of the land remained uncultivated, which is very harmful for British Government. Tan Tai Yong, *The Garrison State. The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 92-93.

⁸⁸Sir C. M. Rivaz, who was the Commissioner of Lahore (1887-1892), subsequently promoted as Financial Commissioner (1892-1897), and became Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab from 1901 to 1905.

to non-agricultural castes, and allowed land transfers only within related agricultural castes groups in each district.⁸⁹ The Land Alienation Act notified that no land could be taken in mortgage by agricultural tribes for a period of over twenty years.⁹⁰ The primary function of the act was to try and halt the expropriation of agricultural owners by money-lending and trading groups.⁹¹ The landlords played the role of the intermediaries between the government and the rural society and in return conferred upon them *jagirs*, titles, and administrative powers as honorary magistrates. In early 1920s, this emerging new class ambitiously copied British customs and manners and were a political asset for the British in India.⁹²

The Land Alienation Act, 1900 encouraged the acquisition of peasant's land by agriculturist moneylenders and the rich and powerful of the agricultural tribes.⁹³ Instead, there was a continuous increase in the land revenue, for instance, the land revenue "stood at 15 lacs in 1891, it rose to 19.25 lacs in 1906 and to Rs. 353 lacs in 1923."⁹⁴

1.6 Biradism Became More Imperative Through Panchayats

Biradari (literally brotherhood) is generally contended that 'primordial' group characteristics such as family, kinship and caste, or membership in a village faction, more significant in character determining and voting behaviour in the sub-continent.⁹⁵ The social organization articulated on kinship categories. The indigenous *biradaris* (clans or tribes)

⁸⁹Ali, *The Punjab Under imperialism*, p. 5.

⁹⁰H. K. Treviskis, *The Punjab of To-Day*, Vol. I (Lahore: The Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1931), p.25

⁹¹N.G. Barrier, *The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900* (Durham: Duke University, 1966), p. 63

⁹²Malik, *Sikander Hayat Khan: A political Biography*, p.14.

⁹³Gilmartin, *Tribe, Land and Religion in the Punjab*, p. 37.

⁹⁴Yash Pal Bajaj, Land Revenue Reforms of the Unionist Party, *the Punjab Past and Present* (Patiala), Vol. X-II, October 1976, p. 343.

⁹⁵Andrew, R. Wilder, *the Pakistan Voter. Electoral Politics and Voting Behaviour in the Punjab* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.177.

cohesion played a noteworthy character in the culture. Every clan having own spearhead who exercise substantial control over its members. The clan leadership appeared as a substitute foundation of authority.⁹⁶

The *biradri* system was not important for big landlords and *pirs*, they recognised the authority of the organization, and used it for political ends. The landlords assume impressive place in the rural society and being the leader of the *panchayat*, settle the disputes according to his own dictates. The rural population in the Punjab was further classified into other four categories:

1. The big landlords who owned substantial areas of land and exercised feudal influence over their tenants.
2. The peasant proprietors who were further subdivided in two groups — firstly, the peasants who owned about 20 to 30 acres of agricultural land and usually cultivated their land with their cattle power, labour, expertise and leisure and thus attained a higher standard of living. Secondly, the semi-tenants, who owned very small landholding, in some cases, the average being not more than five or six acres, while in others it may be as much as ten or twelve, and often they had to seek employment as tenants.⁹⁷
3. The tenants or farm servants, the landless labourers who entirely depended on the landlords for their employments.
4. The *kamis* or village artisans such as carpenters, blacksmiths, potters, barbers, washermen, oil pressers, singers and others were doing menial jobs being the lowest in social ladder. The peasants in the Punjab were thus either proprietors or tenants and the area cultivated by them was as under:

⁹⁶Tanvir Anjum, "Decline of the Unionist Party an analysis of the Inter factors", *Pakistan Journal of History & Culture*, XVIII/2, (1997), p.54.

⁹⁷Darling, *The Punjab Peasants in Prosperity and Debt*, p.3.

Table No.1

Cultivated Area of the Province held by Owners and Tenants

Year	Total cultivated Area (Acres)	Area Cultivated by Owners (Acres)	Area Cultivated by tenants free from rent or normal rent (Acres)	Area Cultivated by tenants paying rent with right of occupancy (Acres)	Area Cultivated by tenants without right of occupancy (Acres)	Total area held by tenants paying rent 4+5 (Acres)
1901-1902	25,363,161	11,282,286	280,911	2,666,480	11,133,484	13,799,964
1911-1912	27,231,427	12,896,948	308,509	2,367,645	11,658,325	14,025,970
1916-1937	31,041,660	12,908,188	489,113	2,483,646	15,160,713	17,646,359 ⁹⁸

Agricultural castes held land and were hereditary agriculturalists services and labouring castes, which made up the landless stratum of the rural population and were commonly termed *kamis*, or menials were excluded from access to land grants.

1.7 Canal Colonies

A process of migratory settlement in western parts of the British India called “canal colonies.”⁹⁹ The land grants and leases of wasteland had been distributed by the British in the Punjab for those who had served in the military campaign in 1857 and the Afghan wars. After 1890, when the canal colonies were opened, the volume of land grants awards to the military increased dramatically. Large tracts of canal-irrigated wastelands were reserved for *Fauji* grants to soldier-settlers, pensioners and ex-soldiers.¹⁰⁰ The bulk of the military grantees were settled in the four canal colonies: the Chenab, Jhelum, Lower Bari Boab and Nili Bar. The total amount of land allotted to military grantees was almost of half-a-million

⁹⁸Bhagwan Josh, *Communist Movement in Punjab: 1926-1947* (Lahore: Book Traders, 1977), p.12.

⁹⁹Ali, *The Punjab Under Imperialism*, p. 3

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, p. 110-120.

acres.¹⁰¹ The ownership of land and water gave the central power over the means of production and ultimately its authority over society.

The process of agricultural colonisation commenced in the western Punjab from 1885, and it was to continue into the final years of the British rule. The canal irrigated area of Punjab increased three to fourteen million acres from 1885 to 1947.¹⁰² The nine canal colonies were Chenab, Jhelum, Lower Bari Doab, Upper Chenab, Upper Jhelum and Nili Bar.¹⁰³

Table No.2

Estimated

Name of Colony	Period of Colonisation	Doab Districts	Name of Construction	Cost of Canal Work (Rs 000)
Sidhnai	1886-1888	Bari	Multan	Sidhnai 1,301
Sohag Para	1886-1888	Bari	Montgomery	Lower Sohag Para 1,803
Chunian	1896-1898 1904-1906	Bari	Lahore	Upper Bari Doab
Chenab	1892-1905 1926-1930	Rechna	Gujranwala, Jhang Lyallpur Lahore Sheikhpora	Lower Chenab 53,072
Jhelum	1902-1906	Jech	Sheikhpora Jhang	Lower Jhelum 43,613
Lower Bari Doab	1914-1924	Bari	Montgomery Multan	Lower Bari Doab 25.086
Upper Chenab	1915-1919	Rechna	Gujranwala Sialkot	Upper Chenab 43.569
Upper Jhelum Nili Bar	1916-1921 1926- ^b Bari	Jech	Gujrat Montgomery,	Gujrat 49,770 Sutlej Valley 83,787 ¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, p. 115.

¹⁰²Dushka Saiyid, *Muslim Women of the British Punjab* (London. Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), p.4.

¹⁰³Ali, *The Punjab Under Imperialism*, p. 9.

¹⁰⁴PCM, pp. 2-25 and Statement II-C in *Administration Reports of the Punjab Public Works Department (Irrigation Branch)*, 1945-1946. Quoted in Ali, *The Punjab Under Imperialism*. p. 10 Notes a) Chunian

The first colonisation project in the Punjab was Sidhnai colony, located in Multan district. It was settled mainly in 1886-1888, and the total allotted area, after further extension in the 1890s was around 250,000 acres. The significant social and political change the British made in Punjab was the development of the canal colonies. They determined the reality that they gained the political control over the common masses with the support of land owing groups. The first Punjabi society was established in the end of the nineteenth century. It was the outcome of the collaboration between the aboriginal population and the British rulers.¹⁰⁵ The military grant was the allotment of large areas of land to ex-soldiers, commissioned and non-commissioned officers which were from twenty-five to fifty-five acres in canal colonies. As a result, the strength of the military in Punjabi society grew ever greater.¹⁰⁶ However, the landless rural population of the Punjab did not receive land grants called *kamis* or “menials,” the term officially used for them. They remained as the lowest stratum of a Punjabi society.¹⁰⁷

The assessment and recovery of revenue used to be done under several heads of taxation. The heaviest was that of water rates, also called occupiers rates, or *abiana* (water rates; occupier’s rate levied for irrigation water).¹⁰⁸ Imposed on the cultivator for the use of irrigation water and it was levied on the area sown. A further levy was the land revenue,

Colony obtained irrigation from a southern extension of the Upper Bari Boab Canal, which was constructed in the 1860s to provide irrigation to proprietary lands in Amritsar and Lahore districts b) Not completed by 1940s at the end write.

¹⁰⁵Talbot, *Punjab and the British Raj*, p10.

¹⁰⁶Ali, *The Punjab Under Imperialism*, p 110.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

¹⁰⁸The revenue assessment system of the canal colonies in described in *Chenab Colony SR* (1915), pp. 156-92. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

the traditional source of state income on the soil and its produce. Many other taxes were also levied. One was the *malikana* (fee paid in recognition of proprietary title), paid by grantees until proprietary rights were acquired by them.¹⁰⁹ The share of water by cultivators was generally done based on *warabandi* (the distribution of water to cultivators was itself an intricate process known as *warabandi*), or access to outlets by turn. Each cultivator was allowed a certain period in which to irrigate his fields.¹¹⁰

1.8 Railways and Other Means of Communications

A scheme was prepared to introduce railway network in Punjab. The proposal was that Multan would be linked with Karachi and then connect it with Amritsar. Upto May 1854 some 2,251 miles of roads were paved, bringing the total to 3,600.¹¹¹ The military works at Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Multan, Sialkot, Mianmir (Lahore) and Kohat were completed.¹¹² The Baree Doab Canal, fittingly described as one of the finest irrigation works of that time, was completed. By 1876, economic developments had begun to change the face of the Punjab. Lahore was developed into a hub of railway communications, and irrigation canals began to be extended to arid area of the province.¹¹³

1.9 Education

The Punjab was backward in education as compared to other provinces of India. In 1856, a project of thirty schools at district headquarters, one hundred school in the

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, p 160.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, p 175.

¹¹¹The Second Punjab Administration Report quoted in N.M. Khilnani, *British Power in the Punjab. 1839-1858*, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1972), p.167

¹¹² The Second Punjab Administration Report quoted in *Ibid.*, p.62.

¹¹³*The Indian Public Opinion and The Punjab Times*, 3 January 1877, IOL.

populated areas and a central college at Lahore to teach western knowledge and science.¹¹⁴

The level of education provided in those communities, villages, municipalities and towns was not upto the mark.¹¹⁵ The Muslim schools were mostly linked with the mosques where besides teaching of the Quran, education was provided in Persian.

Primary education was left chiefly to the missionaries; whereas vernacular schools persisted elementary in character.¹¹⁶ The middle and high education received huge subsidies in 1864, government colleges were opened in Lahore and Delhi.¹¹⁷

1.10 *Anjuman-i-Punjab*

The *Anjuman-i-Punjab* was established in 1864.¹¹⁸ The *Anjuman* activities were to solve the basic problems of the community and took positive steps for the welfare of the people, just like, revival of ancient oriental learning, educating public opinion in current problems, and creating interest in English education.

1.11 The *Anjuman-i-Islamia*

The *Anjuman-i-Islamia* was formed in 1869 with a limited scope of looking after the Badshahi Mosque. It gradually extended its activities and spread a network of *Anjumans* to 'improve the social and intellectual conditions' of the Muslims in the Punjab.¹¹⁹ The *Anjuman* affiliated itself to the Mohammadan Educational Conference and arranged for its

¹¹⁴The Third Punjab Administration Report quoted in N.M. Khilnani, *British Power in the Punjab*, p.43.

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹¹⁶*Report of the Punjab Provincial Committee of Indian Education Commission* (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing Press, 1884), pp. 16-18.

¹¹⁷*Imperial Gazetteer of India: Punjab 1908*, (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing Press, 1908), p.13

¹¹⁸Founded as *Anjuman-i-Mutalib-Mufiti-e-Punjab*: S.M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and Birth of Pakistan* (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1970), p.201.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 95.

session at Lahore in 1888.¹²⁰ It also served as a worked for the extension of the United India patriotic Associations.¹²¹

1.12 *Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam*

The *Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam*(AHI) was formally founded on September 22, 1884, when Khalifah Hameed-ud-Din was elected its president, Ghulam Ullah Qasuri as secretary, Munchi Chiragh Din and Munchi Peer Bakhsh as joint secretaries, and Munchi Abdul Rahim as treasurer.¹²² Its main objects were to defend Islam against the onslaugths of the missionaries, promote Islamic unity and to provide western education along with religious education.¹²³ It started five institutions for girls in 1885. In 1892 Islamia College for boys was opened in Lahore. Later, *Anjuman-i-Khadim-i-Islam* (1849) was founded for the advancement of Arabic learning. This movement “originally began as an attempt to free the Punjab from the British rule, the war continued upto1860s against the newly organised British administration.”¹²⁴

1.13 *Arya Samaj*

The Arya Samaj, founded by Dayanand Saraswati (1824-1883) in Lahore in 1875, and it had widespread support amongst the middle class, educated Hindus in the province. Its branches were set up in all district headquarters.¹²⁵ The revivalist organisation stressed upon social reforms. It opposed orthodoxy and idol-worship; it documented one God as the

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 197-198.

¹²¹M. Y. Abbasi, *Muslim Politics and Leadership in South Asia 1876-92* (Islamabad: Institute of Islamic History, Culture and Civilization Islamic University, 1981), pp. 249-250.

¹²²Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan*, p. 207.

¹²³*Ibid.*, pp. 198-199.

¹²⁴G.S. Chhabra, *Social and Economic History of Punjab, 1849-1901* (Jullunder: S Nagin, 1962), pp. 52-53.

¹²⁵Yong, *The Garrison State*, p. 193

primary foundation of factual knowledge and accepted the Vedas as the source of entire knowledge. Gradually, the Arya Samaj dominated most of the Hindu community in the province. Between 1899 to 1907, the Punjab Arya Samajists contributed expressively to the development and influence of the Provincial Congress. It was replaced by two Hindu political organisations, the *Shuddhi Sabha* and *Hindu Sabha*. Among the Hindus, Brahmo Samaj was the first revivalist movement founded in Bengal in 1828 by Raja Ram Mohan Roy. Its branch was established in Lahore in 1864.¹²⁶

1.14 Political Developments

The caste set-up called communal in which folks are dissect into different factions recognized in English as castes and *zat\ biradari* in Pakistan. Biradari is more robust than any other section, because biradri's integration is vulnerable and sturdy.¹²⁷ Casteism and *Biradaism* are main components of this culture having very deep impact on political alignments of the people. Social system of sub-continent influences local political system. Components of political culture are attitudes, beliefs, values and behaviour related to political system.¹²⁸ Henry Lawrence (1806-57) measured three principles of government indispensable for political control. First, personal rule by all-powerful district officers was necessary for the pacification of warriors like Punjabi tribes. Second, peace and order were considered necessary, active defence of peasant cultivators, the village community, and the small class of landed aristocrats supposedly insured continuing the British rule. The third principle was that the British must never identify with any of the three main Punjabi

¹²⁶N. G. Barrier, "The Arya Samaj and the Congress Politics in the Punjab" *Punjab Past and Present* Vol. V-II, October 1971, p.358.

¹²⁷Mughees Ahmed, "Faisalabad Division ke Siasatper Biradarism kay Asraat," (Ph.D. diss., B Z University. Multan, 2004), p.160.

¹²⁸Mughees Ahmad, "Caste system in the Sub-continent", *Al Siyasa*, Issue IX, 2006, Lahore, p.29.

religions i.e., Islam, Hinduism, and Sikhism, a policy aptly summarised by Henry Lawrence's following annexation; "my men are expected to extend equal rights to all native religious and to align with none."¹²⁹

The Punjab, being less progressive province, the legislative business was in the hands of the Governor General's Legislative Council. In 1897, eventually the council was established; it consisted of nine members, all nominated by the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab.¹³⁰ The British imperial system endeavoured to change the political and administrative hierarchy of the Punjab.¹³¹ Local people were employed in different departments like army, police, judiciary and other branches of administration. The British won over the rural classes ranging from the feudal lords to the peasantry. Urban elite found themselves generally more comfortable in the new set up. They benefited from modern education.

1.15 Beginning of Political Activities in Punjab

In 1877, formal political activities and events were started in Punjab. Surrendra Nath Banerjee (1848-1925) formed the first political organisation Lahore Indian Association in 1876 in the Punjab.¹³² The Punjab Muslim Association, was established in 1916 to represent the interests of the Muslim *zamindars* and the "military races" of the Punjab.¹³³ The Association's views and concerns regarding Montagu-Chelmsford

¹²⁹ Thorburn, *The Punjab in Peace and War* (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1904), pp. 165-76.

¹³⁰ W. W. Reinhardt, *The Legislature Council of the Punjab. 1897-1912* (Ph. D diss., Duke University, 1968), pp. 8, 236.

¹³¹ Khalid B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1947*, (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1992), p.216.

¹³² Malik. *A Book of Reading on the History of The Punjab*, pp.229-230.

¹³³ Tan Tai Yong and Gyanesh Kudaisya, *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 170.

Reforms were elaborated by Honorary Lieutenant Colonel Malik Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana (1875-1944) a leading member of the association and an influential spokesman for the military classes in the province.¹³⁴

A branch of the Indian National Congress (INC) in Punjab was formed in 1885. Its activities were focused only on yearly basis meetings, in which little strength of the people participated. As Duni Chand, remarked: "The Congress from 1885 to 1905 was nothing but a gathering of a few holiday makers out of intellectual entertainment."¹³⁵

1.16 All India Muslim League

All India Muslim League came into being at Dacca in December 1906. Its objectives were (i) to promote, among the Muslims, a sense of loyalty to the British Government; (ii) to look after their political rights and interests; and (iii) to cultivate better understanding between the Muslims and other communities.¹³⁶ The Punjab Provincial Muslim League established in November 30, 1907, in Lahore.¹³⁷ Mian Shah Din (1918-1968) and Mohammad Shafi (1869-1932) were designated President and General Secretary respectively of the new body.¹³⁸ It established itself as a branch of the All India Muslim League (AIMC) and demanded to protect the political rights of the Muslims in the Punjab.¹³⁹

¹³⁴In the immediate aftermath of the war, Umar Hayat Khan served in the Punjab Soldiers Board, where he strongly advocated increased rewards and welfare benefits for soldiers who had fought in the war.

¹³⁵Duni Chand, *The Ulster of India of the Analysis of the Punjab Problems* (Lahore: Navjivan Press, 1936), p. 2.

¹³⁶A.B. Rajput, *Muslim League-Yesterday and Today* (Lahore: M. Ashraf Publishers, 1948), pp. 19-20.

¹³⁷*Paisa Akhbar*, 3 December 1907, quoted in Malik. *A Book of Reading*, p. 268.

¹³⁸Zarina Salam, *The Punjab in 1920's: A Case Study of Muslims* (Karachi: Royal Book of Company, 1997), p. 36.

¹³⁹*Ibid.*

By the end of 1907, two organisations appealed to characterise the Provincial Muslim League: the one shaped under Fazl-i-Husain (1877-1936) and the other set up by Mian Shafi and Shah Din. After consultations, the two provincial Leagues were amalgamated. Mian Shah Din and Mian Mohammad Shafi continued as President and General Secretary, while Fazl-i-Husain became Joint Secretary.¹⁴⁰ In 1908-1909, the Provincial Muslim League consolidated its grip on the province by the opening of seventeen branches.¹⁴¹ With the growing strength of the Muslim educated, urban middle classes in the Muslim League after 1913, which demanded self-government to India. The period from 1929 to 1935 was marked by inactivity, dissensions and poor party financing.¹⁴²

Jinnah returned from England to India in 1935 and tried his best to organise the highly disorganized Muslim League. The first change in the League thinking was observed in October 1938 at a conference of the Sind Muslim League at Karachi. The conference urged the council of the All-India Muslim League to review, "for the political self-determination of the two nations-Muslims and Hindus," the issue of a future constitution to secure the "legitimate status" due to the Muslim for the attainment of "full independence."¹⁴³ The final decision was taken at the Lahore session of the Muslim League in March 1940. The Lahore Resolution of the session, later to be known as the "Pakistan Resolution," laid down that Muslim acceptance of a constitutional plan required that: "Geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be constituted

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*

¹⁴¹*Paisa Akhbar*, 15 April 1909. quoted in Malik. *A book of reading on the history of The Punjab*, p 269.

¹⁴²Mohammad Noman, *Muslim India Rise and Growth of the All India Muslim League* (Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1942), pp 212-213.

¹⁴³Syed Sharif-ud-din Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan* (Lahore: Legal Decisions, 1963), pp. 148-50.

with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.”¹⁴⁴

Jinnah initiated the process of the development of the Muslim League through its reorganization at all levels. Primary Leagues were established at the grassroots level representing *Mohallahs*. Primary Leagues were bifurcated into *Tehsil* and District Muslim Leagues. District Leagues were constituted into Provincial Muslim Leagues, which were given representation at the centre in the Muslim League Working Committee. The Working Committee was made responsible to the Council of the AIML.¹⁴⁵

1.17 Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Singh (RSSS)

It was founded by Keshav Rao Bali Ram Hedgewar (1889-1940), a Nagpur doctor in 1925. Its leaders believed that the whole of the Indian sub-continent was a land of Hindus who had been living here for thousands of years and the Muslims were foreigners and intruders. This doctrine was further developed by Golwalkar, who succeeded Hedgewar as the Supreme Leader of the organization in 1940. He believed that India has been the home of the Hindu civilization for 10,000.”¹⁴⁶ The ideology of the RSSS was revivalist and fascist. The membership of the Singh is drawn from the lower middle classes, clerks, artisans, small shopkeepers and Hindu youth. In the Punjab, branches of the Singh first came to notice in 1938. The object of the Sangh was stated to be “to unite and organise the

¹⁴⁴Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (London: Faber and Faber, 1949), p. 62

¹⁴⁵Yunus Samad, *A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937-1958* (New Delhi: Saga Publishers, 1995), p. 61.

¹⁴⁶Mailik. *A Book of Reading*, p. 674.

Hindu and to inculcate a political consciousness in them.”¹⁴⁷ By the close of 1946, the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh was well-established throughout the province. On January 24, 1947, the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Singh was declared an unlawful organisation in the Punjab, offices of the Singh were searched throughout the province.¹⁴⁸

1.18 Akali Movement and Growth of Sikh Doctrines

The first Sikh movement Nirankari was started by Bhai Dyal Das in 1855 in Rawalpindi. The main objective of this movement was to emphasise the defence of their faith with the revival of Sikh traditions and ceremonial rites. The Namdhari Kuka Movement was founded by Baba Balak Singh (1785-1865) in April 1857 emphasis on strict observance of 5K’s: *Kara, Kchhera, Kangha, Kesh, and Kirpan*.¹⁴⁹ The Sikhs established the Singh Sabha (1873) and Khalsa Dewan (1883) to strengthen their community and to save it from the onslaught of Arya Samaj and Christian Missionaries.

In 1920, Sikhs in the Punjab started a campaign at freeing principal gurdwaras from hereditary managers. The campaign developed into a non-violent struggle between the Sikh community and the Punjab authorities. The first major occupation of Sikh shrine was achieved early in 1920 at the Golden Temple in Amritsar.¹⁵⁰ The Sikh Gurdwara Act (1925) was passed, placing all the Sikh gurdwaras under the management of a Sikh Central Board known as the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandak Committee (SGPC). It had 175 members, claimed as its moral right and duty the control of the Golden Temple and all Sikh

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 674-75.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 675-76.

¹⁴⁹ Sarfraz Khawaja, *Sikhs of the Punjab, 1900-1925* (Islamabad: Modern Book Depot, 1985), p. 10.

¹⁵⁰ Yong, *The Garrison State*, pp. 196-197.

shrines in the Punjab.¹⁵¹ The Akali *jathas* (headed by a jathedar), bands of Sikh volunteers who called themselves Akalis (immortal soldiers).¹⁵² The SGPC decided to bring these independent *jathas* under its wing. In December 1920, the SGPC sanctioned the formation of the Shiromani Akali Dal. The chief function of the Shiromani Akali Dal was to maintain a register of the membership of the *jathas* which subordinate to it and to convey instruction from SGPC to the *jathas* at the local levels.¹⁵³ The activities of the *jathas* much of which veered towards violence and a total disregard for the law, began to trouble the Punjab government. The Akalis began to seize and occupy disputed shrines by force, if the incumbent *mahants* did not voluntarily surrender their shrines to *jathas*.¹⁵⁴

In October 1921, the executive committee of the SGPC (now dominated by the extremists) demanded that the keys to the treasury of the Golden Temple be handed over to them.¹⁵⁵ The SGPC had emerged triumphant from its first trial of strength with the government; it had only won back the keys to the Golden Temple. By the end of 1921, the relationship between Sikhs and Punjab authorities had deteriorated significantly. The SGPC strengthened its control and systematised the recruiting of Akalis carried out in rural central Punjab.¹⁵⁶ In addition to the local *jathas*, a central force of Akali volunteers, known as the Akali *Fauj*, was organized under the direct supervision of SGPC. In 1922, the *Fauj* was reputed to have a strength of 30,000 men. The SGPC agreed to negotiate with the

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, p 198

¹⁵²The Akali Dal and the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, 1921-1922, a Secret memorandum by V.W. Smith, Akali Dal and SGPC. Quoted in Tan Tai Yong, *The Garrison State*, pp. 187-88.

¹⁵³*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴Report of a Tour out by the Commandant of the Jullunder Brigade in the Malwa region of the Punjab. Home (Pol.), 1924, File no. 1/VI. Quoted in Tan Tai Yong, *The Garrison State*, pp. 196-197.

¹⁵⁵Rajiv A Kapur, *Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1986), p. 123

¹⁵⁶Mohinder Singh, *The Akali Movement* (New Delhi: National Book Trust, 2008), p. 93.

government for a permanent settlement of the gurdwara disputes. In the wake of negotiations, the Sikh Gurdwara and Shrine Bill was passed on July 8, 1925.¹⁵⁷ Sikh Gurdwara Act was passed merely to win their favour and to balance the political power in between the Unionists and their opponents.

1.19 Disturbances of 1919 and the Imposition of Martial Law

The 'Anarchical and Revolutionary Crime Act'¹⁵⁸ (commonly called the Rowlatt Act) introduced in January 1919 in place of the Defence of India Act. Now the provincial government could arrest a person without warrant and imprison him without any right of appeal. The Act led to a series of country-wide agitations and *hartals* (strikes). Jinnah had made a strong speech against the bills in the Imperial Legislative Council and resigned from the Council.¹⁵⁹ M.K. Gandhi, a prominent leader of the Congress, started a 'civil disobedience' movement, *Satyagraha*, which soon led to a large-scale violence and bloodshed. From the very outset unfortunately, because of the Chaura Chauri incident in February 1922, the non-cooperation movement was suspended. Fazl-i-Husain appealed for a total rejection of the non-cooperation programme, but the majority was against him and the Punjab Muslim League adopted the principle of non-cooperation. In protest, however, against the acceptance of the principle of non-cooperation, he resigned from the League.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ Sikh Gurdwara and Shrines Bill of 1925, as reproduced in *Punjab Gazette*, 26 June 1925.

¹⁵⁸ Chelmsford Correspondence Papers, Vol. 1,2,3 IOL/M2/678. quoted in, Khurshid, *Feudal Ascendancy and the Role of Sir Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 101.

¹⁵⁹ M. Afzal, ed., *Selected Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1966), p. 141.

¹⁶⁰ Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain, A Political Biography*, p. 106.

1.20 Massacre of Jallianwala Bagh

Under the leadership of the urban middle-class lawyers, rioting started in Amritsar on April 10, 1919. The climax was culminated when General O' Dyer ordered an opening fire on the densely packed crowd assembled in the Jallianwala Bagh on April 13. The number of people killed was 379 and at least 1200 wounded. As Ajeet described: 'That horrible butchery was committed in the name of law and order. I have tried to find out one single word, cowardice, no butchery.'¹⁶¹ The bonds between the two communities (the Muslims and the Hindus) were further cemented by their opposition to the 1919 constitutional reforms and the Rowlatt Act. Indeed, as Khalid bin Sayeed pointed out, the British did everything possible to force the Hindu and Muslims to unite against the government.¹⁶² The result was a formidable alliance between the Muslim and the Hindus as expressed in the *Khilafat* (Non-cooperation Movement).¹⁶³ The year 1919 was a turning point in the history of Punjab because for the first time the masses began to join the nationalist politics. The Martial Law was imposed from April 15 to till June 9.

After the incident of Jallianwala Bagh the British government imposed Martial Law in the Punjab and rewarded strict punishment to common men. The government appointed Hunter Commission to redress the grievances of the people but not a single representative cooperates from India. Fazl-i-Husain stated before the Hunter Committee: "The administration of Martial Law was calculated not to restore peace and order but to strike to imagination of the Indians to humiliate and to disagree them. It was whitewashed Ahmad

¹⁶¹ Ajeet Jawed, *Secular and Nationalist Jinnah* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.39.

¹⁶² Sayeed, *The Formative Phase*, p. 47

¹⁶³ Saleem Ahmad, *All India Muslim League: A History of the Growth and Consolidation of Political Organization* (Bahawalpur: Ilham Publishers, 1989), p. 201.

Shah's and Nadir Shah's atrocities whom in our school days we were taught to dread as human tyrants.”¹⁶⁴

1.21 Delhi Proposals

On March 20, 1927, M. A. Jinnah, with twenty nine prominent Muslim leaders¹⁶⁵ put forth a formula which was later known as the ‘Delhi Muslim Proposals,’ to give up separate electorates, provided (i) Sind was constituted into a separate province; (ii) constitutional reforms was introduced in the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan; (iii) Muslim were given one-third representation in the central legislature; and (iv) the proportion of Muslim representation in the Punjab and Bengal was in accordance with their proposals.¹⁶⁶ Initially, the Congress gave its consent to the new proposed formula. However, a controversy and disagreement within the All-India Muslim League leadership arose on the issue of surrendering separate electorates. The urban Muslim leaders particularly Muhammad Iqbal, Skeikh Rahim Bakhsh and Skeikh Din Muhammad opposed the idea of accepting the joint electorates coined by Fazl-i-Hussain.

¹⁶⁴Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain, A Political Biography*, p. 118.

¹⁶⁵Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar, Ali Imam, the Mahraja of Mahmudabad, M.A. Ansari, Mufti Kifait-Ullah, Nawab Ismail Khan, Mian Shah Nawaz, Abdul Rahim, Sardar Muhammad Nawaz Khan, Abdul Mateen, Syed Abdul Aziz, Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Khan, L.K. Hayder, Maulvi Syed Murtaza, Imam ShaibJarnia Masjid Delhi, Abdullah-al-MamoonSoharwady, Syed Al-e-Nabi Shah, Muhammad Zubair, Raja Ghazanfar Ali (1895-1963) and Muhammad Shafi were among those who attended this meeting. Fazl-i-Husain was also invited but he did not attend the meeting being an executive member of the Punjab Council. According to David Page, out of these twenty-nine Muslims who attended the Conference, sixteen were members of the Central Assembly and two were members of the Council of State. David Page, *Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control, 1920-1932* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,1982), p. 146.

¹⁶⁶M.H. Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah: A Political History* (Lahore: M. Ashraf Publishers, 1945), p. 369.

1.22 Simon Commission 1927

On November 8, 1927, the British government decided to send a constitutional commission to India, consists of seven members,¹⁶⁷ headed by Sir John Simon (1873-1954), to evaluate the political situation and proposed a constitution for India. The Simon Commission had no Indian representative. Mian Shafi wanted to cooperate with commission whereas the League had decided to boycott it. On this issue, the League split up into two factions i.e., Jinnah and Shafi. Nevertheless, the division did not last for long and the two got united soon.¹⁶⁸

The Indian Statutory Commission reached in India on February 3, 1928. The Commission greeted with *hartal* all over the country, offices of the newspapers were shutdown and in a few big cities, even the schools and colleges were closed.¹⁶⁹ The Governor General formed an Indian Central Committee including four elected members of the Council State and five members of the Legislative Assembly. With the cooperation of this committee, the Commission started visiting the provinces in September 1928 and on October 30, 1928, reached Lahore by train. But the commission was greeted with black flags and slogans like 'Simon go back.'¹⁷⁰ Fazl-i-Husain and Feroz Khan Noon personally

¹⁶⁷Simon Commission was composed of seven parliamentarians, the Chairman himself, Harry Lawson Webster. Donald Sterling Palmer, Edward Cecil George Cadogan, Stephen Walsh, George Richard Lane Fox and Clement Richard Atlee. On December 7, 1927, Walsh resigned because of ill health and Vernon Hartshorn was appointed in his place. Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League Its History, Activities and Achievements* (Lahore: Mustafa Waheed Publishers, 1979), p 180.

¹⁶⁸There were two Leagues in the Punjab first headed by Mian Shafi while second headed by Mian Fazl-i-Husain. Shafi's league was conservative while Fazl-i-Husain league represented the progress ideas. Both the league amalgamated in Pakistan Muslim League. Malik, *A book of reading on the history of The Punjab*, p.549.

¹⁶⁹M. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-58 Vol. I* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1986), p. 9.

¹⁷⁰Craig Baxter (ed.), *From Martial Law to Martial Law: Politics in the Punjab, 1919-1958* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1985), p. 75.

appeared before the Commission and demanded 63 seats out of 126 Council seats based on the Lucknow Pact. But the daily *Milap* blamed them of doing nothing: “that both these gentlemen are trying to lay the foundation of a government which should be linked with a Pan Islamic Federation.”¹⁷¹

Muhammad Shafi submitted a memorandum before the Commission. A Hindu delegation headed by Pandit Nanak Chand appeared before the Commission and said that the “Unionist Party was a fraud and no one should believe that the Punjab is represented by a non-communal party based on economic factors.”¹⁷² The Punjab Committee was formed under the chairmanship of Sikandar Hayat Khan (1892-1942) with seven members, four from the Unionist Party, Sikandar Hayat Khan, Zafrullah Khan(1893-1985), Chhotu Ram (1881-1945) and Owen Roberts (1875-1955), who had been elected¹⁷³ purely on non-communal basis. The Punjab Committee, while cooperating with the Simon Commission, prepared a comprehensive report and the recommendations. As far as the Simon Commission was concerned, after inquiring into the working of the constitution concluded that “so long as Muhammadans claimed and received separate electorates in provinces. It was impossible to deny to Sikhs similar treatment, if this is what they desire.”¹⁷⁴

In this report many injustices were done to the Muslims¹⁷⁵ such as:

1. The Commission suggested the re-settlement of the provincial boundaries which could affect the Muslim majority provinces.

¹⁷¹ *Milap* (Lahore), November 15. 1928, Information Department, Government of Punjab, *Report on Newspapers and Periodicals*, Lahore 1928, p. 771.

¹⁷² Baxter, *From Martial Law to Martial Law*, p. 78.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

¹⁷⁴ Anup Chand Kapur, *The Punjab Crisis. An Analytical Study* (New Delhi: S. Chnad, 1985), p. 43.

¹⁷⁵ *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission 1930*, Vol. II, (Calcutta Government of Indian Central Publication Branch, 1930), p. 58.

2. The Commission did not grant in principle the separation of Sindh as an independent province.
3. The demand of equal status for N.W.F.P was completely neglected.
4. For Balochistan the Commission recommended no change at all.

According to the Unionists assessment, the Commission's recommendations were quite unsatisfactory, Fazl-i-Husain stood firm to retain separate electorates for Muslims in the Hindu majority provinces.

1.23 Nehru Report

The Secretary of State for India Lord Birkenhead (1872-1930) challenged the political parties to produce an agreed constitution.¹⁷⁶ The Indian political parties accepted this challenge and immediately on May 19, 1928, an All-Parties Conference was held at Bombay, which was presided over by Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari (1880-1936). The Conference agreed to draft and determine the basic principles of the future constitution. Nehru Report produced a report argued, "when we see that the Muslim demands on the one hand and those of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikhs on the other are just the opposite to each other, we cannot wholly accept any one point of view."¹⁷⁷ It did not provide the principle separate electorates for any community. In Punjab, Fazl-i-Husain and Muhammad Shafi flatly rejected the Nehru Report on the issue of separate electorates. Jinnah was ready to accept Nehru Report but with amendments.

¹⁷⁶Other than Motilal Nehru, there were nine members, Shoaib Qureshi and Ali Imam representing the Muslims, M.R. Jayakar and M.S. Aney for the Mahasabha, Sardar Mangal Singh for the Sikhs, G.R. Pardhan for the non-Brahmins, Tej Bahadur Sapru, the liberal leader, N.M. Joshi, the trade Unionist, and Subhas Chandra Bose, an independent from Bengal. Most of the work was done by Motilal Nehru, Shoaib Qureshi, Mangal Singh, Aney and Sapru, Jawaharlal Nehru also attended some of its important meetings *Report of the All-Parties Conference, Report of Committee and Summary of Proceedings* (Allahabad: AICC, 1928) http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/151986/14/13_chapter%209.pdf.

¹⁷⁷*Ibid.*

1.24 Round Table Conference and The Role of Unionists

On May 12, 1930,¹⁷⁸ Governor General Lord Irwin (1926-1931) announced that His Majesty's government after the publication of Simon Commission Report, was convinced to call a conference on the Indian representatives to solve constitutional problems.¹⁷⁹ Fazl-i-Husain selected Aga Khan, Zafrullah Khan and Shafaat Ahmad Khan to counteract M.A. Jinnah's nationalist efforts. Consequently, Hailey conceded to Fazl-i-Husain's arguments that Shafaat Ahmad Khan would provide more effective counteraction. Three sessions of a Round Table Conference (1930-32) were held. The biggest hurdle was the communal representation as Hindus and Sikhs were not ready to accept the Muslim majority in the PLC based upon separate electorates. Deadlock in talks for a communal settlement resulted in a "Communal Award" on August 16, 1932, by the British government.

1.25 The Communal Award- The Unionists Leadership and Separate Electorate

Ramsay MacDonald (1866-1937) announced the Government's provincial scheme, famous as the 'Communal Award.' The explanation as under:

¹⁷⁸The Indian Annual Register, Vol. I, 1930, p. 107. quoted in Muhammad Khurshid "Quaid and the Punjab Muslim Leadership, A Comparative Study of Quaid-I Azam M A Jinnah and Fazl-i-Husain Political Strategies: (1924-1936)" *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, Vol. XIX 2, (1998), p. 19.

¹⁷⁹Nine Committees were formed: Federal Structure Committee, Provincial Constitution Committee, Minorities Committee, Burma Committee, North-West Frontier Province Committee, Franchise Committee, Defence Committee, Service Committee and Sindh Committee, to consider the matters. The report adopted by the Sub-Committees was presented at the final plenary session held on January 19, 1931. *The Indian Annual Register*, Vol. II, 1930, pp. 292-318 Quoted in Khurshid, "Quaid and the Punjab Muslim Leadership". *Ibid.*

1. The principle of separate electorates was accepted. Existing weightage enjoyed by the Muslims in U.P., Bihar, Orissa, and Madras was maintained with slight modification.¹⁸⁰ The Muslims of Punjab got 51 per cent representation in the legislature as the Muslims were given 86 out of 175 seats through separate electorates along with a few jointly elected special interest seats. In this way, the Muslims expected to get totally 90 seats. The Bengal Muslims were awarded 48.4 per cent representation and the Muslims were given 119 out of 250 seats through separate electorates, whereas 16 seats were to be filled through joint electorates. Though in Bengal, the Muslims were not expected to gain a majority, but their position was far better than imposed by the Lucknow Pact. In U.P., which had only 13 per cent Muslim population, but was more important for the Muslims as the centre of Muslim civilization and culture, the Muslims got 30 per cent of the seats, while in the other minority provinces the concessions were more or less the same. The seats were reserved for the Marathas in certain selected constituencies in Bombay.
2. Weightage was given to non-Muslim minorities in the N.W.F.P. equivalent to three times their population which was far in excess of what the Muslims got in their minority provinces. The Award in principle agreed for the separation of Sindh from the Bombay Presidency.¹⁸¹ All those qualified voters who were not allowed to vote in separate electoral constituencies, were entitled to vote in general constituencies.
3. Women were given special representation on communal lines. The electorates of a particular community were given right to elect their own quota.
4. Special seats were allotted to commerce, industry, mining and planting to be filled up through the chambers of commerce and other associations.

¹⁸⁰ According to the modified quota, the Muslim were granted 29 seats in Madras, 30 seats in Bombay, 66 seats in U.P., 14 seats in C.P., and 42 seats in Bihar and Orissa.

¹⁸¹ M.A. Khuoro (M.L.C.) leader of those demanding reforms for Sindh, wrote to Fazl-i-Husain on December 28, 1932: "The Muslims of Sindh are conscious of the fact that you have contributed to a very large extent towards their success in this matter and I take this opportunity to thank you most warmly on their behalf". Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain. A Political Biography*, p. 26.

5. Seats were given to landholders which had to be filled by the landholder's constituencies. The Muslims were allowed one-third seats in the central legislature. In the central services Muslims were granted 25 per cent quota.

6. Finally, it was suggested that there should be a federal form of government with provincial autonomy.¹⁸²

1.26 Constitutional Developments

1.26.1 Establishment of Punjab District Soldiers' Board

The District Soldiers Board (DSB) had a central committee, comprising a president, vice-president, secretary, and representatives at tehsil level. The DSB worked under the deputy commissioner of the district.¹⁸³ All DSBs had a network of *zail* committees and sub-committees. The *zails* committees consist of one to three members. The primary function of *zails* were to extend the DSB organisation to the village level.¹⁸⁴

Table No. 3

Organization Subordinate to the Punjab Soldiers' Board

<i>District</i>	<i>Organisation (s)</i>
Ambala	DSB, Ambala
	Ambala Ex-Indian officers' Association
Amritsar	Amritsar District Zail Committees
Attock	DSB, Attock
Ferozepur	DSB, Ferozepur
Gurjranwala	DSB, Gurjranwala
Gurdaspur	DSB, Gurdaspur
Gurgaon	DSB, Gurgaon
	Gurgaon Ex-Indian Officer' Associaton
Gujrat	DSB, Gujrat
Hissar	DSB, Hissar
Hoshiarpur	DSB, Hoshiarpur

¹⁸²*Ibid.*, p. 70

¹⁸³Pamphlet produced by General Staff, Indian Army, entitled 'Notes for Assistance of Members of District Soldiers' Boards and Officers Touring in Recruiting Areas', Simla, 1935, PHP (M) 'B', File 127,1935. Quoted in Yong, *The Garrison State*, p. 153.

¹⁸⁴*Ibid.*, p. 153

Jhelum	Hoshiarpur and Jullunder Doab Ex-Indian Officers' Association DSB, Jhelum DSB, Ex-Indian Officers' Association
Jullunder	DSB, Jullunder DSB, see Hoshiarpur
Kangra	DSB, Kangra Zail Committees (53)
Karnal	DSB, Karnal Karnal Ex-Indian Officers' Association
Lahore	DSB, Lahore
Ludniana	DSB, Ludiana
Lyallpur	DSB, Lyallpur
Mianwali	DSB, Mianwali
Rawalpindi	DSB, Rawalpindi
Rohtak	DSB, Rohtak Rohtak Ex-Indian Officers' Association
Shahpur	DSB, Sargodha Sargodha, Ex-Indian Officers' Association
Sheikhpura	DSB, Sheikhpura Mazbhi Singh Association
Sialkot	DSB, Sialkot Sialkot Ex-Indian Officers' Association ¹⁸⁵

The DSBs provided free treatment of wounded soldiers in government hospitals. The DSBs delivered financial aids to soldiers and families of deceased soldiers. The DSBs also assisted the ex-soldiers in finding civil employment after discharged from the army.¹⁸⁶ The DSBs maintained regularly the records containing detailed information of soldiers and ex-soldiers.¹⁸⁷

1.27 First World War and Its Consequences

Punjab with its robust and martial rustic populace of peasant proprietors had been observed as the 'Shield' and 'Spear head,' and the 'Sword-hand' of India.¹⁸⁸ When the

¹⁸⁵Punjab Government, Home/Military Proceedings 'B', 1922, File 15. Quoted in Tan Tai Yong, *The Garrison State*, pp. 154.

¹⁸⁶Punjab Government, Home/Military Proceedings 'B', 1922, File 15. Quoted in Tan Tai Yong, *The Garrison State*, pp. 155-56.

¹⁸⁷Minutes of Quarterly meeting of Rawalpindi DSB, 22 December 1926, PHP (M) 'C', File no. 12, 1927. Quoted in, *Ibid.*, p. 155.

¹⁸⁸Michael O'Dwyer, *India as I knew it, 1885-1925* (London: Constable Limited, 1925), p. 192.

demand for manpower became imperative, the military establishments looked for Punjab. The area initially reserved for military activities was 103,000 acres, particularly for horse breeding. The Punjab supplied more than sixty per cent of the manpower from all twenty-eight districts.¹⁸⁹ At the commencement of the war, the Punjab had about one hundred thousand men of all ranks in the army. The services of the *Noons*, *Tiwanas* and *Daultanas* proved to be of special value, for the supply of recruits and other contribution to the war efforts. Even Gandhi had taken part in a recruiting campaign urging the Gujarati peasants to win *Swaraj* by joining the army.¹⁹⁰

From September 1914 to November 1918, India's material and financial contribution amounted to an equivalent of £479 million¹⁹¹ and approximately one and a half million from the Indian army both combatants and non-combatants fought in the battlefield of Europe, the Middle East and Africa.¹⁹² The total amount of money raised through war investments and donations aggregated 92,118,664 rupees, roughly equivalent to £700,000 in 1918.¹⁹³ Economic conditions in the Punjab at the end of the war were poor. After war the province faced severe scarcity of essential commodities.

1.28 Minto-Morley Reforms 1909

The Indian Councils Act 1909, commonly known as the Morley-Minto Reforms. The maximum number of Legislative Council at the centre was increased from 16 to 60. The

¹⁸⁹Annual Caste Returns Showing class composition of the Indian Army on 1 January 1910. IOR/MIL/14/226. quoted in Yong, *The Garrison State*, p. 18.

¹⁹⁰Khalid B. Sayeed, *Pakistan The Formative Phase 1857-1948* (Karachi Oxford University press, 1996), p. 46.

¹⁹¹Dewitt C. Ellinwood and S.D. Pradhan, *India and World War I* (Delhi Manohar Publishers, 1978), p. 24.

¹⁹²India's Contribution to the Great War, published by the Authority of the Government in India, Calcutta, 1923, pp. 72-73 IOR: V/27/281/32 quoted in Yong, *The Garrison State*, p. 98.

¹⁹³M.S. Leigh, *The Punjab and the War* (Lahore Superintendent, Government Printing, 1992), pp. 64-81.

right of separate electorate was given to the Muslims. The provincial legislative council seats in Punjab were fixed up to 30.¹⁹⁴

1.29 The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms 1919

The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, known as *Dyarchy*, it envisaged two categories of subjects: 'transferred' and 'Reserved.' Under this system, certain departments of provincial government, such as local government, education, agriculture, health, commerce and industry were "transferred." Subjects related to revenue and law and order, such as land revenue administration, justice and police were "reserved" in official hands.¹⁹⁵ The reformed provincial Legislative Council would be expanded to comprise seventy-one elected and twenty-three official members. The nominated official and non-official members and distribution in PLC was as under:

Table No.4

Distribution of Seats in PLC according to the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms

Nominated	Muslims	Sikhs	Hindus	Total
23	35	15	21	94 ¹⁹⁶

The first provincial elections under the Government of India Act of 1919 were carried out in Punjab in December 1920. Of the seventy-one elected seats only fifty-nine were contested; the rest of the seats were turned unopposed.¹⁹⁷ In the fifty-nine contested

¹⁹⁴ Ilbert, Sir Courtenay Peregrine. "Appendix I: Indian Councils Act, 1909", (Calcutta: The Government of India, Clarendon Press, 1907), p. 430.

¹⁹⁵ *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms (The Montford Report)*, 1918 in, Cmd. 9190, Vol. 8, pp. 113-421. Quoted in Yong, *The Garrison State*, p. 243.

¹⁹⁶ Madan Gopal, *Sir Chhotu Ram: A Political Biography* (Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1977) p. 50

¹⁹⁷ *Returns showing results of election in India, 1921. Punjab legislative Council*, in PP, Cmd. 1261, 1921, Vol. 26, p.11. Ibid., p. 261.

constituencies, only 32.2 per cent of the electorate 130,152 out of 404,371 voted.¹⁹⁸ The candidates were prominent and influential families of their localities, holding such rural officers as *halqadar*, *inamdar* and *zaildar*.¹⁹⁹

The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms had established a political arrangement in the Punjab. But this arrangement, predicated upon the limiting terms of 1919 Act in the Punjab, were then brought about by the Government Act of 1935.

1.30 Diarchy to Provincial Autonomy 1935 Act

The Government of India Act 1935 was a beginning of a new chapter in the politics of Indian subcontinent.²⁰⁰ It delivered two-tier federal legislature and responsible governments in the provinces. It contained three lists of subjects: federal, provincial and concurrent. Each province provided with a Council of Ministers which were responsible to the legislature provincial leaders 'to govern, so to speak on their own.'²⁰¹ The governor general had all of powers in defence and external affairs. The central executive was to operate on a diarchic basis.²⁰²

The six 'Governor's provinces,' including Punjab were given full provincial autonomy. Diarchy was abolished and full powers vested in Councils of Ministers, responsible for legislatures. The Governor remained the titular head of the province.²⁰³ The

¹⁹⁸ *Returns showing results of election in India, 1923: Results in the Punjab, PP. Cmd. 2154, 1923, Vol 18*, p 497. *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ Ali, *The Punjab Under Imperialism*, p. 54.

²⁰⁰ Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan Political Roots & Development 1947-1999* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 14.

²⁰¹ Reginald Coupland, *India: A Re-Statement* (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 113.

²⁰² Reginald Coupland, *The Indian Problem, 1833-1935* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 134-35.

²⁰³ Yong, *The Garrison State*, p. 273.

new Assembly contained 175 seats, including special seats reserved for women, landholders, scheduled castes, eighty-four were Muslims seats, forty-two generals, thirty-one for Sikhs. Eighteen seats were also reserved for special groups, such as women, landowners, small communal groups like Europeans, Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians, and other functional groups, such as commerce, labour and university graduates.²⁰⁴

1.31 The Unionist Party and Election 1937

The Unionist Party established in 1923 at Lahore, under the leadership of Fazl-i Husain, to protect the interests of rural community. Under the Government of India Act 1935, the elections were held in 1937.²⁰⁵ The result of the provincial elections was announced in March 1937. Out of 175 seats in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, the Unionist Party won ninety-eight seats.²⁰⁶ It formed the government in coalition with the Sikh Khalsa Nationalist Party (fourteen seats), and the Hindu National Progressive Party (eleven seats).²⁰⁷ The Council of Ministers formed in Punjab in 1937 was essentially a Unionist Ministry, comprising Sikandar Hayat Khan as the premier, Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana (son of Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana and leader of the Mitha Tiwana family in Shahpur), Chhottu Ram, Sunder Singh Majithia, representing the Sikhs, Abdul Haye (Unionist) and Manohar Lal, and independent Hindu member.²⁰⁸ Total seats were 175 and the party position as under:

²⁰⁴Kripal Chand Yadav, *Elections in the Punjab, 1920-47* (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1987), p. 17.

²⁰⁵The Civil and Military Gazette, 19 September 1937.

²⁰⁶Ian Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in North-west and North-east India. 1937-47* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 87.

²⁰⁷The Hindu National Progressive Party was a loyalist Hindu organization comprising mainly of non-Congress Hindu landed interests. It was noted that seven of the eleven elected members belonging to this party were title-holders. Satya Rai, *Legislative Politics and the Freedom Struggle in the Punjab*, p. 223.

²⁰⁸Yong, *The Garrison State*, p. 274.

Table No. 5
1937 Elections Results

Party	Number of Seats
Unionist Party	98
Indian National Congress	19
Muslim League	02
Khalsa National Party	13
Hindu Mahasabha	12
S. Akali Dal	11
Majlis-i-Ahrar	02
Etihad-e-Millat	02
Independents	16 ²⁰⁹

The 1937 elections in Punjab gave an overwhelming victory to the Unionist Party (UP), whose members belonged to the rural elite and faithful to the British rule.²¹⁰ The *biradarism*, natural leadership and *Pirs* ensure the party's success.

Muslim League won only two seats *i.e.*, first one won by Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan and the other one by Malik Barkat Ali. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan joined the Unionist Party and Malik Barkat Ali was left alone to keep alive the League in the Provincial Assembly. During the League-Unionist conflict, he played invaluable services for the final success in the Punjab.²¹¹ The Muslim League and the Congress were not active in the Punjab politics. The Muslim League had captured 104 seats out of a total of 489 Muslim seats. The Indian National Congress gained twenty-six Muslim seats.²¹²

²⁰⁹Shamaila, Younas "Party Politics in the British Punjab: A Study of the Punjab Unionist Party 1923-1937". *The International Journal of History and Social Sciences*. Vol.4 (2013), p. 76.

²¹⁰Ayesh Jalal and Anil Seal, "Alternative to Partition: Muslim Politics Between the Wars," *Modern Asian Studies*, XV, 3 (1981), pp. 415-54.

²¹¹Malik, *The History of the Punjab*, p.552.

²¹²Sayeed, *Pakistan the Formative Phase*, p. 83.

1.32 Unionist Government in Punjab

Sikandar Hayat took oath as a premier of Punjab on April 1, 1937. The Unionist Party continued policy of clamping down the moneylenders and spent gigantic amount for rural uplift. In 1937, Sikandar chalked-out a Six-Year Programme to boost up the rural community. He launched medical centres, schools, model farms and improved sanitation and drainage system. The Punjab *zamindars*, in 1937 came under indebtedness of Rs. 200 Crores and paid annually four to five times interest on their loans, land revenue and water rate.²¹³ Sikandar proclaimed the Punjab Alienation of Land Second Amendment Act, the Registration of Moneylenders Act and the Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act to give relief the dupe public. Due to these Acts over 700,000 acres of land would be returned to its owners. The agrarian reforms called as 'Golden Acts'.²¹⁴

Sikandar Hayat faced problems because of his opponents at the beginning of his tenure. The antipathy of Congress added insult to the Unionist ministry. The Ahrar (Muslim *militant* religious group in Punjab) claimed a complete independence; and went against the Unionist government.²¹⁵ The Shahidganj dispute further constrained the Ahrar-Unionist relations. The Hindu-Sikh groups concentrate on the elimination of the communal electorates and quota in the services. These groups were against the Communal Award.²¹⁶ The Akali leader, Tara Singh, was against the Premier, because Sikandar had given approval for dismissal of his brother worked as a professor in the Khalsa College. The most

²¹³D. Verma, 'Provincial Autonomy in the Punjab April 1937-October 1939'. *Indian Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 1 (1940), p. 457 & ff.

²¹⁴R. Narendranath, 'The Punjab Agrarian Laws and their Economics and Constitutional bearings', *Modern Review*, 65 (1939), p. 30.

²¹⁵Civil Military Gazzetter, 22 April, 5 July 1936.

²¹⁶C.M.G., 10 & 26 April, 10 January 1937.

important development under the course of these enmities was that the premier sought the League-Unionist co-operation. The Sikandar-Jinnah understanding accepted sovereignty for the Unionist Party at provincial level, while the Unionist Party settled to live with the League on Indian dealings. The League had authority to impose its control on the Muslim members of the Unionist Party, despite of Sikandar denial. The Premier briefed the Governor of Punjab that that understanding would not change the power of his party. But his calculation was wrong.²¹⁷ Sir Chhotu Ram, the deputy leader of the party, also commented that the Sikandar had committed a major mistake.²¹⁸

1.33 Shahidganj Mosque Tragedy

One of the most miserable incidents in the Punjab history is Shahidganj tragedy. A clash started about an old mosque, now in Naulakha Bazar (Lahore) built by Abdullah Khan during the regime of Shah Jahan.²¹⁹ A gurdwara was also constructed in the same compound in Sikh's regime. After annexation in 1849, Shahidganj became a bone of contention between the Muslims and Sikhs. In May 1935, Lala Amolak Ram, *Munsif* of Lahore, clearly identified in his verdict that the entire property of the Shahidganj gurdwara was an endowed property belonging to Sikhs.²²⁰ The emotionally wrapped communal issue led to a series of violent riots, significantly upset the Sikh-Muslim community in the Punjab, in between 1935-1936.

²¹⁷ Governor to Viceroy, October 1937, L/P & J/5/238, IOR, quoted in Syed Qalb-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab 1921-1947*, p. 194.

²¹⁸ M. Gopal, *Sir Chhotu Ram: A Political Biography* (Delhi: BR Publishing Corporation, 1977), pp. 120, 123.

²¹⁹ Batalvi, *Iqbal Kay Akhari Do Saal* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1989), p. 547.

²²⁰ Ganda Singh, *History of the Gurdwara Shahidganj Lahore: From its Origin to November 1935* (Lahore: Ganda Sing Publishers, 1935), pp. 50-54.

Accordingly, in March 1935, entire property attached to the Shahidganj including the mosque passed into the possession of the local Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandak Committee (SGPC), Lahore. On June 28, 1935, a big crowd of Muslims armed with sticks and hatchets appeared near Shahidganj to protest the Sikh strategies. The Sikh SGPC arranged to bring *jathas* to hold counterdemonstrations against the Muslims. The Deputy Commissioner warned Syed Habib of the *Siyasat*, and Maulana Zafar Ali and his son Maulana Akhtar Ali of the *Zamindar* “any attempt to instigate the Muslims against the Sikhs.”²²¹ Fazl-i-Husain was against the agitation, described “the only possible solution was to negotiate an agreement to refrain from building on the site of the mosque”.²²² The government tried to divert the Muslim concentration from the Shahidganj matter by presenting two bills- Graveyard’s Bill and Auqaf Bill.

A Muslim conference held at mosque, Rawalpindi, from August 31 to September 1, 1935, under the presidentship of *Pir* Jamaat Ali Shah Alipuri (1845-1951). It was decided that September 20 would be observed as the ‘Shahidganj Day’ and the programme of civil disobedience was announced. Syed Jamaat Ali Shah’s appointment as Amir brought support from other *pirs*. The Punjab government decided to take immediate action to restrain the prominent agitators from such activities and to deal firmly with the press. Henry Craik, member of the Governor General’s Executive Council talked to M.A. Jinnah on the existing situation. On February 11, 1936, M.A. Jinnah expressed his willingness to visit Lahore to affect a settlement between the Muslims and the Sikhs.²²³ Fazl-i-Husain welcomed M.A. Jinnah’s visit and wrote: “Government of India seems to have accepted

²²¹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, (Lahore) July 9, 1935.

²²² Azim Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 287.

²²³ Waheed Ahmad, ed., *Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 154.

Jinnah's offer to help and asked the Punjab government to cooperate with him. This is all to the good. This trouble stands in the way of communities coming together, and we should all be grateful to Jinnah for making the effort, and if he succeeds, Punjab benefits from it.”²²⁴

The *Shahidganj* clash was a key difficulty for the Punjab ministry. Sir Sikandar, meanwhile, tried to convince the Sikhs to give the right of prayers in the mosque for the Muslim. Sikhs had upper hand because of the previous judicial decisions and Hindu community support in their favour. When the court decision had gone against the Muslim, the Ahrars and the Ittehade-Millat threatened to launch an agitation against the decision.²²⁵ In May 1940, the Privy Council eventually gave its decision, upholding the previous court's judgement. This stratagem worked perfectly well; despite the various call by the *Zamindar*, no real interest was shown by the Punjab Muslims in reviving the issue again.²²⁶

1.34 The Punjab Unionist Party's Vulnerable Position after the Second World War (1939-1944)

The Punjab government involved in several issues such as response to the war efforts, development of the Pakistan Scheme, and the establishment of the Defence Council. The most significant of all these problems from the Punjab's point of view was the Indian response to the British war effort.²²⁷ The Second World War was started on September 1, 1939. The Unionist Party unconditionally supported the British war efforts. The Muslim

²²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 200.

²²⁵*Civil and Military Gazette*, 24 & 26 December 1937.

²²⁶F.N.R., 15 May 1940 quoted in Qalb-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab*, p. 239.

²²⁷Craik to Brabourne, 10 September 1938, Linlithgow Collection, 125/87, IOR. quoted in Yong, *The Garrison State*, p. 270.

League empowered Jinnah to ‘assure Great Britain on behalf of the Indian Muslims of their support in the War, provided that they were assured the acceptance of their demands.’²²⁸ But, on the other hand, the Congress Working Committee decided on October 22, 1939 ‘to ask Congress Ministries to resign as a mark of protest against government policy.’²²⁹ The Congress had reacted against the non-acceptance of their demand to establish a representative legislative body to decide the future of India and to frame the constitution.’ Jinnah appealed the Muslims to observe the “Deliverance Day on December 22” as a mark of redress from the tyrannical rule of the Congress.²³⁰ The Unionist Party’s assurance to the war made its position weak. Coercion began to be used to sustain supply recruits in Punjab. Such actions led to opposition from the people towards the Unionist Party.

1.35 Lahore Resolution 1940

The Lahore Resolution was passed on March 23, 1940, by the Muslim League and set a goal for a separate state for the Indian Muslims. Sikandar did everything to preclude the Pakistan Scheme from establishing its origins in the Punjab but proved futile due to swift popularity of the League during the war.²³¹ The word ‘Pakistan’ was not used by the League in its resolution, but the non-Muslim while criticizing, called it ‘The Pakistan Resolution.’ The Khalsa National Party considered the Punjab as a holy land and threatened the Unionist Party for dire consequences on the division of the Punjab. Sikandar Hayat delivered a speech in the Punjab Assembly, denouncing the Pakistan Scheme: ‘A Muslim Raj here and

²²⁸ *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 11-18 November 1939, p. 3806

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 4-11 November 1939, p. 3787.

²³⁰ Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. 1 (Lahore. M. Ashraf Publishers, 1960), p. 104

²³¹ Even Sikandar’s Federation Scheme was described as the Pakistan Scheme. (Viceroy to S/S, 16 March, 21. March, 7 July 1939. Linlithgow Collection, 125/88-89). quoted in Qalb-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab 1921-1947*, p. 236.

a Hindu Raj elsewhere, if that is what Pakistan means I will have nothing to do with it'.²³²

For the Congress, the formation of Pakistan was a fatal setback to their entitlement of being a nationalist organization. It meant that Muslims did not trust the Hindus as a majority community.²³³

1.36 Cripps Mission, Acharia Formula and the Punjab

When the war broke out, India was on the frontline. The British government pondered on the situation after resignations of Congress ministries and shortage of bulk of army recruitment specially in Punjab. In the given situation the British sent Cripps Mission in 1942 for promulgation of a constitutional plan for the post-war India. One of its clauses in the draft was to give an option to any province to refuse or to join the proposed Indian union, if so desired. Furthermore, the non-acceding provinces could form union of their own. The Viceroy suggested to Cripps that they get in touch with the Punjab Premier and gave him early information regarding their proposals, before meeting the Congress and the League leaders.²³⁴ The Sikhs was the most aggrieved party. The Sikhs community formed a committee negotiate with the Cripps.²³⁵ The Sikhs got relieved when Congress and League both rejected the Cripps offer.

The Congress launched 'Quit India' Movement in August.²³⁶ Despite its failure, the Cripps Mission had moved the constitutional process forward with the offer of 'Dominion

²³² Full text of speech, in V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (Bombay: 1957) Appendix I, pp. 443-58; quoted in *ibid.*, p. 244.

²³³ Khalid B. Sayeed, *Pakistan The Formative Phase 1857-1947* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.8.

²³⁴ Viceroy to S/S, 11 March 1942, *T.P.*, Vol. I, PP 405-06 quoted in Syed Qalb-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab 1921-1947*, p. 249.

²³⁵ C.M.G., 19 March 1942.

²³⁶ F. Hutchins, *India's Revolution: Gandhi and the Quit India Movement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 52.

Status' after War. It increased the upright of Jinnah and League by its inspiration of Pakistan through the principle of provincial option. Jinnah had robust role in dealing with the Punjab Unionists.

One more blow for the Sikhs and the Punjab Hindus came in a shape of the Rajaji group's acceptance of the Pakistan Scheme led by Raj Gopal Acharia (an ex-Premier of Madras) a member of the Congress Working Committee for the last twenty years and was a close friend of Gandhi. In Punjab, the Acharia group was entirely supported by the Punjab Congress President, Mian Iftikharuddin's group. Iftikhar considered the demand of Pakistan a democratic one. On May 9, 1942, he said that no community could be compulsory bound to live as a part of the Indian Union against its aspirations. But the Congress was not ready to accept it. The Congress Working Committee vetoed against the Acharia's demand.²³⁷

1.37 Sikandar-Baldev Singh Pact

Most of the Sikhs were anti-Unionist, and they had also parted with the Congress because of their difference of opinion on the war issue. At the time of Congress's 'Quit India Movement' Sikhs in Punjab were totally out of its fold.²³⁸ The relations were increasingly stressed among the Sikhs, the government and the Unionists. It was a need of the time to reconcile the matter among communities.

Akali leader, Tara Singh nominated Baldev Singh, to start negotiations with Sikandar in 1942. Because of negotiations between the two, a contract was acted upon. The *Civil*

²³⁷ *Civil and Military Gazette*, (Lahore), 15 May 1942.

²³⁸ *Inqilab*, 11 & 12 August 1942.

and Military Gazettee, elaborated that under the recommended contract, the governing party would not practice its power in the Assembly to suggest any legislation which might damage Sikh interests in the Punjab. The agreement pronounced that Baldev Singh would be appointed as a minister in the Punjab Cabinet. Baldev Singh identified that the government was enthusiastic to acknowledge the Sikh demands of Jhataka meat, Gurmukhi as a second language in schools where an adequate number of students desired, Sikh representation in services at 20 per cent, and their due share at the Centre.²³⁹ Ultimately as a result of the Unionist-Sikh Pact, Baldev Singh assumed office in late June as the Minister of Development. On the hearing of the progress of the Sikandar-Baldev negotiation certain Sikh political factions, such as the Akali Congress, the Akali Dal and the All Parties Sikh Conference expressed their opposition to the proposal.²⁴⁰ Jinnah appealed to the Muslims not to rest upon anybody, but on their own inherent strength.

1.38 Khizar Hayat Khan in Punjab Political Development:1943-47

After the demise of Sikandar, the Governor appointed Khizr as the new Premier of the Punjab. As soon as Khizar took charge he realised that biggest utmost challenge for him was the Muslim League's pro-Pakistan propaganda in the Punjab. The new Premier had little political ability, sagacity and experience, now it was the time when League feeling comparatively robust. The League severely complained that the government had dishonoured the legitimate process by declining to consult the League, despite the fact the League claimed as the largest political party in the Punjab. Though, at that time a split

²³⁹*Civil and Military Gazettee*. (Lahore), 16 & 28 June 1942.

²⁴⁰*Civil and Military Gazettee*. (Lahore), 7 & 14 June 1942.

between the Unionists and the League was also forecasted.²⁴¹ Also, the Premier did nothing to stop the League from booming out. The Punjab Premier in his positive response, guaranteed the Punjab's support to the League, and sponsored the Muslim demand for the right of self-determination.²⁴² Sir Chhotu Ram a prominent leader of the Unionist Party, strongly condemned the thinking of generating Muslim League Party and for the same substance even calling the present alliance a 'Muslim League Coalition.'²⁴³

In June 1943, a thoughtful argument was on-going between the Premier and the Nawab of Mamdot over the understandings of the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact. The Muslim press, *Nawa-i-Waqt*, supported the League and repudiated that the pact prohibited the establishment of a League Ministry in the Punjab. The Premier was not ready to accept it, he also protested against *Nawa-i-Waqt* during his meeting with Viceroy.²⁴⁴

Meanwhile, Khizar's problems increased when one of his own ministers, Shaukat Hayat, made speeches in favour of the League Ministry in the Punjab. Shaukat's speeches were supported by the League and the Muslim press and making the non-Muslims more apprehensive. However, within the Unionist Party about 20 Muslim members of the Assembly, comprising one of the Khizar's Muslim minister (Shaukat), had endangered the party with succession if the Premier did not provide lodgings to the League.²⁴⁵ The Premier cautioned the League leader that in case of split in the Unionist party there was a possibility of Governor's rule being obligatory in the Punjab.

²⁴¹*Civil and Military Gazette*, (Lahore), 30 March 1943.

²⁴²S.S Pirzada (ed.), *Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents 1906-1947*, Vol. II, (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1970), p. 437

²⁴³*Civil and Military Gazette*, (Lahore), 29 April 1943.

²⁴⁴Interview 16 November 1943, mentioned in, Wavell Collection, 977/18, IOR. quoted in Qalb-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab 1921-1947*, p. 273.

²⁴⁵*Civil and Military Gazette*, (Lahore), 6 & 16 August 1943.

On April 26, the Premier had discharged Shaukat on the plea that he had inappropriately implemented his authorities as a minister.²⁴⁶ The outcome of Shaukat's dismissal was that the relations between the League and Unionist Party became decidedly strained and after some time broke. After the dismissal of Shaukat about 17 members of the Assembly presented their resignations to the Unionist Party. It acknowledged that the League had started its combat in contradiction to the Unionist Party. Jinnah exclusively declared all the Muslims who co-operated with the Unionist Party as traitors: 'We have no jobs to offer them; we have no money to purchase them.'²⁴⁷ Meanwhile, the Punjab Premier's expulsion from the League also aroused enthusiasm amongst the League's supporters.

At the same time few more developments in the Indian politics such as Acharia-Gandhi Formula and Gandhi-Jinnah dialogues occurred which recognised the principles of Pakistan. It enormously heightened the League's reputation.²⁴⁸ On August 13, the All Parties Hindus Conference held at Lahore, Sir Chhotu Ram's group and Sir Manohar Lal most profoundly was in favour of the Conference, influenced to register its durable antagonism to the ideology of the acceptance of Pakistan. The Conference also disregarded the reservation of seats for Muslims in the organisations, like separate electorates and the Communal Award. The Sikh leaders stressed to return the Punjab in their capacity and formation of a Sikh state.²⁴⁹ The Unionist Party believed that if the League took office at

²⁴⁶ *Inqilab*, 27 April 1944.

²⁴⁷ Jamil-ud-din, Ahmad (ed.) *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. 2 (Lahore: Sheikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1960), p. 47.

²⁴⁸ Verma, *Chhotu Ram*, p 138

²⁴⁹ Interview 26 July, mentioned in, Wavell Collection, 977/18, IOR 92. quoted in Syed Qalb-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab*, p. 286.

the Centre, the existence of the Unionist Party and its ministry in the Punjab would be uncertain.²⁵⁰

1.39 Talks Between Quaid and Khizar

The negotiations process between the Quaid-i-Azam and Khizar Hayat remained for fourteen days. The Quaid was of the view that the League was doing all efforts only to establish Pakistan and the Punjab would play a key role. The debate between the Quaid and Malik Khizar was based on three proposals. These proposals presented by Quaid were (1) that every member of the Muslim League Party in the Punjab Assembly should declare that he owes allegiance solely the Muslim League Party in the Assembly and not to the Unionist or any other party; (2) that the present label of the coalition, namely ‘the Unionist Party’ should be dropped, (3) that the name of the proposed coalition should be the Muslim League Coalition Party.²⁵¹ ‘Jinnah met Khizr several times and asked him for final verdict. However, in the meantime the Punjab Premier, his cabinet and the Governor of the Punjab had made up their minds to reject League’s demands.’²⁵² Lord Wavell’s critical character was responsible for the failure of the Jinnah-Khizr dialogues. Due to the opposition of him, an understanding between Jinnah and Khizr proved unsuccessful and Khizr was in a pressure to sacrifice his political future for the safeguard of the British interests.

In keeping with his democratic attitude, the Quaid referred the whole matter to the Committee of Action which was a body charged with responsibility for maintenance of discipline and observance of the principles of the Muslim League. The Committee issued

²⁵⁰Viceroy to S/S, 5 February 1945, *T.P.*, Vol. V, pp. 527-30 quoted in Qalb-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab*, p. 288.

²⁵¹Malik, *A Book of Reading on the History of The Punjab*, p.569.

²⁵²Qalb-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab*. p. 280.

a notice to Khizr Hayat to explain his position before the Committee. The Committee, after reviewing the whole situation, resolved to remove him from membership of the Muslim League in view of the breach of party discipline and contravention of rules, principles and policies of the Muslim League that he had committed.²⁵³

The Viceroy's determinations ultimately resulted in a conference of the Indian leaders at Simla on June 25, 1945. The key purpose of this conference was to side-step the Pakistan question and to accumulate the parties for working cohesively in the central government. Jinnah responded that Unionist Party members were conspirators to Muslim benefits.²⁵⁴ Khizar knew that in future the Unionist Party would decline in popularity and the League would gain the power. It would be much more problematic for Khizar and his supporters to counter the circumstances. This situation was equally harmful for the Congress and the Unionist Party both. The Premier's assessment was right. Exactly after the disappointment of the Simla Conference the League went against Khizar in a full-fledged manner and claimed their right for supremacy. Jinnah attacked on the government bitterly with severe criticism over its efforts to defers the Pakistan matter. Jinnah also confronted Premier and the Governor of the Punjab over generating distress during the Punjab Muslims. In the Punjab, the League's factions held many meetings attributing Khizar for weakening the Muslim case at the Simla Conferences; subsequently the Unionists were uninterruptedly branded as traitors.²⁵⁵

²⁵³Malik, *A book of reading on the history of The Punjab*, p.573.

²⁵⁴Viceroy to S/S, (tgm), 25 June 1945, *T.P.*, Vol. V, pp 1153-54 quoted in Syed Qalb-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab*, p. 289.

²⁵⁵F.N.R., 15 August 1945, *Ibid.*

The League had arranged for the upcoming elections. It had disseminated 30,000 copies of its manifesto in numerous rural zones and cities; an attractive quantity (four lakh rupees) was accumulated for its election campaign; and its National Guards now *Razakarane Islam*. (Volunteer of Islam), were re-organized beneath the command of Shaukat Hayat.²⁵⁶ The Congress, the Sikhs and the Punjab Government, were in a condition of troublesome about the League's forthcoming popularity. The Punjab Government and the Unionist ministry were unenthusiastic to face the upcoming elections on the excuse that the League would strengthen its Pakistan propaganda in the Punjab, which would escalate the existing communal strain in the province.²⁵⁷

In this challenging environment, even Khizar's closest Muslim private secretary Syed Amjad Ali a renowned figure of Jhang, had amalgamated League.²⁵⁸ The chief of Khizir's tribe had also left him in the early October. On December 1, 1945 the governor described that League's organization had achieved the support of 80 per cent of the Muslims of the Punjab. The Unionist Party was so chaotic, and it did not encounter the circumstances. Khizar asserted openly that there is nothing any sort of difference between the Unionist Party and League because both supported the Pakistan Scheme.²⁵⁹

The Congress knew the failure of the Simla Conference had significantly enriched the League's reputation amongst the Muslims.²⁶⁰ The future of the India now essentially be contingent on the results of the Punjab elections; the Congress hierarchy emotionally

²⁵⁶F.N.R., 30 September 1945, *Ibid*.

²⁵⁷Colville to Amery, (tgm), 14 May 1945, *T.P.*, Vol. V, pp. 1028-29 quoted in Qalb-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab 1921-1947*, p. 290.

²⁵⁸F.N.R., 27 December 1945. *Ibid*. p. 292.

²⁵⁹*Civil and Military Gazette*, (Lahore), 28 October 1945.

²⁶⁰Nehru to Cripps, 27 January 1946, D. Das (ed.) *Sardar Patel's Correspondence, Vol II*, (Ahmadabad: Shanti Lal Harjivan Shah Navajivan Press, 1972), pp 24-5.

involved to a great deal of prominence to the Punjab as a 'key province.' Nehru had been giving extraordinary consideration to the re-organisation of the Punjab Congress, after the failure of the Simla Conference. Nehru paid a visit to the Punjab in the middle of July 1945, criticised the grouping within the Punjab Congress Party and also censured the separate electorates for generating 'political ills' in India.²⁶¹ Although Nehru while criticised the principles of Pakistan, that if the Muslim claimed on separation the Congress would be agree on the same and condemned the Unionists Ministry. While on the other side, the Congress's Muslim President, had been continually in contact with the Ahrars, Khaksars, Unionists Party, Nationalist Muslims and Sikhs, deliberately focused his attention to unite these parties against League front in the elections. In spite of these immense efforts the Congress had to face a sequence of hindrances as far as the Muslim were concerned. The motto 'Pakistan' and the anti-Congress spirits in the middle of the Punjabi Muslims were much countless that even a person like Khizar had also started to depend upon them. Khizir had previously given acknowledgement in support of Pakistan and now he was also condemning Congress of overwhelming Muslim rights.²⁶²

1.40 The Cabinet Mission 1946

The Cabinet Mission was sent to seek the constitutional solution in India. The Mission cross-examined most of the Indian leaders. In the atmosphere of absence of an arranged clarification, the Mission presented a Constitutional Award,²⁶³ proclaimed on May 16, 1946. The Cabinet Mission's plan visualised a three-tiered Indian Union containing of a

²⁶¹Press Conference in *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 18 July 1945

²⁶²*Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 28 November 1945.

²⁶³Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman Jinnah, The Muslim League and the Demand of Pakistan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 176-95.

Centre authorised to deal with foreign affairs, defence and communications of groups of provinces dealing with all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the union. The provinces were grouped into the three sections, of which section 'A' was to consist of all Hindu provinces, 'B' of the Muslim provinces, and 'C' of Bengal and Assam.

On 16 May 1946, the Cabinet Mission announced its own 'Plan.' The salient features of the 'Plan' were as follows:

1. Making a set up and to maintain union of India including both British India and the Indian states.
2. Establishing an Interim Government at the Centre.
3. Formation of three groups within provinces.
4. To form a of Constituent Assembly.
5. The Union government should deal only with Foreign Affairs, Defence, Communications and Finance.
6. All residuary powers should rest with the province.²⁶⁴

The Sikhs in the Punjab were in good numbers to express their resentment against the Cabinet Mission's Plan. They forecasted that underneath the structure of grouping their community would be subdued by the Muslim majority. On June 6, the League accepted the plan, asserting that it was doing so with the confidence of eventually launching a complete sovereign Pakistan. On the other side, the Congress was still observing the May 16 announcement.

²⁶⁴Nicholas Mansergh, *Transfer of Power; 1942-47 Vol. 7* (London: H.M.S.O., 1970), pp. 582-91.

1.41 Election 1946

The Muslim League won all thirty seats in the central legislature in the elections.²⁶⁵ In the provincial elections, its triumph was also beyond the limits. In the Muslim majority provinces, it gained strong majorities of Muslim seats except in the North-West Frontier Province in Bengal 113 out of 119 seats, in the Punjab 79 out of 86, in Sind 28 out of 35, and in the Frontier Province 17 out of 38 seats.

The elections of 1946 held in a state of tug of war among the parties. All parties engrossed their concentration on the Punjab fallouts. By February 23, 1946 all the polls results were identified. The Unionist party captured only 13 Muslim seats whereas the League secured a splendid and outstanding conquest by catching 73 out of 86 Muslim seats. While all the Nationalist Muslims upon which the Congress had consumed extravagantly were overpowered; in maximum cases these contenders lost their securities. The League fixed March 1 to celebrate 'The Day of Deliverance' from the Unionist ministry.²⁶⁶

Table No.6
Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1946: Election Results

Party	Seats
Muslim League	71
Congress	51
Unionist Party	19
Akali Dal	21
Independence	11
Total	175 ²⁶⁷

²⁶⁵V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (Calcutta Orient Longmans, 1937), p 226.

²⁶⁶*Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 26 February 1946.

²⁶⁷Yadav, *Elections in Punjab*. P. 106.

The League at that time was in a position to form government in Punjab with the help of Sikhs. For that very purpose, the League referred this matter to its General-Secretary, Liaquat Ali Khan, to negotiate with the Sikhs for the establishment of an Akali-League alliance. The Akali-League negotiations were held in a sophisticated atmosphere,²⁶⁸ but could not succeed owing to the League's stance on the question of Pakistan. Another development for the construction of Punjab government progressed well among the Congress-Unionists-Akali.

The Unionist Party had conclusively mitigated to a strength of half a dozen Muslims. The Pro-Unionist paper, *The Civil and Military Gazette*, clearly wrote that the Unionists had lost all the prestige and prominence they had enjoyed in between the last twenty years.²⁶⁹ Khizar had sketched a clear-cut line between the League and the anti-League forces in the Punjab. Khizar and his partners knew that they were fighting delicate battle with the League; but now the efforts were only to comprehend the League and its 'Pakistan Scheme' if possible. The 1946 election had clearly presented the scenario that there were only two political parties in India who essentially got significance i.e., the League and the Congress. Especially in Punjab the League had appeared as the sole representative of the Muslim view in the province and also the major single cluster in the Assembly.²⁷⁰

During all the political developments the Governor of the Punjab showed lack of interest. For a long time, Glancy and Khizir were mutually the constant antagonists of the League and its Pakistan Scheme. The Punjab Premier had been doing all things according

²⁶⁸*Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 1 March 1946

²⁶⁹*Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 26 February 1946.

²⁷⁰Pakistan Muslim League had won only two seats in 1937 elections

to his Governor's advice for a long time; to keep the League away from the Punjab power. Throughout this period Khizir had strong motives to develop a great deal of personal friendship with Glancy. Secondly, Glancy himself intensely believed in the unanimity of India.²⁷¹ At that time when the election fallouts were lastly declared, demonstrating that Khizar had acquired little majority. While Glancy expecting that after coming into rule Khizir might increase his following²⁷² amongst the Muslim members of the Assembly by giving few of them the extraordinary positions.

On August 16, the Direct Action Day (The 'Direct Action' was announced by the Muslim League Council to show the strength of Muslim feelings both to British and Congress) observed, although peacefully, the Punjab League leaders addressed a great number of gatherings in local mosques; Muslim shopkeepers observed a whole strike; some speakers criticised the unblessed coalition against the League and called upon the Muslims to begin a sacred war (jihad) for the accomplishment of Pakistan. At the same time, the Punjab League appeared silent, dozens of its noticeable leaders, with the help of their colleagues in the Central Government were waiting for the accurate time to launch a movement to alight down Khizar from rule. Although on January 24, 1947, the opportunity was provided by the Punjab government, when it declared the League's National Guards and *Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh* (R.S.S.S.)²⁷³ to be illegitimate bodies and ordered the search of the Guards Headquarters. Approaching at that time when the League was already had a lot of grievances against the Punjab Governor's attitude, at the same time the Government was on great mistake while when it banned the League's National Guards.

²⁷¹ Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*, pp. 162, 169.

²⁷² Governor to Viceroy, 28 February 1946, L/P& J/5/249, IOR. quoted in Qalb-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab*, p. 299.

²⁷³ Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, the para-military arm of Militant Hindus Nationalism.

The Punjab ministry was certainly so failed that it had nothing any sort of authority to stand out against any systematised movement. Sooner the Governor confessed that it was principally owing to his suggestion that action had been taken against the League's Guards.²⁷⁴ In short, the whole scenario that the banning of the League's Guards was a severe mistake which have done by the Punjab Government. It seems to be an invitation to the soldest strength to take-over the weakest Ministry in the history of the Punjab. After the conciliation, the Punjab League leader called off the League's civil disobedience movement; the government in response at large about 1,500 League prisoners.²⁷⁵ The Alliance Ministry had ultimately surrendered to the League's pressure; this was the end of Khizar's political occupation and a shameful expiration of the Unionist remnant on March 2. On that occasion League celebrated Victory Day. With the end of the British rule in 1947, the province was partitioned between India and Pakistan.

²⁷⁴ Governor to Viceroy, 26 January 1947, *T.P.*, Vol. IX, pp. 556-59 quoted in Qalb-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab*, p. 318.

²⁷⁵ *Civil and Military Gazette*, (Lahore), 27 February 1947

CHAPTER- 2

UNIONIST PARTY'S IDEOLOGY, ORGANIZATION, REFORMS AND SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

2.1 Establishment of the Political Party

The British gave a special attention toward the rural areas of Punjab as they believed the peasantry as their main strength. The rural Punjab, which had deep rooted traditions, was not easy to be ruled. The British established their hold on the rural community through local elites. A major chunk of the British Indian Army was recruited from the areas of rural Punjab. The Governor of the Punjab, Sir Michael O' Dwyer (1864-1940) entrusted upon the landlords and peasantry because it was considered to be the guarantee to endure the faithfulness of the Indian Army.²⁷⁶ To extend their rule and to implement their policies, the colonial rulers always quested for trustworthy and influential people particularly those in rural Punjab.²⁷⁷ Under these circumstances, in order to protect the rights of the landed gentry of the Punjab, irrespective of cast and religion, the Unionist Party was founded.

Talbot explained this fact in a remarkable manner that how the British sought to provide rural stability to Punjab:

First by involving the natural leaders of agricultural tribes; second by guaranteeing that the pastoral leaders politically meticulous the economic forces set in train by the colonial inspiration of a market concerned with agriculture; third by using the resources which were provided to recompense the agriculturist population rather than stimulate industrial development, fourth by launching a framework of political representation which established the division between the agriculturist and non-agriculturist population.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁶ Michael O'Dwyer, *India As I Knew It 1885-1925* (London: Constable and Company, 1926), pp. 22-70.

²⁷⁷ Raghuvendra Tanwar, *Politics of Sharing Power the Punjab Unionist party 1923-1947* (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1999), p19.

²⁷⁸ Ian Talbot, *Khizr Tiwana: The Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition Of India* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1996), p53.

Because of fertility of its land, Punjab was known for its agriculture, but over the period of time the transferring of chunks of land annually to the moneylenders affected the common farmers. The situation was even more dangerous in the Western part rather than Central and Eastern parts of the Punjab²⁷⁹ and almost 98 per cent peasantry was under debt.²⁸⁰ Under such circumstances the Unionist Party came into being and the debt issue remained its principal political agenda during the course of its development.

The government passed the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1901 (Amended) which provided a little respite to the peasantry. The Act imposed a ban on the transfer of land from an agriculturist to the non-agriculturist.²⁸¹ The Unionist Party reinvigorated inter-communal political collaboration among the three communities. Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs but, at the same time, it created a gulf among the rural and the urban sentimentalities of the Punjabis. The feudal lords overwhelmed the rural society and later on also subjugated the Punjab Legislative Council established in 1897. The 'Montagu Chelmsford Reforms' of 1919 introduced 'dyarchy' — a system of 'transferred subjects' further down in the control of Indian Ministers and leaving the respite of 'reserved subjects' under the Governor's Executive Council.²⁸² Furthermore, the agricultural tribe members, as demarcated by the 'Alienation Act', could contest elections for the rural constituencies.²⁸³

²⁷⁹ S.S. Thorburn, *Musalmans and Money-lenders in the Punjab* (Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1983), p.1.
²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁸¹ Ali, *The Punjab Under Imperialism*, pp. 8-12.

²⁸² Page, *Prelude To Partition*, pp 31- 72.

²⁸³ Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 85.

Table No.1
Types of Constituencies in the PLC, 1920

Designation of the Constituencies	Urban	Rural	Total
Mohammadans	5	27	32
Non-Monammadans	7	13	20
Sikhs	1	11	12
Special	-	-	07 ²⁸⁴

A study of the Unionist Party's origin depicted the distinctive character of the society of the Punjab. Talbot explained: 'two overriding characteristics of the colonial Punjab were its rural nature and co-existence of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh communities'.²⁸⁵ The distinctiveness of Punjab's social system was that while the religiously divided society, the ethnic and caste bonds shaped an undercurrent of affinity and affiliation.²⁸⁶ During the early years the Unionist Party focused on social as well as cultural aspects of the masses residing in the province, for example, the predominance of self-respect, *izzat* as a way of life. Since Unionist Party politics principally revolved around caste, kinship, *biradari*, and religion therefore, its every decision seemed to gain its inclined toward these parameters.²⁸⁷ Socio-religious leadership like *pirs* and *sajjadanashins* had a firm hold on the political destinies of a vast section of rural community especially of Punjabi Muslims²⁸⁸.

During the early years of the Unionist Party, the other significant political parties in the Punjab were the INC, ML, Swaraj Party, Central Sikh League and Akali Dal. The elections under the Act of 1919 held to the Central and Provincial legislatures assimilating

²⁸⁴K.C. Yadav, *Elections in Punjab 1920-1947* (Delhi: Manohar, 1987), p.11.

²⁸⁵Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*, p. 4.

²⁸⁶*Ibid.*, p. 6.

²⁸⁷Tanwar, *Politics of Sharing Power*, p. 32.

²⁸⁸W.C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis* (Lahore: Ripon Printing Press, 1947), p. 193.

the shadow of the Non-Cooperation Movement. Majority of the elected candidates did not affiliate to any political party but were generally big landlords, traders, lawyers, *biradari*, rich, shrewd, enlightened and politicized.²⁸⁹ The effort of bringing together the leaders from different communities on a common platform was a deliberate in nature to amalgamate the common cultural and social connection and for the same reason the appeal of Fazl-i-Husain became legitimately attractive. Fazl-i-Husain secured support not only from Muslim member of the council but also from the Hindu Jat peasantry of eastern Punjab under the leadership of Chhotu Ram. The elections to the second Legislative Council (1923) of Punjab were thus contested by the 'Rural Block' in coalition with rural leaders of the Hindu and Sikhs.

Table No. 2

Party Position in Punjab Legislative Council, 1923

Party	No. of candidates won
Rural Block (Party)	33
Swaraj Party	12
Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee	09
Independents	17
(Hindus	11
Muslim	05
Europeans	01
Total	71 ²⁹⁰

The Unionist Party came into existence exactly after the establishment of the Legislative Council in 1923.²⁹¹ The Party was launched under the guidance of two significant leaders, Fazl-i-Husain and Chhotu Ram. The new political programme and ideology was that: the new party would improve the condition of the peasantry and the

²⁸⁹ *The Tribune*, 10 December 1920.

²⁹⁰ Yadav, *Elections in Punjab*, p. 52.

²⁹¹ PLCD, vol. VI, 1924, p. 3 quoted in Tanwar, *Politics of Sharing Power*, p. 50.

communities living in backward areas of rural Punjab. It was also resolved that the party would stand against the exploitation of moneylenders and strive to improve the life in rural areas by setting up dispensaries, cooperative societies and education institutions.²⁹² The origin of the Unionist Party can be outlined to the changing scenario and economic as well as political environment of Punjab during the first twenty years of the twentieth century. The other factor that contributed to the formation of the Unionist Party was the influence of ex-servicemen who had returned from the West after the First World War. Western education, evolution of middle class, the print media and effect of the national movement all combined to spread awakening in the rural Punjab.

Throughout the British rule, Indian Sub-continent remained divided into multi-party system at national and provincial levels. Along with the main-stream political parties, the regional political parties like *Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam*, *Khaksar Tehrik*, *Hindu Mahasabha*, and *Akali Dal* had their deep impacts on the common masses as well as politics of Punjab.²⁹³ In 1923 Sir Mian Fazl-i Husain, a chief Punjabi landlord, took the initiative to fill the vacuum and the *Zamindara* Party was converted into the Punjab National Unionist Party, a province-wide cross-communal organisation.²⁹⁴ The party was erected on a social base comprising the Muslim agriculturist followers of *Fazl-i-Husain*, the Hindu agriculturist group of Ambala Division, led by *Chhotu Ram* and the Sikhs under *Sunder Singh Majithia*.²⁹⁵ Later on the party was elevated to the status of an elitist party with pro-rural and agrarian policies.

²⁹²Husain, *Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 153.

²⁹³Talbot, *Punjab and the British Raj 1849-1947* (Riverdale MD: The Riverdale Company, 1988), pp. 80.

²⁹⁴Malik, *Sikander Hayat Khan: A political Biography* (Islamabad: National Institute of Heritage Cultural Research, 1985), p. 6.

²⁹⁵Sikandar Hayat, *Aspects of the Pakistan Movement* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1991), p. 107

Most of the landlords and *pirs* who had become members of the Unionist Party played a dominating role in the provincial policies. In fact, under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, the landlords got a chance to strengthen their political hold as “agricultural tribes”. Despite of their rivalries, they gathered under the banner of the Unionist Party for their personal interests and political advantages.²⁹⁶

2.2 Aims and Objectives of the Unionist Party

It is a fact that the party system is not only based on democratic course but profoundly considered as an integral part of representative government. “A political party may thus be defined as an organized group of citizens who prefer to share same political views and who by acting as a political unit try to control the government.”²⁹⁷ “A political party consists of a group of citizens more or less organized who act as a political unit and who by the use of their voting power aim to control the government and carry out their general politics.”²⁹⁸ “An association organized in support of some principle of policy which by constitutional means endeavours to make the determinant of government.”²⁹⁹ Fazl-i-Husain with Chhotu Ram got an opportunity to establish a political party to secure the rights of the rural peasantry. Whether Fazl-i-Husain believed it or not, but the “accentuation of differences between the ruralities and the urbanities caused the formation of the Unionist Party”.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁶Hussain, *Fazl-i-Husain: A Political Biography*, p. 155.

²⁹⁷R.N. Gilchrist, *Principles of Political Science* (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co, 2000). P 640

²⁹⁸R.C. Gettel, and W.A. Dunning, *Democracy: A Political Reader* (New Delhi: Genesis Publications, 2004), p. 274-290.

²⁹⁹R. Morrison MacIver, *Politics and Society* (New York: Aldine Transactions, 1947), p. 298.

³⁰⁰Prem Chaudry, Social Basis of Chaudhri Sir Chhotu Ram’s policies, *The Punjab Past and Present*, Vol. X-1 April (1976), p. 164.

The aims and objects of the Unionist Party were *inter alia*:

1. To attain dominion status within the British Commonwealth of Nations by constitutional means as early as possible.
2. To demonstrate that Indians have potential and capabilities to run the Government.
3. To prove that constructive efforts, if directed in a spirit of goodwill to the working of Reforms, can produce results of greater benefit to the community than a pose of disdainful aloofness and destructive criticism.
4. To provide equal opportunities of progress to backward areas and neglected classes
5. To ensure a fair distribution of burden of provincial taxes between agricultural and other classes.
6. To secure a just and fair representation of all classes and communities in the public service of the province.
7. To check the exploitation of economically backward classes at the hands of elite classes.
8. To develop national self-respect lawfully and constitutionally;
9. To promote and protect the interest of masses without undue encroachment on the interests of capitalists, big landholders and money people;
10. To reconstruct and re-organise the agricultural and industrial life of the Province economically and commercially;
11. To effect rural uplift by infusing the real and enlightened spirit of village community and making every village a unit of true social and national life;
12. (i) to secure purity of administration and reduce its cost consistently with efficiency;

- (ii) to distribute fairly and equitably the burden of taxation;
- (iii) to secure funds for promoting and developing beneficent activities;

13. (i) to preserve and protect the religious culture and social integrity of each community;

- (ii) to treat all communities alike so that no community dominates the other community; and
- (iii) to infuse the spirit of mutual goodwill, co-operation and toleration and thus to prevent the creation and to settle amicably when created all religious, communal or social difference and disputes;

14. To work out the Reforms, despite their being unsatisfactory and imperfect, and to make strenuous efforts to obtain good results from them.³⁰¹

15. To promote indigenous industries and to encourage the use of *Swadeshiethos*.

16. To promote literacy in the province

17. To encourage the policy of decentralization.

18. To encourage the growth of local self-governing institutions.

19. To diminish litigation

20. To suppress corruption and bribery; and

21. To preserve enactment of the Punjab Land Alienation Act as a measure of protection to backward classes.³⁰²

³⁰¹ Letter dated 23 January 1936 from S. Din to Fazl-i-Husain quoted in Waheed Ahmad, ed., *Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-i-Husain* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1976), p. 154.

³⁰² Husain, *Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, pp. 154-155.

2.3 Creed of the Party

The creed of the Unionist Party was Nationalism as it was free from Sectarianism, Communalism, Communism and Socialism.

Fazl-i-Husain, was a prominent personality in the Unionist Party. He prepared the programme through which the starving peasantry might be liberated from the hands of avaricious moneylenders. It was a non-communal party generally organised by the Muslim members and that was why urbanist politicians constantly branded it as a Muslim Party. Fazl-i-Husain proclaimed that ‘the party should never become either a communal party or a racial party or a caste party or a professional party’.³⁰³

The faith of the party displayed that it was designed for useful and practical purposes. The main ethos was the economic uplift of the Punjab by expending the assets, which seemed to be attractive because of its optimistic anticipations. Certainly, its creation evidenced to be a landmark in Punjab history because for the first time a political party presented its programme and drew an organizational set up from village level to its headquarters at Lahore. The objectives of the Party included attainment of dominion status by constitutional means; providing suitable opportunities for self-government; constructive efforts for the working of the reforms; providing equal opportunities for advancement to all; fair distribution of taxes and the representation of all communities and classes in the public services; checking exploitation of the economically backward classes; promotion of indigenous industries, literacy and preserving intact the Punjab Land Alienation Act as a

³⁰³Fazl-i-Husain’s speech delivered at the chasht given by Chhotu Ram on June 19, 1932. quoted in Muhammad Khurshid, *Feudal Ascendancy and the Role of Sir Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 121.

measure to protect peasantry.³⁰⁴

The party's object was to work for the reasonable welfare, intellectual advancement, political consciousness and physical comforts of all the communities and classes irrespective of their caste, creed and area. The major aim of Fazl-i-Husain was "to assist, encourage and help the backward classes and communities., For instance, taking rural areas like Hisar, Dera Ghazi Khan and Gurgaon, Kangra which had a preferential claim on the attention of government as compared with comparatively better off areas".³⁰⁵ The actual aim of the party was to encourage harmony of thought and action among the diverse communities organising it. Therefore, the party succeeded in attaining the sustenance of most of the Hindu-Sikh enthusiasts and achieved its purpose to an abundant extent.

2.4 Organization, Membership and Manifesto

The Unionist Party was one of the organised political parties in the Punjab. The founder of the party, Fazl-i-Husain had developed an alliance between the three major communities of the province Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs that proved surprising for the communal ethos of the League. The League was clearly no match with Fazl-i-Husain's Unionist Party with its solid political base drawn from all the three communities and representing the powerful rural elites. Fazl-i-Husain's own objectives as leader of the coalition were both complex and varied. While his policies were not ostensibly communal, he did little to check the growing imbalance in favour of Muslims in areas of education and

³⁰⁴Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, pp. 154-55.

³⁰⁵Fazl-i-Husain's speech delivered by Chhotu Ram on June 19, 1932, p 3

their representation in municipal councils".³⁰⁶ Anyhow, Fazl-i-Husain's "reputation as a guardian of the conservative interests, which had won his party by the support of British officials, made him a likely successor to replace the League's loyalist 'old guard', whose influence had been sharply eroded by the Khilafat Movement".³⁰⁷

It was decided that the party would be established on a well-thought pattern. Keeping in view the doctrine of the party, various measures were taken to support its aims and objectives. According to the rules and regulations of the party published in 1936 from its headquarters secretariat, Lahore, the organization of the party included:

1. A provincial centre at Lahore to be called as the headquarters;
2. A Tehsil branch in each tehsil, which would be comprising on sub-branches within its jurisdiction;
 - (a) Sub branches in each town of 7,500 to 30,000 population and in each *Zail*.
 - (b) Local branches in each village or small town of 500 to 7,500 population.
3. A branch in each city with a population of 30,000 or above, under which there should be a ward committee in every municipal ward, and a sub-branch as far as possible in each *mohallah*, or street or *abadi*;
 - (a) With the approval of the headquarters necessary arrangements may be made for coordination between one or more tehsils or other branches to ensure effective working..
 - (b) Various local branches, sub branches, tehsils and city branches would be responsible for all

³⁰⁶Farzana Shaikh, *Community and Consensus in Islam, Muslim Representation in Colonial India: 1860-1947* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 185.

³⁰⁷*Ibid.*

party activities within their respective areas.³⁰⁸

The party membership was open for all who attained the age of 21 and passionately prepared to adopt the faith of the party as the basic principle. According to its founder, it was “the unity of faith and belief, which should be the determining factors as to who would be in the party.” Chhotu Ram wrote, that the membership “is open to all those who subscribe to the views and the policy of the party and one who has a genuine feeling for the backward classes and a true sympathy with those whom the changes of life have subjected to the economic exploitation and political domination of more favoured classes, need not shy of the National Unionist Party”.³⁰⁹

The rules and regulations and obligations laid down for the membership of the headquarters and its various branches as under:

1. To assist in the promotion of the party’s creed and in the execution of its programme;
2. To take all possible active interest in the party’s uplift movement for individual member as well as for the village, town, city and the province;
3. To encourage harmony and good-will between various sections of the population;
4. To attend, as far as possible, various meetings of the party to which he (member) is invited.
5. To vote at the election, when he be entitled to vote in favour of the party nominee, if any, and
6. To pay annual subscription at the following rates:
 - (a) Two *Anna* per rupee of land revenue (excluding water rates, local rate and cesses) by those

³⁰⁸Punjab Unionist Party Rules and Regulation, pp. 1-2, See complete text of tehsil branches model programme in Appendix III and city model programme in Appendix IV

³⁰⁹Madan Gopal, *Sir Chhotu Ram: A Political Biography* (Delhi: B.R. Publishing House, 1977), pp. 59-60.

paying land revenue of Rs. 10 or more.

- (b) One *Anna* per rupee of *Haisiyat* Tax or Income-Tax by payers of the taxes respectively.
- (c) Four *Anna* per annum by persons not covered by (a) or (b) above but residing in towns or cities with a population of 7,500 or more.³¹⁰

It was mentioned that the branches with the sanction of the Head-Quarter, might amend the rates or any other subscription or discharge any person from the payment of such subscription at any point of time. The branches were permitted to gather the contribution in cash or kind during harvesting or some special instances such as marriages, *Eids* and *Baisakh*.

The party opened branches in every town and village with a population of 500 to 7,500. The membership was open for all who agreed with the constitution of the party which was about to promote doctrine and goals; to register members and assemble subscription; to encourage benevolence and coordination; to disseminate all the directions concerning party's programme to hold a meeting of the native branch once in a month; to refer a monthly report to *Zail* sub-branch; to sustain suitable record of proceedings and to help the ignored sections of the population inside the area concerned.

Zail sub-branches were recognised and the villages in each *Zail* were also assigned by the tehsil branch with the advice and sanction of the headquarters, each of which had to return one representative to the *Zail* branch after every three years. Their functions were "to assist and arrange collection of funds and to supervise their proper disbursement, and to be risible for the carrying out of the party's programme within the *Zail* in local branches

³¹⁰Punjab Unionist Party Rules and Regulations, pp. 2-3.

and in other area".³¹¹ Town subbranches' functions were similar as assigned to the native branches under rules.

The tehsil branch was containing two representatives from every *Zail* branch inside the tehsil. The tehsil branches had to organize *Zail* sub-branches to assume ideal programmes, to deliberate difficulties raised by sub-branches, and to organize at least one meeting every month. The city branches were established in all town having populations of more than 30,000 which contained of five members of every ward, all the party members were appointed by the headquarters.

The headquarters of the party was at Lahore comprising of two representatives from each tehsil and one from city branch. The functions of the headquarters were as under:

1. To set up such organizations which may be necessary from time to time to promote the creed and objects of the party and to carry out its programme;
2. To arrange proper supervision of work at tehsil, city and local branches level and coordinate their activities;
3. To set up branches;
4. To develop enlightened public opinion in the province and inculcate political education among the electorate;
5. To prepare useful programme for the party from time to time;
6. To arrange necessary spade and research work with regard to important questions which the

³¹¹ *Punjab Unionist Party Rules and Regulations*, p. 6.

party may have to tackle; and

7. To organize the party's election campaign.³¹²

The office-bearers of the headquarters were as follows:

- (a) A Chairman who was designated leader of the party, Vice Chairman not exceeding five, secretaries up to seven including the treasurer and personal assistant if any, to the leader and number of assistant secretaries as many as found necessary.
- (b) The Chairman, Vice Chairman, the secretaries (and in the absence of any secretary his assistant) will be ex-officio members of the executive committee.
- (c) These office-bearers shall be elected for a term of three years.³¹³

It is important to mention that the party structured its executive committees at each level including that of headquarters which performed their functions according to the mandate. In case of "any emergency of special contingency, the executive committee of the headquarters, with a three fourth majority, might suspend operation of any of rules with respect to any or all branches of the party for a period not exceeding six months".³¹⁴

The Unionist Party had a well-established set up extending from its lower level to the headquarters. It had a sound and an attractive programme and was fully firm to make all possible efforts to achieve its goals and protect its cause which no other provincial party could claim.

³¹²*Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

³¹³*Ibid.*, p. 13-14.

³¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 17.

2.5 Growth of the Unionist Party, Elections and Enactments, 1924-1936

The concept of shared power was a way through which the British patronized those who sustained the colonial edifice. The real objective of British, behind every political move, was to further strengthen the political influence of landlords. And it was for the reasons that candidates belonging to landlord families were only entitled to contest election from constituencies of rural areas. The doctrine undoubtedly divided the society into rural and urban sections.³¹⁵

The Punjab Legislative Council elections were held in 1926 and the party position is as under:

Table No. 3

Party Position in Punjab Legislative Council, 1926

Party	No. of seats won
Unionist Party	31
Hindu Mahasabah	12
Central Sikh League	11
Khilafat Committee	3
Congress	2
Independent	12
Total	71 ³¹⁶

The imperative character of this council's functioning was polluted by the negative

³¹⁵Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*, p. 58.

³¹⁶Yadav, *Election*, p. 61.

role of Malcom Hailey, Governor of Punjab who instead of nominating ministers from one of the largest party, on technical grounds appointed Firoz Khan Noon, Sardar Joginder Singh³¹⁷ (1877-1946) and Sir Manohar Lal³¹⁸ (1879-1949) as ministers. The Council thus had the communal representation of all the three main groups in Punjab but even then, the inspirations of the Unionist Party members were significantly abridged by the policies of Governor Hailey.

The Unionists followed the government to advance the excellence of education by opening new primary and secondary schools.³¹⁹ The Punjab Land Revenue (Amendment Bill) passed by the Council on May 11, 1928 was a major success of Unionists.³²⁰ The bill got Governor-General's assent on February 12, 1929. The Bill was a benefit to the farmers of Punjab.³²¹

The Punjab Legislative Council elections were held in 1930 and the party position was as under:

Table No. 4

Party	No. of seats won
Unionist Party	37
Nationalist Progressive Party	20
Independent and others	14
Total	71 ³²²

³¹⁷ Sir Joginder Singh was from the family of the Rasulpuria Chiefs (Amritsar dist.). He remained minister (Agriculture) from 1926-37. He also served as Executive Council from 1942-6.

³¹⁸ Sir Manohar Lal was chosen by Governor Haily as minister (Education) in 1926 to represent the Hindu community. He was elected to the Legislative Council and in 1937 to the Assembly from the University Constituency. He was minister from 1926-30 and again from 1937-46. In the Punjab Legislative Assembly Elections of 1946, he was defeated by Gopi Chand Bhargawa.

³¹⁹ PLCD, vol. X, 24 November 1927, p. 1145 quoted in Tanwar, *Politics of Sharing Power*, p. 68.

³²⁰ Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 148.

³²¹ PLCD, vol. XII, 25 February 1929, p. 381, *Ibid.* p. 70.

³²² Yadav, *Election*, p. 63.

In Punjab, the affects of economic recession were worst for agriculturists. The decline in agricultural prices profoundly enhanced the burden of debt on agriculturists that in turn caused more mortgage of agricultural land.³²³ The Unionist leader Chotu Ram played a pivotal role in the enactment of Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Bill.³²⁴ The Act introduced the rule of *Dandupat* by which a creditor could not take more interest than the principal amount. The Act stated that the provisionally isolated land of the debtors would never be auctioned as a compensation of debt and no debtor would be detained for non-payment. One more initiative to provide protection to debtors was the Debtors Protection Act 1936³²⁵ which was a part of the Relief of Indebtedness Act of 1934. The most significant provision of the Act was that crops, cattle and trees had been declared to be exempted from the accomplishment of a decree. The Provincial Committee of Congress was founded in 1886, with district and primary branches in the whole Punjab but practically it was little effective.³²⁶ The Congress also failed to chalk out a clear strategy for agriculturists of the province and its internal differences further aggravated the situation. The acrimonious jealousy between the Brahmo Samaj and the Arya Samaj overwhelmed the attention of the party. On the other hand the Muslim League in Punjab had practically been enjoying no public support and even the annual sessions of the Punjab League remained unable to gather large crowds. Because of this reason the Muslim League remained unable to give tough time to the Unionists until 1937. Initially the Muslim politics

³²³Husian, *Fazl-i-Husian*, p. 27.1

³²⁴*Annual Report on the Progress of Education in Punjab, 1935-6*, p. 41 quoted in Tanwar, *Politics of Sharing Power*, p. 73.

³²⁵PLCD, vol. XXIV, 28 June 1934, p. 326, *Ibid.*

³²⁶*Report of the Administration of Punjab, 1933-4*, p.19. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

mostly revolved around Fazl-i-Husain³²⁷ and it was mostly due to his influence in the Communal Award of 1932. The Unionist Party made early political progress because its rivals parties were not enough strong in Punjab. Moreover, The Unionists made efforts to safeguard the interests of those who formed its social and political base. The Unionist seemed to be secular in nature to run its day-to-day affairs and to tackle its problems.

2.6 Organizational Structure of the Unionist Party

Sikandar Hayat and Fazl-i-Husain met in December 1935 to resolve misunderstandings between them.³²⁸ The meeting helped to tide over the immediate crisis but beyond that achieved little else. The Party was re-designated as the Punjab Unionist Party.³²⁹ A five-tier system was approved at the organizational level

Table No. 5

Central committee

|

District committee

|

Tehsil committee

|

³²⁷Husian, *Fazl-i-Husian*, pp. 394-6.

³²⁸Ahmad, *Martial Law*, p. 127.

³²⁹*The Constitution, Aims and Objectives of the Unionist Party* (Lahore, 1936), p. 1.

Zail committee	town	city committee
	Committee	(population of more
Population of 700	population 30000	than 30000)

The Central Committee encompassed Fazl-i-Husain as President, Chhotu Ram as Vice-president and Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana was appointed as General Secretary among others. Sardar Habibullah, Maulvi Ghulam Mohyuddin and Syed Afzal Ali Hansi were Organizing Secretaries, Nawab of Mamdot³³⁰(1883-1942) was Treasurer and Mian Maqbool Mahmood³³¹(d. 1942) Drafting and Propaganda Secretary. Begum Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz was appointed Office Secretary. A sum of Rs. 50,000 was collected for party work. Nawab of Kalabagh, Syed Mahtab Ali and Sardar Muhammad contributed Rs 10,000 each whereas Nawab Khan, Fazl-i-Husain, Zafarullah Khan, Nawab Allah Bakhsh, Nawab of Mamdot, Sir Chhotu Ram, Malik Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, Ahmad Yar Khan Daultan and Ch. Shahabuddin all contributed Rs. 3000 each.³³² Agha Khan also promised a sum of Rs. 20,000 out of which he paid Rs. 10,000 in June 1936.³³³ The election office was established at Lahore and special emphasis was laid on publicity through press and special notes were supplied to newspapers and periodicals to enable favourable coverage for the party. Certain newspapers like *Eastern Times* (Lahore) provided good coverage to the party.

³³⁰Nawab Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot was one of the largest landholding owner of the Punjab. He was close friend and political confidant of Sikandar Hayat. He was elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly for the first time in 1937. His financial resources enabled him to play a crucial role in the Unionist Party particularly in matters of financial support.

³³¹Mian Maqbool Mahmood had close relations with Sikandar Hayat. In 1923 and 1926 elections he was elected to the Punjab legislative Council from the Amritsar rural constituency and in 1937 from Amritsar.

³³²Husian, *Fazl-i-Husian*, p. 340.

³³³Agha Khan took back the amount (telegraphically) when he learnt of Fazl-i-Husain death in July 1936. Quoted in Husian, *Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husian: A Political Biography*, p 340.

The election manifesto was mainly prepared by Sir Chhotu Ram focussed on issues like: (a) attainment of dominion status by constitutional means; (b) the securing of a respectable status for Indians living overseas; (c) achieving the provincial autonomy for Punjab; (d) economic criteria as the basis for forming political parties; (e) equal opportunities for all with special consideration for backward classes and rural areas.³³⁴ The manifesto also highlighted that as problems faced by the province were mainly economic in nature therefore the agriculture being the main occupation of almost 90 per cent of population must be given proper attention. The party also demanded more jobs in the public as well as the private sector.³³⁵ It showed concerns over increasing gap between the rich and the poor and emphasised practical steps to address the same.

The Unionists leaders were well aware about the dynamics of the politics of Punjab and know that caste, religion and regionalism were the major driving factors. Because of these reasons Unionist Party enjoyed a wider acceptance among majority of *pirs* including those of *Taunsa*, *Jalalpur*, *Alipur*, the *sajjada nishins* of the *Chishti* Shrine of *Mahar Sharif*, the dargah of Moueen-ud-din Chishti (Ajmair) and Nizamuddin Aulia (Delhi).³³⁶ Most of them decided to provide tacit provision to the party where as some others like *pirs* of *Shergarh* and *Sheikh Jiwana* even annexed them to the party.³³⁷ The leadership of the party made all possible efforts to withstand the goodwill of the dominant land lord families. Those families were the *Qaizilbash*'s of Lahore, *Chattha*'s of Gujranwala, the *Tiwanas*, *Noons*, *Qureshis*, *Piracha*'s of Minawali, the *Giliani*'s *Daultana*'s, *Gardezi*'s of Multan,

³³⁴ *The Constitution, Aims and Objectives of the Unionist Party*, p 15-18

³³⁵ *Ibid.*

³³⁶ Waheed Ahmad, (ed.) *Letters of Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain: A Political Biography* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1976), p. 592.

³³⁷ D Gilmartin, "Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in Punjab", *Journal of Modern Asian Studies*, 13, 3 (1979), pp 493-500.

the *Gurmani's and Dastri's* of Muzaffargarh.³³⁸ The feudal besides bringing *biradaris* into the Unionist network, also influenced the smaller peasants and tenants on their estates in favour of the Unionists.

The Unionists got substantial support from the non-Muslim peasant communities of Punjab. For example in Haryana or the South-East Punjab region the support was mustered with the efforts of Sir Chhotu Ram who had been greatly regarded among the agricultural communities especially the Hindu Jats. The party also gathered support from the British administrative system particularly rural officials in Punjab, the *patwaris*, *lambardars*, etc.³³⁹

The year 1936-37 was a worrisome for the INC as it failed to muster popular support of the rural Punjab. Fazl-i-Husain made all out efforts to reach to an electoral understanding with the Congress both at national and provincial levels and hold talks with Bhulabhai Desai through his friend Raizada Hans Raj.³⁴⁰ If the Congress had have recognised the Unionists deal at that moment, the Indian history would entirely be different³⁴¹ as in the presence of a strong coalition in Punjab the Muslim League could not enjoy the popularity which it did in the 1940s.

For electoral objectives, Muhammad Ali Jinnah even offered Fazl-i-Husain the President ship of the All India Muslim League (Bombay Session, January 1936), saying:

I feel that at this moment no one can give a better lead to the Muslims of India than yourself. We want a man of your calibre and experience, and nobody can, well at this critical moment, as far as I can see, perform that

³³⁸Craig Baxter, The People Party Versus The Punjab Feudalists, *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vol. VIII: 3 and 4 (July-October 1973), p. 168.

³³⁹Peter Robb (ed.), *Rural India Land Power and Society Under British Rule* (London: Curzon Press, 1983), pp. 244-273.

³⁴⁰Ali, *Punjab Politics in the Decades Before Partition* (Lahore: South Asian Institute, 1970), p. 75

³⁴¹Yadav, The Partition of India: A Study of Muslim Politics in Punjab 1849-1947, *Punjab Past and Present*, vol. XVIII-I, (April, 1983), p. 125.

duty and render the services to the community as you would be able to do.³⁴²

But Fazl-i-Husain twice rejected Muhammad Ali Jinnah proposal first during January 1936 and again in April 1936.³⁴³ 'Your refusal, he said, will be the utmost disaster and awful distress.'³⁴⁴

Both Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Fazl-i-Husain wanted to sustain their political effect by projecting themselves as leaders of the Muslim community. Jinnah sought to use the Unionists to shape a Muslim League base in Punjab. Fazl-i-Husain made his mind to keep the Punjab Unionist Muslims secluded from national level and to endure his political influence in Punjab. Jinnah wanted to proceed on the Muslim card, but Fazl-i-Husain identified that to form a ministry in Punjab the collaboration of Hindu and Sikhs was necessary.³⁴⁵ Fazl-i-Husain's death on 9 July 1936 was a setback for the Unionist Party. After Fazl-i-Husain, Muhammad Ali Jinnah's privilege to the leadership of the Muslims of Punjab got a boost.

The 1937 election was contested by 7775 candidates. The Unionist Party put up 107 candidates for 175 constituencies.³⁴⁶ Chhotu Ram led the Unionist election campaign. The Hindu Mahasabha, Raja Narender Nath and Rao Balbir Singh as its chief spokesmen. They hunted votes on the basis of protecting the rights of the Hindu community. Master Tara Singh was the crux of the election campaign of the Akalis affiliated with the Congress. The Muslim League was being represented by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Raja Ghazanfar Ali

³⁴²Ali, *Punjab Politics in the Decades Before Partition*, p. 75.

³⁴³Yadav, The Partition of India: A Study of Muslim Politics in Punjab 1849-1947, *Punjab Past and Present*, vol. XVIII-I, April, 1983, p. 125.

³⁴⁴Ali, *Punjab Politics in the Decades Before Partition*, p. 75

³⁴⁵Muhammad Iqbal, *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah. A Collection of Iqbal's Letters to the Quaid-i-Azam Coveying his Views on the Political Future of Muslim India* (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf Publishers, 1956), p. 10.

³⁴⁶*The Tribune*, 2 February 1937.

Khan and Malik Barkat Ali. Electioneering for the Ahrars was conducted mainly by Mir Abdul Qayyam, Muhammad Abdur Rehman Khan, Maulana Mazar Ali Azhar, and Khawaja Ghulam Husain.³⁴⁷ For the urban-based Ittehad-i-Millat, Sheikh Muhammad Alam and Khalid Latif Gauba led the election campaign. Lorries, *tongas*, etc., were used to bring voters to booths. Some clashes took place, mainly between the supporters of the Ahrars and the Majlis-i-Ittehad-i-Millat. Talbot pointed out that money power played a big role as some Unionist leaders were returned unopposed because the rivals were paid off.³⁴⁸ The poor performance of the Unionist Party in rural central Punjab was mainly due to the hold of Akalis, particularly over the Jat Sikh peasantry. Region-wise, the Unionist Party achieved a great success in the Canal colony constituencies of west Punjab, where its candidates were either members of the leading *biradaris* or had the support of the influential *pirs*.³⁴⁹

The election results highlighted that Punjab's society had been classified on the basis of *biradarism*, caste and religion. The Unionist Party's triumph credited to the feudal charisma of Punjab's political system. The role of leaders (a term coined by the British) was important in the Unionist Party's success.

2.7 Elections, Party Elections and Electorates

After a short span of rest Fazl-i-Husain decided to re-organise the Unionist Party in the Punjab and used modern techniques of that time for this cause. He issued pamphlet 'Punjab Politics' in February 1936, in which he elaborated his thoughts openly and saying

³⁴⁷ Ahmad, *Matrial Law Sa MaMatrial Law tak*, p. 184.

³⁴⁸ Ian Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*, p. 67.

³⁴⁹ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p. 114.

that, regardless of caste, class and creed the three communities in the Punjab should establish themselves into one party on the basis of a certainly liberal and socialistic programme, and work for the uplift of the Indian masses, pushing forward the cause of the backward people and areas.³⁵⁰ Fazl-i-Husain wanted to alter the party from a narrow landlord group to a mass party with its branches in the whole Punjab. Most of the Hindus criticized him because of his Muslim's favouritism policies. The *Tribune* warned the non-Muslim not to be taken in by Fazl-i-Husain's tactics and added that the new move was meant to establish Muslim domination under the new constitution.³⁵¹ *Daur-i-Jadeed* of February 24, 1935, revealed the Hindu apprehensions:

Sir Fazl-i-Husain has astounded the Punjab by his scheming. He plans to take up public life on his retirement from the central government. He would adopt a new line of policy. He would renounce 'communalism' and put up the pose of a staunch nationalist. He adherents hope that the moment he delivers some public speeches; the Hindus nationalist elements would forget his (black) record of the past. With the support of the nationalist Hindus, he would then attempt to capture power under the new constitution.³⁵²

According to Fazl-i-Husain's political ideology, it was necessary, particularly in the Punjab to form a political party on non-communal grounds. In 1930, when he left Punjab, he had advised the Unionist leaders:

Bear in mind that this party (Unionist) should never permit itself to become either a communal party, or a racial party, or a caste party, or a professional party. It should be the unity of faith and belief, the political faith and belief, which should be the determining factor as to who is to be and who is not to be in the party.³⁵³

During its reorganisation, the Unionist Party assumed a central organization set up at 14-C, Davis Road, Lahore, under Fazl-i-Husain's chairmanship. Ahmadyar Khan

³⁵⁰Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 304.

³⁵¹*Tribune*, February 18, 1936.

³⁵²Yusaf Abbasi, "A Tussle for the Punjab Leadership", *Punjab Past and Present*, (Patiala), Vol. IX-II, October (1975), p. 399.

³⁵³Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 305.

Daultana was appointed 'Organizing and Office Secretary,' Sardar Habibullah, Maulvi Ghulam Mohyuddin and Syed Afzaal Ali Hasni, Organization Secretaries and the Nawab of Mamdot, Treasurer. Amir-ud-Din was appointed personal assistant to the Leader of the Party, and Mir Maqbool Mahmood was Drafting and Propaganda a secretary. The funds for the party were given by Nawab of Kalabagh, Syed Maratib Ali and Sardar Muhammad Nawaz Khan of Kot to the extent of Rs. 5,000 each, while Fazl-i-Husain, Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan, Nawab Allah Bakhsh, Nawab of Mamdot, Malik Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, Ahmadyar Khan Daultana, Chaudhri Shahab-ud-Din and Chhotu Ram gave Rs. 3,000 each and other were to pay Rs. 1,000 making a total of Rs. 50,000. The amount was spent on secretariat expenditure, publishing matters and also on giving subsidies to newspapers and to Hindu and Muslim Party candidates who were not able to meet their election expenses. A sum of Rs. 20,000 promised by Aga Khan³⁵⁴ was to be consumed for advertising on a large scale. A training class for political workers was started and an Election Bureau was established to give information to candidates. Strategies were chalked down for party organization at tehsil, city and town levels. A tehsil organisation was considered to be the most important institution from where the Party drove its power and strength. It was decided that at least 75 out of 110 tehsils would be organized by the end of September same year.³⁵⁵

On April 1, 1936, Fazl-i-Husain formally inaugurated the party headquarters at Lahore 14-C, Davis Road, and issued the Unionist party manifesto. To manage a successful election campaign, following steps were recommended by the central committee of the

³⁵⁴In June 1936 Rs. 10,000 was received, but as soon as the Aga Khan heard of the death of Fazl-i-Husain, he at once telegraphically asked for the return of the reward.

³⁵⁵Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 340.

party:

- i) A committee on economic affairs was set up to suggest necessary changes in provincial taxation order to implement the economic programme of the party.
- ii) An election bureau was set up to supply information to candidates and also to compose differences between rival candidates.
- iii) A district-wise plan was drawn to win large number of seats by adopting modern techniques.
- iv) A comprehensive scheme was chalked out to organize workers at tehsil level.
- v) Workers were selected to mobilize the election campaign from district to tehsil and village level.
- vi) A plan was prepared to organize the party branches at city, town and tehsil headquarters.
- vii) Workers were sent to districts with handouts.
- viii) It was decided that all the branches in villages, towns, and cities were to work under the general supervision and direction of the party headquarters at Lahore.³⁵⁶

To escape the party from defeat, compromising strategies were made with the rival candidates just like *Chhotu Ram* and *Lal Chand*. Consultations took place on May 21, 1936.³⁵⁷ It was acknowledged that *Lal Chand* was with the Unionist. *Chhotu Ram* confirmed support for *Lal Chand's* election as the Chairman of the district board. Party leaders tried utmost to win the sustenance of the vernacular press and a trustworthy committee was established. Monthly subsidies were given to press to publish pamphlets

³⁵⁶The central committee was organizing under the chairmanship of Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, while Sardar Habibullah, Maulvi Ghulam Mohhu-ud-Din, Syed Afzal Ali Hasni and Shah Nawaz of Mamdot held other important offices Iftikhar Haider Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan*, p 40.

³⁵⁷*Inqilab*, May 23, 1936.

and leaflets to spread party propaganda on modern lines in the whole Punjab. The *Eastern Times* and *Inqilab* were in support of the party. At that moment the Unionist leader declared that:

We do not want to pose as Communists, or Sovietwallahs, but we claim that we have an intense desire to raise the masses to higher level of living than they occupy at present, that we have it on our programme, and in order to achieve this object, it will be our business to persuade to wealthier classes to become alive to their responsibility in this matter and to prepare themselves to shoulder the burden in that connection.³⁵⁸

Fazl-i-Husain was ardent for the prosperity of the Punjab, elimination of communal conflict and contention among the different communities. He wished to boost-up the common man and his son Azim Husain endorsed that "The aim of Fazl-i-Husain was that there should be no one ruling class, but the leaders should arise from among the common people and not confined to the aristocracy, the upper middle and middle class".³⁵⁹ Fazl-i-Husain open heartedly admitted that "in spite of the existence of the Unionist Party for over twelve years, he found the party towards the end destitute of first rate Muslim leaders".³⁶⁰ He wanted to establish a mass political party but his sudden death ruined his mission. Particularly, "the factional rivalries among the landlords of Multan, Jhang, Muzaffargarh and Dera Ghazi Khan districts frustrated his efforts to create Unionist district branches there".³⁶¹

Keeping in view the election campaign requirements, a meeting of the leading member of the National Unionist Party from every district was called in April 1936, and the party programme was chalked out as under:

³⁵⁸ Madan, *Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, pp. 90-91.

³⁵⁹ Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 317.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

³⁶¹ Talbot, *Punjab and the British Raj*, p. 106.

1. To achieve as early as possible, dominion autonomy as against subservience to a powerful centre.
2. To promote the principle of provincial autonomy as against subservience to a powerful centre.
3. To promote the institution of self-government and enhance its scope.
4. To practise thrift in the administrative expenditure.
5. To curb bribery and dishonesty.
6. To remove ignorance and illiteracy from the province.
7. To abstain from the use of narcotics.
8. To minimize litigation.
9. To make efforts for rural uplift.
10. To use country-made goods.
11. To promote public welfare activities in the backward section and regions so that every segment of society should get equal opportunities of progress.
12. To divide the burden of taxation judiciously and equitably.
13. To give to all parties and communities a judicious share in the services.
14. To make efforts for the economic deliverance of the weak from the extortions of the dominant sections.
15. To give protection to the Land Alienation Act because it safeguards the interests of backward classes.
16. To exercise administrative powers skilfully in order to prove that India had the aptitude to run the government.

17. To declare that constructive efforts could produce better results than destructive criticism.³⁶²

2.8 Election of 1937: Unionist Form Government

Fazl-i-Husain always worked hard to undertake unusual tasks and despite of his poor health he decided to visit six districts to launch election offices and to resolve differences between several candidates. Even during those days, he used to spend some time daily in checking files and meeting officials and other people to discuss important issues. At last, he died on July 9, 1936.³⁶³

In 1937 the first general elections were held in the Punjab. The Unionist Party's manifesto erected on adult franchise proved fruitful in eradicating the separate electorates.³⁶⁴ The Unionist Party arranged no street gatherings or processions throughout the elections.³⁶⁵ Everybody desired for the Unionist ticket, so it was decided that the candidates should contest elections at their own without party discipline. The key prospect of the Unionist Party was just "to stick the power"³⁶⁶ The Unionist leaders trusted on their personal social, economic, traditional and religious, connections to secure votes in their constituencies.

In the eastern Punjab, canal colony areas and in Rohtak district, the *biradri* system played a pivotal role in organising political considerations. In the Western Punjab the bonds of financial reliance and *piri muridi* played as a leading factor. In Shahpur district four

³⁶² *Inqilab*, May 5, 1936.

³⁶³ According to *Inqilab*, he died at 10.30 in the night. His funeral prayer was held on July 10, 1936, at 8.30 A.M. and then his dead body was carried to Batala for burial.

³⁶⁴ *The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore)*, 4 October 1936.

³⁶⁵ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p. 106.

³⁶⁶ Kirpal Singh, *The Partition of the Punjab 2nd ed* (Patiala: Punjabi University Press, 1989) P. 14.

seats were won by Tiwanas.³⁶⁷ The traditional landlords³⁶⁸ and *pirs* succeeded under the Unionist banner from Multan.

Table No. 6
1937 Election results showing parties position in the Punjab Legislative Assembly

Party	Muslim			General			Sikh			Others	Total
	U	R	O	U	R	O	U	R	O		
Unionist	2 1	7 1	1	-	1 3	-	-	-	-	8	95
Hindu Electoral Board		-	-	1	8	1	-	-	-	1	11
Khalsa National	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1 1	1	-	14
Government	2 1	7 1	1	1	2 1	1	2	1 1	1	9	120
INC	-	2	-	7	3	1	-	4	1	-	18
Shiromani Akali Dal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 0	-	-	10
Majlis-i-Ahrar	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Ittihad-i-Millat	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
AIML	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Congress Nationalist	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Socialist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Labour	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Independent	2	2	3	-	9	-	-	3	-	-	19
Opposition	7	4	3	7	1 3	1	-	1 8	1	1	55
Total	9	7	4	8	3	2	2	2	2	10	175³⁶⁹

³⁶⁷They were Allah Bakhsh Tiwana, Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana, Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana and Habib Ullah Khan Tiwana *PLAD*, Vol. I, No. I, April 5, 1937, *Official Report*, pp. 2-7.

³⁶⁸These traditional landlords, were Nawab Ashiq Hussain, Syed Raza Gilani, Syed Wilayat Hussain Gilani, Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, Khan Haibat Khan and Wali Muhammad Sayal Hiraj, won the election as Unionist *PLAD*, Vol. I, No. I, April 5, 1937, *Official Report*, pp. 2-7.

³⁶⁹Stephen Oren, 'The Sikhs, Congress and Unionists in British Punjab 1937-1945', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 8 (3) (March 1974), p 398.

		5		4		9		
Symbols: U=Urban,	R=Rural		O=Others		(women, landowners)			

The other seats include those of small groups, Europeans, Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians, and those of functional groups such as Commerce and University Graduates.

The relatives of Sikandar Hayat in Punjab Legislative Assembly formed an influential block rivalled only by the Noon-Tiwana group from the Shahpur district.³⁷⁰ Those relatives of Sikandar included Nawab Muzzaffar Khan, Mian Maqbool Mahmood, Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq, Sheikh Sadiq Hasan, Ahmad Bakhsh Khan, Pir Ashiq Husain, Mian Bashir Ahmad, Mian Iftikhar-ud-din, Nawab Shah Nawaz Khan and Begum Shah Nawaz.³⁷¹ The Noon-Tiwana group's loyalty too was guaranteed once Khizar Hayat Tiwana was included in the government as a cabinet minister.³⁷² The insertion of the non-Unionists empowered Sir Sikandar Hayat to project himself as a secularist and as a representative of the key communities in the State. To boost this image of communal harmony the 1st March was declared "Communal Harmony Day" and too made a public holiday.³⁷³

Sikandar Hayat was a situation handler and that was why he gained the support of 110 out of 175 members in Assembly.³⁷⁴ Since April 1938, Governor Emerson believed that Sikandar Hayat had become indispensable for the sustainable victory of Unionist Party.' In April 1938 he wrote to Viceroy that success had depended mainly on the personality and popularity of the Premier. It would be difficult to replace him if for any

³⁷⁰Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p. 115.

³⁷¹Craig Baxter, "The People Party Versus The Punjab Feudalists", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vol. VIII: 3 and 4 (July-October 1973), p. 171.

³⁷²*Ibid.*

³⁷³Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*, p. 77.

³⁷⁴*Five Years of Provincial Autonomy in the Punjab*, Punjab (India) Information Bureau, 1944, p. 14.

reason he were not able to carry on.³⁷⁵ With regard to the main objectives of his government Sikandar said:

Lightening the burden of the peasantry, tackling the problem of unemployment, development and expansion of nation-building activities, uplifting backward classes, including our brethren of the scheduled castes and creating a more favourable atmosphere for the promotion of communal amity and goodwill are questions which have been a subject of universal comment not only in the Punjab, but throughout India. In order to afford the requisite relief to the peasantry and to provide for the removal or even mitigation of unemployment and the intensification of nation-building activities, it would be necessary to explore fresh avenues and examine the existing source of revenue with a view to segmenting our income to the extent which would enable us to take appreciable action in these very desirable directions without adding to the burden of the poorer classes.³⁷⁶

2.9 The Enactments

After winning 1937 elections in Punjab the Unionist ministry had a free hand to complete their earlier reforms. The Unionist government present its first legislative suggestion in the Assembly was the Registration of Money lenders Bill.³⁷⁷ This Bill among other things, aimed at establishing an effective control on money lending by making a compulsory provision for licences. Only 8232 people got themselves registered out of the estimated 55,000 moneylenders in Punjab showed that people involved in the trade had other methods and alternatives to recover their dues.³⁷⁸ The opposition to the Bill was based on the plea that it did not have adequate provisions to protect the moneylenders against debtors for recovery of dues.³⁷⁹ The Unionists defended the Bill, saying 'the need of the day was not protection of the moneylender but the peasant.' The role of the Congress as a party in the Assembly and out of it once again showed a total lack of direction. The Registration of Moneylenders Bill came into effect from 15 June 1939.³⁸⁰ The Restitution

³⁷⁵Home Political (FR), 1st half April 1938, cited in Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p. 116.

³⁷⁶Tanwar, *Politics of Sharing Power the Punjab Unionist party*, p. 112.

³⁷⁷*Punjab Government Gazette* (Extraordinary), 2 September 1939, pp. 111-14 *Ibid.*, p.112.

³⁷⁸*PLAD*, vol. V, 1938, pp. 228-30. *Ibid.*, p. 113

³⁷⁹*PLAD*, vol. V, 1938. pp. 978-89. *Ibid.*

³⁸⁰*Punjab Govt. Gazette*, Part I, 9 June 1939. *Ibid.*

of Mortgaged Land Bill 1938 was introduced on priority. It delivered for the dissolution of the mortgages of land contracted by members of the agricultural tribes before 1901. Of total land returned by mortgagors to the original landowners, agriculturist moneylenders returned only 5 per cent whereas non-agriculturist moneylenders had to return about 95 per cent.³⁸¹ About 7,756,131 acres of mortgaged land was restored to its owners, in most cases without the payment of any compensation to the mortgagors. Sikandar Hayat himself lost Rs. 5.5 lakhs and Khizar Hayat lost Rs. 4,13,00,000, an amount on which debtors had been paying between Rs. 24 crores to Rs. 50 crores by way of interest every year.³⁸² Undoubtedly, the Act had given a major relief to a vast number of ordinary peasants and therefore, was an important milestone in the history of agrarian legislations initiated by the Unionists. *Benami* transactions had negated the very spirit of the effort to end indebtedness and prevent the sale of land from small peasants to moneylenders. By March 1940, about 41,000³⁸³ such *benami* transactions had been sorted out and the amount relating to these transactions was about Rs. 16 crors. The major shortcoming of the Act was the fact that it was applicable only to the pre-1901 period.³⁸⁴ Once again the Unionist policy clearly suggested that most of its legislative measures were directed towards protecting the interests of big landholders. Between 1901 and 1938 it was estimated that two-third of the land taken from the small peasant was occupied by large landowners.³⁸⁵

In 1938, an amendment was made to the Land Alienation Act 1901, termed as the

³⁸¹ Raja Narendra Nath, "The Punjab Agrarian Laws and their Economic and Constitutional Bearing", *Modern Review*, 65 (1939), p. 30.

³⁸² *PLAD*, vol. V, 1938, p. 228-30. quoted in Tanwar, *Politics of Sharing Power the Punjab Unionist party*, p. 114.

³⁸³ Prem Chaudhary, *Punjab Politics and the Role of Sir Chhotu Ram* (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1984), p. 274.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 278.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

Punjab Alienation of Land (III) Amendment Bill 1938. The Bill was commonly known as Zamindar Sahukar Act.³⁸⁶ Sikandar Hayat himself introduced the Bill and made provisions to protect the agriculturist debtors from the agriculturist moneylenders. The Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act 1939³⁸⁷ was a milestone in the Unionist Party's policy of endeavouring to restore the financial health of the agriculturists. Practically Act was not implemented owing to widespread protests from affected quarters mostly the grain leaders. Middlemen trading in agricultural commodities affected directly because the Bill was to regulate the market to ensure fair prices and judicious dealings by traders with the farmers. The unfair practice in the grain trade was a serious problem in the grain markets of the Punjab. Commission agents often made illegal cuts in the farmer's produce.³⁸⁸ The tussle was viewed by most as a fight between the 'Bania and the farmers'.³⁸⁹

The Relief of indebtedness [(Amendment) Act, 1940] if interest of above 7.5 per cent for secured debts and 12.5 per cent for unsecured debts regarded as usury. The Act was not for cooperative societies and banks. The Debt Conciliation Boards had become under the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1935, with such Boards being set up in each district. The task of the Boards was to settle debts amicably. The Act, provided that if creditors failed to appear before the Boards or prove by documents their claims, the creditors case against the debtors was to be liquidated.³⁹⁰

The political rivals of the Unionist Party while opposing the pro-agriculturist

³⁸⁶ N.M. Mitra, (ed.), *Indian Annual Register*, vol II, 1938 (New Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1937), p. 196.

³⁸⁷ *bid.*, p. 196.

³⁸⁸ *Punjab Government Gazette* (Extraordinary), 1 May 1939, p. 196. quoted in Tanwar, *Politics of Sharing Power the Punjab Unionist party*. p 116.

³⁸⁹ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p. 120.

³⁹⁰ *Punjab Government Gazette* (Extraordinary), 5 October 1940. quoted in Tanwar, *Politics of Sharing Power the Punjab Unionist party*. p. 117.

legislative measures sought support from those peasants of rural Punjab who had marginal landholdings or related to agriculture but have no land on an anti-landlord platform. A *Kisan* Conference was organized by the Unionists in September 1938 at Layallpur, to accord with the *Zamindara* Conference.³⁹¹ Sikandar Hayat and Chhotu Ram fascinated a huge gathering of over 1.5 lakh people. Numerous meetings were organized in Punjab in favour of the Unionists with more than 100 meetings in Amritsar district alone.³⁹²

The Unionist government also given significance to the expansion of a new irrigation infrastructure and upgrading in the existing one.

Table No. 7

Progress of Land Holding Consolidation

Year incurred (in Acres)	Area Consolidated (in Rupees)	Expenditure
1937-8	1,50,784	2,84,281
1939-40	2,16,644	4,33,754
1942-3	2,27,305	4,31,910
1945-6	2,69,112	4,53,71 ³⁹³

The impact of agricultural development policies in rural Punjab during the provincial autonomy years was not directly reflected an increase in food-grain production, even though the budget head of agriculture showed an increase of 197 percent in the year 1937-46.³⁹⁴

³⁹¹PLAD, vol. XII, 8 April 1940, p. 283, *Ibid.*, p. 118

³⁹²Home Political (FR), 1st half September 1938, cited in Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p. 119.

³⁹³*Punjab Govt. Gazette* (Extraordinary), 8 March 1945, p. 33 quoted in Tanwar, *Politics of Sharing Power the Punjab Unionist party*, p. 119.

³⁹⁴PLAD, vol. XXII, 10 March 1944, pp. 490-3. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

Table No. 8

Growth in Area Under Irrigation.³⁹⁵

Year acres	Area irrigated in lakhs of
1932-3	105
1936-7	119
1937-8	123
1941-2	131
1945-6	143

Table No. 9

Production of Important Food Grains in Punjab 1942-6³⁹⁶

(in thousands tons)

Food-grains	1942-3	1944-5	1945-
6			
Wheat	1241.1	1189.2	1152.6
Gram	673.6	519.0	730.4
Barley	170.4	125.3	105.3
Paddy	195.8	182.5	150.3
Maize	295.8	355.2	297.1

The Punjab Village Panchayat Act, 1939 was an important initiative. A Panchayat Department was designed. The Act broadened the practical range of the Panchayats while taking the control of the criminal cases in which the punishment was not supposed to exceed one year in normal cases. The Panchayats in civil matter were empowered to try

³⁹⁵Five Years of Provincial Autonomy in the Punjab (Lahore: Govt. Publication, 1942), p. 61.

³⁹⁶Agricultural Statistics of Punjab 1939-49 (Simla: Govt. Publication, 1950), p. 1

cases up-to a value of Rs. 200 which could be extended by the government to Rs. 500 under special conditions. The administrative functions of Panchayats had also been broadened so as to include the level of taxes on select items which were previously under the competence of the Legislative Assembly. The Act was executed in 12,000 of Punjab's 36,000 villages considerably contributing to the growth of local government. The utility of the Act is well illustrated in 1946 alone, Panchayats in Punjab decided 27,715 criminal and 32,345 civil suits, the reversed decisions were only 327 cases.³⁹⁷

The Unionists government did worthwhile work in education. The Punjab Primary Education Act was conceded in January 1941. The Act presented free and compulsory education for children between the age of 6-12 years. The Unionist tried to make teaching and instructions more effective. Syllabi were revised and emphasized on vernacular education. For spreading vernacular education, 400 teachers were recruited and trained.³⁹⁸ To encourage education among backward tribes, the Unionist opening of 42 schools for boys and girls. Primary education did progress during the years 1937-46. For example, in 1937 only 25 percent of the 52 percent of the children enrolled could reach class IV, whereas by 1946 about 53 percent of the enrolled children managed to enter class IV. In 1937 there were 7,641 primary schools in Punjab, this figure had risen to 8,375 in 1942 and to 9,763 in 1946.³⁹⁹

The Unionist government focused on cottage and rural industry. The Punjab State Aid of Industries (Amendment) Act was passed in 1939. The key objects of the Act were

³⁹⁷ *PLAD*, vol. XIX, 10 March 1942, p. 220. quoted in Tanwar, *Politics of Sharing Power the Punjab Unionist party 1923-1947*, p. 123.

³⁹⁸ *Annual Report on the working of the Panchayats in Punjab*, p. 2.

³⁹⁹ *Five Years of Provincial Autonomy*, p. 32.

to encourage cottage and rural industry. A subsidies scheme was started,⁴⁰⁰ and a quantity of Rs. 1,50,000 was for industrial research. Small scale industry like toilet goods, starch, oil extraction, rope and nivar making, carpentry, pottery, tailoring and even sericulture received special care. The Unionist government, presented some changes to get better results from Trade Employees Act of 1940.⁴⁰¹ It provided (i) four paid holidays a month; (ii) not more than 11 hours of work a day and not more than 40 hours a week; (iii) no employee could be dismissed without a month's notice; (iv) children less than 14 years of age were not to be employed in industrial establishments.⁴⁰²

The Unionist government (1937-46) preserved benevolence to rural Punjab in the allocation of funds and enactment of improvement schemes. The strategy empowered them to establish substantial goodwill among the rural areas masses. The provision and extensive acceptance of the Unionist government is reflected in the peasantry's response to the 'golden agrarian laws', and no worthwhile opposition withhold against the Unionist Party programme throughout the years. The party's basic political strategy to improve the quality of rural life, to decrease rural debt burden. The period known in rural Punjab as 'golden laws'.⁴⁰³

2.10 Unionists Political Relationships

The Unionist Party was intensely rooted in the politics of vested class interest. The party politics was influenced by the feudal contextual of a large majority of its leaders. The cooperative creed and contradictory policy against other political parties reflected in its

⁴⁰⁰*Ibid.* p. 28.

⁴⁰¹PLAD, vol X, 26 October 1939, p. 719 quoted in Tanwar, *Politics of Sharing Power*, p. 125.

⁴⁰²*Ibid.*

⁴⁰³*Ibid* pp. 125-26.

opportunistic character. The significant thing that bound together the Unionist Party legislators and its leaders was the obligation upon them towards the colonial establishment.

The Hayat, Tiwanas and Noons were the pillars of Unionist Party. The Hayat family known as the Hayats of Wah (Attock District).⁴⁰⁴ The Premier of Punjab, Sardar Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, was the famous scion of the family (recognized for loyal service to the British). The Tiwana, like the Hayats had a history of devoted service to the British. The most famous Khizar Hayat Tiwana became Preimer after Sikandar in 1942. The third family was the Noon who influenced the politics of Punjab and Unionist Party. The most prominent was Sir Firoz Khan Noon. The *pirs* and *sajjadanishins* were significant elements in influencing the course of politics and policies of the Unionist Party.⁴⁰⁵ The *biradari* leaders were the imperative political essential of the Unionist Party.

Isphani and Talbot, explained the unexpected political development that Sikandar Hayat recognised the offer of Jinnah because he felt nervousness of the fame of Congress following its mass interaction programme after 1937.⁴⁰⁶ Isphani explained other reason of understanding with Jinnah is that Muslim public opinion soon after the elections had marked swing in favour of the Muslim League. It was observed by Isphani the agreement changes the political feeling of the Muslim community towards the Muslim League in Punjab. The agreement was signed on 13 October 1937 and announced the next day amidst great rejoicing and shouts of *Allah-o-Akbar*.⁴⁰⁷ The main points accepted were:

⁴⁰⁴ L H Griffin and C.F. Massey, *Chief's and Families of Note in the Punjab*, ed., by G.L. Chopra, Vol. II (Lahore: Government Printing, 1940), p. 332.

⁴⁰⁵ Waheed Ahmad (ed.), *Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 592.

⁴⁰⁶ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p. 124.

⁴⁰⁷ Khizar Hayat, "The 1937 Elections and the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact", *Punjab Past and Present*, Vol. X-II, (October 1976), p. 23.

(i) That on return to Punjab, Sikandar Hayat will satisfy his party members, who are not member of the Muslim League already, to sign the creed and join it. As such they will be subject to rules and regulations of the Central Parliamentary Board of the All India Muslim League. This will not affect the continuance of the present coalition of the Unionist Party in Punjab.

(ii) That in future elections and by-elections for the legislature after the adoption of this arrangement the group constituting the present Unionist Party will jointly support candidates put up by their respective groups.

(iii) That the Muslim members of the legislature who are elected on or accept within the legislature. It shall be open to the Muslim League Party so formed, to maintain to enter into a coalition or alliance with any other party consistent with the fundamental principles of the policy and programme of the League. Such alliances may be evolved before or after the elections. The existing combination shall maintain its present name, the Unionist Party.⁴⁰⁸

The points of the deal were ambiguous, overlapping and unclear. Although, understanding proved to be the turning point for the Muslim League and Jinnah in their rise to power in Punjab. Jinnah wrote to Barkat Ali 'once a Unionist Muslim accepts the League and its creed, he ceases to be anything but a League'. Chhotu Ram, however,

⁴⁰⁸Sir Stanley Reed, ed. *Indian Year Book, 1938* (Bombay: The Times of India Press, 1938), p. 823.

appears to have been pacified by Sikandar's assurance to him 'that Jinnah was in his pocket'. It was Jinnah's political shrewdness that had made him seek an agreement with the Unionists.⁴⁰⁹ The Sikandar's relations with the Punjab Muslim League leaders like, Muhammad Iqbal and Malik Barkat Ali had never been pleasant.

Jinnah gave Sikandar Hayat a free hand to reorganize the Punjab Muslim League Session at Calcutta (April 1938). Shah Nawaz Khan Mamdot became President of the Punjab Muslim League after Muhammad Iqbal.⁴¹⁰ Sikandar Hayat while taking Jinnah in confidence dissolved the original body of the Punjab Muslim League. He arranged 35 Organizing Committee members, only 4 were hard-core Muslim Leaguers, the rest of them either from Unionists or had affiliation with Unionist Party. The triumph for Sikandar came when the Punjab Muslim League constituted by Sikandar was affiliated to the All India Muslim League body despite of robust opposition from the old members of the Punjab Muslim League Mian Nurullah from Lyallpur even in a press statement asking Jinnah to take action against the Punjab Muslim League led by Unionists.⁴¹¹

The issue of break between Jinnah and Sikandar occurred on the Pakistan Resolution (1940). The areas of North West and Eastern zones of India in which the Muslims are numerically in majority should be grouped to be constituted as independent states in which the consistent units shall be autonomous of sovereignty.⁴¹² Jinnah succeeded in putting Sikandar Hayat & Unionists like him on the defensive. Sikandar Hayat had provided Jinnah the primary chance of gaining control over the Muslims of Punjab but

⁴⁰⁹ Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 156.

⁴¹⁰ Letter of Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana to Jinnah, 15 November 1937, quoted in Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p. 139.

⁴¹¹ *The Tribune*, 7 June 1938.

⁴¹² *The Tribune*, 18 April 1941

more importantly his vacillating stance on vital political matters and strategy only served to further confuse his party legislators and supporters. The premier had never been in favour of the two-nation theory. He had believed 'Pakistan would mean massacre'. Sikandar Hayat suggested that:

1. Each province be a sovereign state;
2. The sovereign states be vested with unlimited powers, except insofar as subjects like defence, communications, foreign affairs were concerned, which to be controlled by a central body;
3. The central body have power to control only subjects contained at number-II as an agent of the sovereign states.⁴¹³

In March 1941, Jinnah sought an explanation from Sikandar Hayat of his stand point on the issue. Sikandar Hayat categorically went against the idea of Pakistan. The difference between the two ever never entirely vanished. Sikandar Hayat nomination through government for National Defence Council (for his support in the war effort) was infuriated Jinnah keeping in view the League's policy of not supporting the war.⁴¹⁴ The resignation of Sikandar Hayat from National Defence Council equally faced criticism. Sikandar Hayat's pact with Baldev Singh (15 June 1942)⁴¹⁵ was another because of his increased differences with Jinnah. The ingredient of the pact is as under:

2.11 Issue of Jhatka

It was agreed that instructions would be given to the government and semi-government

⁴¹³Nur Ahmad, *Martial Law*, pp. 151-4

⁴¹⁴S.Q.H. Jafri and S.A. Bukhari (ed.) *Quaid-i-Azam's Correspondence with Punjab Muslim League Leaders* (Lahore, 1977), p. 372

⁴¹⁵*The Tribune*, 22 August 1941.

institutions to allow every community to cook and use meat slaughtered according to its own rituals and rites.

2.11.1 Teaching of *Gurumukhi*

It was decided that whatever an adequate number of Sikh students sought to study it, the government would try to make arrangements for teaching of Punjabi Gurumukhi. Provision was also to be made to restore the status of Punjabi as a second language in the province.

2.11.2 Legislation regarding religious matters

Members of the Legislative Assembly would be free to take decisions on religious matters concerning their community.

2.11.3 Recruitment criterion

A recruitment policy with a fixed proportion for recruitment of members of various communities to government jobs was in existence in Punjab under which Sikhs had been allotted a 20 percent share, but this share had seldom been given. Sikandar Hayat agreed that he would ensure that the 20 percent reservation for Sikhs would not henceforth be ignored.

2.11.4 Sikh delineation in Interior

Sikandar Hayat further assured that whenever there was any reshuffle or change in the Executive Council of the Viceroy, the Sikh claim to the vacant seat would have this full sympathy and support. He would also give his support to the Sikh claim for a due share in the central services.

Jinnah was against the pact because he considered the Sikhs were the hurdle in the way of two-nation theory. Sikandar was finally removed from the All India Muslim League in July 1942.⁴¹⁶

Chhotu Ram played a significant role in making Sikandar to confront Jinnah. The death of Sikandar Hayat on December 26, 1942 gave Jinnah a relief and free hand in Punjab. Chhotu Ram himself led other dominant Unionist legislators in floating the name of Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana for the premiership that enjoyed the support of governor of Punjab and the Viceroy.⁴¹⁷ Khizar Hayat elected unopposed on 23 January 1943.

By August 1943 affairs between Shaukat Hayat and Khizar had touched a state of no turn.⁴¹⁸ Exclusion of Shaukat Hayat from the Punjab ministry brought change in political affluences of both the Muslim League and the Unionist Party. Shaukat and Mumtaz had correctly concluded that the wind of successful political fortune in Punjab had begun to flow in favour of the Muslim League.

The Muslim League had begun to erode Unionist impact on the rural Muslim masses after the announcement from Sir Stafford Cripps that states might have even the option of separating from the Indian Union. From 1937 to 1942, Jinnah wrecked the Unionist Party and majority of the Muslim strength in Punjab came under the Muslim League spell. After adoption of Pakistan Resolution, the League focused on organizational erection, enrolling members, opening branches, collecting funds. Many Unionist legislators had never enthusiastically recognized the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact. Chhotu Ram

⁴¹⁶ *The Tribune*, 12 June 1942.

⁴¹⁷ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p. 167.

⁴¹⁸ *The Civil & Military Gazette*, 21 December 1943.

believed that the Muslim League interrupting into the policy and programmes of the Unionist Party affairs. An enraged Jinnah vowed to finish Chhotu Ram's supremacy.⁴¹⁹

Talbot said that Khizar Hayat may probably have surrendered to Jinnah's rhetoric and intimidations⁴²⁰ but did not do so because he had to maintain the identity of the Unionist Party till the War time. Jinnah made a second attempt to talk with Khizar Hayat in April 1944 in Lahore. The talks eventually broke down on 27 April.⁴²¹ Jinnah had put forward the following terms:

- (i). Every member of the Muslim League Party in the Punjab Assembly should declare that he owes allegiance solely to the Muslim League Party in the Assembly and not to the Unionist or any other party;
- (ii). The present label of the coalition, namely the Unionist Party should be adopted;
- (iii). The name of the proposed coalition should be the Muslim League Coalition Party.

Khizar Hayat did not accept the terms but supporting Jinnah on matters that entirely involved the Muslim community. However, he insisted unity among the communities.⁴²² After refusal Khizar was called for explanation from Jinnah. Khizar Hayat was expelled from the Muslim League; of which he was assumed to have become a member as per the clauses of the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact. The dissimilarity between the two augmented intensely, Jinnah referring to Khizar as a 'traitor'.

The Muslim League strength had increased in the Punjab Assembly from 2 to 27 at

⁴¹⁹ G. Alana. *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents* (Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1977), p. 237.

⁴²⁰ Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*, p. 79.

⁴²¹ *The Hindustan Times*, 15 April 1944.

⁴²² Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*, pp. 116-22

the end of 1944.⁴²³ These included Shaukat Hayat, Begum Shah Nawaz and the Nawab of Mamdot. Mian Maqbool Mahmood and Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana resigned as Parliamentary Secretaries. Khizar Hayat dismissal of Shaukat Hayat from the Ministry on misuse of position and charges of corruption proved fatal for Unionist Ministry.⁴²⁴ The action further enhanced the detachment between the Khizar Hayat and Khattars led by Shaukat Hayat.

Khizar Hayat was not ready to accept the Muslim League as the sole representative of the Muslims in India.⁴²⁵ Jinnah personally wants to represent the Muslim of India through Muslim League alone. Relations between the Muslim League and the Unionist Party was strained. Jinnah desired to assassinate word Unionist and go to the “Party’s funeral”. Many of the MLAs leaving from the Unionist Party in favour of the Muslim League. By the end of 1944 the Muslim League had shaken the basics of the Unionist Party. The Unionist Party was not able to win the local body elections in 1944.⁴²⁶

The Unionist Party was never a well-knit, its rules, regulations and creeds were only on paper. The party’s relations with others were only on the wishes of the British had wanted them to be. The Unionist Party represented the politics of compromise when the political progress key words were confrontation and challenge

2.12 Eclipse of the Unionist Party

The Lahore Muslim League Session of 1940 was turning point in the political history of Punjab. The formal demise of the Unionist Party took place only on 23 June

⁴²³Ibid, p. 122

⁴²⁴Ibid., p. 123.

⁴²⁵Ali, *Punjab Politics in the Decade*, p. 43.

⁴²⁶Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p. 173.

1947, but its death knell has been sound loud and clear by the Pakistan Resolution. Sikandar Hayat's death in 1942 and Chhotu Ram's death in 1945 were factors that greatly added to the party's problems.

The end of the War brought far-reaching social, economic and political changes. The War completely changed the political scene of India. In Punjab the War eroding the political influence of the Unionist Party. During War, the Unionist leaders had worked earnestly for the enlistment of soldiers. Money sent by soldiers during the War years played a vital role in rural Punjab economy. The economic consequences of War extremely harmful for the future of the Unionist Party.⁴²⁷

Another problem was at the end of the War majority of soldier were demobilized and sent to home without adequate pension and alternate jobs.⁴²⁸ The soldiers were recruited with the promises of fruitful incentives on their return from the war. During the war soldiers travelled to different countries and enlightened with advanced standards of living, more progressive ideas and conscious for their rights. A section of soldiers believed that the Unionists being the government were responsible for their problems. The soldiers anger gave benefit to Congress and the Muslim League at the obvious cost of the Unionist Party. The unconditional support for war was a major set-back to the party. The British policy changed towards the Unionist Party was basically inclined by the fact that Jinnah successfully proved himself the sole orator of the Muslim in India. The Labour party won in Elections in Britain in 1945 raised, among Indian leaders, a ray of hope for political relief. In Punjab the Muslim League heap on its demand for a separate state.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 165

The elections for the Punjab Legislative Assembly were announced on August 21, 1945. The Muslim League stood for Pakistan and the Congress for Indian's freedom, while the Unionist Party herewith its past glory to project. The Unionist Party lost its goodwill in rural areas and for its survival depends upon the government. The Unionists coerce the people to support them it damaged their image. The Unionist Party had for long been out of touch with the people. While the Muslim League had hidden sustenance of the British bureaucracy. The League leadership explored a methodical strategy to secure the support of dominant *pirs*. The socio-religious leader like the *pirs*, whom the Muslim common masses were in practice to trust. The League requested them to start a campaign that the idea of Pakistan was a 'heaven' on earth.⁴²⁹

Some religious leaders stating that those who did not vote for League were considered *kafirs*.⁴³⁰ A staunch Unionist Firoz Khan Noon even said that a vote for the League was a vote for the Prophet.⁴³¹ The Punjab Muslim Students Federation registered majority of volunteers students, trained them for political propaganda, led by Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi, Ibrahim Ali Chisti and Hameed Nizami. Most of the students were from Islamia College, Lahore.⁴³² The Punjab Muslim Students Federation established a Pakistan Rural Propaganda Committee and demand for Pakistan, with Niazi as its Secretary.

The Muslim League ferocity of religious based appeal adopted by the Unionists to gain masses support. Some Unionists even started flying Islamic flags at political gatherings as the League did. Khizar at Gujarat gatherings used the first verse of the *Sura*

⁴²⁹*Civil and Military Gazette*, 29 November 1945.

⁴³⁰*Ibid.*

⁴³¹Ian Talbot. *Punjab and the Raj*, p 157

⁴³²*Ibid.*

Fatiha to prove that the Unionists had great religious validation to direct the Muslim than the Muslim League. Khizar denoted that *Allah* described in the Quran as ‘*Rab-u-alameen*’ (Lord of everything and everyone not just the Muslim).⁴³³ The Unionist Party at the start of 1946 lost the support of most of the leading *pirs* and *Sajjadanishins*, and also lost Muslim support in rural Punjab.

From the 86 designated seats for Muslims (including rural and women) the League won 73, while only 19 seats won by the Unionists.⁴³⁴ The polls result showed that Punjab had finally alienated on communal lines. The Unionist Party had reduced to the status of unimportant political organization.

Table No. 10

Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1946: Election Results.

Party	Seats
Muslim League	73
Congress	51
Unionist Party	19
Akali Dal	21
Independence	11
Total	175 ⁴³⁵

Unionist ministry founded with the creation of Congress-Unionist-Akali alliance on 6 March. The League observed a strike in protest on 7 March and traitor's Day was planned on 9 March.⁴³⁶ Evan Jenkins Governor of Punjab submitted political reports, to the Viceroy constantly indication that the political system was leading on the way to chaos. Every passing day was a step closer to the holocaust for the Unionist ministry that rapidly

⁴³³ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

⁴³⁴ *Indian Annual Register*, vol. 1, 1946, pp. 229-30.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁶ Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 72, 129.

engulfed the province. Communal and political tension in increasing communities is preparing for rioting private armies reported the governor to the Viceroy on 2 May 1946. To keep curtailed the Punjab government the League started slogan of 'Islam in Danger' and its programme of 'Direct Action Day' on 16 August 1946. The League Lahore Action Committee planned a meeting with the *ulema* and *pirs* and had a *fatwa* issued for *Jehad*. By June 1947 the RSS had 58,000 members, the Muslim League National Guard 39,000 members and the Sikh Akali Fauj 8000 members.⁴³⁷

The government responded strictly in deploying law and order, freely using the Punjab Public Safety Ordinance from November 1946. All types of offensive activities like protests, carrying weapons and processions were barred. The RSS and the Muslim League both were affirmed illegal figures. The League member's arrests, though, showed to be uniting pointes towards violence and communal passions. The League's headquarters searched at Lahore also extracted 2000 steel helmets.⁴³⁸ Jinnah the master of political strategies seek the opportunity to launch an all-out struggle. A disheartened government ordered the release of the Muslim League leaders on 27 January 1947 and lifted ban on the Muslim League National Guard the very next day. The lifting of the ban and release of the arrested leader appears, as Talbot said, to have been influenced by the Governor Jenkins's conciliatory attitude at this stage. He remained with Khizar that 'it was easier to send people to jail than to get them out of jail in a cooperative frame of mind.'⁴³⁹

The British government announced on 20 February 1947 the transfer of power by June 1948. The situation deteriorated swiftly that a double-minded Khizar Hayat was

⁴³⁷ Ian Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p. 233.

⁴³⁸ Moon, *Divide and Quit*, p. 35.

⁴³⁹ Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*, p. 155.

unable to bear the pressure of office and resigned on 1 March 1947. Khizar explained his resignation by saying ‘parties in the province must now be brought face to face, it is now incumbent on me to leave the field clear for the Muslim League to come make arrangement with other parties.’⁴⁴⁰ The coalition ministry formally resigned on 5 March 1947. All the Muslim legislators of the Unionist Party voted in favour of Pakistan.⁴⁴¹ The Unionist Party fragmented and vanished into the oblivion of history. The Unionist Premier Khizar Hayat, for example, was against the very concept of dividing Punjab to form Pakistan.

It will be ruinous for all communities to spilt up the Province into bits I had, in a Press interview some weeks back, expressed my opposition to any scheme involving partition of the Punjab. I notice now that section of the Press has doubted the authenticity of that statement. I have in fact on many occasions in the past expressed the view that it would be ruinous for all communities to split up the Province into bits. The present Punjab boundaries make the Province a self-sufficient economic unit. The irrigation system, the electricity scheme, and the extensive development programme of the future, if torn apart, would lead to an improving of both the western and the eastern Punjab. It will be a catastrophic calamity if this comes about and all sections of the Punjabis should consider its dangerous implications, particularly the Hindus and Sikhs in the west and Muslims in the east of Punjab.⁴⁴²

The demise of the Unionist Party changed political situation both in Punjab as well as in whole India. The Unionist Party politics in Punjab was of two decades. It enjoyed the provision of nearly 68 percent of the Punjab Legislative Assembly members. Even when it was practically routed in 1946 it was able to rescue about 20 percent of the votes polled.⁴⁴³

⁴⁴⁰*The Tribune*, 3 March 1947.

⁴⁴¹*The Tribune*, 24 June 1947.

⁴⁴²Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan* (Lahore: Longmans Pakistan Branch, 1961), p. 376.

⁴⁴³Ian Talbot, “Back to Future? The Punjab Unionist Model of Consociational Democracy for Contemporary India and Pakistan”, *International Journal of Punjab Studies*, vol 3, No. 1 (1996), p. 67.

CHAPTER- 3

MAINSTREAM LEADERSHIP OF THE UNIONIST PARTY 1935-1947

Early twentieth century witnessed the emergence of the new political leadership in Punjab which influenced the masses of the province. The regional politics presented that the AIML was a popular political party in Muslim majority provinces while other parties like Unionist Party in the Punjab, Khudai Khidmatgars (Red Shirts) in the North-West Frontier Province, the Sindh Azad Party and the Sindh United Party in Sindh and the Krishak Praja Party in Bengal appeared to have potential influence. The political monopoly of Unionist Party remained in the Punjab until 1946 as afterwards League dominated the province. The traditional political leadership of Punjab that played a dominant role was comprised of social elites such as the nobility, titled gentry, landlords.⁴⁴⁴

Death of Fazl-i-Husain was a severe setback, who was founder-leader of the Unionist Party having charismatic personanlity. While David Page commenting on Sir Fazl's personal qualities said that 'he understood the value of persuasion and organization, and he had a very outstanding intelligence of when to compromise and when to stand firm.'⁴⁴⁵ His successors Sikandar Hayat and Khizar Hayat were not able to uphold the charisma. The charismatic leadership of Sir Fazl-i Husain kept the party intact despite of numerous flaws in party structure.⁴⁴⁶ The Unionists' charismatic leadership in Punjab could be constant if the leaders had steadfastly constructed their party and transmitted the personal charisma to a charismatic institution, their political party. After Fazl-i Husain the

⁴⁴⁴K.K. Aziz (ed.), *Public life in Muslim India, 1850-1947* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1992), p. 25.

⁴⁴⁵Page, *Prelude to Partition*, p. 198.

⁴⁴⁶Bendix, Max Weber: *An Intellectual Portrait*, pp. 298-310.

Unionist Party faced the music of leadership crisis. His successor Sikandar Hayat never enjoyed a certain leadership of his party. Factional rivalries in the Unionist Party were damaging the party, already having a narrow social base.

3.1 Mian Fazl-i-Hussain (1877-1936)

3.1.1 His Early Life and Education

Fazl-i-Husain was born in Peshawar on June 14, 1877, in a Rajput family. Fazl-i-Husain was sent to the local school. In 1891 he passed his middle standard examination. He passed matriculation examination from the Punjab University in 1893. Fazl-i-Husain for further studies went to Lahore and got admission in Government College. He studied English, Arabic, Persian and Philosophy for the Degree Examination. In 1897, Fazl-i-Husain passed his B.A. examination. In 1895 Professor Ussher founded a Philosophical Society, with himself as its President and Fazl-i-Husain, as its first Secretary. Ussher came closed with Fazl-i-Husain and taught him art of discussion and how to organize societies in the college. After resignation of Ussher in 1897, later Sir T. W. Arnold (1864-1930) took his place. He instructed him to go to Cambridge for further studies. Maulvi Muhammd Husain Azad (1830-1910) was the Persian teacher at Government College. He was a renowned scholar and originator of historical research and literary criticism in Urdu; Fazl-i-Husain was inspired from extensive vision of Hussain Azad.⁴⁴⁷

Fazl-i-Husain married to Mahar-un-Nisa in 1896. At that time marriage brought for him only anxiety and worry. Despite of persistent ill-health and domestic worries, he never

⁴⁴⁷Hussain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, pp. 9-10.

vacillated in his commitment to work.⁴⁴⁸ Fazl-i-Husain's father wanted to send him England to make him I.C.S. officer. Arnold proposed Cambridge University and Fazl-i-Husain quickly applied for admission at Cambridge. Arrangements completed; the day of departure was August 28, 1898.

Fazl-i-Hussain prepared for Indian Civil Services (I.C.S.) with full dedication. The first attempt was a failure and afterwards Fazl-i-Husain went to Christ's College Cambridge, on September 30, 1899, and took admission in Law. The college was popular with Indians, and Fazl-i-Husain became a friend with Mian Shah Nawaz who was a frank, amiable and sincere person. He sat again for I.C.S. examination, in August 1900, when the result was announced he wrote: "The result of the Indian Civil Service was out, and I was not on the list. I must say it in all fairness did disappoint me."⁴⁴⁹ The sympathetic attitude of his father inspired him, and he decided to practice Law and participate in public life. Soon after the results Fazl-i-Husain set an elaborate programme and restarted his studies.⁴⁵⁰

In his first year at Cambridge, he focused on his academic work. He wholeheartedly engaged himself into the busy life of university. He started to take part in the College Debating Society and writing articles for the College Magazine.⁴⁵¹ His articles on *Hafiz Sadi* and *Ghalib* were greatly cherished. He joined the *Majlis* (University Society of Indian students) and took part profoundly in its activities. He recognised the importance of public speaking both from a lawyer point of view and a potential public man took lessons in it. He was elected as President of *Majlis*.

⁴⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p.12.

⁴⁴⁹Diary, October 10, 1900. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁴⁵⁰Diary, October 11, 1900. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁴⁵¹Diary, October 19, 1900. *Ibid.*, p.27.

On his return to Cambridge, he decided to form a Muslim Association, and pronounced its inception in the following words: -

Today I had invited thirteen people to tea; all Muslims and the object of all this was to find an Association for Muslim only, and to arrange about the Id. I started in a guarded way and successfully showed to my guests the necessity of such a body, and they were ready to fall in with my views. They appointed me as the Acting Secretary and we started, and then in injunction with Sherafat and Wahby, I was asked to frame rules, which I did.⁴⁵²

The organization of the Muslim Association was completed, and the rules, already framed were published.⁴⁵³ The newly created body was called the International Muslim Association. It showed a success, and in the following tenure Fazl-i-Husain was elected its president. He lived in England from 1898 to 1901. Economically England subjugated world markets and fiscally the credit of English was incontestable. Fazl-i-Husain never supported the idea of defeating British in India by power. Fazl-i-Husain was not succeeded in Indian Civil Service. He attained a degree in Law from Cambridge and returned to India in 1901 as a barrister. His father was a District Judge in Peshawar. Fazl-i-Husain started practice as a lawyer. With the help of Mian later Justice Shah Din, (a friend of his father) was registered at the Punjab Chief Court, and decided to launch himself as a barrister at Peshawar, but he was forced to write:

My certificates came and a note saying that the Honourable Judges consider it highly inadvisable that I should practise in my father's court. It was unfair but harsh and annoying If not insulting. I wrote back, I meant to do so, and thanked the Honourable Judges for their advice on this point of etiquette. The Registrar did not like this independence of spirit, and I believe took exception to it, writing back that the Honourable Judge consider it very inadvisable that I should practise at Peshawar while my father is a District Judge there. I had to find myself another station. After serious consideration my choice fell upon Sialkot.⁴⁵⁴

On September 29, 1901, Fazl-i-Husain settled in his own house started his practice at Sialkot. He had desire "to be a recognized leader of the Indian Muslims and some day

⁴⁵²Diary, January 19, 1901. *Ibid.*

⁴⁵³Diary, January 22, 1901. *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁴Diary, undated September 1901. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

to sit in the House of Commons as the Right Honourable Gentlemen from the Punjab.”⁴⁵⁵ The establishment of *Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam* was laid down. Mir Hissam-ud-Din was responsible for its management. The *Anjuman* started a high school of its own and set up a large number of primary schools all over the town. In 1903, with the help of the *Anjuman*, he originated a *Madrassa-tul-Quran* to bring up orphans and give them education. He decided in 1905 to leave Sialkot and go to Lahore to struggle for a better income at the Bar and to “achieve national leadership.” Later he assumed “the risk had to be taken” as he was finding district life too inadequate and narrow for his activities. He shifted to provincial capital, where he started political, social and literary activities. In Lahore he paid full concentration to legal profession, within two years, he had become a capable counsel. His professional work made him known to the public at large and indirectly extended the circle of his clients.

3.1.2 Political Career

Fazl-i-Husain was a key political figure in 1920s and 1930s in Punjab and India. Fazl-i-Husain spent almost thirty-five years (1901-1936) in the province as a social reformer, educationist, statesman and an administrator and made some valuable input to its political evolution.⁴⁵⁶ Fazl-i-Hussain had extra-ordinary aptitude, dedicated and firm in his aspirations, brought about a whole alteration of the political scene of the Punjab. He had noble astute and energetic personality. Due to such personality Punjab notables and *pirs* gave him importance and maintained relations. This decent Unionist loyalist intended to ameliorate the plight of the frail and the backward masses and led the Punjab to the goal of

⁴⁵⁵ Ahmad, ed., *Diary and Notes*, p. 2.

⁴⁵⁶ Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 70.

self-government through inter-communal unity.⁴⁵⁷ Fazl-i-Husain started to write in Journals like *Observer* and *Makhzan* from Sialkot, but his activities in political and educational grounds considerably amplified when he was in Lahore. He also took continuous interest in the activities of AHI as a member of its general council and managing committee, for about 15 years.⁴⁵⁸ Iqbal, Fazl-i-Husain and contemporary thinkers express their views through AHI platform.

Fazl-i-Husain's political life had begun with the rise of revolutionary activities in Punjab in the early twentieth century. According to Syed Nur Ahmad:

The end of these cases saw the beginning of a new chapter in Mian Fazl-i-Husain's life. The confidence of the litigant public in him as a lawyer grew. On the other hand, his work in the cause of education claimed more and more of his time. He continued to put in good, solid and honest work in both directions, and yet found time from 1907 onwards to take part in politics.⁴⁵⁹

Fazl-i-Husain coined the name "Muslim League" in February 1906 at Lahore and established Muslim political organization which was the "the first organization in India to call itself the Muslim League".⁴⁶⁰ Fazl-i-Husain supporters comprised progressive persons like "Pir Tej Din, Malik Barkat Ali (1886-1946), Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din, Chaudhri Shahab-ud-Din (d. 1946), and Ghulam Bhik Nairang (1876-1952). Mian Muhammad Shafi reserved the mechanism of the Provincial Muslim League till 1916. Fazl-i-Husain along with Justice Shah Din had done valuable work for the uplift of Punjab Muslims. This brought him close to the Muslim League. The outcome was that on December 28, 1916, the AIML separated itself from the old Punjab Muslim League, headed by Mian Muhammad Shafi, which was recognised as a progressive group. Fazl-i-Husain

⁴⁵⁷Khurshid, *Feudal Ascendancy and the Role of Sir Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 131.

⁴⁵⁸Ahmad, *Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 8.

⁴⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴⁶⁰Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 96.

became the General Secretary of the new Punjab Muslim League and continued till 1920. The object of both Fazl-i-Husain's League and AIML were safeguard the benefits of Muslims, allegiance to government, and friendliness towards other races. Fazl-i-Husain played an important role to negotiate a treaty which was named as Lucknow Pact. A contemporary observer admitted that Fazl-i-Husain had played an active role in framing Lucknow Pact.⁴⁶¹

From 1915 onward, Mian Fazl-i-Husain started taking interest in politics.⁴⁶² In 1916 he decided to enter the Punjab Legislative Council. Fazl-i-Husain affiliated with the national movement in the country, he found public life in Punjab almost non-existent, "For the past ten years, the Punjab has been locked in deep slumber. From the political point of view this province is so inactive that while the public men of all other provinces have expressed their opinions regarding the operation of the Press Act, the public of this province has shown no activity, except in publishing a few articles on the subject."⁴⁶³

Fazl-i-Husain contested election from the constituency of the Punjab University and was successful. He resigned from the Muslim League in 1920 on the issue of non-cooperation movement.⁴⁶⁴ Fazl-i-Husain invigorated All-India Muslim Conference and made it the utmost power of Muslims in India. Mian Fazl-i-Hussain was elected under the first election of the Punjab Legislative Council in 1920 and appointed as minister.

⁴⁶¹Diwan Chand Sharma, 'The Truth About Mian Fazl-i-Husain', *The Muslim Review* (Calcutta), Vol. LXI, No. 6, (June 1937), p. 641.

⁴⁶²Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 80.

⁴⁶³The *Hindustan Times*, 28, 1916. *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁴Diwan Chand Sharma, "The Truth About Mian Fazl-i-Husain", *The Muslim Review* (Calcutta), Vol. LXI, No. 6, June 1937, p. 641.

3.1.3 Education Ministry

On January 3, 1921, Fazl-i-Husain was appointed as Minister of Education. He continued to hold this portfolio till 1926. When he became a Minister of Education, he consumed his skills to stimulate education in this province. Being a Minister of Education, Fazl-i-Husain encouraged primary education on a massive scale.⁴⁶⁵ He focused on provision of a competent staff and survey of school-going boys in rural areas which were effective measures for the extension of primary education and active execution of the Compulsory Education Act of 1919.⁴⁶⁶ He proposed the extension of the Central Training College and the foundation of additional training college and numerous normal schools to deliver extra teachers for the expansion of secondary and primary education. He insisted that the university should be turned into a residential university than just an examining body. He desired the establishment of an Industrial School and a Commercial College to support industrial progress of the province. Finally, the education should be encouraged in backward areas such as the South-West Punjab districts of Jhang, Multan and Muzaffargarh. The Punjab got better than other provinces regarding primary education.⁴⁶⁷

During his tenure as Education Minister, education in Punjab made record progress. A new set up of primary and secondary school was spread in rural areas; a plan of opening of colleges in towns was taken properly; the training of teachers was attended to; primary education was free of cost in the province; the cost of education per pupil was kept at a lower figure than in most other provinces.⁴⁶⁸ The percentage of Punjab population

⁴⁶⁵Husain, *Mian Fazl-i-Husain: Glimpses of Life and Works 1898-1936* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication, 1993), pp. 150-151.

⁴⁶⁶Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 132

⁴⁶⁷Khurshid, *Feudal Ascendancy and the Role of Sir Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 228.

⁴⁶⁸Ahmad, *Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, pp. 36-40.

getting education in all institutions has been 2.42 per cent, after six years under the system, it was 6.71 per cent.⁴⁶⁹ Fazl-i-Husain gave special importance to adult education, and within two years 98,467 adults were enrolled. Fazl-i-Husain did a new experiment by opening Government Intermediate Colleges in the whole province. Thus, the system of higher education was cemented.

The vernacular middle schools were swiftly advanced, farms and gardens were attached to them, teachers in agriculture were trained; and later, the whole teaching of the schools was brought into harmony with rural conditions and requirements.⁴⁷⁰ A large number of scholarships awarded to military families and Muslims to enter in Anglo-Vernacular schools. AHI was encouraged to expand its educational institutions. As a result within two years the strength of the Muslim increased in all institutions by 42.3% as compared to Hindus were only 19.6%.⁴⁷¹ Few Mulims were able to get admission in institutions like Medical College and Government College of Lahore. Fazl-i-Husain ordered reservation of seats for them under the Lucknow Pact (viz. 40%). The measures improved the Muslims position in administrative and education sector. However, it did not mean that Fazl-i-Husain was communal in his policy. Fazl-i-Husain distributed a warning circular to all public schools against refusing admission to “untouchable” children even private schools were to be removed from the list of recognised institutions and lose Government grant, if they closed their doors on “untouchables.” During his five years’

⁴⁶⁹Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 132.

⁴⁷⁰*Ibid.*, p 140.

⁴⁷¹*Ibid.*, p. 136.

regime in the province, education made unprecedented progress as “he regarded it the *sine qua non* of social, economic and political progress”.⁴⁷²

3.1.4 Health Ministry

In 1923, Fazl-i-Husain, took charge as a Health Minister. To accommodate the Punjabis, he eliminated the number of higher posts up to 50 per cent. These posts were reserved for Indian Medical Service (I.M.S.) officers who were mostly British. In order to facilitate and accommodate the native community, he launched a new scheme by which clinical assistants were appointed from amongst the practitioners. The medical services were expanded to far flung rural areas with the help of the agencies of local bodies, missionary and charitable organisation. Fazl-i-Husain concentrated to increase the dispensaries strength with the average of twenty-five annually. He inaugurated a comprehensive scheme which provided “within five years sufficient dispensaries to bring the total number in each district up to one dispensary for every 100 square mile of every 30,000 of the population.”⁴⁷³ Consequently, it “involved the establishment of 375 new rural dispensaries and by the year of 1927, 205 such new dispensaries had already been built.”⁴⁷⁴ One medical officer and a sanitary inspector were appointed to improve the medical and sanitary facilities in every district. The medical aid was managed through the agency of local bodies, missionary and charitable organizations.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷² Ahmad, *Mian Fazl Husain: A review of his life and works*, p. 57

⁴⁷³ Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 143

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

3.1.5 Local Self-Government Ministry

Fazl-i-Husain as a minister (1923-26) for local self-government was interested in Punjab's development, he explored that "political life in the Punjab could hardly be said to exist and would be at the mercy of any whiff of breeze of political agitation that might be blowing."⁴⁷⁶ Fazl-i-Husain introduced general reforms in District Boards. The Franchise was extended and in certain District Board launched the elective system in most of the districts instead of nomination. With the efforts of Fazl-i-Husain in 1926, "out of total 1,177 members, 812 were elected and the rest nominated."⁴⁷⁷ A Town Improvement Act passed for the assistance of big cities like Lahore and Amritsar. To increase the strength of voters, franchise qualifications were lowered and the number of elected elements in the committees was raised to 75 per cent of the total number of members.⁴⁷⁸

Fazl-i-Husain established the statutory *panchayats* with the endorsement of the Punjab Panchayat Act of 1921. Every village *panchayats* elected with the adult voters and consisted of three to five members, its head called *sarpanch* which was elected among the members. The *panchayats* were established for construction, maintenance and upgrading of public buildings, wells, ponds and the formation of burial and burning grounds and to arrange the village watch-men. The *panchayats* had to deal with the matters of theft, mischief and ordinary assault and the property matters or claims not exceeding Rs. 50. The *panchayats* had the authority to enquire the misbehaviour of petty government officials and the findings report to their senior officers.⁴⁷⁹ Fazl-i-Husain, decided to employ

⁴⁷⁶*Ibid.*, p 138.

⁴⁷⁷*Ibid.*, p 139.

⁴⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 139.

⁴⁷⁹*Ibid.* p. 142.

panchayat officers to support the working of the *panchayats* to make them active organisations.⁴⁸⁰ Fazl-i-Husain, presented the Punjab Small Town Act, 1921. Due to this act, town committees were established in small towns. The committees were elected by non-communal electorates and had an elected president.⁴⁸¹

3.1.6 Religious Ministry

Fazl-i-Husain submitted a Gurdwara Bill to the Council in July 1921. The proposed Sikh Gurdwara and Shrines Act of 1921 envisaged the establishment of a temporary board of commissioners to enquire into cases of disputed shrines, and if necessary to take possession of them for a period of three years, during which it would ascertain where the actual ownership of the gurdwaras lay. With his efforts Sikh Gurdwara Act of 1925 was passed and all Sikh temples control were given to Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC).

3.1.7 Formation of the Unionist Party

Fazl-i-Husain was the originator and remained the leader of the pro-British Punjab National Unionist Party from 1923 till his demise in 1936. He created the Unionist Party to save the landed benefits of the *Punjabis* from the moneylenders primarily Hindus. The situation was not good, 83 per cent of the proprietors of the Punjab were in debt.⁴⁸² Fazl-i-Husain hunted to handle the bizarre condition through the Unionist Party, by collaborating hand with the Hindu Jats, led by Chhotu Ram and the Sikhs led by Sir Majithia Singh

⁴⁸⁰Ibid., p. 142.

⁴⁸¹Ibid., p. 143.

⁴⁸²Malcolm Darling, *Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 123.

(1872-1941). In this effort, Fazl-i-Husain was mostly assisted by the British authorities.⁴⁸³ The Unionist Party was projected to work as a sign of inter-communal collaboration in pursuit of common national objectives.

3.1.8 Appointment as Revenue Member

In 1926, Fazl-i-Husain was appointed as a Revenue Member. His significant triumph as Revenue Member was the enactment of a Land Revenue Act in Punjab. His noteworthy achievement was to introduce a new plan in respect of reduction of land-taxes and water-rates at the time of bad crops. The Land Revenue Act of the Punjab considered to be the best law in all India.⁴⁸⁴

3.1.9 Appointment as a Member of Governor-General's Executive Council

Fazl-i-Husain took charge as Member of Viceroy's Executive Council in 1930 for the Department of Education, Health and Lands.⁴⁸⁵ Political turmoil in the North-West Frontier Province got his special attention, after his appointment as a Member of the Government of India. He was deputed to visit Peshawar in June 1930. During this visit, he brought about a settlement between the provincial and the people of Peshawar and set the basis of constitutional reforms for the Frontier Province. In 1932, the Frontier Province was raised to the Governor's province status, and provincial Council elections were held in 1933. The Frontier Province was given a seat in the Central Assembly and Dr. Khan

⁴⁸³Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 320.

⁴⁸⁴S.M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan* (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1990), pp.231-232.

⁴⁸⁵Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 191.

Sahib was elected on it. In 1931, he proposed a law imposing import duty on wheat. Due to his frail health went on a four month leave to Abbottabad in 1932.

Fazl-i-Husain took interest in Indo-Japanese trade negotiations and created healthy environment for the sale of Indian grown cotton. He got recognition for Indian Medical degrees by the Medical Council of Great Britain. The motivation to work for the All-India Council for Agricultural Research was another achievement. He organised an All India Wheat Conference, Crop-planning Conference and a Co-operators Conference to encourage the economic expansion. He launched Marketing Section to support marketing facilities for agricultural produce and set parameters for the Council of Agricultural Research. He revived the Advisory Board of Education for the harmonisation of educational efforts in diverse portions of India.⁴⁸⁶

3.1.10 Round Table Conference

On May 12, 1930, Governor General Lord Irwin (1926-1931) proclaimed that His Majesty's Government called a conference which will consist of the Indian representatives to solve constitutional problems. Fazl-i-Husain therefore used all his influence in Muslim Delegation selection. The Viceroy proposed the Muslim members which include Dr. Ansari and Sir Ali Imam. Fazl-i-Husain protested it. Fazl-i-Husain nominated new members (Aga Khan, Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan, and Dr. Shafaat Ahmad). Government needed the Congress co-operation in Round Table Conferences. The Mahasabha Hindus

⁴⁸⁶Ahmad, *Fazl Husain*, pp. 41-56.

both in India and in England violently agitated in the Press against Fazl-i-Husain,⁴⁸⁷ and accused him of sacrificing India to communal deliberations.

Gandhi before second Round Table Conference failed to satisfy Muslims and the All-India Muslim Conference. Gandhi went to London without resolving the communal issue. After the second Round Table Conference, the British Prime Minister Ramsay announced communal Award on August 16, 1932. It declared separate electorates and preserved the principle of weightage for Muslim-minority provinces. The total Muslim population were 56 per cent in the Punjab and seats were given only 86 out of 175.⁴⁸⁸ The Sikhs received 32 seats while they had only 13.2 per cent share in the population of the Punjab. In other provinces, the position of the Muslims was as under:⁴⁸⁹

Table No. 1

Province	Muslim population		Total	Seats reserved for Muslims
	Percentage	Seats		
Madras	7.9	215	29	
Bombay excluding Sind	9.2	175	30	
The United Provinces	15.3	228	66	
The Central Provinces	4.7	112	14	
Assam	33.7	108	34	
Sind	70.7	60	34	
N.W.F. Province	91.8	50	36	
Bihar and Orissa	10.8	175	42	

The Muslims were not satisfied, but they reluctantly accepted it.

⁴⁸⁷ Diary-October 9, 1930. quoted in Waheed Ahmad, ed., *Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 30.

⁴⁸⁸ Waheed-uz-Zaman, *Towards Pakistan* (Lahore: Publishers United, 1964), p. 70

⁴⁸⁹ Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan-The Formative Phase 1858-1948* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 78.

3.1.11 Fazl-i-Husain in Final Phase of Struggle

Fazl-i-Husain did not recognise that “the war of succession” was expected to start. He declined to preside over the session of the All-India Muslim League and gave no weightage to Quaid when he visited Lahore in 1936. Things were made easier for Fazl-i-Husain by the reluctance of the princely states to work for the new Indian centre. Fazl-i-Husain could establish provincial rule unfettered by responsible central control.⁴⁹⁰ But Fazl-i-Husain died on July 9, 1936, after a severe attack of bronchitis, well before provincial rule could be realized.⁴⁹¹

Fazl-i-Husain had exclusive place in the Punjab and common people trusted upon him because he did not support individual favouritism.⁴⁹² His impact on Punjab political life was due to his creative schemes, political organization, policies and programme which gave him control of the provincial legislature.⁴⁹³ He proved to be “a man of inflexible will and immutable purpose, with a mind like diamond which can cut its way through anything.”⁴⁹⁴ Chhotu Ram admired his qualities as under:

there are very few people I have come across, who possess anything like his vision, or other rare qualities which Mian Fazl-i-Husain. On account of the possession of these rare qualities, he has been to overcome almost every difficulty that has come in his way. The peculiar qualities to which I wish to refer are that he not only a very clever politician but he is also a very successful administrator. Not only he is a very successful administrator but his is a very far-sighted statesman.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹⁰Page, *Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims*, p. 299.

⁴⁹¹Ahmad, *Marshal Law say Marshal Law Tak*, p. 180.

⁴⁹²Ikram, *Modern Muslim India*, p. 231.

⁴⁹³*Ibid.*, p. 230.

⁴⁹⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁵Chhotu Ram’s Speech, delivered at the Chasht, National Unionist Party Secretariat, Lahore, June 19, 1932, pp. 2-3.

Fazl-i-Husain ideology was that democracy should be run by parties having non-communal lines. Fazl-i-Husain advocated the origin of civil liberties and right in the Punjab but often not succeeded due to official obstacles. The *Observer* and the *Zamindar* criticised him for his “loyalty to the British Government at every cost.” Fazl-i-Husain focused in his political career on democracy and opposed to despotism and autocracy. He alleged in specific liberty and the purity of the human character.⁴⁹⁶ Fazl-i-Husain lived for short span of time after the establishment of the Unionist Party. He suffered from frail health in his whole life. He was measured as the outstanding statesman. The event of his demise was widely taken note of both in India and abroad. Bold headlines in the press proclaimed him as “Maker of modern India,” “The most successful politician of India” and “India’s greatest statesman.”⁴⁹⁷ The BBC declared:

Sir Fazl-i-Husain was by far and away the most important political figure in the Punjab and one of the ablest leaders, hitherto produced by the Muslim community. By common consent he was a great parliamentarian whom the Reforms have produced, and it is a strategy that he should not have been spared to help India and his province along the next stage of constitutional development.⁴⁹⁸

3.2 Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan (1892-1942)

3.2.1 Early Life and Education

Sikandar Hayat Khan was born on June 5, 1892.⁴⁹⁹ He belonged to the renowned clan of Khattars, living in Wah near Hassan Abdal.⁵⁰⁰ He took deep interest from his childhood in literature, sports, like cricket, hockey and sociable disposition. Later he joined Aligarh where he entered in Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental Collegiate High School and

⁴⁹⁶Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 174.

⁴⁹⁷D.C. Verma, *Sir Chhotu Life and Times* (New Delhi: Sterling Publisher, 1981), p 116.

⁴⁹⁸*The Civil and Military Gazette*, July 15, 1936.

⁴⁹⁹Saeed Baig, *Hayat-i-Sikandar* (Lahore: Taj Company, 1944), p. 17.

⁵⁰⁰Iftikhar Haider Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan: A Political Biography* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, 1985), p. 7.

after that proceeded to England for higher education. He came back because of his death of Ghaiart Hayat Khan, his elder brother. His dynamic involvement in politics ⁵⁰¹ and trouble with his eyesight were causing difficulties for him to continue his studies in England. Sikandar Hayat's active part in the Ghadr Party was not acceptable to the British Indian Government. The government put pressure on two of his brothers having official posts to recall him.⁵⁰² While returning to Punjab, Sikandar Hayat and Malik Lal Khan, in their interview told that:

Sir Sikandar began to participate in the activities of Ghadr Party, rather he was an active leader of the party, when the Indian Government became aware of it, she, through, compulsion on his two brothers, who were holding posts in the Government, got him returned to India. On the arrival, he met me at Gujranwala, where I was the manager of Islamia High School as well as member of Municipality, I was to hold, that evening, a session of the School Foundation under the chairmanship of Malik Mubaraz Khan Tiwana. At that very time, Sikandar Hayat Khan came to see me. I offered him a char, but he refused to sit on a mat. It was due to the humbleness inculcated in him in the Ghadr Party. He asked me to help him in seeking a job from him. I introduced him to Malik Mubaraz Khan; and next day, we all three left for Rawalpindi. Here, was managed a post of jamadar in the army, through the kind offices of the Jhelum Recruiting Officer. At Gujranwala, his two brothers were cautious enough not to endanger their jobs for their activist brother; so he sought refuge with me.⁵⁰³

During the First World War, Sikandar was Captain in British Army, while posted in the North West Frontier Post, he got an Member of the Order of the British Empire (M.B.E.) In 1920, he took interest in the commerce and industry and was Managing Director of several industrial concerns. His attention rested with the Punjab Portland Cement Company.⁵⁰⁴ He was also major shareholder of the Taj Company Limited, Lahore and paid big sums for the publication of the Quranic literature.

⁵⁰¹ Baig, *Hayat-i-Sikandar*, p. 20.

⁵⁰² Malik Lal Khan, interviewed on October 8, 1971, at Lahore quoted in Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan*, p. 8

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*, p.10.

⁵⁰⁴ Baig, *Hayat-i-Sikandar*, p. 23.

He was an honorary magistrate of his local area and Vice-Chairman of the Attock District Board, besides informally holding the office of Chairman of the Hasan Abdal Small-Town Committee. Sikandar Hayat had a steadfast spiritual installation. He performed prayers regularly and daily dispersed charities to the people who assembled outside his house.⁵⁰⁵ He was very respectful to his servants.⁵⁰⁶ In 1921, his election was set aside, and he had to wait till 1924 before his entry in the Legislative Assembly. In 1928, he supervised the Punjab Reforms Committee set up by the Provincial Legislative Council to work in collaboration with the Simon Commission. In 1929, he became the Revenue Member of the Government of the Punjab and acted as Governor in 1932. In 1936, he was designated leader of the Unionist Party after the demise of Fazl-i-Husain.

3.2.2 Sikandar as a Revenue Member

Sikandar Hayat was appointed as the new Revenue Minister of the province.⁵⁰⁷ Sir Chhotu Ram a veteran Unionist, issued a statement to the newspapers on July 22, 1932:

His Excellency Captain Nawab Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan has proved his high qualities and administrative genius in his designation as the Revenue Member of the Punjab Government. Though he holds no university degrees, yet he has the highest mental and academic properties. He is a first rank liberal statesman and a conscientious leader, while being industrious at the same time. His Excellency is totally free from communalism, and I am sure that his new administration would be honoured and liked by all the groups of Punjabis.⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁵Shaukat Hayat Khan interviewed on October 18, 1971, at Lahore. quoted in Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan*, p. 12.

⁵⁰⁶Baig, *Hayat-i-Sikandar*, p. 112

⁵⁰⁷Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 270.

⁵⁰⁸Krishna Daya Kapur, *Monography No. 4: A History of the Development of the Judiciary in the Punjab 1884-1926* (Lahore: Punjab Government Press, 1928), pp. 65-66.

3.2.3 Sikandar served as a Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank

In the ailment of Sir Geoffrey de Montmonrency in 1932, Sir Sikandar Hayat appointed as Governor in place of H. Calvert, I.C.S and again from February 15, 1934, to June 9, 1934, in the absence of Lt. Governor Herbert Emerson worked as the chief executive of the province.⁵⁰⁹

Sikandar Hayat had close relations with the British. In his London visit, he applauded the co-operation received from the British:

I have the fullest confidence in the effective working of the administration under the Reforms. Both as a member of Government and Acting Governor, I received the fullest co-operation from the ICS, the Police and other service. In the Punjab, all the communities response confidence in the British officers of Government, and we hope that under the new Constitution there will be a substantial leavening of the British element in the services.⁵¹⁰

Sikandar Hayat wanted the welfare of the people of Punjab, to continue a non-partisan and non-communal policy. Sikandar Hayat bestowed with a knighthood in 1933. In 1934, Sikandar Hayat was appointed as Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of a salary of Rs. 5,500 per mensem. Sikandar Hayat joined the new assignment and for the time being the political conflict among prominent Unionists abated. Sikandar Hayat recaptured the assurance of his political mentor, he had not given up his independent political ambitions.

3.2.4 Sikandar Hayat and Punjab

Sikandar Hayat had started contributing in animated politics in 1920.⁵¹¹ In 1921, he was elected to the Punjab Legislative Council. He was effectively entering in the politics

⁵⁰⁹Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan*, p. 46

⁵¹⁰*Ibid.*

⁵¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 41.

with the emergence of the Unionist Party as the key political force in the Punjab. In 1928, he met his first assignment when he managed the Punjab Reforms Committee established by the Punjab Legislature. The Nehru and Gandhi subjugated the Congress, whereas Jinnah and Iqbal had struggled to defend the rights of Muslims under the flag of the League. The Simon Commission came in India having no Indian representative. It created anger and agitation among Indian masses. Punjab Legislative Council suggested the names of Sikandar Hayat, Zafrullah Khan, Chhotu Ram and Owen Roberts to cooperate with the Commission on constitutional issues.⁵¹² The Unionist members made the following recommendations before the Commission:

All powers of the Provincial Government should be vested with the Cabinet, and the Governor should only act as a constitutional head. The Centre should have a federal system with limited powers and the remaining powers should be allocated to the federating units. The Centre should deal with the matters of security, stability, and defence. Separate electorates should be retained. Muslims should be given one-third representation in the Central Legislative Council. Reforms should be introduced in *Balochistan* and NWFP. Sind should be separated from Bombay and designated as a separate province. The minorities should be given a weightage of seats without affecting the majority communities.⁵¹³

The Punjab's crops were affected by the disaster of the monsoon rains and in 1931 all the canals were dried. When the rains occurred, the Punjab's plains were underwater, triggering widespread devastation. Sikandar Hayat had lack of experience in dealing with the financial problems. Distress and disappointment were spread among the peasants. Moreover, Sikandar Hayat organised government loans and despite hostility got the Legislative Council to pass a bill for the formation of an Arbitration Board to decide differences between money-lenders and borrowers. Sikandar Hayat was interested in the wellbeing of the land-owing class in accord with the faith of the Unionist Party. His father

⁵¹²Indra Gandhi, *My Truth* (Delhi: Vision Books, 1981), p. 23.

⁵¹³Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan*, pp. 43-44.

performed a decisive character in the outline of the Land Alienation of Act of 1900.⁵¹⁴ Prior to the Act,⁵¹⁵ the agricultural community in the Punjab had been suffering great at the hands of money-lenders; but the Act too, did not mitigate their problems. Sikandar Hayat had the full provision of his party when he wanted to work for the agrarian class in the province. To make himself strong in the provincial Legislature, Sikandar Hayat tried to safeguard the rights of his native supporters in Attock. Sikandar hunted to erect a network of Unionist branches which would generate a locus of power independent of the rural notables.

3.2.5 Role in Politics

After Fazl-i-Husain, the responsibilities of leadership fell on Sikandar Hayat's shoulders. Sikandar Hayat was acceptable to all communities because of his communal approach. The *Tribune* asserted "the announcement will be welcomed even by those whose expectations from the Unionist Party, of which Sir Sikandar Hayat will now be the leader, are much less than those of the members of the party themselves."⁵¹⁶ Fazl-i-Husain certainly was thinking of retirement from politics. At this time, Sikandar Hayat, too joined those trying to persuade him to renew his leadership and wrote him as follows:

Unless you are prepared to take the lead and get into harness again I am afraid the Muslim will go under for ever from the very start. If you come forward I can assure you once again that there will be no dearth of reliable and efficient lieutenants to assist you in your work. What they need is a sound leader and clear and definite advice. The rest they can be depended upon to do themselves. The present position is that they are like the railway carriage without an engine. I do hope and earnestly wish that you will be able to change your mind on mature thoughts.⁵¹⁷

⁵¹⁴Rafiq, *Malik Barkat Ali: His Life and Writings*, (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1969), pp. 50-52.

⁵¹⁵Barrier, *The Punjab Land of Alienation Act of 1900* (Durham: Duke University, 1966), p. 20.

⁵¹⁶*Tribune* July 23, 1936, Information Department Government of Punjab, *Report on Newspapers and Periodicals in the Punjab*, Lahore, 1936, p. 312.

⁵¹⁷Letter Sikandar Hayat to Fazl-i-Husain, dated, September 23, 1935 quoted in Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan*, p. 34.

Sikandar Hayat actively involved in religious enterprises and benevolent activities. He paid full consideration towards the repairs in the *Badshahi Mosque* and to religious publications of the Taj Company. He also supported the activities of the *Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam* to stimulate education among Muslims.

3.2.6 Elections 1937

In the elections 1937, the League secured only two Muslim seats while, the Unionist Party secured 88, the Congress managed only 18 seats, 36 begged by non-Congress Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab Legislative Assembly.⁵¹⁸

Table No. 2

Punjab Legislative Assembly Constituencies, 1937

Constituencies	Urban	Rural	Total
Urban	8	34	42
Mohammadans	9	75	84
Sikhs	2	29	31
Special	-	-	18
Total	19	138	175 ⁵¹⁹

3.2.7 Sikandar Hayat's Coalition Cabinet and Premiership

Sikandar Hayat's Cabinet consisted on three Muslims, two Hindus and one Sikh. The Cabinet was sworn in on April 1, 1937. Sikandar Hayat stated his determination to curb unemployment in the province and installed strategy of non-communal political faith.

⁵¹⁸Letter Iqbal to Jinnah dated August 23, 1936. quoted in Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan*. p. 48.

⁵¹⁹Yadav, *Elections in Punjab*, p. 16.

On April 13, 1937, in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, Sikandar Hayat observed: "If ever we find that the Governor disagrees with what we believe is the right thing to do in the interests of the people, we shall not hesitate to resign offices and go to the opposition benches."⁵²⁰

Raja Narendra Nath astonished Sikandar Hayat by resigning from the Punjab Legislative Assembly.⁵²¹ Raja Narendra Nath was against the amendments made in the Land Alienation Act which disallowed the money-lending class from taking over the land or produce of farmers who failed to return debts. The Sikandar-Jinnah Pact intensified the non-Muslims and the imposition of extra taxes on the commercial class inclined to endorse their distrust. But Sikandar Hayat asserted his non-communal policy, while addressing the annual convocation of the Punjab University, observed: "In conclusion I would appeal to the youth of the Punjab, the future hope of our province, to keep clear of the party narrow-minded communalism which dictates intolerance and injustice to others."⁵²²

Sikandar Hayat along with other Muslims assumed fund raising responsibility.⁵²³ Sikandar Hayat took deep interest for the Quranic literature. Sikandar Hayat's interest in education followed a tradition established by his father.

Sikandar Hayat showed a passionate interest in the educational undertakings of the *Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam*. On the Jubilee Session of the *Anjuman* held in December 24, 1938, Sikandar Hayat donated a sum of Rs. 25,000 to the *Anjuman* on behalf of the Punjab

⁵²⁰I.H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan* (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1965), pp. 83-84

⁵²¹Since Sikandar Hayat was opposed to communalism, he did not adhere to the principle of separate electorates. Quoted in Baig, *Hayat-i-Sikandar*, p. 56.

⁵²²*The Indian Annual Register*, 1937, Vol. II, p. 535 quoted in Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan*, p. 50.

⁵²³*The Indian Annual Register*, 1938, Vol. I, p. 238 quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 51.

Government.⁵²⁴ Sikandar Hayat established collaboration with non-Unionist Hindu and Sikh leaders, giving few of them ministerial position.

Occasionally, the Muslim press of the Punjab expressed its resentment at the way of Sikhs insistently put forward their demands to the Premier. The criticism levelled against Sikandar Hayat over his joining hands with the League in 1937 and later, against his role in the holding of its historic session at Lahore in 1940 came from non-Unionist circles of non-Muslim Punjabis. Even the Khalsa National Party of Sardar Sundar Singh Majithia, the Revenue Minister of the Punjab, viewed: "In the opinion of the Party the resolution of the Muslim League has created a situation which may mean a parting of the ways for the Sikhs and the Muslims with whom the Khalsa National Party had been co-operating in the Provincial Autonomy regime."⁵²⁵

Though, Sikandar Hayat tried to evade communal controversies as much as possible. In June 1942, he did a settlement with Sardar Baldev Singh, the spokesman of the Sikhs⁵²⁶ in the Punjab Legislative Assembly and forwarded the terms of the pact to him in a letter.⁵²⁷ In reply, Baldev Singh conceded Sikandar Hayat services to the Sikhs and

⁵²⁴Daily, *Khalid* (Lahore, December 26, 1938).

⁵²⁵Resolution of the Khalsa National Party, Lahore, March 29, 1940.

⁵²⁶*Inqilab*, March 2, 1940

⁵²⁷The terms of the Pact as announced on July 15, 1942, were as follows:

- (i) The *Jhatka* for Sikhs would be done according to their faith, making *Jhatka* meat available from their shops.
- (ii) At a convenient time in the future, the Gurumukhi script would be facilitated for the Sikhs as a medium of instruction
- (iii) Religious laws would be discussed and passed with the accord of the respective community.
- (iv) The Sikhs would enjoy a 20 percent allocation of seats in jobs, as allotted to them earlier. However, promotion would be strictly on merit. Efforts for the proper uplift of the Sikh community would be continued.
- (v) The Punjab Premier would support the maximum representation of Sikhs in the Central Assembly for special comments. *The Transfer of Power*. Vol. II, p. 297.

guaranteed him of his full co-operation in the wake of non-communal policies. This pact strengthened the communal origins of his government.

Sikandar Hayat in the Second World War vigorously wanted to help for the war effort "on behalf of a self-respecting and brave people, who offer the hand of friendship and cooperation in a spirit of mutual confidence and trust".⁵²⁸ In another statement, he forecasted "that the Punjab will rise to its highest traditions and once again establish its proud claim to be the sword-arm of India."⁵²⁹ He also convinced the Punjab Legislative Assembly, to pass a resolution for the establishment of a War fund, with a cumulative capital of Rs.150 crores, to provide necessary facilities and assistance to the soldiers and their families after the War was over.⁵³⁰

Sikandar Hayat during the days of premiership strengthened his position as a provincial leader. He was acceptable to all sections of Punjabis without discrimination. Sikandar Hayat not ever tried to become an all-India leader. He tried to demonstrate himself a moderate loyalist to the British rulers. With the Punjab Muslim Press support he was able to venture a better image of his stature to the rest of South Asia.

3.2.8 Golden Acts

Initially in 1937, Sikandar started a six-year programme of rural development which was for the formation of schools, medical centres, model farmers and upgraded drainage and sanitation. The Ministry took many initiatives to accomplish its promise of 'lightening the burden of the peasantry and uplifting the backward classes.' Debt

⁵²⁸Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan: A Political Biography*, pp. 65-67.

⁵²⁹Letter, Jinnah to Ispahani, June 24, 1940. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁵³⁰Baig, *Hayat-i-Sikandar*, p. 59.

Conciliation Boards were formed in every district which climbed down agriculturalists debts from Rs 1.5 *crores* to Rs. 4 *crores*. The Ministry under Section 61 of Civil Procedure Code dispensed a notification which exempted whole of the fodder crop of an agriculturalist debtor and a proportion of the yield of his grain crop from attachment in the execution of civil decrees.⁵³¹ As land modifications was unpleasant to the Unionist Party's elite supporters, Chhotu Ram was again given his head in pursuing in moneylenders and traders.⁵³²

The Registration of Money-Lenders Act delivered that a money-lenders would not be able to get their loans through Law Courts unless he was licensed. The Punjab Alienation of Land Second Amendment Act shut the gap shaped by the *benami* transaction. Under this the moneylenders had employed agents in the villages who belonged to statutory agriculturalist tribes, and essentially their borrower to handover their land to the agent, so it never went to agriculturalist hands. The upshot was that over 200,000 Hindus and Sikhs had to return an estimated 700,000 acres to its original owners.⁵³³ Chhotu Ram held a conference at Lyallpur early in September 1938 in which more than 150,000 agriculturalists demonstrated their support for these Golden Acts. The 'Golden Acts' shattered the Congress's hope to gain popularity in the villages. The Congress's elusions concerning the Golden Acts further diluted its support in the towns, whereas in the villages it isolated the Hindu and Sikh cultivators.⁵³⁴

⁵³¹ Director Information Bureau Lahore, *Five Years of Provincial Autonomy in the Punjab 1937-42* (Lahore: Punjab Government Press, 1942), pp. 15-16.

⁵³² Malik, *A Profile in Courage: A Biography of Chaudhri Chhotu Ram* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 2.

⁵³³ R. Narendranath, "The Punjab Agrarian Laws and their Economics and Constitutional hearings", *Modern Reviews* 65, (1939), p. 30.

⁵³⁴ Punjab FR, 26 October 1938, L/P&J/5/241 IOR. quoted in Talbot, *Khizar Hayat*, p. 101.

3.2.9 Sikandar Hayat and The Unionists

From 1930 to 1935, Fazl-i-Husain kept away from the Punjab because he was nominated in Viceroy's Executive Council. In his absence Sikandar Hayat got confidence of the masses for the control of the Unionist Party. In 1930, a dispute arose between Chaudhary Zafrullah and Firoz Khan Noon over a ministerial post, Fazl-i-Husain wrote to Sikandar Hayat for conciliation between the two, he requested to "try to prevent this scramble for office degenerating into squabbles."⁵³⁵ From the improvements at that time, Fazl-i-Husain was impressed by Sikandar Hayat's capabilities and considered him as a possible future leader of the Unionists.

Fazl-i-Husain's non-communal policy was a big hurdle to join hand with Jinnah. When efforts were made by Iqbal and Jinnah to reactive the Punjab Muslim League, Fazl-i-Husain clearly differed with it. Fazl-i-Husain disliked the establishment of the Central Parliamentary Board of the League, and expressed that in a letter on May 1936 to Sikandar Hayat:

Jinnah's move in establishing a Central Parliamentary Board of the League was a wrong move, detrimental to the Indian Muslims interest. We have taken the right line. He has misrepresented us and press propaganda in his support is responsible for his utter failure of not having been broadcasted. We refused to join him, Ittehad-i-Millat has refused to join him. Ahrars have been negotiating with him. Whether they join him or not, their positon remains the same. Miscellaneous urbanites, like Iqbal, Shuja, Tajuddin, Barkat Ali, have naturally been trying to make something out of this, so the scheme is purely a paper one.⁵³⁶

Sikandar Hayat expressed the same views earlier in a letter:

Meanwhile, I have asked Ahmad Yar to convey to Jinnah to live up to his professed view that he wants Muslims to be one united body and to speak with one voice both to the Congress and the British. His activities during the past few weeks, judging from the press reports, are contrary to his professions. I have also asked Ahmad Yar to strongly press on him the advisability of keeping his finger out of the Punjab pie. If he meddles, he would only be encouraging fissiparous tendencies already painfully discernible in a section of Punjabi Muslims, and might burn his fingers; and in

⁵³⁵Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 270.

⁵³⁶Letter, Fazl-i-Husain to Sikandar, May 6, 1936. quoted in Ahmad, ed., *Diary and Notes*, pp. 533-34.

any case, we cannot possibly allow 'provincial autonomy' to be tampered with in any sphere, and by anybody, be he a nominee of the powers who have given us this autonomy or a President of the Muslim League or any other association or body.⁵³⁷

During 1936, the party politics in Punjab was a hotbed. The Unionists were divided into two groups; the Muslim League asserted the only representative party of Muslims, and many other communal parties signified Sikhs or Hindu.⁵³⁸ Fazl-i-Husain tried his best to control the situation but he was unsuccessful. The *Tribune* maintained that Sikandar Hayat had "expressed his readiness to his non-Muslim friends to take a leading part in the formation of the future provincial cabinet," and had imparted the impression that he should follow "a less aggressively communal policy than that of Sir Fazl-i-Husain."⁵³⁹ Fazl-i-Husain, still acting as the party boss, sought a clarification from Sikandar Hayat when he visited Lahore in March 1936.

3.2.10 Confrontation with The *Ahrars*

The Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam or the Ahrar Party came into existence in 1929 with the aim of creating an Islamic State within the Subcontinent that would manage its affairs in accordance with Islamic dictates of life.⁵⁴⁰ Its membership consisted on those who had lost faith in the Congress, the League and were fundamentally opposed to British imperial strategies in the Punjab. The Ahrars could not assemble any stable support to confront with the Unionists.

In 1935, Fazl-i-Husain was restructuring the Unionist Party, he evaded the Ahrars and established faster affairs with the Ahmedis.⁵⁴¹ Numerous reliable colleagues of Fazl-i-

⁵³⁷ Letter Sikandar Hayat to Fazl-i-Husain, dated May 1, 1936. *Ibid.*, pp. 527-531.

⁵³⁸ Husain. *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 323.

⁵³⁹ *Tribune*, Lahore, April 1, 1936.

⁵⁴⁰ Afzal Haq, *Tharik-i-Ahrar* (Lahore: Maktaba-i-Tabsra, 1968), p. 9.

⁵⁴¹ *Tribune*, Lahore, May 17, July 17, and July 20, 1935.

Husain were assisting the Ahrars and giving them ethical and fiscal provision for their movement to recover the *Shahidganj* Mosque.

In a message, the Secretary of State acknowledged the severity of the *Shahidganj* conflict, which had increased the difficulties Sikandar Hayat faced. Governor Herbert Emerson also faced problems on account of the *Shahidganj* situation and together with the Premier courted further unpopularity by starting a witch-hunt of alleged communists in the province.⁵⁴² At the departure of Herbert Emerson, Sir Henry Craik took over as the new Governor of the Punjab on April 7, 1938. The same day, he wrote to Linlithgow, briefing him on his meeting with Sikandar Hayat, in which Jinnah's offer to help Sikandar Hayat in resolving the Shahiganj issue was discussed. Despite the lessening of the Ahrar pressure, Sikandar Hayat was still in a troubled situation, since the Shahidganj controversy had shaken the very roots of the Unionist Party, and by mid-1939, it became subject to serious discord. The Governor felt that this "might ultimately lead to serious dissensions in the Unionist Party, which even Sikandar, in spite of his general popularity, might find it difficult to handle."⁵⁴³ The Governor was kept well-informed on tensions in the Unionist Party, as he received regular secret reports on the Ministers as well as other leading members of the Party.⁵⁴⁴

3.2.11 Sikandar and the Khaksars

Another challenge for Sikandar Hayat was from Inayatullah Khan Mashriqi (1888-1963) and his Khaksar Movement, started in 1931. Sikandar Hayat dealt severely with the

⁵⁴²Shorish Kashmiri, *Iftikhar-ud-Din* (Lahore: Progressive Press Ltd., 1967), pp 16-17.

⁵⁴³Craik to Linlithgow, June 24, 1938. quoted in Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan: A Political Biography*, p. 62.

⁵⁴⁴P. Moon to Puckle, Secretary to Governor, July 2, 1938. *Ibid.*

Khaksars that stimulated ill-will against him in different Muslim quarters of South Asia.⁵⁴⁵

The Khaksars started their political engagement on December 13, 1937, when they offered their demands to Sikandar Hayat:

A *zakat* organization should be created and the administration of a *bait-ul-mal* and its expenditure should be taken care of on all-India basis. The Punjab Cabinet should correspond with the Indian Government for the establishment or a radio station in the province. Government officials should not be barred from joining the Khaksar Movement, and the Punjab Government should withdraw all its restrictions in this regard.⁵⁴⁶

On March 6, 1938, Mashriqi wrote a letter to Sikandar Hayat, thanking him for considering three demands already presented to him.⁵⁴⁷ Many letters and telegrams were sent to Sikandar Hayat, to know about his decision on three demands. A clash between the Khaksars and the Punjab Government was inevitable, but on November 14, 1938, the Punjab government acknowledged the Khaksar demands, and the Punjab rescued from bloodshed. Relations between the Unionist Government and the Khaksars worsened, on February 28, 1940, the police confiscated the pamphlet and literature of the Tehrik.⁵⁴⁸ Later the *al-Islah* (Magzine) was banned. The office of the *Al-Islah* was transferred to Delhi, in March 1940. Mashriqi elaborated that Sikandar Hayat wanted to destroy Khaksars.

On March 18, 1940, 313 Khaksars heading towards the Badshahi Mosque with spades on their shoulders. Near the Shahi Mohallah, police confronted them. The reports estimated the death toll at between 50,⁵⁴⁹ and many injured. Sikandar Hayat's rivals criticised him for the massacre. Subsequently, the League Working Committee recommended that Sikandar Hayat must remove all restrictions executed on the Khaksars

⁵⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁵⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁵⁴⁷ *Inqilab*, February 22, 1938.

⁵⁴⁸ *Al-Islah*, March 8-15, 1940.

⁵⁴⁹ *The Indian Annual Register*, 1940, Vol. I, p. 189 quoted in Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan. A Political Biography*, p. 68.

and asked for inquiry, the Jinnah presented his consideration with them. In the Punjab Assembly, Sikandar Hayat faced sharp criticism from the opposition.

On March 19, 1940, soon after the incident, Craik sent a telegram to Linlitgow informing him about clash and its casualties: 23 Khaksars killed, 40 wounded; two British police officials and two local police officers were also wounded. He also added that the troops had been called out and the procession had been tear-gassed. After praising the conciliatory role of Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang, Craik observed 'I think it must be admitted that Jinnah handled a difficult situation with very great skill.'⁵⁵⁰ The clash between the Unionists and the Khaksars undermined the fame of the Unionists, especially among the Muslims of the Punjab. The conditions that ultimately led to the fall of Unionists Government in 1947, while all discontented groups went against it.⁵⁵¹

3.2.12 Sikandar Hayat and the Muslim League

Sikandar Hayat informed Jinnah that "the Muslim members of the Unionist Party be known as Muslim League Unionists."⁵⁵² The Unionist Party was composed of elements that were ready to co-operate with the Muslim League, and Sir Sikandar assured Jinnah of the whole-hearted support and loyalty to all the Muslim Leaguers at heart. Jinnah could not accept Sir Sikandar's suggestion, made the Muslim Leaguers very depressed. Resulting the Muslim League devastation in the elections, which gained only two of a total of 175 seats in the Punjab Assembly.⁵⁵³

⁵⁵⁰Craik to Linlithgow, March 25, 1940. *Ibid.*, p. 71

⁵⁵¹*Ibid.*

⁵⁵²Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz, *Father and Daughter* (Lahore: Nigarishat, 1971), p. 163.

⁵⁵³Iqbal to Jinnah, April 22, 1937. quoted in Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan: A Political Biography*. p. 76.

Ispahani observed that Sikandar Hayat, along with his Muslim Unionist followers joined hands with the League “not out of deep conviction”, but “as a matter of necessity. He knew that the Unionist Ministry by itself could not withstand the tide of Congress totalitarianism unless he secured the support of a Muslim organization functioning on an all-India plane.”⁵⁵⁴ The only hindrance to the development of a co-operative relationship between the two parties had been the Unionists reluctance to give up non-communal stance.⁵⁵⁵ Thus, the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact was not an abrupt development, but the result of place,⁵⁵⁶ it emerged as “the shining hour of Sikandar’s political career.”⁵⁵⁷ Sikandar-Jinnah Pact made on October 1937, as under:

- (1) That on his return to the Punjab Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan will convene a special meeting of his party and advise all Muslim members of his party who are not members of the Muslim League already to sign its creed and join it. As such they will be subject to the rules and regulations of the Central and Provincial Boards of the All-India Muslim League. This will not affect the continuance of the present coalition and the Unionist Party.
- (2) That in future elections and by-elections for the legislature after the adoption of this arrangement, the groups constituting the present Unionist Party will jointly support the candidates put up by their respective groups.
- (3) That the Muslim member of the legislature who is elected on or accept the League ticket will

⁵⁵⁴Ispahani, *Quaid-e-Azam as I knew Him* (Karachi: Forward Publications Trust, 1967), pp. 54-55.

⁵⁵⁵*The Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, May 7, 937.

⁵⁵⁶Ahmad, *Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, pp. 188-189.

⁵⁵⁷Ikram, *Modern Muslim India*, p. 252.

constitute the Muslim League Party within the Legislature. It shall be open to the Muslim League Party to maintain or enter into coalition or alliance with any other party consistently with the fundamental principles, policy and programme of the League. Such alliances may be evolved upon after the elections. The existing combination shall maintain its present name, the 'Unionist Party.'

(4) In view of the aforesaid agreement the Provincial League Parliamentary Board shall be reconstituted.⁵⁵⁸

Under the stress of Congress, it was need of the time for Sikandar to join hands with the Quaid-i-Azam. The understanding consolidated the hands of the Premier but it certified the League to arrive in power corridors of the Unionist government. Sikandar determined the famous "Sikandar-Jinnah Pact" in October 1937 with the Muslim League Premier which was an attempt to bring the League effectively under the Unionist control. However, the results proved counter-productive. After Sikandar Hayat his successor Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana, tried to demote the League to an inferior status in the provincial politics, Jinnah was furious. He denounced the pact and charged: 'How could there be a pact between a leader and a follower?'⁵⁵⁹

Sikandar-Jinnah Pact displeased the British. The British considered that it enabled Sikandar Hayat to deal with the British on equal footings by subscribing to the creed of the Muslim League, which was becoming critical of the British Government, particularly when

⁵⁵⁸Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan*, p. 162.

⁵⁵⁹Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publishers, 1995), p. 39.

it desired communal harmony in the Subcontinent. Many Muslim leaders welcomed Sikandar Hayat's alliance with the League in the general interest of the Subcontinent's Muslims.⁵⁶⁰ However, it disappointed non-Muslim Unionists and worried other non-Muslim Punjabi. The Punjab Muslim League, led by Iqbal and Malik Barkat Ali became more and more critical of Sikandar Hayat.⁵⁶¹

Ashiq Batalvi has also criticized Sikandar Hayat's servile loyalty to the British Government, which among other things made him support its imports policies, despite their negative impact on the economy of the Subcontinent. Sikandar Hayat worked in a complex situation in which he endeavoured to do what he could without disturbing a delicate equilibrium between a number of pressure groups with conflicting interests. According to Batalvi, despite his pledge, Sikandar Hayat never founded a Muslim League Party in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, and it was his ambivalence towards the League that led to differences between the Punjab League and himself.⁵⁶²

The Viceroy's Indian National Defence Council, established by Lord Linlithgow in July 1941 to assemble Indian support for the war through its membership of noticeable personalities, comprising the Premiers of the Punjab, Bengal, Sind and Assam. The Quaid severely criticized that motion and the League Working Committee demanded that Sikandar Hayat and others should resign from the Council. On August 25, 1941 the Working Committee passed a resolution demanding the immediate resignations from Sikandar Hayat Khan and other Muslim members.⁵⁶³ Sikandar gave his resignation from

⁵⁶⁰Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan* (Karachi: Longmans Pakistan Branch, 1961), p. 290.

⁵⁶¹Ibid., p. 228.

⁵⁶²Batalvi, *Hamari Qaumi Jidd-o-Jihd*, 1939 (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1968), pp. 71-72.

⁵⁶³ Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 255

the Council. Sikandar considering the League's authority really important to the Unionist Party's submission to a more energetic, enormous and important movement.

3.2.13 Sikandar Hayat and the Pakistan Movement

Sikandar Hayat prepared an initial draft of the Lahore Resolution in March 1940 and referred it to the Quaid-i-Azam through Mir Maqbool Mahmud.⁵⁶⁴ Sikandar Hayat was in favour of confederation based on provincial autonomy, where provinces like Punjab could retain their geo-political entity. Later in the Punjab Assembly, Sikandar Hayat observed:

I have no hesitation that I was responsible for drafting the original resolution. The main difference between the two resolutions is that the latter part of my resolution which is related to the Centre and co-ordination of the activities of the various units was eliminated. It is, therefore, a travesty of fact to describe the League resolution as it was finally passed as my resolution. It must be taken as the official resolution of the Muslim League which was ratified by the Muslim League.⁵⁶⁵

He was not in favour of partition. In March 1941, the *Civil and Military Gazette*, giving up its earlier balanced approach, declared that it "stands for the preservation of the integrity of India. It opposed Pakistan for a variety of reasons."⁵⁶⁶ The non-Muslims of the Punjab did not welcome the approach of "territorial adjustment", suggesting an ultimate partition. Sikandar Hayat advocated his own Zonal Scheme as a substitute legitimate solution of the political stalemate. Conferring to his scheme,⁵⁶⁷ Federation was to be divided into seven zones alongwith separate legislatures and Federal Assembly of 375 members, one-third of whom would be Muslims. The other minorities participation in the Federal Assembly to be assigned quota as mentioned in the India Act of 1935. In

⁵⁶⁴Ahmad, *Martial Law say Martial Law Tak*, p. 201.

⁵⁶⁵*Punjab legislative Assembly Debates*, 1941, Vol. XVI, pp. 350-356

⁵⁶⁶*Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, March 4, 1941.

⁵⁶⁷The Scheme was published in Indian press on July 30, 1939, given in the *Indian Annual Register*, 1941, Vol. II, p. 234.

unicameral Federal Assembly of 375, with 250 from British India and 125 from the Indian states, Muslims were to have at least one-third representation. The states were allowed to have some nominated member as well as some elected representatives.

Sikandar Hayat's scheme received more criticism than applause. The Congress did not support it because it had uncertain plan for independence. The Muslim League went against it because it had no solution of the communal problem. Ashiq Husain Batalvi accused Sikandar Hayat of trying to supersede the Lahore Resolution with his own scheme.⁵⁶⁸ While praising his scheme the *Civil and Military Gazette* asked how he reconciled his adherence to the Lahore Resolution with his own proposals.⁵⁶⁹ The relations were started to decline between Sikandar and the Quaid. The reasons were that Sikandar Hayat had not shaped a League Parliamentary Party in the Assembly, and irritated Muslims while showing his allegiance to the English war efforts. In March 1942, to gain support for war the British handed out a Draft Declaration on the future of India, designating that after the War, India would be allowed Dominion Status.⁵⁷⁰

Sir Stafford Cripps on March 22, 1942, reached in India and started discussions with the Indian leaders. Sikandar Hayat had informed him that the League was willing towards the suggestions.⁵⁷¹ The Congress and League were not ready to accept it. Sikandar Hayat extending his hand of collaboration to the Muslim League to establish its position in the Punjab, but he was no more alive to complete its mission and died in December 1942.

⁵⁶⁸Batalvi, *Hamari Qaumi Jido-Jihd*, p. 125.

⁵⁶⁹*Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, March 13, 1941.

⁵⁷⁰*Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, February 24, 1942.

⁵⁷¹Stafford Cripps, "My Interview with Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan", L/P&J/1014:141, March 25, 1942, p. 515

Affairs between the Akalis and the Congress further constraint because of Raj Gopal Achari proposals recognized the formation of Pakistan.⁵⁷² This rupture unlocked the way for a alliance between the Akalis and the Unionists. In June 1942 Sikandar came into a pact with Baldev Singh which allocated his seat in the Unionist coalition to the backing he received from the Akali Dal.⁵⁷³ The Sikandar-Baldev Singh Pact, was on social and religious queries as giving *jhatka* meat the same status as *halal* meat. The Pact increased Sikh representation in all departments with communal proportion of 20 per cent.⁵⁷⁴

3.2.14 Sikandar Stance on *Shahid Ganj Masjid*, Lahore.

In 1935, a chain of fierce disturbances happened on the issue of Shahidganj Mosque; and this was the test case for the non-communal doctrine of Unionist ministry. It also enhanced conflict between the Ahrars and the Unionists. Fazl-i-Husain and Ahrars felt uncomfortable with each other. Fazl-i-Husain wrote very critically of the Ahrars: "Their position is one of the dangerous unemployed, and they look out for some mischief. Their tendency is to create disruption in Muslim community and thus injure its soldairity."⁵⁷⁵ In his *Diary*, he wrote as bitterly of those who helped the Ahrars as of the Ahrars themselves:

Ahrars-Mirazi controversy, and now Quetta sufferers have helped Ahrars a great deal. They are the extremists, the riff-raffs of Muslims, and as such Congress seduces them. Firoz is frightened of them and support them: Sikandar and Muzaffar have been in league with them and encouraging them; Amiruddin is also keeping on the right side of them; while Ahmadyar finances them and encourages them and supports them. Thus, they are the recipients of help and support from different person who hope to use them against each other. Even Government officials and in particular, the CID are said to be their supporters. They are strongly against me.⁵⁷⁶

⁵⁷²S. Oren, "The Sikhs, Congress and the Unionists in British Punjab, 1937-1945", *Modern Asian Studies* 8, 3 (1974) p. 41.

⁵⁷³Baldev Singh officially entered into Government as the leader of the United Punjab Party which contained some Muslim and Hindu members as well as Sikhs.

⁵⁷⁴*Civil and Military Gazette* Lahore, 5 June 1942.

⁵⁷⁵September 12, 1935. quoted in Ahmad(ed.), *Diary and Notes*. p. 333.

⁵⁷⁶July 1, 1935. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

3.2.15 Sir Sikander Hayat's Strategy for the World War II

Sir Sikandar Hayat clearly indicated in his speech that if our rulers did not give us freedom after this war, then I would be the first who revolted against them, and they must remember that revolt which came out from the brave nations of the Punjab that would be different from those of Gandhi Taranga. Furthermore, I would appeal to all concerned to place their services and resource at the disposal of their king and country.⁵⁷⁷

Sikandar Hayat offered unconditional support for war. He had visited the Punjab for boosting army recruitment. The war effort gradually led to clash with the Muslim League. The earliest conflict happened in 1940. Jinnah directed that the Muslim Unionist members of the Punjab Provincial War Board should resign in accordance with the Muslim League policy. Jinnah effectively convinced a reluctant Sikandar to step down from the Viceroy's National Defence Council in September 1941. The cause of the surrender of Punjab Premier was undefined.⁵⁷⁸

3.2.16 Laws about Labour Trade Employers

Sikandar had introduced the measures to uplift the labour community. Ban on work under fourteen years of children and every eighth day is considered the holiday. The duty periods would not be exceeded than 54 hours in a week. The employer who functioned in a trading organisation for a year, partaking rights leaves for fifteen days or compensation and who worked for six months, having rights for seven days leave or remuneration. It is the duty of the owner of any institution to retain record of all employees. The other things

⁵⁷⁷ *Inqilab*, 9th January, 1940.

⁵⁷⁸ Punjab FR, 10 September 1941, L/P&J/5/244 IOR.

like revenue law, law of accounts, debt laws, method of insolvency relaxed, for the nurture of the children a reasonable part of the inheritance and disinheritance property declared unseizable.⁵⁷⁹

The anti-corruption department was established in the secretariat. The department with the assistance of the district heads made all the enquires of the corruption. The government terminated those officers who showed untruthful. The immoral repute officer must get less pension or stop it. The Unionists government in four years with *Abeyana, Maliya Lagan and Malkan* bestowed reduction of seven crores.⁵⁸⁰

3.2.17 Sikandar's Death

Sikandar died on December 26, 1942, in a state of sadness. At that time, he was in the wedding ceremony of his son and a daughter.⁵⁸¹ Whilst Churchill described that Sikandar was equally a gallant soldier and a statesman with a broad and valiant outlook, loyal to his own province, loyal to India, to the British Commonwealth and to the common sense of freedom.⁵⁸² Sikandar was buried at the base of the *Badshahi* mosque. Khizar declared: "The Punjab has been widowed. Sir Sikandar was a unique individual, a just Premier, a loving and affectionate friend, and a deeply religious-minded man. His death at this critical time is an irreparable loss to the Punjab, India, and the Muslim community."⁵⁸³ The unsafe aspect of Sikandar's personality was his softness and loyalist in dealing with

⁵⁷⁹ *Ingalib*, 26th January 1941.

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸¹ C. Dewey, *Anglo-Indian Attitudes. The Mind of the Indian Civil Service* (London: Hambleton Press, 1993), p. 186.

⁵⁸² Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan. A Political Biography*, p. 105.

⁵⁸³ *Civil and Military Gazette* Lahore, 29 September 1942

the British bureaucrats. He had affection with Islam and interest in the welfare of the Indian Muslims. He was a sincere Muslim and offered *namaz* and *roza* regularly.

3.3 Sir Khizar Hayt Khan (1900-1975)

3.3.1 Early Life and Education

Khizar was born in Chak Muzaffarabad Shahpur on August 7, 1900, in Tiwana tribe.⁵⁸⁴ His father's name was Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana while mother's name Fateh Khatun. Khizar was under the influence of his mother. She had Kalra estate in 1920s. Fateh Khatun was a *murid* of *Pir* of *Golra*. She requested the *pir* to pray for Khizar's success in the upcoming provincial elections. *Pir Golra* prayed for his success.⁵⁸⁵

3.3.2 Aitchison Contribution

Aitchison was established in 1886 to educate the sons of Punjabi chiefs and landlords. Umar and Khizar lived here at college times.⁵⁸⁶ Aitchison shaped a significant share in alteration of tribal *maliks* and *pirs* into a landed elite. In 1908, religious teachers had been appointed for Khizar to gain religious education. Inspite of religious education he mixed freely with Hindu, Muslim and Sikh boys. In early 1930s, C.H. Barry became principal, and he combined the building housed which had been formerly separated on communal lines. Barry presented other reforms, like eliminated the private rooms, cooks and valet's grooms. When Khizar was a member of the School's Management Committee intensely supported Barry's modifications. Khizar and Umar were energetic members of

⁵⁸⁴Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*. pp. 2-3.

⁵⁸⁵Interview with Nazar Tiwana, New Delhi, 10 December 1993. *Ibid* p. 4

⁵⁸⁶Umar was at Aitchison from 1888-1893. During this period, J.C. Godley was the principal. Khizar attended between 1908-1916 when F.A. Jones was the principal.

the Aitchison Chiefs' College Old Boys' Association. Khizar received gold medal prize in the final year diploma examination.⁵⁸⁷

3.3.3 Military Career

Khizar had a distinguished military career. Khizar go with the regiment to the front at the time of the Third Afghan War. The military association supported both their loyalism and non-communal attitude. Brigadier John Woodroffe who served in the 19th Lancers had visited to Tiwana family native city, and described:

I stayed with Umar Hayat who was living in retirement in a very fine house near the villages of Hadali and Mitha Tiwana. It was a wonderful experience and after four days I felt I was fully accepted as a member of the Tiwana tribe. I met all the families at various informal gatherings all of which had members who had served or were serving with the regiment.⁵⁸⁸

Khizar linked the loyalist endeavours of 1939-45 with those of 1857. This notion came clearly as under:

A great wave of loyalty had swept the Province similar to that which swept it in 1857, of the wave of loyalty in the Punjab no further proof is needed than this fact that we have furnished more than twice the number of recruits we furnished in the last war and the fine response of certain other parts of India indicates that there also is a wave of loyalty. The force of this loyalist movement must not be wasted. It should be conserved and exploited for the common advantage of India and of Britain I ask that (the loyalist classes) should be given an effective voice in any discussion on the solution of the present deadlock and of India's future constitution.⁵⁸⁹

3.3.4 Interest in Politics and Social Circles

Khizar's political distinctiveness was his allegiance to the British. During his premiership he trusted mostly on the counsel of the Punjab Governor, Sir Bertrand Glancy. Khizar was stunned by Wavell's submission to Jinnah at Simla Conference. He assumed

⁵⁸⁷It was not until 1933 that study for the Cambridge School Certificate was introduced Subjects studied for the diploma examination included, English, History, Geography, Science, the Classics, Mathematics and a vernacular language.

⁵⁸⁸J.H.P Woodroffe, unpublished manuscript, quoted in Talbot, *Khizar Hayat*. p 52.

⁵⁸⁹Khizar to Sir James Grigg, 18 September 1944, TP.V. p. 223-24. *Ibid.*, p 55.

that Attlee had deceived him about British's accurate timing extraction. His wishful thinking was to have firm government and not to surrender for the cause of Partition.⁵⁹⁰ Khizar's loyalty with the Imperial power was alleged for the Punjab's prosperity. Afterwards 1946 provincial election, he took together the Congress and Akali parties in a last useless effort to shore up the Punjab's communal harmony. In short, he was a pragmatic practitioner of consociational democracy.

Khizar sustained his relationship with Aitchison in the shape of Management Committee and Old Boys Association. During his ministership he visited every Sunday evening, to his son Nazar who was an Aitchison student from 1934-44. During his Premiership he still visited Aitchison every week.⁵⁹¹ By 1942, he had developed equally in political maturity and administrative capability. Sikandar's death brought Khizar to power.⁵⁹² The crucial times for Khizar came out from the World War II in the Far East and the general political situation in India. At the same time, the situation was tumultuous one. Japanese troops voyage from the Malaya had overwhelmed the island fortress of Singapore.

Khizar had at the time an unpopular government. As Chotto Ram acknowledged that 'the party has been living on its past prestige.'⁵⁹³ H.V. Hodson's comment that Sikandar died in the full flight of power is typical of this myopia.⁵⁹⁴ Khizar had came across with three rivals, Nawb Muzaffar Khan, Liaqat Hayat Khan and Feroz Khan Noon, were more skilful than himself. After breakfast on December 31, Glancy with Khizar, Glancy while retaining his hand on Khizar shoulder stated that 'You shall need to take yourself

⁵⁹⁰Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*, p. 8

⁵⁹¹Ian Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*, pp. 107-108.

⁵⁹²Ibid., pp. 108-109

⁵⁹³Chhotu Ram to Azim Husain, 4 January 1943. quoted in Talbot, *Khizar Hayat*. p. 97.

⁵⁹⁴H.V. Hodson, *The Great Divide, Britain-India-Pakistan* (London: Hutchinson of London, 1969), p. 271.

more seriously in future.' After 1946 provincial elections, the Unionist Party set up government in Punjab with other party's coalition. Khizar's premiership lasted less than three months. The further cracks in the Unionist ranks in the Assembly started with its tug of war with the All-India Muslim League. The League denoted Punjabi Premier as a traitor to Islam.⁵⁹⁵ There is no denying that Khizar was not able to counter the League attacks.

3.3.5 The Unionist Party Interest

Khizar became president of the Unionist Party in 1943. He assured Jinnah to rearrange the League in Punjab. But he was not able to come up to his promise and thus unsuccessful to withstand his pledges. Quaid instructed Khizar to comply with his promises to which Khizar always responded in a positive way but failed to carry them out on the ground.⁵⁹⁶ Khizar Hayat was the uncertain leader of the Punjab Unionists in the eyes of Fazl-i-Husain. In 1937, he promoted to ministerial rank in the Sikandar Hayat Government. In next five years he had taken leadership of the Unionist Party as well as government in the Punjab. The Unionist Party at the time of Khizar was following the British outlooks towards political representation and identity. The British had linked its authority with the building of rural Punjabi society.

Distress developed between the Unionist Party and Muslim League after the Delhi Council Session of March 1943. Muslim League group wanted that the Government should be named the Muslim League Coalition Ministry instead of the Unionist Ministry.⁵⁹⁷ The Muslim League vision was that religion was the main cause of political characteristic while

⁵⁹⁵ *Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore)*, 13 March 1943

⁵⁹⁶ *Talbot, Khizar Tiwana*, p.114-15.

⁵⁹⁷ *Talbot, Khizar Tiwana*, p. 149.

the Unionist creed was cross-communal cooperation. Clash over the explanation on the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact became inevitable. The British officials obviously shared these worries. The Viceroy Wavell noted to Glancy in April 1944:

It is of the greatest import that until the end of the war against Japan there should be a stable administration in the Punjab, the dissolution of the Unionist Ministry and the substitution of a Muslim League Ministry such as Jinnah wants, will be a disaster. I very much hope that Khizar will look at the matter from this point of view and rally the Unionists.⁵⁹⁸

The Punjab Governor described that, the main threat to our political tranquillity comes from Jinnah and the Muslim League.⁵⁹⁹ Khizar wanted to resolve the ambiguities about Sikandar-Jinnah Pact. Khizar stated that he intended to retain the Unionist Party name for his ministry. Jinnah said that the Unionist Party had ceased to exist when the Pact was drawn up.

3.3.6 Panchayat System and Other Punjab Developments

The British introduced panchayat system to solve the civil and criminal cases of trivial nature. The objects of the panchayats were multi-purpose like education, planned healthy activities etc. in the villages. The panchayat was empowered in his jurisdiction. The panchayat consisted of 4/5 members of the village with head called *panch*. Khizar also adopted that system and did reforms in panchayat system. There were only 1142 panchayats for 36,000 villages in the Punjab in 1939.⁶⁰⁰ Khizar wanted to give peasant a due share in the political life of the country. In three years, the panchayats had enlarged from 1142 to 6978. In 1941, they dealt 50,000 criminal and civil cases, saving a huge amount which would normally had been spent on trial. Local Panchayat officers delivered

⁵⁹⁸ Wavell to Glancy, 15 April 1944, *TP*, iv, p. 461. quoted in Talbot, *Khizar Hayat*. p. 150.

⁵⁹⁹ Punjab FR, 17 April 1943, L/P&J/5/246 IOR. *Ibid*. p. 150.

⁶⁰⁰ Azim, Husain, *Panchayats in the Punjab* (Lahore: Longmans Green & Company, 1941), p. 36.

at village level education, planned games and tournaments. In the times of Khizar's premiership twenty-nine rural libraries had been opened in the selected areas. The libraries represented as epicentres for encouraging communal harmony.⁶⁰¹ Azim Husain, Mian Fazl-i-Husain's son served as Director of Panchayats, a department with in the Ministry of Local Self-Government from 1941-2.⁶⁰²

Khizar's ministership in accordance with the Public Works Department's accomplished the Assembly Chamber in Lahore with its adjoining civic centre. The Fazl-i-Husain Library of Government College was also established. In 1942, length of metalled roads had risen to 4200 miles. It was during Khizar's period as minister that modern surfaced roads were laid in the Salt Range. The irrigation facilities project was started in May 1939 to deliver perennial irrigation for 10 lacs of acres in the Mianwali, Muzaffargarh and Shahpur districts.⁶⁰³ Khizar cordially did efforts to stimulate communal harmony. March 1 was stated as "Communal Harmony day" and marked by an annual public holiday. A Communal Harmony Committee was established in Lahore during Khizar's premiership. Its President was Raja Narendra Nath and its Secretary Maulvi Mahomed Ilyas, the agent of the Bahawalpur State.⁶⁰⁴

3.3.7 Khizar and the World War II & Services for Ex-Servicemen

Khizar immediately offered his services to the Raj on the outbreak of the World War II. According to Khizar's own calculation 75, 642 men from the Rawalpindi district

⁶⁰¹ Director Information Bureau Lahore, *Five Years of Provincial Autonomy*, pp. 62-4.

⁶⁰² Azim Husain had begun his career as an Assistant Commissioner in the Punjab in 1937. Two years later he served as an Under Secretary in the Political Department of the Punjab Government. From 1939-41 he was Sub-Divisional officer in the Punjab Government.

⁶⁰³ Director Information Bureau Lahore, *Five Years of Provincial*, p. 52.

⁶⁰⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 2 April 1943.

enlisted, with 1420 persons sending three or more sons to the Army.⁶⁰⁵ The Unionist Party unconditionally supported the war. It dominated the Punjab National War Front which coordinated the region's endeavours. Sikandar and Khizar in turn acted as its Presidents. At the local level, the *zaildars* actively encouraged army Recruitment.⁶⁰⁶ A survey of twenty villages in the Ludhiana district revealed. For example, that during the period April 1943 to November 1944 over 20,000 rupees was sent each month by servicemen to their relatives. More still could have been sent if many of the soldiers had not been interested in saving sufficient money to start their own business at the end of the war.⁶⁰⁷

Under the encouragement of the grow more food campaign the cropped area rose from thirty million acres in 1939-40 to nearly thirty-five million in 1942-3, before stabilising at around thirty-three million acres. The total cultivated area which was redeemed arose steadily from 203,669 acres in 1940-1 to 482,641 in 1942-3. At the times of Khizar's premiership, shortages of food-grains were reported from thirteen districts of fuel from ten, sugar from six and salt from four. The Lahore Retail Price Index rose from a base of 100 in August 1939 to 371 in August 1945. It had climbed still further to 398 by the time of the 1946 elections.⁶⁰⁸

After Khizar's expulsion from the Muslim League and the emergence of Shaukat Hayat as a rival spokesman of the martial castes, the Punjab Premier devoted even more attention to tours of the recruitment centres. Late in October 1944, he made his first official

⁶⁰⁵ Khizar Papers, Chicago File 16. quoted in Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*, p. 134.

⁶⁰⁶ *Nawa-e-Waqt* (Lahore), 6 February 1945.

⁶⁰⁷ R.S. Nakra, *Punjab Villages in the Ludhiana District during the War*, Punjab Board of Economic Enquiry, No. 91 (Lahore: Punjab Govt. Press, 1946), p. 22.

⁶⁰⁸ *Annual Review of Economics Conditions in the Punjab*, Punjab Board of Economics Enquiry, No. 90 (Lahore: Punjab Govt. Press, 1946) Table xii, p. 62.

visit to Kahuta, one of the leading recruiting centres in the Rawalpindi district. In his reply to the address presented by the district leaders of the National War Front, Khizar described Kahuta as a best *tehsil* in the best district of the best province of India regarding recruitment to the Army. He then publicly demanded for the first time the creation of separate and special constituencies for soldiers in the future constitution of India.⁶⁰⁹ Khizar in fact, privately mooted the idea of political weightage for ex-service personnel in a meeting with Linlithgow in September 1943, shortly before the Viceroy's retirement.

Khizar took his praises of the martial castes as far as field the Paris Peace Conference which was held between July 29-October 15, 1946. I want to tell you something about our soldiers, he told the assembled delegations:

For their courage and sacrifices are the reasons why we are (here) today. Not one of the two and a half million men in the Army was compelled to serve. About a million men left their homes in the Punjab to serve in the war effort and three quarters of them served as active combatants. These men who know what it is to storm the heights of Cassino and to encounter the cunning Japanese in the jungles of Burma are not going to forget what they have done and see. They, and others like them all over India, men of every caste and community, are the men his delegation represents. If all the powers great and small lay their cards on the table and deal with each other openly and sincerely, then we shall give our soldiers a Peace that they will feel has been worth fighting for.⁶¹⁰

From early 1945 onwards Khizar turned his attention from unsuccessful endeavours to secure special representation for servicemen to schemes for post-war rehabilitation. He ridiculed the fact that it had reserved only 75,000 acres of land for ten *lakh* servicemen, out of which 20,000 had been earmarked for supporters of the Unionists in these elections.⁶¹¹ Rather late in the day in August 1945, Khizar's government published an ambitious five-

⁶⁰⁹Cutting from *Hindu* (Madras), 26 October 1944, filed in F99/44-R, Secretary of Governor General Reforms, NAI, quoted in Talbot, Khizar Hayat, p. 138.

⁶¹⁰Draft Speech to Paris Peace Conference, 7 August 1946. This document was in the private possession of Nazar Tiwana in Chicago. It is now deposited with the Unionist Party papers at Southampton University Ibid. p.140.

⁶¹¹*Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 27 October 1945.

year plan for post-war development. A sum of Rs 100 crores rupees was earmarked for reconstruction work. This was to be spent on over 200 separate schemes ranging from massive irrigation projects to the developments of fruit-growing and bee-keeping societies. Facilities were to be provided to ex-servicemen for the purchase of improved seeds, agricultural implements and equipment at concession rates. They were also to be provided with grants for the setting up of cottage industries, for training as teachers and vets and for the establishing of sheep breeding units free of cost. Whilst sons of ex-servicemen were to receive free education up to B.Sc. level that the Punjab Agricultural College, Lyallpur.⁶¹²

The Thal project was expected to irrigate 831,000 acres in Mianwali and Shahpur districts. This would release land on which an estimated 85,000 ex-servicemen could be settled as tenants. The Bhakra Dam, and Hydro-electric project, was expected to provide upwards of 5000 jobs for ex-soldiers. As further 2000 construction jobs would be created by the Gurgaon irrigation project which was designed to serve a 400,000-acre area. If any further evidence of the plan's commitment to the well-being of ex-soldiers was required, this was provided by the decision to select twenty-nine *thesils* for concentrated development.⁶¹³

⁶¹²Punjab FR, 14 December 1946, L/P&J/5/249 IOR. Government of the Punjab, Five-year Plan For Post-War Development Schemes (Lahore, 1945), Scheme, 22, p 75.

⁶¹³They were as follows in Rawalpindi division: Kahuta, Murree, Gujar Khan, Talagang, Pindigheb, Jhelum, Fatahjang, Chakwal, Pind Dadan Khan, Kharian, Rawalpindi, Khusab, and Isakhel, in the Lahore division: Sialkot, Narowal, Tarn Taran, Ajnala; in the Ambala division: Rohtak, Jhajjar, Rewari, Bhiwani, Hissar, Kharar; in the Jullundur division. Hamir, Palampur, Hoshiarpur, Jullundur, and Jagraon

3.3.8 Jinnah-Khizar talk

Khizar and Jinnah hold a chain of meetings in between March 28 and April 27, 1944; these talks have got the name as the Jinnah-Khizar talks.⁶¹⁴ So, Jinnah presented the following demands before Khizar:

1. Every member of the Muslim League Party in Punjab Assembly should declare that he owed his primary allegiance to the Muslim League and not to Unionist Coalition or any other party.
2. The name of the Ministry namely 'Unionist Coalition Ministry' should be changed.
3. The nature of the Ministry should be called the Muslim league Coalition Government.

Initially, Khizar assured to follow the plan of the Muslim League's claim for Pakistan, but he was unsuccessful to come up his promises. Jinnah infuriated on Khizar for breaching a firm pledge, ejected him from the Muslim League in 1944 thus weakening the Unionist Party.⁶¹⁵ Khizar wished-for conciliation with League but both Wavell and Glancy declined to licence him any flexibility in this regard. The Governor would not meet Khizar's request to give him an order to stand up to Jinnah in the interests of the war effort,⁶¹⁶ but he did take the controversial step of dismissing Shaukat, at the very moment when it was becoming clear that the talks were failing. By the time these hit the news-stands, however, Shoukat's dismissal was over-showed by the dramatic collapse of the Khizar-Jinnah negotiations.

⁶¹⁴Talbot, *Provincial Politics And The Pakistan Movement. The Growth of The Muslim League in North-West and North East India, 1937-1947* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 93-94.

⁶¹⁵Ikram, *Modern Muslim India*, 259.

⁶¹⁶Glancy to Wavell, 14 April 1944, *TP*, iv, p. 880-1. quoted in Talbot, *Khizar Hayat*.159.

Abdul Hamid has analysed that “The Unionists of Punjab were a liability rather than an asset for they had joined the League for tactical reasons. In 1944, their leader refusing Jinnah’s demand to line up with the League to form a Muslim League Coalition he walked out of the League with many his followers.”⁶¹⁷ Quaid-i-Azam described Khizar’s attitude as ‘Childish,’ but the Punjab Action Committee under Liaquat Ali Khan expelled Khizar from the membership of the Muslim League. Khizar’s ejection from the League, resulted in his lowered popularity and political slide of the Unionist Party in 1945-1946 elections.⁶¹⁸

3.3.9 1946 Elections and Later Situation

The 1946 elections concluded the Unionist Party’s twenty-year hegemony on Punjab politics. However, with the support of the Coalition Government Khizar remained in office. In a distressing situation, Khizar stated that:

Apart from the great harm being done to the studies and careers of these students, it was an insult to the intelligence of Muslim stalwarts in the Punjab that young students from the United Provinces with no knowledge or experience of life should come and preach to us that we were in danger in this Muslim majority province.⁶¹⁹

Khizar also pointed out the Muslims could only achieve solid, rapid, moral, and material progress in alliance with the non-Muslims on a basis of identity of common interests. The Unionist difficulties were vividly brought home during Khizar’s election tour of the Jhelum district. He unsuccessfully interviewed 120 people to find someone willing to oppose the Muslim League candidate, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan in the Pind Dadan Khan

⁶¹⁷Abdul Hamid. *Muslim Separatism in India: A Brief Survey 1958-1947* (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 234.

⁶¹⁸Muhammad Munawwar, *Dimensions of Pakistan Movement* (Lahore: Service Book Ltd., 1997), pp 140-143.

⁶¹⁹*Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 3 January 1946.

constituency.⁶²⁰ No one would take on this task because they feared the displeasure of the powerful pir of Jalalpur, Pir Fazl Shah. Pir Fazl Shah was Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan's uncle and was a traditional adversary of the Unionists.⁶²¹

Khizar risked the wrath of Pir Golra in his continued struggle against the Muslim League. He was warned that he would become a friend in hell if he separated himself from the Islamic movement.⁶²² Another leading Chishti, *Sajjadanashin*, Pir Qamaruddin of Sial Sharif held a meeting on the outskirts of the Kalra estate in which he publicly challenged Khizar and Allah Bakhsh to come on terms with the Muslim League. I have never begged for anything in my life before, he declared:

But today I have come out of my house to beg for votes, believing God is present here (the meeting was being held in a mosque) it is Islamic to ask for votes and religious to give them. The Muslim League is purely a religious movement in which all the rich, poor, Sufis and scholars are participating. Not as a *pir* but even as a Muslim, I have repeatedly advised Nawab Allah Bakhsh who is my *murid* not to desert the Muslim at the critical time.⁶²³

The Unionists responded by introduced religious appeals into their own propaganda. Khizar garnished his speeches with quotations from the Quran. The Unionist Party also employed *Ulema* from the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind who opposed the Pakistan demand. The Unionist Party profited little from this strategy. The election results were announced on February 24, 1946. The Unionists Party was reduced to 18 members in the 175 Assembly. The Muslim League was the largest single party in the Assembly with seventy-five seats.⁶²⁴ Khizar's foundation of a coalition government between the Unionists, the Akalis and the Congress rests extremely contentious. The Muslim League's frustration

⁶²⁰ *Dawn* (Delhi), 28 October 1945.

⁶²¹ Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam*, pp. 69-70.

⁶²² *Nawa-e-Waqt* (Lahore), 5 January 1946.

⁶²³ *Nawa-e-Waqt* (Lahore), 5 January 1946.

⁶²⁴ Talbot, Khizar Tiwana, p. 197.

was real as its exclusion from rule. Glancy using inappropriate opinions for few days⁶²⁵ to concretise the way of Khizar to reappearance. Khizar confronted with two important responsibilities, firstly to continue the Budget Session of the Assembly and secondly denoted the Punjab's opinions to the Cabinet Mission. The League had planned a province wide *hartal* on March 7 and two days later had observed the celebration of 'Traitors Day.'⁶²⁶ During the course of the debates on the Budget, Muslim League speakers continuously denounced the Coalition as a fraud Chaudhri Mohammad Hassan addressed Khizar as Malik Sir *Gaddar* (traitor) Hayat Khan and Shaukat called him a quisling. The new Governor, Sir Evan Jenkins who had replaced Glancy on April 8, was nevertheless, displeased with Khizar's ingenuity in this respect.⁶²⁷

The League had started a direct-action campaign against government. It had initiated strikes, the student, politicians and women taken to the streets. Conflicts between the police and protestors developed progressively fierce. On one occasion 500 rounds of tear gas were fired in Lahore. On February 13, the police *lathi* charged commenced on processions in Sargodha, Ferozepora, and Wazirabad.⁶²⁸ Khizar worryness was enhanced by Atlee's proclamation of February 20, 1947, that His Majesty's government envisioned the transfer of powers before June 1948. Khizar became ever more depressed. Under these circumstances, he discussed about his resignation with Jenkins. At last, surprisingly, Khizar announced his resignation to a stunned Cabinet and Governor on the eve of the session. The violence in March ended residual faiths of a United Punjab. After three

⁶²⁵ Ahmad, *Martial Law Sai Martial Law Tak*. p. 179.

⁶²⁶ Satya M. Rai, *Legislative Politics and Freedom Struggle in Punjab 1897-1947* (New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research, 1984) p. 318.

⁶²⁷ Jenkins to Mountbatten, 4 August 1947, *TP*, xii. p. 513. quoted in Talbot. *Khizar Hayat*. p. 200.

⁶²⁸ *Dawn* (Delhi), 14 February 1947.

months, the East and West Punjab units of the Assembly had supported partition. The violence also demolished the British political control in the country.⁶²⁹ The downfall of Unionist impact in the Punjab resulted in political and administrative disorder.

3.4 Sir Chhotu Ram (1881-1945)

3.4.1 Early Life and Education

The youngest son of Chaudhri Sukhi Ram, Chhotu Ram was from a Jat family of Rohtak district. He was born at Garhi Sampla,⁶³⁰ (A group of people from this main town settled down in a neighbouring village which came to be called Garhi-Sampla) in November 24, 1881 and got name as Ram Rachhpal. He was the youngest in his family that was why called as 'Chhotu.'⁶³¹ He enrolled in primary school at Sampla and stood first in the district at the primary stage earning a scholarship. He passed Middle examination in 1899 from Jhajjar. Chhotu Ram passed the High School examination (Matriculation) in the first division from Christian Mission High School Delhi in 1901.⁶³² He did Intermediate in 1903 from St. Stephen's College, Delhi. He graduated in Sanskrit from the Punjab University in 1905. Then he joined Law College at Lahore. He had taken L.L.B. degree in 1911 in first division from Allahabad University. He was registered as a practising lawyer in the Allahabad High Court but finally started his practice at Agra where he was a successful advocate in criminal cases.

⁶²⁹Sir E Jenkins 14 and 20 March 1947, *TP*, x, pp. 998 and 953. quoted in Ian Talbot, *Khizar Hayat*, p. 213.

⁶³⁰Sampla was a tehsil headquarter situated about 22 kilometres from Rohtak in Haryana. The village Garhi Sampla was inhabited by the agriculturists, where Chhotu Ram's father Sukhi Ram, an illiterate peasant proprietor of small means, cultivated a small holding with the help of his brother Raja Ram. quoted in Gopal, *Sir Chhotu Ram: A Political Biography*, pp. 11-15.

⁶³¹D.C. Verma, *Sir Chhotu Life and Times*, p. 34.

⁶³²Prem Chaudhry, "Social Basis of Chaudhri Sir Chhotu Ram's Politics", *The Punjab Past and Present*, Vol X-I, (April 1976), p. 157.

Chhotu Ram eager to make his career in law and to bond it with services to the people. He had attained a decent place both as a lawyer and a public man at Agra. In 1912, he moved from Agra to Rohtak with the aim that Jat community desired more of his services. He was an active member of the Jat Mahasabha Samite since its inception in 1905. He became its secretary in 1913 and attended all its important conferences until his death. At Rohtak, he initiated combined practice with Lal Chand and despite of different⁶³³ viewpoint, this corporation remained for eight years. As a moderate politician, "during the First World War he, along with Chaudhri Lal Chand made significant contribution to the war effort of Rohtak district and actually worked as an honorary secretary of the District Recruitment and War Committee."⁶³⁴ It was due to his efforts that "recruitment figures in Rohtak district rose from 6,245 in January 1915, to 22,144 in November 1918."⁶³⁵ He started weekly, *Jat Gazettee* in 1916, to find solution to mend the economic conditions of the reluctant rural communities. In 1916, Chhotu Ram joined the INC and accepted to become the first president of the Rohtak Disrtict Congress Committee and continued in the capacity till November 8, 1920.⁶³⁶

Chhottu Ram was conscious that his political existence was based on his supporting the economic interest of the Hindu Jats from the Ambala division. His political impact in south-eastern Punjab was possessed to the provision of the peasant proprietors and the military classes. In his constituency of the East Rohtak more than sixty per cent of those enfranchised had been or still were soldiers and most of them were rich Jat peasants. It would be politically fruitful for him to associate with the interests of the rural Hindu Jats

⁶³³Gopal, *Sir Chhotu Ram: A Political Biography*, p. 33.

⁶³⁴Chaudhry, "Social Basis of Chaudhri Sir Chhotu Ram" p. 157

⁶³⁵M.S. Leigh, *Punjab and the War* (Lahore: Government Printing, 1922), pp. 54-59.

⁶³⁶*Tribune*, January 10, 1945.

rather than urban Hindus. He resigned from the Congress in 1920, because non-cooperation movement was unconstitutional, and it would lead the masses to violence.⁶³⁷

3.4.2 Chhotu Ram and Unionist Party

The first election under the 1919 Reforms was held in 1920. Lal Chand was elected unopposed while Chhotu Ram lost only by 22 votes.⁶³⁸ After the second general elections in 1923, Fazl-i-Husain wanted to develop a party structure upon which the reforms could be functioned for the residual epoch. At the same time, Chhotu Ram had settled close relationships with Fazl-i-Husain. Along with Lal Chand he had been designated to the Punjab Council in 1923 and in discussions with Fazl-i-Husain the idea of a rural party to safeguard the interests of the backwards classes took form. Fazl-i-Husain given the leadership of the Unionist Party in 1926 to Chhotu Ram (already was the deputy leader of the Party) after becoming Revenue Member. Chhotu remained on this position till the arrival of Fazl-i-Husain in 1935. Hailey (Governor of the Punjab) knew that a man of Chhotu Ram's willpower and stubbornness would create difficulties for the government. Hailey made a plan to refer Chhotu Ram outside the Punjab. He praised Chhotu Ram for his ministership work and proposed that the Viceroy would like to make him Prime Minister of the Kashmir State, but Chhotu Ram rejected the offer.⁶³⁹

The Unionist Party under the leadership of Fazl-i-Husain and Chhotu Ram monitored the similar programme which the Congress had. The programme was designated in the pamphlet, *Punjab Politics*. Fazl-i-Husain wrote to his son: "This pamphlet has

⁶³⁷Chowdhury, *Punjab Politics*, p. 162.

⁶³⁸Verma, *Sir Chhotu Life and Times*, pp. 54-55.

⁶³⁹*Ibid* , pp. 81-82.

created a great stir, and the Press, in the Punjab, is very active about it, very strong opposition in some quarters, fairly general appreciation of the facts and fiction and almost universal agreement with the programme for the future outlined herein.”⁶⁴⁰

A central office of the party was established at Lahore, with Fazl-i-Husain as leader, Chhotu Ram as deputy leader, and Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana as organising and office secretary. Funds were raised to Rs 50,000. Chhotu Ram, the mass orator in the party, initiated a rapid visit of the province. He fascinated enormous crowds. Election plan was settled.

The creed of the Unionist Party was defined in a new clear term as:

1. Attainment of dominion status by all constitutional means at as early as practicable;
2. The securing of an honourable status for Indian overseas;
3. The establishment in the province of provincial autonomy de facto;
4. The acceptance of the community of economic interests as the true basis of political parties, irrespective of caste, creed or residence and;
5. The provision of equal facilities and opportunities for all with special solicitude for the backward classes and areas whether rural or urban.⁶⁴¹

⁶⁴⁰Letter Fazl-i-Husain to Azim Husain, dated, April 3, 1936 quoted in Ahmad. ed., *Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*. pp. 507-508.

⁶⁴¹Verma, *Sir Chhotu Life and Times*. p. 114.

3.4.3 Sir Chhotu Ram Efforts During the First World War

At the time of the First World War Haryana was a chief centre of recruitment and the martial races. The Haryana belligerent classes, like Jat, Brahmans, the Rajputs, the Ahris, the Gujars and the Muslim Meos, all responded with passion to the call for enlistment. The Congress too collaborated with the government in encouraging the war struggles but after 1918, its strategies changed. Gandhi as an active person of INC on March 30, 1919 took part in the Satyagrah Movement in protest against the Rowlatt Act. On April 11, 1919, *hartal* was observed in Rohtak and Chhotu Ram addressed a public meeting, he read out Gandhi's message "stressing upon the people not to take any such step as might bring non-violence into disrepute."⁶⁴² He was the chairman of the Reception Committee to accommodate Satya Pal who was coming at Rohtak to preside over an INC conference. His bold political career enforced the Deputy Commissioner of Rohtak to endorse his name for exile. But because of his popularity among the masses and the resulting fear of grave law and order problem in the district, the government set aside this proposal. On September 4, 1920, beneath the leadership of Gandhi, the INC in its special session at Calcutta, adopted the resolution of 'non-violent, non-cooperation.' Chhotu Ram also opposed this resolution in a political conference⁶⁴³ organised by the INC at Bhawani in Ambala division on October 22, 1920.

Chhotu Ram and Lal Chand, both had played leading role in the mobilisation of Jats during the war. Their assistances raised them to the position of rural elite, particularly

⁶⁴²Yash Pal Bajaj, Chaudhri Chhotu Ram and the Indian National Congress, *The Panjab Past and Present*, Vol. XII-I (April 1978), p. 401.

⁶⁴³This conference was organized under the presidentship of Murli Dhar and attended among them by Gandhi. In this conference Chhotu Ram was appointed as the member of the subject committee. *Ibid* p. 401.

Chhotu Ram, were assumed substantial political inspiration within the Jat community in south-east Punjab.⁶⁴⁴ He was bestowed the title of Rai Sahib and given 100 acres of land in the canal colony at Montgomery for support in the war efforts.

3.4.4 Sir Chhotu Ram Affiliation with Punjab Congress and Political Affairs

The class-consciousness shaped in the Punjab peasantry by Chhotu Ram was the key achievement of his political career. The reforms of 1919 and 1935 Acts increased the strength of voters on the electorate register. The majority of the voters belonged to peasantry class and other allied rural section of population.⁶⁴⁵ Chhotu Ram had an average background. He tried to uplift the lives of the masses. He called the moneylenders black banias and termed them blood-suckers. A popular song at his meetings was:

*Zamindar ziada jan de aik baat mann lai,
Aik bolana lai seekh, aik dushman pehchan lai.*⁶⁴⁶
(Zamindar forget about other things but accept my one advice,
Learn to express yourself and recognize your enemy).

The down-trodden classes of the Punjab were not able to contest against the ruling class. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms provided an ideal opportunity for Chhotu Ram to work for rural uplift. Despite his failure in PLC election, as a spearhead of the Jat community in eastern Punjab, he performed a significant part in collaborating with the Rural Bloc. From 1921 onward, he employed substantial effect in provincial events⁶⁴⁷

⁶⁴⁴Yong, *The Garrison State*. p. 132.

⁶⁴⁵Verma, *Sir Chhotu Life and Times*. p. 15.

⁶⁴⁶*Ibid.*

⁶⁴⁷In 1923, Chhotu Ram was elected as a member of the PLC. since 1924, the Unionist Party was permanently represented in the provincial ministry. He himself was a minister from 1924-27 and was elected as the President of All-India Jat Mahasabha in 1927. He was the leader of the Unionist Party in the PLC from 1926-

poised with a political authority due to his hegemony on Jat community. He operated the rural-urban dissimilarities as a political weapon. According to the urban Hindu elite, controversy was forged by the British to force cooperation between the Hindu Jats of Harayana and the Muslim rural legislative members of western Punjab. In short, the “accentuation of difference between ruralities and urbanities was indeed the basis of formation of the Unionist Party in 1923, the co-founders of which were Sir Fazl-i-Husain and Chhotu Ram.”⁶⁴⁸

Chhottu Ram apprehended that anti-government movements on the Congress pattern proved harmful for the Jats in the Punjab. He collected a group of landowners, ex-soldiers and lawyers at his own initiative to issue a joint resolution calling on all zamindars and retired military officers “not only to keep aloof from any politically subversive political movement such as civil disobedience or non-payment of taxes, but to actually fight against it,”⁶⁴⁹ and in so doing he emphasised to the Jats the vital importance of preserving their military connections, and called on them not to waste their time in such “unmanly” occupations as weaving and spinning, the Gandhian symbol of the nationalist movement. Sikandar Hayat and Chhotu Ram were, however, both were well aware that the Unionist Party’s success had depended largely on the standing of its local candidates.⁶⁵⁰

With the efforts of Chhottu Ram the government was able to make decision in May 1931 to approve reduction of land revenue and water rates to the amount of Rs 109 million

36. In 1937, he was appointed minister under provincial autonomy and continued as minister till his death in 1944.

⁶⁴⁸Prem Chaudhry, Social Basis of Chaudhri Sir Chottu Ram’s Politics, *The Punjab Past and Present*, Vol. X-I, (April 1976), p. 164.

⁶⁴⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 154-155.

⁶⁵⁰*Civil and Military Gazette* Lahore, 3 February 1937.

rupees. This act of the Government eases the hardships of the peasants. Chhotu Ram adopted a non-communal policy as he indicated that “for a united front among the *Zamindars* he must give up his communalism, which was a national corollary to his being a fairly bigoted Arya Smajist”.⁶⁵¹ He was against the communalism, while supporting this entitlement he said: “I do not stand either for Hindu rights or Muslim rights. My creed stands based on common secular and economic interest.”⁶⁵²

The Unionist Party, being a supra-communal party, and Chhotu Ram described the idea of communalism in a stimulating way. Chhotu Ram originated the *Zamindara* League in 1924, which assisted him to assemble the *Zamindars* to demonstration against the hefty taxes. actually, it operated as a outlet of the Unionist Party against the Congress which was trying to establish the *Zamindars* for its own purpose. Chhotu Ram had countless affection for rural Jats and he desired to oblige them. Chhotu Ram used the annual Jat Mahasabha conference, held at Lyallpur on April 8 to tell the masses that economic benefits were more vital than religious community for the rural population. The matters like control of prices, imposition of import and export duties on agricultural commodities etc. were those which had no variance of opinion between the Jats and the other agriculturalist tribes.⁶⁵³ He consoled *Zamindara* workers who were disheartened by the rising tide of communalism with lines from Iqbal, his favourite poet.

Tundia bade mukhalif se na ghabra aiy uqqab
Ye toh chalti hai tujhe ooncha udane kai-liya
Don not get disheartened by the fury of the adverse winds. O Eagle

⁶⁵¹Chhotu Ram's speech, 1942, *The Punjab Past and Present*, Vol. V, Part-I, April 1971 quoted in Khurshid, Feudal Ascendancy and the Role of Sir Fazl-i-Husain p.151.

⁶⁵²PLCD, Vol. XII, March 21, 1929, p. 1037. *Ibid*.

⁶⁵³*Civil and Military Gazette Lahore*, 9 April 1944.

*These blow to enable you to fly still higher.*⁶⁵⁴

Every year from 1927 to 1935, Chhotu Ram spoke on the Punjab budget with full preparation arming himself with all relevant information and factual position of each department. Speaking on the budget for 1928, on Feb. 26 Chhotu Ram said:

As a representative of the peasantry, I want the government to realise that 9 rupess out of 10 in the government budget come from the pockets of the poor zamindars. I have so failed to make the government realise that the poor peasants needs some relief. Yet the justice of the zamindar's case is not accepted all plans fall on deaf ears. We have repeatedly urged on a change in the system of Land Revenue. The same principle that applies to Income Tax should apply here also. The government had dismissed the matter in a bantering way without even considering it. The demand that land upto one acre should be free of land tax similarly been ignored. The money extracted from the peasantry is wasted in constructing palatial houses for the government officials. During the last year government incurred an expenditure of Rs 2 crores and 25 lakhs on this unnecessary item.⁶⁵⁵

Chhotu Ram criticised the Communal Award and wrote to Sir Fazl-i-Husain that it was unfair to the minorities in Punjab and Bengal. Chhotu Ram being the deputy leader of the Unionist Party should have succeeded to the leadership of the party after Sikandar Hayat. But his choice fell on Malik Sir Khizar Hayat Khan; with whom he had developed close affinity. He and Khizar were against the creation of Pakistan. The Akali Party in the Punjab headed by their leader Master Tara Singh planned a scheme known as 'Azad Punjab Scheme.' Chhotu Ram opposed the Azad Punjab Scheme firmly. In the entire epoch of Khizar Hayat's premiership, Chhotu Ram was the central figure of the decisions.⁶⁵⁶

3.4.5 Introduced Several Bills in the PLC

Chhotu Ram remained firm for the cause of peasantry to make them strong to protect their interests. On March 2, 1934, the Unionist Party sanctioned 25 per cent

⁶⁵⁴Verma, *Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 167

⁶⁵⁵Proceedings of the Punjab Councils 26 February 1928. Quoted in Verma, *Sir Chhotu* pp 86-87

⁶⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p 147.

discount in the revenue, which was also supported by the Hindu leader Nanak Chand. The party insisted that the revenue rates should be in conformity with the income of *Zamindars*.⁶⁵⁷ He also wrote many articles in favour of cuts in services. So, the revenue department under Sikandar Hayat, retrenchment resulted in a saving of Rs. 75 lacs. Irrigation charges (*abiana*) were reduced in the light of the reports prepared by Chhotu Ram as the member of the Committee. Chhotu Ram's proposal fixing it at Rs. 37.50 lac was accepted by the government.⁶⁵⁸ According to the manifesto of the Unionist Party, the question of relief from indebtedness had great importance for him. This motion was not against any community as according to Sardar Arjun Singh, there were more than 40,000 moneylenders in the Punjab and this number included Khojas, Pathans, Sheikhs among Muslims, Brahmins, Khatris, Aroras among Hindus and Jats among Sikhs.⁶⁵⁹

According to *Inqilab*:

Zamindars of Punjab were so much hard pressed due to their indebtedness to the moneylenders, *Mahajans* and *Sahukars* that their deliverance from the indebtedness appeared to be a far cry. At present payment of loans to the tune of 150 crores, were due from the *Zamindars* and the interest amounted to more than 20 crore rupees.⁶⁶⁰

After a long fight, he was succeeded in getting some relief for the peasants in 1934. As it was not enough, Chhotu Ram enlisted one more bill to deliver shield against usury by the moneylenders. The bill was sanctioned by the Council on November 29, 1935. The Governor Herbert W. Emerson approved on March 30, 1936.

⁶⁵⁷ *Inqilab*, March 8, 1934

⁶⁵⁸ Gopal, *Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 81

⁶⁵⁹ *PLCD*, Vol. XXV, October 26, 1934, p. 842-848. quoted in Muhammad Khurshid, *Feudal Ascendancy and the Role of Sir Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 148.

⁶⁶⁰ *Inqilab*, April 3, 1932.

3.4.6 Sir Chhotu Ram Appointed as an Agriculture Minister and Promoted Agricultural Class

In 1924, Chhotu Ram appointed as minister for agriculture. Hailey inscribed to the central government in Delhi “if he is not a man of any great distinction, his appointment will, at all events help to keep together the agricultural elements who have felt very deeply the fate of Chaudhri Lal Chand and will besides, afford a fair certainty of combination between the two communities.”⁶⁶¹ According to David Page, “This decision further alienated the Urban Hindus and communal tension continued to run high.”⁶⁶²

Chhotu Ram initiated schemes for the development of agriculture, irrigation and animal husbandry. He paid attention to the rural development programmes especially on the village uplift in the Gurgaon district. This “district had been considered as an insecure area for revenue purposes, or an area prone to periodic scarcity conditions.”⁶⁶³ He established diverse institutions of rural development in the field of sanitation, education and agriculture through the popularisation of improved implements, seeds and composite measures. He transported about social reforms to generate unity and brotherhood among the numerous communities regardless of their caste and creed. Brigadier F.L. Brayne, (an enthusiastic British civilian) who worked under the guidance of Chhotu Ram for rural development, wrote “it was Chhotu Ram who was responsible for the first domestic training schools for female workers in India.”⁶⁶⁴ He revived the Bhakra Dam plan in the

⁶⁶¹Malcolm Hailey to Central Government, September 15, 1924, Hailey Collection, MSS. EUR E 220/SB (IOR) quoted in Khurshid, *Feudal Ascendancy and the Role of Sir Fazl-i-Husain*. p.146.

⁶⁶²Page, *Prelude to partition*. p. 88.

⁶⁶³Gopal, *A Political Biography*. p. 64.

⁶⁶⁴*Ibid.* p. 65.

PLC to eradicate the poverty of the backward areas of the south eastern Punjab and functioned continually on it in his period of ministership.

Chhotu Ram had never supported the unlawful approach such as non-payment of taxes including those of land revenue. In this view, it simply means the “devastation for the down-trodden rural folk.”⁶⁶⁵ He further explained his viewpoint and said “the non-payment of land revenue by farmers could lead to the deprivation of all their lands, either at the hands of revengeful sun-dried bureaucrats or of the moneylenders who would gladly purchase the lands when put to auction.”⁶⁶⁶ In short, Chhotu Ram’s “militant nationalism did not find satisfaction in the non-cooperation method of the Congress.”⁶⁶⁷ It was due to this reason that the non-payment of taxes and defiance of law were not in the interest of agricultural community’s progress which he thought, they could make by adopting only constitutional methods of agitation. Chhotu Ram’s arguments and political outlook was same as that of Fazl-i-Husain and “he persistently held the view that agriculturists interests would not be best served through the Congress.”⁶⁶⁸ Chhotu Ram through *Jat Gazette*,⁶⁶⁹ asked the Jat community to keep away from Congress, because it could not look after their benefits entirely because of its own participation in several ineffective issues.

Chhotu Ram always assumed a defensive policy to the peasantry. He tried in getting reductions of land revenue in bad years. In 1924-25, he was succeeded in getting reduction

⁶⁶⁵Yash Pal Bajaj, Chaudhri Chhotu Ram and the Indian National Congress, *The Panjab Past and Present*, Vol. XII-I, (April 1978), p. 402.

⁶⁶⁶PLCD, Vol. XX, December 3, 1931, pp. 293, 417. quoted in Khurshid, *Feudal Ascendancy and the Role of Sir Fazl-i-Husain*, p.144.

⁶⁶⁷Bajaj, “Chaudhri Chhotu Ram and the Indian National Congres”, p 402

⁶⁶⁸*Ibid.*, p 404.

⁶⁶⁹Urdu weekly *Jat Gazette* edited up to 1924 by Chhotu Ram. As its name clearly indicated, it was the mouthpiece of the Jat Community. Chhotu Ram started this newspaper to safeguard the interests of the community and to give proper publicity to its demands as it was the most patent method of mobilising the masses.

of over a crore of rupees with the assistance of Fazl-i-Husain. He encouraged the educated people to take interest and pride in agricultural pursuits and also presented a scheme for the creation of model villages and *chaks*.⁶⁷⁰

3.4.7 Worked as Education Minister

Chhotu Ram from September 28, 1924, to December 26, 1926, holds the office twice under Fazl-i-Husain. He established a committee to initiate an engineering college in the Punjab. For the development of rural population, he secured seats in diverse technical institutions. He set up the D.A.V. institutions and Radha krishan High School, Jagraon on the list of those given grants and encouraged the starting of ayurvedic classes in the D.A.V. Institutions at Lahore and Yunani Classes in the Islamia College.⁶⁷¹ Like Marx, Chhotu Ram assumed that the poor and the rich, the propertied classes and propertyless were in continuous and basic clash. His triumphs in the administrative, social and economics circles were significant.

The Jat school at Rohtak was under the Baldev Singh who had nationalist emotion, which led to the closure of many educational institutions in the country. But few nationalist leaders assumed otherwise. Madan Mohan Malviya the creator of the Hindu University, Banaras, declined to bend before the strom. Chhotu Ram handled the situation in another way. A new school under the name of Jat Heroes Memorial School was started when Baldev Singh transformed the original school into the national pattern. The Jat school started by Chhotu Ram is now an important college in the new Univeristy at Rohtak.⁶⁷²

⁶⁷⁰Khurshid, *Feudal Ascendancy and the Role of Sir Fazl-i-Husain*. p. 151

⁶⁷¹Gopal, *Sir Chhotu Ra*. pp. 65-66

⁶⁷²Verma, *Sir Chhotu*. p. 53.

3.4.8 Epistemology on Land Alienation Act, 1900

The Land Alienation Act came to be a significant feature of the Unionist Party's programme. The agricultural enactment backed by the Unionist Party under Chhotu Ram's leadership supported this awareness a step forward. The act was to defend the peasant proprietors and to prevent agricultural land from passing over to those of money-lenders due to indebtedness. The Jats were in favour of this task because according to Chhotu Ram, among the statutory agriculturists, the Jats "formed nearly 50 per cent of the notified agricultural population of the Punjab."⁶⁷³ Chhotu Ram's political philosophy concurred with that of the Unionist Party and the Jats, whether were Muslim or Hindus, supported this act for their personal advantage. But the leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha, were against the act and blamed that the result of this act was the formation of one more class of agriculturist money-lenders who were greedier and demanding than the *Bania*. They also attributed that the Unionist Party was the offspring of the Land Alienation Act, "which claimed to be a party of peasants, but which was essentially a political instrument fashioned out of and for the benefit of the landlords."⁶⁷⁴

Mir Maqbool Mahmud, a Unionist presented in the PLC 'The Registration of Moneylender Bill' in November 18, 1924, to check or control the irregularities of the moneylenders. It is interesting to point out that Fazl-i-Husain and Chhotu Ram showed very little interest in it because in their opinion, there was no sign of class struggle in the persuasion. During discussion, this bill changed materially in form and was named as the

⁶⁷³ According to the *Census Report* of 1911, the population of the Jats was 4,411,129 in the statutory agriculturalists of 10,447,000 *Jat Gazette*, December 18, 1916.

⁶⁷⁴ Prem Chaudhry, Social basis of Chaudhri Sir Chhotu Ram's Politics, *The Punjab Past and Present*, Vol. X-I, (April 1976), p. 170.

Borrowers Protection Bill.⁶⁷⁵ This act was passed in 1926. Hailey was in favour of urban interest and did not want to support the bill and extracted his support to the Unionist Party. But it was tough for him to stand stable on his verdict as the Unionist Party was the champion of communal unity and its programme appealed to the masses at large. This act “provided for the preparation of six-month statements of accounts and these statements were not carry any presumption on correctness against the borrower, while the failure to keep accounts was subject to a penalty.”⁶⁷⁶

3.4.9 Sikandar Stance and Sir Chhotu Ram

Sikandar Hayat Khan desired to uphold his place both as a League member and head of the Unionist Government. Chhotu Ram and other non-Muslim leaders of the alliance were not satisfied with Sikandar Hayat Khan’s connotation with the League and the Pakistan demand. Chhotu Ram cautioned Sikandar Hayat Khan that if the League wanted Pakistan because they did not have reliance on the Hindu community, the Hindus will also a like right on the Punjab. In a meeting of Hindu leaders of the Punjab convened in Lahore on November 3, 1942, Chhotu Ram went one step further, and in an emotionally charged speech declared, in a matter of loyalty to Hinduism, I yield to none. If anyone were to devour the Hindus, I would not allow him to devour so before I am devoured first.⁶⁷⁷

3.4.10 Quaid and Sir Chhotu Ram

Jinnah visited Lahore in 1944 and did an effort to fragment the Unionist Party. Khizar Hayat however not in favour of Pakistan but also did not want direct clash with

⁶⁷⁵*The Indian Annual Register*, March 18, 1926 (Calcutta), p. 311.

⁶⁷⁶Hussain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 147.

⁶⁷⁷Madan Gopal, *Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 123.

Jinnah. Chhotu Ram had made it clear to Khizar that if he vacillated in his stand concerning Pakistan the Unionist party would breakdown, as non-Muslim members of the party were inflexible on the matter. Chhotu Ram had basic dissimilarities with Jinnah, and he was unwilling to meet him. Khizar Hayat arranged a dinner for Jinnah and Chhotu Ram to start dialogue, but that thing did not materialise because take place as because Khizar's father suddenly died.

After that Jinnah and Chhotu Ram hold talks many times but resulted in failure. Jinnah statement issued a statement after the failure of the talks:

Although this is a matter of our own internal concern, I thought it proper, as Sir Chhotu Ram representing his group is a member of the present coalition to consult him. I put our case before him and we have had free and frank discussion regarding the matter. Sir Chhotu Ram is adamant and insists and maintains that every member of the Muslim League party in the Assembly owes its primary allegiance to the creed, policy and programme of the so-called Unionist Party and bound by them.⁶⁷⁸

The Quaid said, "Sir Chhotu Ram was adamant," and "insists and maintains that every member of the Muslim League Party in the Assembly owes his primary allegiance to the creed, policy and programme of the so-called Unionist Party and is bound by it. The position taken by him is utterly untenable."⁶⁷⁹ Chhotu Ram planned out tours in all the Punjab to counter the growing League propaganda. But Chhotu Ram was not able to live more to complete his mission and died on January 9, 1945. Khizar lamented Chhotu Ram's loss as a loss of friend and partner. Chhotu Ram's final words to him were, 'I am going may God help all.'⁶⁸⁰ His body was enfolded in the Unionist flag for its journey by ambulance from Shakti Bhavan in Lahore for its cremation in the grounds of the Jat Heroes College at Rohtak. Khizar publicly declared that he regarded Chhotu Ram, not only as an

⁶⁷⁸D.C. Verma, *Sir Chhotu Ram*. pp. 131-132.

⁶⁷⁹Ikram Ali Malik, *A book of reading on the history of the Punjab: 1799-1947* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1976), p. 567.

⁶⁸⁰*Ibid.*, p. 150.

illustrious son of the Punjab and a valued colleague but a cherished friend whose unfailing kindness and support I can never forget or replace.⁶⁸¹

All Punjabis acknowledged that Chhotu Ram's death possessed profound political consequences. Jat farmers who flocked to Rohtak to pay their respect, declared, '*Hamara Raja Mar Gaya*' (Our King is dead).⁶⁸² Piyare Lal, the Unionist Party *Bhajanik* mourned on Chhotu Ram's *tehrevin*,

*Lawaris kunbe ka khaiwa ab kaun uthaiga
Dehat main ab Chhotu Ram kaun kahlaiga.*

Chhotu Ram's death had rendered the zamindars orphans. Who will take his place in the villages?

3.5 Analysis

This study focuses on the political competency of Unionist Party leadership to determine its social, political, and economic contributions in Punjab politics during 1930s and 1940s. Fazal-i-Husain being the founder of the Party and having a hegemonic political figure can be considered an influential character in power politics of British Punjab. On his footsteps and initiatives Unionist Party gradually build its image and constituted a political platform for the socio-political and economic uplift of the Punjabi communities.

In the politics of the British Punjab Sir Fazl-i-Husain was a mature political figure with dynamic leadership skills. He also represented the Indian National Congress (INC) in Punjab Legislative Council. His vibrant role during Lucknow Pact 1916, and the promulgation of Montago-Chelmsford Reforms 1919 was simulative. His political personality had the recognition among all the communities of the Province as well. It was the reason, with the support of a Punjab Hindu Sir Chottu Ram, he strengthens the Punjab Unionist Party.

⁶⁸¹ D.C. Verma, *Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 196

⁶⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 217.

Both leaders provided a concrete shot in the arm to the indigenous politics of the British Punjab. By using the political platform of the Unionist Party of the Punjab they placed the solid foundations by trending mature political practices in native politics. Particularly Sir Fazl-i-Husain preferred the critical socio-political and religious issues, his rectifications regarding Sikh Gurdwaras in 1925 and Panchayat system were remarkable. In fact, these were the basis on which the later leadership like Sikandar Hayat Khan met with courage.

Historically, the leadership hierarchy of the Unionist Party ever remained in the hands of the political elite, highly educated and able personalities. Particularly, in end of 1930s by till 1940 the role of Sir Sikadar Hayat Khan was significant and pivotal. He faced a tough time and critical politics in Punjab by facing Jinnah and Muslim League particularly in the election politics which was not faced by the Fazl-i-Husain and Sir Chhotu Ram. Sir Fazl-i-Husain and Sir Chhotu Ram played vital role to strengthen and made a progressive political party to the Unionist which resulted the huge victory in the elections of 1936. But its main reason was that they had weak or less political opposition in the political scenario of the Punjab.

But later, in the end of 1930s the decisive role of Jinnah and political manifestation of the All India Muslim League in the Punjab politics provided an incredible political mileage to the League's politics. The steady decline of Unionist party, Sikandar-Jinnah Pact of 1937, and Muslim League's victory with heavy mandate in the provincial elections of 1946 in Punjab were its eloquent examples. Sikandar faced the challenging politics than the founders of the Unionist Party.

British administration of the Punjab allegedly tried to again to fortify the Unionist Party in Punjab when Governor offered Unionist leader Khizar Hayat Tiwana to form a collative rule. But unfortunately, the weak leadership and collation could not face the aggressive agitation of the Muslim League against this collative rule of Unionist with Akali Sikh and Congress etc. Khizar Hayat became fail to step ahead the political legacy of the Unionist in Punjab and resigned on March 2, 1947, and Punjab came under Governor Rule under section 93 of Indian Act 1935 till its partition August 1947.

The primary causes of the failure of Unionist were not only the emergence of Muslim League but also its hegemonic, elite political hierarchy. The founders particularly Sir Fazl-i-Husain and Sikandar Hayat were determined to serve the Province till grass-root level but the future leadership could not sustain and failed to serve properly because they were ruSle oriented, which created gap and space for Muslim League.

CHAPTER- 4

UNIONIST LEADERSHIP: RISE AND FALL OF THE UNIONIST PARTY

At the time of the Second World War (1939-1945) Punjab was directly affected by the war. As a primary recruiting ground of the Indian Army, Punjab was the main source of military manpower. The landowners and the peasantry in rural Punjab considered the war as an opportunity and increased rates of agricultural products. The rise in prices provided the much-needed economic uplift to the province which was still feeling the effects of the agricultural depression of the 1930s.⁶⁸³

In dealing with the military districts, the Punjab government had usually trusted on rural-military partners, the province's landowners and rural notables. The rural-military elites ultimately subjugated Punjab politics in the shape of the Unionist Party. The party established with the provision of its electoral base encompassing the landowners, peasant-proprietors and the military classes.⁶⁸⁴

The Unionist Party became weak in Malcolm Hailey's period and practically fragmented as Fazl-i-Husain left the Punjab. He had a desire that the ministry should be established completely by the Unionist Party. The non-Muslims like Chhotu Ram and Harbakhsh Singh were the main persons of the Unionist Party.⁶⁸⁵ Chaudhri Shahab-ud-Din with the support of Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana hunted to be a minister to stop Firoz Khan

⁶⁸³Ian Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj, 1849-1947* (New Delhi: Riverdale Company, 1988), p. 143.

⁶⁸⁴Tan Tai Yong, *The Garrison State, The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 29.

⁶⁸⁵Letter dated Sep 26, 1930, to Chaudhri Zafnullah Khan by Fazl-i-Husain quoted in Waheed Ahmad (ed.), *Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1976), pp 94-96.

Noon from becoming a minister once more. Fazl-i-Hussain wanted to evade enmity for leadership between two members of the party. He wrote to Firoz Khan:

In the matter of ministership, so far as I can see, the number of your supporters from among the Muslim members of the Party is at least double the number of those likely to support Chaudhry Zafrullah Khan. Therefore, I strongly advise you not to make the mistake of forming alliances with Hindus or Sikhs in order to strengthen your position. This is likely to react unfavourably on you and not to be helpful.⁶⁸⁶

While Firoz Khan Noon continued conspiracies in Lahore. Chaudhry Zafrullah Khan was one among them had the utmost probabilities of triumph against Firoz Khan Noon. Chaudhry Shahab-ud-Din and Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana tried to secure signatures of members promising to support him.⁶⁸⁷ On hearing of this, Fazl-i-Husain wrote to Sir Sikander Hayat: "This is very much to be regretted in as much as if some member canvass support for one candidate, others must canvass support for the other candidate, and both sides will decry each other's candidates. This does harm to both."⁶⁸⁸ As the contest proceeded apace, Fazl-i-Husain observed in his diary: "Punjab affairs are all topsy-turvy. Some people have been too selfish and personal".⁶⁸⁹ Later, he recorded:

The Punjab Muslims are today weaker than even before. Firoz Khan on one side, Shahab-ud-Din supported in part by Ahmad Yar on the other side, and Sikander supported by Ahmad Yar on the third. Shahab-ud-Din is at war with both Firoz and Sikander, but more with Firoz than with Sikander. Sikander has neither the power nor the inclination to produce unanimity and is not likely to sink his personal advancement.⁶⁹⁰

Fazl-i-Husain was disappointed and wrote to Chhotu Ram:

I would prefer a ministry of two, both ministers being non-Muslims, as long as they belonged to Unionist Party which is the majority party. The Muslim minister came in only because of the possibility of a third minister not belonging to the Party. The position of the Party being reduced to have but one-third share, and that of a communal nature, is intolerable and one which Party, if united, could have violently protested.⁶⁹¹

⁶⁸⁶ Letter dated October 2, 1930 To Feroz Khan Noon by Fazl-i-Husain *Ibid.* pp. 96-97.

⁶⁸⁷ Diary-October 7, 1930. Waheed Ahmad (ed.), *Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*. p. 29.

⁶⁸⁸ Letter dated October 3, 1930. To Shahab-ud-Din by Fazl-i-Husain. quoted in Waheed Ahmad (ed.), *Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*. pp. 98-99.

⁶⁸⁹ Diary-October 10, 1930 Waheed Ahmad (ed.), *Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*. p. 30.

⁶⁹⁰ Diary-October 14, 1930. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁶⁹¹ Letter dated October 13, 1930. To Chhotu Ram by Fazl-i-Husain. quoted in Waheed Ahmad (ed.), *Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*. p. 102.

He wrote to Hrbakhsh Singh in the same strain:

It hurt me very much indeed to see personal squabbles doing such immense harm to the Party and the cause. It was quite immaterial as to who became minister. What the Party could have stood for, was that there should be two ministers from the Party, a Muslim and a non-Muslim, the choice of the men being left entirely to the Governor. It has been my great ambition and in fact, my only ambition in life to see established in the Punjab a school of thought which proceeds on principles, vital principles, and not on creeds. Personally, I would have preferred a ministry of two only, and both non-Muslims, provided it came from the Party.⁶⁹²

4.1 Leadership Crisis

The place of the Unionists in the Punjab started to reduce by its opposing party, the Muslim League. The weekly *Paisa Akhbar* while commenting on the innovative aims of the League wrote: 'League has become a freedom-loving party that stands for independence of the motherland and protection of Muslim rights.'⁶⁹³ The "Sikandar-Jinnah Pact" obviously made it clear that the Unionist Party was not a single party but a mere coalition of some Muslim and non-Muslim members.⁶⁹⁴ Though its terms were far from satisfactory, it was accepted by Jinnah because it gave the Muslim League a foothold in Punjab, the 'cornerstone of Pakistan' as he subsequently called it.⁶⁹⁵ League adversely affected the status of the Unionist party. Stanley Wolpert makes a strong comment that Jinnah accepted Sikandar's terms, gladly stooping to embrace and conquer the Punjabi baron.⁶⁹⁶ The Sikandar-Jinnah Pact brought many suspicions about the leadership abilities of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan and transported criticism on him that he was damaging the current leadership. Jinnah claimed an isolated state of Pakistan in March 1940, suggesting an enthusiastic response from a clear majority of the Muslims in India. The popularity of

⁶⁹²Letter dated October 13, 1930. To Hrbakhsh Singh by Fazl-i-Husain. *Ibid.* pp. 102-103.

⁶⁹³*Paisa Akhbar* (Weekly), 18 November 1937.

⁶⁹⁴Craig Baxter, (ed). *From Martial Law to Martial Law*. (Lahore: Vanguard, 1985), p. 148.

⁶⁹⁵Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, (ed) *Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah*, Vol. I (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1968), p. 494.

⁶⁹⁶Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University press, 1993), p. 151.

his leadership in the process, legalised and heightened his charisma.⁶⁹⁷ Jinnah enforced the British in Cripps Proposals to identify the idea of partition of India, for the first time.⁶⁹⁸

After the death of Sikandar Hayat, Khizr Hayat succeeded him in 1943. An inexperience leader inherited political glitches, Khizr, instead of handling the situation in a positive way, tried to over-whelmed them in a traditional way. He followed the conservative track of his political forerunners in place of renovate the party-political passage in the way of varying conditions. Due to deficiency of skill in political field,' he has been called a 'political novice.'⁶⁹⁹

The leadership crisis presumed severe forms exclusively after the failure of 'Jinnah - Khizr Talks' in April 1944. The talks were held to explain the affiliation between the Muslim League and the Unionist Party in Punjab. No settlement was took place, so Khizar was expelled from the League membership in May 1944.⁷⁰⁰ Because of his clash with Jinnah, he was condemned as a 'quisling' and kafir (infidel) by the Leaguers. Fake funerals were held and anywhere he moved, he was received with black flags.⁷⁰¹ Ian Talbot wrote about Khizr that:

he was not inspired only by power. His allegiance was not grounded on self-interest but on the prosperity of the province. He was in favour of united Punjab and cross-communal collaboration. With a political pragmatism marked with the practice of consociational democratic approach to politics, he treated the Hindu-Muslim-Sikh communal differences as irrelevant.⁷⁰²

⁶⁹⁷Sikandar Hayat, *The Charismatic Leader Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 2.

⁶⁹⁸Ahmad (ed). *Speeches and Writings*, Vol. I, p. 395.

⁶⁹⁹Baxter (ed.) *From Martial Law to Martial Law*. p. 167.

⁷⁰⁰Talbot, *Provincial and Politics and the Pakistan Movement* (Karachi. Oxford University Press, 1990), pp 93-94.

⁷⁰¹Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*, p.1.

The people got disappointed with the party leadership as they lost their trust on him. Khizr, in the opinion of Penderel Moon, was far more resolute than Sir Sikandar but he did not possess Sir Sikandar's experience and standing as he had entered politics in 1937. Moreover, he was not endowed with the diplomatic gifts and charm of manner in the degree possessed by his predecessor.⁷⁰³ It proved that Tiwana was not as talented as of Fazl-i Husain and⁷⁰⁴ Sikandar Hayat. His political actions were regionalised, marginalised and limited to the Punjab. The party suffered a severe set-back in January 1945 after the demise of Sir Chhotu Ram. He was one of the main leaders of the Unionist Party because he had good connections with the crowds. He had substantial impact on the province.⁷⁰⁵ At the end of 1945, there had been a huge extraction from the Unionist Party to the Muslim League. The decay in the position of tradition elite was due to the development of electoral franchise, increasingly centralised structure of the Indian politics, erosion of the British authority, emergence of the Muslim League as an All-India party and the 'national character of the urban, educated middle classes vis-a-vis the parochial, local, territorial character of the traditional elite.'⁷⁰⁶ So, the deterioration in the Unionist traditional leadership provided way for the advent of numerous fragment group acting as opponent nominees of power inside the party thus separating the partisans into several groups.

The utmost noticeable families (Noons, Daultanas) among them were Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan (1915-98), the eldest son of Sikandar Hayat Khan, and Mian Mumtaz Khan Daultana (1916-95), son of Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana (1896-1940), former

⁷⁰³ Moon Benderal Moon, *Divide And Quit* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962), p.39-39.

⁷⁰⁴ Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman. Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.14.

⁷⁰⁵ Sikandar Hayat, *Aspects of the Pakistan Movement* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1991), p. 104-105.

⁷⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

General-Secretary of the Punjab Unionist Party. The Khizar ministry had come to be fairly unpopular due to abundant army recruitment and demanding of grain, in the war years. Numerous Unionist Party traditional agriculturalist followers joined the League cause from 1944 onwards. The failure of the Simla Conference of 1945 undoubtedly was due to the opportunistic Punjabi landed elite who seemed to believe that their future would only be secured through Muslim League and Jinnah.⁷⁰⁷ Khizar himself prepared to surrender. This ultimate change in the condition was seen in the 1945-46 elections, which the League crushingly acquired, because of a well-organised civil compliance movement thrown in January 1947 and the complete dominance of Jinnah and the League in the Punjab. In Jinnah's words, the Muslims were 'Like a No Man's Land.'⁷⁰⁸ In the end, Jinnah became a living symbol of Muslim unity, Muslim aspirations, and Muslim pugnacity.⁷⁰⁹

4.2 Feebleness of Ideological Foundations

The masses affiliated to any political party because of its ideology. If no ideology exists, complaints of masses are not addressed and the party lacks to meet challenges, then that political group has no chances to exist. The Unionist Party was originally established to counter common danger from the urban money-lenders who were generally Hindus to the general people. About 83 per cent of the landowners of the Punjab were in debt. On the other side, the moneylenders were gradually obtaining their lands by forfeiting or due to mortgage.⁷¹⁰ The Unionist Party came into power in Punjab in 1937 and again in 1946. In 1946, it fashioned an insecure alliance ministry which was soon deposed. The rural

⁷⁰⁷Ian Talbot, *Jinnah: Role Model for Future Generations of Pakistanis* (London: University of Leicester, 2001), p. 5

⁷⁰⁸Ahmad (ed.) *Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah*, Vol. I.p.41.

⁷⁰⁹Saleem Qurashi, "The Consolidation of Leadership in the Last Phase of the All-India Muslim League", *Asian Profile*, Vol.1, No.2 (October, 1973), p 298.

⁷¹⁰Hayat, *Aspects of the Pakistan Movement*. p. 106

candidates were elected owing to their own influence but not with support of the party. The Unionist's claim to rule the Punjab denoted on the harmony of the 'agricultural tribes' whose common interests were clear in the Land Alienation Act.

With the passing of time, it was an influential representative creed which delivered the Unionist's entitlement to rule on the entire Punjab comprising the rural peasantry and urban population as well. Ayesha Jalal comments that the Unionist Party was a ministerial coalition cobbled together to win office while their "cross-communal arrangements depended critically upon local notables whose allegiance was always a matter of calculation not commitment."⁷¹¹

The Unionist leadership confronted severe difficulties because of the inherent conflicts between the party's conceptual appeal, promising to give safeguard to the traditional features of tribal and land-based politics, and the practical problems of surpassing those native structures to form a up-to-date party organisation.⁷¹²Consequently, weak leadership significantly contributed to its fall. The Unionist party claimed to win the origin of the Punjabi population regardless beyond the distinction of rural or urban classes while it enviously shielded the interests of the land-owning groups instead of landless non-agriculturist classes.

4.3 Personal Conflicts Among the Leadership

Exactly after leaving of Fazl-i-Husain from Punjab, self interest and personal clashes of the Unionists leaders devastated the party. The actual reasons of this uncertainty,

⁷¹¹Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*, p 139.

⁷¹²David Gilmartin, *Empire And Islam Punjab and the Making of Pakistan* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), p.145.

desires and jealousies and biased factions.⁷¹³ Shahab-ud-Din (President of the Council) was interested in to be appointed as a revenue member. He was supported by Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana to stop Feroz Khan Noon to be a minister for another tenure. The urban Muslims were also against Feroz Khan Noon due to rural-urban conflict. They went to the governor in a form of a delegation for the nomination of an urban Muslim as minister. Sikandar was also interested to be the revenue member because he was close to the British government. Shahab-ud-Din also requested Zafarullah Khan for ministership. Fazl-i-Hussain at once instructed Zafarullah Khan not to become the part of this controversy. Fazl-i-Hussain asked Feroz Khan Noon and Sikandar Hayat to take the entire matter before the party for decision. He also suggested Feroz Khan Noon not to make coalitions with Hindus and Sikhs.⁷¹⁴ Fazl-i-Husain was extremely to see selfish attitude of the leading members of the party, as he wrote in his Diary:

In think Shahab-ud-Din has behaved badly and Mehar Shah has done great mischief. The effect of this on the party and the Sikh and Hindu member is extremely bad. This is the first serious blow on my work in the Punjab⁷¹⁵

Sikandar Hayat's special concentration in commercial, industrial, and banking concerns, had impressed the governor, who wished to appoint him as a revenue member. These self-interested activities and political clashes in the top Unionists gave enough reason to the governor to focus on a non-party communal system. Finally, the governor appointed Malik Feroz Khan Noon as a Minister of Education, Gokul Chand Narang as a Minister of Local Self-government, Sardar Jogendra Singh as a Minister of Agriculture,

⁷¹³ Letter, H.E. Sir Herbert Emerson to Lord Linlithgow, MSS Eur F 125/112, Linlithgow Collection.

⁷¹⁴ Fazl-i-Husain to Feroz Khan Noon, October 2, 1930, quoted in Ahmad, ed., *Letter of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 97.

⁷¹⁵ Waheed Ahmad, ed., *Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 30.

and Sikandar Hayat Khan as a revenue member. Fazl-i-Husain was disappointed with this decision as he wrote to Sir Chhotu Ram:

This personal squabble has hurt me more than anything else for many years. This shameful exhibition of spite and malice would not be worth noticing but for its most damaging effect in the best interests of the party. United, the party could demand its rights, divided, it becomes a laughing-stock for all. I am in entire agreement with you that the least the party was entitled to was to have two ministers from it. My personal views on the subject are as you know, quite strong. I would prefer a ministry of 2, both ministers being non-Muslims, as long as they belonged to the Unionist Party which is the majority party. The Muslim minister came in only because of the possibility of a third minister not belonging to the party. The position of the party, being reduced to have but one-third share, and that of a communal nature, is intolerable and one which the party, if united, could have violently protested against.⁷¹⁶

When Chhotu Ram was struggling to reinforce the Unionist Party, the important Muslim members were because of their selfish approach destructing its status. Sikandar was interested in Punjab politics with the help of his friends. In 1930, Feroz Khan Noon was against the appointment of Sikandar Hayat but Fazl-i-Husain brought reconciliation between the two and ultimately Sikandar Hayat took office as a revenue member.⁷¹⁷

Fazl-i-Husain was anxious to avoid rivalry for leadership between the two members of the party. Fazl-i-Husain said, that "The Punjab Muslims are today weaker than ever before".⁷¹⁸

He wrote to Firoz Khan:

In the matter of ministership, so far as I can see, the number of your supporters from among the Muslims members of the Party is at least double the number of those likely to support Zafarullah Khan. Therefore, I strongly advise you not to make the mistake of forming alliances with Hindus or Sikhs with the objective of strengthening your position. This is likely to react unfavourably on you and not to be helpful.⁷¹⁹

⁷¹⁶Fazl-i-Husain to Chhotu Ram, October 13, 1930, quoted in Ahmad, ed., *Letter of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 102.

⁷¹⁷Khurshid, *Feudal Ascendancy and the Role of Sir Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 237.

⁷¹⁸Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 271.

⁷¹⁹Letter dated October 2, 1930, to Feroz Khan Noon. quoted in Ahmad, ed., *Letter of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 97.

4.4 Tussles for Premiership

The Unionist Party was a multi-cultural, multi-religious, multi-ethnic composition in which there were numerous interest groups to be accommodated, two major were the landlords and the peasantry. Internal conflict in the Unionist Party had existed since the Fazl-i-Husain times. The Hindus and Sikhs were, anxious of “Muslim Raj” after the declaration of Communal Award. They desired Sikandar to replace Fazl-i-Husain. Raja Narendra Nath, leader of the urban Hindus, had bosom friendship with Sikandar, it carried the support of the urban Hindus. Nawab Muzaffar Khan and Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana were in favour of Sir Sikandar instead of Fazl-i Husain. The conspiracies of Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, Nawab Muzaffar Khan and Sir Sikandar performed a countless character in creating the succession matter further complex.⁷²⁰ At the last days of Fazl-i Husain’s life, he was so much depressed because of internal conflict in the party. His energetic struggle for reconciliation in the party went in vain. Fazl-i Husain’s death in May 1936 and Sikandar Hayat was immediately chosen as a party head.⁷²¹ The wrangle for party premiership erupted after the unexpected expiry of Sikandar in December 1942. There were no rules and regulations for resolving the issue of succession in the Unionist Party. The three key power groups were the Noon-Tiwanas of Sargodha, the Hayats of Wah (Sir Sikandar’s family) and the Daultanas of Luddan. Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan and Mian Mumtaz Mohammad Khan Daultana, Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, were the prominent candidates against Tiwanas. After the succession of Khizr Tiwana, the Hayats and Daultanas ceased to come into arena. The two other Unionist leaders for premiership

⁷²⁰Baxter (ed.), *From Martial Law to Martial Law*. pp.126-28.

⁷²¹*Ibid.*, p 141.

were Mir Maqbool Mahmood and Nawab Muzaffar Khan.⁷²² These all practices and internal disagreement within the party proved to be disastrous for its slender social base.

4.5 Mismanagement During War

One of the main reasons which significantly damaged the Unionists' fame in the Punjab was mishandling during the Second World War. For the same reason people started to support the Muslim League but not unionists. The inordinate despair of 1930s functioned as a catalyst causing extensive rural discontent in the Punjab. At that time, it was difficult for the peasantry to pay taxes and rent and seen a sudden drop in agricultural production.⁷²³ Furthermore, the government levied the price control which added fuel to fire. In January 1943, firms buying supplies of wheat for the army which stimulated hoarding and black marketing.⁷²⁴ The Unionists did nothing for the reduction in agricultural prices which obviously upset their old partners, the property-owners. Till 1944, extraordinary prices for wheat and other agricultural crop had partly remunerated the farmers for price rises and deficiencies of consumer goods. But in autumn of 1944, there was one more disastrous drop in agricultural values. In these circumstances, the Unionist Party, on the rural peasantry's reaction, adopted an informal resolution in the Punjab Assembly in November 1943. The resolution said that any attempt to control the wheat prices would be resented by the agriculturist classes.⁷²⁵ The Unionists tried to exploit the condition as a policy to achieve political and ideological power. In the words of David Gilmartin, the Unionists

⁷²²Talbot, *Provincial and Politics and the Pakistan Movement*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 40.

⁷²³Gilmartin, *Empire And Islam Punjab and the Making of Pakistan*, pp 119-20.

⁷²⁴Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarian in South Asia: A Comparative Historical Perspective* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publishers, 1995), p.87.

⁷²⁵Talbot, *Provincial and Politics*, p. 105.

saw an answer to the depression in strengthening the local idioms of political power on which the colonial system, and the power of the Unionist Party, were based.⁷²⁶ They did not blame the government for it but targeted the non-agriculturist capitalists, and money-lenders.

The stiffness of the peasantry was increased after limiting of food grains in early 1940s. To add fuel to fire, the Central Food Department demanding of grain supplies to the army.⁷²⁷ The common masses felt in the province that the Unionist Party had been unsuccessful to regulate inflation as the wheat prices were placed under ceiling. Sir Chhotu Ram criticised the requisitioning of grains and placing of price ceiling, but the 'Imperial Government' made it clear that the procurement of the necessary surplus wheat from Punjab was more important than any interests of the Ministers.⁷²⁸ In that situation, Muslim League completely demoralised the rural dissatisfaction and its propaganda produced political consciousness in the peasantry of the Punjab. The other most alarming issue was unemployment which caused displeasure in Punjab. The province has always served the colonial masters as a good recruiting ground for the Imperial Army.⁷²⁹ The Punjab provided over half fighting men of the Indian Army. In the World War II (1939-45), the Unionist Ministry tried to uphold the comfortable allegiance of the recruiting parts. The Khizr Cabinet made a strategy for profiting the recruiting zones with an occupation programme for disbanded soldiers. Because of abrupt end of the World War II and the fall in local economy, numerous service-men met with joblessness. Less than 20 per cent of the

⁷²⁶Gilmartin, *Empire And Islam in Punjab*, p. 120.

⁷²⁷Talbot, *Provincial and Politics*, p. 94.

⁷²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁷²⁹H. V. Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain – India- Pakistan* (London: Hutchinson Publishers, 1970), p. 72

discharged soldiers were able to get jobs.⁷³⁰ The Unionists could not fulfilled their promises, it caused a huge disenchantment from the party's strategies and programmes. So, the key recruiting divisions of the Punjab which were considered the monopolies of the Unionists voted in support of League in 1946 elections. While facing all the troubles in the Punjab, the party's position seriously destabilised in both urban and rural constituencies. The elevation in prices of customer things hit the urbanite groups whereas the reduction in agricultural prices hurt the rural landholders. Thus, the Unionists' social base which was already slender declined further.

The military services were commonly attractive due to definite and regular pay it assured. In the late nineteenth century, in the Indian Army a soldier was salaried seven rupees a month with other incentives, such as foreign services *batta* (bonus), good conduct pays and free travel on railways. Malcolm Darling in one of his tours of the villages in the Punjab in 1929, inquired the people whether they joined the army due to *shauq* (keenness) or *bhug* (hunger). Most of them replied *bhug* first and then *shauq*.⁷³¹ As a result, military wages, through pay and pensions, constituted the key basis of their income. In 1901, it was reported that proprietors in the Jhelum tehsil earned over Rs. 500,000 in military pay and pensions, almost three times what they had to pay in land revenue, it was fixed in 1901 at Rs. 185,772.⁷³²

In the area of Salt Range, fiscal misery was an influential "push" element for men from the chosen military districts to sign up in the army. Military service presented an

⁷³⁰Talbot, *Freedom's Cry. The Popular Dimension in The Pakistan Movement and Partition Experience in Experience in North-West India* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 88.

⁷³¹Malcolm L. Darling, *Rusticus Loquitur, or the Old Light and The New in The Punjab Villages* (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 30.

⁷³²LSR, Jhelum, 1901, p. 24.

“escape route from the ecological impasse”⁷³³ and man family incomes were reliant on military earning. The Salt Range area, military pay and pension income was estimated in 1910 that no less than Rs. 16,000,000 more than the Rs. 1,186,020 which the district had to pay as land revenue.⁷³⁴ M.S. Leigh, the Settlement Officer of Shahpur district, a district in western Punjab wrote in 1917: “....the peasants will have to take military service in increasing numbers if they wish to maintain their standard of living.”⁷³⁵

Military service was prevalent in the Jats from the unirrigated areas of the district and for them army pay and pension were observed as a type of “famine insurance policy.” The Jats of Rohtak tended to enter the army to ensure a regular income which was not certain from land and cattle, and to enable them to survive their frequent losses of cattle.⁷³⁶ Because the Jats from Rohtak district regarded military service as nothing more than a reliable source of income, very few of them would stay in the army for long. Like the Jats of Rohtak, the Sikhs peasants proprietors of Central Punjab saw military service as an “insurance against debt,” and often found military income a necessity to keep their small landholdings.⁷³⁷

4.6 Organisational Disaster of the Unionist party and its Leadership

While to study the structure of a political party, its organisational hierarchy, enrolment method of members and interest accumulation etc. are important factors. The Unionist Party and its leadership did not follow the pattern as a political party on the

⁷³³Clive Dewey, ‘*Some Consequences of the Military Expenditure in British India: The Case of the Upper Sind Sagar Doab, 1849-1947*’ (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.96.

⁷³⁴E. Joseph, *LSR, Rohtak District, 1905-1910* (Lahore: Punjab Govt. Press, 1910), p. 1.

⁷³⁵M.S. Leigh, *LSR, Shahpur District, 1911-1917* (Lahore: Punjab Govt. Press, 1918), p.3.

⁷³⁶E. Joseph, *LSR, Rohtak District*, p.23

⁷³⁷Richard G. Fox, *Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the Making* (California: University of California Press, 1985), p. 46.

modern lines and its relative organisational flaws contributed to its demise. The party did not properly fight the provincial elections except after 1937. The rural members fought elections independently and after that they moved to share hands to form a Unionist group in the Punjab Legislative Council after that.⁷³⁸ These individuals did the job due to their respect, moral impact or their affluence.⁷³⁹ The social base of the party was very restricted. Jean Blondel sees popular support indispensable for a political party but the extent to which it requires popular support varies.⁷⁴⁰ Ever since the Unionists were not able to sustain themselves as a political party, the main element seems to be their incapability to handle with the changing political scenario with the ever-increasing political liberalisation as assured by the Reforms of 1919 and 1935. The 1935 Act, elaborated the landowners who paid Rs.5 or more as land revenue were able to cast vote. After the Act, it was need of the time to wide party membership, the leadership of the party could not make any policy to meet the newly franchised voters in its social base. Probably the high property qualifications for suffrage of tenants, i.e., 6 acres of irrigated or 12⁷⁴¹ acres of un-irrigated land disqualified the leaders from making serious struggles in this way. The Unionists did not directly approach the peasantry for electoral triumph. At the time of its inception, the party leadership did nothing to enhance the capacity of the masses. The leadership did not come up according to the essentials of the varying political organisation and the party continued wanting any extensive social base combining the masses.

⁷³⁸Talbot, *Provincial and Politics*, pp 82-83.

⁷³⁹Maurice Duverger, *Party Politics And Pressure Groups: A Comparative Introduction* (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1972), pp 6-7.

⁷⁴⁰Jean Blondel, *Political Parties: A Genuine Case Discontent?* (London: Wild Wood House, 1978), p. 16.

⁷⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 86.

The Unionists were originally not finding any way for widespread support; they focused only on the principle of protecting rights of landed community. The Unionist leadership was in effort to alter itself from an elitist party to a mass party after understanding the dynamics of Indian politics. The party could not effectively convert itself because of the inherent conflicts in its basic ideology, lack of connection in the topmost leadership, also the masses and organisational structure was not adaptable to the changing political situation and evolving demands from the several groups of the society. The Unionists could not successfully develop an organisational hierarchy. Although branches were developed at district, tehsil and zail level, controlled from the provincial headquarters but they could not function well because of local factions and district-wide contentions. David Gilmartin attested the reality of district-wide factionalism in the Unionist rank and file. For example, in Sheikhupura district, there was conflict over establishing a party tehsil centre.⁷⁴² Gilmartin further presents:

the case studies of these districts of western Punjab, Shahpur, Multan and Lyallpur, which clearly manifest the bitter conflict among leaders for political supremacy in the district. Shahpur district was politically dominated by Noons and Tiwanas, two allied Rajput tribes. A rival faction was formed by Nawab Muhammad Hayat Qureshi. Similarly, in Multan district, the Qureshi-Gilani tussle for political leadership in the district greatly undermined the organisational strength of the party.⁷⁴³

Sir Fazl-i Husain established the party's provincial headquarters in his lifetime, but its organisation could not go beyond the provincial headquarters. When he re-organised the party in 1936, extraordinary stress was given on expansion its social base and winning popular support. The tehsil organisation was the utmost imperative branch from which the party was to originate its strength and firmness.⁷⁴⁴ The full-fledged result could not be achieved because of factionalism. Gilmartin while concluding the Unionist factionalism

⁷⁴²Gilmartin, *Empire And Islam in Punjab*, p. 129.

⁷⁴³*Ibid.*, p.13.

⁷⁴⁴Husain, *Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, p.151.

makes a telling comment: “the Unionists asserted their claim to rule in the name of an agriculturist ‘class’ but could not directly claim the identities or allegiances of individual Punjabis.”⁷⁴⁵

4.7 Tussles in the Unionist Party Leadership

Feroz Khan Noon and Shahab-ud-Din’s enmity eventually separated the party leaders into ‘reactionaries’ and ‘progressives’ (such as Noon-Tiwana and Shahab-ud-Din Daultana) and in 1927, an inner forward block was shaped in the Unionist Party under the leadership of Sikandar Hayat.⁷⁴⁶ Shahab-ud-Din was considered as a member of Daultana family. Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana and Shahab-ud-Din were married to two sisters, thus Shahab-ud-Din was the maternal uncle of Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana. Shahab-ud-Din was childless, he espoused Mumtaz Daultana, funded his educational expenditures and gave share of property to him.⁷⁴⁷ On the other hand, Noon-Tiwana Group had close family relationships, but this kinship proved fatal and fragmented the party into blocks. It was entirely because of internal discords that directed the official indifference. Eventually, while the opponent groups in the Unionist Party conceded and they agitated for their due share in the provincial cabinet, but the governor was not ready to allocate ministerial appointments on parliamentary shapes. So, the working of the party was not according to the system of government, and it was completely ignored. These conditions had broken the Unionist party power and it failed to advance interests and rights of the down-trodden common people.

⁷⁴⁵ Gilmartin, *Empire And Islam in Punjab* p.145.

⁷⁴⁶ Chaudhri Chhotu Ram, ‘A Genuine Patriot’ in Lajpat Rai Nair, Sir Sikandar *The Soldier-Statesman of the Panjab* (Lahore: Institute of Current Affairs, 1943), p. 39.

⁷⁴⁷ Baxter (ed.) *From Martial Law to Martial Law*, p. 111.

After 1926, numerous dissimilarities and factions ascended inside the party. In these circumstances, the Unionist Party based on inter-communal collaboration was not in a position to stand on its footings. The inter-party conspiracies spoiled the establishment of a Unionist ministry. Certainly, the Hindu press and the politicians were also trying to highlight differences among the Unionist leaders.

4.8 Food Crisis

During the Second World War, worst food shortage occurred in British India especially in Punjab. ⁷⁴⁸ The Bengal Famine of 1943-44 which took approximately three-and a half million lives was one of the worst famines in the world history. India was a primary food provider; however, government of India did not have capacity to deal with emergencies and food shortage which led to famine like situation in India during and after the Second World War. At the end of 1941, the food supply was running dreadfully short in India. The lack of the main staple rice had increased 2.8 million tons in 1941 and this deficit could not match with its import. The condition deteriorated after the loss of the Burmese rice provisions in 1942, projected nearly 1.5 million tons yearly for India. ⁷⁴⁹

The food issue produced strains between the central government and the Punjab administration on the one hand, and the British administration and the Unionist government on the other. Abundant in food, the Punjab was likely to play its share in serving the scarce provinces.⁷⁴⁹ The agriculturists wanted to take advantage from the extraordinary demand of food grains. As expected, the Punjab Legislative Assembly registered an unequivocal

⁷⁴⁸ Andrew Grajdanzev, "India Wartime Economic Difficulties", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 16(3), (June 1943), p. 199.

⁷⁴⁹ Knight, *Food Administration in India 1939-47* (California: Standford University Press, 1954), p. 156.

opposition to the central government's decision to impose price control for the province's wheat supply.⁷⁵⁰

The Viceroy was watchful on the war effort by the Unionist party. Central government was mindful that if the Unionist government fall then not even a single party was capable of mobilising the province for the war efforts. The Unionists recognised the strategies contrary to the welfares of landed class. They were clearly against food controls of any kind.

The 1943 was a bad year for the Unionists because too much went against the desires of the Unionists. The Government of India imposed restriction and requisition upon the Punjab. Further, the United Provinces were omitted from the proposal and price control was re-imposed in November. Due to these strategies, the Unionists were intensely frustrated. By the end of that year the legitimacy of the collective affiliation between the rural elites and the state that strengthened the civil-military structure had been sternly eroded. Both parties were beginning to abandon their partnership in the aftermath of the food crisis.⁷⁵¹

The food calamity had broken the patronage system that the British had constructed in the Punjab. The British had promoted their relations while giving the ruling elites authoritative powers. And in return the elites, consuming their native influences of patronage through religious leadership and baradari networks, performed the role of intermediaries between rural and military Punjab on the one hand and with the British

⁷⁵⁰ *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, Vol. 18(11), pp. 257-305.

⁷⁵¹ Yong, *The Garrison State, The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 294.

rulers on the other. However, the food catastrophe occurred due to the war had shattered that distinct relationship. The rural-military elites that shaped the Unionist Party had openly and passionately supported the war efforts. However, this guarantee to the war and led to requisitioning and price control. At that time, all-India provincial benefits crashed.⁷⁵²

4.9 Death of Sikandar Hayat Khan and Sir Chotu Ram

Unionists faced dual setback with the demises of its two stalwarts i.e., Sikander Hayat Khan and Chhotu Ram in two years. Sikander Hayat, passed away in December 1942, at 55 years of age. His death was a severe setback which not only deprived the rural-military lobby from one of its utmost significant members, but also proved fatal for cross-communal rural coalition. In the disturbed months of 1942, the Muslim League's publicity was predominantly fatal as Muslim landowners were anxious that their communal and urban opponents Hindu and Sikh businessmen were profiting from a new and worth system of government support, namely civil supply agreements for grains.⁷⁵³

The mounting figure like Jinnah was the undisputed Muslim leader in the entire India which put the Unionists on defensive mode. With the mandatory enlisting in few districts, food crisis and the economic effects of the war further damage its fame. The Sikander's successor, Khizr Hayat, was a weak leader.⁷⁵⁴ The Punjab Governor acknowledged that Khizr was certainly in a much "weaker position than his predecessor." And this was in part the result of Sikander's "sometime unnecessary surrenders" to Jinnah.⁷⁵⁵ The politically fraile and inexpert Khizr at the helm, the Unionist structure start

⁷⁵² *Punjab Assembly Debates*, Vol. 22 November 1943, p. 98.

⁷⁵³ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p. 151.

⁷⁵⁴ Talbot, *Khizr Tiwana*, pp. 85-87.

⁷⁵⁵ Glancy to Linlithgow, 20 July 1943, TP, Vol. 4, p. 110.

to crumble when the Muslim League considered that Khizr was a political trivial and augmented its political attack. Khizr's position was certainly further frail at the demise of the Unionist key Hindu Jat mainstay, Chhottu Ram, who yielded to a heart attack in 1944.

4.10 Muslim League and the Fall of the Unionist Party

The Unionist government became susceptible to the political encounters mounted by the Muslim League. The League was not in a position to achieve political ground in the Punjab till 1930s because its roots not penetrated at local level and peasant interests in the Punjab. The Punjab Muslim League made a strategy to describe themselves as defender of the Muslim agriculturists in the province. The Nawab of Mamdot, a pastoral distinguished and spearhead of the provincial Muslim League, willingly presented to shape the next League ministry if the Unionists carried out their danger to leave over the substance of food controls.⁷⁵⁶

The Muslim League tried to assemble the common masses with the name of Islam and acknowledged the reality that notion of Pakistan had made little influence on the rural population. When the All-India Jat Mahasabha apprehended a meeting in 1943, at Lahore in which Christian, Sikh, Hindu and Muslim Jats collectively shared the platform to recognise the mutual economic welfares and "martial" identity of the Jat community, the Muslim press severely condemned the meeting "as a tool of colonial interests which ignored the religious differences between the Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs".⁷⁵⁷

⁷⁵⁶ *Punjab Assembly Debates*, Vol. 23, no. 2, p. 106.

⁷⁵⁷ *Talbot, Khizr Tiwana*, p. 94.

The League had hunted initially to win over the rural leaders so that it could touch the grassroots. Whereas Khizr was busy to make constant provision for the war struggle among a gradually more exhausted population, asking that the assistances and sacrifices of the martial castes would be given respectful spaces in the future of India. After 1943, he was not the single orator for the soldier classes in the Punjab. Members of the rural-military elites who had affiliated Punjab League, utmost particularly, Shaukat Hayat Khan, eldest son of the late Sikander Hayat, started affirming that the Unionists had did little for the marital groups of the Punjab.⁷⁵⁸ Shaukat was not outsider to the military community, and his promise that the Muslim League would give “whole-hearted support in all matters relating to post-war resettlement and welfare”, representing an attempt to strike at the heart of the Unionist power base in the Punjab.⁷⁵⁹

The league’s triumph in the 1946 elections gestured the demise of the Unionist Party in the Punjab, it did not change the power formation that had long been in reality there. The League success was just a case of the landlords and sufisirs moving en-bloc from one party to the other.⁷⁶⁰ This swing according to Imran Ali, “provided the basis for maintaining major communities for the Muslim landed elite chose to use the League as its vehicle for carrying over its authority into the post-colonial period”.⁷⁶¹ The political defeat of the Unionists in 1946 signalled but a change in political labelling.

⁷⁵⁸Talbot, *Khizr Tiwana*, pp. 89.

⁷⁵⁹*Dawn* (Delhi), 8 October 1945.

⁷⁶⁰Ronald J. Herring, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Eradication of Feudalism in Pakistan in *Economic and Political weekly*, Vol 15(12), 22 March 1980, pp. 599-614.

⁷⁶¹Imran Ali, *The Punjab and the Retardation of Nationalism*. D.A. Low (ed.), *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 47.

4.11 Opposition of Malcolm Hailey Against the Growing Power of the Unionists

Sir Malcolm Hailey,⁷⁶² was not in favour of that a political party control the affairs of Punjab. He did his task with determination to decline the mounting power of the Unionist Party disallowed the Registration of Moneylender Bill and blocked the way of the Land Revenue (Amendment) Bill, both of Bills were the most vital matters on the programme of the Unionist Party. He tried to damage the party in 1926 during the appointment of ministers on the re-formation of the Council. He appointed Fazl-i-Husain as Revenue Member.⁷⁶³ Sir Malcolm removed the backing of the official bloc from the mainstream party and thus meticulous the balance of power. Actually the tug of war between the government and the Unionist Party performed an imperative character, which had initiated that the president of the PLC would be an elected one or not. Malcolm Hailey hunted to see the Unionist Party in a weak position, so he was against its growing influence. Formerly, the president of the PLC was nominated but in 1925, this office was occupied by an elected member. Hailey was interested in A.H. Casson, who was working as a designated president of the PLC. He persuaded and compelled some of the members to favour Casson. Consequently, the provincial government “began to woo the urban Hindus with political concession”⁷⁶⁴ to maintain balance of power. When the government reached the conclusion that the Swarajists were losing their political ground and the Council had been divided on communal lines. Hailey started supporting the urban members of the

⁷⁶²Took over charge as Governor of the Punjab on May 31, 1924.

⁷⁶³Apparently, the Governor outmanoeuvred Fazl-i-Husain who accepted office without resisting it.

⁷⁶⁴David Page, *Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and The Imperial System of Control 1920-1932* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 91.

Council. Actually, the Governor was firm to deteriorate the mounting power of the Unionist Party.

Fazl-i-Husain pointed out to Hailey that the appointment of a non-elected candidate would not be a legal verdict in contrast to the provisions of the 1919 Act. After understanding this fact, the bureaucracy put up Gokul Chand Narang as their candidate. The Unionist Party proclaimed Abdul Qadir as their candidate and approached Shah Nawaz not to contest the election. Fazl-i-Husain's honour was saved as the Unionist candidate Abdul Qadir, who was initially not willing to come forward due to the fear of defeat, won by forty-one votes against thirty-two.⁷⁶⁵

Hailey further struck his utmost upset to the party by comprising Fazl-i-Husain in the Provincial Executive Council as a member for land revenue. To Azim Husain, he had accepted this appointment as he "wanted to shift the plane of Punjab politics from personalities and communalism to that of political principles".⁷⁶⁶ According to David Page: "This reshuffle was the first step towards reconciliation with the urban Hindus and the reasons for Fazl-i-Husain's promotion made a mockery of the constitutional arguments which had been advanced only a year before".⁷⁶⁷ No doubt, Hailey had masterfully clipped his wings to get rid of the political pressure of the Unionist forces but he argued in a different manner to control the situation, as he wrote to Lord Reading:

His appointment would have some advantage in removing with form the sphere of transferred subjects, in which his position as a supporter of Muslim claims has brought him under general criticism from the Hindus. One is obliged to give to a minister certain latitude in regard to appointment and promotion of officials, control of grants to schools and local bodies and the like, which one need not give to a member.⁷⁶⁸

⁷⁶⁵ PLCD, Vol. I, January 1925, p. 3.

⁷⁶⁶ Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 162.

⁷⁶⁷ David Page, *Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control*. p. 91.

⁷⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

After that Hailey extracted support for the Unionist Party and decided to help the urban politicians to regulate the equilibrium of power in the Council. The British government alter its strategy under the dread of the Hindu community that rural benefaction might enduringly isolate the urban Hindus. When Fazl-i-Husain returned from Delhi, Hailey did not appoint him as minister for education and local self-government. He gave this ministry Jogendra Singh,⁷⁶⁹ a Jat Sikh landholder, as the minister for agriculture.

Hailey in 1926, had disrupted the parliamentary rule and shaped a non-party ministry on communal lines. So, the Unionist Party lost its authority and more or less twisted into opposition. When Geoffrey de Montmorency (1928-1933) appointed as governor of the Punjab, it was expected that he might establish the ministry on non-communal grounds. Fazl-i-Husain was only leader who could project the party's concern beyond own welfares. The Hailey's patterns sustained till the elections which were held under the Act of 1935.

The Unionist government plan received a sequence of set-back because of the government's strategy to preclude the party emerging power which harmony brings. The government had a practice to adopt the policy of "divide and rule" where as isolating the common masses of Punjab into opponent clusters, through sectarian matters and boosting own groups at whatever time it looked essential. These things pull down the reputation of the Unionist Party and in the existence of a communal ministry, the government turned out to be robust. It contributed inspiration to the anti-Unionist powers to encourage their determinations. For example, Gokul Chand Narang, being Mahasabhai minister, offered

⁷⁶⁹ Jogendra Singh who was appointed in November 1925, as minister for agriculture, had no affiliation with any political party. He often found support from amongst the Unionists because the Sikh members as a whole refused to support him. Quoted in Hussain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, pp. 161-162.

the Municipal Executive Officers Act, 1931, to damage the organisation of local self-government in the Punjab. This Act curtail the people of working out executive supremacies. One more measure was the Punjab Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1932, which enhanced the government mechanism over the municipalities through government officials. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani criticized the amendment and said "if we are unfit to control or manage our local bodies it does not lie in our mouth to ask for responsible self-government, responsibility at the centre, or provincial autonomy".⁷⁷⁰

The effect of dwindling the Unionist Party and the establishment of a Communal ministry was catastrophic to the province. The respect of the ministry was depressed, and the Governor grow into robust than always was formerly. Nepotism and favouritism dishonoured the management; the standard of effectiveness decayed. All these drawbacks gave rise to bureaucratic despotism, with the evil of favouritism and nepotism which corrupted the whole administration. Keeping in view the circumstances at the end of 1934, Fazl-i-Husain disgustedly wrote to Sikandar:

Frankly, I do not feel too hopeful about the future. Somehow, it seems that the atmosphere has deteriorated. It is nobody's fault; I am sure; but facts are facts..... However, the trend of events, the general atmosphere. the attitude of mind official and non-official.... the material available, so far as one can judge at present..... are none too encouraging for one who has worked, seen workers, and feel non too strong to mould circumstances and events to suit the dictates of his will. My pessimism may entirely due to my low vitality. I wish with all my heart that it were so.⁷⁷¹

The British were being unable to uphold mechanism despite with all their well-organized means and expectation. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the unhindered forefront of the Muslims in the whole India continued a non-entity in Punjab till that the Muslim League

⁷⁷⁰*The Indian Annual Register*, Vol. I, 1933, p. 229.

⁷⁷¹*Diary*, July 18, 1935. Waheed Ahmad (ed.), *Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*. p. 151.

had put forward the Pakistan Resolution (1940) as its new political strategy. The Punjab Unionist party was on the centre-stage for the last two-decade in the Punjab.

Fazl-i-Husain did the leadership of Unionist party with true spirit. After his demise, no one could get the real stance. After him Sir Sikandar Hayat hold leadership in 1936 who not ever enjoyed an undoubted leadership of his party. Factional oppositions in the Unionist Party were destabilising the party's previously slender social base. The factional leaders significantly eroded the top Unionist leadership by acting as a rival and potential contender for the party's premiership.

In the weakening of the Unionists not only the external factors, but the internal factors like deficiency of cohesiveness, frail conceptual basis, lack of competent organisation and judiciously planned hierarchy and the incapability of the leaders to incorporate the ambitions of the people attached with the destruction of charisma and the leadership disaster played a substantial role. The magnetism of Fazl-i-Husain finished with his demisethough his heirs remained unsuccessful to provide the party an energetic leadership. They were not able to address the glitches of the masses which had appeared out of the altering social and political scenario. However, the final blow to the party came after the abrupt settlement of the World War II when the party's economic policies and the growing unemployment which it could not control undermined its base both in urban and rural constituencies.

The British governed the sub-continent through a strategy of divide and rule which led to Hindu-Muslim conflict and ultimately Pakistan and India were divided in 1947.

CONCLUSION

This study provides us firsthand knowledge about the rule of British government as after annexation of Punjab in 1849, the British government established a non-regulation system of colonial administration that would change the instable region into a stable area. As the Punjab province had agrarian economy, so keeping in view the importance of the agrarian infrastructure, the British government had depended upon the landlords to capture the rural population.

For this purpose, an administration board was established by British government in Punjab in 1849, which consist of three members Henry Lawrence, John Lawrence, Charles Mansel⁷⁷² holding absolute executive, judicial and military authority at the discretion of Governor-General. With these powers the board achieved the goal of (i) pacification of Punjab, (ii) general disarmament, (iii) raising a frontier force consisting of cavalry, infantry and irregular regiments of tribes, guide corps and the intelligence department⁷⁷³.

The research study finds that the British government ruled the Punjab province for nine decades which had large impact on the society in all aspects such as by introducing the western education system, revenue settlement, administrative system, the construction of canals, colonization of canal-irrigated lands and railways infrastructure. For law-and-order situation the British government made alliance with the rural aristocracy, to empower

⁷⁷² i) Henry Lawrence, the soldier statesman and a well know administrator who had most intimate knowledge of the Sikh character.

ii) John Lawrence, younger brother of Henry Lawrence and a distinguished civil servant who had valuable experience in the revenue settlement.

iii) Charles Manse, a covenanted civil servant who had a high reputation as one of the ablest financiers in India. Syed Muhammad Latif, *History of the Punjab From the Remotest Antiquity to the Present Time* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1891), p.574.

⁷⁷³ B.S. Nijjar, *History of the United Punjab, Vol. I* (New Dehli: Atlantic Publishers & Distt India, 1996), p. 342.

their rule. The recruitment of Punjab peasants in the army and police had converted Punjab into the sword of India as this proved in WWI and WWII.

As the study shows that in WWI (1914-1919) the Punjab province proved the home front for the British rule with its manpower as the Indian Army in all field of war in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. This participation of Indian Army in WWI and WWII provided the base to militarized bureaucracy in Punjab province whose administration had played role in society and in the economy. This integrated civil-military bureaucratic structure, institutionalized in the form of the District Soldiers Boards (DSBs) remained very much intact in post-war Punjab, as the state sought to tackle the problems associated with demobilization and later to secure the military districts against internal disturbances and external political influences.

The research study also highlights the civil military structures in the Punjab province which first take part during the WWI to facilitate the deployment and control of a greatly expanded recruiting base in the province. The tie was then emphasizing by the formation of a local political structure dominated by rural-military privileged, following constitutional reforms 1920 and 1937. This civil-military administration, particularly its western half, remained essentially intact despite the major political developments and turmoil in the mid-1940s which subsequently acceded to the state of Pakistan.⁷⁷⁴

The immediate prerequisite of the British government was to attain the support of the rural masses majority; therefore, they adopted a policy of providing all possible facilities to the rural population by presenting following reform as renewed revenue

⁷⁷⁴Yong, *The Garrison State*, p. 304.

system, a new concept of landownership, colonization of barren land and the Land Alienation Act 1900 (to protect the cultivators from the clutches of moneylenders). The Land Alienation Act as proved was beneficial to the upper- and middle-class landlords as it gave them a certain amount of relief from rapacious moneylenders.

This study tells us about the Unionist Party which was founded by Fazl-i-Husain. He was proved the blind supporter of British government with the slogan of economic development for “have not” class of the society. The Unionist party had the slogan to change the economic conditions of the poor society by uplifting the economy but in long term the Unionist party only benefits the landlords of Punjab under the cap of the British government. The Unionists had the support of British religious and spiritual class. As the Punjab society attached with their traditions and the people of Punjab accepted change very gradually, therefore they remained apart from the politics. Fazl-i-Hussain as a personality could be the true leader who worked for the Muslim community. He was perceived as disputed leader because of his policies for Muslims but he was considered as communalist in politics.

This study discover that he failed to prove his secular image in politics. In 1923, the Municipal Amendment Act introduced by Fazl-i-Hussain in which he increased number of the Muslim seats that caused tension between Muslims and non-Muslims. Raja Narendra Nath put the request to the Governor for dismissal of Fazl-i-Husain for his communal policies.⁷⁷⁵ Fazl-i-Hussain made contribution in Muslim education by starting educational institution and increasing quota for Muslims. Mr. Sikandar had same policy as the Fazl-i-

⁷⁷⁵Page, *Prelude to Partition*. p. 72.

Hussain had but Sikandar support to AIML made him great leader than Fazl-i-Hussain. Quaid-i-Azam worked for the unity of Muslims in subcontinent, but Fazl-i-Hussain worked individually for the interest of Muslim community. Sikandar contributed to the creation of Pakistan with his cooperation and by consolidating the AIML. The Sikhs and Hindus acknowledged that Muslim Unionist as cross-communal leader were not accepted. As Iftikhar Malik said that the Muslim and non-Muslim land aristocracy in their alliance with British government were a phenomenon of the class politics which worked for the benefits of elite agrarian class, as Raghuvendra Tanwar writes, "Sir Sunder Singh Majithia with his economic interests like Unionist Party leadership had no difficulty to work with Unionist ministry."⁷⁷⁶ The rural population of Punjab was least interested in politics not because of Unionist politics but because of interdependent society, illiteracy and lack of enhancing activities which proved a blessing for keeping the rural population apart from politics. The Punjab society was consisted of different religious population, so the rural population founded different conducts to live friendly by removing the hurdles of extremism. So this study explores that the communal politics was a blunt reality in the power sharing campaign among Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs politics to remain in their own circle.

The study finds that in the failure of the Unionists where not only the external factors played an important role, but also the internal factors like lack of coherence, weak ideological base, lack of efficient organization, rationally structured hierarchy, and lack of aspiration for the people played a significant role in leadership crisis. The allure of Sir Fazl-i Husain ended with his death while his successors failed to give the party a dynamical

⁷⁷⁶Tanwar, *Politics of Sharing Power*, p. 111.

leadership. The Unionist after the death of Fazl-i-Hussain could not tackle the transformation process in social and political scenario at mass level. So, after WWII, party's economic policies and the growing unemployment which it could not control damaged its base both in urban and rural constituencies.

This study locates the leader Sir Chhotu Ram among the co-founder of the National Unionist Party in Punjab and was a great leader that was part of the Unionist Party. His contribution to the party was proved bond that strengthen the party as a powerful parliamentary organization. As a leader of Haryana rural Punjab, Chhotu Ram confirmed compliance, uniqueness, valor, and imagination.⁷⁷⁷

One of the most distinguishing features of politics in Punjab from 1923 till the eve of independence was the continued political supremacy of the Unionist Party. Formed from the rural Muslim and Hindu members elected to the Council in 1920, the Party came to dominate constitutional politics in the Punjab for nearly a quarter of a century, until its final defeat in the elections of 1946.⁷⁷⁸

The study finds that the nature of the Punjab's political experience from 1920 to 1937 left an ineffaceable mark on the political landscape of the Punjab province. First, politics in the Punjab were dominated by the very classes whose interests were intimately tied to the British. As rural-military elites, the position of these classes was predicated upon the Punjab's continued position as the "sword arm" of the Raj, and ultimately on British rule itself.

⁷⁷⁷Verma, *Sir Chhotu Life and Times*, pp. 4-5.

⁷⁷⁸Yong, *The Garrison State. The Military*. pp 278-279.

On moving towards concluding remarks this study shows that in Punjab the Unionist leadership was not able to address their ideas among the common masses in rural areas. But the Unionist Party failed to participate in the creation of separate homeland for the Muslims. As the Unionist Party worked with alliance of the British government to benefit the landlords of rural population.

The Unionist Party had no important opponent political party to challenge its authority in Punjab political affairs. The period from 1937-40 is measured as the period of Unionist dominance in Punjab history. The Unionists began to decline in 1943 with the succession of Khizar Hayat. The 1946 provincial polls shaken the basis of the Unionist Party by the crushing defeat set at the hands of the League. It wrapped the destiny of the Unionists in the Punjab forever. Khizar Hayat had no ability to comeback. The Unionist party faces lack of leadership ability after the death of Fazl-i-Hussain, not a single leader found that could work according to the willingness of masses. The Unionists leadership was not accomplished to keep the working of the Unionist party in that way the leaders like Fazl-i-Hussain were working.

The study explores that WWII, the Punjab province again supported the British government which provided basis to rural aristocracy for the post-colonial state of Pakistan. From 1939 to 1945 the Punjab was mobilised once again to support Britain in a major world conflagration. This political configuration was to provide the basis for the powerful and deeply entrenched landlord lobby in the post-colonial state of Pakistan.⁷⁷⁹ It held the province intact throughout the early 1940s, although cracks were beginning to form in the

⁷⁷⁹ Hamza Alavi, *Authoritarianism and Legitimation of State Power in Pakistan* in Subrata Kumar Mitra (ed.), *The Post-Colonial State in Asia* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1998), p. 27.

garrison state. By the mid-1940s, larger all-India issue — the Muslim League's campaign for Pakistan, increasingly strident communal politics and impeding self-government “quite suddenly and traumatically broke the Punjab into two distinct parts upon independence in 1947.”

APPENDIX 1

The Creed of The National Unionist Party

The party stood for a practical and useful creed and its main planks were as follows: -

- (a) The attainment of Dominion Status by all constitutional means at as early a date as practicable. Under the head, the party pledged itself to work in a peaceful manner for the establishment of national self-respect, which had been badly damaged due to revolutionary activities. Further the party decided to work for the establishment of provincial autonomy de-facto, for freedom of thought a den for the maintenance of proper relations between the masses and the ruling authorities.
- (b) To provide equal opportunities and facilities for all, and special solicitude for the backward classes and areas. According to this provision the party which was formed on non-racial grounds pledged itself to push forward the constructive programme equally in rural as well as urban centers. In this respect the policy of the party had been to help the backward people first whether they belonged to rural or urban areas. In simple words, the party wanted to uplift the living standard of the people of the whole Punjab irrespective of any caste or creed. The party, as a matter of principle, pledged its support particularly for the Land Alienation Act as a measure to protect the poor cultivators. It further aimed to lower the burden of taxes by its efficient, fair and equitable distribution among the different class and to endorse beneficial activities through gradual reduction of expenses in administrative departments. The party also pledged to develop and protect the socio-cultural values of all the communities on equal grounds with the promotion of education activities.
- (c) The economic readjustment and planning of the province was the basic plank of the party's programme. In this connection, the party pledged itself to work for the development of agriculture and industries. The Punjab, being basically an agricultural province, the party devoted its full attention, for the uplift of the agricultural structure. For this purpose the party modelled its programmes at the tehsil level which included crops planning, marketing, legal standard of weights, *mandi* dues and cesses, fixation of rates, improvement of cattle-breeding, arrangement of improved seeds and the survey of those holdings which had suffered due to water logging, *kallar*, or otherwise. The party also included in its programme the creation of better relations between landlords and the tenants and the protection of their legitimate rights and interests, for example collection of statistic to know whether revenue or other charges on land were reasonable or high, if high, to make efforts for their proper adjustment. Moreover, proper measures were proposed, for the development of cottage industries to boost the income of the cultivators and to take steps for the reduction of rural indebtedness. Further for the party pledged to work against corruption and bribery and to start beneficent activities--- educational, medical, public health, cooperative movement, village uplift and economic, social and intellectual awakening. It means that the party had accepted to work for the economic well-being of all irrespective of caste, creed or residence.
- (d) The party programme assured to each community its religious and cultural integrity as the best basis of lasting national unity. The party stood for settling the communal disputes on

the principles of toleration, negotiation and justice. Being non-communal in structure, it pledged to work for the welfare of all the inhabitants of Punjab irrespective of Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims or Christians.

(e) The party regarded the new constitution as most unsatisfactory. But its leader, in spite of its limitations, was determined to cooperate with the government and to get the best possible results out of it according to him it was no good to wreck it or boycott it.

Source: *Punjab Unionist Party Rules and Regulations* (Lahore, 1936), pp.18-24.

APPENDIX 2

Aims and Objectives of The National Unionist Party

The aims and objectives of the Party were as under:-

- (1) to attain by constitutional means Dominion Status within the British Commonwealth of nations at as early a date as possible;
- (2) to demonstrate, by a statesman like working of the reforms, that given suitable opportunities and responsibilities of self-government, the people are capable of working the constitution;
- (3) to prove that the constructive efforts if directed in a spirit of goodwill and earnestness to the working of reforms, can produce results of greater benefit to the community than a pose of disdainful aloofness and destructive criticism;
- (4) to provide equal opportunities for advancement to all, and to direct, in an increasing measure, the beneficent activities of government to the backward classes and areas, with a view to enabling them to make good the leeway produced by an ill-conceived or inadvertent policy of neglect in the past;
- (5) to secure a fair distribution of the burden of provincial taxes between agricultural and other classes;
- (6) to secure a just and fair representation of all classes and communities in the public service of the province;
- (7) to check exploitation of the economically backward classes by the economically dominant classes;
- (8) to promote indigenous industries and to encourage the use of *swadeshi* articles;
- (9) to banish illiteracy for the province;
- (10) to encourage a policy of decentralization;
- (11) to encourage the growth of local self-government institutions;
- (12) to diminish litigation;
- (13) to secure economy in administration;
- (14) to suppress corruption and bribery;
- (15) to promote temperance;
- (16) to preserve intact the Punjab Land Alienation Act as a measure of protection of backward classes;
- (17) to take up economic remonstration and re-organization of agricultural and industrial life of the province so as to cope with the problem of unemployment;
- (18) to study and promote the commercial interest of the province;
- (19) to overhaul the educational system in all its branches;
- (20) to promote industries with special emphasis upon cottage industries in rural areas so as to provide supplementary means of income to rural population;
- (21) to improve methods of marketing, including the reforms of objectionable market usage and practices; and
- (22) To effect rural uplift by infusing the real and enlightened spirit in village communities and making every village a unit of true social and national life.

Source: *Punjab Unionist Party Rules and Regulations* (Lahore, 1936), pp.18-19.

APPENDIX 3

Punjab Unionist Party Tehsil Branches model programme

The Punjab Unionist Party's first instalment of the model programme of work for tehsil branches shall include the following items: -

- (1) Crop Planning--- to make sure that the rotation of crops prevailing, is the best possible, making survey effort to see to what extent change in profitable and practicable.
- (2) Marketing--- to make sure that the produce gets the largest possible returns by marketing his produce. This involves *mandi* reforms i.e., reforming the *mandi* in, the following respects: -
 - (a) Weights prevailing in *mandi* vary---a mound is held to contain more than 40 seers. There is no reason to maintain this tradition.
 - (b) Weights are not correct to the legal standard; they should be put right.
 - (c) Actual weighting leaves great room for improvement; substituting of reliable machines is advocated.
 - (d) *Mandi* dues and cesses---- these arbitrary and over their disbursement the producer who pays, has no control. This should be put right.
 - (e) Fixing of rates of *mandi* from day to day---- this is a crying evil and should be remedied at the earliest possible moment. Public opinion on these evils should be formulated, and proposals for reforms matured and efforts made to secure action of accordance with laws which already exist, and secure new legislation to carry out the necessary reforms.
- (3) Cultivators and agricultural labourers are not occupied all the year round and during off season they are unemployed. It has been felt that during this period cottage industries should supplement the income of the cultivator and agricultural labourer. Efforts should be made to survey the cottage industries to see when the labourer is unemployed and what are the suitable cottage industries which can be introduced to the benefit of the labourers and consumers.
- (4) Along with these three items of work the question of rural indebtedness should be borne prominently in mind, and debtor class apprised of their legal position i.e., of provisions of law which exist and the nature of protection they give them.
- (5) To take steps to improve the purity of administration. Corruption and bribery are evils; the public are no free from blame in its continuation.
- (6) Beneficent activities--- educational, medical, public health, agricultural, cooperative movements, village uplift, general, economic, social and intellectual awakening, and raising the standard of culture prevailing in rural areas. These objectives should be secured by the effort of expert committee lectures, and the circulation of simple literature bearing on these matters
- (7) Improvement of local self-government activities in the tehsil---- those concerning district boards as well as small town committees and *panchayats*.
- (8) Improvement of cattle-breeding, fruit culture, consolidation of holdings and improved seeds.

(9) Proper relations between landlords and tenants and protection of their legitimate rights and interests.

(10) To collect statistics to show where revenue or other charges on land are too high in order to support effort for their adjustment.

(11) To prepare survey *Zamindars* whose holdings have been substantially reduced to effect of riparian activities, water logging, *kallar*, or otherwise.

Source: *Punjab Unionist Party Rules and Regulations* (Lahore, 1936), pp.28-29.

APPENDIX 4

Punjab Unionist Party City model programme

The first instalment of the Unionist Party's city programme will include the following items:-

- (1) reorganization and reform of local self-government in all branches. In particular:
 - (a) Better sanitation including right soil, sewage, drainage, roads and milk supply.
 - (b) Improved arrangements for maternity and child welfare and better medical relief for all--- particularly the poor.
 - (c) Equitable distribution of taxation between the rich and the poor, taxation according to means.
 - (d) Educational reorganization.
- (2) (a) Home industries, survey of industrial work for women.
(b) Problem of unemployment.

(c) Beggary---- removal or reduction of beggar.
- (3) Information Bureau for trade in the city and trade relations outside the city.
- (4) Encouragement of industrial enterprises.
- (5) To stand against corruption----- in local self-government, as well as in government institutions. Raising the standard of national self-respect.
- (6) i) Endowment in particular:-
 - (a) Registration.
 - (b) Supervision.
 - (c) Gradual voluntary consolidation.
ii) protection of religious institutions.

(7) *Mohallah* administration---- private enterprises to supplement maintenance of peace, order and fair dealings. Possibilities of *Mohallah panchayat* organization and reading-rooms.

(8) Indebtedness and cooperation on *Mohallah* basis.

(9) Physical cultural, and revival of indigenous aesthetic traditions. Amusements----- indigenous and modern to amuse, instruct, inform and elevate, raising the cultural standard of the city.

(10) Training of youth for constructive services of country Volunteer corps.

(11) Instruction of the electorate---- popularizing of the creed and objects of the party. First aid.

(12) Development of true national spirit. Tolerance and good will. Inter-communal relations. Encouragement of the backward and poor classes. Cooperation with other parties having similar aims and objectives.

Source: Punjab Unionist Party Rules and Regulations (Lahore, 1936), pp. 30-31.

Party Structure/Constitution,

Important feature of manifesto were:- 1923 (ragvinder tanver)

1. To attain dominion status within the British Commonwealth of Nations by constitutional means at any early date.
2. To demonstrate by a statement like working of the Reforms, that given suitable opportunities and reasonable facilities, Indians can shoulder the responsibilities of self-government.
3. To prove that constructive effort, if directed in a spirit of good-will and earnestness to the working of reforms can produce results of greater benefit to the community than a case of disdainfulness and destructive criticism.

4. To provide equal opportunities of advance to all and to direct in an increasing measure, the beneficent activities of government to backward classes and areas with a view to enable them to make good the leeway produced by an ill-conceived or inadvertent policy of neglect in the past.
5. To secure a fair distribution of the burden of provincial taxes between agricultural and other classes.
6. To secure a just and fair representation of all classes and communities in the public services of the province.
7. To check exploitation of economically backward classes by economically dominant classes.
8. To promote indigenous industries and to encourage the use of Swadeshi articles.
9. To banish illiteracy from the province.
10. To encourage a policy of decentralization.
11. To encourage the growth of local self-governing institutions.
12. To diminish litigation.
13. To secure economy in the administration.
14. To suppress corruption and bribery.
15. To promote temperance.
16. To preserve intact the Punjab Land Alienation Act as a measure of protection to backward classes

Source: *Punjab Unionist Party Rules and Regulations* (Lahore, 1936), pp. 30-31.

APPENDIX 5

The Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation Sikandar Hayat Khan,

1939

It is hardly necessary for our purpose to recapitulate the widely divergent reasons which have actuated the various political parties and interests in British India, as also the Indian States, to enter a caveat against the Federal Scheme embodied in the Constitution Act of 1935. The grounds of criticism are well known and have been repeatedly ventilated by the leading spokesmen of the parties concerned. We need only take cognizance of the fact that the federal proposals embodied in the Government of India Act are unacceptable to a vast majority of the people in the country. At the same time, it is admitted by all concerned, and even those who are opposed to the present scheme, that a Federation of some kind is not only desirable but indispensable for the ordered and peaceful progress of the country as a whole. In sentence the problem resolves itself into this, whether it is possible to devise a Federal Scheme to replace the one envisaged by the framers of the Government of India Act, which would satisfy and compose the conflicting interests of the various communities and classes, or at least command a large measure of support than the present scheme. Any alternative scheme to be generally acceptable must, therefore be so devised as to allay the reasonable doubts and apprehensions of the Minorities and the Indian States, and at the same time meet the criticism levelled on the score of inadequacy of political power which it is proposed to transfer to the representatives of the people under the present scheme. The problem is undoubtedly difficult and complex; but it should not be beyond the ingenuity of British statesmen to plan a revised Federal Scheme which, if not universally acceptable, would at least command a much larger measure of support and be free from some of the more serious defects which have been prominently brought into relief as a result of the working of the new Constitution in the provincial sphere. It is my fixed conviction that any scheme which does not rigidly and specifically circumscribe the authority of the Centre to matters of all-India concern (which are enumerated later in this note) is not likely to work. One of the main criticism, on the part of the Minorities and the Indian States, against the present scheme is that it does not afford adequate protection to the British Indian Provinces and Indian States from interference by the Centre in the internal administration of the units. It is apprehended that a domineering Central Government might be tempted gradually to undermine the authority and the independence of the units and thus reduce Provincial Autonomy to a farce. It is further contended that the safeguards provided in the present scheme to curb such a tendency are likely to provide ineffective. The ineffectiveness of the safeguards in the provincial sphere is cogently cited in support of this contention. In my opinion, any scheme of federation which seeks to cater for the peculiar condition of this vast subcontinent and which can reasonably be expected to work smoothly must take into account the legitimate desire of the Minorities to safeguard their religious, political, cultural and economic rights and interests, as also secure, to the satisfaction of the Princes, complete immunity to the Indian States from undue interference by the Centre or British Indian Provinces in their inter affairs. Without these guarantees it

would be unreasonable to expect willing co-operation which is essential for the successful working of the Federal machine.

I venture to give below the outlines of an alternative federal scheme for consideration.

Some of the salient features of the scheme are:

- (1) Instead of bringing British Indian Provinces and Indian States into Federation as two distinct components, it will provide for their entering it together on a religious basis which will be conducive to the solidarity of the country and the stability of the Central Government.
- (2) It will encourage collaboration between contiguous units, i.e. both between British Indian Provinces and Indian States whose geographical proximity, common language and affinity of economic and other interests from natural ties to bind them together. For Instance:
 - (a) In administrative matters, and particularly in matters pertaining to law and order, this scheme will encourage the various units in a zone to make reciprocal arrangement and when necessary, to devise a common line of action.
 - (b) In the economic field it will enable the units to share in common arrangements for the establishment of institutes for industrial and agricultural research, for experimental and determination farms and other similar matter.
- (3) By thus encouraging collaboration between British Indian Provinces and Indian States it will tend to reduce causes and occasions for friction, which would otherwise be constantly present if British Indian and Indian States Units are kept in two watertight compartments.
- (4) By confining the jurisdiction of the Federation Executive and Legislature to a few specified subjects of common concerns, it will enable both the British Indian Units and the Indian States to enter the Federation on a uniform basis. At the same time, it will allay the doubts and misgivings of the units by eliminating the possibility of undue interference by the Centre in their internal affairs.
- (5) It will ensure the willing the loyal co-operation of the Units with the Federal Centre and thus avoid the growth of any fissiparous tendency among the Units.
- (6) It will effectively safeguard the integrity and autonomy of British Indian and Indian States Units; and
- (7) It will give to the Minorities a great sense of security.

The Scheme in General Outline

- (1) For the purpose of establishing an All-India Federation on a regional basis the country shall be demarcated into seven 'zones' as under:
Zone 1: Assam + Bengal (minus one or two western Districts in order to reduce the size of the zone with a view to approximate it to other zones) + Bengal States and Sikkim.

Zone 2: Bihar + Orrisa (Plus the area transferred from Bengal to Orissa).

This would benefit Orissa which is at present handicapped to some extent to account of its limited resources and area.

Zone 3: United Provinces and UP States.

Zone 4: Madras + Travancore + Madras States and Coorg.

Zone 5: Bombay + Hyderabad + Western India States + Bombay States + Mysore and CP States.

Zone 6: Rajputana States (minus Bikaner and Jaisalmer) + Gwalior + Central Indian States + Bihar and Orissa States + CP and Berar.

Zone 7: Punjab + Sind + NWF Province + Kashmir + Punjab States + Baluchistan + Bikaner and Jaisalmer.

(NOTE: The proposed composition of these zones is only tentative and can be altered if necessary in consultation with the various interests concerned).

- (2) There shall be a Regional Legislature for each zone consisting of representatives of both British and Indian States Units included in that Zone. For the purpose of representation in the Regional Legislature every Unit will be entitled to send representatives in accordance with the share allotted to it in the scheme embodied in the Government of India Act 1935, for representation in the Federal Assembly.
- (3) The representatives in the various Regional Legislatures shall collectively constitute in Central Federal Assembly which will consist of 375 members (250 from British India and 125 from the Indian States).
- (4) One-third of the total number of representatives in the Federal Assembly shall be Muslim.
- (5) The other Minorities also shall be allotted the share appointed to them in the Federal Assembly by the Government of Indian Act 1935.
- (6) The Regional Minorities shall deal only with subjects which are included in the regional list under this scheme, but may at the request of two or more units included in the zone, legislate with regard to subjects falling in the Provincial List in order to secure uniformity and facility of administration within the zone. Such enactments would for application in any unit with the region require confirmation by the Government of the unit concerned and shall therefore supersede any provincial (or State) legislation on the subject.
- (7) In the Regional Legislature no Bill or other measure having the force of law, relating to a subject included in the Regional List shall be considered to have been passed unless two-thirds of the representatives vote in favour of the measure. (This limitation is suggested in order to give additional security to the smaller units).
- (8) The Regional Legislatures may by a resolution authorize the Federal Legislature to undertake legislation with regard to subjects included in the Regional and Provincial Lists. But such authorization shall not be effective unless at least 4 out of 7 zones ask for such action. And unless such authorization is endorsed by all the 7 Regional Legislatures the enactments so passed shall have force only in those zones which ask for such legislation.
- (9) Any law enactment by the Federal Legislature at the request of the zones and by the regional Legislature at the request of the Units shall be repealed if in the case of the regional Legislature at least half the number of units that zone ask for its repeal. The Federal executive shall consist of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General as representing His majesty the King and a Council of Ministers, as far as possible, not less than 7 and no more than 11 in Number, including the Federal Prime Minister. The Federal Prime Minister shall be appointed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General from among the members of the Federal Legislature and the remaining Ministers also from

among the members of the Legislature in consultation with the Federal Prime Minister, but subject to the following conditions and exceptions:

- (i) That such zone shall have at least one representative in the Cabinet;
- (ii) That at least one-third of the Ministers so appointed shall be Muslims;
- (iii) That at least 2, if the number of Ministers does not choose from amongst the representation of Indian States.

Note 1: There will be no objection to (ii) and (iii) overlapping, i.e. if a Minister representing an Indian States happened to be a Muslim, he could also be counted towards the minimum stipulated under (ii) and vice versa;

Note 2: Every attempt will be made to provide adequate representation to other important Minorities also.

- (iv) That during the first 20 (or 15) years from the date of the inauguration of the Federal Scheme His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General may nominate 2 of his Ministers either from among the members of the Federal Legislature or from outside and entrust to them the portfolios of Defence and External Affairs. Thereafter all the Ministers shall be selected from among the members of the Legislature.

Note 3: A tentative allocation of portfolio and designation of Ministers is suggested as

under

1. Federal Prime Minister;
2. Minister for Defence;
3. Minister for External Affairs
4. Federal Finance Minister;
5. Minister of Interior (Home);
6. Minister of Communications;
7. Minister to look after Minority Interests;
8. Minister of Co-ordination (Civil);
9. Minister of Commerce and Industries;

Note 2: The Minister of External Affairs could also be entrusted with the work connected with the affairs of the Indian States,

(12)(a) The normal term of office of the Ministers shall be the same as the life of the Federal Legislature (i.e. 5 years)

(b) The Ministers will retain office at the pleasure of His Majesty's representative, i.e. the Viceroy and Governor-General

(c) A Minister representing a particular zone shall be removed if he loses the confidence of the Majority of the representatives of his regional Legislative.

(d) The Ministry as a whole except the Ministers referred to in paragraph 11 (iv) above shall resign if a vote of no confidence against the Ministry is carried in the Federal Legislature.

(13) The representation for the regional Legislatures shall be chosen in the following manner;

(i) In the case of British Indian units by the Provincial Legislature in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Government of India Act, 1935, for the election of representation to the Federal Assembly.?

(ii) in the case of Indian States, as nearly as may be possible in accordance with the procedure outlined hereunder:

- (a) During the first 10 years from the date of inauguration of the regional and Federal Legislature three-fourths to be nominated by the Ruler and one-fourth to be selected by the Ruler out of a panel to be elected by the State Assembly or other similar institution which shall be set up for this purpose;
- (b) during the next five years two-thirds to be nominated by the ruler and one third to be elected as in (a) above;
- (c) after 15 years one-half to be nominated and one-half to be elected, as in (a) above;
- (d) after 20 years and thereafter one-third to be nominated and two-thirds to be elected as in (a) above.

(Note: if the number of seats allotted to a State or group of States is less than 2, than the Ruler shall nominate for the first 15 years and thereafter in State's representative shall be elected as in (a) above by the State Assembly or such other institution as may be set up for the purpose.)

(14) There Shall be a Committee of Defence to advise in matters relating to defence. The Committee shall consist of:

- i. H.E the Viceroy and Governor-General-President;
- ii. The Federal Prime Minister;
- iii. The Minister for Defence;
- iv. The Minister For External Affairs;
- v. The Federal Finance Minister;
- vi. The Minister for Communication;
- vii. The Chief of the General Staff;
- viii. A Senior Naval Officer;
- ix. A Senior Air Force;
- x. Seven Regional representatives, one from each zone;
- xi. 5 official experts to be nominated, one from each zone;

- xii. 2 non-official to be nominated by H.E. the Viceroy;
- xiii. The Secretary to the Defence Department.

(15) A Committee shall also be constituted to advise on matters connected with External Affairs with;

- i. H.E. the Viceroy as President; and
- ii. The Federal Prime Minister;
- iii. The Minister for External Affairs;
- iv. regional representatives (one from each zone) to be selected by the President from among the members of Regional Legislatures.
 - i. 4 other members (2 officials and 2 non-officials) to be nominated by H.E. the Viceroy, and
 - ii. The Secretary for External Affairs, as members.
- iii. NOTE TO PARAS 14-15: If in any of these Committees the number of representatives from the States falls short of 3, the difference shall be made up by the appointment by the President of additional members selected from a panel proposed by the Chamber of Princes.

(16) The Federal Railway Authority shall be so constituted as to include at least one representative from each of the 7 regional zones.

(17) Effective safeguards shall be provided in the revised constitution;

- i. for the protection of the legitimate interests in the revised constitution;
- ii. to prevent racial discrimination against British-born subjects;
- iii. against violation of treaty and other contractual rights of the Indian States;
- iv. to preserve the integrity and autonomy of both British Indian and Indian States Units against interference by the Federal Executive or Federal or regional Legislature;
- v. to ensure the safety of India against foreign aggression, and the peace and tranquility of the Units as also of the country as a whole;
- vi. to prevent subversive activities by the citizens of a unit or a zone against another unit or zone;
- vii. to protect the culture and religious rights of the Minorities.

(18) The composition of the Indian Army (as on the 1st day of January 1973)

Shall not be altered. In the event of a reduction or an increase in the peace-time strength of the Indian Army. The proportion of the various communities as on the 1st of January 1937 shall not be disturbed. This condition may be relaxed in the event of a war or other grave emergency which may arise on account of a threat to the safety of the country.

NOTE: As regards Indianization of the officers ranks see my evidence before the Indianization Committee.

(19) Only those subjects the retention of which is essential in the interests of allocated to the Centre, e.g. Defence, External Affairs, Communications, Customs, Coinage and Currency, etc. The remaining subjects, at present included in the Federal List, shall be transferred to the Units or zones. Residuary powers in regard to subjects which are not specifically included in the Federal List shall vest in the Units, and, in the case of subjects allocated to zones, in the regional Legislatures. The Concurrent List in the Government of India Act, 1935, shall be revised and limited to legislation only subjects to the following conditions:

- (a) that the Federal Legislature shall not undertake legislation on any matter within the Concurrent List unless at least 4 zones have applied for it;
- (b) that any legislation so enacted shall apply only to the zones which have applied for it.

(20) In the event of a doubt or difference of opinion as to whether a subject in Federal, Concurrent, Regional or Provincial (or State), the decision of H.E. the Viceroy and Governor-General in his discretion shall be final.

(21) The Federal Legislature shall be unicameral.

(NOTE: If it is desired that the 'special interests' for whom representation in the Central Legislature had been specially provided in the Upper House (Council of State) under the Federal scheme embodied in the Government of India Act should also be given representation in the unicameral Legislature, then the member of seats in the re-constituted Federal Assembly might be increased to secure them adequate representation. If it is decided to provide additional seats for these 'special interests', then I would suggest that such additional seats should be distributed equally among the 7 zones, say, 14 for each unit or 98 in all. Of these 98 additional seats, 60 should be reserved for representatives of British Indian Units and 38 for the Indian States subjects to the proviso that the distribution shall be so arranged as not to affect the representation of the Muslims and other Minorities in the Assembly as a whole as stipulated in paragraphs (4) and (5) supra.)

(22) Adequate and effective machinery shall be set up both at the Centre and the Provinces to look after and protect the interests of the Minorities.

(NOTE: One way of securing this would be to set up statutory committee consisting of representatives of the Minorities.)

Source: *Punjab Unionist Party Rules and Regulations* (Lahore, 1936), pp.33-34.

APPENDIX 6

Sikandar-Jinnah Pact October 1937

- (1) That on his return to the Punjab Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan will convene a special meeting of his party and advise all Muslim members of his party who are not member of the Muslim League already to sign its creed and join it. As such they will be subject to the rules and regulations of the Central Provincial Boards of the All-India Muslim League. This will not Affect the continuance of the present coalition and Unionist Party.(2) That in future elections and bye-elections for the legislature after the adoption of this arrangement, the groups constituting the present Unionist Party will jointly support the candidates put up by their respective groups.(3) That the Muslim member of the legislature who are elected on or accept the League ticket will constitute the Muslim League Party with the Legislature. It shall be open to the Muslim League Party to formed to maintain or enter into coalition or alliance with any other party consistently with the fundamental principles, policy and programme of the League. Such alliance may be evolved upon after the elections. The existing combination shall maintain its present name, the 'Unionist Party'.(4) in view of the aforesaid agreement the Provincial League Parliamentary Board shall be reconstituted.

Source: *Punjab Unionist Party Rules and Regulations* (Lahore, 1936), pp.35.

APPENDIX 7

A general and substantial increase in all districts showed up with the 1941 enumeration. This resulted partly from political factors, as each religious community sought, with impending communal divisions, to increase its won strength.

District	Number of Persons (000)						Percent Variation
	1891	1901	1911	1921	1931	1941	
Ambala	865	817	691	681	743	848	- 1.96
Amritsar	993	1,024	881	930	1,117	1,414	42.38
Attock	484	464	519	512	584	676	50.72
Biloch Trans-							
Frontier Tract	6	24	29	27	30	40	578.28
Dera Ghazi Khan	428	472	500	469	491	581	35.71
Ferozepur	886	958	960	1,099	1,157	1,423	60.60
Gujranwala	661	740	606	624	736	912	37.96
Gujrat	806	792	788	824	922	1,105	37.03
Gurdaspur	944	940	837	852	971	1,154	22.20
Gurgaon	760	843	730	682	740	851	12.00
Hissar	776	782	805	817	899	1,007	29.75
Hoshiarpur	1,011	990	919	927	1,032	1,170	15.71
Jhang	402	426	525	571	665	882	104.21
Jhelum	514	501	512	477	541	630	22.48
Jullundar	908	918	802	823	944	1,127	24.20
Kangra	763	768	770	766	801	899	17.87
Karnal	863	885	801	829	853	995	15.31
Lahore	899	1,004	1,000	1,130	1,379	1,695	88.63
Ludhiana	649	673	517	568	672	819	26.19
Lyallpur	60	586	836	968	1,167	1,396	2,215.37
Mianwali	287	302	341	358	412	506	76.40
Montgomery	417	430	482	686	1,000	1,329	219.07
Multan	621	700	801	879	1,160	1,484	138.96
Muzaffargarh	494	528	569	568	591	713	44.33
Rawalpindi	534	559	548	569	634	785	47.12
Rohtak	780	834	715	772	806	956	22.63
Shahpur	478	488	645	720	821	999	108.22
Sheikhpura	401	523	540	634	696	853	112.46
Sialkot	962	933	872	878	980	1,190	23.80
Simla	36	39	38	45	37	39	6.85

Total Punjab
(British Territory) 18,653 19,943 19,579 20,685 23,581 28,419 52.36

Source: Census of India, 1941, Vol. VI (Punjab), pp. 8-11.

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