THE DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL POWER POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

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FINAL APPROVAL

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SCHOLAR'S DECLARATION

I, Kalim Ullah Registration No. 1FSS/PHDIR/S14, student of PhD International Relations in Department of Political Science & International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences at International Islamic University, Islamabad, solemnly declare that the study titled, *"The Dynamics of Regional Power Politics: A Comparative Study of Middle East And South Asia"* is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person. This study is not submitted already and shall not be submitted in future for obtaining a degree from same or another University or Institute.

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RESEARCH SUPERVISOR'S CERTIFICATE

The dissertation titled *"The Dynamics of Regional Power Politics: A Comparative Study of Middle East And South Asia"* by Mr. Kalim Ullah, Registration No. 1FSS/PHDIR/S14, has been completed under my supervision and is submitted to meet the requirement of PhD degree program.

Dr. Amna Mehmood

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DEDICATION

The dissertation is dedicated to my love Shahnaz Hassan.

Abstract

The post-Cold War structural shift from bipolarity to unipolarity and further heading towards a multipolarity is a novel development. Recognizing these variations at international level, it has been long debated in IR theories that how other states will respond to these developments, especially what strategy rising regional powers would adopt. Though these regional powers do not have global power projection capabilities but they have formidable strength within their region. Their supposed actions under this varying structure become severely matter. Meanwhile existing theories of power politics are great power centric. They treat rising regional powers as smaller versions of great powers and proposed only goal for them is to "manage the great superpowers". The existing theories mainly proposed three behaviours for regional powers that are balancing, bandwagoning, and neutrality. Whereas it is argued in this study that a weak unipolarity enables and creates incentives for regional powers to go for another options as well. An emerging trend that can be observed from regional power's behaviour is growth of regionalism. Regional powers are getting more conscious about their regional stability and sometimes even at the cost of their relations with Unipole. Those regional powers, who once kept regional hegemony at top of their agenda are inclined towards cooperation, even with their regional rivals. This study named this new behaviour as "*Autarky*". "*Autarky*" mainly refers to a behaviour of the regional powers which aims to maximizing their regional stability instead of establishing regional hegemony and pursue them to cooperate with one another as well as their regional rivals. The main purpose of this study to weigh the above mentioned thesis argument through a comparative study of two regions, South Asia and Middle.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Following the end of the Cold War, the focus of international politics has shifted toward examining localized conflicts, intrastate disputes, and the development of regional institutions. Much of international relations theories in the post-World War II era overemphasized the global superpower rivalry and thus did not suggest much about the regional power politics. The post-Cold War structural shift from bipolarity to unipolarity was a novel development. Recognizing this new structure of the system, IR theorists quickly asked how other states will respond to this enormous power of the United States. Especially the debate begin about the non-great power states that what strategy regional powers (2^{nd} tier states)[1], that do not have global power projection capabilities but have formidable strength within their region, will pursue in this new unipolar world.

The international structure is leaving more complex implications as the only Unipole of the world getting weaker and new centre of powers emerging. The present post-Cold War environment can be described as a weak unipolar; though the United States is clearly the strongest state in the international system, but it does not possess the kind of structural strength needed to shape the world to its liking. In this environment, local concerns and powers become more important than ever before in determining states' behaviours and outcomes.

The polarity ties into longstanding debates in political science. Different authors have argued about the efficacy of different pole configurations, and these discussions have not resolved themselves into a generally accepted conclusions. Poles are important in international affairs,

[1] In this study, the terms "2^{nd} tier states", "major power" and "regional power" will be used interchangeably.

and, importantly, that the new, more loosely organized world order gives us an opportunity to theorize about their effects in ways we have not seen before. Existing literature on unipolarity argues only for variants of balancing and bandwagoning as the main strategies of non-great power states under unipolarity. Specifically current theories on unipolarity propose that states will either ally with or against the sole remaining great power since they have nowhere to go, no other great power to ally with. States can either try to constrain the unipole through military (hard balancing)[2] or non-military means (soft balancing) (Pape, Soft Balancing Against the United States, Summer 2005) (Paul T. V., Summer 2005) or cooperating with the unipole and acting according to its security preferences for security/material benefits (bandwagoning). (Wohlforth, Summer 1999) (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008)[3] Yet while observing world politics one can easily find that there some regional powers are differently behaving in the present post-Cold War unipolar era, their behaviour cannot be explained with this dichotomy of balancing/bandwagoning and presents some puzzles in terms of what their motivations are.

India, for example, tested its nuclear weapons in 1998 knowing too well that the United States would object and could suffer from sanctions as a result (expectedly, the United States did object and imposed sanctions on India.) Yet, it also allowed the United States to refuel its airplanes on Indian territory for the 1991 Iraq War, the first time in its history India has let its territory used for a foreign war, even if for fuelling, signed a nuclear deal and engaged in military exercises with the United States.

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[2] Only select few argue that some states will hard balance. Monteiro argues that minor powers that lack a great power sponsor may hard balance by developing nuclear weapons. See (Monteiro, Winter 2011/2012). Layne also argues hard balancing will occur, but his theory only explains the possible transition out of unipolarity, not balancing under unipolarity. See (Layne, Spring 1993)

[3] Monteiro also argues that major powers will bandwagon – see (Monteiro, Winter 2011/2012, p. 24), For the logic of balancing for "profit", see (Schweller, Summer 1994).

On the other hand, Turkey – a staunch Cold War U.S. ally –, denied the United States the use of its territory for the 2003 War on Iraq and even more puzzling than this decision, one week after the U.S. Congress passed sanctions on investing in Iran's energy sector in 1996, signed a 20 billion dollar gas deal with Iran and in 2010 attempted to broker a deal on Iran's nuclear program to prevent U.S. imposition of sanctions. If there were one issue one would expect Turkey to closely cooperate with the United States, it should have been the Iranian nuclear program. Iran is Turkey's main regional rival and when cooperating with the United States had the potential to weaken its rival, why would Turkey not do so? If Turkey's intention is to balance the United States, then why did it cooperate with the United States in the First Gulf War, in Kosovo and War on Libya?

The same goes true some other second-tier states like Pakistan, despite allying with the United States in the War on Afghanistan, is certainly not fully supporting the United States' agenda and manoeuvring its Afghan policy time to time.

A 2nd ties states' behaviour which discussed above suggest that neither these states to be preoccupied with constraining the United States nor behaving according to the security preferences of the United States, even at times when doing so would weaken their rivals as in the Turkish case vis a vis Iran. They are behaving autonomously, independent of the security preferences of the Unipole.

How can this behaviour be explained in term theory? This study is a quest to find out answer of this question. It is argued that relatively a weaker unipolarity enables and creates incentives for some states to adopt this different strategy which named here as "autarky". "*Autarky*" can be defined as a strategy of the regional powers which aims to maximizing their regional stability

instead of establishing regional hegemony and pursue them to cooperate with other regional states even with their regional rivals and this study aims to provide causal logic for regional powers' motivation for this strategy.

Of course, not all regional powers are pursuing 'autarky'. Some regional powers like Iran is trying to balance the United States by developing nuclear weapons, therefore, this study also intends to explain this variation of regional powers' strategies under present unipolarity by developing a 'theory of regional power politics of weak unipolarity' from the perspective of 2nd tier states.

1.1 Research Questions

In doing so, this study will answer following interrelated questions:

i. Why unipolarity enables and creates incentives for some states to adopt a strategy of "*autarky*[4]" which is different than balancing, bandwagoning and neutrality?
ii. Why rising regional powers avoid to fully rely on unipole?
iii. What explains the variation in regional powers' security strategies under unipolarity?
iv. Why do we need a theory of regional power politics?

Without grasping the answers of these questions, it is difficult to determine what motivates the behaviour of regional powers and how they likely to develop their strategies.

1.2 Significance of Study

Essentially, this research seeks to determine whether the regional subsystems of the post-Cold War era will be fundamentally competitive in accordance with realist predictions, or whether

[4] A strategy of the regional powers which aims to maximizing their regional stability instead of establishing regional hegemony and pursue them to cooperate with other regional states and their regional rivals as well.

the rise of economic interdependence and multinational institutions will preclude the systemic realities of power politics and allow for increased cooperation among regional powers. A comparative study of power politics of Middle East and South Asia is important not only because it is a contemporary case study, but in these two regions the regional powers are emerging in an environment of traditional rivalry, thus providing an excellent case of regional power politics.

The study of the factors that shaping the foreign policy of rising regional powers provides an accurate understanding of regional power politics that culminate into an effective policy formation. Basing foreign policy on theories that do not adequately explain the international system, or worse yet based on no theory at all, is a mistake with potentially disastrous consequences. Because the security and prosperity of the state is on the line, foreign policy needs to be based in the realities of the system, not on how one would like the system to be. In other words, policy formation must be designed with an accurate understanding of state behaviour and systemic realities.

This study has three limitations.

i. First and the most obvious one, it is applicable only to non-great power states that are regional powers, states considered as second-tier states. The threat environment of the third-tier states is vastly different than those of the second- tier states since they have a three dimensional external source of threat, threat from the unipole, threat from regional powers and threat from other third-tier states.
ii. Second, the security challenge of third-tier states is not the same as those of the second-tier states. They cannot pursue strategy of autarky since they lack the capabilities for

self-help. They cannot deter second-tier states that are much stronger, and exist in their region.

iii. Third, the proposed theory is only applicable to second-tier states that are located outside the region the unipole. Regional powers that are located in the unipole's region face a security environment vastly different than the second-tier states in other regions. Being located in the region of the unipole, they do not have the same freedom of action as other regional powers do. Moreover, despite their relative strength vis-à-vis other states in terms of economic and military capabilities that would still classify them as second-tier states in the entire system, in their region, but they are like third-tier states due to the fact the unipole is overwhelmingly stronger than these states. These states should be expected to act differently than other regional powers in the system.

Hopefully this dissertation will contribute towards building such a launching pad for further research into regional politics.

1.3 Statement of the Research Problem

Existing theories of unipolarity are written from the perspective of the Unipole. They treat non-great power states as smaller versions of great powers and proposed only goal for them is to "manage the sole great power"[5] by balancing or bandwagoning . This approach is based on an assumption that regional powers share the same security problems that great powers do, and have the same relationship to anarchic structure as great power holds – which is self-help. But there are some regional powers whose behaviour cannot be explained by this limited theoretical scope. The threat environment they facing and the constraints in which they operating are

[5] See (Walt, 2006) for example, is written with the perspective that the majority of states' main concern in the unipolar world is managing the sole great power.

different than great powers. Here a new theory of regional power politics is needed which can recognizes what distinguishes these states from great powers and looks at what the structural shift from unipolarity to weak unipolarity, means to them. So it can be determined that that how these states are likely to behave under a weak unipole structure.

This study aims to fill this theoretical gap in the literature by developing a theory of regional power politics under weak unipolarity that explains the second-tier states' security problematique from the perspective of these states.

1.4 Hypothesis

As discussed in earlier, in power politics polarity matters in determining regional stability and there is need to see consistent patterns of political behaviour across regions. Drawing upon insights from structural realism following three hypothesis are formulated:

Hypothesis I

A weak unipolarity, where great power competition are rising, regional powers are unlikely to face direct threats from Unipole, their main security concerns are deterring their rivals and ensuring regional stability. Those regional powers that have capability to deter their rivals have an incentive to pursue autarkical foreign policy and move towards self-help.

Hypothesis II

Regional powers that do face a direct threat from the Unipole are likely to balance the Unipole and their only option is to develop nuclear weapons but their nuclear program can be compromised if they asses that unipole is getting weak.

Hypothesis III

Regional powers with a declining trajectory, being fearful of their regional rivals, have incentive to deepen their alliance with the Unipole and cooperate closely. However, due to the unreliability of the commitments of the Unipole, they will still try to boost their own capabilities.

The hypotheses this study purpose is a structural centric. This is assumed that the structural shift into unipolarity after the Cold War and further decline in unipolarity is what motivates and enables some regional powers to pursue autarky. But autarky has a trade-off. Regional powers are not great power states and they have other goals such as internal development and there are good reasons for states to remain dependent on a great power, outsource their regional security and focus on other goals. In fact, that is exactly what Japan did even when it had the second largest economy in the system during the Cold War. On the other hand, for some states autonomy might be a goal that is highly prized for some normative preferences. Under rare circumstances in which they do not face direct great power threat under bipolar/multipolar systems, they may wish to pursue autarky as India did during the Cold War. However, the structural conditions in these systems limit their ability to pursue autarky. Therefore, this is argued that autarky can be seen in other structures like in bipolarity or multipolarity, unipolarity not only necessitates, but it offers the conditions most favourable to autarky.

The supposed hypothesis may stands in contrast to those that highlight normative/domestic factors for explaining states' security strategies. No doubt, norms and domestic factors certainly do play a role in how states formulate their national security policy and their strategies, but when states face harsh systemic and regional environment – such that they face great power threats or threats from their rivals that they cannot deter on their own – what best

explains their strategy is the structure. Under these circumstances, states do not have much choice, but ally with a great power. Yet, when structural constraints are looser, states have more latitude in their choice of strategy. Then, norms and domestic factors may play a larger role.

1.5 Objective of Research

This research aims to cover the following objectives:-

i. The aim of this research is to identify the emerging pattern of regional power politics, either these states are acting according to the logic of regional stability or pursing to establish their regional hegemony.

ii. The second objective of this research is to study the implications of shift in international structure for rising regional power, in what means and ways it affecting the security environment these states.

1.6 Research Design and Methodology

The research is quite broad in its scope. Because it seek to answer not only what the current state of regional power politics, but also why it is in this current state. The methodology will be basic and mixed with deductive approach. A comparative case study method will be used in this research. These case studies are used to demonstrate the *strategy of autarky* and distinguish it from *balancing, bandwagoning* as well as *neutrality*. It will need to employ a number of different methods in order to analyse this topic. The methods that intend to employ are; to review and critique the current literature; to obtain official records and statistics on foreign

policy behaviour; to develop a quantitative analysis of soft/hard power of regional hegemon and its rival state; to conduct qualitative research interviews.

There is plan to discuss two regions: Middle East and South Asia. But determining which states would make the status for being a regional power is not an easy task. In the post-Cold War literature, the most common criterion used for determining which states are the major powers in the system has been whether the state has nuclear weapons or not. Consequently, France, China, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and the United Kingdom are considered "major powers" and the rest as "minor powers." The logic behind this classification is that states that possess nuclear weapons can deter the unipole as well as any other state in the system.

Yet, defining 2nd tier states as states that have nuclear weapons is problematic as, it leads to a strange list in which states like Israel and North Korea that have limited economic power to be included among major powers, but states such as Germany or Japan that have substantial economic strength not to be.

Recognizing the weaknesses of classifying non-great power states based on their possession/lack of nuclear weapons, two additional criteria are being used and that are their relative economic and military strength within their region. To determine the relative economic strength of states, their GDP based on PPP (purchasing power parity) share of the total world output and for the military strength, the size of the army (active and reserve) are being used.

In Middle East, based on economic and military capabilities, five states; Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia can be considered 2nd tier states in this region.

	Share of the World GDP	Military Power - Size of Army active (+reserve)	Nuclear Power
Egypt	0.647	310,000 (+375,000)	No
Iran	1.243	350,000 (+350,000)	?
Israel	0.313	133,000 (+500,000)	Yes
Saudi Arabia	1.041	75,000	No
Turkey	1.344	402,000 (+258,700)	No

Relative Economic/Military Capabilities of 2nd tier States in the Middle East 2011

While looking at table above, one sees that Iran and Turkey not only have the largest economies in the region, but also the largest armies. Egypt, within the region, is more like a middle power that can put up a good fight against its peers. Israel, the only nuclear state in the region, lags in both economic and military capability though has a sophisticated and high-tech military industry. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, despite its large economy, has very limited military capability. It can be proposes that Iran and Turkey, as the rising states in the region, are likely to pursue autarky. As such, they are likely to take a larger part in the security affairs of their region and establish themselves as regionally preeminent states. For the rests of the 2nd tier states in the region, the rising status of Iran and Turkey is likely to create fear and insecurity. Of these states, since Israel has the nuclear deterrent and Egypt a formidable army, Saudi Arabia with its weak military capability, as the declining state of the region, has the most to fear from Iran and Turkey's rise.

In South Asia two states, India and Pakistan, can only be considered as regional powers based on their economic, military and nuclear capabilities and that can pursue autarky. So, there are four cases Turkey, Iran, India and Pakistan from two different regions will be used to examine the dynamics of regional power politics.

Lastly, it is important to define how the concept of autarky will be measured in regional powers' behaviour. Autarky is a strategy and distinguish from neutrality even though both strategies rely on self-help. Autarky can be defined as a strategy aimed at maximizing one's regional security through gaining autonomy of one's foreign policy. As such, if a state is pursuing autarky, the state's pattern of foreign policy choices vis-à-vis the great power should be mixed and non-directional as opposed to a state that is balancing or bandwagoning. These patterns should be observed at times when state is cooperating with the great power and at times non-cooperating with the great power. Looking at the pattern of their behaviour vis-à-vis the great power provides a more accurate understanding of their orientation towards the great power. It should be evaluating its cooperation with the great power case by case, based on its own self-interest at a given time. At the same time, the state should be taking measures to reduce its security dependence on the great power/s. On the other hand neutrality will mean non-alignment. The aim of this strategy, from the perspective of a regional power, is to avoid getting drawn into a great power war. It can observe in a state's consistent choice to stay out of any military cooperation with the great powers, in its refusal to contribute to their war-fighting abilities.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

What distinguishes regional powers from great powers? Do they have the same relationship to anarchy as great powers do? What are the types of threats these states face that endanger their survival? What are the means to maximize their power – do these states view regional stability or regional domination as their path to power maximization? How is unipolarity different from bipolarity/multipolarity for their security world? What are the strategies available to these states under different structures? A theory of regional power politics under unipolarity from the perspective of these 2nd tier states to answer these interrelated questions will be presented in this chapter.

This chapter provides a brief review of the literature relevant to the dissertation. The chapter begins with a general discussion of the concepts of regional integration and globalization followed by a review of the key theoretical debates related to economic and political integration in both the developed and developing worlds. Most of the academic work that has been done on the politics of regional integration has been concentrated on Europe. The prevailing tendency has been to assume that many of the same forces (for example, the assumption of full employment of resources or spillover effects) are at work in developing countries. The chapter suggests a general inductive approach to understanding the regional power politics, utilizing existing theories where pertinent. The chapter then outlines the analytical framework for the study.

2.1. Defining Regional Integration

The clear definitions of regional integration are difficult to find. In practice, usage tends to fluctuate between economics and politics. Economists who study regional integration look

mainly at market relationships among goods and factors of production within the area. (Mattli, 1999, p. 41) Drawing on the work of Jacob Viner, trade economists focus on preferential trading agreements, which have been grouped into the following categories: free trade agreements, customs unions, common markets and economic union. (Viner, 1950, p. 21) According to Anne Krueger, "a free trade agreement is described as a preferential order in which tariffs are lowered relative to other members of the scheme, but maintained against the outside world. A customs union is a preferential arrangement in which all tariffs among the members are eliminated while external tariffs are adjusted to a general level. A common market is a customs union, which permits free movement of factors of production, like labour and capital, among the member countries. An economic union is a common market, which also has general economic laws governing fiscal and monetary standards across members." (Krueger, 1999, p. 111)

For political scientist Ernst Haas, regional integration is "the process whereby political factors in many distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties and political activities to a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states." (Haas, 1958, p. 25) According to Haas, "the study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the actual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves." (Haas, The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Preauthorizing, 1970, p. 610) However, this theory known as neofunctionalism fails to address questions about whether domestic factors such as nationalism are important in the integration process. a critical issue addressed in this dissertation.

Stanley Hoffman maintains that a "regional integration model can best be understood as a series of bargains among political leaders of major states in the region as the result of converging preferences among leaders." (Hoffman, 1966, p. 866) This definition is connected to the theory of intergovemmentalism. Intergovernmentalism is defined as "integration in which national governments establish institutions and procedures to pursue common interests but in which those governments retain the final authority to pursue an independent policy if they desire." (Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, 1999, p. 28)

According to Andrew Axline, "while classical theories have been successfully applied to Western Europe, in the case of the developing world, an understanding of regional integration requires a different theoretical approach born born out of understanding of the world's political economy." (Axline, 1979, p.8) He claims that both the economic and political goals of developing countries are different from those of industrial societies. (Axline 1979, p.8) In the Western European integration experience, the ultimate political goal was the preservation of European peace and security. The primary political objective of underdeveloped countries involved in regional integration schemes is development itself. (Axline, 1979, p.8)

However, Walter Mattli contends that by narrowly focusing on markets, economic theories often overlook a crucial aspect of integration, that is, the provision of general rules, regulations and policies that affect regional economic areas. (Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, 1999, p.11) According to Mattli, "the failure to consider the institutional dimension of preferential trading agreements renders economic theories of integration ill equipped to tackle questions that permit the deepening and widening of integration." (Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, 1999, p. 11) Such analysis is based on the interrelationship between market integration and institutional analysis. (Mattli, The Logic of

Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, 1999, p. 11) This critique is relevant to this dissertation since it addresses the importance of considering both markets and institutional dimensions, two key issues in understanding the politics of regional politics. As a result, this dissertation adopts the following definition of regional integration: "regional integration is the voluntary linking in the economic and political domains of two or more formerly independent states to the extent that authority over key areas of domestic regulation and policy is shifted to the supranational level." (Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, 1999, p. 41)

2.2. Three theoretical perspectives on the post-Cold War security order

This theoretical framework starts by sketching out the three main perspectives on the structure of international security. The three principal theoretical perspectives on post-Cold War international security structure are neorealist, globalist, and regionalist. What does mean by `structure in this context? The answer can be achieved by using it in broadly Waltzian (Waltz, Theory of International Politics., 1979) terms to mean the principles of arrangement of the parts in a system, and how the parts are differentiated from each other. But here range is wider than the neorealist formulation because it is desired: (a) to look at structural perspectives other than the neorealist one; and (b) to privilege the regionalist perspective.

The neorealist perspective is widely understood. It is state-centric, and rests on an argument about power polarity: if not bipolarity, then necessarily either unipolarity or multipolarity (or some hybrid). This debate is about the distribution of material power in the international system, which in neorealism determines the global political (and thereby also security) structure and the interplay of this with balance of power logic. Its interpretation of the post-Cold War structure of international security assumes that there has been a change of power structure at the global level

(the end of bipolarity), and its concern is to identify the nature of that change in order to infer the security consequences. Neorealism does not question the primacy of the global level, so its search for change is confined to a narrow range of options within that level: unipolarity or multipolarity.

The globalist perspective (by which mean acceptance of the view usually labelled `globalisation') is generally understood to be the antithesis of realism's (and neorealism's) statist, power-political understanding of international system structure. Globalisation is rooted mainly in cultural transnational, and international political economy approaches. Perhaps its clearest guiding theme is the deterritorialisation of world politics (Woods, 2000, p. 6) (Scholte, 2000, pp. 2-3) (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999, pp. 7-9). In its stronger versions (whether Marxian or liberal), deterritorialisation sweeps all before it, taking the state, and the state system, off the centre stage of world politics (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt. & Perraton, 1999, pp. 3-5). Milder versions leave the state and the state system in, but have lots of nonstate actors and systems operating across and outside state boundaries (Held, McGrew. Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999, pp. 7-9) (Scholte, 2000) (Woods, 2000) (Clark, 1999): 'territoriality and supraterritoriality coexist in complex interrelation' (Scholte, 2000, p. 8); and 'Territorialization remains a check on globalization' (Clark, 1999, p. 169). In terms of structure, the globalist position is clearer as an attack on neorealism's state-centric approach than as a statement of an explicit alternative. The global market or capitalism or various forms of world society probably best capture the underlying ideas of system structure in the globalist perspective and the key point is rejection of the idea that an adequate sense of system structure can he found by privileging states.

Globalisation's hallmark is acknowledgement of the independent role of both transnational entities - corporations, non-governmental social and political organisations of many kinds - and

intergovernmental organisations and regimes. Its focus is on how territorial sovereignty as the ordering principle for human activity has been redefined, and in some ways transcended, by networks of interaction that involve actors of many different kinds and at many different levels, and that feed off the huge technological and social improvements in the capacity for transportation and communication of nearly all types of goods, information. and ideas. The state is often a player in these networks, but it does not necessarily, or even usually, control them, and is increasingly enmeshed in and penetrated by them. Marxian and liberal versions of globalisation differ more in their normative perspectives than in their basic understanding of what globalisation means: here, as elsewhere, they are mirror images of the same phenomenon. Both see the macro-structure of the international system as taking a centre—periphery (or 'rich world—poor world' or 'developed—developing') form, with a core of societies (or elites) controlling most of the capital, technology, information, and organisational and ideological resources in the system and shaping the terms on which the periphery participates. In the Marxian view, this structure is fundamentally exploitative, unequal, unstable, and undesirable, whereas in the liberal one it is fundamentally progressive and developmental, and its tendencies towards instability, though serious, are not without institutional solutions.

It is not in our remit here to go into the entirety of the debate about globalisation or to take on its enormous literature. Our perspective is security, and as Cha notes (Cha. 2000. pp. 391, 394) there has not been much written about the links between globalisation and security, not least because the security effects of globalisation have been hard to distinguish from the more dramatic effects of the ending of the Cold War. (Cha, 2000, p. 397), (Clark. 1999. pp. 107-26), (Guehenno, 1998, p. 9), (Scholte, 2000, pp. 207-33), and (B. Zangl, 1999) all argue that globalisation is responsible for complicating the security agenda, while at the same time

reducing the elements of control that underpin the security strategy options of states. Cha and Guehenno both think that globalisation increases the incentives for states to pursue more cooperative security policies, especially at the regional level, a line of thinking much reinforced by the responses to the attack on the United States in September 2001. Barkawi and Laffey (1999) even want to sweep away state-centric security analysis and replace it with a centre—periphery model. The academic debate about globalisation is not relevant than in the real world responses to it. From our perspective, what matters most is whether and how either globalisation in general or specific aspects of it (e.g. financial flows, terrorism. migration. trade liberalisation) become securitised by the actors in the international system. If globalisation is seen and acted on as a threat by states and other actors in the system then it plays alongside, and competes with, more traditional securitisations of neighbours or great powers or internal rivals. Then the global level is directly - not only indirectly - present in a constellation of securitisation.

This quite widespread real world security perspective on globalisation has two sides. The first highlights the dark side of the centre-periphery structure. It is the successor to a long line of ideas going back at least as far as Hobson and Lenin all emphasising the unequal exploitative and coercive aspects of relations between centre and periphery: imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, dependencia, cultural imperialism. anti-hegemonism, and suchlike. At the risk of oversimplifying, one can see these ideas as stemming from the perspective of the periphery, and reflecting its resentments about its relative powerlessness, underdevelopment, and vulnerability in relation to the centre. In one sense, they reflect concerns that the practice of economic liberalism is a major key to understanding what generates the wider international security agenda (Buzan, Waver, & deWilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 1998), (Scholte, 2000, pp. 207-33). At their most passionate, these ideas carry the accusation that the centre-

periphery structure generated and maintains the weak position of the periphery for the benefit of the core, pointing to cases such as Zaire, Angola, and Iraq as evidence. This dark-side securitisation of globalisation is counterpointed by more upbeat liberal interpretations, more strongly rooted in the centre, which acknowledge the inequalities and disparities, but see the process of globalisation as the fastest and most efficient way to overcome them. In this view, globalisation should be a path to the steady erosion and eventual elimination of the traditional international security agenda (and in more radical views also the state). The darlings of this perspective are South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, all of which have transformed themselves economically, and up to a point politically, within the embrace of globalisation (i.e. penetration by globalisation) will eventually generate political liberalisation and a lowering of threat perceptions. But even here, there is a security dimension, mostly focused on the potential instabilities in the global trading and financial systems (Buzan, Waver, & deWilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 1998, pp. 95-117).

Typical securitisations from the non-liberal perspective on globalisation have been in the 'new' non-military areas of security. They have focused, inter alia, on the (in)stability and (in)equity of the liberal economic order, on the contradictions between the pursuit of capitalism and the sustainability of the planetary environment, and on the homogenising pressures of global (read `Western', or 'American') culture and the threat this poses to other cultures, languages, and identities (Buzan, Waver, & deWilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 1998. pp. 71-140). During the 1990s, the globalisation perspective generated a more explicitly military-political securitisation, in the process creating an interesting conjuncture between itself and some strands of neorealist thinking. In this view, the periphery is threatened by two linked developments consequent on the collapse of bipolarity:

- The overwhelming military superiority of the West in general and the USA in particular, no longer balanced by a rival superpower.
- The collapse of the political space generated for the third world by superpower rivalry during the Cold War, and its replacement by a much more monolithic domination by the West, Without an ideological challenger within or adjacent to the core, the Western Powers can impose much more demanding legal, social, financial, and political conditions on the periphery as the price of access to aid, trade, credit, recognition, and membership in various clubs ranging from NATO and the EU to the WTO. They can also wield increased pressure on states to conform to contested regimes (non-proliferation) or norms (democracy, human rights, anti-terrorism).

Seen in centre—periphery perspective, these developments mean that the centre has become much more cohesive and the international system much more hierarchical. It is hard not to notice how closely parallel this analysis runs to much of the unipolarist thinking within neorealism. In this perspective, globalisation is less an autonomous process and more an expression of US hegemony. The response to this development from those who feel threatened by it has been to take a position against hegemonism and in favour of developing a multipolar global power structure. Such views are prominent in the foreign policy rhetoric of China, India. Russia, Iran, Indonesia, Brazil, and tip to a point France to name only the most outspoken exponents. Both the analysis and the cure link globalist and neorealist understandings of the post-Cold War security order.

From a regionalist perspective Lake and Morgan (Lake & Morgan, 1997, pp. 6-7) point of view appeals more that in the post-Cold War world 'the regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars

seeking to explore contemporary security affairs', and it can be believed this to be true even though the understanding of security more open than their rather traditional, military one. This approach can be superficially seen as a post-Cold War focus rooted in two assumptions:

1. that the decline of superpower rivalry reduces the penetrative quality of global Power interest in the rest of the world (Stein & Lobell . 1997, pp. 119-20) and
2. that most of the great powers in the post-ColdWar international system are now 'lite powers (Buzan & Segal, The Rise of the "Lite" Powers: A Strategy for Postmodern States, 1996), meaning that their domestic dynamics pull them away from military engagement and strategic competition in the trouble spots of the world, leaving local states and societies to sort out their military political relationships with less interference from great powers than before.

As that the regional level of security was also significant during the ColdWar, and that except when global powers are extremely dominant, as they were during the imperial era, regional security dynamics will normally be a significant part of the overall constellation of security in the international system. In this context, Lake and Morgan's (Lake & Morgan, 1997. p. 11) call for security analysis 'to start with regions and employ a comparative approach' and think that this idea should be applied well beyond the immediate circumstances of the post-Cold War period.

The regionalist perspective contains elements of both neorealism and globalism, but gives priority to a lower level of analysis. Because both the neorealist and the regionalist approaches are rooted in territoriality and security, it can be believed RSCT as complementary to the neorealist perspective on system structure, in a sense providing a fourth (regional) tier of mixture. But our regional focus and even more our use of a constructivist understanding of

security place us outside the neorealist project. Here relationship with the globalist perspective is, on the face of it, necessarily less close. To the extent that globalists start from an assumption of deterritorialisation, their approach at the opposite end of the spectrum front ours. But this opposition is often more apparent than real. For one thing, globalists have not so far had much concern with security, and therefore are largely addressing a different agenda. For another, the moderate wing of globalists are keen to emphasise the interplay between territoriality and deterritorialisation. It is, for example, already widely understood that many aspects of regionalisation, especially the more cooperative ones of regional economic groupings, are responses to globalisation (Buzan, Waver, & deWilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 1998, pp. 113-15). Globalisation constructed as a threat will play a pan in our analysis. So, while we are not dismissive of the force of some of the globalist arguments, we do not see them as yet overriding the continued prominence of territoriality in the domain of security, whether in the form of states, nations, insurgency movements, or regions. Security is a distinctive realm in which the logic of territoriality continues to operate strongly. But non-territorial connections are also possible and some may emerge. Such non-territorial subsystems (see Buzan et al. 1998) are fully compatible with the meta-theory of securitisation and constellations, but they have to override the normal rule underpinning the territorialisation of security relations: that most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones. There are two obvious ways for that overriding to happen: (1) by a shift from more territorialised (e.g. military) to less territorialised (e.g. economic) threats; and/or (2) by a rise in levels of absolute power sufficient to enable more and more actors to ignore the constraints of distance. A good case can be made that both of these things are happening — and such arguments are part of the globalist position. But only if these developments become much more

common and more evenly distributed than they are now would they begin to question the key element of our theory: that regional security complexes are a principal expected component of international security. It can be seen it as a strength of the theory that it establishes the possibility of its own overturning i.e. it specifies one of the developments that could annul it. The relevance of territorial versus non-territorial patterns of securitisation is an empirical question, which can be left open to be addressed later. Here a theory has been designed so that it can accommodate nonstate actors, and even allow them to be dominant. Although our theory features the regional level, it also incorporates other levels (global, interregional. local), and allows the particular circumstances of time and place to determine which level(s) dominate. The security constellation that can map in each case is one that covers all levels, although to varying degrees as appropriate to the case.

Many securitisation processes around the world (identity concerns in Cairo and Copenhagen, excessive supplies of black market weapons in Albania and Abkhazia, financial fears in Moscow and Malaysia, fears of terrorism in Uzbekistan and the USA, etc.) are in some essential ways caused by the bundle of developments captured in the term globalisation. Both the introversion of the 'lite' powers and the worry about American/Western hegemony are aspects of globalisation, and these can easily trigger regional responses, where the regional level becomes either a bastion against global threats, or a way of obtaining greater power in global level dynamics. Securitisation processes can define threats as coming from the global level (financial instability, global warming, Americanisation), but the referent objects to be made secure may be either at the global level (the global economic regime, the planetary ecosystem. the norm of non-proliferation) or at other levels (community, state, region). Phrases such as 'glocalisation' in the globalist discourse capture the way in which global level causes can trigger

consequences and responses on other levels. Global causes can have very different effects in different regions, e.g. a financial collapse leading to disintegration and conflict in some regions and to increased cooperation in others. To understand such outcomes one needs to grasp the regional dynamics.

If global-triggered concerns and resentments cause reactions defined in relation to regional actors and issues, the resulting constellations can easily be regional. The real challenge for a regionalist interpretation is when globalisation as such is securitised as a threat, as it sometimes now is. This has to be a part of the total picture. In many places (e.g. India. Russia. the Islamic world) globalisation is seen as a major threat, and to varying degrees it is seen and treated as more or less synonymous with American unipolarity and (especially cultural) imperialism. However, `globalisation' has also been securitised in the North American and European core by a diverse coalition of oppositional groups demonstrating against the key institutions of the liberal international economic order, the WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF. In this case, the issue is to a larger extent (as it is also to significant groups in, for example India) competing visions for the global political economy. To the extent that actors are seen as behind a threat here, they are either the multinationals or the global economic IGOs. There is need to investigate more, such securitisations of 'globalisation' as well as of other global phenomena to find out to what extent they make for truly global security dynamics or play a particular local or regional role.

What becomes clear from this consideration of the neorealist. globalist, and regionalist perspectives is that all of them encompass important elements that need to be kept in view when trying to understand the post-Cold War global security order (or any security order). Underlying these three perspectives is a central question about levels of analysis: are the threats that get

securitised located primarily at the domestic, the regional, or the system level? This question can be asked about any given time and place in the international system, or about the international system as a whole. This study argues that understanding levels is the key to painting a portrait of the global security structure. To show why regionalist approach appeals more to security explanation, it helps at this point to complement the three theoretical approaches with a historical overview. This overview is of course not the only possible reading of the history concerned, but it can be hoped that it shows how an account that emphasises the rising salience of the regional level in the structure of international security can upgrade both neorealist and globalist themes, while also striking a distinctive chord of its own.

2.3. The Problem of Polarity

The existing literature on regional power politics argues that the 'management of the Unipole's power or threat' is what drives regional powers' behaviour under unipolarity. But In this research it is argued that concerns for regional security, deterring regional rivals and spill-over effects of regional stability, is what motivates these states' strategies. And in this regard a new concept of independence i.e. 'autarky' is being proposed in this study.

The influence of polarity and the degree of stability it produces are unresolved issues in international relations. Some people argue about the superiority of unipolar (Kindleberger , 1974) (Gilpin, 1981) (Wohlforth, Summer 1999), bipolarity (Waltz, Theory of International Politics., 1979) and multipolarity (Morgenthau H. J., 1962). For a long time, international relations scholars have been inclined to privilege for systematic or domestic analysis (Waltz,

Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis., 1954)[6]. Suppose different logics direct these levels of behavior, that is, the global level is "anarchic" and the domestic level is "hierarchical" - so they are incompatible and irreconcilable

System logic suggests that if you want to understand international behavior, you must focus on the broader international context of regional embedding. These backgrounds create the pressure and incentives that regional actors are responding to; in addition, the world is now so interconnected and interdependent that no single self-sufficient region is immune to outside influences (Hurrell, 1995).

Therefore, the system approach believes that the global environment shapes the behavior of actors among them by providing punishment and rewards. Since the distribution of internal capabilities of the system is unequal, the superior capabilities of large countries and the reliance of smaller powers on these capabilities force small countries to adapt to the dominant patterns of environment and interaction created by more powerful countries. In it. The shortest summary of this situation is still the Merian Dialogue of Thucydides: "The strong they want, the weak they must" (Thucydides, Blanco, & Roberts, 1998). Regional conflicts are the result of friction between big powers - in the final interpretation, regional conflicts are merely proxy wars that reflect the power and competition of big powers (Väyrynen, 1984). According to this line of thinking, the polarization during the Cold War triggered many regional conflicts, just as the end of the Cold War and US hegemony established a pattern of regional conflicts since then.

[6] for a similar regional differentiation, see (Katzenstein, 2005)

In contrast, local regional political methods have a privilege on indigenous features, claiming that these factors and development are the most important determinants of regional security. Here, direct neighbors are more important than distant big countries, mainly because the regional environment produces the most direct threats and the most viable opportunities (Wriggins, 1992). A group of neighbouring countries form a "regional security system"; this system is characterized by a high degree of security interdependence, often a high frequency of conflict (Buzan, 1983) (Wriggins, 1992). The probability of a conflict is particularly high if the system's membership statistics are geographically continuous (Vasquez, 1993). Importantly, these regions have a large degree of independence from the global context around them, and the impact of global structure is regulated by the unique attributes of each region, such as conflict intensity or geographic factors (Buzan, 1983) (Gibler, 2007). Because of these personal factors, regional political students must consider their structure if they want to understand the outcome, rather than paying attention to the conspiracy of big powers or international structures. Each region has its own unique opportunities and constraints, and operates on its own structure and dynamics (Holsti, 1992).

Realist theories, whether classical (Morgenthau H. J., 1962), structural (Waltz, Theory of International Politics., 1979) or neoclassical (Rose, 1998), put emphasis on three main factors in determining conflict propensity:

- "International anarchy" and "self-help system" which is a tolerant factor for all types of international conflicts.
- "Security dilemmas" and mutual mistrust and fear, which create conflict spirals and unconscious conflicts.

- "Unbalanced power" creates incentives at the expense of others to provide incentives for conflict.

Historically, realists have always emphasized anarchy; defensive realists (Walt S. M., 1987) (Taliaferro, 2000) focus on security dilemmas and how they are mitigated, as well as between offensive and defensive capabilities and technology. Balancing related issues (Van Evera, 1998) (Glaser & Kaufmann., 1998), while offensive realists (Mearsheimer J. J., 1995a) (Labs, 1997) emphasize the pursuit of power maximization by states the primary cause of conflicts.

However, there are realist variants that reject the concept of anarchy. The theory of the English School of International Relations believes that there is an "international society" characterized by common norms and beliefs. The rules governing the management of social behavior must be the main goal of social scientists. On the other hand, it also recognizes that material capabilities are the ultimate policy driver (Butterfield, Herbert, Wight , & Bul, 1966) (Wight, 1978) (Linklater, Andrew, & Suganami, 2006). The theory of power transfer believes that the world is a clear hierarchy, with great powers governing the local and global power pyramids; when the order in these hierarchies is nearly equal, conflicts will occur, distorting the hierarchy (Organski, 1968) (Tammen, 2000) (Lemke, 2002).

In nutshell existing literature on unipolarity argues that if the unipole remains engaged in the system, it can reduce the security competition among the regional powers. As such, expects no likelihood of war between these states as long as the unipole is intent on managing the system. This study will questions this claim in the literature.

2.4. What Does Being a Regional Power Mean?

The term 'regional power" is a relatively recent term, more commonly used since the end of the Cold War and there is a good reason for this. Until the end of World War II – especially in the 19th century – not many states occupied the position of being 'middle powers'. Many of the states we view as regional powers today were either weak states, lacking complete autonomy under great power empires or were former great powers. With the end of World War II, many weak states gained autonomy and saw an increase in their capabilities throughout the Cold War. Several former great powers, on the other hand, lost their previous status, though still retaining influence in their region. As such, a category of states that were neither weak states nor great powers began to emerge in the system. Yet, the intense rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union during existed during the Cold War. Today, though, several states are referred to as 'regional powers'. Who are these states? What distinguishes them from great powers?

The basic characteristic that distinguishes regional powers from great powers is they lack the global power projection capabilities great powers have. Yet, this does not mean they are insignificant minor states in the system. What this means is they cannot balance a great power systemically as another great power can. Nonetheless, these states have formidable weight in their region due to their regional power projection capabilities. Paul Kennedy and his colleagues' description of 'pivotal states' after the Cold War as "the states that have the potential to significantly harm or benefit their region" (Robert Chase, 1999, p. 7)[7] provides a succinct way to understand what lies underneath the concept of a regional power. These are the states which great powers especially want their security policies aligned with their own when

[7] It is important to note that the authors do not use the term 'regional power' in their book and their intention is not to provide a theory of regional power security after the Cold War. They intend to draw attention to some countries that will be significant for the United States after the Cold War.

they manage a conflict in that region. Consequently, knowing how these states will behave is especially important. This requires understanding their security environment – what type of threats these states face and what their security goal is.

2.1 Regional Powers' Security Goal

Current theories of international relations already start with states that are great powers or with the assumption that every state wants to be a great power. In these works, it is often presumed that rising states, in their quest for becoming a great power, will emulate the United States and aim for regional dominance since that is the best way for the Cold War that overwhelmed the entire system left little space for these states to project influence in their region. Consequently, not much discussion on regional powers states to maximize their power.[8] As such, in the post-Cold War era, many rising 2nd tier states such as India, China, Turkey, Iran, South Africa etc. are viewed as "potential hegemons" and their behaviour is analysed through this analytical lens of regional hegemony. Yet, both assumptions – that states are working to become great powers and their power maximization goes through domination of their region – are problematic when viewed from the 2nd tier states' security reality.

While it might be true that every regional power would desire to become a great power since being a great power carries many benefits ranging from security, status to ability to shape the system according to one's own preferences, states are also realistic in what they can and cannot achieve. For most regional powers, becoming a great power is such an unrealistic goal that it is more accurate to assume that it doesn't play a role in their present decision-making. At the end,

[8] For articulation of regional hegemony as power maximization, see (Mearsheimer J. , 2001). For an earlier discussion of regional hegemony as one of three potential security goals states might have, see (Morgenthau H. J., 2005, pp. 64-69). Morgenthau identifies three types of goals of expansion: local preponderance, continental empire (which is regional hegemony in his definition) and world empire.

upward mobility is highly limited in the international system and new great powers rarely appear.

This, though, does not mean that 2nd tier states may not aspire to great power status. India's quest for a permanent member status in the U.N. Security Council or France's call for a multilateral resolution to international security issues suggest that some 2nd tier states certainly desire to have a bigger say in the international system and even perhaps ability to shape it. However, aspirations are one thing and security realities are another. Theorizing 2nd tier state politics with the assumption that these states are aiming for great power status does not help us with how they are likely to behave at the moment as 2nd tier states in the system.

Yet, post-Cold War literature on regional powers still continue to treat regional powers as smaller versions of great powers and as such, project the same type of behaviour and goals such as regional hegemony to these states. This is, though, based on a problematic assumption that regional powers have the same relationship to anarchy as great powers do – which is one of self-help – and share the same security problems with great powers. However, as this will show next, not only anarchy does not necessarily mean self-help for these states, but also the security environment they operate under does not resemble those of great powers'.

2.2 Anarchy and Regional Powers

All states – great powers, regional powers, weak states alike – first and foremost, wish to survive – "maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order." (Mearsheimer J. , 2001, p. 31) [9] They also all live under anarchy – meaning that there is

[9] This is a common assumption in the literature. See (Waltz, Theory of International Politics., 1979, pp. 91-92)

no central government over governments that can enforce rules and laws in the international system. In the great power literature, it is rightly assumed that this leads to a self-help system in which great powers have no option but to take care of their own security in order to survive. Theoretically, the only states that can resolve great powers' security problems are other great powers. Yet, their peers are also their rivals, potential threats to their survival. Consequently, great powers cannot rely on other great powers for their security and left with no choice, but self-help.

For regional powers, though, this is not the case. Not only self-help is not their only choice, but also self-help is most often not enough – especially to protect them from other great powers and even at times from their regional peers. Thankfully, regional powers have the option to receive help, borrow power from great powers to protect them from other great powers as well as their regional rivals. What makes this great-power help possible is the existing power asymmetry that prevents great powers to see regional powers as competitors. When a great power helps another great power, it knows that it is shifting the balance of power between them and so increasing the potential of danger from its rival in the future. Yet, when a great power offers help – security protection and material benefits – to a non-great power state, it is not changing the balance of power between them, just like a rich person helping a poor does not make the poor rich. In other words, the lack of competition between great powers and the non-great power states enables great powers to offer help to regional powers. However, this will demonstrate later, the reliability of this security partnership is highly conditional. It is contingent on the structure of the system – the level of great power competition – that determines the interest/preferences of the great powers. Some international structures make great power help more reliable than others.

Recognizing that self-help is not the only choice for regional powers, now it is time to turn to what types of threats these states face to understand what their security goal and means to maximize their power are – whether these states act according to the logic of regional stability or regional hegemony to maximize their power.

2.3 Threats to Regional Power Security

For great powers, the only threat that has the potential to endanger their survival is other great powers. Non-great power states do not have the capabilities to pose threats to their security.[10] Regional powers, on the other hand, face three types of threats:

a. Threat from great powers
b. Threat from regional rivals
c. Threat of internal stability.

It is necessary to look into each of these threats to see what they mean for 2nd tier states.

2.3.1 Threat from great powers

Great powers, due to their immense capabilities, constitute potential threats to regional powers' security. Unlike great powers that can balance against other great powers, regional powers do not possess the capabilities to do so. Therefore, the most likely strategy for a regional power when it faces a direct threat from a great power is to form an alliance with another great power if one exists. Self-help is not enough for regional powers to deal with threats from great powers. Only if a regional power does not face direct threats from a great power, self-help can be a

[10] This does not mean that they may not have a conflict of interest with a non-great power threat. It means that these states do not pose direct threats to their security or freedom of movement in the system.

choice for a regional power. For example, during the Cold War neither of the great powers posed direct threats to India's security and as a result, India had the choice to remain out of the alliance structure of the two great powers.[11]

Of course, other than alliance with a great power, acquiring nuclear weapons is another option for regional powers to deter threats from a great power. If a state gets nuclear weapons, it can certainly deter a great power regardless of how weak it might be compared to the great power. Hence, at a first glance, this seems to be the most reasonable response of the regional power in dealing with a threat from a great power. If a regional power remains without nuclear weapons, there is always a possibility that the great power can shift gears despite their alliance and attack it one day. Yet, nuclear path is a highly risky strategy that has significant opportunity costs for three reasons.

First, great powers have a strong interest in preventing other states to get nuclear since nuclear strike is the only type of attack great powers are vulnerable in their homeland from non-great power states. As such, they adamantly highlight this interest. If there was one issue which the United States and the Soviet Union most successfully cooperated on during the Cold War, it was the non-proliferation issue, making sure that other states do not get nuclear weapons. As such, the road to becoming nuclear is a highly risky path for majority of the states that can draw the wrath of the great power/s. Moreover, most of the time there is a short window of opportunity these states can get adequate nuclear capability to be able to deter a preventive attack from a great power. If not, they can suffer a devastating attack.

[11] Even under this security environment, the regional power's relative power within its region matters for whether they choose this strategy. As 2nd tier states that do not face great power threats but face threats from regional rivals that they cannot deter on their own would be highly likely to choose alliance over a strategy of self-help. India, for example, had a favourable relative standing within its region in the beginning of the Cold War. As such, it had the choice for self-help.

Secondly and interrelated to the first reason is that knowing great powers' strong preference for nuclear non-proliferation, non-great power states are aware that choosing this path means foregoing great power help –security and material benefits from the great power – due to the imposition of punishment. Going nuclear can come with a heavy economic opportunity cost that can halt their internal development. As such, they are more likely to give up their nuclear ambitions in return for economic benefits.[12]

Thirdly, it is important to realize that non-great power states are not natural targets for great powers. In other words, great powers can choose to ignore these states unlike their rivals – other great powers – which they cannot afford to ignore. Therefore, a non-great power state has the opportunity to not to be under constant attention of the great power. Yet, if it attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, it necessarily draws the attention of the great power/s and this increases the threat from the great power/s which it was trying to prevent in the first place.[13]

Considering the reasons above, regional powers are more likely to choose alliance with a great power, if available, when they are confronted with a great power threat instead of internal balancing through nuclear weapons.[14] What this shows is that for 2nd tier states, threat from great powers is the one least under their control and the one they are most helpless to deal with among the three threats these states face. Yet, it is also the only threat that most varies across

[12] The November 2013 deal with Iran to halt its nuclear ambitions in return for easing the sanctions is a good case for how attractive economic benefits from a great power is for a regional power.

[13] It is important to recognize that non-great power states' attempts to acquire nuclear weapons are rarely directed against great powers. It is usually the regional rivalries among them – as in the case of India and Pakistan or Israel – that drives proliferation attempts. Only for few cases of nuclear acquisition – as in the case of North Korea – deterring a great power can be considered the root cause of nuclear acquisition. For how regional rivalries drive nuclear proliferation, see (Paul T. , 2000)

[14] In fact, even under unipolarity when the sole great power is overwhelmingly stronger than all the other states in the system, we do not see nuclear proliferation – more states have abandoned nuclear weapons than acquired them.

structures. While great power rivalry under bipolar/multipolar systems increases great power threats to regional powers, lack of it under unipolarity decreases this threat.

2.3.2 Threat from regional rivals

While there may be rare situations in which a regional power might be the only one in its region[15], more often, they have peers in their region that can pose security threats. Regional rivals constitute a grave concern for 2nd tier states, first and foremost, due to their proximity. Moreover, unlike threats from great powers that vary across structures, threat from regional peers is a constant for 2nd tier states. Yet, trying to maximize their security through making substantial relative gains against their peers is a highly risky and even futile endeavour for several reasons.

First, aggressive moves by a regional power can invite great power/s into the region. Once the great power intervenes in the region, it can quickly change the distribution of power against the aggressor power. Secondly, even if great powers neglected a certain region and there were no possibility of great power intervention, regional powers cannot expect to gain much by attempting to make relative gains due their unstable power trajectories vis-à-vis their peers. Regional powers, unlike great powers that have stable power trajectories which makes expansion relatively affordable, have unstable power trajectories. Even in a period as short as a decade, they can get knocked out of their rising trajectory. Power shifts among them are too

[15] For example, South Africa can be considered the only regional power in its region in the post-Cold War era, having predominance of power in its region. Yet, this does not make South Africa a great power. It neither has significant economic capabilities nor the global power projection capabilities beyond its region to be considered a great power.

quick and frequent to sustain expansion or make permanent relative gains.[16] As such, it is highly risky for them to aim for significant gains against their peers since it can quickly backfire. Lastly and most significantly, these moves are likely to destabilize the region and create threats to their internal stability/development. Therefore, 2nd tier states' security maximization against their peers can only be limited to deter their rivals or for small gains when low costs make them possible.

2.3.3 Threat to internal stability

Internal stability is a major concern for regional powers. Since they are smaller states, neighbouring events can spill-over and it is harder for them to buffer these effects that can potentially cause internal stability. This is a critical factor that distinguishes non-great power states from great powers.

When we think of great powers and their expansionary goals, we look at the presence of other great powers as a constraint. Internal limitations – such as concerns for internal stability and development – are not generally viewed as significant considerations for great powers. This approach is appropriate for understanding great powers' behaviour since becoming a great power already entails that the state has achieved high level of stability and internal development. Of course, no state – even great powers – can be viewed as totally "having made it" with no worries for internal stability or need for further economic development. These concerns, though, are much more limited for great powers than it is for other states. Moreover, even in cases when a great power faces high level of internal instability it is highly unlikely that another state would use this opportunity to invade the great power. In other words, the

[16] These frequent power shifts among them do not mean that they are no longer a regional power when they fall (e.g. Japan).

consequences of internal stability are likely to be different for the United States than for Iran or South Africa. While Mexico or Canada would not take the risk of using this internal stability to interfere in the United States, the same cannot said for the neighbours of Iran, Pakistan or Turkey. Conversely, it is harder for instability in Canada or Mexico to destabilize the United States. It would be easier for a great power like the United States to buffer the spill over effects of regional instability than it would be for smaller states. Consequently, the costs of internal instability as well as regional instability are likely to be much higher for 2nd tier states than great powers.

Considering the threats regional powers face as discussed above, these states can be said to have a strong interest in regional stability for maximizing their power. There should not expect the same expansionary attempt from them as we would from great powers, even without a great power in their region. Yet, it is important to note that the interest of 2nd tier states in regional stability does not mean that they will not expand or engage in security competition to make relative gains when the costs are low. Yet, we are likely to see their expansion to be limited to their immediate border to deter rivals. In other words, we are likely to see limited border wars.

Great Powers versus Regional Powers

	Great Powers	Regional Powers
Characteristics	Global power projection capability, stable power trajectories, limited internal stability/development problems	Regional power projection capability, unstable power trajectories, internal stability/development problems
Implication of anarchy	Self-help	Self-help, great-power help
Threats	Great powers	Great powers, regional powers, internal stability
Strategies	Balancing, bandwagoning	Alliance, balancing, autarky
Goal	Regional domination, system domination	Regional Stability

Having established why regional stability is in the interest of 2nd tier states and why attempts at domination is highly unlikely even in the absence of a great power intervention in their region, This will turn to the question of what different structures mean for the types of threats regional powers face and how it affects their security environment.

2.4 Regional Power Security and Strategies under Different Structures

Under all structures, regional powers potentially face the three types of threats as laid out earlier threat from great powers, threat from regional powers and threats to their internal stability from

spill-over effects of regional instability. Yet, different structures make certain threats less acute and others more prominent.

Since what distinguishes unipolarity from bipolar/multipolar systems is the existence of more than one great power, it is first necessary to look at how this factor affects the security environment of regional powers under bipolar/multipolar systems.

Chapter 3

South Asia: Continuity or Transformation?

This chapter will analyse India's foreign policy in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods to see what India's security goal is and if and how the structural change into unipolarity impacted its security strategy. Since India is famously known as one of the regional powers that successfully pursued neutrality – a policy of non-alignment – and was able to escape falling into either U.S. or Soviet camp, this chapter will first look into how India was able remain neutral and what the Indian neutrality entailed. Then, it will discuss the impact of the end of the Cold War on India's security strategy, especially whether India is pursuing an alliance with the United States or pursuing autarky in the post-Cold War era. Lastly, it will answer the question what the intended goal of India's chosen security strategy in the post-Cold War is – if India is aiming for regional stability or regional domination.

India is an especially useful case to demonstrate why strategy of neutrality is necessarily a more "constrained" form of autarky due to the environment this strategy is pursued under[17], even though both strategies reflect a state's choice to rely on self-help as opposed to a great power. When a state pursues neutrality, one of its aims is to prevent getting drawn into a great power. As such, this strategy requires hiding[18], a consistent choice to stay out of any military cooperation with the great power/s so that the state is not shifting the relative power between the great powers. A state that pursues autarky, on the other hand, can militarily cooperate with a

[17] For neutrality to have any conceptual as well as behavioural meaning, there has to be at least two sides to remain neutral between. As such, neutrality vis-à-vis great powers, by definition, can be pursued under bipolar and multipolar structures.

[18] Schroeder discusses "hiding" as one of the alternative strategies to self-help, recognizing that many states in the system cannot afford self-help. Yet, Schroeder views hiding as a possible strategy when a state is faced with a direct threatl, on the other hand, discuss hiding as a realistic choice only if the state does not face a direct threat. See (Schroeder, Summer 1994, p. 117).

great power based on its self-interest at a given time. As a result, a state that is pursuing autarky has more flexibility in its foreign policy than a state that is pursuing neutrality.

Based on the definitions above, when India is pursuing neutrality, this has been observed that India staying out of any great power war and not contributing to war fighting ability of the great powers. On the other hand, when India is pursuing autarky, India sometimes cooperating and sometimes non-cooperating with a great power based on its own self-interest at a given time.

3.1 The Argument

India was one of the few regional powers that did not face a great power threat during the Cold War. As such, India's security threat environment did not significantly change in the post-Cold War era. As in the Cold War, India still views Pakistan and China as the main threats to its security and worries about the potential spill-over effects of regional instability that can threaten its internal stability. The fact that India now faces a stronger China than before, though, has led many to believe that India will increasingly pursue an alliance with the United States for its regional security, moving away from its pursuit of non-alignment during the Cold War. Yet, if we look at India's foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, we see that India is increasingly pursuing autarky rather than an alliance with the United States. While India's pursuit of autarky rests on its long-held normative preference for autonomy over dependence on a great power, the structural conditions of unipolarity also makes alliance with the United States inadequate for a rising regional power like India.

First, India's concern for regional instability resulting from the United States' intervention in its region loom large since there is no other great power to contain the spill-over effects of the

United States' intervention. As this will demonstrate, India's behaviour in 2001 U.S. intervention in Afghanistan as opposed to its behavior in 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan not only demonstrates how India worries about the spill-over effects of the United States' intervention in its region under unipolarity, but also how the unipolar structure enables India to have larger role in the security politics of its region. Instead of hiding as it did in 1979 which a strategy of neutrality necessarily dictates, India has taken pro-active measures to deal with the potential spill-over effects of the U.S. intervention in 2001.

Secondly, as this is argued in this thesis, the sole great power in a unipolar world has a hard time signalling reliable commitments and is likely to send mixed signals to states. United States' behaviour in Asia, expectedly, has been erratic and inconsistent from India's perspective as the United States pursued close ties with Pakistan and China, India's two main regional rivals, at various times. Therefore, not only for the reason of strong preference for autonomy but also for these structural reasons, it is hard for India to choose alliance with the United States as the path to maximize its regional security. As such, India is increasingly pursuing autarky since the end of the Cold War.

This can be observed, India's autarkical strategy in the post-Cold War era in its sometimes cooperative and sometimes non-cooperative behaviour vis-à-vis the United States' security policies. While India tested its nuclear weapons in 1998 despite knowing that the United States would object and could suffer from sanctions, opposed the 2003 Iraq War and refused to send even peace-keeping forces for Iraq's post-war reconstruction, it has allowed the United States to refuel its airplanes on Indian territory for the 1991 Iraq War – the first time in its history India let its territory used for a foreign war, even if fuelling –, signed a nuclear deal and

engaged in military exercises with the United States. As such, opposed to its strategy of non-alignment when India consistently withdrew support from the great powers' in their war efforts. Moreover, India taking pro-active steps to increase its capability for an autonomous foreign policy such as establishing a foreign military base in Tajikistan, pursuing active regional engagement, changing its nuclear policy from recessed to actual deterrence, diversifying its military procurement and developing indigenous military industry.

India's has also increased its regional engagement in the post-Cold War period, we can also see that India is acting according to the logic of regional stability rather than regional domination. Despite its rising trajectory, India is behaving as a status-quo state and acting with restraint towards the states in South Asia, including Pakistan. While India highly desires to become a great power, its foreign policy conduct within its region suggests that it views regional stability as the path for its power maximization.

3.2 Why India?

India has become the world's third largest economy in terms of GDP based on purchasing power parity, even exceeding Japan. It also has the third largest army and is the second most populous state in the system. There is an expectation that India's population may even exceed China's in the next twenty years. (Cohen S. , Summer 2000, p. 32) In addition to its high ranking in the size of its economy, army and population, India also has a geo-strategic location at the cross-roads of the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. Expectedly, there is near consensus among scholars that India is a key regional power in the international system. Yet, the fact that India shares a border with China – the regional power that is seen as the most likely candidate for becoming a great power –, makes it even more important to understand

how a rising India is likely to behave in the post-Cold War era since this has significant policy implications for the United States in the future.

For example, if China continues to rise, would India ally with the United States the way Western European states did during the Cold War to contain the Soviet Union or would it continue to behave with a strong preference for an autarkical foreign policy? This chapter, through a cross-structural analysis of Indian foreign policy during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, can help to shed light on this important policy question.

3.3 India's Threat Environment and Security Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era: What, If Anything, Changed from the Cold War for India?

3.3.1 India's Threat Environment

Earlier, some people believed that regional powers might face three major security threats: direct threats from big countries, direct threats from large regional powers, and indirect threats from spillover effects from regional stability. During the Cold War, due to the overall positioning of South Asia in the Cold War competition, India was one of the few regional powers that did not face the threat of a direct power. For the United States and the Soviet Union, South Asia is a priority area compared to other regions such as Europe, the Middle East, East Asia and Southeast Asia. Therefore, the big countries did not vigorously compete for the relative benefits of the region (Robert Chase, 1999, p. 51). Therefore, the end of the Cold War does not mean eliminating the threat of direct power to India, as it has done for many other major powers such as Turkey. India's main security issue during the Cold War was the direct security threats of its regional rivals Pakistan and China, and the spillover effects of regional stability could threaten its indirect threat of internal stability. Between 1947 and 1948, during

the Cold War in 1965 and 1971 and in China in 1962, India and Pakistan waged three wars. However, for India, concerns about regional stability are equally large.

Today, in the post-cold-war era, India's major security issues have not changed significantly. India still sees Pakistan and China as the main threat to its security - unresolved territorial disputes between the two countries - and concerns about the spillover effects that may be caused by regional instability. Therefore, stopping regional rivals and maintaining internal stability is a major security issue for India during the post-cold-war period and during the Cold War.

Facing the similar threat environment during the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, examining India's strategies during these periods separately provides a rare opportunity for the structural transformation from bipolar to unipolar to influence India's security strategy. Correct. As this shows, India always prefers autonomy. During the Cold War and the post-cold-war era, India tried to rely on self-help and autonomous foreign policy to deal with its regional security, rather than building a coalition with strong power. However, the structural conditions of the Cold War have limited India's flexible foreign policy opportunities, and although it is neutral, India is increasingly seen as part of the group, limiting its ability to diversify. The end of the cold war and the evacuation of the two groups have greatly enhanced India's ability to "autarkical strategy".

3.3.2 Post-Cold War Era and India's Pursuit of Autarky

Not facing a direct security threat from neither the United States nor the Soviet Union when the Cold War began, the recently independent India had two choices – to ally with one of the great

powers or remain neutral. India chose the latter and refused to form a military alliance with either of the great powers. The fact that India was not threatened by the great powers and had a relatively favourable position vis-à-vis its rivals Pakistan and China in the early decades of the Cold War[19] – certainly enabled India's pursuit of neutrality. Yet, not all states under this security environment chose the path of neutrality and there were valid strategic reasons for India not to do so as well.

Pakistan, one of India's regional rivals, for example, chose to ally with the United States early on despite the fact it did not face a great power threat like India. In 1954, Pakistan signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Treaty with the United States and in 1955 joined the Baghdad Pact – a defense pact against a possible aggression by the Soviet Union – supported by the United States and Britain.[20] India was well aware that Pakistan was pursuing an alliance with the United States to bolster its capabilities vis-à-vis itself, as Indian Prime Minister Nehru clearly stated, "Nobody here imagines that the Pakistan government entered into this Pact because it expected some imminent or distant invasion or aggression from the Soviet Union...Whatever it is, they have joined the Baghdad Pact and SEATO essentially because of their hostility to India." (India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946 to April 1961, 1961, p. 94)[21] As such, India could have also allied with the United States or even better, with the Soviet Union to offset Pakistan's alignment with the United States. Many regional rivals indeed allied with great powers to deter threats from each other during the Cold War. Yet, India chose not to do so. More significantly, as the Cold War progressed and India faced an increasingly

[19] Data is taken from the database of World Bank – www.worldbank.org. It would be preferable to compare the size of their economy using GDP based on PPP. Unfortunately, this date is not available until 1980. When we look at their relative GDP in the early years of the decade, Pakistan certainly is in a highly unfavourable position. On the other hand, India and China fare relatively similar in terms of the size of their economy.
[20] Even though the United States supported the Baghdad Pact, it did not officially enter the pact.
[21] From Nehru's speech he gave in Lok Sabha on March 29, 1957.

challenging regional security environment such as facing a devastating loss in the war with China in 1962, China testing its nuclear weapons in 1964 and militarily supporting Pakistan after 1965[22], India still remained neutral. Why did India choose neutrality which meant that it had to rely on self-help as opposed to alliance through which it could receive security guarantees from a great power?

Nehru's declaration of India's policy of non-alignment in 1949 as, "Our (Indian) foreign policy is one of keeping aloof from the big blocs of nations – rival blocs – and being friendly to all countries and not becoming entangled in any alliances, military or other, that might drag us into any possible conflict...the broad lines of our policy have been laid down and they are: (a) that India will naturally and inevitable in the course of a few months become an independent Republic; and (b) that in our external, internal and domestic policy, in our political policy, or in our economic policy, we do not propose to accept anything that involves the slightest degree dependence on any other authority," (India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946 to April 1961, 1961, pp. 37-38)[23]

[22] The U.S. decision to put an embargo on both India and Pakistan at the onset of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan indirectly led Pakistan and China get closer. Between 1959 and 1965, the arms from the United States constituted more than half of Pakistan's arms imports while only less than five percent of India's. Deeply affected by the U.S. embargo, Pakistan turned to China for arms and this initiated the ongoing support from China to Pakistan. Whereas arms sales from China and Pakistan were less than 1 percent of Pakistan's arms imports between 1950 and 1965, in 1966 and 1967 it would become 70 percent of Pakistan's total imports. (The India's and Pakistan's arms imports has been calculated using the date from Arms Transfers Database published by the SIPRI.)

[23] From Nehru's speech "Friendly Cooperation".

Fig 3.1 : China, India and Pakistan's GDP in constant 2000 US$ 1960-1991



highlights that there was both normative and strategic rationale behind India's choice of neutrality. India certainly had a strong ideational preference for autonomy, not willing to be dependent on a great power.[24] As pointed out by Narang and Staniland, India's "aversion of alliances emerged due to clear analogy drawn between colonialism and dependence." (Vipin Narang P. S., 2012, p. 82) Yet, Nehru's articulation of India's policy of neutrality also makes clear that India had a strategic rationale for choosing neutrality which was to prevent getting drawn into a great power war due to being part of a bloc. Non-alignment could shield India from the danger of getting entangled in conflicts due to alliance with a great power. The alliance between Turkey's United States, this was indeed a vulnerability alliance with a great power

[24] This has been argued earlier that when states face looser structural constraints – such that they do not face direct power threats and have favourable standing within their region – they can have the luxury to act with their normative preference.

during the Cold War could create. India strongly wished to deter this possibility by pursuing neutrality. What did India's neutrality entail for its foreign policy – its relationship with the great powers as well as its regional security?

By choosing neutrality, India had to signal both great powers that it had no desire to join one or the other side during the Cold War. This meant India's neutrality precluded any type of military cooperation with either great power during the Cold War that could provide a relative advantage to one or the other great power. When we look at India's foreign policy until the end of the Cold War, we indeed do not see India cooperating with the United States or the Soviet Union in any of their wars and contributing to their warfighting abilities. The fact that South Asia was not a sub-region in which great power rivalry heavily played out during the Cold War certainly made it easier for India not to partake in a great power war. Yet, it is important to note that many regional powers did participate in great powers' wars outside their region for favour of protection as Turkey swiftly contributed to the Korean War to gain currency with the United States. India, on the other hand, did not participate in any great power war, including the only one in its region which was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that played out as a proxy war between the great powers.

India's behavior in the Soviet War in Afghanistan in 1979, for example, was in sharp contrast to Pakistan's. Pakistan became the extended arm of the United States to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan throughout the conflict, letting the United States use its military bases and actively helping the United States to covertly support the mujahedeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan. India, on the other hand, did not participate in any capacity in the decade-long conflict. Granted there were no request from neither the United States nor the Soviet Union for India's military

support (Cohen S. P., 2001, p. 140)[25] – most probably not only due to recognition of India's long-held policy of non-alignment but also due to India's lack of geographical access to Afghanistan unlike Pakistan –, India could have chosen to do so especially when Pakistan received huge sum of aid (more than 7 billion dollars) from the United States for its support. India, though, chose lved in the only proxy war in its region during the Cold War.

For its regional security, neutrality also meant that India had to give up great power security guarantees and rely on self-help instead. Expectedly, India placed high value on indigenous arms industry see (David Kinsella, 2001, pp. 353-373)[26], diversification of its military procurement see (Frankel, Spring 1980, p. 59)[27] and eventually developed nuclear weapons, testing its weapons in 1974. Yet, this did not necessarily mean India could not elicit help from the great powers at times of need. In fact, its strategy of non-alignment enabled India to ask for help from both great powers at different times, especially in the early years of the Cold War. If India had allied with one of the great powers, it would have lost its flexibility to receive help from one great power when the other was unavailable or unwilling. For example, during the 1962 war with China, when the Soviet Union refrained from helping India due to the Cuban Missile Crisis it was involved in that necessitated having China on its side, India was able to receive support from the United States.[28] Yet, as the Cold War progressed and the regional

[25] The Soviet Union had not even informed India of its decision to intervene in Afghanistan in advance.
[26] for the high value India put on indigenous weapons production and how desire for autonomy was a crucial motivation for this. Also, see (Vipin Narang P. S., 2012, pp. 79-80) for India's preference for indigenous military industry as opposed to foreign weaponry.
[27] for how India was uncomfortable with its increasing dependence on the Soviet Union and wished to diversify its military procurement.
[28] The United States helped India not only by securing assurance from Pakistan that it would not invade Kashmir so that India could redeploy its northern troops towards the front with China, but also by dispatching an American carrier, the Enterprise, towards the Bay of Bengal. It is important to note, though, China unilaterally declared a ceasefire and India lost the war.

dynamics changed such that China increasingly supported Pakistan and rapprochement between the United States and China occurred, India lost this flexibility.

India's signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union prior to its war with Pakistan in 1971 is often seen as a sign of India's tilt towards the Soviet Union to balance the U.S.-Pakistan-China cooperation. Some even view India's relationship with the Soviet Union in the latter part of the Cold War as one of "alignment", 1971 treaty as marking India's shift away from non-alignment to alignment with the Soviet Union. (Malone, 2011, p. 50) While this is an inaccurate understanding of India's relationship with the Soviet Union as, it highlights the fact that the Cold War dynamics eventually restricted India's flexibility in eliciting help from the great powers.

India's motivation to sign the security treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971 was to elicit support from the Soviet Union prior to the war with Pakistan as well as to deter China to get involved in the war. From India's perspective, it was a strategic move to maximize its chances for winning a war. It was not a sign for India's desire to align with the Soviet Union. Not only the treaty formally recognized India's neutrality, for the full text of treaty see (India-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, 1971, pp. 904-908)[29], but India also did not offer anything to the Soviet Union that could provide it with a relative advantage vis-à-vis the United States. The only thing the Soviet Union had secured with the treaty was India's promise not to enter into a military alliance directed at itself.[30] This was in fact just a reaffirmation of India's already neutral stance during the Cold War. Yet, India

[29] Article 4 of the treaty "the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment" clearly recognized India's neutrality.

[30] Article 8 of the treaty stated that the two states "shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party and to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military damage on the other High Contracting Party."

increasingly came to viewed as a Soviet-leaning state from the perspective of the United States and its Western European allies. This made Western companies hesitant to sell arms to India which pushed India to increasingly turn towards the Soviet Union for its arms purchases. (Cohen S. P., 2001, pp. 143-144) Moreover, when India refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the U.S. Congress would not approve aid for India's heavy industry projects which India needed, the Soviet Union would come to offer what the United States could not.

For sure, by the end of the Cold War, India had become heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for its weapons supplies, aid to the public sector and trade. In the years between 1971 and 1991, for example, arms from the Soviet Union constituted 70 percent of India's total imports, while the arms imports from the United States were only 0.11 percent.[31] India's ability to diversify its procurement highly diminished. Cohen's remark that when the Soviet Union disintegrated "Indian defense experts prowled the factories of Russia, Ukraine and other states in search of spares and machinery" (Cohen S. P., 2001, p. 144) sharply captures how dependent India had become on the Soviet arms.

Yet, while the Cold War dynamics eventually led India to tilt towards the Soviet Union and lose its flexibility, India's relationship with the Soviet Union cannot be viewed as an alignment. Throughout the entire period of the Cold War, we do not observe any instance of India contributing to war-fighting ability of the Soviet Union such as letting its territory used for war or participating in any of the wars it was involved in. India's foreign policy vis-à-vis both great

[31] This percentage has been calculated by using data from the Arms Transfer Database published by SIPRI.

powers was consistently based on "hiding" from their rivalry and trying to keep an equal distance towards them so that it would not get entangled in their conflict.

After all, while India's neutrality relied on a strong normative preference for autonomy, it was also a quite realist approach to interstate relations which not only recognized the limits of what being a lesser power in the system, but also perceived neither the United States nor the Soviet Union much different from one another. One can clearly see this realist understanding in Nehru's statement,

"I cannot guarantee which country will commit aggression and which will not. Every great and powerful country tends to expand and to be somewhat aggressive. It is very difficult for a giant not to function as a giant. One can guard oneself as much as possible. One can create an atmosphere in which the giant will function mildly, but it is inherent in a giant's strength to act like a giant if he does not like something. That is true of whichever giant of the world you might have in mind." (India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946 to April 1961, 1961, p. 94)[32]

3.3.3 Post-Cold War Era and India's Pursuit of Autarky

The breakdown of the Soviet Union and the end of the great power rivalry was a debilitating event for India that had pursued its foreign policy with the principle of nonalignment. Its strategy of neutrality no longer had the ideological relevance in a world with one great power – there were no two sides to be neutral between. This has led some to argue that India, now also facing a stronger China, will increasingly pursue an alliance with the United States in the post-

[32] From Nehru's speech

Cold War era, shifting away from its policy of nonalignment. The fact that Indian- U.S. relations became warmer in the post-Cold War period as the two states cooperated in several instances when their interests coincided, at a first glance, seems to confirm this thinking. Yet, when we look at India's pattern of foreign policy choices in the post-Cold War era, we in fact see that India is increasingly pursuing autarky rather than alliance. One can observe India's pursuit of Autarky in its autonomous foreign policy as well as in its attempts to increase its capabilities for self-help enabled by the removal of the rigid Cold War blocs.

In the post-Cold War era, while India allowed the United States to refuel its airplanes on Indian territory for the 1991 Iraq War – the first time in its history India let its territory used for a foreign war, even if fuelling, cooperated with the United States in the 2001 war in Afghanistan, signed a nuclear deal and engaged in military exercises with the United States, it has also tested its nuclear weapons in 1998 knowing that the United States would object and could suffer from sanctions, opposed the 2003 Iraq war and refused to send even peace-keeping forces for Iraq's post-war reconstruction and at times diverged from the United States' policy on Iran's nuclear program, see (Malone, 2011, p. 169)[33], such as ignoring the sanctions imposed on Iran. As such, we observe India at times cooperating with the United States in its security policies and at times not cooperating, based on its self-interest at a given time.

This pattern of India's foreign policy choices certainly stands in contrast to its Cold War one when India consistently withdrew support from the great powers and went to great lengths to not to be involved in any security cooperation with either great power. For example, it would have been unthinkable for India to let the United States or the Soviet Union use its territory,

[33] For example, after voting against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency's resolution on Iran's nuclear program in 2005, in 2010 India then praised Iran "for fighting its rights. India's energy needs are often seen as why India's views diverge from the United States' on Iran's nuclear program.

even if for refuelling, for a war during the Cold War. Yet, the fact that India has done so in the post-Cold War era reveals that the structural shift from bipolarity to unipolarity has enabled India to have more flexibility in its conduct of relationship with the United States as opposed to the Cold War when India needed to make sure not to provide a relative advantage to one great power over another which would hurt its neutrality. Yet, India no longer operates under such restraint in the post-Cold War era which makes cooperation with the United States a possibility when doing so serves its self-interest. Yet, as its non-cooperative behavior with the United States also highlights, this does not mean that India is acting according to the security references of the United States most of the time and will do so in the future.

While India's long-held preference for autonomy certainly dictates its pursuit of Autarky, there are also structural reasons for why India just cannot outsource its regional security to the United States as some regional powers did during the Cold War. First, concerns of potential regional instability resulting from the United States' interventions in its region loom large for India in the post-Cold War era. One can see this in India's pro-active handling of the United States' intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 where India swiftly moved to take measures to counter potential negative security externalities the war could create and establish its footprint in the country. It committed 1.2 billion dollars for the reconstruction of Afghanistan which made India the sixth largest bilateral donor in Afghanistan (Ganguly & Howenstein, Fall/Winter 2009, p. 115), sponsored Afghanistan's membership in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and signed a strategic partnership with Afghanistan in 2011. Most importantly, lacking geographical access to Afghanistan, India established a military base in Tajikistan, though not operational yet, in preparation to counter Pakistan's influence once the United States departs. India's involvement in Afghanistan is not surprising, considering the

significance of the country for the Indian-Pakistani relationship. Pakistan, for long, has used its ties in Afghanistan to support Islamic militancy against India. As such, Afghanistan has become the proxy for the Indian-Pakistani conflict in which both states have an interest to have a regime in Afghanistan that cooperates with them. Yet, what is striking is how different India's behaviour vis-à-vis the 2001 U.S. intervention has been from the 1979 Soviet intervention. In the decade long Soviet war in Afghanistan, India had similar interest in countering Pakistan's influence as well. Yet, India chose to remain unengaged and was adamant on not partaking in any capacity in the war.[34] India's strategy of neutrality certainly precluded India from any type of involvement in the war which would necessarily put India at the centre of a great-power conflict, but also India could rely on the Soviet Union to counter the U.S-Pakistan support for the Islamic militants. Yet, in the post-Cold War period, such reliance on the United States is not possible. After all, the United States will eventually leave (and did leave) and the instability can get out of hand which necessitates India to take precautionary moves to deal with such a scenario. Apart from concerns of regional instability that cannot be contained by the great powers as in the Cold War, the United States' erratic and inconsistent behaviour in the region makes the United States a highly unreliable security guarantor from the perspective of India and necessitates its pursuit of autarky to deal with its regional security. Not only the United States has mostly neglected the South Asian sub-region in the 1990s, but it has also cooperated with India's two main rivals – Pakistan and China – at various times since the end of the Cold War. The United States has closely allied with Pakistan in the War on Afghanistan due to latter's strong influence in Afghanistan and provided Pakistan with more than 15 billion dollars of

[34] Even rhetorically, India remained neutral. Despite the fact India was a founding member of the Non-Alignment that held the principle of non-intervention and had ideologically positioned itself against great power intervention in third-world states, it refrained from openly criticizing the Soviet Union and abstainedfrom voting against the U.N. resolution that asked for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

economic and military aid in exchange for its support. For India, this has expectedly been problematic. Moreover, in the last two decades the United States has pursued a policy of engagement with China, especially heavily under the Clinton administration. While the Obama Administration's "pivot to Asia" policy suggests a shift in the United States' earlier policy and its increasing intention to balance the rising China, the overall engagement of the United States will all three regional powers at the same time necessarily creates uncertainties regarding what the U.S. policy could be in the future. One cannot underestimate the fact that the first conventional war between two nuclear states has happened in this region in 1999, highlighting the great level of uncertainty on whether the United States would intervene or not, as well as which side, and especially when it is involved somewhere else.[35]

As such, India is taking pro-active steps to bolster its capabilities for self-help in the post-Cold War era. We can observe this not only in India's continuing emphasis on indigenous military industry, its change of nuclear policy from recessed to actual deterrence and establishment of foreign military base, but also in its increased regional engagement as well as diversification of its economic, military and diplomatic relations. As opposed to the Cold War period in which the rigidity of the alliance blocs increasingly pushed India towards the Soviet Union[36] and confined its influence to South Asia and the non-aligned bloc, the end of the Cold War has opened up possibilities for India's ability to play a more regionally active role and diversify its relations. One can see India's increasing regional engagement in the launch of its "Gujral

[35] The Kargil Conflict in 1999 occurred when the United States was involved in war in Kosova. Even though Clinton decisively intervened in the conflict and put pressure on Pakistan to withdraw from the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir which Pakistan complied and was a welcoming change for India that expected the United States to tacitly support Pakistan

[36] When India tilted towards the Soviet Union in the 1970 and there was growing perception that India was in the Soviet camp, the Western European countries refrained from selling arms to India for example. After all, both great powers managed the coherence of their alliances through preventing inter-bloc interaction which they viewed with suspicion.

Doctrine" and "Look East Policy" that aims to foster relations with the states in South Asia and East/Southeast Asia respectively, its participation in regional organizations in which India became a Summit Level Partner in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Nations) and a founder member of the East Asia Summit, see (Pardesi, 2010, pp. 120-21)[37], and more importantly, its conduct of naval exercises with Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Japan, Australia and the United States and joint military exercises with even China, see (Malone, 2011, pp. 173, 216-217)[38], see (Brewster, March/April 2010, pp. 402-25)[39], see also (Ghosh, March/April 2008, pp. 282-302)[40].

Yet, India's engagement is not limited to the Asian region. India has pursued closer ties with states outside its region including the United States. In 2000, for example, India signed a Declaration on Strategic Partnership with Russia, both states reemphasizing their partnership during the Cold War. At the same time, India is increasingly engaged with the states in the Middle East, establishing close ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel. While India's engagement with Iran and Saudi Arabia is motivated by its growing energy needs, its relationship with Israel is primarily driven by the need to modernize its military. As such, India has established full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, becoming a major arms client of Israel. Israel has sold components of its Arrow II theatre missile defence system such as Green

[37] For India's involvement in regional institutions.
[38] For the discussion of military exercises and defence agreements India has conducted after the Cold War.
[39] For India's growing relationship with South Korea.
[40] For India's increasing cooperation with Japan.

Pine Radar despite U.S. objections to some parts of the contract and has played a significant role in India's development of its missile defence program (Malone, 2011, pp. 190-91)[41].

Even though Russia is still India's largest provider of defence goods, India has been careful not to rely on one power for its purchases. For example, India chose French Rafale over Russian MiG-35 and U.S. F-16/F-18 in one of the largest aircraft deals in history. Even though price can be said to play a role in India's choice of France so has its strategic concerns of defence dependence. Having suffered from high level of dependence on the Soviet Union for its arms in the latter part of the Cold War as discussed earlier, India certainly wishes to avoid that possibility and as such, gives as high level of priority to expanding its indigenous production as it does to diversifying its military procurement (SIPRI, 2012, pp. 216-217)[42].

As we can see from India's conduct of its relationship with the United States – sometimes cooperating and sometimes non-cooperating with the United States' security policies based on its self-interest at a given time – and its attempts at increasing its capabilities for an autonomous foreign policy, India's foreign policy in the post-Cold War period can be best understood as pursuit of autarky. In the next section, it will discuss whether India, as a rising regional power, is pursuing autarky for regional stability or regional domination. Even though India strongly wishes to become a great power and be recognized as a major power as we can see in India's quest for a permanent member status in the U.N. Security Council , it is acting with a strong preference for regional stability to maximize its power.

[41] For Indian-Israeli relationship since the end of the Cold War. India's closeness with Israel is especially striking since India had no diplomatic ties with Israel during the Cold War and took a firm pro-Palestinian position in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

[42] For India's expansion of its indigenous production

3.4 India's Security Goal: Pursuit of Autarky for Regional Stability or Regional Domination?

Being a rising power, discussions on India's desire to become a great power and dominate South Asia have become widespread in the works on India, see (Nayar & Paul, 2003) (Ladwig III, 2010, pp. 1162-1183). India is often referred as a regional hegemon or at least an aspiring one, see (Ayoob, Summer, 1991, pp. 420-448), (Khan B. , 2008, pp. 29-36), (Ginat, 2004, pp. 189-218). India's increasingly active foreign policy in its region such as the launch of the "Gujral Doctrine" and "Look East Policy", especially its establishment of a foreign military base despite the fact India was in principle opposed to foreign military bases during the Cold War all seem to substantiate this view. Yet, it would be a mistake to read this regional engagement as an attempt at regional domination. A closer analysis next of India's relationship with Pakistan as well as smaller states in its region will reveal that India has acted with restraint and caution in the post-Cold War era with a concern for regional stability despite its rising power trajectory.

3.4.1 India vis-à-vis Pakistan in the Post-Cold War Era

Even though Pakistan is the second largest state in South Asia, wide power gap exists between India and Pakistan in all dimensions – currently, India's economy is nine times of Pakistan's in terms of GDP based on PPP[43], population seven times of Pakistan and India spends six times of what Pakistan spends on defence expenditures (SIPRI, 2012, p. 211). Yet, despite the existing and growing power gap as a result of India's high growth rates in the last decade, India's

[43] For GDP based on PPP and population data, for years 2010 and 2011 has been taken from IMF's World Economic Outlook Database – www.imf.org.

behaviour vis-à-vis Pakistan has been in defence of the status-quo in the crises they had in the post-Cold War period.

One can clearly see India's limited response vis-à-vis Pakistan in the 1999 Kargil crisis and in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament attack which India believed Pakistan had a hand in it. In the 1999 Kargil crisis, for example, even though India responded militarily to Pakistan's intrusion and seizure of Kargil heights in Indian-controlled section of Kashmir, it did not cross the line of control (LoC) that separates the Indian and Pakistani controlled parts in its response. In 1965, on the other hand, India had crossed the line of control and the conflict had escalated to full scale war. Even though what triggered the crisis in 1965 and 1999 were the same – Pakistan's intrusion to the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir and attempts to create uprising in Indian-controlled section – India's response was much more restrained in 1999, see (Khan S. , 2005, pp. 162-64)[44]. Again, after the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, India reacted with caution. Even though India deployed 800,000 troops along the border with Pakistan, it did not escalate the crisis by using military force. The fact that both India and Pakistan are nuclear states in the post-Cold War period and India fears that conflicts can escalate to a nuclear level certainly is a major reason why India's responses have been limited and why it did not cross the LoC in post-Cold War crises, see (Khan S. , 2005, pp. 156-177)[45]. Nuclear weapons play a major role in limiting India's responses and why crises have not turned into full-scale wars. Yet, one also needs to recognize India's preference for status-quo. After all, India's nuclear weapons have not stopped Pakistan from crossing the LoC and instigating crises in the post-Cold War period. Despite its relative weakness, Pakistan has

[44] For the comparison of India's behaviour in the 1965 and 1999 crises.
[45] For the argument that nuclear weapons are the reason why crises between India and Pakistan have not led to full scale war.

more often been the initiator of the crises between the two states since the beginning of their rivalry and this has not changed since the two states achieved nuclear status (Goertz, Saeedi, & Diehl, 2005, pp. 27-53)[46]. On the other hand, we do not see India using its rising power trajectory and the widening of the power gap with Pakistan for instigating disputes in their rivalry. The fact that India is a rising state and benefits more from the status-quo than Pakistan does play a large role for India's defence of the status quo. After all, India has more to lose than Pakistan. Risky behaviour for trying to make relative gains (also to note for uncertain outcomes as majority of the disputes between India and Pakistan have resulted in stalemates or indeterminate outcomes (Goertz, Saeedi, & Diehl, 2005, pp. 39-40)[47] can knock India out of its rising trajectory by diverting India's resources for a lengthy conflict and even provoking U.S. intervention into the conflict. As such, despite its increasing relative power vis-à-vis Pakistan, India has acted with a preference for the status-quo in the conflict.

Yet, one might still argue that India's restrained behaviour vis-à-vis Pakistan is one of exception since they are the only two states in South Asia that are nuclear. As such, it would be helpful to look briefly at India's behaviour vis-à-vis other states in South Asia to see whether one can observe the same restraint or whether India's rising trajectory is leading to a foreign policy of regional domination.

One of the first doctrines India launched in the post-Cold War era has been the Gujral Doctrine to foster friendly and cooperative relations with its South Asian neighbours. Indian Prime

[46] Diehl, Goertz and Saeedi show that Pakistan has been the revisionist state in the history of the India-Pakistan conflict by using the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset. Pakistan has initiated the majority of the disputes (over 65 percent) between the two states.
[47] Authors note that more than 80 percent of the disputes have ended in stalemate.

Minister I.K. Gujral laid out the five principles of this new strategic approach of India vis-à-vis its neighbourhood in 1996 as,

"First, with neighbours like Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity but gives all that it can in good faith and trust. Secondly, no South Asian country will allow its territory to be used against the interest of another country of the region. Thirdly, none will interfere in the internal affairs of another. Fourthly, all South Asian countries must respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. And finally, they will settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations. These five principles, scrupulously observed and will recast South Asia's regional relationship, including the tormented relationship between India and Pakistan, in a friendly, cooperative mould" (Malone, 2011, p. 326).

The doctrine certainly resembles the United States' 19th century Monroe Doctrine which is often regarded as the beginnings of the United States' establishment of its hegemony in its region or at least its wish to do so by excluding the European powers. The Gujral Doctrine as well highlights India's unease with outside intervention in its region and India's perception of itself as the guarantor of the security and stability in the sub-region which suggest a desire for dominating the region. Yet, India's behaviour vis-à-vis the conflicts in its region in the post-Cold War era not only show at times a reluctance to take an active role in the management of its region, but also more tolerance for outside intervention than it had during the Cold War. Prys, for example, in her discussion of India's handling of the crisis in Nepal and Sri Lanka in the 2000s points out that India took a much more limited role than desire for regional leadership would suggest and welcomed international organizations as well as the extra-regional actors'

intervention to resolve the crisis (Prys, 2013, pp. 267-99). India's behavior vis-à-vis Sri Lankan crisis that began in 2000 is especially illuminating. Despite Sri Lankan government's demand for India's support and military aid, India refused to provide it and welcomed Israel's and even China's support for the Sri Lankan government against the Tamil Tigers (Prys, 2013, pp. 267-99).

One should not, though, view this as India being comfortable with outside intervention in its region unanimously. What it highlights is that under conditions when instability already exists, India might be willingly cooperate with outside actors to ensure regional stability and possibly reduce costs of managing the conflict. Yet, on the other hand, when the outside intervention is likely to lead to regional instability, India would most probably be alarmed at the intervention. India's restraint vis-à-vis Pakistan and its reluctance to intervene in some conflicts within its region seem to suggest that India is not acting with a view for regional hegemony despite its rising trajectory in its region. Yet, this does not mean that India would not wish to be a regional hegemon. It attests more to the fact that India cannot afford to think in terms of hegemony. After all, despite having the third largest economy in the system, India still has significant internal development and stability problems which necessarily makes India's concern in its region to be limited to deterring its rivals and preventing potential spill-over effects of regional instability that can pose threats to its internal stability.

3.5 Conclusion

Given the fact India has had a strong ideational preference for autonomy and chose neutrality over alliance during the Cold War, it is not surprising that India is once again pursuing an autonomous foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. Yet, what this chapter reveals is how

the structural shift into unipolarity has made India's foreign policy to be much more flexible than it was during the Cold War when it pursued neutrality and increased its capabilities for an autonomous foreign policy.

As opposed to Cold War when India had to refrain from any type of military cooperation with the great powers which would hurt its neutral stand, in the post-Cold War period India has at times cooperated with the United States when doing so would also enhance India's security goal. India no longer faces the restraint of neutrality that was necessitated by the great power rivalry in the system. Moreover, the end of the Cold War has significantly increased India's capabilities for self-help. It is hard to imagine how India could establish a foreign military base or diversify its economic and military relations to this extent during the Cold War.

India's pursuit of autarky in the post-Cold War also reveals that while India may cooperate with the United States to counter a rising China, one should be highly critical of expecting this cooperation to look like a Cold War alliance such as Turkey's as.

Neither India's strong preference for autonomy nor the structural conditions that make alliance with a unipole unreliable as well as inadequate points in that direction.

Chapter 4

Middle East: Continuity or Transformation?

This chapter will analyse Turkey's foreign policy in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods to see what motivates Turkey's security behaviour and especially whether we can observe a shift in its security strategy with the end of the Cold War. In doing so, it will answer two interrelated questions: 1) Is Turkey balancing, bandwagoning or pursuing autarky in the post-Cold War period? 2) What is Turkey's security goal as a rising regional power in the post-Cold War era? Is Turkey's regional activism a sign of its desire for regional domination or is Turkey acting with a concern for regional stability?

Taking first question first, how would one know Turkey's strategy under a given structure? In other words, what counts as balancing, bandwagoning or autarky? This has been argued in this thesis that in order to determine Turkey's security strategy, there is need to look at Turkey's pattern of policy choices over time within a structure as opposed to instances of Turkey's policies. If Turkey is balancing against or bandwagoning with the United States, vast majority of Turkey's policies should be in one direction since these strategies presuppose a certain orientation towards the United States. If Turkey is balancing the United States, for example, one should observe Turkey consistently giving support to the United States' opponent or withholding support from the United States to constrain or impose costs on the United States. If Turkey is bandwagoning, then Turkey will align its security policy with that of the United States and consistently acting according to the United States' security preferences and demands.

If Turkey is pursuing autarky, Turkey's policies should be mixed and nondirectional in contrast to balancing and bandwagoning. A deep look on Turkey's foreign policy suggests that sometimes cooperating and sometimes non-cooperating with the United States' security policies. It should be evaluating its cooperation with the United States case by case, based on its own self-interest. At the same time, we should observe Turkey taking pro-active steps to reduce its security dependence on the United States over time.

4.1 The Argument

The end of the Cold War dramatically changed Turkey's security environment by not only removing the Soviet threat, but also increasing its concerns for its regional security. Turkey no longer thinks that its Cold War alliance with the United States which protected from the Soviet Union as well as safeguarded it from regional conflicts is adequate or reliable for addressing Turkey's security concerns.

First, concerns of regional instability resulting from U.S. interventions are a serious security concern for Turkey in the post-Cold War era. Lacking a great power rival, not only the United States is freer than it has been to intervene in the region, but there is also no other great power to contain the spill-over effects of its intervention. As such, negative spill-over effects of United States' policies that can threaten Turkey's internal stability and economic goals loom large in Turkey's security thinking. Moreover, during the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union used to restrain their respective allies to not to be pulled into a direct confrontation. Yet, this same dynamic is no longer valid in the post-Cold War era. As such, allying with and outsourcing its regional security to the United States does not guarantee Turkey's regional security as it did during the Cold War. Secondly, Turkey doubts how reliable

an ally the United States can be when the main threat – the Soviet Union – which motivated the alliance is no longer present. As a result, Turkey is taking steps to reduce its security dependence on the United States by moving towards indigenous military production, diversifying its military procurement, establishing foreign military bases and attempting to locate itself as a diplomatic counterweight to the United States in the Middle East. At the same time, it is increasingly following an autarkical foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.

We can observe Turkey's autarkical strategy in the post-Cold War era in its sometimes cooperative and sometimes non-cooperative behaviour vis-à-vis the United States' security policies. While Turkey participated in NATO-led operations in Kosova as well as Libya and seems to be cooperating with the United States against the Assad regime in Syria, it denied the United States the use of it bases for the 2003 War in Iraq, pursued friendly relations with both Iran and Syria at the time when the United States designated these states as sponsors of terrorism, signed a gas deal with Iran despite U.S. sanctions and pursued an alternative diplomatic route from the United States' preferred policies that emphasized sanctions and a possibility of regime change to deal with Iran's nuclear program.

This autarkical foreign policy stands in sharp contrast to Turkey's Cold War foreign policy. When Turkey closely allied with the United States during the Cold War, Turkey consistently cooperated with the United States in its security policies even when those policies could potentially harm Turkey. Turkey's willingness to cooperate was so evident that at times the United States did not even bother to consult Turkey in security issues that directly interested Turkey. In the post-Cold War period, that acquiescence is no longer the reality of the Turkish-American relationship.

When one look into when Turkey cooperates or does not cooperate with the United States in the post-Cold War, we can also see that Turkey is acting according to logic of regional stability over regional domination. When U.S. policies are likely to lead to regional instability, even if they would weaken Turkey's regional rivals, Turkey has withheld support from the United States. Turkey views regional stability as the path to maximize its power, willing to forego relative gains it can potentially make vis-à-vis its rivals for the goal of regional stability.

4.2 Why Turkey?

Turkey and Iran are the two countries that have the potential to bid for regional hegemony in the Middle East based on their relative economic and military capabilities vis-à-vis other states in the region. Turkey currently has the largest share of the GDP based on PPP among the major powers in the region. Moreover, based on its strategic geopolitical location – bordering Europe, Persian Gulf, the former Soviet Union and the Mediterranean, Aegean and Black Sear along with its control of the Straits, it is a regional power which has historically been significant for great powers. Not only Turkey was an important part of the United States' policy of containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the United States has sought Turkey's support in many regional security issues and conflicts since the end of the Cold War. As such, understanding Turkey's foreign policy and why it might or might not support U.S. security goals has important policy implications. Moreover, Turkey is a useful case to demonstrate how the theory of regional power politics developed in this project fares vis-à-vis alternative theories on how states are likely to behave under unipolarity. Scholars who write on unipolarity, especially after Turkey's decision to deny the United States the use of its military base for the 2003 Iraq War, frequently cite Turkey to support their arguments that states will balance against or

bandwagon with the United States (Pape, Soft Balancing against the United States, Summer 2005, pp. 39-41)[48] (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008)[49]. Yet, most of these works lack an overall analysis of the Turkish foreign policy and are based on snapshots. As opposed to this literature that look at instances of Turkey's foreign policy to advance arguments on Turkey's security strategy, this chapter will analyse Turkey's pattern of policy choices during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods to determine Turkey's security strategy and whether this can be concluded that policies are shifting with the structural change into unipolarity.

4.3 Structural Shift into Unipolarity and Turkey's Security Strategy: From Alliance to Autarky

Is Turkey balancing, bandwagoning or pursuing autarky in the post-Cold War era? If and how did the end of the Cold War and the structural shift into unipolarity impact Turkey's security environment and consequently its security strategy? In order to answer these questions, it is being needed to first discuss Turkey's threat environment and its foreign policy during the Cold War. Then, an analysis of Turkey's foreign policy in the post-Cold War period will be needed to see whether this can observe a shift in its pattern of foreign policy choices with the structural change into unipolarity.

4.3.1 Soviet Threat and Turkish-American Alliance during the Cold War

During the Cold War, Turkey viewed the Soviet Union as the main threat to its security and this fear was not unfounded. As soon as World War II ended, the Soviet Union announced that it would not renew the friendship treaty the two states had signed in 1925, demanded a revision of

[48] For the use of Turkish case to make the argument for soft balancing.
[49] For the use of Turkey as a case for why states are not balancing against the United States as well as the general argument why other states are likely to bandwagon with the United States under unipolarity.

the Montreux agreement – asking for Soviet bases in the Straits – and made territorial demands on two Turkish provinces bordering Georgia (Kirisci, 2001, p. 118). Considering that the Soviet Union was a great power that bordered Turkey and these demands were taking place at a time when the Soviet Union was establishing communist satellite governments in Eastern Europe, it is not hard to understand why Turkey perceived the Soviet Union as such a threat to its territorial integrity. Facing the Soviet threat and lacking the capabilities to deter that threat on its own, Turkey had no real choice, but to ally with the United States. For the United States, on the other hand, Turkey was a valuable ally. Early on during the Cold War, the United States viewed Turkey along with Iran, Iraq and Pakistan as the states which "are most keenly aware of the threats of Soviet Russia and which are located geographically in the way of possible aggression" (Internal Memorandum for the National Security Council, "United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East NSC 1551/1", 2017) and should be selected for American military aid. When the United States announced the Monroe Doctrine which promised substantial aid to Greece and Turkey, it clearly signalled its willingness to contain a Soviet advance into Turkey.

The fact that Turkey sat over the Straits of Bosphorous and the Dardanelles that constitute the major Soviet sea outlet to the world was an important reason for the United States' desire to have Turkey firmly located in the Western camp. It was within this context of mutual interest that the U.S.-Turkish alliance formed when Turkey joined the NATO in 1952. The United States quickly established military bases in Turkey, stationed thousands of military personnel in the bases and set up electronic installations along the Black Sea to gain information from the Soviet Union. Turkey's alliance with the United States was a double-edged sword. In one respect, Turkey was able to outsource its security to the United States. This enabled Turkey to

pursue strict regional isolationism and remain aloof from the conflicts in its region. On the other hand, the alliance made Turkey highly dependent on the United States, limiting its ability for an autarkical foreign policy during the Cold War.

Turkey felt it had to comply with U.S. demands and support American policies in return for security guarantees against the Soviet threat. If we look at Turkey's pattern of foreign policy choices over the entire period of the Cold War – from its swift contribution to the Korean War in 1950 to the full support it gave to the United States in the 1991 Iraq War, Turkey consistently cooperated with the United States in its security policies. Turkey's willingness to back American policies was so obvious that one U.S. General testifying before the Congress in 1952 stated that "I know dollar for dollar you are getting more in Turkey than you are any place else in the world" (Rustow, Fall 1979, pp. 85-86). As such, the United States took Turkey's acquiesce in its security policies granted during the Cold War. This led the United States, at times, not even bother to consult Turkey in security issues that directly concerned Turkey and that could even potentially endanger Turkey's security (Costigliola, Spring 1995, pp. 105-123)[50].

For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis – one of the most intense points during the Cold War that could have brought the United States and the Soviet Union into direct confrontation –, the United States struck a deal with the Soviet Union to trade the Jupiter missiles in Turkey with those in Cuba to resolve the crisis despite knowing that Turkey would strongly resent such an act (Finletter, 1962) (Hare, 1962). It neither consulted nor informed Turkey of its decision during the process. Even after the deal was made, President Kennedy told the U.S. Ambassador

[50] In fact, this was a rather common practice of the United States vis-à-vis its allies during the Cold War that the United States did not bother to consult its Western European allies at times.

to Turkey not to disclose to the Turkish authorities that the removal of the Jupiter missiles was part of any deal with the Russians (Kuniholm, Turkey's Jupiter Missiles and the U.S. Turkish Relationship, 1999, p. 123).

On a same pattern Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved and that the United States chose not to employ military means. However, at the time, this was not certain, see (Allison & Zelikow, 1999)[51]. If the United States had decided to invade Cuba or strike the missile sites in Cuba, the Soviet Union could have retaliated by targeting the missiles in Turkey. Of course, this is a counterfactual and one cannot conclude what could have happened under such a scenario. Yet, it attests to the fact during such a significant crisis that directly interested Turkey and even potentially could make Turkey vulnerable, Turkey had no say in it.

Yet, the Cuban Missile Crisis was not the only time the United States did not consult Turkey on a policy that directly involved Turkey's security. During the Lebanese civil war in 1958, the United States used the Turkish bases to support its intervention in Lebanon without consulting the Turkish authorities. American forces were dispatched to Turkey's Incirlik base in haste and permission from the Turkish authorities was not even sought (Harris, 1972, p. 67). For Turkey that wished to isolate itself from regional conflicts, United States' use of its base for a conflict in the region was highly problematic. It could implicate Turkey and endanger its efforts to remain aloof from the regional wars.

Turkey certainly resented such acts of non-consultation in issues that directly interested Turkey's security (Kuniholm, Turkey's Jupiter Missiles and the U.S. Turkish Relationship,

[51] For the different policy options considered by the United States.

1999, p. 126)[52]. At times, it tried to stand up for its own vision of foreign policy that highly prioritized remaining neutral in regional conflicts.[53] In 1969, for example, the Turkish government would come out and publicly state that "joint bases could not serve for operations to interfere in the internal affairs of another country" (Harris, 1972, p. 166). In the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, Turkey would let the United States use only the communication stations in Turkey, not permitting its bases to be used for refuelling or supply activities for the 1967 war or for direct combat or logistical support in the 1973 war (Kuniholm, Turkey and the West, Spring 1991, p. 40). Yet, it is important to realize that the United States was not a combatant participant in either of these wars. As such, it was not as if the United States militarily needed to use the bases and Turkey opposed. When the 1991 Iraq War came and the United States needed the Turkish bases for the military intervention in Iraq, Turkey would once again acquiesce to U.S. demands despite the fact Turkey would come to suffer serious economic and security consequences as a result of its participation in the war.

What limited Turkey's ability to say "no" to the United States' demands during the Cold War was the Soviet threat it faced, especially in the early decades of the Cold War, and the increasing dependence the alliance created. The United States knew too well that Turkey desperately needed its protection against the Soviet threat and was highly dependent on it. As a result, the United States could easily use the Soviet card for Turkey's compliance. For example, when the United States was concerned about the possibility of a unilateral Turkish intervention into Cyprus, President Johnson would threaten Turkey that under such circumstances the

[52] Years later when the Turkish-American relationship would go sour with Turkey's dealings with Cyprus, Turkish Prime Minister Inonu would complain that the United States had made a bargain with the Soviets without any consultation with Turkey.
[53] Turkey remained neutral in all regional conflicts – 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Iran during the Cold War.

NATO may not "protect Turkey against the Soviet threat" (Johnson & Inonu, Summer 1966, pp. 386-93)[54].

It is often argued that the bipolar structure of the Cold War was in fact beneficial for weak states as they were able to play one great power against another to get benefits in return, see (Handel, 1981) for this argument. Yet, for states like Turkey that viewed one or the other great power as a direct threat to their territorial integrity, this was not a realistic option during the Cold War.[55] U.S. Ambassador to Turkey at the time succinctly summarized this reality of the U.S.- Turkish alliance in his statement, "Despite all the reservations, most Turks believe that Turkey has no realistic alternative but to rely on the NATO umbrella to protect it against unpredictable Soviet pressures (Komer)".

Thus, Turkey remained heavily dependent on the United States, unable to risk the U.S. security guarantees against the Soviet threat. Consequently, except Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 when Turkey defied the United States' warnings[56], there was almost no instance of Turkey's opposition to U.S. military/security demands and Turkey closely cooperated with the United States in its security policies throughout the Cold War in return for American security guarantees and favours of aid.

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[54] For the text of the Johnson letter and Inonu's reply to the letter.

[55] There were certainly times Turkey tried to warm up its relations with the Soviet Union to get more security assurances and economic/military assistance from the United States. In the early 1960s, official visits between Turkey and the Soviet Union were exchanged when the U.S.-Turkish relationship had rough patches. Most importantly, when the United States imposed an embargo on Turkey after Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus, Turkey responded by increasing its contact with the Soviet Union which resulted in the signing of the Soviet-Turkish Agreement of 1978 that affirmed friendly relations between the two states. Yet, with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Turkey would again fear the Soviet Union.

[56] It is important to note that even Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus cannot be categorized as "Turkey acting against the United States' security interest" since there was no direct U.S. policy vis-à-vis Cyprus. It was more like Turkey doing its own thing on an issue that did not involve U.S. security policy.

While this dependency created discontent at times, it also enabled Turkey to outsource its regional security to the United States throughout the Cold War by relying on the United States' security commitments. Considering the high level of domestic turmoil Turkey went through in this period which resulted in three military coups and the increasing Kurdish insurgency it faced, the alliance provided Turkey the benefit of regional isolationism so that it could focus on its internal problems. Turkey was also rewarded generously for the support it gave to the United States. During the Cold War, Turkey became the third largest recipient of U.S. economic aid after Israel and Egypt.

It is important to note that even if Turkey wished to play a more regionally active role, there was not much space for Turkey to do without getting involved in the Cold War dynamics. In fact, in the early 1950s when Turkey attempted to play an active role within the region and intimidated Iraq and Syria due to their Soviet leaning regimes, (Sever, April 1998, pp. 80-85) the United States strongly warned Turkey against any unilateral action, worried Turkey's threatening acts could possibly lead to a Soviet-US confrontation (Sever, April 1998, pp. 82, 84-85). Learning its lesson, Turkey kept itself isolated from the region until the end of the Cold War.

Yet, with the end of the Cold War, Turkey's security environment significantly changed and this, necessarily led Turkey to re-evaluate its security strategy which impacted the nature of the U.S.-Turkish security relationship as well as its involvement in the politics of the region.

4.3.2 Post-Cold War Era and Turkey's Pursuit of Autarky

The end of the Cold War significantly altered Turkey's security environment by removing the Soviet threat. For the first time in its history, Turkey did not face a great power threat. The only great power in the system, the United States was Turkey's close ally during the Cold War and Turkey had no reason to perceive the United States as a direct threat to its security. This new security environment impacted Turkey's security thinking in two significant ways: creating doubts on how reliable an ally the United States can be in the post-Cold War era and the increasing concerns for spill-over effects of the United States' intervention in the region now the United States was no longer restrained by another great power.

The end of the Cold War created great level of uncertainty on the reliability of the United States' security commitments. The United States began to dismantle some of its military bases in Turkey right after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Even though this move was partly welcomed for domestic political reasons since bases were often seen as sign of dependence, it was also perceived as a decrease in the U.S. security commitments (Kirisci, 2001, p. 119). Turkish policymakers, unsure what the United States' grand strategy would be, worried whether Turkey would continue to be a strategic partner for the United States. In fact, this was one of the main reasons why the Turkish President Ozal, despite high level of domestic opposition to Turkey's participation in the 1991 Iraq War, decided Turkey should fully take its place next to the United States in the war. Ozal thought Turkey's cooperation with the United States would "demonstrate that Turkey was still of great political significance" (Brown, March 2007, p. 95) and as such, a valuable ally to the United States in the post-Cold War era. It was within this context of early post-Cold War fear that Turkey was losing the United States' security commitments Ozal made the decision to lead Turkey into the war. At that point, Turkey was still

operating within the Cold War framework and Ozal thought Turkey had no choice but to cooperate with the United States in its security policies.

Yet, Turkey paid a heavy price for its involvement in the 1991 Iraq war. It suffered severe economic losses due to cutting off its trade with Iraq as a result of the sanctions – estimates vary from nine to thirty billion dollars –, faced a massive refugee problem as half a million Iraqi Kurds fled to Turkey during and after the war and confronted increased terrorism from PKK, the Kurdish insurgent group operating in Turkey since 1980s, see (Hale, Oct 1992, pp. 687-93) (Nachmani, 1999) (Brown, March 2007)[57]. These negative economic and security externalities Turkey faced after the 1991 Iraq war led Turkey realize early on that the alliance with the United States was no longer the optimum choice for Turkey's regional security.

After all, the United States, lacking a rival that dictates and balances its policies in the region, has been less restricted than before to intervene as well as non-intervene as it pleases. For example, during the Cold War one can hardly imagine the United States to be able to invade Iraq as it did in 2003. This lack of constraints on the United States in the post-Cold War era naturally has increased Turkey's concerns for the spill-over effects of the United States' interventions in the region in addition to its worries that the United States may no longer be a reliable security guarantor. As such, Turkey has been slowly shifting away from its Cold War regional outlook that viewed cooperation with the United States as necessary and adequate for its regional security and is increasingly pursuing Autarky. One can observe Turkey's pursuit of Autarky in its autonomous foreign policy as well as in its attempts to reduce its dependence on the United States over time.

[57] For the detrimental effects of the First Gulf War on Turkey. Even though Turkey was compensated by the United States for its losses through economic and military assistance, it was much less than what Turkey expected for its contribution.

Compared to Turkey's foreign policy during the Cold War when Turkey consistently cooperated with the United States' security policies, Turkey's pattern of foreign policy choices in the post-Cold War era looks strikingly different. Turkey remained part of NATO, participated in U.S.-led NATO operations in Kosova and Libya, partially supported the 2001 War in Afghanistan (contributing to NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in non-combat role) and seems to be cooperating with the United States in Syria against the Assad regime. Yet, Turkey has at times pursued policies against the United States' preferred security policies as well. For example, one week after the US Congress passed actions on investing in Iran's energy sector in 1996, Turkey signed a 20 billion dollar gas deal with Iran. Despite United States' objections to back down from the deal, see (Kinnander, January 2010)[58], Turkey did not acquiesce and went ahead with the gas contract.[59] It pursued friendly relations with both Iran and Syria at the time when the United States designated these states as sponsors of terrorism. It opposed the 2003 War on Iraq and denied the United States the use of its bases. In 2010, Turkey tried to broker a deal with Iran on its nuclear program – the Tehran Declaration – and vetoed the U.N. sanctions that the United States was trying to impose on Iran.

As can be seen in Turkey's foreign policy choices in the post-Cold War era, Turkey is neither consistently opposing the United States' policies nor consistently acting according to the United States' security preferences. One cannot observe Turkey having a specific orientation towards its relationship with the United States such that the United States can assume that Turkey will most likely support its policies or oppose its policies. In contrast, Turkey is acting autonomously and deciding when to support/not to support the United States' policies on a case-by-case basis

[58] For the details of the deal.
[59] There was no sanctions imposed Turkey due to gap that existed in the 1995 US Iran Sanctions Act. At the end, Turkey was importing the gas from Turkmenistan that would only pass through Iran.

according to its own self-interest. At the same time, Turkey is taking pro-active steps to reduce its dependence on the United States so that it can increase its capability for an autonomous foreign policy. We can observe this effort in three moves Turkey has made since the end of the Cold War: regional activism, indigenous military production and diversification of military procurement.

As opposed to Turkey's strict regional isolationism during the Cold War, Turkey is pursuing an increasingly active regional policy in the post-Cold War era. As one scholar put, "Turkey has begun to rediscover the Middle East." (Larrabee, July/August 2007, pp. 103-114) Taking advantage of the removal of the great power rivalry in the region and the increased operational space this has created, Turkey is pursuing closer relationship with the states in the region. As such, Turkey is trying to establish itself as a regionally preeminent state through active engagement in the politics of the region.

In the early 1990s, for example, Turkey initiated a relationship with Iran, its main regional rival, trying to include it regional organizations such as Regional Cooperation and Development. (Candar & Fuller, Winter 2011, p. 32) It signed an energy deal with Iran despite U.S. sanctions and attempted to broker a deal on Iran's nuclear program to prevent U.S. sanctions. At the same time, it took steps to improve its historically bitter relationship with Syria, leading to the signing of the "High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council Agreement" in 2009 which ended visa requirements between the two countries and established yearly meetings. The fact that Syrian President al-Assad's visit to Turkey in January 2005 was the first ever trip by a Syrian president to Turkey in the history of Syria demonstrates what a shift this rapprochement between Turkey and Syria was. Of course, this warming of the relations ended with the Syrian uprising in which

the Turkish government took a position against the Assad regime and called for his removal. Apart from Iran and Syria, Turkey signed free trade agreements with Jordan, Israel and Palestinian Authority. Most significantly, it is increasingly taking a more active stance towards Palestinian grievances, moving away from its historically neutral position in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.[60]

Through this active engagement with the states in the Middle East, Turkey is trying to position itself as a diplomatic alternative to the United States in the management of the region, especially in the resolution of the conflicts in the region. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's "Zero Problems with Neighbours" foreign policy framework which states that "Turkey has a vision for the Middle East and this vision encompasses the entire region" see (Davutoglu, 2010)[61]clearly points to such effort. This has inevitably put Turkey at odds with some of the U.S. policies in the region. Turkey's efforts to build ties with Iran and Syria at the time the United States designated these states as sponsors of terrorism, Turkey's economic engagement with Iran despite U.S. sanctions on Iran or Turkey's insistence on diplomacy over sanctions or use of military force to deal with Iran's nuclear program are some examples to this. This autarkical regional policy stands in sharp contrast to Turkey's Cold War regional policy when, as one historian of Turkish politics put, "Turkey championed the cause of the West whenever she could... and came to be seen as the West's surrogate in the region." (Ahmad, 1994, p. 119)

Some attribute this shift in Turkey's foreign policy, especially its regional activism to normative and domestic factors. According to this view, the Islamic turn in Turkish politics is what had led Turkey to turn towards the Middle East and identify itself more closely with the region, away

[60] It is important to note that strategic military cooperation between Israel and Turkey still continues despite Turkey's more vocal stand for Palestinian grievances.
[61]For the layout of the policy.

from its traditionally Western-looking national identity, see (Kosebalaban, 2011) (Cornell, Winter 2012, pp. 13-24)[62]. As such, the coming to power of the Islamic-oriented AKP in 2002 is seen as critical for Turkish foreign policy's direction. The religious tone of the Turkish President Erdogan's speeches in which he calls upon the "Muslim brothers/sisters in the region," and identifies with the larger Muslim community, the increasingly pro-Palestinian stance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the government's support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt all seem to point in the direction that the domestic shift in Turkish politics is leading to a more active foreign policy in the Middle East. Yet, attributing this to domestic politics is not only historically inaccurate but cannot explain the foreign policy on the ground.

First, Turkey's involvement in regional politics did not begin with the AKP administration. In fact, the most critical turn happened right after the end of the Cold War when Turkey decided to take an active part in the First Gulf War in 1991. It was really in the 1990s – before the election of AKP – Turkey began to get more involved in regional politics. It was during this time, Turkey initiated a relationship with Iran, trying to include it regional organizations and signed a gas deal with Iran despite U.S. sanctions. Turkey's regionally active policy not only towards the Middle East, but also the former Soviet republic had much to do with the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the increased operational space the end of the Cold War brought enabled as well as necessitated regional powers like Turkey to play a larger role in the politics of their region.

Secondly, despite the Islamic rhetoric of the current administration, the actual foreign policy on the ground has been more nuanced. When Turkey deemed necessary, it has not refrained from

[62] For how different ideologies shaped Turkish foreign policy and how the Islamic ideology is currently doing so.

going to war against another predominantly Sunni state as in Turkey's 2011 NATO-led operation for the removal of Qaddafi from power. In Syria, when revolts against the Assad regime began and the spillover effects of the instability in Syria caused concerns, the administration has quickly shifted gears in its relations with Syria and asked for Western military action against the Assad regime. As such, it is hard to say that ideological concerns ave trumped the strategic ones in Turkey's behaviour towards the region. This does not mean that AKP's Islamic worldview does not have any influence in Turkish foreign policy. There have been times when strategic and ideological concerns both played a role and moved in the same direction as in AKP's opposition to the 2003 Iraq War. Yet, it is more accurate to state that when strategic concerns clashed with the ideological ones as in Libya or Syria, Turkey acted according to its strategic concerns.

Turkey's regional activism should be seen as a broader part of Turkey's pursuit of autarky as Turkey has also made domestic military production and diversification of its military procurement essential features of its security policy since the end of the Cold War. Indigenous military production was a goal Turkey first entertained after the 1974 U.S. imposition of an arm embargo as a result of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Turkey, though, did not have the economic resources necessary to build a capable military industry back then. However, taking advantage of its rising economic status, Turkey has adopted a policy in 2004 to build an extensive local defence industry, invest in research and development projects to boost Turkey's indigenous military production and increase its arms exports. (Kemal, 2011) As part of its 2007-2011 Strategic Plan, for example, the Undersecretariat of Defence Industries – the regulatory body established in 1985 for devising and implementing Turkey's defence policies – targeted 50 percent domestic supply for Turkish Armed Forces. Accordingly, the domestic ratio of military

supplies has increased from 25 percent in 2003 to 52.1 percent in 2010. (Domestic Defense Firms Join Together, 2011) Turkey currently manufactures part of its defense equipment such as helicopters, training aircraft and missile guidance systems and is developing its first national drone system – the ANKA. (Bekdil, 2013)

Aside from initiatives to expand local defence production and arms exports, Turkey seems to desire to diversify its military procurement. Turkey's September 2013 decision to award the construction of its first long-range air and anti-missile system to a Chinese company is a testament to that fact. From the Turkish perspective, it was not only price, but the Chinese company's offer of technology transfer and joint production was what had led Turkey to award the deal to the company. (Toksabay, 2013) Even though Turkey seems to be backing from the deal and the final decision is not yet made, the decision's controversial nature cannot be underestimated. Turkey's choice of a Chinese arms maker over the rival French-Italian and US companies was a big shock for the NATO countries. The decision was not only criticized for the fact that the Chinese company was on the U.S. list of companies that are sanctioned under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Non-proliferation Act, but also for the inoperability aspect with the NATO assets in Turkey. Yet, Turkey stood behind its decision after sharp criticism from the NATO countries, arguing that the system could be integrated.

As we can see from Turkey's more autonomous foreign policy and its attempts to reduce its security dependence on the United States over time, Turkey is increasingly pursuing autarky in the post-Cold War era. The question that needs to be answered is whether Turkey, as a rising regional power, pursuing autarky for regional hegemony or stability. In other words, what is Turkey's security goal? In the next section, this will be examined that when Turkey has

cooperated and not cooperated with the United States' security policies in the post-Cold War era and for what reason, so we can see Turkey is acting according to the logic of regional stability over regional domination.

4.4 Turkey's Security Goal: Pursuit of Autarky for Regional Stability or Regional Domination?

Turkey, along with other rising regional powers like China, India, Iran, Brazil, etc., is often seen as a state bidding for regional hegemony now the Cold War is over, taking advantage of the removal of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry from the regions of the world that limited these states' roles in their regions, see (Mearsheimer J. , 2001)[63]. Analyzing Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era with this conceptual lens of regional hegemony has gained great traction, especially due to Turkey's active regional engagement, and this is not surprising. (Mufti, May 2011)[64] After all, Turkey already has a history of being a great power as the Ottoman Empire and its desire to become one has appeared in Turkish politicians' worldviews from time to time. None illustrates this aspiration better than the Turkish President Celal Bayar's words in 1957 when he stated Turkey was working to imitate the United States so that it could become "little America" one day. (Mufti, May 2011) Current President Erdogan's speech in his party's Fourth General Congress where he vowed to make Turkey "a great nation, a great power" (Fradkin & Libby, March/April 2013, p. 41) and one of the top ten economies in the world by 2023 certainly point to the fact Turkey, as a rising state, strongly desires to become a great power. Yet, the question is whether Turkey sees emulating American style regional hegemony as the path to become a great power. If regional dominance is Turkey's security goal, we should be

[63] For a detailed discussion on why states pursue regional hegemony.
[64] For the argument that Turkey is pursuing regional hegemony.

able to observe Turkey taking advantage of the opportunities for making relative gains vis-à-vis its rivals and even cooperating with the United States when doing so would weaken Turkey's rivals or increase its influence in the region. Yet, when we look at when Turkey supported some U.S. policies and not others in the post-Cold War era and why, we can see that Turkey's concerns for regional stability is what is driving Turkey's sometimes non-cooperative behaviour with the United States. When U.S. policies are likely to disturb regional stability, Turkey has withheld support even though the U.S. policies would weaken Turkey's regional rivals. On the other hand, when no risk to regional stability exists, Turkey has backed U.S. policies. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey has willingly cooperated with the United States in the NATO-led operations in Libya and Kosova and seems to be collaborating with the United States in arming the anti-Assad groups in Syria. For Turkey, participating in the wars on Kosova and Libya, due to these states' geographical distance from Turkey, carried no risk of creating negative security externalities. In the case of Syria, on the other hand, uprising against the Assad regime had created instability that had already resulted in negative spill-over effects for Turkey such as high number of Syrian refugees that fled to Turkey[65], fighting close to Turkey's border with Syria as well as potential Kurdish uprising in Syria that can strengthen Kurdish insurgency in Turkey. As such, Turkey's cooperation with the United States in arming the opposition in Syria was an outcome of an already existing threat to Turkey's internal stability.

On the other hand, when we look at the two cases when Turkey did not cooperate with the United States' security policies – 2003 Iraq War and the sanction on Iran's nuclear development program, concerns of regional instability was what drove Turkey's decision to oppose the United States. 2003 Iraq War and Turkey As well known, Turkey opposed the 2003 Iraq War

[65] Currently, the number of Syrian refugees that fled to Turkey is over one million people. There is increasing concerns of internal stability resulting from discontent with the Syrian refugees.

and the Turkish parliament did not pass the resolution which would have enabled the United States use the Turkish bases in the war against Iraq. Turkey's decision surprised many, especially the United States. Turkey was a long-time ally of the United States and the United States assumed that Turkey would comply with its demand for the use of its bases.

Why Turkey opposed the use of its territory for the 2003 Iraq War has become a contentious debate –explanations ranging from the overwhelmingly anti-war Turkish public opinion, the inexperience of the AKP government in foreign affairs just having come to power a year ago, AKP's overestimation of its ability to hard-bargain with the United States for additional economic and military benefits to concerns of spill-over effects of the war. In the literature, Turkey's denial of the use of its bases for the Iraq War is often seen as a "near-miss" – that the resolution could have almost passed or that Turkey was dragging its feet to secure adequate payoffs for its involvement. (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008, pp. 86-7) After all, Turkey had given full support to the United States in the 1991 Iraq War. Consequently, Turkey's 2003 decision is seen as an anomaly that requires explanation.

From the perspective of Turkey's assumed interest in regional domination, the decision seems more puzzling since there were good reasons for Turkey to participate in the war. Turkish-Iraq relations were not one of perfect harmony prior to both Iraq wars – 1991 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War – and even worse before the 2003 War. The use of the water flowing from the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers was a major source of conflict between Turkey, Iraq and Syria; especially after Turkey's decision in 1975 to undertake the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP), a massive dam-building mission with extensive irrigation canals for increased flow of water.

(Bolukbasi, Summer 1993, pp. 9-32) (Turan, 2004, pp. 193-208)[66] Iraq, being the main user of water until then, had naturally reacted with anger to the project since it is believed that by the time GAP is completed – planned to be in 2017 – most of Tigris and Euphrates' water will flow to Turkey which have the potential to create severe water shortages in Iraq and Syria. Yet, the water issue did not face serious opposition from Iraq in the 1980s due to Iraq's involvement in a war with Iran which made Iraq dependent on Turkey as its only oil outlet (Syria had closed its border with Iraq and closed down the Iraqi oil pipelines in he early 1980s). (Carkoglu & Ender, Jan 2001, p. 59) Moreover, facing Kurdish separatism in the midst of its war with Iran, Iraq collaborated with Turkey on the Kurdish issue during the 1980s. The two states, for example, signed a security protocol in 1984 in which they agreed they could enter each other's territory up to five kilometers to track insurgents without prior consent. Yet, with the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq began to side with Syria on the water issue, voicing fierce opposition to Turkey's dam project. In addition, Iraq refused to renew the 1984 security protocol in 1990.[67] As such, Turkish-Iraqi relations were deteriorating prior to the First Gulf War.

In the 1990s, Turkey's relationship with Iraq was even more unstable. 1991 Gulf War had led to the creation of a safe haven for the Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq. This had increased the ability of the PKK to carry out operations against Turkey by utilizing this territory. Despite the fact Turkey no longer had the security protocol with Iraq to conduct operations against the Kurdish insurgents in Iraq, Turkey kept on entering into northern Iraq through several heavy-handed incursions in 1992, 1995 and 1997. (Keskin, November 2008, p. 62) In 1996, Turkey even considered establishing a security zone inside Iraq along the Iraqi-Turkish border to fight the

[66] For the conflict over Tigris and Euphrates Rivers' Water among Turkey, Iraq and Syria.
[67] It was Turkey that did not extend the duration of the protocol in 1998 after Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds. Yet, when Turkey changed course and wanted to renew the security protocol in 1990, this time it was Iraq that refused.

PKK, but backed down due to negative reaction from Iraq as well as the international community. (Sayari, Spring 1997, p. 47) Iraq, on the other hand, strongly opposing Turkey's incursions into Iraqi territory, applied to the United Nations Security Council several times claiming that Turkey was violating Iraq's sovereignty.

Considering Iraq and Turkey's conflict over water as well Turkey's concerns over the Kurdish zone in Iraq, Turkey had reasons to collaborate with the United States in the 2003 War. Turkey could have thought that it would have more control over a weakened Iraq and thus, increase its influence over the area. If Turkey's security goal is one of regional domination as some argue, this path could have made sense.

Yet, the negative spill-over effects of the war were a grave concern for Turkey. Turkey was worried about the possibility of a breakup of a Kurdish state out of Iraq and as such, highly desired Iraq to keep its unity. When the United States began to campaign to the Turkish government in early 2003 for its support for the upcoming war, Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish Prime Minister at the time, clearly stated in an interview that "we definitely don't want a military operation. Neither will we want to be in such an operation, but if such an operation is staged...we may be affected more this time (than in 1991)," (Brown, March 2007, p. 102) presenting the dominant view that the security consequences of this war would be even more detrimental to Turkey than the 1991 Iraq War.

After all, Turkey had paid a heavy price for its involvement in the 1991 Iraq War. Moreover, this time the United States had a much more extensive goal than when it went to war against Iraq in 1991. In the First Gulf War, the United States aimed to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and did not target regime change. The 2003 Iraq War, on the other hand, was a war for

changing the status quo in the region. From the start, the United States' objective was to remove Saddam Hussein from power. As such, greater level of uncertainty existed from Turkey's perspective regarding what would happen once the regime changes in Iraq and whether the Iraqi state would dissolve into different parts – especially if it would lead to a separate Kurdish state. Consequently, Turkey opposed the Iraq War and did not let the United States use its bases for the war. Concerns of negative economic and security externalities loomed larger than any potential relative gains Turkey could make in Iraq.

It is important to note even though the decision seems like a near-miss since the resolution failed by a slim margin in the parliament, it is not accurate to view it as such. If AKP's leadership really desired Turkey to participate in the war, it could have enforced its party members to vote in bloc which is quite common in Turkish parliamentary politics. Yet, AKP left its party members free to vote according to their individual preferences knowing that the resolution had a chance of not passing through the parliamentary voting as such. After all, there was intense political opposition prior to the First Gulf War as well – Turkey's Minister of Defense, Foreign Minister and Chief of Turkish General Staff resigned from their posts due to their objections to Turkey's participation in the war. Yet, Turkish President Ozal still led Turkey into the war, determined that Turkey's participation was necessary. As such, it is important to recognize that Turkey's 2003 decision very much reflects Turkey's unwillingness to participate in the war.

4.4.1 Turkey and the Iranian Nuclear Program

Of all the policies Turkey pursued in the post-Cold War era, the most puzzling one when viewed from the perspective of Turkey's desire for regional domination has been its relationship with

Iran, especially Turkey's 2010 effort to broker a deal with Iran on its nuclear program – The Tehran Declaration – and its veto of the U.N. sanctions that the United States was trying to impose on Iran. Iran has historically been Turkey's main rival and in the post-Cold War era is the only state in the region that has the economic and military might to compete with Turkey for regional dominance. As such, if there was one issue which Turkey should have closely aligned with the U.S. security policy, it should have been the Iranian nuclear program.

Yet, Turkey has consistently advocated diplomacy to deal with Iran as opposed to sanctions and the military option the United States has advocated until recently. At times, it has even downplayed Iran's nuclear ambitions. For example, when Turkish President Erdogan was asked why Turkey seemed not worried about Iran's nuclear ambitions, he replied, "Our Iranian colleagues tell us that they want nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to satisfy their energy needs, not for weapons."[68] What lies beneath Turkey's approach to Iran's nuclear program? Why is Turkey intent on the United States to use diplomacy with Iran as opposed to imposing sanctions or using military force?

Turkish Foreign Ministry's official document after the 2010 Tehran deal provides an insight into Turkey's thinking regarding Iran's nuclear program. The document makes the point that "Turkey could well incur the biggest damage as a result of the sanctions or through the use of force against Iran."49 Then, it refers to the adverse economic and political consequences Turkey suffered in the 1990s as a result of the sanctions against Iraq for why Turkey favors diplomacy over sanctions or any military action in dealing with Iran's nuclear program.

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[68] Quoted in Mustafa Kibaroglu and Baris Caglar, "Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey," Middle East Policy V.15, N.4 (Winter 2008), p.65.
49 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Iran's Nuclear Program: The Turkish Perspective (June 2010).

What the document makes clear is that Turkey's thinking is centred on the economic/security consequences Turkey would face as a result of sanctions or use of military force against Iran. Turkey has significant bilateral trade with Iran – in excess of 10 billion dollars – and Iran is a source of cheap oil and gas for energy deficient Turkey. Moreover, sharing a border with Iran, any war with Iran is likely to have severe spill-over effects for Turkey. Iran, just like Iraq, has a significant Kurdish population and Turkey has accused Iran several times for giving logistical support to PKK. As such, instability in Iran is likely to cause similar problems for Turkey as instability in Iraq. Considering these factors, it is understandable why Turkey highly prefers diplomacy to deal with Iran's nuclear program. Most importantly, what this reveals is that Turkey cannot afford to think in terms of relative gains even though Iran is Turkey's main regional rival. For Turkey, strengthening itself through increased trade and minimizing spill-over effects of regional instability takes precedence over weakening Iran.

This should not conclude one to think that Turkey does not fear a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran is certainly a serious security concern for Turkey. It may not only embolden Iran in its regional ambitions, but can potentially destabilize the region through making the Israeli-Iranian relationship even worse than it is now, inviting a show-down between the two states. Turkish President Gul has clearly stated that "Turkey does not want to see any neighbouring country possess nuclear weapons. Turkey will not accept a neighbouring country possessing weapons not possessed by Turkey herself. We are not underestimating this matter in any way." (Tepperman, Jan/Feb 2013) Yet, Turkey prefers diplomacy to deal with the issue due to negative externalities sanctions or the military option may create. Of course, the fact that Turkey still

hosts U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory helps to lower Turkey's fear of nuclear Iran.[69] However, one should recognize that Turkey's position on Iranian nuclear program is consistent with its security thinking that views instability in the region as harmful for its economic development and internal stability.

The two cases – Turkey's opposition to the 2003 Iraq War and its policy towards Iranian nuclear program – reveal that Turkey highly prefers stability in the region. If Turkey were acting according to the logic of regional domination, it had good reasons to see its neighbours weakened so that it can make relative gains vis-à-vis them. However, Turkey made its foreign policy choice based on its concerns for regional stability. This, though, does not mean that Turkey is impervious to power politics and does not care about the balance of power in the region. Yet, as this project argues, Turkey faces constraints as most other non-great power states due to its internal development/stability issues. As such, it cannot afford to think in terms of regional domination. Both cases also reveal that Turkey's opposition to U.S. policies did not stem from a desire to balance the United States in the classical sense, such as constraining or imposing costs on the United States. What motivated Turkey's opposition was its own self-interest in regional stability.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, through a cross-structural analysis of Turkey's foreign policy, this has been examined that the structural shift into unipolarity necessitated and enabled Turkey to move away from its alliance with the United States and increasingly pursue autarky. As such, Turkey's pattern of foreign policy choices during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods exhibit a sharp

[69] U.S. nuclear umbrella was extended to Turkey with a 1959 NATO Summit decision.

contrast. During the Cold War, Turkey consistently cooperated with the United States' security policies and the United States was able to take Turkey's acquiescence granted. The United States at times did not even bother to consult Turkey on issues that directly interested Turkey or could make Turkey vulnerable. In the post-Cold War period, on the other hand, that acquiesce is no longer the reality of the U.S.-Turkish security relationship. We see Turkey sometimes cooperating and sometimes non-cooperating with the United States' security policies. Unlike the Cold War, Turkey is acting autonomously and deciding when to support or not to support American policies on a case-by-case basis. At the same time, it is taking steps to reduce its security dependence on the United States.

Ironically, though, the United States has not yet grasped this changing reality of the U.S.-Turkish relationship. The United States was quite surprised when Turkey denied the use of its bases for the 2003 Iraq War. It was again taken aback by Turkey's decision to award the construction of its anti-missile system to a Chinese company sanctioned by the United States. As Sinirlioglu, Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey noted, "the United States knew that the Chinese company was one of the companies bidding for the deal and there was no prior warning against choosing the Chinese. Only after the decision was made, the United States and the other NATO members complained. This shows they were taking Turkey's choice for granted." (Sinirlioğlu', 2015)

However, as this chapter demonstrated, as opposed to arguments that highlight the domestic Islamic shift in Turkish politics, the end of the Cold War significantly altered Turkey's security environment and this has led to a change in Turkey's attitude towards its relationship with the

United States. Consequently, the United States can no longer take Turkey's compliance granted as it was in the habit of doing so during the Cold War.

Chapter 5

Extension: Explaining Japan Relations with Unipole

At the end of the Cold War, Japan stood as the second economically most powerful state in the system after the United States. In 1991, it had more than ten percent of the world GDP, was the leading net creditor nation and the highest donor of foreign aid. Japan's economic strength stimulated the discussion of the "rise of Japan" in the 1980s and 1990s just as scholars and policymakers today debate the "rise of China." Yet, Japan witnessed a striking fall in its economic strength. In two decades after the end of the Cold War, Japan is not only a declining regional power, but also faces two rising powers – India and China – in its region.

5.1 Japan: A More Willing Ally under Unipolarity

In this section, Japan's foreign policy will be analysed in the post-Cold War era to see whether the developed theory that expects declining 2nd tier states to pursue alliance with the sole great power under unipolarity holds true for the Japanese case. In order to see whether Japan is allying with the United States since the end of the Cold War, This project will look at Japan's pattern of foreign policy choices over time (as it did for Turkey and India in the previous chapters) to determine Japan's security strategy. If the theory grounded in project is correct, Japan's security strategy in the post-Cold War era, as a declining power, should look different than rising regional powers that have incentive to pursue autarky in the unipolar period. As such, we should observe Japan aligning its security policy with that of the United States and closely cooperating with the United States' security policies. Consequently, vast majority of Japan's policies should be in one direction – in favour of the United States – as opposed to a strategy of autarky where we should see Japan's policies to be mixed and non-directional.

5.2 Summary of the Argument

In the post-Cold War era, we observe Japan closely cooperating with the United States' security policies and militarily participating in its alliance with the United States more than it used to during the Cold War. For the first time since World War II, Japan sent its Self-defence Forces (SDF) overseas to support the United States in 2001 War in Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq War. At the same time, in July 2014, Japan approved a reinterpretation of its pacifist constitution that will allow Japan to participate in "collective self-defence", paving the way for the Japanese military to use force alongside other states, especially the United States.

These moves Japan made in the post-Cold War era constitute a significant departure from Japan's attitude towards its alliance with the United States as well as its outlook to security matters during the Cold War. Even though Japan was a close ally of the United States and significantly contributed to the United States' war-fighting abilities during the Cold War by offering unconditional access to its bases and economically participating in the alliance, it tried to remain aloof from security issues and despite the U.S. pressure to take a more active military role in the alliance, displayed high level of reluctance to contribute to its own self-defence as well as militarily support the U.S. wars. This shift in Japan's willingness to remilitarize in the post-Cold War era and take a more active role in its alliance with the United States by offering increased military support can be best explained by the structural shift into unipolarity which has created great level of uncertainty on the United States' security commitments from Japan's perspective as well as Japan's declining regional stature. During the Cold War, Japan, knowing that it occupied a significant place in the United States' effort to counterbalance the Soviet Union, had strong confidence in the United States' security commitments. As such, Japan could

outsource its regional security to the United States and focus on other goals, especially the goal of economic growth, remaining disengaged from regional security matters. Yet, with the end of the Cold War, Japan can no longer afford to stay aloof from its regional security by relying on the United States. Consequently, we observe not only Japan taking steps to remilitarize to deter its regional peers but also becoming a more active ally to the United States by increasing its support for the wars the United States is involved in – even when no direct security interest of Japan is present such as the 2001 War in Afghanistan or the 2003 Iraq War –. After all, Japan is a declining state in its region that faces an increasingly stronger rival, China. Lacking the capabilities to deter China on its own, Japan is more than ever willing to stand behind the United States to win its favour.

In this project, the thesis argument that highlights the precedence of systemic and regional structural factors to explain Japan's foreign policy during the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods is in contrast to alternative arguments that prioritize domestic and normative factors such as Japan's civilian control over its military and especially its anti-militarist norms to understand and predict Japan's foreign policy. It demonstrate in this project that that even during the Cold War when it is commonly thought that Japan adopted a comprehensive concept of security that emphasized economic development and political stability over military understanding of national security and embraced and institutionalized pacifism, Japan was still very much engaged in strategic military thinking as can be seen in its realist attitude even towards nuclear weapons that is so often considered a "taboo" in Japan. As such, one cannot underestimate the structural conditions that made militarization a choice, rather than a necessity, for Japan until the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, when structural conditions changed – facing a rising regional rival coupled with increased uncertainties regarding U.S.

security commitments, so has Japan's foreign policy. Japan has increasingly loosened the internal restraints on militarization despite domestic opposition and anti-militarist norms have begun to wane. This necessarily casts doubts on the primacy of domestic and normative factors in understanding Japan's security behavior.

5.3 Why Japan?

Japan is a 2nd tier state that has the most strikingly declining trajectory in its region in the post-Cold War era. Even though Russia faced a sharp decline in the 1990s and Germany is slowly declining vis-à-vis its peers in the last decade, Japan's decline vis-à-vis its peers in its region is sharpest. Japan's relative share of the total economy of the region's 2nd tier states has declined from over 50 present in the 1980s to less than 20 present by 2012 and this decline has been continuous over the last three decades. What has been even more worrying for Japan is the rising trajectory of its main rival – China – in this period. Considering Japan's declining trajectory, it is a significant case to see how 2nd tier states under these circumstances are likely to behave, what strategy they will pursue in a unipolar world.

Secondly, Japanese case is an interesting one for the fact that it was a rising regional power – most often seen as the next competitor to the United States – towards the end of the Cold War and looking into Japanese case in detail can illuminate how rising regional powers under a bipolar system as opposed to a unipolar one may behave differently. We can see how rising powers under different structures may face strikingly different opportunities and constraints. As it will show, even though Japan had become the second largest economy in the system by the end of the Cold War, it continued to focus on economic and technological advancement as opposed to militarization, kept its close alliance with the United States, preferring to outsource

its regional security to its great power ally. In other words, Japan's behavior when it was a rising regional power during the Cold War is much different than Turkey's, India's or China's in the post-Cold War era.

Lastly, Japan is an especially significant case to see whether structural factors outweigh normative/domestic ones for regional powers' security strategies. Japan is often used as a primary example in arguments that rely on normative, cultural or domestic explanations for states' construction of their national security policies (Katzenstein P. J., Cultural Norms and National Security, 1996), (Katzenstein & Okawara, Spring 1993). It has become commonplace to talk about "Japan's uniqueness" in terms of its culture, not only viewed by others as such but also by the Japanese themselves (Pilling, 2014). From Japan's model of economic development to its unique cultural norms, Japan is frequently seen as a state that can be best understood by looking inside the state. As such, for my theory that highlights the structural constraints as the most determining factor to understand states' security strategies, Japan constitutes a critical case.

5.4 "Golden Age" of Debating Japan – Literature on Japan in the 1980s and 1990s

Due to its rising economic trajectory in the 1980s (Heginbotham & Samuels, p. 178), Japan's foreign policy was intensely debated during the 1980s and the early years of the post-Cold War world. Most of the literature in this period assumed that Japan was likely to be the next competitor to the United States. Paul Kennedy, for example, in his famous book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, expecting the decline of the United States, argued that Japan was about to emerge as the next great power in the early twenty-first century and take its place in international leadership (Kennedy, 1989 , pp. 458-471). Kenneth Waltz suggested that "Japan

will receive the mantle (of a great power) if only it will reach for it." (Waltz K. N., Autumn 1993, p. 55) Chalmers Johnson predicted that "by the late 1990s it (Japan) will become a fully-fledged major power." (Johnson C. , Fall 1992, p. 6) As such, the main debate around Japan revolved around the issue of Japan militarizing and becoming a great power competitor to the United States. Some argued that Japan was inevitably move away from its alliance with the United States, re-militarize and even possibly get nuclear weapons (Waltz K. N., Autumn 1993, pp. 66-69) (Waltz K. N., Structural Realism after the Cold War, Summer 2000). Some even went further and suggested that the system was highly likely to witness a war between the United States and the rising Japan (Friedman & Lebard, New York). Others, on the other hand, pointed out that the normative and domestic constraints will constrain Japan to build up its military even though Japan has the wherewithal to do so (Katzenstein P. J., Cultural Norms and National Security, 1996) (Katzenstein & Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies, Spring 1993).

Yet, as it will show, these works on Japan that flourished in the 1980s and 1990s failed to predict future course of Japan's foreign policy. Neither did Japan militarize and behave like a great power in formation when it was rising economically nor refused to militarize when the structural conditions necessitated. Obviously, the biggest fallacy resulted from the assumption in these works that Japan's rising trajectory would continue. Contrary to expectations, Japan's relative economic standing within its region sharply fell.[70] The quick shifts in relative power among regional powers are in fact more common than realized. Secondly and most importantly, existing works applied theories of great power politics to understand Japan's foreign policy. As such, they expected Japan to behave like a great power when it was rising – move away from its

[70] In light of Japan's fate, scholars have in fact been more careful when discussing China's rise, recognizing that China's continuous economic growth cannot be taken for granted.

alliance with the United States, militarize and compete with the United States. Yet, as it will show, Japan continued to rely on the U.S. security commitments and acted with a concern for regional stability – especially in its relationship with its main rival, China – from 1970s to 1990s despite its economic rise. As it has been argued argue in this project, what is often not recognized is that these states cannot afford to behave as if they will eventually become a great power even if they are economically growing at an impressive rate. Those who argued that Japan's civilian control over its military and its widespread antimilitarist norms would prevent Japan to militarize also underestimated the power of structural forces. As it will show next, when the structural conditions – both systemically and regionally – changed so that Japan began to doubt U.S. security commitments and face a rising regional rival, so did Japan's reluctance on building its defence.

5.5 Structural Shift into Unipolarity and Japan's Security Strategy

In this section, it will first discuss Japan's foreign policy and the nature of its alliance with the United States during the Cold War to see if and how Japan's security environment and its strategy changed in the post-Cold War period.

5.5.1 Japanese-American Alliance during the Cold War

Japan's alliance with the United States did not form on a voluntary basis like some other U.S. alliances with regional powers such as the one with Turkey as it described in Chapter 4. As a defeated and occupied state by the United States at the end of World War II (Dower, 1999)[71], Japan did not have a choice for non-alliance. Its alliance with the United States was imposed

[71] U.S. occupation of Japan lasted from 1945 to 1952.

upon Japan and being an occupied state, Japan initially bowed to many of the U.S. demands. One can clearly see this in the nature of the 1947 U.S. drafted Japanese constitution that prohibited any type of Japanese rearmament as well as the asymmetric security treaty Japan and the United States signed in 1951. The treaty not only granted the United States military bases in Japan but also "gave the United States the right to intervene to quell domestic disorder in Japan, the right to project military power from bases in Japan against a third country without consulting Japan and indefinite time period for the treaty." (Pyle, 2007, p. 234) As such, the United States treated defeated Japan as a dependent, not a sovereign state capable of autarkical foreign policy.

Yet, after the occupation ended and Japan rebuilt its strength as the Cold War progressed, it still chose to remain a close ally of the United States. The Soviet threat Japan faced – the two states had fought in 1904-5 as well as during World War II and had disputed territory between them (Kuril and South Sakhalin Islands which, to this day, Japan disputes Russia's sovereignty over them) – was certainly a crucial factor in Japan's decision to maintain its alliance with the United States even after the end of the occupation (Lind, Summer 2004).[72] East Asia was a sub-region in which the Soviet-U.S competition was the fiercest after Europe and Japan, being a critical state in this region, was not a state that would be ignored by either great power. Under this security environment, Japan's decision to closely ally with the United States made strategic sense. Moreover, the alliance not only protected Japan from the Soviet threat, but enabled Japan to pull all its resources to rebuild its economy that was devastated by World War II by outsourcing its regional security to the United States. Japan, unlike some other regional powers

[72] In the early years of the Cold War, the fact that Japan was occupied by the United States certainly made it secure against the Soviet threat. The Soviet Union could not have afforded to act in a threatening manner to Japan. Yet, in the 1970s, after the Soviet-China split and the resulting rapprochement of China with the United States, the Soviet Union began to behave in a more aggressive manner towards Japan. The Soviet Union, being fearful of a closer alliance of Japan with both China and the United States and its weakened relative power in the region, made several threats to Japan. s.

like Turkey that tried to build its military strength while allying with a great power, chose to focus almost exclusively on its goal of economic recovery and militarily fully depend on U.S. security commitments. Japan's refusal to build up its own defence forces and militarily contribute to the alliance, though, became major issues of dispute between Japan and the United States throughout the Cold War.

Japan's initial demilitarization was, in fact, imposed on Japan by the United States. When the United States occupied Japan at the end of WWII, U.S. strategic thinking was centered on preventing Japan become a military threat again. In U.S. General Douglas MacArthur's words, the goal was to make Japan the "Switzerland of the Orient." (Kawashima, 2005, p. 25) In the early years of occupation, it was not yet clear what the U.S. grand strategy on Asia would be – how long the occupation of Japan would last and whether the United States had an interest in long-term security commitments to the region – in contrast to Europe which both the United States the Soviet Union recognized the region's strategic significance for their competition early on. In other words, the Cold War had not arrived in Asia yet and the drafting of the Japanese constitution such that Japan could no longer become a military power made sense from the U.S. perspective.

The Chinese communist revolution in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, though, quickly changed the U.S. strategic thinking on East Asia and Japan came to be viewed as a critical state for the United States to maintain the balance of power in the region. One can clearly see the increasing importance of Japan for the United States in the U.S. Secretary of State Dulles' statement at the time, "The future of the world depends largely on whether the Soviet Union will be able to get control over West Germany and Japan by means short of

war...The world balance of power would be profoundly altered." (Pyle K. N., 2007, p. 228) In this new strategic outlook, Japan's demilitarization naturally posed a problem for the U.S. calculations. Japan's military weakness increasingly was seen as vulnerability against a possible Soviet advance. Consequently, the United States altered its policy and insisted on Japan to remilitarize.

In 1954, Japan and the United States signed the Mutual Security Assistance agreement which acknowledged that "Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense." (Pyle K. N., 2007, p. 235) Japan, after signing the treaty, initially complied with the U.S. wishes by building its Self-Defence Forces in 1954, comprised of ground, maritime and air forces with a total of 152,000 men, though still less than half of what the United States had asked for the size of Japanese forces. Yet, throughout the Cold War, despite the consistent U.S. pressure on Japan to strengthen its Self-Defence forces, Japan declined to do so and instead, chose to rely on the U.S. security commitments. It continually invoked the Article 9 of its U.S. drafted constitution, which stated:

"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized,"

and put forward convenient arguments that Japan remaining demilitarized served the U.S. interests since remilitarization could create domestic social problems and make Japan vulnerable to communism, instill fear amongst Japan's neighbors as well as divert resources from its

economic recovery. (Pyle K. B., 2007, pp. 229-230)[73] On top of its reluctance to build up its own defense, Japan also declined to militarily participate in the wars the United States was involved in, most significantly in the Vietnam War. While Japan offered its bases, it did not deploy any military forces unlike the United States' other Asian ally, South Korea that fought in Vietnam alongside the Untied States with more than 300,000 troops.

Japan's refusal to arm, though, was a strategic move from its perspective and was highly enabled by the Cold War dynamics of the time. Some view Japanese foreign policy in this period a form of "mercantile realism" (Heginbotham & Samuels) or "buckpassing" (Lind, Summer 2004) through which Japan could invest in its rise while relying on the U.S. security commitments. After all, Japan was highly aware of its significance for the United States' containment policy of the Soviet Union in the region. It knew that the United States could not afford to lose Japan to the Soviet Union and would come to its defence if needed. In the 1960 treaty the two countries signed, the United States had committed itself to defend Japan if it came under attack and as a result of the secret agreement between the two states, tactical and strategic nuclear weapons were placed in Okinawa. As such, even though the Soviet Union constituted a serious security concern for Japan, Japan was fairly confident that it could rely on the U.S. security guarantees and could avoid investing in building a strong military. Based on this thinking, Japan kept its defence expenditures around 1 present of its GDP throughout the Cold War[74] despite its increasingly growing economy and continually balked at U.S. demands for building a strong military force. Instead, it focused on its goal of economic and technological

[73] Japan's refusal to build its defense came to be known as the "Yoshida Doctrine" named after the Prime Minister of Japan during the early years after WWII.

[74] One percent of Japan's GDP was not small in the latter years of the Cold War, considering Japan's growing economy at the time. Yet, it was still less than what the United States demanded from Japan and did not lead to much increased military capabilities.

advancement. When U.S. pressures to militarize increased in the 1970s, Japanese solution was an an economic one – Japan agreeing to pay for some of the costs of maintaining U.S. bases in Japan.

What is especially important to note is that Japan's reluctance to militarize and play a larger role in the security affairs in its region continued even when it began to economically grow at an impressive rate from the 1970s to 1990s. As Katzenstein put, "Japan experienced substantial changes in its relative standing in the international system without great changes in its policy for national security." (Katzenstein P. J., Cultural Norms and National Security, 1996, p. 24) Japan, despite its rising trajectory, continued to act with a concern for regional stability, defying expectations of those who viewed Japan as a great power in being and assumed that Japan was increasingly going to play an aggressive role within its region.

Japan, through its first officially announced foreign policy doctrine in 1977, the "Fukuda Doctrine", for example, declared that it had no desire to play a military role in the region despite its economic and technological capabilities to re-arm. (Haddad, 1980) (Yano) In this doctrine, Japan highlighted a vision of deeper economic and diplomatic engagement with the states in East and Southeast Asia as opposed to a military one. It was within this foreign policy outlook that Japan took also initiatives to improve its relations with China, taking advantage of the rapprochement between the United States and China after the SinoSoviet split. In 1978, signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China and pursued a policy of economic engagement – through government loans for development assistance and increased trade – for maintaining stable relations with China. (Pyle K. B., 2007) (Green, 1999)

Japan's vision of increased engagement with the states in the region when it was economically growing with remarkable pace might, at a first glance, seem as masking Japan's desire for a form of regional hegemony at the time. Yet, it would be a mistake to view it as such for two reasons. First, Japan's move for increased economic and diplomatic engagement with the region did not take place along with a plan for remilitarization. Japan not only was still reluctant to arm, but also continued to remain aloof from the security affairs in the region. Secondly, one cannot highlight enough the fact that Japan's economic rise was taking place within the bipolar Cold War order in which there was intense great power competition. As such, Japan's ability to play a larger role in its region was severely restricted. As some noted, the Fukuda Doctrine, despite Japan's ambitions for a more prominent standing in its region, had limited success at the end. (Sudo, Spring 1988) After all, one should not underestimate the fact that the Soviet Union was still a significant threat for Japan and especially after the Sino-Soviet split and fearful of its relative decline in the region, the Soviet Union was acting in a more aggressive manner towards Japan. (Lind, Summer 2004, pp. 106-109) Under these circumstances, Japan to play a significant role within its region was naturally constrained.

Japan's disengagement from regional and international security affairs – Japan had declared that its Self-Defense forces would not be deployed abroad and it would not participate in any collective defense agreement – and its almost exclusive focus on economic goals during the entire period of the Cold War is often seen as a sign of Japan's internalization of an anti-militarist outlook to interstate relations, a demonstration of its unique understanding of security that emphasizes economic, technological and political aspects over military ones as well as its domestic structure that has high civilian control over the military. (Katzenstein & Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies, Spring 1993) The fact that Japan

witnessed a devastating defeat as well as became subject to atomic bombing during World War II is viewed as critical for discrediting militarism in Japanese public and as well as elite foreign policy thinking. Moreover, how this anti-militarism has been institutionalized by creating a strong civilian control of the military, according to the proponents of this view, highly limit Japan's militarization and make the norm more stable across time. (Katzenstein P. J., Cultural Norms and National Security, 1996) For example, as opposed to its World War II domestic structure in which the military had strong influence in national security policy making, post-World War II Japan has limited military's role by restricting Japan Defence Agency's (JDA) autonomy. For example, four of the JDA's top bureaucratic seats are reserved for officials from other ministries and as such, other ministries especially Ministry of Finance and Ministry of International Trade and Industry have significant influence in security policy making, such as defence budget, SDF size, etc.

Yet, Japan's efforts in the last decade to build up its defence and provide support for the U.S. wars as it will show in the next section already casts doubts on this approach to understanding Japanese foreign policy. Moreover, this view overlooks how Japan viewed non-militarization not necessarily as a long-term policy during the Cold War, but more as an economically sound path for the "time being" when it could conveniently rely on the U.S. security commitments. One can clearly see this Japanese strategic thinking in Prime Minister Yoshida's words, "The day (for rearmament) will come naturally when our livelihood recovers. It may sound devious, but let the Americans handle (our security) until then" (Pyle K. B., 2007, p. 230) or in his half-joking comment, "Just as the United States was once a colony of Great Britain but is now the stronger of the two, if Japan becomes a colony of the United States, it will also eventually become the stronger." (Pyle K. B., 2007, pp. 227-8) Interestingly, a closer look into Japan's

attitude even towards nuclear weapons during the Cold War reveals that Japan, at times, entertained much realist approach to international security affairs than assumed by those who argue that Japan mostly embraced a unique, non-military understanding of security.

If Japan had really internalized pacifism to such an extent and adopted an understanding of security that was unique in its emphasis on economic/technologic, advancement and political stability rather than military goals, its attitude towards nuclear weapons during the Cold War should also reflect this. After all, those that emphasize Japan's non-military conceptualization of national security often use Japan's strong nonnuclear stature to support their arguments. For example, according to Katzenstein who offers the most authoritative argument on Japan's distinct understanding of national security, "The Japanese public probably opposes nuclear weapons more strongly than the public in any other state… The three nonnuclear principles have been an integral part of Japan's national security." (Katzenstein P. J., Cultural Norms and National Security, 1996, p. 128) As such, he sees no prospect of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons. (Hughes)

At a first glance, Japan's stance towards nuclear weapons during the Cold War seems to reinforce the arguments on Japan's pacifism, its non-militaristic conceptualization of security. Despite China's first nuclear test in 1964, Japan declared its Three Non-Nuclear Principles in 1967 which were "not to make nuclear weapons, not to possess them, and not to bring them into Japan" (Katzenstein P. J., Cultural Norms and National Security, 1996, p. 128) and ratified the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1976. Japan did not build nuclear weapons even though Asia witnessed the highest level of nuclearization during the Cold War – Pakistan and India acquiring nuclear weapons alongside China and the already nuclear Soviet Union. Yet, when we

look closely into Japanese debate and policies on nuclear weapons at the time, it is hard to say that Japan did not at all entertain the idea of becoming nuclear.

When China conducted its nuclear tests in 1964, Japan's then Prime Minister Sato, in fact, told President Johnson that "if the Chicoms [Chinese Communists] had nuclear weapons, the Japanese should have them" (Hughes, p. 86) suggesting that there was no outright rejection of becoming nuclear. Within the political elite, there was divergence of opinion on acquiring nuclear weapons as well. While the Japanese left was vehemently against building nuclear weapons, those on the right, on the other hand, were hesitant to give up the nuclear option. According to the conservatives, nuclear weapons were a sign of rank in the international system and remaining non-nuclear would make Japan a second-class state. (Pyle K. B., 2007, p. 251)

The fact that Japanese Defense Bureau undertook a study between 1968 and 1970 to analyze the nuclear option and concluded that "developing a nuclear weapon would not be in the national interest" (Hughes, p. 76) also suggests that the Japanese government's thinking was not that removed from standard security calculations. An internal Japanese Foreign Ministry Document in 1969 which stated "For the time being, we will maintain the policy of not possessing nuclear weapons. However, regardless of joining the NPT or not, we will keep the economic and technical potential for the production of nuclear weapons, while seeing to it that Japan will not be interfered with in this regard" further demonstrates Japan did not wish to entirely give up the option of going nuclear for the future.

Of course, this is not to deny that Japanese public opinion, at the time, was heavily against nuclear weapons, often referred as Japanese "nuclear allergy" (Hook, September 1984), and this put constraints on the Japanese government. For example, the U.S. placement of nuclear

weapons in Okinawa was agreed upon by a secret deal between the two states, without informing the public, due to the concerns of negative reaction. Yet, it is also important to note that Japan by letting the United States place these weapons on its territory also broke one of its three non-nuclear policies during the Cold War, which was "bringing nuclear weapons into its territory." In other words, when deemed necessary, the Japanese government found a way to bypass the public opinion. Of course, at the end Japan decided to forego the nuclear option and rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella instead.

The fact that Japan did not outright reject the nuclear option and considered the costs/benefits of building nuclear weapons suggests that one should not overestimate the role of anti-militarism in Japan's refusal to militarize and strengthen its defence during the Cold War. Even on an issue as controversial and sensitive as nuclear weapons, not only the elite demonstrated divergence of opinion on the issue, but that Japan was very much involved in strategic calculations. Therefore, one should not overlook the role of the U.S. security blanket over Japan during the Cold War for Japan's ability to remain under-militarized and remain aloof from involvement in regional and international security affairs, exclusively focusing on economic/technological progress. As it will demonstrate in the next section, when the structural conditions changed, Japan's policies did as well.

5.6 Japan's Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

Japan's heavy focus on economic development during the Cold War, diverting most of its resources to building its economy by taking advantage of the U.S. security guarantees, had paid off. At the end of the Cold War, Japan's economy was the second largest in the system after the United States. Yet, what many observers had overlooked was Japan's decline was already under

way since the 1980s. Japan's relative share of the region's economy was decreasing slowly in the 1980s, even though the decline became much steeper in the 1990s and 2000s. Not only China's, but also India's economy surpassed Japan's. What has been even more worrisome for Japan is that its declining power trajectory over the last four decades does not seem to be reversing.

As such, early post-Cold War predictions that Japan is the most likely candidate to become the next competitor to the United States miserably failed. On the contrary, Japan suffered from a dooming fate in the post-Cold War era – economically declining rapidly while facing a regional rival, China, that is growing at an impressive rate. As such, while the end of the Cold War meant the removal of a Soviet threat for Japan, it also increased regional security concerns for Japan due to rising power of China. Considering Japan and China already have territorial disputes – Senkaku/Diaoyu islands[75] in East China Sea – and historical animosity – Chinese resentment over Japanese war crimes prior to and during WWII – China, without doubt, is a serious security concern for Japan. Under this altered regional security environment as well as systemic shift with the end of the Cold War that has created doubts on U.S. security commitments, we see Japanese foreign policy significantly, though slowly, shifting away from its Cold War foreign policy that insisted on remaining de-militarized and reluctant to militarily contribute to the United States' security policies.

In the post-Cold War era, we observe Japan not only more willing to support the United States in its security policies, but also taking steps to re-militarize and build up its defense. (Hughes C. W., 2009) Japan, for the first time since World War II, sent its Self-Defense Forces (SDF)

[75] These eight islands are known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu is China.

overseas to support the United States in 2001 War in Afghanistan, dispatching its navy to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support for the U.S.-led coalition. Again, when the United States invaded Iraq, Japan quickly passed legislation to send troops to help with Iraq's reconstruction and stationed its navy and air force for logistical support. This was an especially significant move for Japan since it constituted the first time it sent troops overseas without a U.S. mandate. Considering that Japan did not send its SDF for the 1991 Iraq War despite strong U.S. pressure and contributed only economically[76], sending its SDF to a more controversial war in 2003 highlights what a shift in Japan's foreign policy the decision was. Moreover, unlike the Afghanistan War which half of the Japanese public thought the war was justified, the public opinion was overwhelmingly against the 2003 Iraq War. (Midford, 2011, pp. 126-7) In other words, while this was an even more difficult decision for the Japanese government domestically, Japan still decided to show its support for the United States.

Japan's willingness to offer military support for both wars shows a remarkable shift from it Cold War foreign policy when Japan frequently invoked the Article 9 of its constitution to refrain from providing military support for the U.S. wars - as in Vietnam or the First Gulf War. For sure, Japan's military contribution for both the 2001 Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq Wars has been minimal and largely symbolic. As Heginbotham and Samuels point outs, during the 2003 War in Afghanistan, Japan "ended up contributing... much less than did Germany or Italy, which also have constitutions repudiating war." (Heginbotham & Samuels, p. 110) Yet, despite the small scale of Japan's involvement, one still should not deny the shift this signals. For a state that did

[76] The United States was so angered by Japan's refusal to send troops for the 1991 Iraq War that the U.S. House of Representatives approved a resolution to withdraw U.S. troops from Japan. Consequently, Japan provided economic support for the war

not send troops for any war overseas for decades, Japan's willingness to offer military support for both wars – even if minimal – cannot be underestimated and needs to be acknowledged.

Considering in neither war, especially in 2003 Iraq War, Japan did not have any serious security interest[77], Japan's behaviour can be best explained by its desire to strengthen its alliance with the United States for the security benefits it provides, considering the rough regional security environment Japan is under. This behaviour of regional powers is actually a quite common one when they face threats they cannot deter on their own and need to win the favour of their great power patrons. As it demonstrated earlier, Turkey's swift contribution to the Korean War in the early years of the Cold War, even though Turkey had no security interest, was one instance as such. This is especially common when these states have uncertainties regarding the great power commitments. During the Cold War, Japan was highly certain of the U.S. commitments for the defence of Japan as it laid out in the earlier section. Yet, since the end of the Cold War and the removal of the Soviet threat that has decreased Japan's strategic significance for the United States, Japan no longer has the same confidence. Tokyo Governor Shintaro's words, "I wonder how the U.S. will interpret its security treaty with Japan if our nation decides to confront China...?" (Arase, July/August 2007, p. 560)[78] clearly demonstrates Japan's doubts on the U.S. security guarantees in the post-Cold War period and there are good reasons for this. After all, the United States' behavior – the strategic priority it placed on the region – as well as its relationship with the states in the region has not been consistent.

[77] One can possibly argue, especially considering the wider international support, that Japan could see "combating terrorism" in its interest. After all, close to half of the Japanese public supported the Afghanistan War. However, participating in such alliance carries risks as the participants potentially become targets of terrorism.

[78] Shintaro is known to be a nationalist, known for his extremist views. Yet, Arase points out that "he is looking less extreme today ... because Japan has changed."

Right after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the United States declared its plan to reduce its presence in Asia. Even though it quickly reversed this decision and announced its plan to maintain its forward deployment in the region (Mastanduno, Spring 1997), the U.S. behaviour in the last decades has not been reassuring from Japan's perspective. In the 1990s, the United States' attempt to strengthen its relationship with China through engagement led to great level of anxiety in Japan. (Carpenter, Nov./Dec., 1998, p. 2) President Clinton's 1998 trip to China without stopping in Japan, for example, created concerns for the U.S. policy towards the region in Japan's eyes. (Carpenter, Nov./Dec., 1998, p. 6) Even though the Bush Administration's tougher stance on China and especially the current U.S. "pivot to Asia" has somewhat eased Japan's worries, one cannot ignore the fact that the United States was almost fully preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan Wars for more than a decade. When one takes into account the U.S. shifting of priorities in the post-Cold War era from one decade to another as well as its policies towards China in this period, why Japan can longer be as certain of the United States' commitment to Japan's defence as during the Cold War is not unjustified. When looked from this perspective, Japan's increasing willingness to support U.S. security policies as in the case of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars is not surprising.

As such, Japan is trying to strengthen its relationship with the United States more than ever in the long history of the alliance between the two countries. In the Defence Policy Review Initiative the two countries launched at the end of 2002 and completed in 2006, for example, Japan has radically enlarged the Cold War function of the alliance – defence of Japan and stability in East Asia – by assuming more global objectives and as such, potential U.S. use of the Japanese bases outside the region. (Katzenstein P. J., Japanese Security in Perspective, 2008, pp. 15-16) In the 2011 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee Meeting, marking the 50th year

of the alliance between the two states, the two countries agreed for further broadening of cooperation in many different areas such as "operational cooperation, including surveillance and reconnaissance, ballistic missile defense, extended deterrence, space, cyberspace, trilateral and multilateral cooperation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, information security, and cooperation in equipment and technology." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan)

Yet, of all the initiatives the Japan has taken in the post-Cold War era, Japanese Cabinets' approval of the reinterpretation of its pacifist constitution in July 2014 that will allow Japan to participate in "collective self-defense" is the most significant one. This paves the way for the SDF to be deployed overseas even when Japan itself is not under attack and as such, seriously undermines the infamous Article 9 of the constitution. Japan, by taking this step, has eased the decades-long restrictions on its participation in military conflicts. Consequently, Japan's ability to take a more active military role within its alliance with the United States has greatly increased.

Yet, apart from strengthening its alliance with the United States, Japan is also building up its military capabilities. While Japan's 2003 decision to get a U.S. missile defense system was an important one in this direction that also further increased U.S–Japan technological cooperation and reinforced the alliance, Japan's 2013 declaration of its Five-Year Defense Plan that calls for the highest defense spending since the end of the Cold War "to build a comprehensive defensive posture" (New York Times, 2013) is the most aggressive step Japan has taken since WWII to increase its military capabilities. Japan intends to acquire surveillance drones, fighter jets, naval destroyers and amphibious vehicles as part of the plan. At the same time, Japan is increasing its non-nuclear attack submarine force and F15J fighters which constitute Japan's already stronger

type of weapons. (National Interest, 2014) However, it is important to note that this vigorous Japanese military-build up is especially apparent in the last few years. For the rest of the post-Cold War era, Japan's defense spending was low, actually declining since 1994. (Katzenstein P. J., Japanese Security in Perspective, 2008, p. 19) Taking into account Japan's steep economic decline since the end of the Cold War, this is expected. However, China looming as a larger threat than ever, Japan's recent decision to bolster its defense spending despite its economic trajectory is not surprising.

Yet, for an economically declining state like Japan that is facing an increasingly powerful China in its region, Japan's attempts to militarize can only go so far and Japan is well aware of that. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' statement, "Under the increasingly severe security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, including North Korea's provocative behavior such as its nuclear and ballistic missile development programs and China's military build-up, the Japan-U.S. security arrangement are indispensable to the security of Japan and to the peace and stability of the region," (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan) clearly underlines the reality that Japan cannot afford rely on its own capabilities to deter China and desperately needs its alliance with the United States. This is why Japan is a more active U.S. ally in the post-Cold War era, willing to support U.S. security policies.

As we can see, Japan's post-Cold War foreign policy constitutes a significant departure from its Cold War one. When Japan had the assurance of the U.S. security commitments due to the Soviet threat which dictated U.S. interest in maintaining the balance of power in the region, Japan was able to almost free-ride on the U.S. alliance (at least militarily) and focus on economic goals. Japan resisted re-militarization and was an unwilling military partner in the

alliance. With the structural shift into unipolarity that has created uncertainties on U.S. determination to defend Japan combined with the regional configuration of power that put Japan at a severe disadvantage, we see Japan no longer able to maintain its resistance to build up its defence in the post-Cold War era. Considering the steps Japan is taking to remove the domestic restraints for a more active foreign policy, as long as the regional power dynamics does not change, Japan is likely to continue in this path. This is not to deny that this will be easy and quick for Japan that has lived with a passive foreign policy for decades.

Domestic and normative constraints for militarization and a more active foreign policy certainly exist in Japan. At the end of the Cold War, numerous scholars have indeed argued that Japan's strong civilian control over military, its pacifist norms and a more economic based conception of security will necessarily lead Japan's foreign policy not to significantly change from its Cold War one. Yet, when we look at the extent of the already occurring shift in Japanese foreign policy, it is necessary to question the conventional wisdom on domestic/normative explanations for understanding Japanese foreign policy.

For those who emphasize domestic and normative factors as more crucial for explaining Japan's foreign policy, Japan's recent shift in its foreign policy is mostly explained not by the structural shift, but the domestic changes that are occurring in Japan. According to Katzenstein, for example, the demise of the Japanese Left that has historically voiced the strongest opposition to Japan's active military role has enabled more nationalist, conservative voices to play an increasing role in Japan's foreign-policy making. (Katzenstein P. J., Japanese Security in Perspective, 2008) Moreover, he points out the role of the generational change Japan is undergoing which has necessarily led to questioning some long-held Japanese ideas of national

security. (Katzenstein P. J., Japanese Security in Perspective, 2008) After all, the fact that the current Prime Minister Abe is the first Japanese Prime Minister born after WWII already highlights the generational change that is occurring in Japan. However, the fact "support for an active foreign policy has been growing across age cohorts and older voters are more supportive of an active foreign policy" (Rosenbluth, Saito, & Zinn, July/August 2007, p. 596) suggests that the generational change might not be what is pushing the change in the public support.

One needs to question why more nationalist, conservative ideas are gaining prominence at the time when Japan is also facing an increasingly threatening security environment. In other words, it is more likely that when states face threatening security environments, ideas that are in favor of a militarized foreign policy also become more salient within the elite and/or the public. As such, the potential role Japan's regional security threat environment plays cannot be underestimated for why more nationalist ideas are gaining prominence as well as politicians who profess these ideas. After all, for ideas to be relevant, they need to be more or less in line with realities on the ground.

This, though, does not mean that domestic and normative factors are not significant in Japan's foreign policy formation. The slowness of Japan's adaptation to its security environment, difficulties Japanese government faces in revising its long-held pacifist constitution certainly attests to the presence of domestic/normative restraints on the Japanese foreign policy. Yet, one should also be aware that when deemed necessary, Japanese government has found ways to surpass these blocks as one can see in Japan's dispatch of SDF for the 2003 Iraq War despite overwhelming public opinion against the decision or the 2005 legislation that that "has given the prime minister and military commanders the power to mobilize military force in response to

missile attack without cabinet deliberation or parliament oversight."[79] After all, Japan is slowly lifting the domestic restraints for a more militarized national security policy and Japanese public sentiment is increasingly in support of it.

5.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, through a cross-structural analysis of Japanese foreign policy, it showed that the structural shift into unipolarity that has created doubts on the U.S. security commitments coupled with Japan's declining stature within its region has led Japan to move away from its Cold War reluctance to re-militarize and passive role in its alliance with the United States to taking steps to build up its defense and become a more willing ally to the United States. As opposed to rising regional powers like Turkey and India that discussed in the previous chapters which are increasingly pursuing an autarkical foreign policy, Japan as a declining regional power feels the need to move even closer to the United States.

The discussion of the Japanese case also demonstrated the weakness of two main strands of arguments on Japan's foreign policy: arguments that applied theories of great power politics and those that prioritized domestic and normative factors for understanding Japan's national security policy. Works that viewed Japan as great-power in being when it was rising economically not only assumed that this rise would continue, but quickly jumped to the prediction that Japan would begin to think/act like a great power, remilitarizing and acting in a more confrontational manner with the United States. Yet, as it showed in this chapter, Japan's economic rise did not translate into a more aggressive regional or international behavior, re-arming or moving away from its alliance with the United States. As developed theory expected, being a rising regional

[79] Peter J. Katzenstein, "Japanese Security in Perspective," in Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 15.

power within a bipolar order, Japan not only maintained its alliance with the United States facing still a Soviet threat, but also acted with a logic of regional stability as can be seen in Japan's Fukuda Doctrine.

Lastly, this chapter demonstrated that arguments that highlighted domestic and normative factors to explain Japan's security policy were unable to predict the shift in Japan's security with the end of the Cold War and the changing configuration of power within Asia. First, it highlighted that Japan was involved in militarist strategic thinking much more than assumed by those who emphasized Japan's anti-militarist culture as can be seen in Japan's attitude towards an issue as sensitive as nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Secondly, my analysis demonstrated that while norms and domestic factors do play a role in national security policy making, structural factors – the regional and systemic configuration of power – provide a better tool for understanding and predicting security strategies of states. When Japan's security environment changed such that Japan faced a rising rival and concerns of reliability of U.S. security guarantees increased so did Japan's reluctance to militarize despite expectations to the contrary by theorists that emphasized normative and domestic factors for Japan's security strategy. Most importantly, Japanese case also illuminates how structural factors also impact norms and domestic system in states. Japan's altered security environment not only is leading to a change in its security policy, but also in its domestic system such as the relaxing of its Article 9 of its constitution and most significantly, increasing public support for militarization which suggests how structural conditions also influence which norms take precedence in the public as well as the elite.

Chapter 6

Extension: Rise of China under Unipolarity

Of all the regional powers in the system, China has become the most-often discussed one due to its impressive economic growth in the last decades. While China is currently a regional power, lacking global power projection capabilities, China's rise had led scholars and policymakers to view China as the major power that has the highest chance of becoming a great power, the next competitor to the United States. As such, there are two questions related to China. The first one is a short term question which is how China today is likely to behave as a regional power. The second and more complicated one is on China in the long-term, if it continues to rise and becomes a potential peer competitor to the United States. How then China is likely to behave, how the United States will deal with China – whether it will accommodate and engage China or attempt to prevent its rise –, how successful it can be in preventing China's rise if it chooses to do so.

6.1 Unipolarity and Preventing the Rise of a Peer Competitor

In this chapter, it will be briefly discussed China's role as a regional power, today, from the perspective of developed theory. The main focus of the chapter, though, will be on presenting an extension of developed theory to examine China in the long term as a potential competitor and looking into what theory implies if and how a unipolar structure makes a difference for the potential peer competitor to rise and the reigning great power's ability to prevent it from rising.

While there is already a large body of literature on China's rise (Johnston, Spring 2003), existing works have overlooked if and how the unipolar structure might impact the

opportunities for a potential peer competitor to rise as well as the reigning great power to prevent its rise. In other words, scholars have not yet asked the question of whether a unipolar structure exhibits any difference from bipolar/multipolar structures on this issue. Yet, China's rise is taking place under a unipolar structure and it is necessary to consider whether and how this factor matters. Even though the theory developed in this project is one of regional powers under unipolarity but it will demonstrate that this theory has also implications for the dynamics between the potential peer competitor and the sole great power, particularly on the unipole's ability to form a counter-balancing coalition. The analysis from this perspective will show that while unipolarity provides encouraging conditions for the potential peer competitor to rise, for the reigning great power it offers the least favourable or at least costly environment to prevent this from happening when compared with bipolar/multipolar systems.

Considering that the current literature on China is heavily China-U.S. specific, taking a step back and looking into rise of China through a theoretical lens of a potential peer competitor and a reigning sole great power under unipolarity can help to provide a better picture of the structural opportunities/constraints for both actors.[80] This also can illuminate what aspects of China-U.S. relations are unique and what conditions are generalizable to other dyads.

Before going any further, it is first necessary for me to emphasize that it does not argue that unipolarity necessarily leads to rise of another potential peer competitor. (Waltz K. N., The Emerging Structure of International Politics, Autumn 1993) (Layne, Spring 1993) Unipolarity can very well be durable and last a long time. (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008) (Wohlforth, Summer 1999) After all, barriers to entry to the great power status are high and might have

[80] This is not to deny that any interaction between two states is not shaped at all by their internal characteristics, their past and existing relationship, their regional environment, etc. Yet, an abstraction at the structural level is necessary to see how the structure might play a role, independent of these factors.

even risen with time. (Mueller, 1989)[81] Historically, the number of states considered great powers has declined. Moreover, under unipolarity power capabilities necessary to become a great power may be more demanding than bipolar and multipolar systems. (Schweller R. L., 1999, p. 6) The unipole is likely to have larger share of the economic and military capabilities in the system than a great power in a multipolar system with five or more great powers for example. Yet, it is important to note that this difference might have less relevance when bipolar and unipolar structures are compared than multipolar and unipolar ones. After all, the United States had larger share of the economic capabilities in the system at the end of World War II than it has had since the end of the Cold War, though in military capabilities it certainly outpaces others in a striking way.

6.2 China Today – A Rising Regional Power under Unipolarity

Even though China currently has the second largest economy in the system and a powerful military, it not only lacks the global power projection capabilities that would make it count as a great power, a peer competitor to the United States, but also the economic strength – its GDP is still half that of the United States and when the two states are compared in terms of GDP per capita, the gap is even more striking. Moreover, today's China shares similar characteristics with many regional powers: uncertain power trajectory and internal stability/development problems.

[81] Nuclear weapons, increasing costs to war that make war among great powers less likely as well as nationalism that makes territorial expansion more difficult have limited states' ability to increase their territory for example which is one of the important ingredients of being a great power

While China has been growing at a high rate in the last two decades, the question remains whether it can sustain that growth rate in the future or that it will naturally slow down as its economy matures.[82]

In other words, its power trajectory is far from stable and economic development is still a major concern. At the same time, concerns of internal stability loom large for China. Infamous 1989 Tiananmen Square protests aside that already indicates how much the regime perceives itself vulnerable to domestic opposition and worries about its survival, evidence suggests that number of protests from various groups have increased significantly in the last decade. (Zhang, May 2014, p. 393)[83] As such, China highly worries about its internal stability. Therefore, China today, despite its impressive growth rate, should be thought as a rising regional power, albeit a powerful one for sure. Recognizing today's China as a regional power, The developed theory has two expectations. First, that China will act according to the logic of regional stability as opposed to regional domination. Second, it will pursue a strategy of autarky as a rising 2nd tier state. First it will briefly discuss why China's behaviour in the post-Cold War era is in line with the predictions of developed theory.

China's instances of behaviour in the post-Cold War era – from its passing of maritime territorial law in 1992 that affirmed China's "indisputable sovereignty" over the Spratlys, Paracel and Senkaku/Diaoyu islands that are disputed with other states in the region to conduct of military exercises and missile tests in 1995-1996 near Taiwan that led to a crisis between the

[82] IMF recently forecasted that China's economic growth will likely to slow down in the next decade.
[83] Zhang notes that "according to date publicized by the Chinese government, the number of so-called collective incidents (defined as public disruption or protest with participation of more than three persons) have increased from 9000 in 1993 to 100,000 in 2009.

United States and China (Ross, Fall 2000)[84] as well as its recent declaration of its own air defense zone, installation of an oil ring in contested waters in South China Sea near Vietnam's coast or increasing tensions with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands – are often seen as signs of its regional aggression and even a testament to China's desire for regional hegemony.

Yet, a more comprehensive look into China's regional behavior in the post-Cold War era casts doubt on this approach. While China has certainly taken aggressive stand towards some of its territorial claims and held an unwavering position against Taiwan's independence which is often seen as a critical place of potential conflict between the United States and China, overall post-Cold War Chinese foreign policy has been much more status-quo than recognized. (Johnston, Spring 2003) (Johnston, How New and Assertive is China's New Assertiveness?, Spring 2013) (Kristof, Nov./Dec. 1993)[85] Not only China has taken steps to build better relations with some of the states in its region after the end of the Cold War – for example, resumed diplomatic relations with Singapore in 1990, signed a Treaty of Friendship with Russia in 2001)[86], developed better relations with India , the fact that it has made more concessions than not in the territorial disputes it has with its neighbors (17 out of 23 disputes China made concessions) (Fravel, 2008) clearly signals that China feels that it has a strong interest in regional stability and good relations with the states in its region. Fravel's analysis of China's territorial concessions which demonstrates that concerns of internal stability was a major factor at the times when China offered concessions (Fravel, 2008), further suggests how its internal problems naturally limit China to adopt an expansionist outlook in its region. Actually, when

[84] For an excellent discussion of the context of China's display of such level of force in 1995-1996, especially how much uncertainty regarded whether the United States would react (China was much surprised at U.S. response)..
[85] For arguments on China as a status-quo state.,.
[86] While China-Russia Treaty is sometimes seen as a "balancing act" against the United States, one should recognize that China for long feared Soviet aggression. Building better relations with Russia for regional stability has been, in fact, an important part of China's post-Cold War foreign policy.

the Soviet Union broke down, one of China's biggest worries was possible instability in the former Soviet Republics that could spread and create instability within China, especially among its Muslim minorities. (Glaser B. S., March 1993, p. 254) In other words, even at the time when the Soviet Union disintegrated, China could not afford to think in terms of taking advantage of the power vacuum, but was highly concerned with potential spillover effects of instability. These worries, coupled with China's goal of economic development and growth which necessitate stability in the region, have motivated China to act in a status-quo manner since the end of the Cold War, despite its rising trajectory.

Moreover, one cannot underline enough the fact that China still has not accumulated the economic and military capabilities to compete with the United States and cannot afford to behave like a great power. China is well aware of its vulnerabilities against the United States. One can clearly see this in the event when China declared its own air-defense identification zone in the East China Sea in November 2013. Even though China stated that any foreign aircraft entering its zone should first identify itself, the United States quickly defied China's claim by flying two B-52 bombers in the zone without any notification. Yet, China kept low and did not escalate the tension. The incident demonstrates not only how the United States can treat China without caution, but also how China does not want to take up a conflict with the United States. In a similar occurrence between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, both sides would have behaved much differently – not only the United States would have been more wary to defy the Soviet claim that openly, but the Soviets would not have reacted as quietly as the way China did. In other words, currently the United States feels free to treat China not as a peer and China recognizes that it does not have the power to confront the United States. As such, China does not want to provoke the United States.

This does not mean that China could not act in an aggressive manner in a conflict in its region or is satisfied with the status-quo, especially the U.S. presence in the region that bolsters the capabilities of its regional rivals. The fact that China still has serious territorial disputes with states in the region is a warning sign for potential conflict and there are strategic reasons for why China will be highly unlikely to back down from some of its claims. Yet, viewing China's security goal as one of regional hegemony would be a mistake. China's post-Cold War foreign policy highly suggests that China is acting according to the logic of regional stability. With its worries of internal stability and economic development, China has a vested interest in stability in its region and its behaviour reflects that thinking.

As expected in developed theory, China is also pursuing autarky in the post-Cold War era, taking advantage of the operational space the end of the great power competition has created in the system. Not only China is vigorously building up its military strength and has established its first foreign military base in 2011 in Seychelles, but also diversifying its economic, diplomatic, and military relations with the states in the system. Even though scholars frequently look into China vis-à-vis its region in relation to whether China is or will be pursuing regional hegemony, what is often missed is how China has built extensive economic ties with states outside its region. For example, China has become the largest trading partner of Africa in the post-Cold War era (Brautigam, 2009) in addition to many states such as India, Brazil, Iran. The end of the Cold War has greatly enabled China to increase its presence in the system.

6.3 China in the Future - Potential Peer Competitor and the Sole Great Power under Unipolarity

In the previous section, It demonstrated that China, as a rising regional power, is acting with a concern for regional stability as opposed to regional domination. Yet, what worries scholars and policymakers is not China today, but China in the future if it continues to rise and becomes a potential peer competitor to the United States. In this section, it will be discussed what unipolarity means for the potential peer competitor and the reigning great power's ability to prevent its rise after demonstrating that it will highly likely to do so. The discussion will be mostly theoretical and this is especially justified considering we do not know what the future holds for China, whether China can continue to grow economically and accumulate the power to compete with the United States. Down the road, a state other than China can very well be the potential peer competitor to the United States.

6.3.1 Potential Peer Competitor under Unipolarity versus Bipolar/Multipolar Systems

As it has been argued in this project, 2nd tier states face a different security environment under a unipolar system as opposed to bipolar/multipolar systems. Under bipolar/multipolar systems in which great power competition exists, 2nd tier states are highly likely to face direct threats from great powers or indirect threats from great power competition in their region. As such, they are likely to pursue an alliance with a great power under these systems and even in cases where they do not face a great power threat and can pursue autarky, they have limited operational space within and outside their region.[87] This naturally limits their ability to expand, diversify their economic, diplomatic and military relations with other states. Consequently, even if a 2nd tier state is rising under these systems, they are likely to be highly dependent on

[87] In Chapter 3, it has been demonstrated how India, despite not facing a direct great power threat and being located in a region in which great power competition was limited, was still constrained in its pursuit of autarky. Only after the end of the Cold War and the removal of the great power blocs that India was able to diversify its economic, diplomatic and military relations.

one of the great powers and even if not, still severely restricted in forming ties alternative to those offered by the great powers. Their ability to expand is naturally constrained.

In contrast to bipolar/multipolar systems, regional powers under unipolarity – due to the fact they do not constitute security threats to the sole great power – are highly unlikely to face direct threats from the unipole and as such, have less incentive for an alliance with a great power. Moreover, as it demonstrated in this project, alliance pays reliance on the unipole by diversifying their economic relations and military procurement, developing indigenous military industry, establishing military bases as well as playing a more active role in their region. The fact that great power competition does not exist under unipolarity as in bipolar/multipolar system, the ability of the rising 2nd tier state to form links with states in and outside their region is enhanced.

As a result, a rising state in a unipolar system is not only less likely to be in alliance with the great power than in bipolar/multipolar systems, but that it has more chances to increase it presence within and outside its region. It is not a coincidence that more 2nd tier states – such India, Turkey, China – have established foreign military bases in the post-Cold War era and diversified their economic, diplomatic, and military relations compared to the bipolar Cold War era. As it discussed earlier, since the end of the Cold War China has greatly increased its presence in the system and become the largest trading partner of Africa. Even though Africa was not a region in which the great power competition was as intense as Europe or East Asia, great power competition in the region still existed, albeit more covertly. Under the Cold War dynamics, for China to have such presence in Africa would have been highly unlikely. 2nd tier states in systems which great power competition exist are likely to come face to face with great

powers and get in the midst of their competition if they increase their regional presence which they sure would like to avoid. Unipolarity, especially considering the unipole's "tendency to be distracted" (Walt S. M., January 2009, p. 99)[88] due to lack of a rival that disciplines its grand strategy/ behaviour and extension of its commitments, can create increased operational space for 2nd tier states less under unipolarity due to concerns of unipole's erratic behaviour in a state's region as well as the extension of its commitments which sends mixed signals to states in terms of its commitments to their security as well as its resolve to act. As such, rising regional powers are likely to pursue autarky under a unipolar system – reducing their without coming face to face with the great power. This can create opportunities for rising 2nd tier states to further their economic power and influence within and outside their region. This, though, does not suggest that a great power will necessary come out of one of the 2nd tier states. Many factors determine whether a state can potentially become a great power. What is important to take from this is two things: that the potential peer competitor under unipolarity has opportunities for expansion more than bipolar/multipolar systems – especially diversifying its economic, diplomatic and military relations in the system and that it is a state likely to be pursuing autarky rather than in alliance with the great power.[89] As it will demonstrate in the next section, both factors have significance in the ability of the unipole to prevent a potential peer competitor to rise, especially its economic rise.

[88] Walt makes this point that there is "a tendency of the unipole to be distracted by a wide array of foreign policy problems." According to him, this creates potential opportunities for other states to make relative gains vis-à-vis the great power such as the 2003 Iraq War enabling North Korea to advance its nuclear program or China to increase its influence in Asia.

[89] This can also have potential implications for possibility of conflict between the potential peer competitor and the reigning great power. States that are in alliance, due to history of close cooperation, are more likely to resolve their conflicts through peaceful means as they have enhanced information on each other. In other words, misperception might be less of a problem at times of conflict. On the other hand, when the two states do not have a history of strong cooperation through which states have better information on each other, potential conflicts among them can escalate due to misunderstanding.

6.3.1 Unipole and the Peer Competitor

The unipole is more than likely to aim for preventing the rise of a peer competitor. After all, great powers do not like peer companions in the system. Not only other great powers potentially pose security threats to them, but they also limit their freedom of movement in the system. This is especially true for a state that has gained the status of being the only pole in the system. When a state enjoys such advantages, it sure would not want to give them up. As a result, the unipole is likely to view the state with the potential to become a great power with suspicion and take steps to prevent its rise. This is true even if the likely peer competitor is acting in a status-quo manner and as such, signalling benign intentions.[90] How a state might behave in the future when it accumulates enough power is uncertain and past behavior may not be the best predictor. (Mearsheimer J. , 2001, p. 31)

When we look at the United States and its increasing view of China as a potential competitor, we can see that it is already worrying about the prospect and taking measures. The Obama administration's recent "Pivot to Asia" policy through which it is fortifying its military presence in the region and strengthening its ties with states that are fearful of the rise of China is a testament to that fact. While some argue that this policy is not necessary as China does not constitute a threat yet (Ross R. S., November/December 2012), the fact that the United States is already concerned demonstrates how much great powers do not want peers in the system and are fearful of the prospect. Recognizing this, it is highly likely that the unipole will take steps to prevent a potential peer to rise. The question is how the unipolar structure differs from bipolar/multipolar structures in preventing this rise.

[90] The potential peer competitor is in fact likely to behave in a non-threatening manner to prevent balancing against it

6.3.2 Lack of a Great Power Ally

One important difference between the unipolar and bipolar/multipolar systems is that there are no great power allies to the sole great power. As such, it will necessarily bear the burden of the effort without a great power ally. It is important to note that even though great powers compete with each other for power and influence, they also power allies in case of a war with the potential peer. Considering that great powers are the states that have the largest capabilities in the system, in a unipolar world efforts of the sole great power – unable to elicit help from great powers – is likely to be costlier to itself.

6.3.3 2nd Tier States and the Unipole – Will They Join?

Lacking a great power ally, the second best option for the unipole is to get help from 2nd tier states in the system in its efforts to contain the rise of a peer competitor. Here, it highly matters what strategy we think 2nd tier states under unipolarity are likely to pursue. The conventional wisdom in the literature has been that these states will bandwagon with the unipole – align their security policy in line with the unipole's.but on the other hand, in this project it has been argued that unipolarity not only creates incentives but also necessitates these states to pursue autarky and increasingly follow an autonomous foreign policy. As such, expectation is that we are not likely to see majority of the 2nd tier states' joining the unipole in its efforts to contain the potential peer competitor and that it will be hard for the unipole to form an effective counter-balancing coalition.

First, it is important to remember that 2nd tier states are not great powers and as such, they care less about the systemic distribution of power than great powers do. They care about their

region. As it argued, their main concerns are deterring their regional rivals and the stability in their region due to concerns of negative spillover effects from regional instability. Consequently, most 2nd tier states – especially those located outside the region of the potential great power – do not have much stake in the game. For example, Walt has argued that the European countries will not be joining the U.S. balancing effort against cooperate when they have shared interests. Great powers are likely to have a common interest in preventing rise of another one. After all, one should not forget how the United States and the Soviet Union fought alongside each other against Germany despite their resentment to each other. In a unipolar system, the sole great power lacks such great China due to lack of common perception of threat between the United States and NATO countries. (Walt S. M., There's No Partnership in Pivot, 2014)

Yet, interest does not dictate whether 2nd tier states align their security policy with the great powers' and join their fight.[91] Under bipolar/multipolar systems in which they face great power threats and desperately need their great power patrons for protection, they are highly likely to support their policies even if they have no stake in those policies or possibly could be harmed. As discussed in Chapter 4, Turkey during the Cold War when closely allied with the United States against the Soviet threat complied heavily with the U.S. demands – quickly joined the Korean War, let its military bases used without consultation, etc. In other words, when the structural conditions necessitate a 2nd tier state to win the great power's favor they are likely to support their policies. South Korean President's statement in the Parliament when he was seeking authorization for sending troops to Iraq in 2003, "Although American action in Iraq was unjustifiable, Korea had to support the U.S. in order to preserve effective deterrence

[91] For great powers, it is more likely to be interest than profit

against North Korea" (Rosenbluth, Saito, & Zinn, July/August 2007, p. 587) succinctly lays out the logic why non-great power states support great power wars even when they have no direct security interest. Therefore, in a unipolar world in which the rising 2nd tier states are increasingly pursuing autarky, the sole great power is not likely to receive help from most of the rising 2nd tier states in its efforts to contain the potential peer competitor. Of course, as it has been argued in this project, declining 2nd tier states are likely to support the unipole's efforts since they need the security protection of the unipole against their rising regional rivals.

Yet, this is not good news for the sole great power since they are also the states among the 2nd tier states that have fewer capabilities. One could argue that what matters for the unipole's effort to contain the rising power is the 2nd tier states in the region of the rising power and they are likely to join the fight alongside the unipole. Yet, this argument is based on two assumptions: first, that the potential great power is aiming for regional hegemony and second, that the only way to contain is military balancing. Both of these assumptions, though, are contingent and may not apply to the scenario between the unipole and its likely competitor.

First, the potential great power may not be aiming for regional hegemony, not that it does not desire to do so, but that the conditions of the region may not be favorable for regional hegemony. It is important to recognize that not all great powers aimed for regional hegemony, e.g. Great Britain or that all great powers have been regional hegemons despite their attempt e.g. Soviet Union, Germany or Japan. In fact, regional hegemony is rare in history and the United States has been the only state that achieved this status. The United States' success was an outcome of unique historical circumstances – lack of nuclear weapons in that period when it was rising in its region, comparatively much weaker states in its region as well as ability to

formulate a common cause with the states in its region against the prevailing great power in its region. In the current period, with the development of nuclear weapons as well as the rise in the capabilities of 2nd tier states, regional hegemony has become even more difficult than before.

Yet, with respect to China's rise and what its security goal is, the debate overwhelmingly revolves around China's aim for regional hegemony. Ironically, the region that is least conducive to regional hegemony is Asia, being not only the most nuclearized region, but also composed of some relatively strong states. (Glaser C. , Will China's Rise Lead to War?, 2011, pp. 80-91)[92] As such, it is quite far-stretched to assume that China is likely to bid for regional hegemony when chances of success are so low. Recognizing that the potential great power may not bid for regional hegemony[93], some second-tier states in its region – especially those that possess nuclear weapons and formidable conventional capabilities – may also not join the unipole's effort to militarily contain the rising power, especially involve itself in any potential war between the two.

Up to now, though, the emphasis of discussion has been on military containment of the rising power. However, military containment and preventive war are the costliest options for the prevailing great power to prevent the potential peer from rising. Moreover, in the age when the potential peer possesses nuclear weapons, a war that can finish it off the way Germany or Japan was after World War II is highly unlikely. Therefore, curtailing the economic rise of a potential peer might be a better and more effective way for preventing its rise.

Yet, the policy to prevent the economic rise of a potential great power requires cooperation of other 2nd tier states to succeed. In a unipolar world in which the potential great power already

[92] For an argument why regional hegemony is neither necessary for China's ability to defend itself nor possible.
[93] The fact that potential great power does not bid for regional hegemony does not make that state less threatening

has increased opportunities to diversify its relations compared to bipolar/multipolar systems and when the other 2nd tiers are increasingly pursuing autarky, the ability of the unipole to succeed in curtailing its potential peer's economic rise is much restricted.

During the Cold War, for example, both the United States and the Soviet Union were able to reduce economic interaction between the two blocs. The fact that most regional powers were closely allied with one or the other great power due to threats they faced from one or other great power, they had incentive to comply with the demands of their great power patron. Iy has been discussed earlier how even India was unable to diversify its economic and military relations despite the fact it pursued neutrality during the Cold War. When the Western bloc increasingly saw India as a Soviet-leaning state, they were unwilling to sell to India. Yet, in a unipolar world, such cooperation with the unipole on restricting economic relations with the rising potential great power is not to be expected. Moreover, considering the fact that the rising state is not likely to be an ally of the unipole, but a state already pursuing autarky and has diversified economic relations[94], the unipole's economic leverage would not be as strong as on an ally's. (Drezner, 1999)[95]

6.4 Conclusion

In light of the factors laid out in this section – the lack of a great power ally as well as the unlikelihood of 2nd tier states to cooperate with the unipole in its effort to contain the rise the potential great power –, unipolarity does not offer conditions favorable to the sole great power to structurally curtail the rise of a potential great power in the system. An effective counter-

[94] For example, even though the United States, as a single state, is China's largest trading partner, China's trade with EU taken as a whole surpasses its trade with the United States. Therefore, how Europe would react to economic containment of China would matter greatly.

[95] Evidence suggests that sanctions are likely to be more effective against states that are allied than nonallied.

balancing coalition becomes highly difficult. Moreover, it is likely to be costly when the burden falls mostly on the unipole itself.

Yet, this is not necessarily bad news for the unipole. The ability of a state to become a great power has much to do internal factors as well. For example, some have already suggested China does not have the ingredients to become a great power and that the United States has no reason to fear the rising China. After all, this project has demonstrated that one should not be quick to jump to the conclusion that a rising 2nd tier state will turn into a great power that can compete on a global scale. The case of Japan should already be cautionary, granted rising China seems to have more factors in its favour than rising Japan.

Chapter 7

Regions and Powers: Summing Up and Looking Ahead

In this chapter, it is discussed that how the theory which has been developed challenges two important assumptions of the existing literature on unipolarity:

1) the unipole can reduce the security competition between 2nd tier states if it remains engaged in the system so there is no likelihood of war between 2nd tier states (Wohlforth, Summer 1999, pp. 26-8) (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008)

2) the unipole can revise the system as it wishes since there can be no counterbalancing. (Monteiro, Winter 2011/2012, pp. 9-40)

7.1 2nd Tier State Security Competition under Unipolarity

Existing literature on unipolarity argues that if the unipole remains engaged in the system, it can reduce the security competition among the regional powers. As such, expects no likelihood of war between these states as long as the unipole is intent on managing the system. (Wohlforth, Summer 1999, pp. 26-8) (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008) (Monteiro, Winter 2011/2012, pp. 9-40) The theory which is which has been presented, though, questions this claim in the literature. It is argued that there is increased level of uncertainty that exists under unipolarity in terms of the unipole's security commitments as well as its resolve to act from the perspective of 2nd tier states. As such, it is hard for these states to reliably assume that the unipole would interfere if war happens when its commitments are extended and when its interests are uncertain at best. In fact, when we look at the post-Cold War era, one cannot dismiss the fact that the first conventional fighting between two nuclear states occurred in this system when India and Pakistan went to war in 1999, at the time when the United States was involved in Kosova. As

such, one should not overestimate the ability of the unipole's engagement in the system in preventing war between 2nd tier states.

The theory presented by this study, also highlights another potential pathway to conflict between regional powers – concerns of increased regional instability under unipolarity. The unipole's intervention in a region can at times cause regional instability get out of hand and thus, exacerbate the tension between the 2nd tier states in the region. As this study demonstrated in cases on Turkey and India, both of these states established their foreign military bases after the United States' war in their region to deter the potential spillover effects when the United States left. Therefore, one should also recognize how the unipole's interventions can at times intensify security competition between states. Considering that the sole great power is more unrestrained under unipolarity without a great power rival, chances that it can intervene in regions as it pleases highlights that this is a serious issue under unipolarity.

How we think of security competition between 2nd tier states under unipolarity has significant implications for how we also view the unipole's grand strategy options. When theorists identify the great power engagement as the main factor for peaceful relations between the 2nd tier states as well as the cause for stability in the regions, then a strategy of global engagement becomes, at least for the well-being of the system, a preferred strategy. The idea that the unipole may disengage leads necessarily to a vision of the system in which all hell would be loose. Yet, in this project, It is argued that there are other mechanisms – such as regional powers' internal stability concerns, economic development needs – that ameliorate expansionary goal of regional powers and as such, even if the unipole disengages from the system, the outcome

might not be as pessimistic as assumed in the literature. This, though, does not mean that war cannot occur between these states. As It is argued, even when the unipole is engaged in the system, war between 2nd tier states is a possibility.

7.1.1 Unipole and Its Ability to Revise the System: Limitations of the Unipole's Power

The existing literature in unipolarity, except few works that suggest soft balancing to occur if the unipole behaves aggressively in the system, overwhelmingly argues that 2nd tier states will bandwagon with the unipole. As such, they expect these states to "shape their policies with a view towards the power and preferences of the unipole." (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008, pp. 217-8) (Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, 1990/91, pp. 23-33) (Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment Revisited, Winter 2002, pp. 5-17) Not surprisingly, they argue that the United States now "has an opportunity to revise the system (according to its interests)." (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008, p. 217)[96] If states will align their security policy in line with the United States as these theorists assume, this is in fact not an unreasonable conclusion to arrive at. Why shouldn't the United States take advantage of this opportunity?

Yet, developed theory also challenges this optimism regarding the unipole's ability to shape the system as it desires. First, the recognition that rising 2nd tier states will pursue autarky necessarily highlights limits of cooperation with the unipole if the unipole is intent on revising the regional order. The unipole cannot assume that these states will act according to its security preferences. One might say so what? After all, the unipole is so militarily powerful that other

[96] It is important to note that Brooks and Wohlforth do not define what "revising the system" entails. Krauthammer, on the other hand, suggests policies such "promoting democracies" or "preventing weapons proliferation", writing from a neo-conservative perspective. See (Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, 1990/91, pp. 23-33) & (Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment Revisited, Winter 2002, pp. 5-17) Some scholars recognize the limitations of the unipole's ability to revise the system – See, for example (Pressman, Spring 2009, pp. 149-179), (Nye, 2003). Yet, they also do not offer a systemic explanation why this is the case under unipolarity.

states' cooperation does not matter. As noted, it has "goit- alone power." (Gruber, 2000)[97] Yet, this is a myopic and actually inaccurate view. If the unipole is employing direct military force, non-cooperation of regional powers such as their denial of bases, lending support to the unipole's opponent, etc. can make the unipole's operations costlier. More importantly, there is a limit to how many wars the unipole can undertake since use of military force is expensive. Consequently, the unipole would prefer its security policies to succeed without resorting to direct use of military power. The sole great power, when it has a conflict of interest with a state, is more likely to employ non-military means such as diplomatic pressure, sanctions, regime change through indirect means such as arming the regime's opposition, etc. to coerce the state. Yet, all these strategies require other states' cooperation. For example, if the United States is imposing sanctions on Iran and other states are continuing and even bolstering their trade with Iran or if the United States desires regime change in Syria and arming the opposition and other states in the region are supporting/arming the regime, the likelihood of its policies to succeed dramatically decreases. Therefore, a world in which 2nd tier states are bandwagoning with the unipole and one in which the strongest states are pursuing autarky looks quite different and consequently highlights the limits of the unipole in revising the system.

Lastly, one might say that the fact rising regional powers are moving towards selfhelp and bolstering their capabilities by establishing military bases, diversifying their military procurement and moving to indigenous production is a desirable thing for the unipole. These states can now take care of their own regional security and this decreases the costs for the unipole in managing the regions. Put differently, it is like your dependent child that now has a job and can take care of himself/herself which reduces your costs. While there are certainly

[97] For the use of this term. For the opposing view that the unipole needs other states' cooperation, see (Nye, 2003).

benefits to this as this example illuminates, it also implies that your ability to control these states' behavior is naturally reduced. If conflict of interest occurs with these states in the future, the likelihood of coercion to succeed decreases. Moreover, in the big picture, pursuit of autarky by the rising powers highlights how the unipole's stature as a hub of diplomatic, economic and military relations is likely to wane as time goes on.

7.2 Further Research

This project offers several venues for further research. First and the most obvious one would be to test developed theory on other cases. Of the potential cases, South Africa is an especially important one since sub-Saharan African regional dynamics holds the greatest potential for a regional power to aim for hegemony. South Africa is located in a region in which great power involvement has been minimal and of all the regional powers, it has the highest GDP based on PPP share of its region. Moreover, this is a region without a nuclear state. Yet, South Africa's behaviour, despite its continuous rise, at a first glance suggests that it is not acting according to the logic of regional hegemony – it gave up nuclear weapons, played a minimal role in regional conflicts in the post-Cold War era and even seems to be welcoming China's growing influence in its region. As such, looking into this case can help to further illuminate why a 2nd tier state may not pursue regional hegemony even when structural barriers to pursuit are not high and whether developed theory that expects concerns of internal stability/development to be the reason holds true for this case as well.

Moreover, analysing South Africa's foreign policy during the Cold War can shed light on the security thinking of 2nd tier states located in regions in which great power competition is minimal. This is a rare situation for a regional power to be under. Even though South Asia also

was also region that did not face intense great power competition during the Cold War as discussed in case study on India, the geographic closeness of the sub-region to the Soviet Union as well as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 still brought the Cold War dynamics into the region. As such, looking into the South African case can provide new insights on how lack of great power competition influences regional security dynamics and strategies of states in the region.

Apart from testing developed theory on other potential cases, an analysis of 2nd tier states' overall trade and military procurement trends since the end of the Cold War to see how the aggregate picture looks like - whether we observe in the last three decades a shift away from the unipole as a hub of economic and military relations – would substantiate this argument on the potential implication of unipolarity that the unipole's stature as the center of relations is likely to wane as time goes on. Even though it is tried to show in the individual cases of Turkey and India that these states have more diversified relations in the post-Cold War era, backing this argument with quantitative data can strengthen this observation.

Theoretically, one potential area to extend this project is to 3rd tier weak states. Since the focus of this study was on regional powers, did not delve into these states' security problematique and assumed they will pursue alliance with a great power under all systems (except if they face direct great power threat under unipolarity which then developed theory would expect them to balance) for the purpose of simplicity. Yet, this can be expected to see variance amongst these states' security strategies. Granted that developing a general theory on these states may be difficult due to the more complex threat environment they are under– since these states also

potentially face threats from 2nd tier states, extending the theory to 3rd tier states can provide additional insights into regional security dynamics.

7.3 Conclusion

In this project, a theory has been developed for regional power politics from the perspective of 2nd tier states that tried to explain these states' security problematique under unipolarity and consequently, what strategy they are likely to pursue. In contrast to conventional wisdom that treats regional powers as small great powers and expects them to behave just as great powers do, it laid out the logic for why 2nd tier states see regional stability as the path to their power maximization as opposed to regional domination and why the unipolar system not only necessitates, but also creates incentives for them (those rising) to pursue autarky.

Overall, how we perceive regional powers' security goal to be – regional stability or regional domination – and what strategy we think these states will pursue under unipolarity – balance, bandwagon or autarky – has important policy implications. This is not just a theoretical issue. For the United States to devise an effective grand strategy in the unipolar era, it needs to work with accurate assumptions. Policies based on wrong assumptions not only are likely to be sub-optimal, but also can backfire.

Interestingly, the United States since the end of the Cold War seems to be operating with the Cold War mindset, with the presumption that 2nd tier states under unipolarity will bandwagon. As such, not only the United States has underestimated the costs of its interventions as during the 2003 Iraq War when it assumed that its Cold War allies would support the war, but that some its policies such as its push for expansion of NATO and EU have backfired as in the case

of Georgia and Ukraine. If the United States were operating with the recognition that rising regional powers have an interest in the status-quo in their region, it could have better predicted the reaction to its policies.

There is no doubt that unipolarity still constitutes the best system for the unipole due to the simple fact there is no state in the system that can pose direct security threat to the sole great power. In other words, unipole is safest under this system compared to bipolar/multipolar ones. Yet, the developed theory in this project explains why its power advantages do not translate into an ability to revise the system as it pleases.

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