

VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN PASHTUN SOCIETY: A CASE STUDY OF SWABI DISTRICT



Researcher:

Noor Hamid Khan Mahsud
Reg. No. 11FSS-PHDPS/S16

Supervisor:

Dr. Husnul Amin
Associate Professor
Department of Politics & IR

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD**



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Voting behaviour
Pakistan elections

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of. Doctor of Philosophy in
Political Science.

Researcher:

Noor Hamid Khan Mahsud
Reg. No. 11FSS-PHDPS/S16

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD
2021**



FINAL APPROVAL

This is to certify that we gone through and evaluated the dissertation titled "Voting Behaviour in Pashtun Society: A Case Study of Swabi District", submitted by Mr. Noor Hamid Khan, a student of Ph. D Political Science under University Registration No. 11-FSS/PHDPS/S16, in partial fulfillment of the award of the degree of Ph. D. This thesis fulfills the requirements in its core and quality for the award of the degree.

1. Supervisor

Dr. Husnul Amin
Associate Professor
Department of Politics & International Relations
Faculty of Social Sciences
International Islamic University
Islamabad.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dr. Husnul Amin".

2. Internal Examiner

Professor Dr. Muhammad Khan
Department of Politics & International Relations
Faculty of Social Sciences
International Islamic University
Islamabad

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Professor Dr. Muhammad Khan".

3. External Examiner-I

Professor Dr. Shaheen Akhtar
Department of International Relations
National Defense University (NDU)
Islamabad

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Professor Dr. Shaheen Akhtar".

4. External Examiner-II

Dr. Sohail Ahmad
Assistant Professor
Department of Humanities, IR Program
Comsats University, Chak Shehzad
Islamabad

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dr. Sohail Ahmad".

5. Incharge of Department

Department of Politics & International Relations
International Islamic University
Islamabad

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Incharge of Department".

6. Dean

Faculty of Social Sciences
International Islamic University
Islamabad

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dean".

Table of Contents

Contents

Final Approval	i
Table of Contents	ii
Dedication	vi
Student Declaration	vii
Supervisor Certificate	viii
Abstract	ix
Acknowledgements	x
List of Tables	xii
Abbreviations	xv
Chapter 1	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Rationale of the Study	3
1.3 Statement of the Problem	5
1.4 Objectives of the Study	6
1.5 Research Questions	6
1.6 Significance of the Study	7
1.7 Limitations of the Study and Functional Definitions of Words/Terms	8
1.8 Review of Literature and Gaps in Existing Research	9
1.9 Research Methodology	15
1.9.1 Mixed Method	15
1.9.2 Quota Sampling	17
1.9.3 Sample Size	20
1.9.4 Quantitative Questionnaire	23
1.9.5 Population	25
1.10 Organization of the Study	25
Chapter 2	28
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	28
2.1 Introduction	28
2.2. Sociological Model or Columbia School of Voting Behaviour	29
2.3. Psychosocial Model or Michigan Model of Voting Behaviour	35

2.4. Rational Choice Model	43
Chapter 3.....	48
ELECTORAL HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA	48
3.1 Introduction.....	48
3.2 Historical Background	48
3.3 Electoral History of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	49
3.3.1 1932 Elections: The First Ever Elections in the Province.....	49
3.3.2 1937 Elections.....	51
3.3.3 1946 Elections: The Build-up to Partition	53
3.3.4 1951 Elections (Provincial): The first experience with adult franchise based elections in the province	56
3.3.5 The 1970 Elections: The lead-up to the Break-up of the Country	60
3.3.6 1977 Elections: The Path toward Second Military Coup.....	63
3.3.7 1988 Elections: The Return of Civilian Governments	66
3.3.8 1990 Elections.....	69
3.3.9 1993 Elections: Accepting the Unacceptable.....	71
3.3.10 1997 Elections.....	73
3.3.11 2002 Elections: Emergence of a New Politico-Religious Force	75
3.3.12 2008 Elections: The Ousting of Pervez Musharraf and Return of Civilian Rule..	80
3.3.13 2013 Elections: The Emergence of a New Political Force.....	82
3.3.14 2018 Elections: KP Makes History	86
3.4 Electoral Geography of the Province	87
3.4.1 Cential KP.....	88
3.4.2 North-Eastern KP	89
3.4.3 Northern KP	90
3.4.4 Southern KP:.....	91
3.5 The PTI Wave	92
3.6 The phenomenon of Electables or Independents	96
Chapter 4.....	102
THE RESEARCH SETTING: SWABI's GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY, PEOPLE, ECONOMY AND POLITICS	102
4.1 Introduction.....	102
4.2 Weather	103
4.3 People of Swabi	104
4.4 Household Infrastructure in the District.....	104
4.5 Education	105

4.6 Health System	109
4.7 Economy	110
4.7.1 Agriculture Sector.....	110
4.7.2 Industrial Sector.....	113
4.7.3 Services sector	114
4.8 Political and Electoral History of the District.....	115
4.8.1 Britishers, Khudai Khidmatgars, Congress, and Muslim League in Swabi	116
4.8.2 Khudai Khidmatgar Movement and Swabi.....	117
4.8.3 Muslim League and Swabi.....	118
4.8.4 Post-1947 politics of Swabi	120
Chapter 5	140
VOTERS' ATTITUDE TOWARD ELECTORAL POLITICS	140
5.1 Introduction.....	140
5.2 Voters' Interest in Politics	142
5.3 Source of Information about Politics	146
5.4 Do Voters Discuss Politics? And with Whom?	152
5.5 Attending Political Rallies	154
5.6 Voters' Perceptions about Politicians' Abilities to Solve Pakistan's Problems	157
5.7 Do Voters Believe in Politicians' Speeches During the Election Campaign?.....	161
5.8 Do Politicians Serve the People?	164
5.9 Effects of Election Campaigns.....	166
5.10 Voters' perceptions about the worth of their votes.....	170
5.11 Women's Right to Vote Independently and Contest Elections	172
5.12 Electoral Fraud.....	177
Chapter 6	192
VOTERS IN THE POLLING BOOTH	192
6.1 Introduction.....	192
6.2 Do Voters Read Manifestoes before Casting Votes?	192
6.3 Turnout and Abstention Rate	195
6.4 Voting Against One's Will	201
6.5 Stability in Voting Behaviour	203
6.6 Voting for Someone Mistakenly	208
6.7 Voting for Two Different Parties in Same Elections	210
6.8 Voting In 2018 General Elections.....	213
Chapter 7	226
VOTING MODELS AND THEIR RELEVANCE IN SWABI DISTRICT	226

7.1 Introduction.....	226
7.2 Sociological Model.....	226
7.3 Psychosocial Model	227
7.4 Rational Choice Model	227
7.5 Political Model is the Most Relevant One in Swabi	228
7.6 Importance of Party vs Candidate.....	244
7.7 Is Vote Commodity Which Can Be Sold For Money or Other Material Benefits?	247
7.8 Critique of Earlier Studies on Voting Behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	249
Chapter 8.....	259
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION	259
8.1 High Level of Voters' Distrust in Politicians	259
8.2 Women are Not as Conservative, Politically Unaware, and Uninterested in Politics as Generally Assumed.....	263
8.3 Younger Voters Have More Positive Attitude toward Electoral Politics	266
8.4 Political Factors Play More Important Role in Determining Voting Behaviour than Social and Economic Factors.....	268
References.....	273
Appendices.....	294
Appendix 1: Questionnaire	294
Appendix 2: Tables.....	301

Dedication

*I dedicate this dissertation to my parents for
their endless and unconditional support,
encouragement, patience, and prayers.*

Student Declaration

It is hereby declared that this thesis titled "Voting Behaviour in Pashtun Society: A Case Study of Swabi District," submitted for the PhD degree in Political Science is my own research work and has concurrently not been submitted to any other university for any other degree.



Noor Hamid Khan Mahsud
Reg. No. 11FSS-PHDPS/S16



الجامعة الإسلامية العالمية
International Islamic University
Islamabad – Pakistan
Faculty of Social Sciences

P.O Box 1243 Islamabad – Pakistan: Ph: +92-51-9019474

No.

November 15, 2021

Supervisor Certificate

This thesis titled "Voting Behaviour in Pashtun Society: A Case Study of Swabi District" submitted by Mr. Noor Hamid Khan Reg. No. 11-FSS/PHDPS/S16, a student of PhD Political Science has been completed under my guidance and supervision.

Sincerely,

Dr. Husnul Amin
Associate Professor
Department of Politics and International Relations,
International Islamic University Islamabad, Pakistan.
Email: Husnul.amin@iiu.edu.pk

Dr. Husnul Amin
Associate Professor
Department of Politics &
International Relations
International Islamic University
Islamabad

Abstract

In Pakistan, there prevails a somehow predictable pattern of voting behaviour in the provinces of Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a predominantly Pashtun province, however, voting patterns usually remain unpredictable. Voting behaviour in this province so frequently oscillates that even seasoned political analysts fail to predict election results. Despite their great importance, electoral studies in Pakistan in general and in Pashtun society in particular have been understudied. It was in this context that this researcher decided to work on voting behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province by taking Swabi District as a case study. While undertaking this study, the researcher actually wanted to seek answers to some important questions like determinants of voting behaviour, voters' attitude toward electoral politics, and causes of frequent oscillations in voting behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. For reaching at some conclusive and clear findings about voting behaviour in Swabi District, the researcher conducted extensive fieldwork and used mixed research method. For this purpose, a questionnaire was designed for collecting quantitative data and for qualitative data the researcher conducted focus group discussions and formal and informal interviews and interactions with voters, workers of different political parties, academics, journalists, and senior politicians including former and serving lawmakers.

This thesis presents a brief political and electoral history of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the province's electoral geography, comprehensive discussion on the research setting (Swabi) including its electoral history since 1932 and voters' attitudes toward electoral politics and voting behaviour. For determining key determinants of voting behaviour, the researcher tested the three major theoretical models (sociological, psychosocial, and rational choice model) of voting behaviour. According to the findings of this study, political determinants (psychosocial model) play the most significant role in shaping voting behaviour in Swabi District. The major themes discovered through this study are: (i) low level of voters' trust in politicians, their commitments, and abilities (ii) women are not as conservative, politically unaware, and uninterested in politics as generally assumed (iii) younger voters have more positive attitude toward electoral politics than older generations, and (iv) political factors play more important role in determining voting behaviour than social and economic factors.

Acknowledgements

All Praises and Thanks Be to Allah Almighty who enabled me to complete this dissertation.

I am really grateful to my supervisor Dr. Husnul Amin. It was his invaluable guidance, endless patience, and appreciation which helped me complete my dissertation in this current shape. I am also thankful to my co-supervisor (unofficial) Dr. Noor Fatima for keen interest in my research and her valuable suggestions.

I would also like to thank other faculty members in the Department of Politics and International Relations who taught me courses or helped me in some other way. The administrative staff of the department also deserves recognition of their services throughout my degree. I am also thankful to Zahid for his help in SPSS analysis of my data.

It would be complete injustice if I don't recognize the services of many people who facilitated me during my fieldwork in Swabi and helped me in drawing a representative sample. Noteworthy among them are Taimur Bacha, Ibadullah Naik, Dr. Zaman Sher, Faraz Ali, Faiz Muhammad Wazir, Fahad Khan, Shahab Ali, Abdur Rehman, Shahid Alam, Maulana Abdullah, Karam Sattar Yaqubi, Babar, and Jabar Mohmand. I would also like to extend my thanks to my interviewees, key informants, and participants of focus group discussions.

I am also indebted to my friends both at the campus and outside of it whose presence during my PhD made my life rich. The list includes Sartaj, Muhammad Rashid, Shahid Sultan, Tabiullah, Attaullah, Shabir Afridi, Shafiullah, Kashid Khan, Naveed Imran, Husai Kakar, Zain Ullah, and Zia Ullah.

I am also grateful to former Prime Minister Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif for the financial benefits I got from his programs like Laptop Scheme and PM Fee Reimbursement Scheme.

At the end, I would also like to appreciate my parents, siblings, and other members of my extended family for their patience, encouragement, and moral support during this long journey. Without their support, I would not have been able to complete this daunting task.

List of Tables

Table No. 01: Quotas and their shares in the sample.

Table No. 02: Provincial Assembly seats won by various political parties since 1988.

Table No. 03: National Assembly (from KP) seats won by various political parties since 1970.

Table No. 04: Swabi's Provincial Assembly Results since 1988.

Table No. 05: Swabi's NA seats won by different parties since 1970.

Table No. 06: Major source of information about national politics (gender-wise).

Table No. 07: Frequency of attending political rallies and meetings (profession-wise).

Table No. 08: Can politicians' solve Pakistan's problems (educational qualification-wise).

Table No. 09: Election in which voters for the first time exercised their right to vote and their choices in 2018 general elections.

Table no. 10: Voting for same party/candidate in consecutive elections (income-based).

Table No. 11: Voting for two different parties in same elections.

Table No. 12: Reasons for voting for two different parties.

Table No. 13: For which party you voted in 2018 general elections? (Age-wise).

Table No. 14: For which party you voted in 2018 general elections? (Education-wise).

Table No. 15: Monthly income profile of voters of different parties.

Table No. 16: Voters' professions and for their party choices in 2018 general elections.

Table No. 17: Voters' reasons for voting for different parties.

Table No. 18: Satisfaction level of different parties' voters.

Table No. 19: Qualities that voters value the most.

Table No. 20: Relevance of voting models.

Table No. 21: Voters' income level and preference for the three models.

Table No. 22: Voters' professions and their preference for elements of sociological model.

Table No. 23: Relevance of major elements of psychosocial model (Overall).

Table No. 24: Relevance of major elements of psychosocial model (Education-wise).

Table No. 25: Relevance of components of rational choice model.

Table No. 26: Income-based analysis of rational choice model.

Table No. 27: Which one between party and candidate is important? (Age-wise).

Table No. 28: Which one between party and candidate is important? (Education-wise).

Table No. 29: Voters' interest in politics.

Table No. 30: Main source of information about national politics.

Table No. 31: Do you discuss politics with people?

Table No. 32: With whom voters discuss politics?

Table No. 33: How frequently do people attend political and election rallies?

Table No. 34: Can politicians solve Pakistan's problems?

Table No. 35: To what voters do believe in speeches delivered by candidates during election campaign?

Table No. 36: Do politicians serve the people?

Table No. 37: Impacts of election campaign on voters.

Table No. 38: Will your vote make any difference?

Table No. 39: Should women have free hand in voting for candidates of their choice?

Table No. 40: If not then why? (Linked with the previous question).

Table No. 41: Should women have the right to contest elections against men?

Table No. 42: If not then why? (Linked with the previous question).

Table No. 43: Voters' opinions of transparency of elections.

Table No. 44: Who rigs elections?

Table No. 45: Factor that affects transpiercing of elections the most?

Table No. 46: Opinions about quality if next general elections?

Table No. 47: How elections can be made completely free and fair?

Table No. 48: Do voters read manifestoes before casting votes?

Table No. 49: When you exercised your right to vote for the first time?

Table No. 50: In how many of the above national elections did you vote?

Table No. 51: Have you ever decided not to vote?

Table No. 52: If Yes, then why? (Linked with the previous question).

Table No. 53: Voting for a candidate other than the first choice.

Table No. 54: If Yes, then why? (Linked with the previous question).

Table No. 55: Have you ever voted for the same party in consecutive elections?

Table No. 56: If yes, then how many times? (Linked with the previous question).

Table No. 57: For which party did you vote in consecutive elections?

Table No. 58: What was the reason for voting for the same party consecutively?

Table No. 59: Have you ever decided not to vote for the party/candidate for which you voted in the previous elections?

Table No. 60: If Yes, then why? (Linked with the previous question).

Table No. 61: Voting for someone mistakenly.

Table No. 62: Voting for two different parties in same election.

Table No. 63: Reasons for voting for two different parties in same election (Linked with the previous question).

Table No. 64: When voters make decisions about their votes?

Table No. 65: For which party you voted in 2018 general elections?

Table No. 66: Why you voted for this party?

Table No. 67: To what extent are voters satisfied with their voting choices in 2018 elections?

Table No. 68: What type of candidates voters like the most?

Table No. 69: What voters want from their representatives the most?

Table No. 70: Relevance of theoretical models.

Table No. 71: Relevance of major components of sociological model.

Table No. 72: Relevance of major components of psychosocial model.

Table No. 73: Relevance of major components of rational choice model.

Table No. 74: The most important element within all the three models.

Table No. 75: Which one between party and candidate is more important?

Table No. 76: Should voters have the right to sell their votes?

Table No. 77: Relationship between level of education and interest in politics.

Table No. 78: To what extent you agree with the statement that politicians can solve Pakistan's problems? (Profession-wise).

Table No. 79: Relationship between voters' income and level of their belief in politicians' speeches.

Table No. 80: To what extent you agree with the statement that political parties/candidates contest elections to serve the people? (Age-wise).

Table No. 81: Impacts of election campaign (Income-based responses).

Table No. 82: Do you think that your vote will make any difference? (Age-wise).

Table No. 83: Do you think that your vote will make any difference? (Education-wise).

Table No. 84: Opinion about transparency of elections in Pakistan (Profession-wise responses).

Table No. 85: NA and PA seats of the four electoral regions of KP.

Table No. 86: ANP's decline in Swabi in terms of seats.

Table No. 87: Independent candidates' share at national and provincial levels.

Abbreviations

AJIP: Awami Jamhuri Ittehad Pakistan	JUP-N: Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan-Noorani
ANP: Awami National Party	JWP: Jamhoori Watan Party
APDM: All Parties Democratic Movement	KP: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
ASER: Annual Status of Education in Pakistan	KPITB: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Information Technology Board
BHUs: Basic Health Units	KPITB: KP Information Technology Board
CDA: Christian Democratic Appeal	LFO: Legal Framework Order
CRSALCD: Crop Reporting Services, Agriculture, Livestock and Cooperative Department	M.C.H: Maternal and Child Health
DAMKP: Directorate of Archaeology and Museums Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	MDM: Muttahida Deeni Mahaz
ECP: Election Commission of Pakistan	MJAH: Markazi Jamiat Ahle-e-Hadith
FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas	ML: Muslim League
HERA: Higher Education Regulatory Authority Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	MMA: Muttahida Majlis-I-Amal Pakistan
HSNP: Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party	MQM: Muttahida Qaumi Movement
IJI: Islami Jamhoori Ittehad	NAP-W: National Awami Party-Wali Group
IJM: Islami Jamhoori Mahaz	NWFP: North West Frontier Province
IPP: Index of Political Predispositions	OSOCRSS-Office of Statistical Officer, Crop Reporting Services Swabi
JI: Jamaat-e-Islami:	PADC: Pak-Afghan Defense Council
JUH: Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind	PBS: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics
JUI-F: Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam-Fazl	PDA: Pakistan Democratic Alliance
JUI-H: Jamiat-e-Ulema-e- Islam Hazarvi Group	PIF: Pakistan Islamic Front
JUI-S: Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Islam-Sami	PIPS: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies
JUI-WP: Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam-West Pakistan	PML-N: Muslim League-Nawaz
JUP: Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan.	PML-Q: Muslim League-Quaid
	PML-Qy: Pakistan Muslim League-Qayyum

PNA: Pakistan National Alliance
PPP: Pakistan People Party
PSLM: Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey
PTI: Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
PTM: Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement
RHCs: Rural Health Centers

SQM: Swabi Qaumi Mahaz
SRC: Survey Research Center
SWKKP: Zakat, Ushr, Social Welfare, Special Education & Women Empowerment Department Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
WUS: Women University Swabi

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Pakistan is a country where elections have played a vital role in its formation and its subsequent political history. Muslim League's clear victory in 1946 elections among Muslim voters helped the party legitimize its claim of representing the Muslims of subcontinent and its demand for a separate state for the Muslims. The scheduled elections of 1958,¹ which would have put Pakistan on the path of parliamentary and representative system thus transferring some powers from bureaucracy, both civil and military, to the elected government, prompted the establishment to launch the country's first coup de eta before the elections could be held. In 1970, Pakistan held its first national-level general elections on universal franchise basis. However, this election proved to be the antithesis of the 1946 elections. The unwillingness of West Pakistani leadership to allow Awami League from East Pakistan to form the government led to a gory civil war which ultimately ended with Pakistan's break-up and formation of a new independent state of Bangladesh. The controversy surrounding results of Pakistan's second national elections in 1977 led to the second military takeover of the political system which continued for eleven years under Gen. Zia ul Haq (Wilder, 1999). This controversy also led to the execution of Pakistan's first elected Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (Chandio & Chandio, 2013). The period from 1985 to 1997 experienced five general elections (1985, 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997) (Wilder, 1999) but no elected government could complete its constitutional term and were dismissed/removed by the

¹ The first ever general elections to the provincial assemblies were held in 1951 in Punjab and NWFP, in 1953 in Sindh, and in 1954 in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The first ever general elections at national level were held in 1970).

President or army chief (Farmanullah, 2014) thus adding more color to the country's electoral history.

The 2002 general elections were marked by the exclusion of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, former prime ministers and chiefs of country's two main political parties, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan People Party (PPP), respectively, from the electoral process (Farmanullah, 2014). Similarly, the condition of graduation qualification fixed by the Musharraf regime for contesting elections automatically excluded many seasoned politicians from the electoral process. Furthermore, the prevailing national and international circumstances led to the emergence of an alliance of six religio-political parties called Muttahida Majlis-I-Amal Pakistan (MMA) which also formed government in NWFP and opposition at the center (Khan, 2011).

The 2008 general elections were also special in their nature as it were these elections that brought together PPP and PML-N, two arch rivals in Pakistani politics, together in a coalition government which was formed after the elections (Anthony, 2008). Another important feature of the 2008 elections was that the newly elected parliament was preparing for impeachment of military dictator Pervez Musharraf who ultimately resigned from his office as president. It was for the first time in Pakistan's history that a military dictator was forced by the parliament to resign. The 2013 elections were a historic development in Pakistan's political history as it was for the first time that a civilian government (without military tutelage) completed its term followed by smooth transition of power to another civilian government (Samad & Gurmani, 2017). The 2018 were also no less important as these elections are considered by many to be among the most rigged elections in Pakistan's history. The opposition parties, while expressing

their concerns and reservations over the alleged rigging, went to the extent that they invented the term "selected" for Prime Minister Imran Khan. The term became so popular and irritating for the ruling party that ultimately its use in the parliament was banned by Deputy Speaker National Assembly, Qasim Khan Suri. It seems Suri (like other party members and leaders) was offended because it meant that PTI did not come to power through popular votes (Hussain, 2019).

1.2 Rationale of the Study

Voting behaviour occupies a central place in the study of electoral politics. It is one of the subfields of political science and the main form of political participation in democratic systems (Scott & Marshall, 2009). Robert Dahl, quoted by Shakeel Ahmed (2010), writes that elections and political parties are the prerequisite for any democratic system (Ahmad, 2010). Elections are not only the main form of people's participation in a democratic country but also provide legitimacy to a government. It is free and fair elections that establish the power of the people in a polity. They provide the mechanism through which people can make the wielders of political power accountable and can change them in a smooth and systematic manner. Furthermore, elections also create awareness among the voters (Akhter, 2004).

Gilbert and Mohesni (2001) as quoted by Samad and Gurmani (2017) argue that only holding elections is not enough indicator of democracy in a polity. Instead, there should be competitive multi-party elections that lead to transfer of power among them (according to the outcome of elections), unelected officials or external elements should not have the authority to override decisions of elected officials and there should be rule of law. According to Fred Hayward;

[t]he basic principles and expectations of competitive elections can be summarized as follows: all the law-abiding adult citizens are entitled to vote; political organizations are free to put up candidates, debate their merits freely, and criticize opponents; political organizations campaign with the objective of winning; each voter casts one vote and is not hindered in expressing a choice (preferably in secret); votes are honestly counted and the results faithfully reported; the candidate, party, or coalition with the most votes wins; the losing individual or party does not try to use force to alter the outcome or prevent the winner from taking office; and the party in power does not restrict political participation and competition which are within the parameters of existing rules. (Ahmad, 2010, p-26).

To the contrary, if political parties will occupy political power through unfair means then there is least possibility that they will conduct governmental affairs in an honest way, especially with regard to transparency and accountability. In such a situation, they will remain obsessed with the protection of their hold on political power for which they will not even hesitate to further deviate from values of the electoral system (Zafarullah & Akhtar, 2001). In the Third World, there are many countries with regimes that have been misusing elections as military dictators or civilian rulers, who want to stick to political power by hook or by crook, usually use elections as a tool to stay in power. Such leaders manipulate the electoral process to get desired results (Akhter, 2004). It is because of the large number of elections held by dictators that scholars invented the term 'electoral authoritarianism' (Kao, 2015, p, ii).

The study of voting behaviour always focuses on the determinants of why people vote the way they do and how they reach at the decisions they ultimately make (Scott & Marshall, 2009. The word voting behaviour suggests more than just studying records of voting and voting statistics' compilation (Apple, 1949). In essence, it indicates voters' choices, alternatives, preferences, concerns, agreements, programs and ideologies etc. on the basis of which elections are contested (Jangam, 1982).

Even though elections have played a decisive role in the creation of Pakistan and the subsequent political developments, little attention has been paid to the topic both by students and scholars. According to Muhammad Waseem (1994), electoral malpractices, army's dominant role which has damaged Pakistan's reputation as electoral democracy, the fact that relatively few elections have been held, decline of social sciences in Pakistan and the variety of legal and constitutional systems under which elections were held, which led to skepticism about elections' usefulness and legitimacy, are the main factors for lack of interest among students and scholars in electoral politics. Though the field of electoral studies has been understudied so far, it has already started attracting a large number of researchers. A trend has emerged now and researchers try to go deeper into the dynamics of voting behaviour at both macro and micro level. It is in this context that the researcher conducted his PhD dissertation on voting behaviour in Swabi, a district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

In Pakistan, there prevails a predictable pattern of voting behaviour in Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a predominantly Pashtun province, however, voting patterns usually remain unpredictable. Voting behaviour in this province so frequently oscillates that even seasoned political analysts fail to predict election results. Political observers present different explanations for this unpredictability of voting behaviour. It was this uncertainty and unpredictability of voting behaviour that attracted this researcher to study voting behaviour in Pashtun society. For this purpose, the researcher chose Swabi district for a deeper inquiry into voting behaviour.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

While undertaking this study, the researcher had the following objectives in mind:

- To understand the dynamics of voting behaviour in Pashtun society by focusing on only one district: Swabi.
- To know the major drivers of voting behaviour in Pashtuns society and empirically investigate the frequent oscillations in voting behaviour.
- To gauge voters' attitude toward electoral politics.
- To analyze in a comparative fashion the results of this study with other such studies conducted on voting behaviour among Pashtun voters in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

1.5 Research Questions

Voting behaviour is a complex phenomenon and cannot be explained easily. In Pashtun society, voters' tendency to bring into power new political forces has further complicated the situation. The unpredictability of voters' behaviour raises several questions in the minds of scholars and students of political science. Therefore, this study will try to answer the following questions:

1. What are the key determinants of voting behaviour in Swabi?
2. How do the Pashtun electorate look at electoral politics?
3. What is voters' level of participation in electoral politics in the province?
4. What are the major reasons for frequent fluctuations in voting behaviour in Pashtun society?

1.6 Significance of the Study

Study of voting behaviour is a subfield of political science and has great importance for developing an understanding of electoral politics. Despite the fact that elections have always played an important role in the creation of Pakistan and its subsequent history, this subject has not attracted many scholars and students in Pakistan in general and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in particular. Very few researchers have tried to empirically study voting patterns in Pashtun society. It was in this context that this researcher decided to do research on this topic. This study is an attempt to ascertain the role of each voting determinant in Pashtun society by selecting one district for thorough inquiry. In this study, on the one hand, this researcher is presenting findings of his research while on the other hand, he is comparing his findings with the findings of other similar studies conducted on voting behaviour in KP.

An important aspect of this study is that on the one hand, it determines the broader role of social, political, and economic factors in shaping voting behaviour in Pashtun society while on the other hand, it penetrates deeper to also ascertain the role of each component within social, political, and economic spheres. Thus, it gives a detailed account of role of religion, ethnicity/caste/language, and social class among social determinants of voting behaviour, party identification, candidate orientation, and issue orientation among political determinants of voting behaviour, and pocketbook vs sociotropic considerations among economic determinants of voting behaviour. In addition to giving a detailed account of voting determinants, the researcher also tried to ascertain electorates' attitude toward electoral politics, level of voters' trust in parliament, politicians and political parties, and the level of voters' participation in political activities. Another interesting aspect of this research is that it presents a comparative

study of the findings of different studies on voting behaviour in KP. In short, the research tries to present a comprehensive analysis of electoral politics in Pashtun society.

1.7 Limitations of the Study and Functional Definitions of Words/Terms.

1. Though this case studies can help the readers understand voting behaviour in Pashtuns society, still the issue of generalizability will remain as a limitation.
2. Keeping the nature of the population under study in view, the researcher had to use quota/judgmental rather than random sampling.
3. Due to the gender gap in the population under study, the researcher was not able to himself directly interview all of the female respondents. Instead, services of locals including females were availed for filling some of the questionnaires from female respondents.
4. By Pashtun society the researcher means Pashtuns living in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province excluding Balochistan and erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) which was merged with KP after the researcher had started his work.
5. Before April 19, 2010, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's name was North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Thus, the researcher will address it as NWFP while writing about something that happened before 19th April 2010 and NWFP from 19th April, 2010 onwards.

1.8 Review of Literature and Gaps in Existing Research

The modern study of electoral politics started in 1939 when a group of researchers led by Paul Lazarsfeld at Columbia University applied survey research to the study of voting behaviour. In Pakistan, the study of voting behaviour is a relatively new field. However, the field has attracted many researchers and scholars and thus there is enough and diverse material on the topic. Researchers have tried different methodological approaches to reach their findings about voting behaviour in the country. As is normal in social sciences, scholars are sharply divided over the factors that determine voting behaviour in the country and thus different schools of thought present different arguments in support of their claims. The available literature show that economic, social, and political determinants all have their relevance.

Saghir Ahmad (1977) and Hamza Alavi (1971) look at voting behaviour from Marxist perspective--- in terms of class relations. They argue that voting behaviour of voters from lower classes is more determined by their dependence on their employers rather than their membership in a caste and clan etc. Their argument is that the importance of caste and clan etc. for a voter depends upon the fact whether he is economically dependent or independent. Those who are economically dependent cannot make independent voting decisions based on their membership in a clan etc. Alvi argues that in case the voter is economically dependent on a landowner or some other figure, his (voter's) horizontal alignment (membership in a social group like clan and caste) is overshadowed by his vertical alignment to the one on whom he is economically dependent. These two works provide invaluable insights into electoral dynamics of Pakistan. However, their works' focus is mainly Punjab while there is huge difference in political and electoral subtleties of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Muhammad Waseem has also made valuable contributions to the studies of voting behaviour in Pakistan. His two important works are his books (published in 1994 and 2006) on 1993 and 2002 general elections in Pakistan. In these works, Waseem has tried to explain as how the colonial legacy of bureaucratic rule inherited by Pakistan has enabled the bureaucracy, both military and civilian, to stick to power after the creation of Pakistan. He has also established a theoretical framework for the study of elections in Pakistan. However, the focus of Waseem's work has mainly been national level electoral politics rather than specifically Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Andrew R. Wilder's "The Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behaviour in the Punjab" (1999) is another seminal work on voting behaviour in Pakistan. The author has shed light on electoral politics before as well as after the creation of Pakistan. It argues that earlier electoral studies in South Asia emphasized on social determinants of voting behaviour and it was later on that political determinants of voting behaviour were included in these studies. The author has logically and empirically explained voting patterns and argues that the role of political determinants is usually underestimated in Pakistan. Furthermore, it argues that partisanship in urban Punjab and clientelism in rural Punjab plays a dominant role in determining voting behaviour. However, the scope of this book is limited to electoral politics in Punjab (Wilder, 1999).

Inaytullah in his article "Perspective in Rural power structure in West Pakistan" (1963) argues that voting behaviour in present day Punjab is mostly determined by social structures and group identities such as baradari, family, tribe and clan etc. Though this work is about voting behaviour in Punjab but some of his conclusions

can also be applied to voting patterns in some areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as there too social structure plays an important role (Inaytullah, 1963).

Though considerable research has been conducted on voting behaviour in the country, voting patterns in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa still do not feature much in it. In this regard, some of the most important works are discussed below.

Javed Kamran Bashir's N.W.F.P. Elections of 1970: An Analysis (1973) focuses on 1970 elections only. The work discusses social and economic characteristics of various constituencies in the province during the elections. The work provides good insight into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's electoral politics but the shortcoming of this work is that the researcher has not paid attention to various determinants of voting behaviour in the province (Bashir, 1973). Imdad Ali Khan (1986) in "Voting Behaviour in Rural NWFP: A Study of People's Participation in Election" has discussed voting behaviour during provincial elections in mid 1980s. The author has tried to ascertain viewpoints of members of NWFP Assembly about local councils and voters' aspirations to participate in the decision making process and the implementation of developmental projects. He has also presented brief explanations of social and political determinants of voting patterns. For this study, the researcher employed client-patron theory and found that clientelism was a major determinant of voting behaviour. He found that voters mostly focused on issues of local nature like employment opportunities, poverty alleviation, educational and health facilities, water scarcity, and infrastructure etc. In addition to clientelism, the researcher found that social structure also influenced voting behaviour. (Khan, 1986).

Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad's PhD dissertation (2010) is one of the few works thoroughly focused on electoral politics of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The dissertation

covers general elections from 1988 to 1997. The researcher challenges the widely held perception that social determinants play a greater role in shaping voting behaviour. Instead, he argues that in urban areas of the province, it is political determinants of voting behaviour like political party and party leaders which play greater role while in rural areas it is patronage that determines voting patterns (Shakeel, 2010).

Another important work is Farmanullah's PhD dissertation entitled "*Voting Behaviour in Pakistan: A Case Study of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2008 General Elections*" in which he has tested the applicability of voting theories like clientelism, party identification, issue voting, ethnic, and religious voting in three elections (2002-2013). The researcher argues that theories of clientelism and issue orientation have higher applicability as compared to the other three---partisanship, voting on the basis of religion and ethnicity (Farmanullah, 2014). According to Farmanullah, theory of issue orientation is the most relevant in the context of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as 80.9% of the respondents said they vote on the basis of issues. The second most relevant factor in determining voting behaviour is clientelism. Farmanullah claims that theory of party identification is the least relevant in case of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Farmanullah, 2014).

Rauf and Shah (2015) in their paper have tried to ascertain the determinants of turnout in Charsadda, a district in Peshawar valley of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The major data collection tool they used was a survey questionnaire. According to this study's findings, the major reasons for low turnout are voters' distrust of politicians and the electoral system, difficulties in accessing polling stations, the fact that many people live abroad due to their jobs, and socio-cultural traditions (Rauf & Shah, 2015). Farmanullah and Jan (2016) conducted their study on voting behaviour in NA-2

Peshawar in 2008 general elections. They conclude that party identification does not play a key role in shaping voting behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as other factors like issue also play an important role (Farmanullah & Jan, 2016).

Badshah, Rehman, and Muhammad (2018) in their study of 2002, 2008, and 2013 elections have highlighted the role of political parties, candidates, issues, and ideology. They argue that party identification plays the most important role among different political determinants of voting behaviour. They have also pointed out the importance of party leadership especially in case of PTI (Badshah, Rehman, & Muhammad, 2018).

Shah (2019), in his PhD work "Voting Behaviour in Pakistan: An Analysis of Partisan and Floating Voters in General Elections 2013 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa" has analyzed the role played by party identification, issue, candidate personality, religion, family, clan, and social networks in determining voting behaviour in KP. He concludes that, despite the fact that several socio-political and economic factors influence voting behaviour, floating voters play a crucial role in determining election results in KP.

Another work is of Farmanullah and Islam (2019) in which they have tested the applicability of issue voting in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The study is mainly based on quantitative data collected through a survey in NA-2 Peshawar². The authors argue that issues played a crucial role in shaping voting behaviour in 2002, 2008, and 2013 general elections. In 2002 general elections, they claim, religious parties' slogan of implementation of sharia and their opposition of the US invasion of Afghanistan was the major factor in influencing voting behaviour in favor of MMA. In the case of the

² Now constituencies have been newly demarcated, so NA-2 does not fall in Peshawar.

2008 elections, they argue that ANP's slogans of safeguarding Pashtuns' rights enabled it to win seats. Similarly, the authors argue that PTI won the 2013 elections due to its slogan of change (Farmanullah and Islam, 2019). Shah, Shah, and Khattak (2019) in their paper "Candidate's Personality and Voting Preferences in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa" have tried to know about influence of candidate personality, their economic and political clout, and participation in sorrowful and joyous events in the constituencies on voting behaviour (Shah, Shah, & Khattak, 2019).

The above mentioned and other researchers have made invaluable insights into the field of voting behaviour in Pakistan in general and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in particular. They have applied and tested different research methodologies and theoretical frameworks while studying voting behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Though the above cited works have discovered new aspects of electoral studies in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, still they suffer from some methodological and theoretical issues³.

Other works focusing on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa also lack an in-depth and coherent analysis of voting behaviour among Pashtuns. In most of the works, the authors have collected data for 2-3 questions focusing on one or two of the voting determinants in isolation due to which we do not have a complete and contextual analysis of the phenomenon. No researcher has applied theoretical works in a systematic and organized manner. Thus, there is enough gap for more and organized research on the topic. It was in this context that this researcher decided to conduct his research on voting behaviour among Pashtuns by taking Swabi district as a case study. The

³ For detailed critique of these works, see Critique of earlier studies on voting behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in chapter 6.

researcher applied theoretical approaches to the voting behaviour in a comprehensive, systematic, and organized way to reach logical conclusions. An interesting aspect of this study is its comparative analysis of its findings with some major previous works.

1.9 Research Methodology

1.9.1 Mixed Method

An important characteristic of case studies happens to be a mixed method which is also referred to as triangulation. According to Cresswell & Clark (2011), as quoted by Almeidai (2018), "mixed methods research is a research design (or methodology) in which the researcher collects, analyzes, and mixes (integrates or connects) both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or a multiphase program of inquiry." Triangulation is used to analyze the case from different aspects while at the same time it helps in ensuring case study's validity (Johansson, 2003).

According to Denzin, there are four types of triangulation. They are data triangulation (use of different sources for data collection for the same study), investigator triangulation (use of several researchers), theory triangulation (use of more than one theories for interpreting the data), and methodological triangulation (using different components of either qualitative/quantitative method or both) (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). Mixed method actually combines both qualitative and quantitative research methods for the same study for providing a complete and diversified inquiry of the matter at hand. This method is used for overcoming the limitations of qualitative and quantitative methods employed independently and for collecting information which cannot be obtained by using just one of the two methods (Almeidai, 2018).

For purposes of deeper understanding of the subject matter and corroboration (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007), this researcher used a mixed method for conducting his study. This method provides enough freedom to analyze quantitative and qualitative data independently (in which interview questions do not depend upon the findings of quantitative data and vice versa) or dependently by letting the interview questions depend upon the outcomes of the analysis of the questionnaire data (or vice versa) (Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017). This researcher first conducted extensive literature review and then collected statistical data. For the collection of statistical data, a survey was conducted in the district and official reports released by various departments of the provincial and federal governments, results declared by Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), figures published in different newspapers, surveys conducted by other researchers and research organizations, and reports of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) etc. were consulted.

After collecting quantitative data, the researcher tried to seek answers for the findings through qualitative data. For this purpose, the researcher employed both primary and secondary sources. For primary sources, the researcher conducted formal and informal interviews with politicians, political workers, journalists, academics, students, and common people, held focus group discussions with university and college students, teachers, and common people, and gathered information through observations both during the campaign of 2018 elections and later while conducting the survey and interviews.

Though the researcher would conduct informal interviews and would make observations during the election campaign and later during the survey, he conducted the formal interviews and focus group discussions (the main component of qualitative

data in this case) after compiling quantitative data. Thus, his approach can be termed as a sequential mixed method, an approach in which a researcher first collects qualitative or quantitative data and then the other type of data (Almeidai, 2018).

1.9.2 Quota Sampling

Probability sampling is considered as the best option for conducting surveys in social sciences. However, use of probability sampling sometimes happens to be unsuitable as the prevailing circumstances do not permit its use (Babbie, 2002). This study is one example of situations that do not permit probability sampling.

Swabi district is mostly rural. It is divided into hundreds of villages of various sizes spreading over an area of 1543 sq.km with a population of 1624616 persons. During the 2018 elections, there were 912,669 registered voters in the district. Thus, conducting a survey in the district through probability sampling needed huge resources and time. Being a self-financed study and having time constraints, the researcher did not have enough financial resources and time to conduct such a survey. In addition to resources and time constraints, there were also some other practical constraints due to which the researcher could not adopt probability sampling.

For example, gender segregation is an important characteristic of the social fabric of the society. Thus, one is not always sure that he will be able to get access to every female voter selected in the sample selected through random probability sampling. As majority of the people do not know about survey research and sampling, convincing them to allow you to talk to their womenfolk is almost impossible. This issue can be overcome by hiring services of females, but doing so was not possible: firstly due to financial constraints and secondly due to a sense of insecurity among the people to

frankly talk about political issues to strangers, even females⁴. Finding female workers ready to go anywhere in the district for conducting interviews from those selected in the sample was also not possible.

One option to reduce expenses and time while conducting probability sampling can be done through the use of modern communication techniques such as telephone, mobile, and email. However, this option also could not be utilized in the target district because neither every voter in the district uses modern means like mobile and email nor is there any repository containing data of all those who do use them. In the absence of some kind of easily accessible data repository, collecting mobile or telephone numbers and emails addresses of respondents selected in the random probability sampling is next to impossible. Even if one collects mobile numbers or email addresses of all those selected for the sample, still there is no guarantee that the response rate will be satisfactory keeping in view people's hesitation to talk to strangers and respond to questions that might look sensitive to them.

Keeping the above points/limitations in mind, one can easily understand that probability sampling was not possible for this study. Therefore, the researcher had to choose one from various types of non-probability sampling techniques. The main alternative to probability sampling is quota sampling (Bock, n.d). Thus, the researcher chose Quota Sampling for conducting his survey for this study, which some social scientists claim to be nearly as good as probability sampling (Bryman, 2018). Visser, Krosnick, Lavrakas, and Kim (2002) even argue that if quotas are allocated according to correct

⁴ The researcher faced severe difficulties even getting questionnaires filled from people whom he contacted through acquaintances. In some cases, he was subjected to thorough interviews about the purpose of the study, his family background, income sources, and reasons for selecting Swabi district for research. In one case, a government official whom the researcher approached for some official data indirectly refused to accept the justifications presented by the researcher for selecting Swabi for his research.

information about the composition of a given population then the sample may be more representative of the population than a sample drawn through random probability sampling. However, they urge researchers to take utmost care in selection of respondents while employing nonprobability sampling (Visser, Krosnick, Lavrakas, & Kim, 2002).

Quota sampling is used for giving representation to various segments of a given population (like people from different age groups, genders, socio-economic classes, regions, and professions etc.) according to their share in the population under study (Bryman, 2018). Unlike stratified sampling in which the ultimate respondents are selected through random sampling, respondents in quota sampling are selected by the interviewer by using his/her judgmental capabilities (Bryman, 2018). The share of each group in the sample is determined on the basis of data like census or other reliable figures (Bryman, 2018).

This researcher divided the target population in two broader quotas of male and female voters. According to the 2017 census, there were 815,526 male and 809,047 females in the district. Similarly, total registered voters in the district in 2018 were 912669 with 514,651 male (56.4%) and 398,018 (43.6%) female voters. Thus, common sense dictates that the sample should have been divided between male and female voters either on the basis of their shares in population or electoral rolls. However, this formula did not work for this study as female turnout has always been very low in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. For example, female share in the polled votes in Swabi in 2018 general elections was 33% on the two National Assembly constituencies while 33.5% on the five provincial assembly constituencies in the district. Therefore, the researcher allocated 33% of the sample to female voters.

Like any city with more than 1.5 million residents, Swabi district is heterogeneous in nature. Its population can be subdivided on the basis of wealth, place of residence, education, and age etc. For example, the research allocated more questionnaires to voters below 45 years of age because Pakistan is one of the youngest countries in the world. According to a UNDP report of 2017, 64% of Pakistan's population was below 30 years of age while 29% of its population was between 15 and 29 years of age (Kundi, 2018). The researcher tried his best to give due representation to people with various levels of education from illiterate to highest level. Similarly, every possible effort was made to also give proper share in the sample to people of different professions and income groups. For this purpose, the research visited Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS) and requested the concerned authorities to provide latest data including 2017 census. Unfortunately, no such data was provided on the ground that the census was still not approved by the cabinet. It was on the basis of interviews with local journalists, local officials and some old reports that the researcher prepared kind of quotas in the sample. Details of quotas are given in table 01.

1.9.3 Sample Size

In survey research, the principle is that the larger the sample size the greater the accuracy of the findings will be, because large sample size will reflect the opinion of the target population more accurately. However, still there is no fixed criteria for it. In most cases, decisions about the final sample size are influenced by factors like time and cost (Dawson, 2002) and population variability. Thus, the final decision about the sample size represents a compromise between the constraints on the one hand, while need for precision on the other hand (Bryman, 2018). For this purpose, there are several statistical formulas that are used for determining the final size of a sample. These

formulas are based on different statistical approaches taking into account factors like level of confidence, margin of error, and total population size (Taherdoost, 2017).

Margin of error is the risk a researcher is ready to accept in his findings. In social sciences surveys, 5% margin of error is acceptable. For example, there is a survey on level of satisfaction in conjugal relationship and 60% respondents indicate to be totally satisfied, it means the exact percentage of totally satisfied people lies somewhere between 55% and 65% (the survey finding plus or minus 5%). The level of confidence is the degree to which a researcher can be sure that the sample has accurately estimated the opinion of the target population (Taherdoost, 2017). For example, a researcher claims that confidence level in his survey is 95% then it means that if the poll or survey were repeated over and over again, 95% of the times the results would match the results from the actual population. While keeping margin of error at 4.4% and level of confidence at 95%, the researcher derived a sample size of 496 (though filled 500) through online calculator. Thus, the sample size for this study was 500 questionnaires.

While going to field for a survey, a researcher needs to keep in mind the possible non-response rate while finalizing sample size (Dawson, 2002). It means that a researcher does not always get responses from all included in the sample. Thus, if he/she plans to keep a sample's size of 500 people and also thinks that a specific percentage of the selected respondents will not respond, then he/she should keep the sample size higher than the number he/she actually wants to fill. For example, if a researcher wants to fill 450 questionnaires and there is possibility of some 20% non-response rate then he/she should distribute 540 questionnaires because the 90 sample members (20%) will be excluded due to non-response (Bryman, 2012).

Table No. 01: Quotas and their shares in the sample.

Gender-wise		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Female		165	33.0	33.0
Male		335	67.0	100.0
Total		500	100.0	
		Profession-wise		Cumulative Percent
		Farmer/laborer	105	21.0
		Government servant	62	12.4
		Housewife	81	16.2
		Jobless/unemployed	31	6.2
		Not Declared	1	.2
		Personal business	73	14.6
		Private job	74	14.8
		Student	73	14.6
		Total	500	100.0
		Monthly Income-wise		Cumulative Percent
		20,000-40,000	147	29.4
		40,000-60,000	96	19.2
		60,000-80,000	55	11.0
		More than 80,000.	38	7.6
		Not Declared	13	2.6
		Up to 20,000	151	30.2
		Total	500	100.0
		Education-wise		Cumulative Percent
		Graduation (14 Years)	97	19.4
		Illiterate	97	19.4
		Masters and Above	92	18.4
		Matric - Intermediate (10 - 12 Years)	134	26.8
		Not Declared	1	.2
		Up to Middle	79	15.8
		Total	500	100.0
		Age-wise		Cumulative Percent
		19-30 years	171	34.2
		31-45 years	163	32.6
		46-60 years	117	23.4
		Above 60 years	49	9.8
		Total	500	100.0

As this researcher was supposed to fill 500 questionnaires, so he distributed 750 questionnaires. Out of 750, the researcher received 530 questionnaires. As the researcher was simultaneously entering the date in google form, thus the questionnaires received at the end were excluded unless there were some that were needed for completing the allotted quota of a particular group. For example, the researcher included some questionnaires received in the end because he had to complete the quota of more than 60 years old voters. For providing proper quotas to all groups, the researcher stopped entering data after 450 questionnaires were entered. The purpose

was to ensure that all the groups have their due share in the final 500 sample. Had the researcher continued entering the questionnaire data that he received first, the share of young voters would have been more than the researcher actually wanted.

1.9.4 Quantitative Questionnaire

The main instrument used for collecting quantitative data for this study was survey questionnaire with close-ended questions. It consisted of 48 questions with some having multiple choices while others yes/no options. Most of the questions with only yes/no options were followed by other questions directly related to the yes/no answers.

The questionnaire was divided into three parts but without any proper demarcation in the questionnaire. This division was based on the nature of questions. The first part was general in nature aimed at to know about voters' attitudes toward electoral politics. Its purpose was to know about voters' interest in politics, level of their participation in political activities, the extent of their trust in politicians, political parties, and the parliament, and their perceptions about the importance as well as impact of their votes. The second part of the questionnaire was about voters' practices during previous elections. In this part, they were asked as how regular they have been casting votes, how persistent they are in supporting a particular party, why they stopped voting for a party, why they consecutively voted for a particular party and when they made the decision about for whom to vote. The third part of the questionnaire was about role of theoretical voting models. Through this part, the researcher wanted to know the relevance of the three theoretical models of voting behaviour. For this purpose, the research first presented the various components of the three models as three separate choices to ascertain their relative weightage among the voters. In the following questions, components of each model were listed in separate questions to ascertain their

relative importance within the model. At the end, components of all three models were mixed and listed as choices and the respondents were asked to choose one among them. The objective here was to ascertain the importance of each component of all the three models put together.

Sometimes, the order of choices in close-ended questions in a questionnaire affects respondents' answers as some people prefer to go for the options that appear first (primacy effect) (Visser, Krosnick, Lavrakas, & Kim, 2002). According to Krosnick & Alwin it is because of two reasons. They argue;

First, items presented early may establish cognitive framework or standard of comparison that guides interpretation of later items. Because of their role in establishing the framework, early items may be accorded special significance in subsequent judgements. Second, items presented early are likely to be subjected to deeper cognitive processing; by the time a respondent considers the later alternatives, his or her mind is likely to be cluttered with thoughts about previous alternatives that exhibit extensive consideration of later ones. Research on problem solving suggests that the deeper processing accorded to early items is likely to be dominated by generation of cognitions that justify selection of these early items.... Later items are less likely to stimulate such justifications (because they are less carefully considered) and may therefore be selected less frequently. (Krosnick & Alwin, 1987, p 202-03).

In order to avoid the influence of primacy factors on responses, scholars suggest that options of closed-ended questions should be rotated (Visser et al., 2002). This researcher also applied this formula of changing question order to avoid primacy effect. The order of multiple options to questions was presented in 4 ways so that every choice may be placed in different positions and thus reduce primacy effect to maximum possible level.

In addition to survey, the researcher also used other sources of primary and secondary quantitative data. For this purpose, data released by ECP, PBS, and different

departments of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government was extensively used in this research. Data published in books, research papers, and newspapers was also utilized.

1.9.5 Population

All registered voters (registered by ECP in voters' list for the district) comprised the population or universe of this study. According to ECP website, there were 912669 registered voters in the district at the time of conducting this survey. This population was divided into quotas on the basis of gender, age, education, social class, and occupation/profession. Sample was drawn from every stratum of the given population (Johnson, Reynolds, & Mycoff, 2008) and individual voters were used as units of analysis for the study.

1.10 Organization of the Study

This study is divided into the following chapters.

Chapter one is introductory in nature presenting introduction, rationale of the study, objectives and significance of the study, limitations and operational definition of certain terms, research methodology, and literature review.

The second chapter gives a detailed account of the theoretical framework set for the study.

In the third chapter, the researcher has tried to present a brief history of electoral politics of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The electoral history of the province starts with 1932 elections and then covers all the elections till 2018. The basic purpose of this chapter is to familiarize the readers with electoral practices and election results in the province from the beginning. However, the indirect elections and the non-party based elections during

the regimes of the two military dictators are not covered in this chapter. The chapter also presents divisions of the province into four electoral regions with their specific dynamics. There is also discussion on the phenomenon of electables and the PTI wave.

Chapter four gives a detailed overview of Swabi district (the case study). This chapter presents information about physical features, geography, ancient history, people, economy, infrastructure, education and health systems, and political as well as electoral history of the district. There is also discussion about the role of the district in Khudai Khidmatgar Movement and the Pakistan Movement.

In the fifth chapter, the researcher gives an overview of voters' attitudes toward electoral politics and politicians. This is based on survey data and tries to present people's perceptions about politics, voting, politicians, and the parliament. Furthermore, it gives details about people's attitudes toward female candidature, rigging, and the value of their votes etc.

Chapter six is about voters' practical experiences. It mostly presents details about voters' past practices during elections. For example, it contains information whether voters have been voting for same party consecutively, what are the main reasons due to which voters voted for parties of their choice, why some voters decided not to vote for the party for which they voted earlier, how many voters have voted for someone mistakenly, have they voted for two parties in same elections (voting for one party at provincial and the other national constituency), have they voted for someone due to some pressure, and when they made their decisions about their vote etc.

Seventh chapter presents a detailed account about the relevance of the three voting models (theoretical framework) in Swabi. On the one hand, this chapter presents a

comparative analysis of relevance of the three models while on the other hand, it gives an insight about the relevance of each component within the three models. There is also comparison with and critique of earlier studies' findings about relevance of different theoretical approaches.

Eighth chapter is the last chapter/conclusion and it presents thematic analyses of major findings of the study. Based on survey data, there emerged four major themes of this study.

Chapter 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK⁵

2.1 Introduction

The modern study of voting behaviour started at Columbia University just before the 1940 presidential elections when a team of researchers led by Paul Lazarsfeld started using survey research for the scientific study of voting behaviour (Bartels, 2010). Since 1940, researchers in the field of electoral studies have presented different explanations about determinants of voting behaviour. Some of these explanations received more attention than others and have caused the most debate in literature on voting behaviour (Hutchings & Jefferson, 2018). Thus, there emerged three major theoretical approaches to the scientific study of voting behaviour. They are: the sociological model which is also known as School of Columbia, the psychosocial model known as School of Michigan, and the Rational Choice Theory also called School of Rochester or model of economic voting (Antunes, 2010 & Antwi, 2018). These models have their origins in the disciplines of sociology, psychology and economics, respectively (Visser, 1998). In the following paragraphs, a detailed account of all the three theoretical models is being presented.

⁵ The theoretical framework has also been published in HEC recognized "Y" category journal with the student as the principal author and his principal supervisor as the co-author. The title of the published article is Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Voting Behaviour: A Comparative Analysis. DOI: [https://doi.org/10.36902/sjesr-vol3-iss3-2020\(65-73\)](https://doi.org/10.36902/sjesr-vol3-iss3-2020(65-73))

2.2. Sociological Model or Columbia School of Voting Behaviour

It was in 1939 when psychology entered the field of election studies when Paul Lazarsfeld along with other colleagues at Columbia University planned a systematic study of presidential elections of 1940 in Erie County (Visser, 1994). This pioneering study explaining factors influencing individuals' voting decisions was the first to be based on a sample survey and compiled in the form of 'The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign.' This study conducted by scholars at Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Research ultimately led to the emergence of the sociological model of voting behaviour also known as Columbia Model of voting behaviour (Antunes, 2010; Hutchings & Jefferson, 2018). The basic assumptions of this model are explained in three major works: "The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign," "Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign," and "Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications," published in 1944, 1954, and 1955, respectively (Antunes, 2010).

For conducting this survey based study, the Columbia team selected a panel of 600 respondents whom they interviewed seven times before the elections (Bartels, 2010). One of the goals of this study was to ascertain the impact of mass media on voters' decision making process. The results shocked the researchers as 546 out of 600 respondents had already made their voting decisions even before the campaign could be started. Thus, the research team in its analysis put more emphasis on external factors, especially the influence of voters' primary groups. According to the findings of this study, voting decisions are determined by social forces. The researchers found that

171 34895

social groups' active members (opinion makers) interposed between the media content and the members of the social groups, thus disseminating the media messages in the less involved (less active) group members in a way congenial to the political standards of the group members (Visser, 1994). Furthermore, the research team found that voters viewed media messages in a selective manner to filter propaganda which contradicted their own opinions, so there was little room for political parties to attract voters toward themselves through election campaign (Visser, 1998).

Contrary to the hypothesis that voting decisions were influenced by voter' personality and media, the research team discovered that social groups to which voters belong play a decisive role in voters' decision making process. The investigators argued that the relationship between voting behaviour and voters' social groups was so strong that voters' choices could be explained by just focusing on three elements: religion, socio-economic class, and place of residence. The combination of these three was termed as "Index of Political Predisposition." It argued that instead of election campaigns and debates on issues by the candidates, the undecided voters or those who changed their mind during the campaign were pressured by their fellow social group members to vote for a particular candidate (Antunes, 2010).

The Columbia team found that the media content played an insignificant role in changing voters' choices as most of these choices were rooted in strong loyalties of social class and religion reinforced by interactions with like-minded acquaintances (Bartels, 2010). It argued that an election campaign's two effects were reinforcement of choices made by earlier deciders and motivation of latent predispositions of voters who were uncommitted. The researchers claimed that these predispositions activated by electoral campaigns were linked with social characteristics called Index of Political

Predispositions (IPP) (Hutchings & Jefferson, 2018). The advocates of this model observed, "[i]n a way, the content of this chapter can be summarized by saying that people vote, not only with their social group, but also for it" (Antunes, 2010, p. 147).

The Columbia team conducted another study in Elmira community in New York in 1948 and the findings of this study were published in 1954 in the shape of another influential work titled "Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign" (Bartels, 2010). The second study reaffirmed the fundamental role of religion, socio-economic position, place of residence and race in voting behaviour. The authors wrote, "In contemporary America these conditions are best met in class, in ethnic and in ecological divisions of the population. They continue to provide, then, the most durable social bases for political cleavage." (Antunes, 2010: p. 150). Social cleavages refer to the differences in social and political values held by people of different religious, class, or ethnic groups that may influence individuals' political choices (Evans & Ball, 2018).

Sociological model of voting behaviour focuses on the individual and the social structure surrounding the individual. Thus, it places votes in social context and then studies the effects of variables such as social class, religion, nationalism, language, and rural-urban divisions (Scott & Marshall, 2009; Hutchings & Jefferson, 2018; Antwi, 2018). According to this theory, the individual learns their partisan predilection corresponding to the political orientations of the group to which he/she belongs. (Aiba, 2002).

According to the proponents of this model, family has a deep impact on political socialization of children and their attachment with a particular party. This effect is well manifested by Greenstein's (1969) classic quotation of an 11 year old Jennifer saying

"all I know is we are not Republicans, my father isn't." In the words of David Denver, as quoted by Dinas (2017), it is through family socialization that people come to know about the "goodies and the baddies" in the political environment surrounding them. Thus, partisan inclinations among people precede a rational and articulate understanding of politics. The impression created on the minds of offspring by parents remains intact even after they no longer live with their parents. Research studies have established that the level of partisan similarity between offspring and parents remains fairly high and wears away slowly during offspring's adult life (p. 266).

According to the sociological model, the values and norms acquired in the early phase of life play an important role throughout life and influence individuals' attitudes and behaviour. This model further argues that partisanship is learnt by voters as part of their socialization and that voting decisions are also greatly impacted by political socialization. The social differences translate into political ones because each social group has its own interests based on its needs and this difference in their interests plays a significant role in determining their partisanship. As social relations of different classes rarely go beyond their own social standing, so they support political parties that protect their specific interests in a better way (Sharma & Jovanoski, 2014).

This approach gets hold of attitudinal (psychological) factors as dependent variables caused by daily experiences of the individuals in social relations (Aiba, 2002). Therefore, political parties and candidates have little chance to change voters' attitudes in their favor (Visser, 1994). According to this model, the change of votes by some voters from one party to another during the election campaign or between two elections is the result of cross-pressures, (opposite forces pulling the voter in different directions) which the researchers claimed to be mainly social in character arising from voters'

membership in social groups having different voting inclinations (Visser, 1998). In the words of authors of the first book of Columbia team⁶, "a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially. Social characteristics determine political preference" (Visser, 1994, p. 46).

Like class, religion also shapes people's perceptions. The difference between the two is that class shapes perception on the basis of redistribution of resources while religion on other grounds⁷ (Evans & Ball, 2018). Having membership of a religious group is something more than just identification with this particular group. A devoted member of a religious group is supposed to take part in specific religious services and adhere to certain behavioral norms enforced through "social control or social pressure." Deviation from certain norms may lead to some consequences for the group member. Thus, there develops a link between the membership of a religious group and voting which then leads to "social predisposition" of casting votes for particular parties/candidates. Most of the religions provide for communication of these attitudinal norms by priests who also indoctrinate as what is pious and what is sinful or profane. These priests or religious figures do not operate independently rather they are part of a "large-scale clerical hierarchy." The presence of such large-scale organizations presents the explanation for uniformity among members of a specific group (Elff and Roßteutscher, 2017, p. 202).

The common believers are not always in a position to conclude on their own about required behaviour as dictated by their religion but they receive guidance from clergyman and religiously or politically involved contacts about voting or everyday life practices and thus engage in "theology by proxy." Even if this guidance is not enough

⁶ The People's Choice. How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign.

⁷ Abortion, gay marriage, and euthanasia in the West and status of women in society and requirements of individuals to serve on certain offices in Pakistan.

to clearly tell the group members about their vote preferences still it will enable them to develop a kind of understanding about certain issues and thus take positions (Elff & Roßteutscher, 2017, p. 202).

Pillarisation is another phenomenon which creates linkage between members of a particular religious group and voting. Pillarisation is politico-denominational segregation of a society. In other words, it means the division of society into incompatible segments grouped not only by certain beliefs and ways of life but also by segmental organizations that take care of particular groups' several aspects of life ranging from social assistance to recreational activities and thus providing for the specific groups' members "from the cradle to the grave." Pillarization can create stable patterns of denominational or religious voting but historical experiences suggest that pillarization cannot perpetuate such voting patterns permanently. For example, in 1970s, Netherlands' three confessional parties, Catholic People's Party, Christian Historical Union, and Anti-Revolutionary Party, representing Catholics, moderate Calvinists, and orthodox and revivalist Calvinists merged into a cross-sectional party Christian Democratic Appeal⁸ (CDA) (Elff & Roßteutscher, 2017, 203). In Pakistan, the existence of different religious parties having their exclusive vote banks and the formation of MMA is a perfect example of politico-denominational segregation and religious parties' efforts to attract voters by forming an alliance. However, CDA is still functioning while MMA collapsed and reorganized.

Due to some shortcomings, this model gave rise to another one called Michigan Model developed by scholars as University of Michigan (Hutchings & Jefferson, 2018). However, an important contribution of Lazarsfeld and his team was that by employing

⁸ The merger was carried out to stop their declining popularity.

survey research for these studies, they demonstrated the potential of this new research technique for the study of electoral studies (Bartels, 2010).

2.3. Psychosocial Model or Michigan Model of Voting Behaviour

After Columbia school, the next development in electoral studies came from a team of researchers at University of Michigan (Bartels, 2010). A group of scholars at University of Michigan, while criticizing the Columbia Model, developed an alternative model of voting behaviour known as Michigan Model of voting behaviour (Visser, 1994). This model of voting behaviour was developed as a result of studies on 1948, 1952, and 1956 presidential elections carried out by researchers like Campbell, Kahn, Gurin, Miller, Converse, and Stokes in the Survey Research Center (SRC), the University of Michigan. The findings of these studies were compiled in the form of well-known books like *The People Elect a President*, *The Voter Decides*, and *The American Voter*. The theoretical work started by SRC was then taken forward by several other institutions (Antunes, 2010).

SRC's involvement in electoral studies was kind of accidental. In 1948, SRC conducted a survey on public policy issues and included one question about respondents' intentions about voting in presidential elections that year. After the election results, it emerged that findings of the commercial pollsters about the election results proved wrong while only SRC had accurately predicted the election outcome. Later, the SRC team again returned to its sample for post-election interviews (Visser, 1994, 46) to evaluate the impact of different sociological, psychological, and political factors on vote behaviour (Bartels, 2010). The findings of this study were presented in 1952 in the form of *The People Elect a President* (Visser, 1994, 46). After this study, the SRC conducted four national surveys from 1952 to 1958 and the data was analyzed by a team of inter-

disciplinary researchers. Unlike the surveys of the Columbia team, the samples for surveys conducted by the Michigan team were taken from across the country (Bartels, 2010).

The psychosocial model focuses on political factors as determinants of voting behaviour (Antunes, 2010) as it links voting decisions to the psychological predispositions of voters like their party identifications and attitudes towards the candidates etc.(Scott & Marshall, 2009). The model identifies six psychological factors that may influence voters' decision-making process. These factors are: (I) Party identification, (II) Concerns with issues, (III) Personal attachment to candidates, (IV) Conformity to the group standards, (V) Sense of efficacy and (VI) Sense of civic obligation to vote. Of these six factors, party identification, candidate orientation and issue orientation are considered to be the most important ones (Aiba, 2002). Party identification means psychological attachment of a person with a specific political party. Issue orientation means a voter's attitude toward issues highlighted during an election campaign while candidate orientation means voters' attitudes toward personal qualities and performance of a particular candidate (Akhter & Sheikh, 2014).

The central theme of this model is partisanship or party identification. According to this model, partisanship is a durable association with a political party which does not necessarily mean formal registration as its member or constantly voting for it (Antunes, 2010). It argues that partisanship is the outcome of pre-adult socialization of individuals under the influence of their parents. The scholars proposing this model argue that individuals develop partisanship under parental influence just like their acquisition of religious beliefs. For substantiating this claim, they claimed that the survey data showed that an overwhelming majority of their respondents were likely to identify themselves

with parties with which their parents identified themselves (Hutchings & Jefferson, 2018).

The psychological model, while also recognizing the importance of social factors, argues that social characteristics in a given population do change but very slowly and over a long period of time but the changes in voting patterns occur from one election to another. According to this model, these oscillations in election results within a short time period cannot be attributed to independent variables (social factors) which almost remain the same during the time during which there occurs huge fluctuation in voting patterns. Thus, the psychological model looks at this change in voting trends as the result of political factors like issue and candidate that change in a short time period (Akhter & Sheikh, 2014).

The argument which the American Voter presented was that voters' attitudes about issues, candidates, and political parties were factors that subsequently predicted vote choice. The book further argues that intensity of partisanship of voters could determine their assessment of the candidates and position on issues (Hutchings & Jefferson, 2018) and thus voting decision.

2.1.2.1 Partisanship

As stated earlier, the central theme of this model is partisanship or party identification. Party identification is the durable attachment with political parties which basically starts in early phases of political socialization (Dinas, 2017). According to this model, party identification is a sense of psychological attachment with any political party like a sense of attachment with one's social class, religious, or racial group (Hutchings & Jefferson, 2018). Party affiliation, like religious affiliation, often originates within the family

(Thomassen & Rosema, 2009) but is also influenced by attitudes and values of colleagues and peers (Antunes, 2010). In the words of Campbell and his colleagues at University of Michigan, party identification means "the sense of personal attachment which the individual feels towards the party of his choice" (Thomassen & Rosema, 2009, p. 43). According to this argument, voters have long association with political parties without any regard to candidates or issues in specific elections. Voters may occasionally defect from their parties and vote for other candidates but usually they return to the party with which they feel a sense of attachment (Bowler, 2018). Thus, partisanship progresses as a mode of identity, embedded in people's early socialization and operating as a perceptual screen of simultaneous political attitudes (Dinas, 2017).

This model's central idea is that voters' evaluation of candidates in elections is mainly guided by their psychological sense of attachment to a political party (Green & Baltes, 2017). It argues that partisanship provides shortcuts to voters due to which they require less amount of information to process. They don't need understanding of complex ideological and issue positions as political parties provide them cues about them (Bowler, 2018). Partisanship provides simple and important signals to voters while making complex political decisions (Bonneau & Cann, 2013).

According to psychosocial theory, party identification becomes part of the identity of voters like their national identity. It argues that just like people are identified as Americans, Germans, and Macedonians, so they are also identified with particular parties like Liberals, Conservatives, Socialists, and Liberal Democrats etc. (Sharlamanov & Jovanoski, 2014). The authors of *The American Voter* wrote that;

Few factors are of greater importance for our national elections than the lasting attachments of tens of millions of Americans to one of the parties. These loyalties establish a basic division of electoral strength within

which the competition of particular campaigns takes place. (Campbell et al. 1960, 121).

According to the Michigan model, partisanship is fairly stable but definitely not unchanging (Bartels, 2010). The proponents of this model point out two factors for any such changes: personal forces and social forces. Personal forces are changes in voters' social environment and exclusively depend on the voters' personal circumstances (Hutchings & Jefferson, 2018) such as joining higher education institution, contracting marriage, shifting to a new area of residence, or switching one's job etc. (Antunes, 2010). Social forces involve experiences that are shared by a large number of people within the society (Hutchings & Jefferson, 2018) like fascist government's end in Portugal, joining of European Union, or disintegration of the former USSR. Between the two, the changes of the former type occur comparatively frequently but it is the latter types which have a faster and deeper impact on electoral trends (Antunes, 2010).

Some scholars questioned some of the aspects of party identification theory and introduced its revisionist view. According to this new theorization of party identification, it is neither rooted in identity forming experiences nor does it result in fixed political preferences. Instead, party identification is formed slowly in the light of recurrent experience with parties. According to this view, voters retrospectively assess government's performance and thus reach at their conclusions. According to this version of party identification, individuals add new information to their existing experiences with political parties and their stances on different issues, so changes become not only possible but likely with changes in the profiles of political parties. Thus, policy stances of parties and issues become more important here than socialization experiences. In other words, in this new version of party identification, present does matter as much as past or even more and thus continuity and change co-

exist (Dinas, 2017). They argue that partisanship attitude reflects an individual's judgement of parties' performance on issues important for the individual (Ahmad, 2010).

This model's argument of stable and lasting partisanship has been challenged by many researchers who claim that the relationship between individuals and political parties in the US and Europe is progressively fading. Model's inability to explain the logic as how some voters who identify themselves with one party can vote for another party also invites criticism from its critiques (Antunes, 2010).

Another major criticism of this model is that if party identification can influence voters' positions on issues and their evaluation of candidates, then these very factors can also influence party identification of voters. The proponents of this model, however, reject this criticism on the ground that voters generally lack ideological sophistication and political knowledge and that partisanship develops during adolescence and happens to be stable as compared to candidate and issue evaluation which usually develop at a later stage and also happen to be temporary. For changes in presidential election results in a short time period without corresponding redistribution of partisanship, Philip Converse, one of the authors of *The American Voter*, presented the concept of "short-term deviations from the normal vote." By this term, he meant the impact of short-lived circumstances like scandals or international issues on election results (Hutchings & Jefferson, 2018, p. 25).

Most of the claims made by the authors of *The American Voter* were replicated by scholars more than 50 years after the original work and published as *The American Voter Revisited*. The later proponents of the Michigan Model argue that partisanship should be looked at from the view point of 'social solidarity theory.' In other words,

they argue that party identification should be considered as social identity (Hutchings & Jefferson, 2018).

2.1.2.2 Issue and Candidate Orientation

Other important components of this model are issue orientation and candidate orientation (Aiba, 2002). It means voters' attitudes toward issues and candidates (Akhter & Sheikh, 2014). Issue voting mostly takes place during times of socio-economic disorder when political parties provide relatively different policy alternatives (Carmines & Stimson, 1980).

There are two different types of voting issues: hard issues and soft issues. The first type involves a mindful analysis of issues raised by parties. Voting decisions in this type of issue voting are the result of sophisticated calculus on the part of voters. Hard issue voting represents a conscious attempt by voters to use policy choices for making their final voting decisions. The voters, after thorough evaluation of policy preferences of various parties/candidates in a given election, vote for the parties/candidates who are nearest to them in terms of issue space. Hard issue voting is better exemplified by those who have cognitive skills. The second type, easy issue voting, takes place when an issue becomes so entrenched over a long time period that it actually shapes "gut responses" of voters to different parties and candidates. This type of issue voting does not require conceptual sophistication (Carmines & Stimson, 1980, p 80). In Pakistan, the anti-corruption slogan of PTI is a good example of easy issues.

It may be noted that political parties do not always need to take opposite stances to each other on every issue as there are many issues on which the opposite stance is not possible. For example, reducing crime rate, eradication of corruption, and protecting

the environment are issues on which everyone agrees (Brug, 2017). These are called valence issues and they are the issues where all voters want the same thing. On such issues, we find least difference in candidates' promises though they may disagree on their strategies for achieving the goals. In such circumstances, the voters have to select their candidates on some other criteria like level of voters' trust in candidates and their past performance. Candidates' personal vote also plays an important role in such a situation (Dowding, 2018).

Thus, parties prioritize some issues over others. As direct confrontation between parties on issues is not always the case, so parties emphasize issues on which they have good reputation and de-emphasize others. It was on the basis of these findings that the concept called "saliency theory of party competition" was developed by scholars. According to this theory, every competing party has certain policy issues to "own" (policy areas in which it has comparatively good reputation). Political parties expect gaining electoral support by highlighting the salience of "their" issues while campaigning for election, and thus see an incentive in constantly emphasizing these issues. In the West, it has been established through empirical studies that the salience of specific types of issues during election campaigns do influence aggregate election results (Brug, 2017, 522).

By prioritizing certain issues, according to Petrocik (1996), parties actually give signals to the electorate that it is more sincere, committed, and in a better position to address these issues (Petrocik, 1996). This prioritization of some policy issues by parties is called "issue ownership." It means that voters do link specific issues with certain parties and thus these parties become those issues' owners. The voters, while deciding about vote choice, think about issues that dominate election campaigns (Brug, 2017, 522). If

we look at the political landscape of Pakistan, we notice that different parties own different issues. For example, PTI's most important slogan is anti-corruption drive, PPP highlights its pro-poor policies, PML-N boast of its achievements in the fields of communication and economic growth, religious parties claim to enforce sharia, and ANP highlights its stance about secularization and provincial autonomy.

2.4. Rational Choice Model

The third and last model of voting behaviour is rational-choice model which tries to explain individuals' voting behaviour in economic terms (Antunes, 2010). This model claims that individuals' voting behaviour is an outcome of cost-benefit analysis. The voters, it argues, before casting votes, critically evaluate issues addressed and policies supported by various political parties and candidates (Scott & Marshall, 2009).

The most influential introducers of rational choice theory in electoral studies were economists Anthony Downs, Duncan Black, and Kenneth Arrow. Anthony Downs' seminal book (*An Economic Theory of Democracy*) is considered as the foundational work for engaging the Rational Choice Model for the study of voting behaviour (Klingelhofer, 2010). In this book, Downs argues that voters would assess candidates and their electoral platforms and would vote for the party on the basis of promises it made to deliver (Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck & Park, 2017). Proponents of this model argue that voters adjust their association with political parties during every election while keeping in view economic conditions and political parties' approach to them (Antunes, 2010). It further claims that voters cast votes for parties and candidates whose policy positions are closest to them (voters). Thus, voters keep in mind their own interests while deciding to vote for a party or candidate and these interests may be of personal nature or related to family, class, or group etc. (Dowding, 2018).

The premise of this model is that if the functioning of the market can be explained with rational choice assumptions then they can also be applied to the explanation of the political system. The theory basically establishes an analogy, on the one hand, between consumers and voters while on the other hand, between enterprises and political parties. It argues that just like enterprises that want to maximize profits and consumers who desire to maximize their utility, political parties struggle to maximize electoral gains and voters seek to maximize their votes' utility (Antunes, 2010). Downs expressed this point in the following words;

Our main thesis is that parties in democratic politics are analogous to entrepreneurs in a profit-seeking economy. So as, to attain their private ends, they formulate whatever policies they believe will gain the most votes, just as entrepreneurs produce whatever products they believe will gain the most profits for the same reason. In order to examine the implications of this thesis, we have assumed that citizens behave rationally in politics. This premise is itself a second major hypothesis. (Downs, 1957, pp, 295-96).

Downs further argues that neither political parties nor the voters are interested in ideologies. According to him, ideologies, for parties, are means for getting votes while for voters, ideologies are means to reduce costs of political information. Voters simplify the choice between parties because they do not need to get thorough information about a party's potential activities if it came into power. They, instead, can identify a party's idea of good society and their own place in that society. So, it can be said that ideological positions of candidates or parties are kind of "heuristics" (Elff, 2018, p, 138).

There are three main points of this model. (1) All decisions made by voters and political parties are rational as they are steered by self-interest and aimed at maximization of their actions' utility. According to this model, parties contest elections not due to altruistic motives, but to control power through which they will then secure gains and

prestige. Downs writes, "Upon this reasoning rests the fundamental hypothesis of our model: parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies" (Downs, 1957, p. 28) (2) Voters and parties are responsible and trustworthy actors, so consequences of their decisions are predictable as there is a level of consistency in democratic system. According to Downs, voters compare the expected results from both voting for the government and the opposition. In case they expect more from the government party, they will vote for it. But in case they expect less from it then they will vote for the party in opposition. However, if they expect no difference in results from the two parties, they will not vote. (3) The democratic system assumes a level of uncertainty (Antunes, 2010). It means lack of information about the course that events take. This uncertainty is manifold and may be found in any stage of political decision making process and usually has impact on both the voters and political parties as it controls the level of confidence with which the two make decisions (Downs, 1957).

2.1.3.1 Retrospective vs Prospective Voting

Within economic voting, there emerges the question of prospective and retrospective voting. It means whether voters assess parties' past performance (retrospective voting) or they vote with future expectations from the party (prospective voting). Most of the studies answering this question show the retrospective economic voting to be dominant (Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck & Park, 2017).

2.1.3.2 Pocketbook vs Sociotropic Voting

Another important question with regard to economic voting is whether people prefer their personal gains or improvement in national economic conditions. Studies

conducted in the US, Denmark and other countries show that most of the voters give preference to economic matters related to national economy (sociotropic) rather than pocketbook considerations (Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck & Park, 2017).

2.1.3.3 Strategic Voting

As the voters are rational actors, so they do not always vote for the candidate/party that they prefer the most. Sometimes, they go for strategic voting which means that they vote for a party which is not their favorite, but voting for it produces better results than voting for their first priority. For example, there is a small party which does not have enough chances of winning the contest. The voters who consider it as their first priority will vote for their second priority party to avoid wastage of their votes (McGann, 2016) (as their preferred party does not have fair chances of winning election). In other words, strategic voters deviate from their most preferred choice on the ballot list simply because the victory of a less preferred choice may better realize their expectations about possible benefits. They actually combine their candidate preference and their expectations that a particular party/candidate will win the election. A strategic voter votes for a less preferred choice if that choice has a high chance of electoral success (Gschwend & Meffert, 2017).

According to Downs, predicting other voters' preferences is an important part of voters' decision making process. He writes that "[e]ach citizen uses his forecast to determine whether the party he most prefers is really a part of the relevant range of choice. If he believes it is not, then rationality commands him to vote for some other party" (Downs, 1957, p. 48). Downs adds that a rational voter first makes the decision as to which party will benefit him the most and then tries to assess whether that particular party has any chances of winning elections. He writes that voters do so because they want their votes

to be among those that select the government rather than mere expression of preferences (Downs, 1957).

Chapter 3

ELECTORAL HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA⁹

3.1 Introduction

The electoral history of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa started in 1932 after it was declared as a governor province by the British India Government. Thus, this chapter presents a detailed overview of electoral history of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. There is detailed discussion on every election in the province since 1932. The researcher tried to present the overall scenario in which each election took place. Thus, there is brief discussion on the major players in each election, the important issues they raised, election results at national and provincial level and the formation of provincial governments. Furthermore, the researcher has divided the province into four electoral regions with their respective electoral dynamics and position of each of the major parties in these four regions. There is also discussion on the phenomenon of electables in the province and the emergence of PTI which the researcher terms as "PTI Wave."

3.2 Historical Background

On 9th November 1901, the then Viceroy of British India Lord Curzon separated NWFP from Punjab to form a new province consisting of districts of Bannu, Hazara, Kohat, Dera Ismail Khan, Peshawar, and political agencies of Khyber, North Waziristan, South Waziristan, and Malakand. The new province was put under the charge of chief

⁹ Here Khyber Pakhtunkhwa denotes the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which existed before the merger of former FATA with it.

commissioner and agent to the governor general appointed by the Government of India and directly responsible to it. As a chief commissioner had to run the affairs of the province, it was not made a full governor province. It was after the civil disobedience movement of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement that the then British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald announced to upgrade NWFP to a governor province. Thus, the then Chief commissioner NWFP Sir Ralph Griffith was appointed the first governor of the province on 8th April 1932. On the same day, Viceroy of India Lord Willingdon inaugurated legislative council for NWFP consisting of 28 elected and 12 nominated members (Ahmad, 2011). Thus, the electoral history of NWFP started in 1932 after it was given the status of a governor province (Ahmad, 2010).

3.3 Electoral History of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

3.3.1 1932 Elections: The First Ever Elections in the Province

Elections for the NWFP Legislative Council, the first elections in the province, were held in April 1932. Due to lack of enough election staff and police, the elections in various constituencies were held on different dates. The electorate for the elections consisted of males who were at least 21 years of age and paid annually 10 rupees revenue or possessed property worth 600 rupees or had acquired education to a specific level ("The first elections," 1934). The nature of restricted franchise based on property and other qualifications ensured a legislature dominated by conservative and well-off people. Local issues and rivalries, tribal divisions, factional orientations, and religious issues played an important role in determination of election results (Ahmad, 2011).

The Khudai Khidmatgar Movement was the only organized group in the province at the time of 1932 elections but most of its top leaders were in jails and it boycotted the elections. The workers of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement (also known as Red Shirts)

would secretly visit villages to convince voters to refrain from voting. As religion played an important role in the life of people of the province, the Red Shirts also used religious card to dissuade voters from taking part in the elections. They declared that voting was sinful as it was introduced by "Satanic Government" as anti-Islam policy. The Red Shirts equated voters' thumb impression on ballot paper to signatures on Abdul Ghaffar Khan's death warrants. The voters were told that voting will be followed by dire consequences like heavy taxation ("The first elections," 1934).

Polling stations were set in police stations and the voters had to cover long distances on foot, in lorries or horse carts to cast their votes. In order to discourage voting, the Red Shirts also blocked roads and paths leading to police stations and villagers also joined them because of the religious color given to the protest. In some places, police even opened firing on those who had blocked roads. Resultantly, only 10-15 % voters took part in the elections. The election results were surprising for many as strong candidates suffered defeat at the hands of less popular and less known figures ("The first elections," 1934).

While selecting legislative council's nominated members, the governor appointed traditional persons to reinforce the principle of conservatism in the provincial legislature. After the council met, its members grouped into four groups. Nine members formed Liberal Party, nine members formed Progressive Party, seven Hindu and Sikh members grouped into Minority Party while the remaining members formed nationalist bloc (Ahmad, 2011).

3.3.2 1937 Elections

It was the Government of India Act 1935 which provided the legal framework for the elections for the 50-member provincial assembly held in February 1937. Voting took place between 1 and 10 February with a total of 179,529 voters. Franchise was restricted and property ownership was the main qualification for exercising voting right. As there were conditions for franchise, so only 14% people of British Indian formed electorate for provincial assemblies' elections (Ahmad, 2011).

In 1937, Congress¹⁰ was the largest and most organized political force in NWFP, but it was banned due to its civil disobedience movement. Thus, it contested the election under the name of Provincial Parliamentary Board. As Abdul Ghaffar Khan's entry into the province had been banned, so Dr. Khan Sahib led the party in his absence. In the Muslim rural constituencies, Congress mostly nominated small Khans while in Muslim urban and general constituencies, it mostly nominated lawyers. Most of the Khans who were outside of Congress fold contested the election as independent candidates and represented the landed elite and those loyal to the colonizers. The split of anti-Congress votes among various Khans greatly benefited Congress in some of the constituencies. On general seats, Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party (HSNP) was the main political rival of Congress. This party was led by wealthy traders who were loyal to the British. HSNP's main slogan in its election campaign was its demand for the withdrawal of a notification declaring Urdu and English as compulsory languages for instructions from third standard in government run schools for girls. Muslim League had been trying to form its NWFP chapter since 1934 but it could not do so, thus it did not field any candidate

¹⁰ Khudai Khidmatgars were basically close allies of Congress and in N. W. F. P, Congress would award tickets to Khudai Khidmatgars.

in NWFP for 1937 elections. However, it fielded its candidates in the by-elections in Mardan and Hazara and won the Hazara seat. Retired senior government officers also emerged as a separate group in these elections (Ahmad, 2011).

Congress's opponents would accuse it, especially the Khan Brothers, of being under Hindu's influence. On the other hand, Congress adopted the strategy of making promises with the electorate and attacking the government and landed elites in speeches (Ahmad, 2011). When the results were announced, Congress emerged the party with the largest number of seats (19) while HSNP won 7 and the Independent Party 2 seats. The remaining 22 were won by independent candidates (21 Muslims and 1 Hindu) (Ahmad, 2010). Majority of the independents were Khans closely associated with the British. Congress performed very well in rural areas especially in Peshawar and Mardan. In Peshawar, it won all Muslim rural seats and in Mardan it won 3 out of 5 seats while on the remaining two seats its candidates were disqualified. Later, Congress also won these two seats in by-elections following successful election petitions against its candidates' disqualifications. In these districts, party identification seemed to be the most important factor in elections as the elections were a contest between the Congress and anti-congress elements without the consideration of candidates. For example, Secretary of State Lord Zetland noted; "in Peshawar and Mardan constituencies the issue upon which the election was fought was clear cut, Red shirts against the rest" (Ahmad, 2011, pp. 126-128).

After the elections, Sahibzada Abdul Qayum Khan became the chief minister of the province (KPITB, 2018). However, later Dr. Khan Sahib, who was leader of the opposition, secured support of enough members including HSNP to pass no confidence vote against the ministry with 27 to 21 votes and became the chief minister of the

province (Ahmad, 2010; Ahmad, 2011 & Sultana, 2014). In these elections, Muslim League badly failed to establish itself as the sole representative body of the Muslims. It did not win any provincial seat from Sindh and NWFP, while it could win only 1 out of 84 Muslim seats in Punjab (Khan, 1987/1990).

3.3.3 1946 Elections: The Build-up to Partition

After World War II, Viceroy Lord Wavell announced elections for central and provincial legislatures and that a constitution making body would be set up after the elections. Thus, elections were held in January-February 1946 under Government of India Act 1935 and results were announced by 18th February. Though several parties like the Congress (Khudai Khidmatgars), Muslim League, Akali Dal, Khaksars, Ahrars, and Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind (JUH) contested the elections but the main contenders were Congress and Muslim League (Ahmad, Memon, & Rabbi, 2014). In some constituencies, Congress also made seat adjustments with Ahrar and JUH (Ahmad, 2010).

Congress mainly based its election campaign on promises in socio-economic fields and its strategy was to avoid words like Akhand Hindustan or Pakistan so that Muslim voters may not be alienated. It would ask for votes in the name of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement rather than Congress itself. Congress would also accuse Muslim League leaders of corruption and would term them as British agents. On the other hand, Muslim League mainly focused on the demand of a separate state for the Muslims as one banner in Hazara district read "if you want Pakistan, vote for Muslim League" (Ahmad et al., 2014, p.8).

Though the demand for Pakistan had gained momentum among NWFP Muslims by the time, but Muslim League was suffering from inner divisions. For example, the provincial selection board denied tickets to senior leaguers like K. B. Saadullah Khan, Aurangzeb Khan, and Mian Ziauddin while Abdur Rab Nishtar secured his ticket with great difficulty. When the senior leaders appealed to the central leadership, only Mian Ziauddin was allotted the ticket. Several well-known leaguers decided to contest the elections as independent candidates which further deepened the divisions. (Ahmad et al., 2014).

Despite the fact that Muslim League enlisted the support of religious figures like Pirs and Mullahs against the Congress and tried to term it as a Hindu party, Congress did exceptionally well and won 30 out of 50 seats (Aman & Jan, 2015). Muslim League won 17, Jamiat-e-Ulema-Hind 2, and Akali Dal won 1 seat. Congress won almost all seats in the Pashtun inhabited areas of the province while Muslim League failed in all areas except Hazara- a non-Pashtun area. JUH, Congress' ally, won from Dera Ismail Khan (Ahmad et al., 2014). Out of Congress' 30 seats, 19 were Muslim and 11 non-Muslim seats while Muslim League's 17 were all Muslim seats. Thus, even among the Muslim areas, Congress won more seats than Muslim League (Bangash, 2013). As a result of the elections, Dr. Khan Sahib formed the government while Allah Nawaz Khan was unanimously elected as speaker (Ahmad et al., 2014).

According to Abdul Wali Khan, Britishers were disturbed by Congress victory on Muslim seats. He writes that the British administration tried to ensure few more seats to Muslim League. He gives deputy commissioner Bannu's example who, when invited for meal by someone, would ask that his wife be presented with a scarf to indirectly tell people to vote for Muslim League. He further writes that resources from the princely

states and efforts of Khans and religious figures all were used for the promotion of Muslim League's cause (Khan, 1987/1990).

The Dismissal of Congress Ministry

Hardly one week had passed since the creation of Pakistan that the Governor NWFP George Cunningham, by invoking section 51 (5) of Government of India Act 1935 on the directives of Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah, dismissed Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry in NWFP on 22nd August 1947 (Akhter, 2010). Interestingly, it was on Jinnah's advice that Mountbatten inserted this clause into the act to bring governors under the control of Governor General (Bangash, 2013). It seemed that Governor General Mountbatten had promised Jinnah that he would sack the Congress ministry in NWFP but His Majesty's Government overruled him on the ground that such an action would be improper as it will mean dismissal of the ministry despite enjoying support of majority in the assembly (Sayeed, 1960). At the time of dismissal, the Congress Ministry enjoyed the support of 21 lawmakers out of 38 as the 12 non-Muslims had left Pakistan after the partition. It was only in March 1948 that Muslim League proved its majority for the budget session through defections from Congress that we can call as horse-trading. (Bangash, 2013).

The dissolution of Congress' NWFP ministry despite its having majority support is still a loaded and controversial question. This step also led to divisions within Muslim League as Jinnah's decision to appoint Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan¹¹ as chief minister

¹¹ Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan was an active figure within Congress who would strongly criticize Muslim League and Jinnah in his speeches. In 1945, he wrote his book Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier in which he argued in favor of a united India and praised Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan. However, he banned his own book after becoming chief minister of NWFP. In 1937 elections, Dr. Khan won one seat each of Central Legislative Assembly and NWFP Assembly. He vacated the Central Legislative Assembly seat on which Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan was elected unopposed and later became deputy parliamentary leader of Congress in the assembly. During Simla Conference in 1945, Jinnah invited him

of NWFP alienated Pir of Manki Sharif who later responded by forming Awami Muslim League with Khan of Lundkhar Khan Ghulam Muhammad. The new party was also joined by Suhrawardy and Pir of Zakori Sharif. Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan responded to these developments with use of force as Pir of Manki Sharif was banned from entering NWFP while other senior leaders of Awami Muslim League were arrested (Kamran, 2009).

3.3.4 1951 Elections (Provincial): The first experience with adult franchise based elections in the province

The first general elections after the creation of Pakistan were held to the provincial assemblies in the first half of 1950s. Elections to the provincial assemblies of Punjab and NWFP were held in 1951, of Sindh in 1953, and of East Pakistan in 1954. Muslim League won with heavy mandate in Punjab, NWFP, and Sindh but in East Pakistan it faced stunning defeat at the hands of United Front, which was an electoral alliance of Krishak Sramik Party, Nizam-i-Islam Party, and the Awami League (Baxter, 1971).

After the federal government decided to hold elections in the provinces, Chief Minister NWFP Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan announced to hold elections in the province. Before the elections, the number of seats of NWFP Assembly was increased from 50 to 85 with 82 general and 3 reserved for women and minorities. The Delimitation Committee for NWFP divided the province into 82 constituencies with allocating seats to districts according to the 1951 census. Thus, Bannu was allocated 8 seats, Dera Ismail Khan 7,

to join Muslim League. To this offer, KAQK responded after some time by writing a letter to Jinnah to inform him about his decision to join Muslim League. After the creation of Pakistan, he was installed as chief minister of the province and served on this position till April 1953. Later, he left Muslim League and formed his own party Muslim League-Qayyum. After 1977 elections, the leadership of PML-Q passed from KAQK to Kunwar Qutubuddin who then merged the party in Pakistan Muslim League-Functional and thus it ceased to be a separate and major force in the electoral politics of NWFP.

Hazara 21, Kohat 8, Mardan 15, and Peshawar 23 while among the reserved seats, two were allocated to Women (Muslims) and 1 to non-Muslims (Hassan, 2008).

The elections were held after the Constituent Assembly passed the NWFP General Elections Bill under which the provincial assembly was to be dissolved while the chief minister retained his position. Thus, Governor NWFP I. I. Chundrigar dissolved the NWFP Assembly on 10th March 1951, while Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan's Government was allowed to work as interim set up till elections that were announced to be held in November 1951. Keeping in view Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan's previous record of misusing authority, opposition parties demanded his resignation and interim government before elections, but this demand fell on deaf ears as the central government, especially the then Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan, was backing Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan (Hassan, 2015).

Neither the Muslim League nor the opposition parties had any manifesto or program for the elections (Ahmad, 2010). Instead of presenting any program to the voters, Muslim League coined election slogans like "vote for League is vote for progress" and that "League victory is the defeat of Pashtunistan" (Kamran, 2009, p. 269). It would propagate that voting for it, among other things, would mean completion of industrial projects in the province, end of capitalist exploiters, end of Pakhtunistan Movement and acquisition of Kashmir (Hassan, 2008).

The Khudai Khidmatgars (which had already been banned and thus was not contesting the elections), through a poster displayed in Charsadda, announced that some candidates claimed Khudai Khidmatgars' support, but it was not supporting any group or individual. However, it was earlier reported that Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan had

asked his workers to support any party which they thought to be in the best interest of the country (Hassan, 2015).

Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan used all means to disturb the election campaign of his political rivals. The government banned the entry of Jinnah Awami League chief Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy into NWFP, the notice for which was served on him at Attock Railway Station when he was going to Nowshera to attend a party meeting (Hassan, 2008). While commenting on ban of Suhrawardy's entry into the province, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan remarked that, "After his speech in East Bengal applauding the Red Shirts, how could we take the risk of allowing him in the province and trying to revive a banned organization (Red Shirts)" (Hassan, 2008, p.7-8).

Nomination papers of Jinnah Muslim League's thirty-one candidates were rejected on frivolous grounds while of those who were contesting on Muslim League ticket were accepted even if faulty and several Muslim League candidates won their seats unopposed (Kamran, 2009). Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan himself was elected unopposed from two constituencies of Peshawar and Hazara as the nomination papers of his opposite candidates, Master Khan Gul from Peshawar and Akbar Ali from Hazara, were rejected (Hassan, 2015). Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan himself confessed the arrest of 60 political prisoners all of whom were from Red Shirts (Kamran, 2009). The allocation of red color as a symbol of election was banned due to its link with the Red Shirts which had already been banned (Hassan, 2008).

Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan even made every effort to ensure that his party candidates who were not in his good books but got tickets from the central parliamentary board were defeated and for this purpose he encouraged independents to contest elections against them. When a leaguer Mir Alam Khan appealed against Khan Abdul Qayyum

Khan's decision to refuse him ticket and the central parliamentary board awarded him ticket, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan asked Haji Muhammad Ali Khan to contest election against Mir Alam Khan as independent candidate from Charsadda. While attending a function of Haji Muhammad Ali Khan in Charsadda, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan threatened people that they would be hanged upside down if they did not vote for the candidate of his choice. In Karrak, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan fielded Watan Badshah, a peon, against Muslim League senior leader Muhammad Aslam Khattak and rigged the elections to ensure Muhammad Aslam Khattak's defeat. When 500 bogus votes were cast for Watan Badshah while only 32 had been cast as per record, the returning officer refused to sign the result and thus was sent without his signatures (Hassan, 2015).

Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan liberally used state resources for getting results of his choice and it was also believed that he was backed by the central government. After the elections, Jinnah Awami Muslim League accused the government for rejecting 30% votes of opposition candidates. The elections were termed as "Hitlerian elections" by the 30th December editorial of Pakistan Times. Due to extreme electoral malpractices, the elections were nicknamed as "Jhurloo elections"¹². (Hassan, 2008, p. 22).

About 660000 voters (49% of the eligible voters) used their right to vote to elect 73 members of the provincial assembly while nine candidates had already been declared successful unopposed. When the new assembly met, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan had a strong majority of 67 members, while the main opposition party Jinnah Awami Muslim League had four seats and 13 members were independents. The Muslim League

¹² Jhurloo is basically a stick used by the jugglers to send the ball during demonstration from one place to another.

lawmakers held a meeting at Assembly chambers on 14th December 1951 and chose Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan as their leader who later tendered resignation as interim chief minister to form his government as regular chief minister (Hassan, 2015).

Reports and allegations of electoral malpractices in Punjab, NWFP, and Sindh were so widespread that ultimately the central government was compelled to form an Electoral Reforms Commission in 1955. The Commission observed that the provincial elections during the early 1950s were "farce, a mockery and fraud upon the electorate." It further noted that the central government acted with partiality and state functionaries interfered to influence the election results (Kamran, 2002, p. 82).

Being the very first general elections in the province after the creation of Pakistan, they should have provided a sound basis to democratic norms. However, these elections proved just a formality. Syed Minhaj ul Hassan has recorded his observations in this regard in the following words:

These were the first ever elections in the province of NWFP after the creation of Pakistan but the way they were conducted, it set a very bad example for the coming generations. Instead of strengthening democratic institutions, it weakened them. It set an example of fraud, rigging and coercion to achieve desired results. These are those problems which still haunt the political institutions of the country. (Hassan, 2008, p. 28).

3.3.5 The 1970 Elections: The lead-up to the Break-up of the Country

The year 1970 was simultaneously thrilling, eventful, and catastrophic for Pakistan. It was exciting and eventful because the Yahya Khan regime decided to restore political activities in the country, hold general elections on the basis of adult franchise, and hand over political power to the civilians (Mujahid, 1971). It was for the first time since 1947

that Pakistanis were directly electing members of the National Assembly. Though they were also to elect members of five provincial assemblies ten days later, but it was not their first experience as except Balochistan all provinces had already experienced general elections to provincial assemblies based on adult franchise (Baxter, 1971). The year was tragic not only because of the devastating floods that killed hundreds of thousands of people, damaged crops and houses in East Pakistan, but also because it brought home nearer the gloomy prospect of Pakistan's division into two independent states. The elections for the National Assembly were scheduled on 5th October but due to floods in East Pakistan, they were postponed and were held on 7th December (Mujahid, 1971).

Before the 1970 elections, the Legal Framework Order (LFO) was promulgated by the Yahya Khan regime in March 1970, which provided a framework for the upcoming elections and framing of the future constitution. The LFO mandated the National Assembly to be elected as a result of 1970 elections to frame a new constitution for the country. Another important change brought about through the LFO was the disbandment of One Unit, thus re-establishing Punjab, NWFP, Sindh, and Balochistan as separate provinces as they existed before their unification into one province in 1955 (LFO, 1970). Unlike the provisions of constitutions of 1956 and 1962 that provided for equal representation of the two wings of the country in the National Assembly, the LFO of 1970 provided for distribution of NA seats on the basis of population. Thus, 169 seats were allocated to East Pakistan and 144 to West Pakistan (Mujahid, 1971). NWFP was allocated 25 National Assembly seats (Baxter, 1971) while there were 43 seats in KP Assembly out of which two were reserved for women and one for minorities (Provincial Assembly of KP-An Overview, 2019).

In NWFP, Pakistan Muslim League-Qayyum Group (from now onwards, only PML-Qy), PPP, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam Hazarvi Group (JUI-H)¹³ and National Awami Party-Wali Group (NAP-W) each had fielded at least 15 candidates for the province's 25 NA seats, (Mujahid, 1971) but the main rivals were PML-Qy and NAP-W with chiefs of both parties contesting elections from this province (Baxter, 1971- p214). An interesting aspect of this election was that there was no incumbency factor and Yahya Khan's cabinet ministers were not allowed to contest elections (Baxter, 1971).

There was considerable similarity in the manifestoes of the contesting parties as almost all of them vowed not to make any law in violation of Islamic teachings, stressed non-aligned foreign policy and normalization of ties with India for resolution of disputes, and highlighted the need for ending regional disparities across the country. NAP-W used to stress provincial autonomy with defense, foreign policy, and currency only with the center (Mujahid, 1971) while one of its long-standing demands, dissolution of One Unit, had already been fulfilled as Yahya Khan had already restored separate status of the four provinces within West Pakistan. NAP-W mainly appealed to the voters in central NWFP from where Khudai Khidmatgars had received great support in 1937 and 1946 elections (Baxter, 1971).

PML-Qy, led by former Chief Minister NWFP Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan was one of the main contenders in NWFP. Several of the politicians who were earlier in Ayub

¹³ In 1969, Jamiat-u-Ulema Islam split into two groups with the major faction led by Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi and the other one led by Maulana Ehtesham ul Haq Thanvi. The Hazarvi group favored labor's participation in industries' ownership and end of landlordism. The Hazarvi group enjoyed a strong support base in NWFP which was also the home province of the group's top leaders like Hazarvi and Mufti Mahmood while the Thanvi faction enjoyed some following in Sindh and Punjab (Baxter, 1971). Following Mufti Mahmood's death in 1980, his son Maulana Fazlur Rehman became the head of JUI. However, Maulana Fazlur Rahman's succession and disagreement over cooperation with the then military ruler General Zia ul Haq led to division within the party. Thus, it split into two groups--- JUI-F led by Rehman and JUI-Darkhwasti led by Fida-ur-Rehman Darkhwasti and Maulana Sami-ul-Haq. Later, the Darkhwasti faction disappeared and was replaced by JUI-Sami led by Maulana Sami-ul-Haq. It still exists.

Khan's camp also joined PML-Qy. He tried to get support of politicians who supported a strong central government and even advocated the idea of forming a confederation with Muslim countries lying to Pakistan's west like Afghanistan and Iran while in NWFP, he would attack NAP-W for its Congressite background. He also charged it with separatist tendencies and collusion with India and Afghanistan (Baxter, 1971).

In these elections, no single party could win a clear majority either on national or provincial level. Out of 25 National Assembly seats in NWFP, PPP won 1, PML-Qy 7, JUH 6, NAP-W 3, and JI 1 (Ahmad, 2010). In provincial assembly elections, PPP won 3, PML-Qy 10, NAP-W 13, Council Muslim League (CML) 1, JUI-H 4, Pakistan Muslim League-Convention (PML-C) 2, JI 1, and independents 6 seats (Baxter, 1971). Thus, ANP with 13 seats and JUI with 4 seats formed coalition government with JUI-H's Mufti Mahmood as chief minister (Malik, 2014).

As compared to its performance in National Assembly elections, NAP-W performed much better in provincial elections as it emerged as the largest single party. On the other hand, JUI-H failed to repeat its National Assembly performance in provincial assembly elections (Baxter, 1971). However, it performed very well in Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Kohat (Malik, 2014). PPP, which won an overwhelming majority in Sindh and Punjab, failed to perform well in NWFP. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto contested elections from six constituencies winning two in Punjab, three in Sindh but in Dera Ismail Khan Constituency of NWFP he was defeated by JUI-H's Mufti Mahmood (Baxter, 1971).

3.3.6 1977 Elections: The Path toward Second Military Coup

Following the announcement by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Government to hold general elections, nine opposition parties formally launched their alliance called Pakistan

National Alliance (PNA) on 11th January 1977 to jointly challenge PPP, which was in government at the time (Akhter, 2004). The PNA was a conglomeration of political forces that were ethnic, religious, socialist, and secular in nature. Its manifesto was based on religio-economic issues as it promised to enforce Sharia in the country, denationalize some industries, promote cooperation between industrialists and workers (Malik, 2014), end all forms of exploitation, and ensure fair distribution of resources and interest-free economy. It also promised to reverse the constitutional amendments which were introduced by the PPP government to strengthen the executive at the cost of a free judiciary and to give back civil liberties snatched by the previous government. The PNA manifesto also promised a high-powered inquiry commission to fix responsibility for the breakup of Pakistan and punish those responsible. Thus, PNA's main charge sheet against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was inflation, breaking up of Pakistan, curbs on civil and political liberties, corruption, and compromise with India on Kashmir (Ahmad, 2018).

As Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto wanted to stay in power at all costs, his government, among other things, even resorted to house arrest and kidnapping of opposition leaders to disturb PNA's election campaign. Many PPP candidates were declared successful unopposed because nomination papers of opposition candidates were rejected. As there was a ban on political meetings from the government, so PNA would use mosques for spreading its message (Malik, 2014). Use of state machinery reached such a point that even Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto used reports by district administration and intelligence agencies for finalizing candidates for party tickets (Rais, 1985).

When election results were announced, they were simply beyond PNA's comprehension. Though PPP's victory in the election was something expected but the

margin with which it won was surprising for the opposition as PPP won 155 out of 200 seats while PNA was restricted to only 36 seats (Malik, 2014). Winning 36 seats was surprising for PNA because PPP leaders would publicly say that PNA will win 50-60 seats and in their private gatherings, they would concede that it can win even more seats (Weinbaum, 1977,). Though PDA (PPP) won more than 85% National Assembly seats in Punjab and Sindh, it secured only 8 out of total 26 National Assembly seats in NWFP as compared to 17 by PNA. One seat was won by PML-Qy (ECP, 1977).

One day after the elections to NA were held, PNA's working committee held its meeting in Lahore and accused the government of rigging elections, rejected the election results, directed its elected members to resign from their seats, announced to boycott elections for provincial assemblies, and appealed to the people for country-wide protest movement. PNA also demanded Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's resignation, appointment of impartial Election Commission, and fresh elections under the supervision of army and judiciary (Malik, 2014). The PNA, after receiving positive response from the people, decided to broaden its protest movement in support of its demands (Akhter, 2004). Reacting to opposition's protests, ministers also started pro-Bhutto processions in April 1977 (Malik, 2014).

The rigging allegations leveled by PNA were also vindicated by the statements of the then Chief Election Commissioner Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan that he gave on various occasions or were reported by the press. The rigging allegations were so widespread that even the chief election commissioner himself in an interview with Voice of America suggested fresh elections on all constituencies (Ali, 1977).

Bhutto used different tricks to deal with the PNA protests. He used coercion against PNA, proposed to hold referendum, announced to implement Islamic law in the

country, prohibited use of alcohol, banned all forms of gambling and night clubs, appealed to the Muslim world to save Pakistan from serious disaster, and tried to portray the PNA protests as conspiracy by the US for his anti-US approach. However, all these tactics failed to convince or deter PNA to call off its agitation (Akhter, 2004). In order to create divisions within PNA, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto offered government in NWFP to Begum Naseem Wali, release of all persons arrested in Hyderabad Tribunal Case, and the withdrawal of the case, but this move also failed (Ali, 1977).

In the middle of June, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto accepted PNA's demand for fresh elections to National Assembly and provincial assemblies. Thus, following the acceptance of the demand for fresh elections, the government and PNA reached an agreement within short time and Bhutto called a meeting of his close cabinet ministers including Army Chief General Zia ul Haq and informed them that he would end the deadlock the next day. To this development, the army responded by taking control of the government in a post-midnight operation called Operation Fair Play (Akhter, 2004).

3.3.7 1988 Elections: The Return of Civilian Governments

As a result of differences between the then President General Zia and the then Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, the former dismissed National Assembly and the assemblies of the four provinces on 29th May 1988 (Rais, 1989) and announced general elections to be held in November 1988. However, General Zia died in a plane crash before the elections could be held. After General Zia's death, Chairman Senate Ghulam Ishaq Khan became the president of Pakistan and announced that the elections will be held as per schedule (Ahmed, 2007). According to Rasul Bakhsh Rais, General Zia's death in C-30 crash gave him an honorable exit from Pakistan's political scene

otherwise he would have confronted an active and enormously hostile opposition after the elections that he had announced (Rais, 1989).

The election was mainly a competition between PPP and the rest. Most of the well-known political parties had joined one of the three alliances against PPP (Akhter, 2004). These alliances were Pakistan Awami Ittehad (PAI) or Pakistan People's Alliance (PPA) (Awan, 2008), Left and Democratic Front (LDF), and Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). ANP and Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) were the two prominent political parties that did not join any alliance against PPP and contested the elections independently (Akhter, 2004). Among these alliances, IJI was the most important one which consisted of Pakistan Muslim League, National Peoples Party, Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam, Markazi Jamiat Ahle-e-Hadith (MJAH), Independent Parliamentary Group, Jamiat-e-Mashaikh Pakistan, and Hezb-e-Jehad (IJI Manifesto, 1988).

After 1977 elections, the leadership of PML-Qy passed from Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan to Kunwar Qutubuddin who then merged the party in Pakistan Muslim League-Functional (Yaqubi, 2018) and thus it ceased to be a separate and major force in the electoral politics of NWFP. Thus, PPP, IJI, JUI-F, and ANP¹⁴ were the main contenders in the 1988 elections in NWFP.

IJI's objectives as mentioned in its manifesto were implementation of Islamic laws, establishment of true democracy, protection of rights of people including women, promotion of bonds of affection within the country and with other Muslim countries, creation of a just society, formulation of an independent foreign policy, complete

¹⁴ The current Awami National Party (ANP) was formed in 1986 and thus the 1988 election was its first contest. It actually emerged from the National Awami Party (NAP).

support to Afghan Jehad, liberation of Kashmir from Indian occupation and repatriation of stranded Pakistanis from Bangladesh (IJI Manifesto, 1988). Subsequent developments, however, revealed that the IJI was actually formed by ISI to counter PPP. Former DG ISI Asad Durrani confessed his role in money distribution among politicians for this purpose. He even submitted an affidavit to the Supreme Court with regard to the expenditure incurred while forming IJI (Malik, 2014).

Provincial autonomy has always been one of the major slogans of ANP. Another important component of its manifesto for the 1988 elections was the solution of Afghan issue. It was of the view that the Afghan issue can only be resolved by engaging all segments of the Afghan society. This issue later proved to be a major factor that created cracks in the coalition government of PPP and ANP as the latter ultimately resigned from the cabinet. The situation reached such a point that the then ANP chief Wali Khan even remarked that ISI was prolonging the Afghan conflict due to which people of Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa both suffer (Akhter, 2009). JUI-F's main slogan in successive elections has been implementation of Sharia in the country.

PPP and IJI emerged with the largest number of seats at both provincial and national level in NWFP. In NA elections, IJI won 8 seats, PPP 9, JUI-F 3, ANP 2, and JUI-Darkhasti 1 while three seats were won by independents. In provincial elections, out of 74 results available on ECP's website, ANP won 13, PPP 21, IJI 23, and JUI-F 1 seat while 16 seats were won by independents (ECP, n. da; ECP, n.db).

As a result of the elections, PPP, in coalition with ANP and independents formed a government in NWFP (Ahmad, 2010). PPP and ANP reached an agreement according to which the provincial government was to be led by PPP while ANP had to get the slot of governor. Thus, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao became the chief minister of the

province (Aziz, 2016). However, due to non-fulfillment of promises by PPP, especially appointment of ANP governor, ANP not only withdrew from the coalition but also joined hands with IJI to topple the government through no confidence motion though this could not happen due to emergence of forward bloc within IJI. IJI, being the single largest political force within the assembly, would have formed government in NWFP had it paid proper attention to the independents who were won over by PPP to form its government. Internal divisions within IJI were the major reason for this failure (Malik, 2014).

3.3.8 1990 Elections

In August 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, with the consent of army leadership, dismissed Benazir Bhutto's Government by invoking constitutional amendment introduced by General Zia (Taylor, 1992). It was dismissed on charges of corruption, nepotism, failure to maintain law and order situation and govern the country efficiently. Thus, new elections were announced that were held on 24th October 1990 (Akhter, 2004).

PPP, which also had incumbency burden on its shoulders, formed an alliance, Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA), with Tehreek-e- Istaqlal, Pakistan Muslim League Malik Qasim Group, and Tehreek-i-Nafaz-i-Fiqah-i-Jafria (Mehdi, 2013a). On the other hand, IJI not only remained intact but also wanted to include parties like Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) and JUI-F in Balochistan, ANP in NWFP, and Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Sindh in its fold. However, due to opposition from some elements within IJI like JI and Junejo and some other reasons it could not be done. ANP, MQM, and Majlis-e Ahrar agreed not only to cooperate with each other but also with IJI. However, they preferred a free hand to form their election strategies according to their

programs. As a result, it was agreed that IJI will enter into seat adjustment with these parties and some independents. Thus, a grand alliance was formed by the IJI and six other parties. Except the desire to defeat PPP, there was very less common between IJI on the one hand and parties like ANP, JWP, and MQM, on the other. IJI and ANP formally announced their electoral alliance on September 11, 1990 as a result of which they did not field candidates against each other in NWFP. Out of 26 NA seats, IJI contested elections on 19 seats while ANP on 7 seats. IJI also made seat adjustments on provincial seats with JUI-F and ANP, but due to differences among IJI members, candidates of these parties contested against each other on many seats. IJI's decision to support ANP's Ghulam Ahmad Bilour from Peshawar also caused tensions within the alliance as some Pakistan Muslim League leaders thought Peshawar to be one of their strongholds in the province and thus they wanted IJI ticket from the metropolitan (Malik, 2014).

In provincial elections, out of 74 results of NWFP Assembly available on ECP website, IJI won 31 seats, ANP 22, PPP 5, JUI-F 2, and independents 14. In National Assembly elections, ANP secured 6 seats, PPP 5, IJI 8, JUI-F 4, and independents 3 (Gallup Pakistan, 1990). Though there was an electoral alliance between ANP and IJI, there always remained tensions between IJI's Jamaat-e-Islami and ANP. They had sharp differences over issues like enforcement of Sharia, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. ANP was willing to accept Afzal Khan as the chief minister while JI wanted Gen. Retired Fazle Haq to be nominated for the slot. After long deliberations, Afzal Khan was elected as chief minister (Malik, 2014).

It was his defeat at the hands of a joint candidate of PPP and JUI-F in 1990 elections that forced ANP chief and seasoned politician Abdul Wali Khan to quit electoral

politics for ever (Khan, 2013c). He blamed the establishment, the then president Ghulam Ishaq Khan, PPP, JI (which was part of IJI with which ANP had seat adjustment), and some dissenters within ANP for his defeat. He alleged that Gulbadin Hekmatyar, the chief of Afghanistan's Hizb-e-Islami party, would accompany his rival candidate Maulana Hassan Jan during his election campaign and that Hekmatyar also distributed money among prayer leaders in the constituency to influence voters. Abdul Wali Khan said that his National Assembly constituency was divided into five provincial constituencies out of which his party won four, which suggests that he was defeated through rigging (Marwat, 2015).

The 1990 elections are considered to be among the most manipulated elections in Pakistan. The then ISI chief Asad Durrani in his written reply submitted to the Supreme Court confessed the distribution of money for election campaign among IJI leaders (Malik, 2014). Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, who was caretaker prime minister during 1990 elections, in his interview before the elections strongly criticized PPP and urged the voters to support IJI (Akhter, 2004). In January 1991, he told the media that several well-known political figures lost their seats because the "powers that be" did not want them to return to the National Assembly. Jatoi confessed that he knew about the conspiracy, but he was helpless. Similarly, a foreign election observation team consisting of two French magistrates and two lawyers observed that "highly sophisticated fraud" distorted the results of the election (Syed, 1991, p.589-90).

3.3.9 1993 Elections: Accepting the Unacceptable

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan by invoking article 58(2) (b) dissolved the National Assembly on 18th April 1993. The grounds cited for dissolution were wrong economic policies, lack of respect for state institutions on the part of the prime minister,

interference in administrative matters and use of abusive language etc. The then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif challenged the president's act and the Supreme Court declared it illegal. Though Nawaz Sharif's government was restored but it could not develop a working relationship with the president. The deadlock between president and the prime minister ultimately led to the resignation of both on 18th July 1993 and thus fresh mid-term elections were announced (Akhter, 2004). Thus, elections for National Assembly and provincial assemblies were held on October 6 and 9, 1993, respectively (Amin, 1994). Unlike the previous two elections, PPP and PML-N contested these elections independently without entering any formal alliance with other parties. On the other hand, there emerged three different electoral alliances of Islamic parties.

The first one was Islami Jamhoori Mahaz (IJM-Islamic Democratic Front) formed by Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) with Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan-Noorani (JUP-N). The second Islamic alliance was Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) formed by Jamaat-e-Islami (Gardezi, 1994) as its leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed wanted to make JI as the third alternative political force after PPP and PML-N (Afridi, Ullah, & Gul, 2016). The third Islamic alliance was Muttahida Deeni Mahaz (MDM) consisting of 24 religious groups and factions led by Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Islam-Sami (JUI-S) (Mehdi, 2010). All these three alliances had considerable following in NWFP.

Though Qazi Hussain Ahmad wanted JI to emerge as an alternative to PPP and PML-N, yet it performed very poorly in the elections. PIF won only three National Assembly seats while its head Qazi Hussain Ahmad even lost his own seat (Gardezi, 1994). The performance of the other two Islamic alliances was also poor like PIF.

In NWFP, the three alliances collectively won 5 National Assembly seats and 4 provincial assembly seats. In the National Assembly, PML-N's 10 seats were highest

among all, PPP won 6, ANP won 3, IJM 2, MDM 1, PIF 2, Pakhtun Qaumi Party 1, and independent 1. At provincial level, out of 74 seats for which results are available on ECP's website, PPP and ANP won 20 seats each, PML-N 16, PIF 3, PML-J 3, IJM 1, and independents 11 (ECP, n.d a; ECP, n.d b). PPP and PML-N were the two parties that performed very well at both levels while ANP performed well in provincial assembly elections but its performance in National Assembly elections was poor. Like in 1990, ANP and PML-N formed a coalition government with Pir Sabir Shah as the chief minister (Akhter, 2010).

3.3.10 1997 Elections

Like the previous three governments that could not complete their terms, the PPP government elected in 1993 was also dismissed by the then President Farooq Ahmad Leghari on 5th November 1996 on charges of corruption and inefficiency and announced fresh elections (Mehdi, 2013b). The outgoing prime minister and speaker of the National Assembly challenged the dissolution of the parliament and government in the Supreme Court but the court upheld the action of the president (Waseem, 1998). While commenting on the Supreme Court's rejection of Benazir Bhutto's petition, Mike Marqusee (1997, p. 82) wrote that "In so doing, the court appeared to rule that the president could act against the elected government purely on the basis of newspaper articles and untested allegations."

The pre-election environment was marred by uncertainty and lack of enthusiasm as on the one hand, it was widely believed that military establishment wanted to put in place a government of technocrats for two years and thus get rid of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto while on the other hand, Supreme Court's decision on petitions challenging the dissolution of the parliament by the president was awaited till almost the end of election

campaign. The fact that dissolution of Nawaz Sharif's Government by the president in 1993 was reversed by the Supreme Court added more suspense to the political show (Waseem, 1998). Thus, after the Supreme Court upheld the presidential order to dissolve the government, new elections were held on February 3, 1997 (Marqusee, 1997).

The 1997 elections had some important new aspects. It was for the first time that elections to the National Assembly and provincial assemblies were held on the same day, February 3 (Akhter, 2010). Newly formed Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party for the first time took part in elections. It contested on 134 seats but could not win any seat with its chief and the current Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan defeated on nine seats. Another important aspect of these elections was the extension of adult franchise to the erstwhile FATA. Earlier, some 37,000 state nominated elders would elect members of the National Assembly from the area (Mehdi, 2013b).

Jamaat-e-Islami urged the caretaker government to first clean the political system from corrupt politicians through exemplary accountability and then hold just elections. As a protest against non-fulfilment of its demand, it boycotted the elections. Marqusee argues that the boycott was mainly due to possible poor performance rather than a matter of principle and on Election Day, the JT's so-called anti-corruption encampments did not attract many voters (Marqusee, 1997).

In NWFP, ANP and PML-N almost swept the elections. ANP won 10 out of 26 National Assembly seats while PML-N won 15. The remaining one was won by an independent candidate. Out of 74 provincial assembly constituencies' results available on ECP website, ANP won 29 and PML-N 31 seats while 10 seats were secured by independents. The performance of PPP and JUI-F was extremely poor at both national

and provincial levels as they failed to win any National Assembly seat while at provincial level, they won 5 and 1 seat, respectively (ECP, n.d a; ECP, n.d b). ANP formed a coalition government with PML-N and got enough share in the cabinet (Waseem, 1998).

3.3.11 2002 Elections: Emergence of a New Politico-Religious Force

Following the overthrow of Nawaz Sharif's government in 1999, fresh elections were held in the country in October 2002. The 2002 elections were different from 1988-1997 elections in many ways. The voting age was lowered to 18 years from 21, campaign duration was reduced from 90 to 40 days (Ansari & Moten, 2003), the seats of National Assembly, Senate, and provincial assemblies were increased in the light of 1998 census, separate electorate was replaced by joint electorate and seats were reserved for women and minorities in all assemblies (Talbot, 2003). Candidates for National Assembly and provincial assemblies were required to have at least bachelor or equivalent degree recognized by the University Grants Commission (Exec. Order No. 7, 2002). This condition of graduation qualification for contesting elections excluded about 97% of the population of the country from contesting elections (Ansari & Moten, 2003) and it was something which hardly had any parallel in the world as most democratic countries impose conditions of age, citizenship, nomination fee, and in some cases petition requirements also known as signature requirements which require certain number of signatures for nomination of a candidate (Afzal, 2014). In order to deal with this condition, several candidates submitted fake degrees with several of them later de-seated for doing fraud (Nelson, 2011). Thus, the new conditions for contesting elections expelled many seasoned and popular politicians from the contest and even in some cases it was the covering candidates who contested the elections in place of the original candidates (Ansari, 2002).

The 2002 general elections were also marked by the exclusion of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, former prime ministers and chiefs of the country's two main political parties, PML-N and PPP, respectively, from the electoral process (Farmanullah, 2014). The most interesting and unexpected development of 2002 elections was the emergence of MMA and its phenomenal success, especially in NWFP.

The MMA emerged from Pak-Afghan Defense Council (PADC) which was formed in October 2001 by 26 religious parties and groups belonging to various sects that joined hands to oppose Pakistan's role in the US-led campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Later, 6 of the 26 parties formed MMA in January 2002 before the general elections (ICG, 2005). It consisted of Islami Tehreek-e-Pakistan (ITP) JI, JUI-S, JUP, JUI-F, and MJAH. Ahmad Shah Noorani of JUP was elected its president and it was declared that it will work for a truly Islamic and democratic system and would check secularism and sectarianism in the country (Khan, 2003). The formation of MMA bridged the gap between Shia and Sunni sects on the one hand, while brought together doctrinal Islamists and traditionalists, on the other hand. The papering over of serious ideological differences within different members of MMA was made possible by their common stance against the US (Talbot, 2003).

MMA, in its manifesto, promised enforcement of Sharia in the country and to implement the recommendations of the Council for Islamic Ideology. It also pledged to introduce Islamic system of justice and ensure freedom of press, judiciary and equal rights for minorities. It urged the need for accountability of elected representatives, army, and judiciary. Furthermore, it promised to provide food, clothing, shelter, health and education facilities to all. It also promised tax reform to end people's exploitation

and highlighted issues faced by workers, farmers, women, and youth. Importance of provincial autonomy and local government system was also emphasized (Khan, 2003).

As seats of NA and provincial assemblies were increased, so NWFP's general seats in the National Assembly jumped to 35 from 26 while its provincial assembly seats were increased from 80 to 124 with 99 general seats, 22 for women, and 3 for minorities (Exec. Order No. 7, 2002).

MMA won 45 NA seats with 29 from NWFP while in NWFP provincial assembly, it won 48 out of 99 general seats. In Balochistan Assembly, it won the highest number of seats (13), while in Sindh and Punjab assemblies it won only 10 and 11 seats, respectively (Khan, 2003). JUI-F emerged as the major player in MMA as it won 41 out of MMA's 45 National Assembly seats and 29 out of MMA's 48 provincial assembly seats in NWFP. JUI-S won only two seats (ICR, 2003).

The MMA gains in NWFP were mainly at the expense of ANP and PML-N as in NWFP Assembly they were reduced to 8 and 4 seats from 29 and 31 seats in 1997, respectively. Similarly, they won 25 out of 26 National Assembly from NWFP (ANP-9, PML-N-16) in 1997 elections while in 2002, they could not win any NA seat from the province (ECP, 1997, 2002 results). Even ANP chief Asfandyar Wali Khan failed to win his ancestral constituency (Ansari & Moten, 2003).

There are different views about MMA's phenomenal win in the elections, particularly in NWFP. Akbar S. Zaidi (2002) believes that the major factor that led to MMA's victory in NWFP and Balochistan was the US attack on Taliban Government in Afghanistan. According to him, without the propagation of anti-US sentiments, the MMA would not have won even 20% of the seats that it actually won. Zaidi further

argues that the absence of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from the political scene also benefited MMA.

MMA also termed the election as a contest between agents of the US and those upholding Islamic values and urged the voters to vote for it so that it may bring Pakistan out of US influence. MMA's promise to introduce Islamic laws in the country also helped it secure votes, especially among the Pashtuns (Khan, 2003). Some observers believe that though MMA used religious card, the ethnic factor was far more important for MMA's victory than religious factor. The fact that Pashtuns were the major sufferers of the US war in Afghanistan and the impression that the war was specifically against the Pashtuns incited anger among Pashtuns and thus they voted for MMA, which had made anti-US rhetoric a part of its election campaign. Resultantly, it was the Pashtun areas from where MMA won most of its seats. ANP's support for the ouster of Taliban regime in Afghanistan also alienated the Pashtun voters, which indirectly benefited the MMA (ICR, 2003). However, MMA attributed its success to the vanishing support for the mainstream political parties. It also claimed that one factor behind its success was the fact that unlike other parties, religious parties run welfare programs in social, educational, and health sectors (ICR, 2003).

The fact that MMA enjoyed some patronage from the Musharraf Government also cannot be ignored. Many cases against MMA leaders and workers were withdrawn immediately before the 2002 elections. For example, Balochistan Government's law ministry issued official letters to prosecutors of four anti-terrorism courts directing them to put on hold the litigation till scrutiny of nomination papers. This provided relief to several MMA leaders including JUI-F chief Maulana Fazlur Rahman and Hafiz Husain Ahmad (Waseem & Mufti, 2009). The anti-Musharraf parties faced serious constraints

in their electoral campaigns while few parties, including MMA were allowed to run their electoral campaigns without much hindrance. For instance, MMA was allowed to hold public meetings in Rawalpindi even before the removal of ban on such gatherings while PPP and PML-N were denied permission for doing so (ICR, 2003).

MMA also received more time on official television as compared to other opposition parties. The preliminary report of the European Union Election Observation Mission observed that a total of 6 hours and 20 minutes were allocated to election related news on PTV-1 between August 15 and October 9. Of the total allocated time, PML-Q got 44 minutes, MMA 36 minutes, PPP 29 minutes, Grand National Alliance (GNA) 13 minutes, PML-N 13 minutes, PTI 10 minutes and MQM 8 minutes (Iqbal, 2002).

There is also a school of thought which believes that MMA's success was the result of manipulation by ISI and the military regime to use it as a bargaining chip in dealings with the US (Khan, 2003). On the other hand, some believe that ISI, having understanding with the US, played a role in its success. This school of thought argues that as MMA, in addition to its focus on Sharia, Jihad, and anti-Americanism, also called for educational and health facilities and pro-poor policies like other political parties, so, the thinking which prevailed in Islamabad and ultimately Washington was that after its agreement with Musharraf on constitutional and foreign policy issues, formation of MMA government in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was the best strategy to co-opt the Islamic forces. The logic behind this thinking, it is argued, was that Islamic elements 'in' were better than Islamic elements 'out' as the latter option contained the risk of anti-government protests (Waseem & Mufti, 2009).

3.3.12 2008 Elections: The Ousting of Pervez Musharraf and Return of Civilian Rule

November 15, 2007 was a historic day in Pakistan's history as it was for the first time that an elected assembly completed its constitutionally mandated five years term. Thus, fresh elections to the National Assembly and provincial assemblies were held in 2008. The election date was changed several times and finally the elections were held on February 18, 2008 (Kronstadt, 2008).

The 2008 elections were held in a very volatile law and order situation as the country was in the grip of militancy. In four months period starting from 18 October 2007 when Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan to February 18, 2008 when the elections were held, the country experienced twenty-five suicide attacks claiming hundreds of lives including that of Benazir Bhutto herself (Mehdi, 2013c). In addition to law and order situation, the elections were preceded by some serious political crises like imposition of emergency, Musharraf's attempt to dismiss the then Chief Justice Iftekhar Muhammad Chaudhary and other judges of higher judiciary, legal questions over Musharraf's status as president, and the return of two former prime ministers to the country and politics (Kronstadt, 2008).

Before the 2008 general elections, opposition parties including PML-N, PTI, PKMAP, ANP, JUI-F, and JI launched All Parties Democratic Movement (APDM) to oust Musharraf. APDM first led a campaign for the boycott of the elections. However, the majority of its members participated in the elections (Khan, 2010).

Though Musharraf was not contesting the election, yet the election results were viewed as a referendum on his rule (Kronstadt, 2008) and it was shortly after these elections

that he was forced to resign to avoid impeachment by the parliament (Mehdi, 2018). The apparent absence of large-scale rigging on the polling day enabled opposition political parties to comprehensively defeat Musharraf's political allies (Kronstadt, 2008).

Following Jamaat-e-Islami's decision to boycott the 2008 elections, MMA collapsed before the elections. However, JUI-F contested the elections under the MMA banner because it was too late for it to register itself under a different name (NDI & ANERFEL, 2013). However, the religious parties could not repeat their 2002 performance. It lost more than 75% of its votes and 40 out of 45 seats it had won in the previous elections (Mehdi, 2013c). It was mainly ANP which gained at the expense of MMA as the voters gave an impressive comeback to ANP, which had almost been wiped out in the previous elections (Kronstadt, 2008). In its election campaign, ANP clearly stated that it will fight against the militant discourse in the province and the country (Hussain, 2013b).

In NWFP, ANP emerged with the highest number of seats at both national and provincial levels. In NWFP Assembly, ANP won 31 seats, PPP 17, PML-N 6, MMA 10, PPP-Sherpao¹⁵ 6, and PML 4. Twenty-two seats were won by independents while elections on three seats were postponed due to the death of one of the contesting candidates from these constituencies. In National Assembly elections, ANP won 10 seats, PPP 9, PML-N 4, MMA 4, APML 3, PML-Q 2, QWP 1, and independents 2 (ECP, 2008). ANP also received the highest percentage of popular votes (39) followed by PPP with 26%, MMA 12%, PML-N 8%, PML-Q 4%, and independents and others 11% (Kronstadt, 2008).

¹⁵ In 2012, its name was changed to Qaumi Watan Party (QWP).

As ANP emerged the single largest party in NWFP Assembly, so it formed coalition government with PPP. It was for the first time since 1986 when ANP was formed that it got the slot of chief minister. It also got 12 out of 21 ministries in the provincial cabinet (Kronstadt, 2008; NDI & ANERFEL, 2013; Ahmed & Afridi, 2014).

Though many believe that the 2008 elections were one of the most free and fair, but on many polling stations, turnout was more than the registered votes. In NWFP, there were seven National Assembly constituencies where one or more polling stations had turnout more than the total number of registered voters (Khan, 2010).

3.3.13 2013 Elections: The Emergence of a New Political Force

The 2013 elections were another historic development in Pakistan's political history as it was for the first time that a civilian government (without military tutelage) completed its term followed by smooth transition of power to another civilian government (Samad & Gurmani, 2017). Another historical aspect of these elections was that it was for the first time that Political Parties Order was extended to the then FATA and thus political parties were able to award tickets to candidates in former FATA (Commonwealth Observation Mission, 2013).

The environment surrounding the 2013 elections was marred by use of violence by extremists as 128 terrorist attacks took place in 40 days preceding the elections. Responsibility for most of these attacks was claimed by the Taliban who had announced the PPP, MQM, and ANP as their legitimate targets (Mehdi, 2018). Taliban started targeting candidates of PPP, MQM, and ANP and their supporters while assured not to attack parties of Imran Khan and Nawaz Sharif. Thus, some political parties were holding big rallies with loud music while leaders of other parties would sneak from one

corner meeting to another with some never seen in public. Even many journalists refused to interview them because of potential threat. Though the Taliban failed to inflict as heavy losses and destruction as they had promised but still they killed dozens of people (Hanif, 2013). The main victim of Taliban's campaign was ANP because other parties on Taliban list were based in Sindh where Taliban were not as much effective as in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, ANP's stronghold.

According to a report of Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), between January 1 to May 15, ANP faced the highest number of attacks (37) followed by PPP and MQM with 12 each. Other parties also faced terrorist attacks but not as frequently as ANP (PIPS, 2013). New York Times, some 20 days before the elections, reported that "[e]lectioneering has taken a dark twist in northwest Pakistan, where a concerted campaign of Taliban attacks against the main secular party is violently reshaping the democratic landscape before parliamentary elections scheduled for May 11" (Walsh, 2013). BBC also reported this issue and observed that ANP was affected the most by militants' attacks (Hussain, 2013b).

In his article published in daily Dawn on May 10, 2013, Khadim Hussain wrote that "[t]he ANP seemed to be singled out by the TTP in Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, being attacked almost on a daily basis." He further wrote that most of the attacks on ANP occurred in areas where it was supposed to get a majority or considerable votes (Hussain, 2013a). The local leaders of ANP in Peshawar, Swabi, Swat, and Charsadda districts, the stronghold of ANP, would almost on a daily basis receive threatening letters during the three months preceding elections. Some 30 polling agents in these districts revealed that on Election Day, they received letters in the morning warning them of attacks on polling stations where ANP was supposed to win.

Such tactics had serious consequences for ANP as the top leadership was already under "virtual house arrest" due to security threats. Law enforcement agencies would also force ANP's local leadership not to take out rallies and hold corner meetings due to security reasons (Hussain, 2013b).

Though threat and use of violence did put some parties at disadvantage (especially ANP), still the voters took to polling stations more than ever before, which resulted in the highest turnout rate in the province after 1970 elections (Mehdi, 2018). In the 2013 elections, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa voters lived up to their reputation of voting a party into power other than they voted for in the previous elections. Thus they turned away from ANP and voted for PTI which emerged as the largest party in provincial assembly (Mehdi, 2018). Out of 99 general seats, PTI won 35, JUI-F 13, PML-N 12, QWP 7, JI 7, ANP 4, PPP 3, while 18 seats were won by other smaller parties and independents (NDI & ANERFEL, 2013). In the National Assembly too PTI emerged as the most successful party with 17 out of 35 general seats from the province (Cookman and Wilder, 2013). PTI, being the largest single party in the province, formed a coalition government with JI, QWP, Awami Jamhoori Ittehad Pakistan, and some independents (NDI & ANERFEL, 2013).

Religious parties, to some extent, recovered from the crushing defeat of 2008 and won a handsome number of seats. However, ANP received its worst ever results in the 2013 elections as it won only 4 provincial assembly and 1 National Assembly seat. In addition to the incumbency and militancy factors, Hussain (2013b) tries to link this poor performance with some other factors. He writes that it seems that the ANP discourse was not well received by some within the civil and military establishment because of the fear that ANP's indigenous socio-cultural narrative against religious bigotry might

lead to a secular Pakistan and that its dominance in the province might lead to greater regional autonomy. He argues that Pakistan's desire for a negotiated settlement with Taliban in Afghanistan in order to have long term influence also necessitated favorable political conditions in Pakistan (to empower parties like JI and PTI in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) even if it meant deprivation of the voters of genuine representation. Thus, the narrative supported by ANP had to be kept away from political power in the province.

Husain further claims that the election results in 2013 were consequences ANP faced for its efforts to mainstream FATA, which would have compelled Pakistan to revisit its policy toward Afghanistan, and counter militants' narrative. Thus, he contends, ANP was targeted with a deliberate media campaign and attacks by militants to keep it away from the electoral campaign. He writes:

After scanning large media outlets a few months before the elections, one can easily conclude that media was used in the shape of talk shows, propagation of pre-poll surveys and columns in print media to widely disseminate the narrative of 'corruption', 'pro-Americanism' and, bad governance against the ANP. With the exceptions of a few columnists and anchor-persons, most of the columns in print media and most of the anchor persons in electronic media continuously depicted the ANP to be a loser in the elections. The media manipulators knew quite well that workers, voters and sympathizers of the ANP could be de-motivated effectively through the use of this tool. Consistent use of social media was also profusely carried out to discredit the leadership by dubbing them 'corrupt,' 'coward' and 'agents.' (2013b, p-4).

Though ANP linked its defeat with an organized campaign against it, many believe that its defeat was the result of its incumbency factor and widespread allegations of favoritism, nepotism, and corruption.

3.3.14 2018 Elections: KP Makes History

The 2018 elections produced unusual results in the province as it was for the first time since 1951 that a single party won enough seats to form government in the province on its own. PTI emerged as the single largest party winning 65 out of the 96 provincial assembly seats¹⁶. MMA won 10 seats, ANP 7, PPP and PML-N 4 seats each, while 6 seats were won by independent candidates (ECP, 2018a; ECP, 2018a). Following the elections, PTI formed government with Mehmood Khan as chief minister.

Like 1951 elections, the 2018 elections are considered to be among the most manipulated ones in Pakistan's history. The results were rejected by all parties except PTI. On August 8, thousands of workers and leaders of PPP, PML-N, ANP, MMA, QWP, and some other political parties staged a protest in front of Election Commission of Pakistan against alleged rigging ("Opposition parties stage protest," 2018; Hashim, 2018).

An interesting aspect of these elections was that parties like MMA, ANP, and PPP included in their manifestoes some issues that were first raised by Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM¹⁷) or Pashtun Protection Movement. ANP also specifically mentioned in its manifesto the issue of security checkpoints and treatment of people at these

¹⁶ Elections were delayed on two seats due to the death of one of candidates on those two seats while result of one constituency was withheld by ECP.

¹⁷ PTM is a human rights movement led by a young Pashtun Manzoor Ahmad Pashteen. PTM has been alleging security forces and intelligence agencies for dubious role in the war on terror. Its demands are cleaning of land mines laid by security forces in erstwhile FATA that have killed or maimed dozens of people, production of missing persons before courts, legal action against senior police officer Rao Anwar who was found involved in hundreds of extrajudicial killings including the murder of Naqeeb Mehsud in Karachi, end to Pashtuns' humiliation at security check points. After some time, it demanded the constitution of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate the events in Pashtun lands in Pakistan after 9/11. Its leaders have always maintained that they want strict implementation of the Constitution and accountability of all including the army and ISI. It has attracted huge crowds from among Pashtuns toward itself and many political observers and genuine democrats consider it as the only political force in the country which, in real terms, raises questions over army's transgressions.

checkpoints and removal of landmines from erstwhile FATA (ANP manifesto, 2018). These were the issues that were first raised by PTM. Many believe that ANP made reference to check points and landmines in its manifesto to attract voters and prevent PTM from encroaching upon its support base as PTM's demands including these two issues made it much popular. In the run up to elections, ANP even issued directives to its workers not to attend PTM's gatherings as PTM leaders would publicly criticize the army while ANP did not want to displease the army, which many believe to be a major factor in determining election results.

Similarly, MMA raised issues like recovery of missing persons, an end to state's atrocities and illegal arrests (MMA manifesto for 2018). MMA President Maulana Fazlur Rehman, while unveiling MMA's manifesto, even questioned ISPR's claims that peace has returned to the erstwhile FATA. He questioned as why there occur explosions in Waziristan if peace has really been established in the area (Ali, 2018). MMA also included in its manifesto the issues of provincial autonomy and royalty for provinces from resources extracted from their soil---issues mainly concerning KP and Balochistan (MMA manifesto for 2018). PPP also in its manifesto demanded an end to extra judicial killings and enforced disappearances. It further pledged to resolve the issues of maltreatment at check posts and landmines in the tribal areas (PPP manifesto for 2018).

3.4 Electoral Geography of the Province

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa can be divided into four electoral regions. They are: Central Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Central KP), North-Eastern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North-Eastern KP), Northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Northern KP), and Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Southern KP). This division is based on several factors like geographical boundaries of districts, voting patterns, economic outlook and historical, cultural, and

linguistic influences (Ahmad, 2010). A brief description of these regions with regard to their voting patterns is given below. This description is mainly based on the results announced by ECP after every election since 1970.

3.4.1 Central KP:

Central KP consists of five districts including Charsadda, Mardan, Nowshera, Peshawar, and Swabi. This region is the most urbanized, industrialized, agriculturally productive and densely populated part of the province. It is actually the geographic, political, and economic center of the province (Ahmad, 2010). According to the ECP's delimitation for 2018 elections, there are 37 provincial assembly and 14 NA seats in this region.

ANP has been the strongest electoral force in this region as it has so far won 96 out of 252 (38.1%) provincial assembly seats since 1988 and 29 out of 101 (28.7%) NA seats contested from general elections 1970 onwards. It was also ANP's performance in this region which enabled it to form coalition governments with PPP and PML-N. However, ANP's performance in this region during the last two general elections has been extremely poor. For example, ANP's average provincial assembly seats per election from 1988 to 2008 were 15.16 while NA seats per election from 1970 to 2008 (1977 not counted) were 3.85, but during the last two elections, its average dropped to 2.5 seats of provincial assembly and 1 seat of NA.

After ANP, the second popular party in this region is PPP. It has won 15.5% (39 out of 252) of the provincial assembly seats and 18.8% (19 out of 101) of NA seats. Like ANP, PPP's performance has also declined during the last two elections. This is one of the two electoral regions of KP where religious parties have been the most ineffective. It

was only in 2002 when religious parties performed exceptionally well as they won 18 out of 36 provincial assembly seats and 12 out of 13 NA seats from this region. Factions of Muslim League (ML) have also been unable to attract large number of voters from this region as they have won fewest seats from this region among all. Independent candidates have not been much successful in this region as they have won only 10 provincial assembly seats and 1 NA seat so far. This poor performance of independent candidates shows that party structure is comparatively well established in this electoral region.

3.4.2 North-Eastern KP

North-Eastern electoral region is spread over districts of Abbottabad, Battagram, Haripur, Kohistan, and Mansehra (Ahmad, 2010). There are 18 provincial assembly and 7 NA seats in this region.

This region has been a stronghold of Muslim League factions, especially PML-N. The dominance of Muslim League in this region started even before the creation of Pakistan when in 1946 elections Muslim League won eight out of nine Muslim Rural and two out of three Muslim Urban seats from this region (Ahmad, Memon, & Rabbi 2014). In all subsequent elections, various factions of Muslim League remained the major electoral force as they have won 46.8% of the provincial assembly and 62.1% of NA seats since 1970. Among Muslim League factions, PML-N has been the most successful in this region as it has so far won 41.1% of all provincial assembly and 43.9% of all NA seats. The second strongest force has been independents as they have won an average of 31.9% of provincial assembly and 13.6% of NA seats. In this region, independent candidates have been very successful in winning high number of provincial assembly seats.

Like Central KP, this region too has comparatively been difficult for religious parties to win seats from as they have secured only 7.8% of the provincial assembly and 13.6% of the NA seats from this region since 1970. Even when the popularity of religio-political parties was at peak and six of them formed an electoral coalition called MMA for the 2002 elections, this region still did not extend much support to religious parties. MMA could win only 7 out of 27 (25.9%) provincial assembly and NA seats from this region while from the remaining three regions, it won 70 out of 107 (65.4%) provincial assembly and NA seats. This shows that religion is not as much important determinant of voting behaviour in this electoral region as in the other three regions of the province.

In addition to ML and religious parties, PPP, ANP, and QWP have also been struggling to create space in the region but their efforts have not been much successful so far. They occasionally win seats from this region.

3.4.3 Northern KP

Northern KP consists of Buner, Chitral, Lower Dir, Malakand, Shangla, Swat, and Upper Dir districts. In terms of area, it is the largest of KP's four electoral regions (Ahmad, 2010). This region has 24 provincial assembly and 10 NA seats.

This region has been receptive to all types of ideologies as ANP, PPP, religious parties, and factions of ML all have been winning seats from here. Though smaller parties like QWP and ANP have also won seats from this region, PPP, factions of ML, and religious parties have been more successful in this region as collectively they have won 65.7% of NA seats and 57.1% of the provincial assembly seats. Among the three, PPP and religious parties have fared slightly better than various factions of ML collectively. Independent candidates have not been much successful in this region as they have won

only one NA seat and 7 provincial assembly seats so far. Coalitions of rightist parties have performed much better as compared to their performance while contesting elections separately.

3.4.4 Southern KP:

Southern KP is composed of seven districts. They are: Bannu, D. I. Khan, Hangu, Karak, Kohat, Lakki Marwat, and Tank (Ahmad, 2010). This region has 20 provincial assembly and 8 NA seats.

Historically, this region has been dominated by right and center-right political forces. Religious parties especially JUI-F and various factions of Muslim League, particularly PML-N, a center-right party, have been dominant actors in terms of winning seats. JUI-F's performance in provincial elections has been much poor as compared to its performance in national level elections as it has so far won only 23% of the provincial assembly seats as compared to 43.85% of NA seats. When asked about JUI-F's poor performance of JUI-F on provincial seats, M. F. A. Haqqani said that historically JUI-F's focus was on NA seats because of its importance due to its legislative powers. He said that it was at later stage that JUI-F started paying attention to provincial seats as a result of increasing demand for developmental works from voters. This explanation might have some substance but the most plausible explanation seems to be JUI-F's strategy of fielding candidates on NA and provincial assembly seats. In the case of NA seats, tickets are awarded to people with hold some formal degrees from Wafaq ul Madaris and are entitled to use titles like Maulana, Sheikh ul Hadith, Mufti, Qari, etc. On the other hand, many provincial assembly seats are allocated to people who do not have any degrees from Wafaq ul Madaris but have financial resources to finance

election campaign. This trend was observed while reviewing past result reports issued by ECP.

JUI-F's dominance in the region was established by its predecessors like JUI-H when it outclassed its major political rival ML in 1946 elections and then by JUI-WP in 1970 elections when it won all three National Assembly seats from this region. With the exception of 1997 elections, religious parties have in every election secured NA seats from this region while in 1970 and 2002 elections, they won all the NA seats from this region.

Various factions of Muslim League and its coalition like IJI have also performed well in this region and so far, they have won 21% of the provincial level and 19.3% of national level seats. Other parties that have managed to win seats in this region from time to time are ANP and PPP. These two parties, both secular in nature, have collectively won 12.2% of the provincial and 10.5% of the national level seats from this region. ANP was doing quite well in this region as till 2002, it won 11.3% of all national and provincial level seats from this region. However, its performance during the last three elections has been extremely poor. Due to its poor performance in the last three elections, its overall seats share dropped to 4.4%. Detailed results of KP Assembly and National Assembly are given in table 02 and 03.

3.5 The PTI Wave

Recently, PTI has emerged as a strong political force across the country in general and KP and Punjab, in particular. Though there is widespread perception that PTI's victory in the 2018 general elections was the result of rigging, still we cannot ignore the fact that a large portion of Pakistani population supports PTI, mainly because of its leader

and current Prime Minister Imran Khan. For example, a survey conducted at a federal university a few days before the 2018 elections revealed that 54% of the respondents from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa expressed their intention to vote for PTI (Mahsud, Wasai, & Hussain, 2021).

The sudden rise in PTI's popularity during the 2013 and 2018 general elections deeply affected voting patterns in all the four regions of the province as it displaced some of the long-standing political forces in their strongholds. However, the magnitude of displacement was not uniform for all regions. Voting patterns in some regions were affected more as compared to others.

The results of the two elections show that Central KP is the region which was the most affected by the PTI wave¹⁸. Out of the total 99 NA and provincial assembly seats of this region contested during general elections of 2013 and 2018, PTI won 76, which is more than three-fourths of the total seats. It is mainly due to PTI's outstanding performance in 2013 and 2018 general elections in this region that ANP's average of 15.16 provincial assembly seats per election from 1988 to 2008 dropped to 2.5 seats per election during the last two general elections while its average of 3.85 NA seats per election from 1970 to 2008 (1977 excluded) declined to 1 seat per election in the last two elections. This PTI wave also affected the performance of other political forces like PPP and religious parties in this region.

¹⁸ I call PTI's performance as a wave because I believe that it will not be able to repeat this performance in near future.

Table No. 02: Provincial Assembly seats won by various political parties since 1988

Party	Region	1988	1990	1993	1997	2002	2008	2013	2018	Total	GT
ANP	C. KP	11/27	18/27	16/27	21/27	5/36	20/36	2/36	3/36	96	134
	N. KP	1/16	2/16	3/16	5/16		10/21	2/23	3/23	26	
	NE. KP						1/19		1/18	2	
	S. KP	1/15	2/15	1/15	3/15	3/20				10	
PP/ PDA	C. KP	13/27	2/27	10/27	1/27	5/36	8/36			39	80
	N. KP	7/16	2/16	9/16	1/16	2/23	7/21	2/23	2/23	32	
	NE. KP			1/16			1/19			2	
	S. KP	1/15	1/15			1/20	1/20	1/20	2/19	7	
PML-N	C. KP				4/27			2/36	1/36	7	73
	N. KP			1/16	8/16			2/23		11	
	NE. KP			11/16	13/16	1/20	5/19	8/20	3/18	41	
	S. KP			4/15	6/15	3/20	1/20			14	
IJ	C. KP	2/27	6/27							8	54
	N. KP	7/16	11/16							18	
	NE. KP	9/16	8/16							17	
	S. KP	5/15	6/15							11	
JUIF/JJM	C. KP						1/36			1	18
	N. KP						1/23			1	
	NE. KP		1/16				3/20			4	
	S. KP	1/15	1/15	1/15	1/15		8/20			12	
MMA	C. KP					18/36	1/36			19	68
	N. KP					20/23			2/23	22	
	NE. KP					4/20	3/19			7	
	S. KP					6/20	6/20		8/20	20	
PTI	C. KP							22/36	32/36	54	101
	N. KP							6/23	16/23	22	
	NE. KP							3/20	10/18	13	
	S. KP					1/20		4/20	7/19	12	
PIF	N. KP		3/16							3	3
JI	N. KP							7/23		7	7
AJIP	C. KP							3		3	3
PML/APML PML-J/ PML-Q	C. KP					1/36 (Q)				1	15
	N. KP						2/21(PML)	1/23APML		3	
	NE. KP		1/16 (J)			5/20 (Q)	2/19(PML)			8	
	S. KP		2/15 (J)	1/15 (J)						3	
PPPS/QWP	C. KP					5/36	4/36	5/36		14	22
	N. KP					1/23		1/23		2	
	NE. KP					1/20		1/20		2	
	S. KP					2/20	2/20			4	
IND	C. KP	1/27	1/27	1/27	1/27	2/36	3/36	1/36		10	108
	N. KP	1/16	1/16		2/16		2/21	1/23		7	
	NE. KP	7/16	7/16	3/16	3/16	9/20	7/19	5/20	4/18	45	
	S. KP	7/15	5/15	7/15	4/15	4/20	10/20	7/20	2/19	46	
Total		74	74	74	74	99	96	99	96	686	686

Note:

- The table is based on results released by ECP through notifications after general elections. Seats of all regions in all general elections put together make a total of 716 seats, but the above table contains results of 686 seats. Of the remaining 30 seats, results of 24 seats— PF-46, PF-49, PF-52, PF-53, PF-74, and PF-75 of 1988 and 1990 elections and PF-46, PF-47, PF-52, PF-53, PF-74, and PF-75 of 1993 and 1997 elections are not mentioned in the list available on ECP website while elections on PF-59, PF-81, PF-91 (2008), PK-78, and PK-99 (2018) were postponed due to death of one of the contesting candidates while result of PK-23 (2018) was withheld by ECP. Seats won by parties from former FATA in 2019 are not included in the table.
- C. KP stands for Central Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, N. KP stands for Northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, NE. KP stands for North-Eastern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and S. KP stands for Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
- The insertion of QY, Q, A, and P inside statistics may be read as: Q for PML-Q, QY for PML-Qayyum, A for APML, and P for PML.

Table No. 03: National Assembly (KP) seats won by various political parties since 1970

Party	Region	1970	1977	1988	1990	1993	1997	2002	2008	2013	2018	Total	GT
NAP/ANP	C. KP	3/7		2/8	6/8	2/8	8/8		6/13	1/13	1/14	29	36
	N. KP					1/6	1/6		2/8			4	
	NE.KP												
	S. KP					1/5			2/7			3	
PPP/ PDA	C. KP	1/7	3/9	5/8		5/8		1/13	4/13			19	39
	N. KP	3/6	4/6	3/6	1/6				4/8			15	
	NE.KP	2/6										2	
	S. KP				2/5				1/7			3	
JUID/MDM	S. KP			1/5D		1/5M						2	2
	N. KP					1/6	5/6			1/8	1/10	8	36
PML-N	NE.KP					6/7	6/7		4/7	3/7	2/7	21	
	S. KP					3/5	4/5					7	
JII	C. KP				1/8							1	16
	N. KP			2/6	2/6							4	
	NE.KP			4/7	4/7							8	
	S. KP			2/5	1/5							3	
JUI-WP/ JUIF/ IJM	C. KP	1/7		1/8	1/8	1/8				1/13		5	21
	N. KP												
	NE.KP	2/4			2/7					1/7		5	
	S. KP	3/3		2/5	1/5	1/5				4/7		11	
MMA	C. KP							12/13	1/13			13	37
	N. KP							7/8			1/10	8	
	NE.KP							3/7			1/7	4	
	S. KP							7/7	3/7		2/8	12	
PTI	C. KP									9/13	13/14	22	47
	N. KP									3/8	8/10	11	
	NE.KP									2/7	3/7	5	
	S. KP									3/7	6/8	9	
PIF	N. KP				2/6							2	2
JI	N. KP	1/3								3/8		4	4
AJIP	C. KP									1/13		1	1
PML-QY/ PMLQ/ APMI/ PML	C. KP	2/7QY	1/9QY									3	17
	N. KP	2/3QY							2/8Q	1/8A		5	
	NE.KP	2/4QY						4/7Q	2/7P			8	
	S. KP								1/7P			1	
PPPS/QWP	C. KP								1/13	1/13		2	3
	N. KP							1/8				1	
PQP	N. KP					1/6						1	1
PNA	C. KP	5/9										5	17
	N. KP	3/6										3	
	NE.KP	4/6										4	
	S. KP	5/5										5	
IND	C. KP								1/13			1	12
	N. KP				1/6							1	
	NE.KP	3/7	1/7	1/7	1/7		1/7		1/7	1/7	1/7	9	
	S. KP				1/5							1	
		17	26	26	26	26	26	35	35	35	39	291	291

The table is based on the results issued by ECP through notifications after each general election. The insertion of QY, Q, A, and P inside statistics may be read as: Q for PML-Q, QY for PML-Qayyum, A for APML, and P for PML.

The second most affected region by PTI wave is Northern KP. In this region, PTI won 33 out of 64 provincial assembly and NA seats (51.5%) contested during the last two general elections. As this region has been open to all shades of political ideologies, so almost all major political parties like PPP, ANP, ML, and the religious parties are the affectees of PTI's sudden rise.

Unlike 2002 when MMA almost swept the area, in 2018 it could win only 2 provincial assembly seats and one NA seat from this region.

Southern KP is the region from where PTI in 2002 elections won its first ever seat in the province.¹⁹ Despite its first win from the region, PTI could not strike as deeply in this region as in the Central KP and Northern KP. Out of total 54 provincial assembly and NA seats up for grabs in the region during the last two general elections, PTI won 20 seats, which is 37% of total seats. Probably JUI-F's strong presence in the region is one of the major causes for PTI's relatively poor performance in this region.

The fourth and the least affected region by the PTI wave is North-Eastern KP. In this region, PTI won 18 out of 52 (33.3%) provincial assembly and NA seats open for competition during the last two general elections. PTI's comparatively poor performance in this region may be attributed to strong presence of PML-N and electables who while contesting as independent candidates won more seats than in any other region. One common thing among all four regions with regard to the PTI wave is that as compared to 2013 elections, it won more seats in 2018 general elections.

3.6 The phenomenon of Electables or Independents

An important aspect of the electoral process of South and North-Eastern regions is the high success rate of independent candidates in provincial assembly elections. Since 1988, independent candidates have won 33.1% of the provincial assembly seats from Southern KP and 31.9% from North-eastern KP. On the other hand, the success rate of independent candidates from these regions in NA elections has been 1.75% and 13.6%, respectively. This trend indicates voters' preference for sociological and economic

¹⁹ Mian Nisar Gul won the PF-40 Karak-I seat.

models of voting. Ahmad (2010) argues that it is patronage which matters the most in determining voting behaviour in rural areas and this argument can be applied to these regions as they are among the least urbanized, industrialized, and developed regions of the country. The patronage system seems to be so strong that even deeply rooted political parties of the regions like JUI-F in Southern KP and PML-N in North-eastern KP have also been unable to effectively compete with independent candidates at provincial level. For example, JUI-F has so far won 43.85% of the NA seats in southern region while almost half percentage of this figure (23%) of the provincial assembly seats, and this gap in its performance at provincial and national level elections can be, to some extent, attributed to the high success ratio of independents in provincial elections from the region.

The potential and possibility of independent candidates to win seats has badly affected the structure of political parties in these regions as electables frequently change parties without the fear of losing their voters' trust and support. For example, Nawabzada Mohsin Ali Khan contested 1988, 1990, and 1993 elections from Karak as IJI and PML-N candidate, 1997 and 2008 election as independent candidate and 2013 election as ANP candidate. He won 1988, 1990, 1997 elections while lost his seat in 1993, 2008, and 2013 elections. Similarly, Iftikhar ud Din won PF-30, Kohat-III in 1988 as independent, in 1990 as IJI and 1997 as PML-N candidate while he lost the seat in 1993 while contesting on PML-J ticket. In another case, Makhdumzada Syed Murid Kazim Shah has contested 7 elections from Dera Ismail Khan since 1988 as independent, ANP, and PPP-S/QWP candidate and he always secured one of the top three positions. In Dera Ismail Khan, Sanaullah Miankhel contested 1988, 1993, and 1997 elections as PML-N/LJI candidate, 1990 election as independent, 2002 as PML-Q candidate while 2008 as PML candidate. He won all except the 2002 election (ECP results of NWFP

elections of 1988-1990, 93, 1997, 2002, 2008, and 2013). These examples show that a party ticket does not matter much for winning provincial assembly seats in this region.

The recent PTI emergence as a strong electoral force in all regions has also impacted independent candidates' success ratio as only six independent candidates succeeded in winning their provincial assembly seats from the two regions while their average during the seven elections before 2018 was 12.14 seats per election. Now the question is whether the electoral politics of independent candidates will once again occupy its past space or political parties will fill the space created by displacement of independents.

Keeping in view the high success rate of independent candidates in provincial elections, there arises the question about the possible reasons due to which many electables prefer to contest elections as independent candidates. There can be various factors that encourage them to contest as independent candidates. Party structures are weak in these regions as compared to the other two electoral regions of the province. There are examples of independent candidates defeating candidates of political parties from whose platforms they once used to contest elections. For instance, Sanaullah Miankhel won PF-55 D. I. Khan-III in 1988 election as IJI candidate while he won the same seat in 1990 election as independent candidate despite the fact that IJI candidate was also contesting against him (ECP, n. da).

Another reason is that there are more chances for independent candidates to get ministry in the provincial cabinet as compared to federal one. As the formation of government at the center mostly depends upon results in Punjab, so independently elected lawmakers from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have weak bargaining power and thus least chances of getting ministries in the federal government. On the provincial level, their demand happens to be high because of political parties' inability to get the required

number of seats and form governments on their own. From 1970 to 2013, no single party ever won enough seats to form government on its own. In such circumstances, demand of independently elected candidates goes up and thus they bargain with parties and try to get as many benefits as possible in return for support to the party to form government. As capturing political power is the ultimate goal of political parties, so they go as far as possible in accommodating independent MPAs. In the 2013 general elections, fourteen independent candidates won their seats. Out of fourteen, two were killed within 20 days after taking oath as members of the provincial assembly, one joined PML-N while the remaining eleven joined parties within the ruling coalition and all of them were at least for some time appointed as ministers, advisors, special assistants, and parliamentary secretaries (Shirazi, 2013a; Shirazi, 2013b; Shah, 2013; "MPA among 28 killed," 2013; Ali, 2013; "KP govt expands and reshuffles cabinet," 2014; Ali, 2016; Profile of KP ministers, 2018).

Another factor for electables to contest elections as independent candidates is the possibility to enjoy governmental perks and privileges even in successive governments irrespective of which party or parties form the government. Those who win their seats as independent candidates happen to be free to join any party. Sticking to the policies of a particular party may result in sitting on opposition benches for years, even decades in a row. However, the electables cannot afford staying out of power for longer periods because their whole philosophy is based on a patronage system. Staying on opposition benches for longer will simply mean inability to provide patronage to one's voters and supporters and this may lead to defeat in the next election. Control of government resources to give favors to their supporters being the main goal of electables, after winning elections they always remain in search of a bargain with the party which they believe will form the next government. For example, Dr. Amjad Afridi won the 2008

election as independent candidate, later joined ANP and was appointed minister for housing (Irfan & Bangash, 2013). In the 2013 elections, he again won as an independent candidate, joined PTI and was appointed advisor to the chief minister on sports and tourism ("Seven advisors," 2014).

The fact that provincial assembly constituencies happen to be very small as compared to NA ones also seems to have encouraged electables to contest provincial level seats. Unlike NA constituencies that are spread on vast areas, in some cases whole districts, provincial constituencies need less resources and manpower. Thus, many people go for small constituencies in which they can better canvass and mobilize voters in their support.

One thing about electoral politics of the province is that ideologies of various parties have not prevented them from forging alliances with political forces on the other spectrum of political divide. For example, ANP, a secular and ethnic party, made coalition governments with JUI-F, a conservative religious party in 1973, IJI, an alliance of rightist parties including Jamaat-e-Islami in 1990, and PML-N, a mainly Punjab dominated party, in 1993. Similarly, JUI-F made an electoral alliance with PPP, a secular party with leftist tendencies. PPP and ANP, both secular parties, have also made coalition governments in the province in 1988 and 2008. On the other hand, PPP made electoral alliances with parties like PML-J and groups like Tehreek Nafaz-e-Fiqqah Jaffaria Pakistan, a totally sectarian outfit.

In this chapter, themes like electoral history of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, its division into electoral regions, the politics of electables, and the PTI Wave were discussed in detail. In the next chapter, the scope of discussion will be narrowed down to the district of Swabi, the case study for this research. The chapter presents a comprehensive

discussion about Swabi, its weather, people, economy, household infrastructure, politics and electoral history.

Chapter 4

THE RESEARCH SETTING: SWABI's GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY, PEOPLE, ECONOMY AND POLITICS

4.1 Introduction

Swabi²⁰ is one of the five districts of Central Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It lies between Kabul River and Indus River (SMEDA, n.d) and covers an area of 1543 square kilometers²¹ (Anwar, Khan, Khan, Murad & Ali, 2015). According to the 2017 census, the total population of Swabi district is 1,624,616 and divided into 214,209 households (PBS, 2017a). Buner lies to its north, Haripur to its east, Mardan and Nowshera districts to its west, and Attock district of Punjab to its south (Jadoon, 2015, Trans. mine; Buzdar, 2015). A six lane motorway linking Peshawar and Islamabad passes through Swabi with an access interchange at Anbar village (WUS, 2019). Geographically,

²⁰ I think it would have been much better had I worked on my own constituency (South Waziristan). However, there were genuine reasons due to which I could not do so. Most of the people of the constituency were displaced at the time of this study. As a result of militancy and the subsequent military operations, people migrated to places like D. I. Khan, Tank, Karachi, Rawalpindi, Bannu, and Peshawar with majority of them still living in these cities. Thus, conducting survey from so many places was not possible for the researcher. Though a small percentage of the people returned to their native villages, still conducting a well representative survey from them was not possible due lack of facilities like transportation and communication. Another serious issue was security concerns among the people as well as on the part of the researcher. People are reluctant to freely share their views on political issues. The researcher also did not want to take the risk and conduct the survey there.

As far as Swabi is concerned, it was after long deliberations and consultations with his supervisor that this researcher decided to work on it. He prepared a table of districts like Tank, Bannu, Hangu, Kohat, Mardan and Karrak and finally selected Swabi because it is nearest to the university, have enough political dynamics to look into and comparatively peaceful. Swabi used to be a stronghold of Khudai Khidmatgars and ANP but slowly it slipped out of its hands. So the researcher wanted to look into its politics and the possible reasons for ANP's decline.

²¹ In terms of area, Swabi is 17th largest district in the province but in terms of population, it is fifth largest district in the province after Peshawar, Mardan, Swat, and Dera Ismail Khan. It is spread over 1543 square kilometers which makes only 2.07% of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's total area of 74,521 square kilometers. On the other hand, its population of 1624616 makes 5.32% of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's total population of 30523371 persons. It means that Swabi's population density of 1052.89 persons per sq. km is much higher than Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's average population density of 409.59 persons per sq. km.).

Swabi can be divided into two parts: the southern plain areas and the northern mountainous areas. The southern region is the fertile part of the district where most of the agricultural activities take place. The hilly part is 750-1400 meter above sea level and the major portion of the mountainous northern areas consists of Gadoon valley. Karamar, Panjpir, and Mahabanh are some other mountainous regions of this part (Anwar et al., 2015; Khatoon, 2015, Trans. mine).

Swabi was given the status of district on 1 July, 1988. Earlier, it was first a tehsil of Peshawar district and then of Mardan district from 1937 onwards (Khatoon, 2005). The district is divided into four Tehsils of Lahor, Razzar, Swabi, and Topi with Swabi city as the headquarters of the district (Buzdar, 2015). According to the statistics of 2017 census available at Pakistan Bureau of Statistics website, Razaz is the largest tehsil in terms of population followed by Swabi, Topi, and Lahor (PBS, 2017a). These Tehsils are further divided into 56 Union Councils (WUS, 2019).

4.2 Weather

Swabi's climate is classified as warm and temperate. January and June are the coldest and hottest months, respectively ("Swabi Climate," n. d.). A rapid decrease in temperature starts from the month of October (Anwar et al., 2015) and it reaches its extreme in January. In January, average temperature drops to 10.2 °C with minimum temperature of 2.8 °C and maximum 17.7 °C ("Swabi Climate," n. d.). Similarly, a steep rise in temperature is witnessed from May onwards (Anwar et al., 2015) and reaches the highest level in June. In June, the average temperature rises to 32.9 °C with 24.9 °C as minimum and 41 °C as maximum. Average temperature for the whole year is 22.7 °C. The district experiences 639 mm rainfall annually with more rainfalls in summer as

compared to winter. November is the month with lowest average rainfall of 12 mm while highest (137 mm) average rainfall is recorded in August ("Swabi Climate," n. d.).

4.3 People of Swabi

Most of the people living in Swabi are Pashtun. Thus, Pashto is the language of majority of residents (more than 95 % speak Pashto) but Hindko is also spoken in some villages (Buzzdar, 2015). More than 99 percent population is Muslim while small number of Hindus and Sikhs also live in the district (WUS, 2019). Yousafzai is the main Pashtun tribe in the district while other major tribes are Jadoon, Khattak and Mandanr. In addition to these major tribes, there are also people who belong to other tribes like Dalazak, Tanoli, Sadat locally called as Mian, Qureshi, Gujar, Paracha, Awan, and Mughal (Jadoon, 2015).

Some historians are of the view that the forefathers of the current dwellers of Swabi (of Yousafzai tribe) were living in this area till they were expelled by the Huns. Thus, they settled in Kandahar and came back to Swabi in 15th century. It is said that they left Kandahar due to cruelties of Ulugh Beg, uncle of Zahiruddin Babar, who killed their 700 people at one time. Before the arrival of the Yousafzai tribe, Dalazaks used to live in this area who were then forcefully expelled from their abode (Khatoon, 2015).

4.4 Household Infrastructure in the District

According to PBS's Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey 2014-15 (PSLM), 91.1% people of the district live in their own houses, 4.6% in rented houses while 4.3% live in others' houses but free of cost. In terms of material used for household walls, 87.3% have used burnt bricks/blocks, 12.3% mud bricks/mud while

0.4% have used other material. For roofs, 67.3% households have used RCC/RBC material, 26.5% wood/bamboo, 5.6% T-iron/garders and 0.6% sheet/iron/cement (PBS, 2016).

Motor pumps are the main source (53%) of drinking water in the district followed by hand pumps with 22%, dug wells 17%, and 4% each tap water and other sources. It may be noted that tap water's share in drinking water (4%) in Swabi is lowest among all the districts in the province while provincial average of tap water is 35%. For cooking purposes, 20.9% people of the district use gas, 76.8% woods/sticks, and 2.3% use other means (PBS, 2016).

According to official statistics, 99.15% people in the district have electricity while the remaining use either gas or other sources for lighting (PBS, 2016). It seems that the PTI-led provincial government paid special attention to this district in terms of infrastructure development. For example, from 2013-2016 the government provided electricity to 1447 villages across the province. Out of 1447 villages, 298 villages (20.6%) were in Swabi alone. Similar pattern can also be witnessed in terms of opening of new educational institutions (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bureau of Statistics-KPBS, 2017). Swabi has a total of 625.58 km roads with 456.47 km black topped while 169.11 km shingled roads. Thus, the total road per kilometer area is 0.41 kilometer (KPBS, 2018).

4.5 Education

According to Alif Ailaan's 2017 district education ranking, Swabi ranked 11th out of 25 districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 70th out of 155 in Pakistan including Pakistan-

held Kashmir. This shows that in terms of education, the district is neither too advanced nor backward as some other districts in the country.

Literacy rate among people above 10 years of age, as per statistics released by Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2017, was 49% (65% for male and 34% for female). As thousands of children who were below 10 years of age and enrolled in schools have joined this age group since 2015, so the present literacy rate in 10 years and older people seems to be higher than 50%. If the students who are below 10 years of age but can read and write are also taken into account, then literacy rate would probably go further up.

According to Independent Monitoring Unit, District Education Office Swabi's report for October 2019, there were 1303 government schools in Swabi district. Among them, 1003 were primary schools with 437 for girls and 566 for boys, 130 were Middle Schools with 60 for girls and 70 for boys, 124 were High Schools with 49 for girls and 75 for boys, while 46 were Higher Secondary Schools with 19 for girls and 27 for boys. These schools offer education from nursery to twelfth grade and the total enrolment in these schools was 283131 (IMUDEOS, 2019).

The data of government schools from KG to 12th grade shows a pattern of constant decline in number of students with increase in grade level. For example, from KG to 12th class, it was only 2nd grade which had more students than the grade preceding it (1st class) (DEO Swabi, 2019). This trend indicates one of the two possibilities: enrollment rate has been constantly increasing due to which there are more students in lower grades or students constantly drop from school due to which their number is decreasing as they proceed upward.

In addition to government schools, there were also 431 private schools registered with Private Schools Regulatory Authority Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Out of 431, 134 were primary, 133 middle, and 164 high schools (DEO Swabi, 2019). The researcher tried to also get the number of enrolled students in these schools but he could not do so as officials in the district education office said they only have data about the number of private schools rather than students. Though the number of private schools is far less than government ones, it seems that average enrollment in private schools will be higher than government schools. For example, the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey by Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2016) ranked Swabi as third lowest in the province in terms of primary enrollment in government schools. In urban areas, 36% of the enrolled boys and 57% girls were in government schools. In rural areas, 68% of the enrolled boys and 63% of enrolled girls were in government schools. These figures show (1) higher percentage of urban primary level students study in private schools as compared to their rural counterparts, (2) people give preference to male children when it comes to provision of better education facilities---as private schools are considered to be providing better quality education than government schools.

According to the Annual Status of Education in Pakistan (ASER), 14.2% of total children in the district between 6 and 16 years of age were out of schools in 2016 (ASER, 2017). The researcher could not find latest data containing details of total number of school age boys and girls and their enrolment rate, but a report by AAWAZ in 2015 showed that girls' enrolment in schools was lower than boys and the number of out of school girls was higher than boys.

The next level of educational institutions is colleges. According to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's Higher Education Archives and Library Department (HEALD) website, there are 17 government colleges in the district with 8 for boys and 9 for girls. These colleges also include a post-graduate college and a management college (HEALD, n.d.). The district also has one college of technology (TEVTA, 2019). In addition to these government colleges, there are also twenty-one private colleges (three of them closed/cancelled) providing both general and technical education (HERA, 2020).

For tertiary education, there are two universities in the district. One university, Women University Swabi was established in 2013 and it offers education to females only. The other university, University of Swabi, was founded in 2012 and it has a co-education system. One of the colleges mentioned above also has post-graduate status which means it can also provide higher education.

The district also hosts Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology, one of the most prestigious educational institutions in the country. It is located in Topi Tehsil of Swabi (WUS, 2019). Swabi also has a center for blind children in the district with 17 enrolled students. However, there is no institution for mentally challenged and deaf and dumb children (SWKKP, n.d.).

In addition to formal educational institutions, there is also a large number of madrassas in the district. In 2005-6, there were a total of 353 madrassas in Swabi district with 206 for male and 47 for female. These madrassas were providing services to 30630 students (KPBS, 2017). On the basis of discussions with some religious figures, the researcher believes that the total number of madrassas and the students enrolled in them has increased now.

4.6 Health System

According to the 2016 report of the Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, there are 6 government hospitals in the districts with a capacity of 530 beds. In addition to these hospitals, there are 10 dispensaries, 6 Rural Health Centers (RHCs) with a total capacity of 90 beds, 2 Tuberculosis (TB) Clinics, 3 Maternal and Child Health (M.C.H) centers, 38 Basic Health Units (BHUs) and 1 Leprosy center. There are also 10 private hospitals with a combined capacity of 175 beds. According to the same report, there are 215 officially posted doctors in the district while the number of private medical practitioners is 271. Thus, there are 3342 people per doctor and 2043 people per hospital/dispensary bed²² (KPBS, 2017).

The available health facilities in Swabi district do not correspond to the needs of its more than 1.6 million population. The above mentioned health facilities are functional but not much effective in fulfilling the needs of the whole population (Buzdar, 2015). One BHU is supposed to cater to needs of 1000 people while one RHC is expected to fulfil the needs of up to 50,000 people (Khaliq & Ahmad, 2018). In the case of Swabi, the number of BHUs and RHUs is far less than this criteria.

Most of these health units also lack required staff, infrastructure, equipment, and medicines while in some BHUs, staff members come only one or two days a week (Buzdar, 2015). This situation can be better assessed from considering the fact that out of all doctors, nurses, and Lady Health Visitors (LHV) in Pakistan in 2015, only 2.11% of the doctors, 3.88% of the nurses, and 6.29% of the LHVs were in KP. The irony is

²² In the official statistics, the total population of the district in 2016 was estimated as 1727536. However, the total population of the district as per 2017 census is 1,624,616. Therefore, the researcher considered the census statistics while calculating population per doctor and bed.

that KP's share in total hospitals, dispensaries, and MCH centers is comparatively better as it has 17. 74% of the total hospitals, (207/1167), 7.97% of total dispensaries (454/5695), and 7.64% of the MCH centers (56/733) (KPBS, 2017).

Though there is a district headquarter hospital in Swabi city, patients are mostly forced to visit private clinics and many patients, not always serious ones, are referred to Nowshera and Peshawar which sometimes inflicts unbearable costs on poor families (Buzdar, 2015). Furthermore, hospitals are mainly concentrated in Swabi Tehsil. Out of 6 government hospitals having 530 beds capacity, 5 hospitals with a capacity of 420 beds are in Swabi tehsil only (KPBS, 2017). In short, the health indicators of the district are not very satisfactory.

4.7 Economy

Swabi has a diverse economy as all the three economic sectors- the primary sector (farming, mining, and agricultural activities), the secondary sector (industrial and manufacturing activities that lead to the production of tangible goods by using raw materials), and the tertiary sector (the part of economy which provides services to its consumers) play important role.

4.7.1 Agriculture Sector

Swabi district has a total reported area of 148689 hectares out of which 87046 hectares are cultivated while 26505 hectares (17.83%) are covered by forests (OSOCRSS, 2019). Within the province, Swabi has the fifth largest cultivated area after D. I. Khan, Lakki Marwat, Mardan, and Swat districts (KPBS, 2019). Out of 87046 hectares cultivated area, 37312 hectares (43%) area is irrigated while 49734 hectares (57%) area is unirrigated (OSOCRSS, 2019). Of the total 37312 hectare irrigated land, 24814

hectares area is irrigated through government canals, 11448 hectares through wells, 94 hectares through tube-wells, 121 hectares through lift-pumps and 835 hectares through other means (CRSALCD, 2018).

According to Director Agriculture Swabi Dr. Inamullah Khan (personal communication, December 23, 2019), agriculture provides employment to about 40% of the labor force in the district. According to the report of Pakistan Bureau of Statistics for 2017-18 (2019), agriculture's share in employment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is 31.7% while in case of Swabi it is 40%. Thus the agriculture sector has a greater share in Swabi's economy as compared to provincial average. Basically, Swabi's soil is very fertile and different types of crops are grown here (Buzdar, 2015). Similarly, the soil is also suitable for fruits like apricots, citrus, peaches, and watermelon etc. (SWU, 2019).

In Swabi, the agricultural year starts from July and ends in June next year. It is divided into Kharif and Rabi seasons (CRSALCD, 2018). In Kharif season, a total of 36186 hectares area is brought under cultivation while in Rabi season, 52985 hectares land is cultivated across the district (OSOCRSS, 2019). In Kharif season, crops like jowar, maize, rice, groundnut, arher, sugarcane, potato, and garlic are grown while Rabi season's crops include wheat, barley, rape and mustered, sunflower, matter, onion, sugar beet, and potato. In addition, the district also produces seasonal vegetables, fruits and fodders (CRSADKP, 2018).

Wheat is the major crop grown in Swabi. During 2016-17, wheat was grown on 37851 hectares of land with almost half of it on unirrigated land. Second largest crop is maize which during the above mentioned year was grown on 29674 hectares land of which about 90% was irrigated land (CRSADKP, 2018). Tobacco is the third largest crop which during 2016-17 was grown on 9995 hectares of land (OSOCRSS, 2019). During

the above mentioned year, Swabi produced 56% of the total tobacco production of the province (KPBS, 2018). Due to its suitable environmental and agronomic conditions, Swabi produces high quality tobacco used for cigarettes (Qamar, Khan, Ashfaq, Ahmad, & Idrees, 2006). However, changes in seasonal and environmental conditions are forcing tobacco growers to switch to other crops like watermelon and maize ("Tobacco growers turning to other crops," 2019). For example, the total area under tobacco crop in Swabi district in 1999-2000 was 15912 hectares. It reduced to 12601 hectares in 2003-04 (Qamar et al, 2006) and during 2017-18, it further declined to 9995 hectares (OSOCRSS, 2019).

Livestock is also an important element of the primary sector and plays an important role in the economy of district Swabi. According to the livestock census 2006, there were 203076 cattle, 103566 buffaloes, 14866 sheep, 163700 goats, 592 camels, 4034 horses, 25983 asses, 486 mules, and 1158090 poultry (KPBS, 2017). According to the notice displayed on the notice board of District Livestock Officer Swabi, the projected population for 2019 was 341533 cattle, 168183 buffaloes, 18987 sheep, and 275999 goats. According to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bureau of Statistics' report of 2017, there were 36 veterinary hospitals, centers, and dispensaries in the district that treated thousands of animals and poultry every year (KPBS, 2017).

After talking to the locals, the researcher discovered that rapid population growth is adversely affecting livestock in the district. One the one hand, people are constructing new houses etc. while on the other hand, more and more grazing land is brought under cultivation to meet food demand of the increasing population. Thus, continuous encroachment on rangelands is resulting in the shrinking of grazing lands.

Another component of the primary sector in district Swabi is mining. Minerals like dolomite, granite, limestone, marble, quartzite, sandstone, and siltstone are also found in and extracted from the district. (KPBS, 2017).

4.7.2 Industrial Sector

Another sector which contributes to the economy of the district is the industrial sector. According to data provided by the Directorate of Industry and Commerce Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, there are 126 running industrial units providing employment to 26484 people while 110 industrial units have been closed. Swabi has the highest number of closed industrial units across the province. According to this data, Swabi's industrial sector is the second largest (first being Haripur where the industrial sector provides 30,000 jobs) in terms of provision of employment (Directorate of Industry and Commerce Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2019). Chemicals, cigarettes, cotton, engineering works, flour, marble & chips, pharmaceuticals, textile, plastic & rubber, and cement-based goods are the major products of Swabi's industries (KPBS, 2017).

With regard to industries, the Gadoon-Amazai Industrial Estate is the most prominent area in Swabi district. Gadoon is a mountainous region of Swabi district bordering Buner and Haripur districts and consists of more than 50 villages. Poppy cultivation used to be a major source of income of residents of Gadoon area. Government's decision in 1984 to ban poppy cultivation created unrest in the region as it hurt people's income. It was in these circumstances that USAID provided funds for the Gadoon-Amazai industrial project. Later, locals met the then Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo who accepted their demands and announced to set up an industrial zone over an area of 116 acres. According to the plan, there were to be more than 400 industrial units in the estate along with communication system, health centers, educational institutions,

uninterrupted electricity supply, drinking water and proper sewerage system (Turk, 2017).

In order to encourage investors to come and invest in the zone, the first Benazir Government provided many incentives like loans, tax-free import of machinery and raw material, and exemption from tax for ten years and relief in gas and electricity charges. These policies attracted capital from across the country and the estate started with great success. When Nawaz Sharif came to power, he reversed the policy of incentives due to which investors started withdrawing their capital. Thus, the industrial zone lost its charm and many industrial units were closed. At present, steel re-rolling, steel furnace, textile, plastic/PVC, disposable syringes, soap, beverages, foam, marble, paper sacks/paper cones, chipboard, and carpets are the major industrial products of Gadoon-Amazai industrial zone (Turk, 2017).

4.7.3 Services sector

This sector is exclusively about provision of services to the consumers. It includes financial institutions like banks, audit and accounting firms, educational institutions like schools, colleges, and universities, engineering services, computer and software development, insurance services, transportation and communication services, medical facilities, business services, legal services, construction services and tourism etc. Services provided through both government and private channels are included in this sector.

In Swabi, most of the above mentioned sub-sectors of the services sector can be found. While giving a brief introduction of villages in Swabi district, Zia Ullah Jadoon (2015) has mentioned many people who either retired from or still serve in various government

departments and autonomous bodies like law enforcement agencies at provincial and federal level, defense forces, civil bureaucracy, education, and healthcare etc. Government departments are not the only fields in terms of employment provision as the private sector also caters to the needs of a large number of people of the district. At the local level, it seems that education, healthcare system, and businesses are the major fields providing employment in the services sector.

4.8 Political and Electoral History of the District

Swabi has great historical importance as it astride the historical route connecting Peshawar, Charsadda, Shahbaz Garhi, Hund, and Taxila. In other words, Swabi owes its importance mainly to the fact that it was an integral part of Gandhara civilization. Swabi, being part of Gandhara civilization, not only remained as a meeting place for merchandise but also for ideas and cultural values. Keeping in view Swabi's historical and cultural background, its rich cultural and archaeological heritage dating back to 5th century BCE is understandable. Famous Greek historian Herodotus mentioned an area of gold mining which was later identified by Sir Marc Aurel Stein to be lying between Salatura (Swabi's Lahor) and Jaganath in Swabi district (Khan, 1995). So far, more than 100 archaeological sites have been discovered in Swabi district. These sites belong to different periods from 3rd century BCE to 18th century CE ("Peshawar: New archaeological sites discovered," 2004).

Being an integral and important part of Gandhara region, Swabi remained under Achaemenid Empire (Hayat, 2017), Greeks under Alexander the Great (Khatoon, 2015), Maurya dynasty (Rajput, 2018), Greco-Bactrian dynasty (Khatoon, 2015; Hayat, 2017), Scythian rule, Indo-Parthians, Kushan rule (Warrach, 2011; (Khatoon, 2015), Kidarites (Zeimal, 1996), the Huns (Ghose, 2003), Vardhana Dynasty (Kapur, 2010;

Thapar (2003), Turk Shahi and Hindu Shahi dynasties (Rehman, 1976; (Harmatta & Lityinsky, 1996), Ghaznavid, Ghori, Mughal, Pashtun and Sikh rulers (Khatoon, 2015). Coins of different periods, wooden structures, sculptures, Buddha's statues and pots of thousands of years old have been recovered from different parts of Swabi district. Many of them have been preserved in the Hund Museum in Swabi. Udabhandapura (Hund in Swabi) even once served as the capital of Gandhara (Shahi, 2019).

4.8.1 Britishers, Khudai Khidmatgars, Congress, and Muslim League in Swabi

Sikhs were replaced by the Britishers as the lords of the Frontier. Thus, the new masters established camps in Yar Hussain, Nawey Kaley, Saleem Khan, Minay, and Topi of Swabi. They also started giving incentives to the locals to secure their support. Those who opposed the British rule faced armed confrontation from the Britishers. Thus, the British India Government dispatched military expeditions against Khado Khail chief Muqqarab Khan of Panjtar (Buner) and Muhammadzai chief Raheem Khan of Nawey Kaley. A long series of battles between the British Army and the local freedom fighters ensued. People like Maulana Inayat Ali, Maulana Shariat Ullah, and Malik Esa Khan etc. used to lead freedom fighters in Swabi. Several villages like Punjpir, Mangal Thana in Buner and Naranji and Sheikh Jana in Swabi were torched by the British forces (Khatoon, 2015).

It was during the British rule over India subcontinent that movements like Congress, Muslim League, and Khudai Khidmatgars emerged on the socio-political scene. Swabi played an important role in all these three movements.

4.8.2 Khudai Khidmatgar Movement and Swabi

Swabi was the first place after Abdul Ghaffar Khan's native area Charsadda where Khudai Khidmatgars started activities. It is said that before starting his movement, Abdul Ghaffar Khan consulted Maneri's Najeebulah alias Najo Baba about his plans. Thus, when Khudai Khidmatgar Movement started in 1929, many people from Swabi like Maulana Shad Muhammad of Turlandi, Yar Muhammad Khan of Dagai, General Zamrud of Yaqubi, Amir Nawaz of Shah Mansur, Abdul Aziz Khan of Zaida, Shad Ali Khan of Kunda, Firdaus Khan of Maneri, and Bakht Jamal of Nawey Kaley joined it (Khatoon, 2015). Bakht Jamal even became close associate of Abdul Ghafar Khan and also served as Khudai Khidmatgars' president for Mardan in 1931-32 (Ali, 2011). However, when Khudai Khidmatgar Movement merged with the Congress then several people including Bakht Jamal and Maulana Shad Muhammad parted ways with it and established Weekh Pakhtun Organization (awakened Pashtun) and later joined Muslim League (Khatoon, 2015).

When Khudai Khidmatgars launched a civil disobedience movement in 1930, a huge anti-government gathering was held in Turlandi in which people from various parts of Swabi participated. After the gathering, 30 people were arrested and imprisoned for six months. Bakht Jamal and Maulana Shad Muhammad were also among the arrested people (Ali, 2011, Khatoon, 2015). In 1931, Abdul Ghaffar Khan undertook a long tour of Swabi, held gatherings in different villages, and many people joined his movement (Khatoon, 2015). During Khudai Khidmatgars' civil disobedience movement in 1930-34, even elderly women from Swabi took part in its activities (Shah, 1996).

Being a stronghold of Khudai Khidmatgar movement, Swabi, along with Charsadda, witnessed heavy use of state force immediately after the Babra incident on August 12,

1948. Police raided and looted houses of Khudai Khidmatgars. The state brutalities reached such a point that many Khudai Khidmatgars were forced to leave the movement and instead join Muslim League and hoist its flag on their houses to avoid violence from state. The police, while reporting about forced conversion of Khudai Khidmatgars to Muslim League, reported that "[p]olice throughout the District of Mardan is busy in crushing the Red Shirt activities. The Red Shirts are pouring in Police stations in Swabi Tehsil for apology...." (Hassan, 2015, p. 51).

Swabi also had more than two dozen Azad schools and Azad Islamia madrassas opened by Anjuman-i-Islahul Afaghina (Society for the reformation of Afghans) which was founded by Abdul Ghafar Khan in 1921 (Sohail, 2015). In short, Swabi was one of the strongholds of Khudai Khidmatgars and later ANP. Still there are many Khudai Khidmatgars in the district.

4.8.3 Muslim League and Swabi

Till 1940, Muslim League was in name only in Swabi. However, many local influential people joined it after 1940. In 1938, senior Muslim League leaders like Maulana Shaukat Ali and Maulana Abdul Hamid Badewani visited NWFP to organize Muslim League. They also visited Swabi and addressed gatherings there. As a result, many local influential people joined Muslim League during the next few years. Some of the well-known figures were Bakht Jamal²³ of Nawey Kaley, Mir Ghazan of Shah Mansur, Subat Khan of Maneri, Qazi Gul Muhammad of Nabi, Purdil of Taraki, Sahibzada Ehsanullah Khan of Yar Hussain, Mustaan Khan of Jhanda, Abdul Shakoor Bacha of Bam Khel,

²³ Earlier, Bakht Jamal was in the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement and also remained with Abdul Ghafar Khan in Haripur jail. However, later he developed differences with Abdul Ghafar Khan over his decision to join Congress and thus joined Muslim League.

and Syed Muhammad Shah of Lahor (Bukhari, 2015). In 1940, Bakht Jamal was appointed as Muslim League's provincial president (Khatoon, 2015).

Many people from Swabi like Fazal Khaliq, Haji Sahib of Maneri, Malik Taj Muhammad, Pashamdar Malik, Wafadar Khan, Akhwanzada Haji Ehsanullah, Sadiq Ullah Kaka, and Mir Dad attended All India Muslim League's session in Lahore at which Pakistan Resolution was adopted. Similarly, People like Purdil Khan, Haji Muhammad Raziq, Bakht Jamal, Muhammad Sultan Khan of Shewa, and Zia ud Din were some of the active figures from Swabi who spread Muslim League's message for the referendum in NWFP (Quaid-e-Azam kay Sipahi, 2010).

In 1940, Bakht Jamal was elected as president of Muslim League's NWFP chapter while in 1941, he was elected as member of Working Committee of All India Muslim League (Ali, 2011). When later differences emerged within the provincial Muslim League and Bakht Jamal was neither appointed the president of provincial Muslim League nor recommended for the membership of the Working Committee of All India Muslim League, he wrote a letter to Muhammad Ali Jinnah in December 1943. In his letter, he complained to Jinnah against the authoritarian policies of the then Muslim League's Chief Minister in NWFP Sardar Aurangzeb Khan. He even threatened to go to court against Sardar Aurangzeb Khan for leveling serious allegations against him (Zaidi, 2004). Jinnah, through his letter to Bakht Jamal on 22nd February 1944, expressed his inability to appoint him to the All India Muslim League Working Committee in the following words:

This is to inform you that I was unable to appoint you as a member of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League as your Provincial Muslim League had not included your name in the quota allotted to it, which they were entitled to nominate as members of the Council of the All India Muslim League. Under the rules, I cannot

appoint a member of the Working Committee unless he is a member of the Council of the All India Muslim League. From this, you will not gather that I don't appreciate your services that you have rendered as the President of the Provincial Muslim League of your Province and as a member of the Council and the Working Committee. I hope that whatever may be the differences amongst you in your province, you will, I have no doubt, stand by the League, work for the League, and do all you can to uphold our cause. Such differences as may have arisen will have now to be considered by the Committee of Action that I have appointed and I hope that they will soon visit your province and see that all the disputes and differences are settled justly fairly and amicably. There should be only one watchword for us all, Forget and Forgive. Stand united and work for our cause, then alone we shall be in a position to achieve our goal of Pakistan (Zaidi, 2004, pp-168-169).

In his letter to Jinnah, Bakht Jamal had also referred to his meeting with Jinnah in Delhi. This shows that Bakht Jamal had personal relationship with Jinnah and Jinnah also acknowledged his services for Muslim League.

In 1945, Qazi Esa visited NWFP to organize Muslim League. He formed Muslim League's ad hoc committee in Mardan of which Bakht Jamal, Maulana Shad Muhammad, and Yaqub Khan of Nawey Kaley and Ehsanullah of Yar Hussain were members. Muslim League Swabi also enthusiastically participated in civil disobedience movement in 1947 (Khatoon, 2015).

4.8.4 Post-1947 politics of Swabi

Swabi has always played an important role in the politics of the province. It was Swabi's Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Khan who became the first chief minister of NWFP in April 1937. Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Khan was born in 1863 in Topi, Swabi in a Lodhi family. His forefathers had migrated from Afghanistan with Ahmad Shah Abdali and settled on the bank of River Indus from where they later moved to Topi, currently a tehsil of Swabi district. He got his early education from Swabi and passed his matriculation examination from Mission High School Peshawar. After working on

junior posts, he was then promoted and thus served as a political agent of Khyber Agency and Chitral (Yaqubi, 2007).

In 1919, he retired from government service and was nominated for the membership of Indian Legislative Assembly in 1922 (Sultana, 2014). He also attended the first two Round Table Conferences in London during which he argued in support of political reforms in the NWFP. Thus, a sub-committee was constituted for a detailed study of the situation in NWFP, which recommended Governor Province's status for NWFP (Bashir, 2013). After NWFP was given the status of a province in 1932, Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Khan was appointed as the senior minister in the first cabinet of the Governor of NWFP. In 1937, he was elected as member of NWFP Legislative Assembly and subsequently became the first chief minister of the province (Sultana, 2014).

Sahibzada Muhammad Khursheed, the first Muslim Governor of NWFP, was also from Swabi. He joined the British Indian Army as commissioned officer on August 31, 1922 (Sharma, 1996). Later, he joined the Political Department and worked on different positions (Govt of India, 1937). Later, he became the governor of NWFP. He was the first Muslim and native to serve on this position. In addition to these two cited examples, the district has also produced other people who served on important political positions not only in the province but also the country. A relevant example is the current Speaker of National Assembly Asad Qaisar.

Historically, ANP has been the dominant player in electoral politics of Swabi. At the time of 1932 elections in the province, many of the top leaders of the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement were in jails, so it not only boycotted the elections but also ran a campaign to convince people not to take part in them. Thus, owing to restricted

franchise²⁴ and a robust and in some areas violent campaign by Khudai Khidmatgars to force people to boycott it there was just 10-15% turnout ("The first elections," 1934).

In 1937 elections, Swabi was a Tehsil of Mardan district. Khudai Khidmatgar Movement's Abdul Aziz Kaka of Zaida defeated Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Khan on Swabi constituency of Mardan District (Khan, 1987/1990). Muslim League, the other major political power at the time, did not field any candidate in Mardan as it was yet struggling to find some ground in the province. Later it did contest the by-elections but could not win any seat from the district (Ahmad, 2011). In 1946 elections, Abdul Aziz Kaka again won election from Swabi but this time against Muslim League's Abdul Shakoor Bacha of Bamkhail (Khatoon, 2015).

The provincial elections of 1951 were mainly a one-sided show as the sitting ministry of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan had either banned his political rivals or made it almost impossible for them to run their election campaign. The Khudai Khidmatgar Movement, which had so far won from Swabi, was banned during these elections. Through a poster displayed in Charsadda, Khudai Khidmatgars announced that some candidates claimed its support, but it was not supporting any group or individual. However, it was earlier reported that Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan had asked his workers to support any party which they thought to be in the best interest of the country (Hassan, 2015).

In the 1970 elections, PML-Qy's Abdul Mastan Khan won Swabi's provincial seat (PF-23 Mardan-cum-Hazara) by securing 36% of the total valid votes. The National Assembly seat from the area (NW-11 Mardan-cum-Hazara) was also won by PML-Qy's

²⁴ As it was based on qualifications like possession of property, paying taxes and level of education.

chief Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan against NAP-W's Abdul Aziz Khan. Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan secured 32% of the total votes. An interesting aspect of this election was that at provincial level, NAP-W secured less than 1% votes while on the National Assembly constituency, it received 24% of the valid votes (FAFEN, 2019-20).

In the 1977 general elections, the Khudai Khidmatgars regained the Swabi constituency as Pakistan National Alliance's Ali Gohar Khan²⁵ won the NA-9 Mardan IV seat (Swabi seat as Swabi was a Tehsil of Mardan district at that time) (ECP, 1977). Elections to the provincial assemblies could not be held due to the protest movement by PNA against alleged rigging by PPP which was in government at the time.

Between 1988 and 1997, ANP won 10 out of 16 (practically out of 15 seats as it did not contest on one seat) provincial assembly and 3 out of 4 National Assembly seats. Thus, it won 13 out of Swabi's 20 seats (65% seats) at both provincial and national level. During this period, ANP remained the dominant player in electoral politics of the district. Even on the six seats it lost during these elections, it received second highest votes on all seats except one. Thus, out of 19 seats it contested during this period, it was able to secure one of the top two slots on 18 (94.75%) seats.

From 2002-2018, ANP's overall performance drastically declined as it won only 7 out of 23 provincial and 1 out of 8 national level seats from Swabi. Thus, its percentage of seats won declined to 25.8% from 65% for the earlier phase. Similarly, ANP's percentage of securing one of the top two slots also drastically dropped during this period. From 2002 to 2018, ANP failed to secure one of the top two slots on 2 out of 8 NA seats and 7 out of 23 provincial assembly seats. Thus, its percentage of securing

²⁵ Ali Gohar Khan was affiliated with NAP which was part of the anti-PPP alliance called Pakistan National Alliance.

one of the top two positions dropped to 70.95% from 94.75% during the earlier phase. The 2013 and 2018 election results proved the most destructive for ANP. In these two elections, it suffered both in terms of seats as well as securing one of the top two slots. Out of the total 15 provincial (11) and national (4) level seats contested in these elections, it failed to win even a single seat. Similarly, its percentage to secure one of the top two positions dropped to 60% (9 out of 15 seats).

Had ANP somehow recovered from the 2013 defeat in the 2018 elections, probably we would not have been compelled to conduct a deeper analysis of its loosening grip on voters as the poor performance in the 2013 election could have been linked with incumbency factor, which is something understandable in the context of this province. However, ANP also failed to win any seat from the district in the 2018 general elections. So, ANP's steep decline in the district raises the question about possible causes and the emergence of a new political force in the form of PTI.

The first major dent in ANP's politics in Swabi was made by MMA in 2002. MMA won 4 out of the total 8 national and provincial level seats while ANP won 3 out of 8 seats. Since 1988, it was for the first that ANP's share in terms of seats dropped below 50% (it won 3 out of 8 seats which makes 37.5%). However, ANP bounced back with renewed vigor in the 2008 elections as it won 5 out of 8 seats (62.5%). In other parts of the province too it performed very well due to which it was for the first time that it got the slot of chief minister in the province. An unfortunate aspect of the 2008 elections for ANP was that it won 5 out of the total 8 national and provincial levels seats from Swabi but its chief Asfandyar Wali Khan failed to win his seat as he contested this election from Swabi.

Another and probably more fatal blow to ANP's politics in the district was by the Tarakai family and ANP's own dissident Dr. Muhammad Salim. Dr. Muhammad Salim contested 1988 election as independent candidate but he could not win. When he contested as ANP candidate in 1993 he won the seat. Following ANP's refusal to award him ticket for 1997 elections, he, along with former ANP lawmakers Awal Sher Khan and Abdul Majid Khan, left the party and formed Swabi Qaumi Mahaz (SQM) in 1997. He also contested the 1997 elections as an independent candidate but lost it ("Dr Saleem dies at 59," 2009). In the 2002 elections, he contested as an independent and defeated ANP's candidate in one-on-one competition (ECP, 2002). This defeat might not have hurt ANP much but it probably set a trend which later severely hurt ANP.

The Tarakai family appeared on the political scene of Swabi in 2005 with the election of Shahram Khan Tarakai²⁶ as district *Nazim* of Swabi. In 2008 elections, Shahram Khan Tarakai's two uncles, Muhammad Usman Tarakai and Javed Iqbal Tarakai won NA-12 Swabi-I and PF-32 Swabi-II, respectively. Usman Khan Taraki defeated ANP chief Asfandyar Wali Khan while Javed Iqbal Taraki defeated Amir Rehman, another strong personality and ANP's district president (Khan, 2020). An alarming aspect of this election for ANP was that SQM and the Tarakai family forged an alliance with each other ("Two groups ally against ANP in Swabi," 2007).

In 2010, Tarakai family formed Awami Jamhuri Ittehad Pakistan (AJIP) and contested the 2013 elections from the platform of their own party (Khan, 2020). Thus, Tarakai family and Dr. Muhammad Salim group came further close to each other and Babar Khan²⁷, son of Dr. Muhammad Salim, won the 2013 election on AJIP ticket (Khan,

²⁶ He was elected *Nazim* from PML-Q platform.

²⁷ Babar Khan was still chairman of Swabi Qaumi Mahaz.

2018a). AJIP won three provincial assembly and one National Assembly seats in these elections ("Two become one," 2015). PTI also won one seat each at provincial and national level.

In 2015, there emerged differences between Babar Khan and AJIP leadership. Thus, his basic party membership was terminated in October 2015. It is believed that Babar Khan had prepared his mind to merge his SQM with AJIP but he dropped the idea after he developed differences with the party leadership (Farooq, 2015). In March 2015, Shahram Tarakai's father Liaqat Khan Tarakai was elected as senator on PTI's ticket (Khan, 2020). In November same year, AJIP was formally merged with PTI when Imran Khan paid a visit to district Swabi ("AJIP merged into PTI," 2015). In March 2018, SQM also merged with PTI though Babar Khan himself had already joined PML-N (Farooq, 2018).

Thus, ANP was to face a formidable political force in the 2018 elections. On the one hand, locally popular parties/groups had long been active against ANP while on the other hand, PTI after 2011 started emerging as a major political force across the country. PTI Chairman and the current Prime Minister Imran Khan started playing the populist card. While claiming to be the true representative of the people, he blamed all the sufferings of common people on the political class which he used to term as corrupt to the core. He attributed every bad thing in the country to the political parties that had ruled either in the center or provinces. Imran Khan also very aptly used the "bad manners" trait of populist leaders by acting in ways that are not typical of politicians. For example, he would take prayer mat to his political gatherings and would offer prayers on the stage. He even burnt his electricity bill while standing at the top of a container which used to serve as the stage during his months long sit-in in 2014. He

personally intervened and released his political workers from a police van. Thus, he dexterously used the populist card for turning large numbers of people against other older political parties. His strategy did work to a greater extent as PTI attracted a large number of voters toward itself, especially from among the young generation. Swabi district was also no exception to this populist wave. Older political parties' poor governance, allegations of corruption, favoritism and nepotism, and lack of intra-party elections also contributed to Imran Khan's populism. The fact that Imran Khan captained Pakistan's cricket team to win the Cricket World Cup in 1992 and later established Pakistan's first cancer hospital also contributed to his popularity. Thus, many voters voted for PTI because of Imran Khan without considering who was awarded the ticket.

The merger of SQM and AJIP with PTI and joining of PTI by people like former QWP MPA Abdul Karim created further problems for ANP. It was in these circumstances that ANP and PTI contested the elections as the two major political forces in the district. ANP could not withstand the PTI wave and thus was defeated on all seats. The new political force against ANP led to its ignominious defeat. For example, during six elections (1988-2008), ANP won 17 out of 28 provincial assembly seats. However, it could not win any seat in the 2013 and 2018 elections (total 11 seats). Similarly, it won 4 out of 8 NA seats between 1988 and 2008 while it could not win a single seat out of 4 seats contested during the 2013 and 2018 elections.

While discussing ANP's poor performance during the last two elections, we cannot ignore the impact of militants' threats and attacks against its leaders, workers and supporters. Being a secular party, ANP has remained one of the top targets of militants. According to a report of Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), between 1st January

and 15th May 2013, ANP faced the highest number of attacks (37) followed by PPP and MQM with 12 each. Other parties also faced terrorist attacks but not as frequently as ANP (PIPS, 2013). According to Dr. Khadim Hussain, an ANP affiliated researcher and its current provincial cultural secretary, attacks on ANP occurred in areas where it was supposed to get a majority or considerable votes (Hussain, 2013a). The local leaders of ANP in Peshawar, Swabi, Swat, and Charsadda districts, the stronghold of ANP, would almost on a daily basis receive threatening letters during the three months preceding elections. Some 30 polling agents in these districts revealed that on Election Day, they received letters in the morning warning them of attacks on polling stations where ANP was supposed to win. Such tactics had severe adverse consequences for ANP as the top leadership was already under "virtual house arrest" due to security threats. Law enforcement agencies would also force ANP's local leadership not to take out rallies and hold corner meetings due to security reasons (Hussain, 2013b).

Even the 2008 elections had not yet been held that attacks on ANP started as its National Assembly candidate in North Waziristan was killed in an attack on his public gathering. Ever since the 2008 elections, ANP has been facing constant attacks in which hundreds of its workers have been killed. ANP lawmaker from Peshawar Alamzeb Khan, senior minister Bashir Ahmad Bilour, MPA Haroon Bilour, Peshawar district's former president Mian Mushtaq Ahmad, Peshawar city president Sartaj Khan, former MPA from Swabi Haji Shoaib, ANP General Secretary Mian Iftikhar Hussain's only son Mian Rashid Hussain, younger brother of ANP MPA from Swat Wajid Ali Khan, elder brother and two nephews of ANP's another MPA from Swat Waqar Ahmad Khan, and ANP's member of the provincial assembly Dr. Shamsher Ali Khan lost their lives in suicide and target killings since 2008. In October 2008, rockets were fired at the residence of the then Chief Minister NWFP Amir Haidar Khan Hoti while Mian Nisar

Gul Kakakhel, the then minister for prisons, and MPA Aurangzeb Khan sustained injuries in separate attacks.²⁸

Similarly, ANP chief Asfandyar Wali Khan, its General Secretary Mian Iftikhar Hussain, former ANP president for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Afrasiab Khattak, and former Railways Minister Ghulam Ahmad Bilour survived suicide attacks (Khan, 2016). Addressing a press conference a few days after the 2013 elections, ANP chief Asfandyar Wali Khan said that the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) failed to provide a level playing ground to all competitors. While referring to militants' threats and attacks against ANP workers and leaders, he said "We thought that the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) would be the referee. But Hakimullah Mehsud²⁹ was the referee and not Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim³⁰," (Wasim, 2013).

According to former ANP Senator Afrasiab Khattak, more than 800 ANP workers and leaders were killed while several senior party leaders survived suicide attacks before 2014 (Khan, 2016). Mian Iftikhar Hussain, while reacting to a fresh security alert issued to him in 2018 by the security agencies advising him to restrict his movement as terrorists wanted to target him, remarked that "I have been given seven policemen so what else should be done for my protection." "I don't visit my home, cannot pray in a mosque and have restricted my interaction with my people," ("ANP leaders say govt silence demoralising society," 2018).

Swabi district is no exception to this anti-ANP onslaught. ANP's president for PF-36 in Swabi and former Tehsil Nazim Hanif Jadoon was killed in a suicide attack in 2011 while on his way back from Eid prayers (Firdaus, 2011). In July 2016, ANP's former

²⁸ These casualty details are based on the reports of local and national media.

²⁹ The then chief of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.

³⁰ The then Chief Election Commissioner.

provincial assembly member Haji Shoaib was killed by unknown men inside his guest house ("ANP leader shot dead in Swabi," 2016). In August 2019, a local ANP leader Fazal Khaliq was killed in Shewa village of the district ("ANP leader shot dead in Swabi," 2019). Thus, it can be safely said that continuous attacks from militants did not allow ANP to effectively reach out to voters.

In addition to the factors like alliance among anti-ANP elements, emergence of PTI, and militants' attacks on party leaders and workers, Khadim Hussain (2013b) tries to link ANP's poor performance with some other factors. He claims that it seems that the ANP discourse was not well received by some within the civil and military establishment because of the fear that ANP's indigenous socio-cultural narrative against religious bigotry might lead to a secular Pakistan and that its dominance in the province might lead to greater regional autonomy. He argues that Pakistan's desire for a negotiated settlement with Taliban in Afghanistan in order to have long term influence also necessitated favorable political conditions in Pakistan (to empower parties like JI and PTI in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) even if it meant deprivation of the voters of genuine representation. Thus, the narrative supported by ANP had to be kept away from political power in the province.

Khadim Husain further claims that the election results in 2013 were consequences ANP faced for its efforts to mainstream FATA, which would have compelled Pakistan to revisit its policy toward Afghanistan, and counter militants' narrative. Thus, he contends, ANP was targeted with a deliberate media campaign and attacks by militants to keep it away from the electoral campaign. He writes, "After scanning large media outlets a few months before the elections, one can easily conclude that media was used in the shape of talk shows, propagation of pre-poll surveys and columns in print media

to widely disseminate the narrative of 'corruption', 'pro-Americanism' and, bad governance against the ANP. With the exceptions of a few columnists and anchor persons, most of the columns in print media and most of the anchor persons in electronic media continuously depicted the ANP to be a loser in the elections. The media manipulators knew quite well that workers, voters and sympathizers of the ANP could be de-motivated effectively through the use of this tool. Consistent use of social media was also profusely carried out to discredit the leadership by dubbing them 'corrupt,' 'coward' and 'agents'" (2013b, p-4). There is no doubt that ANP has been presented in the media as anti-Pakistan. Propaganda has so effectively been carried out against it that most of the people, including highly educated ones, have never tried to properly understand its philosophy, politics and stance. Through propaganda, its government from 2008 to 2013 was presented as one of the most corrupt in the history of the province. No doubt corruption might have taken place during its government, but it seems that it was more propaganda than reality.

When this researcher asked leaders and workers of different political parties about ANP's decline in the district, they linked it with different factors. For example, JUI-F's senior leader and former provincial education minister M. F. A. Haqqani (personal communication, September 8, 2020) linked ANP's decline in the district with its shift from politics of ideology toward politics of pragmatism and materialism.

According to Jamaat-e-Islami's provincial amir (chief) and current member of Senate M. Ahmad (personal communication, September 18, 2020), ANP is the only political force in Swabi which has proper organization and workers across the district while other political parties have just small pockets of support. With regard to ANP's complete elimination from the district in the last two elections, he said that lack of education in

its local leadership, use of criminal activities for politics by ANP's lower ranks, and disconnect from the gross roots level were the factors which alienated many people from it. Ahmad claimed that many people, in reaction to ANP's attitude, started supporting Tarakai family which was an unfortunate development as families can never be substitute for political parties. PML-N's candidate for NA-18 in 2018 elections S. Ahmad (personal communication, September 30, 2020) was of the view that candidates play important role in elections in Swabi while ANP now does not have the candidates that it once used to field. He said that ANP's candidates have distanced themselves from the voters which alienated the latter.

Though many local leaders and workers of ANP blamed establishment for its defeat, some also pointed toward internal divisions within the party. For example, ANP's candidate for NA-18 in 2018 elections M. I. Khan (personal communication, September 30, 2020) confessed that internal differences within the party have severely damaged its vote bank in the district. He said that different factions within the party struggle for tickets which then weakens the party. Another party worker blamed central and provincial leadership for the divisions within the party. A tehsil level office bearer of the party said that said ANP's decline in Swabi started after Azam Khan Hoti managed to appoint Haji Rehmanullah as party president of the district. He said that Rehmanullah was a contractor and did not know much about politics and organization of the party. He further said that fortunately ANP had strong roots in Swabi district otherwise it would have disappeared from the district during the more than two decades when Rehmanullah was its district president. Another senior worker of the party blamed Azam Khan Hoti and Begum Naseem Wali for party's downfall in the district. He contended that these two imposed wealthy but non-political figures on genuine Khudai Khidmatgars which severely hurt the party.

PTI's MPA Aqibullah (personal communication, September 30, 2020) said that they also own Bacha Khan's philosophy and ideology but the problem is that now ANP has deviated from his ideology. He said that till the time of Abdul Wali Khan, ANP used to do politics of principles rather than winning assembly seats but the main objective of its current leadership is to capture assembly seats without any concern with its original ideology. He argued that ANP ignored its genuine ideological workers and promoted those having resources. According to Aqibullah, ANP was so far using Bacha Khan and Wali Khan's legacy for winning votes but it cannot do so any more.

In addition to ANP (and the recent emergence of AJIP and PTI), PML-N and the religious parties are other political forces that have enjoyed sizable following in the district but as a whole, they have never been able to compete with ANP. PML-N won one provincial seat each in 1988, 1990³¹, 1997, and 2013 general elections. The religious parties have so far won five seats (two provincial and 3 national). Out of their 5 seats, 4 (2 provincial and national level each) were won in 2002 elections when the major religious parties for the first time in Pakistan's history formed an effective electoral alliance-MMA. The remaining one seat was won by the JUI-F-led electoral alliance called IJM in 1993. Tables 04 and 05 show results of Swabi's provincial and National Assembly seats.

One feature of electoral politics in Swabi which distinguishes it from other districts of Central Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is the role of independent candidates, especially on provincial assembly constituencies³². Between 1988 and 2008, independent candidates won 6 out of 28 (21.45%) provincial assembly seats in Swabi. On the other hand,

³¹ In 1988 and 1990, PML-N was part of IJI.

³² Between 1988 and 2018, independent candidates won only one National Assembly seat- Usman Khan Tarkai won it in 2008.

independents won only 4 out of 152 seats (2.65%) contested in other districts of Central Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Charsadda, Mardan, Nowshera, and Peshawar) during the same period. However, independent candidates in Swabi could not win any seat during the last two elections. Thus, the emergence PTI not only affected vote bank of political parties in the district but of electables as well. The responses to one of the questions in the survey questionnaire as to which one between political party and candidate they value the most while casting vote also reflected the importance of candidates.

Table No. 04: Swabi's Provincial Assembly Results since 1988 (Earlier, it was part of Mardan District).

Constitue ncy	1988	1990	1993	1997	2002	2008	2013	2018
Swabi-I	Zain Muhamm ad (ANP)	Zain Muhamm ad (ANP)	DR. M. Salim (ANP)	Saleem Khan Adv. (ANP)	Dr. M. Salim (I)	Muhammad Zarshid (ANP)	Babar Khan (AJIP)	Rangez Khan (PTI)
Swabi-II	Ghafoor Jadoon (UI)	Ghafoor Jadoon (UI)	Inayat Ullah (I)	Ghafoor Jadoon (N)	Amir Rehman (ANP)	Javed Iqbal Tarkai (I)	Shahram Khan (AJIP)	Asad Qaisar (PTI)
Swabi-III	Awal Sher Khan (ANP)	Awal Sher Khan (ANP)	Asmatulla h Khan (ANP)	Muhamm ad Shoaib Khan (ANP)	Mukhtia r Ali (ANP)	Mukhtiar Ali Advocate (ANP)	Muhammad Ali Tarkai (AJIP)	Abdul Karim (PTI)
Swabi-IV	Abdul Majid (ANP)	Sher Zaman Sher (I)	Abdul Majid (ANP)	Sher Zaman Sher (I)	Abdul Majid (MMA)	Sardar Ali (I)	Abdul Karim (QWP)	Muhamm ad Ali (PTI)
Swabi-V					Maulana Fazal Ali (MMA)	Sikandar Irfan (ANP)	Asad Qaisar (PTI)	Shahram Khan (PTI)
Swabi-VI					Sarfaraz Khan (ANP)	Sarfaraz Khan (ANP)	Muhammad Sheeraz (N)	
Party- wise seats and % of total seats	ANP= 17/39= (43.60%)	PTI 6/39= (15.40%)	PML-N 4/39= (10.25%)	AJIP 3/39= (7.70%)	MMA 2/39= (5.10%)	QWP 1/39= (2.55%)	INDs 6/39= (15.40%)	

Note: From 1988 to 1997, Swabi's four provincial assembly constituencies were PF-24 to PF 27. From 2002 to 2013, Swabi's six constituencies were PF/PK-31 to PF/PK-36 while in 2018, its five constituencies were PK-43 to PK-47.

While responding to this question, 44% of the 500 respondents mentioned candidate, which means that during elections candidates are nearly as much important as political parties. According to PML-N's S. Ahmad, candidates play decisive role in shaping voting behaviour in the district.

In other words, this shows the comparatively weak party structures in district Swabi. Weak party structure then provides space to politicians to frequently change political loyalties, a phenomenon which is very much evident in Swabi's political arena. When the researcher asked representatives of different political parties about reasons of frequent changes of political loyalty, the most common answer was that politics of pragmatism and materialism has replaced the politics of ideology and principles, so politicians change parties.³³

Table No. 05: NA seats won by different parties from Swabi since 1970

Const.	1970	1977	1988	1990	1993	1997	2002	2008	2013	2018
Swabi-I	Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan (PML-Qy)*	Ali Gohar Khan (PNA)**	Abdul Khaliq Khan, (ANP)	Rehman Ullah (ANP)	Maulana Fazlullah (JUM)	Haji Rehman Ullah (ANP)	Muhammad Usman (MMA)	Engineer Usman Khan Tarkai (I)	Usman Khan Tarakai (AJIP)	Asad Qaisar (PTI)
Swabi-II							Maulana Khalil Ahmad (MMA)	Pervez Khan Advocate (ANP)	Asad Qaisar (PTI)	Usman Khan (PTI)
Total	ANP 5/14 (Including PNA seat)	PTI 3/14	MMA/I JM 3/14	AJIP 2/14 (Including Ind).	PML-Qy 1/14					

- Before 1988, Swabi was a Tehsil of Mardan district. From 1988 to 1997, Swabi's National Assembly Constituency was NA-8. From 2002 to 2013, its two constituencies were NA-12 and NA-13 while in 2018, its constituencies were NA-18 and NA-19.
- *In 1970, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan won the Mardan-cum-Hazara (NW-11) constituency. At that time, Swabi was Tehsil of Mardan district and thus he won the Swabi-Hazara seat. PML-Qy stands for Pakistan Muslim League-Qayyum.
- ** In 1977, Swabi was part of Mardan district and Swabi constituted Mardan-IV constituency.

Since 1988 when Swabi was made a separate district, we find very few candidates who have not changed their political loyalties. For example, Awal Sher (1988 and 1990), Asmatullah Khan (1993), Dr. Muhammad Salim (1993), and Abdul Majid (1988 and 1993) won their seats on ANP tickets but later they revolted against party decisions and

³³ JUI-F's Maulana Fazal Haqqani claimed that JUI-F is the only party which has stuck to its ideology. When the researcher told him that many people believe that JUI-F has no ideology as it has been coalition partner with all types of parties, he said that due to manipulation of elections by the establishment, JUI-F cannot win more than a few seats. Therefore, it joins coalitions of other parties to safeguard its basic ideology on which it makes no compromise.

contested as independent candidates or on the tickets of other parties ("Dissidents pose a challenge to ANP in Swabi," 2002). After leaving ANP before the 1997 elections, they also formed Swabi Qaumi Mahaz (Dr Saleem dies at 59," 2009). In 2002, Dr. Muhammad Salim and Abdul Majid won their seats as independent and MMA candidates, respectively, while Awal Sher failed to win election while contesting as independent candidate (ECP, 2002). Similarly, Sikandar Irfan won his seat in the 2008 elections on ANP ticket. He developed differences with party leadership after he was denied ticket for 2013 and 2018 elections. Thus, he joined PPP and contested the 2018 elections on PPP ticket (Khan, 2018a; "ANP receives blow, 2018). Former ANP MPA Saleem Khan Advocate also joined QWP in 2013 (Khan, 2013b). In April 2019, he rejoined ANP (Farooq, 2019).

Same is the case with other parties. JUI-F's Maulana Khalil Ahmad won National Assembly seat in the 2002 elections on MMA ticket, but later left the party due to differences with JUI-F's Maulana Fazal Ali Haqqani. He contested the 2008 election as independent candidate against JUI-F's Maulana Atta ul Haq on NA-13 and Maulana Fazal Ali Haqqani on PF-35 while he joined JUI-Nazaryati before the 2013 elections. He contested on provincial constituency PK-35 Swabi-V and national constituency NA-13 Swabi-II (Maulana Fazal Ali Haqqani also contested elections from these two constituencies) (Ali, 2007; "Several Swabi leaders change loyalties," 2013; ECP 2013).

Between 1988 and 1997, Ghafoor Khan Jadoon twice won provincial assembly seat on IJI and once on PML-N ticket. Later he joined JUI-F while his son, Sajjad Khan Jadoon, contested the 2013 election on JUI-F ticket (Rauf, 2013). Similarly, another known figure from the district Sajjad Ahmad contested the 2002 and 2008 elections on PML-

Q ticket but switched his political loyalty before 2013 elections and thus contested the 2013 elections on PML-N ticket ("Several Swabi leaders change loyalties," 2013).

Sardar Ali Khan won the PF-34 Swabi seat in 2008 elections as an independent candidate. He defeated QWP's Abdul Karim Khan. In 2002, Sardar Ali Khan had himself contested on QWP ticket and lost to MMA candidate Abdul Majid Khan (who once contested on ANP ticket) with a narrow margin (Kheshgi, 2008; Khan, 2013a). Abdul Karim was elected on QWP's ticket in 2013. In 2018, he changed his loyalty and won a provincial assembly seat on PTI ticket (Yousafzai, 2018a). Salman Wali of AJIP left his party before the 2013 elections and contested the elections on QWP ticket ("Several Swabi leaders change loyalties, 2013). Similarly, Babar Khan won the 2013 election on AJIP ticket (Khan, 2018a) and then contested the 2018 election on PML-N ticket ("ANP receives blow," 2018).

The frequent change of political loyalties sometimes lead to complex situations. In 2018, Meraj Hamayun Khan, a former member of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly on reserved seat of QWP, had to respond to show-cause notices of two different parties for her single action. QWP, which she had joined in 2010, accused her of violating party instructions by selling her vote in Senate elections and issued her show-cause notice. She denied the allegations and insisted she voted for the candidate recommended by party leadership. She maintained that she had decided to join PTI but delayed its formal announcement till Senate elections so she may vote for the candidate of QWP. On the other hand, PTI issued her show-cause notice for not voting for its candidate (Shah, 2018; "Meraj Humayun says she is still in PTI," 2018). As she was alleged of vote selling by the two parties, she later joined PML-N.

The above list of politicians who changed loyalties is not exhaustive. These cases were mentioned just to show as how frequently they change sides to adjust themselves to the changing political environment. However, Political parties are also to be blamed for this phenomenon. At times, they make arbitrary decisions without taking into confidence the local leaders and workers. For example, in 2018 ANP awarded tickets to Shah Nawaz and Sarfaraz Khan Jadoon for NA-18, Swabi-I, and PK-43, Swabi-I, respectively. They also started election campaigns in their respective constituencies. However, the tickets were later withdrawn and awarded to other people. This alienated the two and they decided to contest elections as independent candidates. The candidates complained that the party leadership did not even bother to consult them about the decision. ("Two ANP leaders to contest polls in Swabi independently," 2018).

Similarly, when QWP decided to accept Saleem Khan Advocate in its fold in 2013, it faced severe resentment from its workers as many of them were unhappy over this decision. Their argument was that Saleem Khan Advocate had several times ditched ANP, so he should not be taken in the party (Khan, 2013b). However, the party leadership went ahead with the plan and Saleem Khan Advocate joined QWP at a public meeting organized at Jhanda village of Swabi (Shah, 2018).

When Tarakai family merged AJIP with PTI in 2015, the decision was resented by local leaders and workers of both parties. Abdul Ahad Bacha, AJIP's candidate for the 2013 elections, responded to the merger by saying that they were free to make any decision about their future course of action because his party leadership did not consult them while making the decision about merger ("Rise and fall," 2015). A group within PTI including the present Speaker National Assembly Asad Qaisar was also resisting this merger but later they were convinced by party leadership. This shows that top

leaderships within each party makes the decisions without giving much weightage to the views of genuine workers who in turn are compelled to look for options including joining other parties.

After discussing geography, weather, people, economy, politics and electoral history of Swabi District in this chapter, the researcher will discuss voters' attitude toward electoral politics, their main source of political information, their opinion about women's candidature, and electoral fraud in the next chapter. The claims and observations are mostly based on the survey findings and qualitative data collected through informal interactions with voters in the district, formal interviews, and focus group discussions.

Chapter 5

VOTERS' ATTITUDE TOWARD ELECTORAL POLITICS

5.1 Introduction

Attitude is a person's disposition to react positively or negatively to a person, object, event, institution, or any other phenomenon. Though there is no single agreed up definition of attitude, still most of the social psychologists agree that the distinctive feature of attitude is its evaluative nature. The fact that almost all standard scaling techniques result in a score that locates a person's evaluative continuum with regard to attitude object further strengthens this view (Ajzen, 1989). Attitude basically reflects passions or hates, attraction or repulsion, likes or dislikes. People have attitudes when they approve and disapprove of something or love and hate something. Attitude object can be anything the idea of which can be held in mind by an individual. Thus, it may be a concrete thing like some building, object or person and abstract like some idea or theory (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998). According to Hogg & Vaughan (2005), attitude is "a relatively enduring organization of beliefs, feelings, and behavioural tendencies towards socially significant objects, groups, events or symbols" (Hogg & Vaughan, 2005, p. 150). Barki and Hartwick, as quoted by Lee (2020), define attitude as "an individual's internal evaluation of an object or a topic" (Lee, 2020). In short, we can say that attitude is an individual's favorable or unfavorable opinion about something.

Political attitude means the emotional or mental set with which someone approaches a political issue and which also determines that person's course of action toward that very issue. The sum total of political attitudes of a person then reveals his inclination whether he is liberal, conservative, reactionary, radical, or progressive. Like an individual, a

community can also be defined by applying the same formula. As government actions affect every individual, so every person has political attitudes. The intensity of political attitudes may differ from person to person with some only holding their political attitudes while others preaching them to others and still others even ready to die for their political attitudes (Rosenberg, 1942).

As stated above, citizens of every country develop some kind of feelings or sentiments toward the political system, different institutions, the ruling class, laws and legal codes, and political processes etc. Individuals' political attitudes are determined by many factors like their sense of civic obligation, level of formal education, family background, environment in which they live, role of political parties, personalities' influence, responsiveness and representativeness of the political system, level of political awareness and political experience, socio-economic standing, and media etc.

Stable democratic systems must create support for the political system among the citizenry and satisfaction with democratic dispensation is usually seen as the basic measure of support (Henderson, 2008). Carlsson, Dahl, and Rooth (2016) in their study of the possible impact of politicians on public attitudes in Sweden found that politicians can change public attitudes. They observed "our results provide convincing evidence that politicians can in fact change public attitudes (and voting behaviour), demonstrating that voter preferences are not fixed, but rather endogenous to political representation." They further observed, "We find some evidence that the quality of a politician and their treatment by the local media play a role in the direction of attitudinal changes" (Carlsson, Dahl, & Rooth, 2016, pp. 3-4). This shows that politicians do have their role in the attitudes held by the electorate.

As attitudes can play a role in promoting democratic participation (Olson, 2016), so holding positive attitude by the citizens is a positive indicator in any democratic system. In this chapter, an attempt is being made to outline political attitudes of voters in the district under investigation.

5.2 Voters' Interest in Politics

Active participation in politics by citizens is considered as an indication of healthy democracy. Citizenry's active participation in politics not only confers legitimacy on democratic bodies but also increases chances of people's voices being heard. Despite the great importance of public participation in the political process, majority of the people in many countries don't engage in it. A survey jointly conducted by Pew Research Center (PRC) and Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in fourteen countries from Asia, Europe, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America revealed that voting was the only form of political participation for the majority of people in these countries (Wike & Castillo, 2018). The problem is that a large number of people not only don't take interest in politics but the very word politics has extremely negative connotation for them. According to Matthew Flinders, founding director of Bernard Crick Centre³⁴, one of the problems with politics is that a large number of people wants democracy without politics (Rutter, 2014).

The above observations about people's interest in politics are also applicable to Pakistan. In Pakistan, politics is usually considered as something dirty, corrupt, and unfair. Many people while making a point can be heard first clarifying that "I have nothing to do with politics." The irony is that many people do discuss politics but still

³⁴ Bernard Crick Centre conducts research on people and politics.

claim not to be interested in politics. It was in this context that the researcher asked the respondents as "to what extent are you interested in national politics?"

Responding to this question only 15.4% of the respondents said they were *too much interested* in politics while 39.6% said they were interested *to some extent*. On the other hand, 16.8% said they were *not at all interested* in politics and 28.2% said they were *not much interested*. So, the findings show that only 15% people take keen interest in politics.

As compared to males, females emerged to be much less interested in politics. Among male respondents, 17.6% said they were too much interested in politics while for females, it was only 10.9%. Similarly, the percentage of females saying they were not at all interested in politics was 10 percentage points higher than male respondents (23% female and 13.7% male). Furthermore, 35.8% females said they were to some extent interested in politics and 30.3% said they were not much interested. For male respondents, it was 41.5% and 27.2%, respectively.

Among different age groups, the percentage of those saying they were not at all interested in politics increased with increase in age. For example, the lowest age category (19-30 years) recorded the lowest percentage (13.5%) while the highest age category (above 60 years) recorded the highest percentage (24.5%). The other two categories (31-45 and 46-60) were in between with 16.6% and 18.8%, respectively. In the 19-30 years age category, 18.1% of the respondents said they were too much interested in politics, while it was 13.5% for the 31-45 years category, 12% for 46-60 category, and 24.4% for 60-plus category. Similarly, 29.2% of 19-30 category said they were not much interested while among other age groups, it was 31.3% for 30-45 group, 26.5% for 46-60 group, and 18.4% for 60-plus respondents. Among all age groups, the

highest percentage was of those who said they were interested in politics to some extent. They were 39.2% for the 19-30 category, 38.7% for 31-45 years, 42.7% for 46-60 years, and 37.7% for above 60 years, respectively.

The above figures show that the lowest age category is the group with highest level of interest in politics followed by the last age category. Three possible major reasons for this trend are, as researcher's discussions with local people in the district revealed, increase in number of students in colleges and universities, prevalence of social media, and PTI's massive youth mobilization. PTT's mobilization also forced other political parties to engage youth and launch social media cells. Comparatively more interest in politics by the youth is a positive indication for the country as youth are the future of any country.

The survey findings showed that there is a kind of direct proportional relationship between level of education and interest in politics. For example, the percentage of respondents showing too much interest in politics increased with increase in level of education while the percentage of respondents with not interested at all option decreased with increase in level of education. Detailed findings of various educational groups are shown in table No. 77, Appendix No. 02

Among professions, private job holders and businessmen/traders recorded the highest percentage of too much interested respondents (19.2% and 20.3%, respectively). For government servants, students, laborers/farmers, jobless/unemployed/retired, and housewives, it was 16.1%, 15.1%, 14.3%, 12.9%, and 8.8%, respectively. As expected, housewives emerged with the highest percentage opting for not interested at all. They were followed by farmers/laborers with 17.1%, government servants with 16.1%, private job holders with 14.9%, unemployed/jobless with 12.9%, students with 12.3%,

and businessmen/traders with 8.2%. Percentages of different professions saying they were not much interested in politics were 25.7% for farmers/laborers, 22.6% for government servants, 33.3% for housewives, 29% for unemployed/jobless, 26% for businessmen/traders, 31.1% for private job holders, and 30.1% for students. Highest percentage of all professional groups opted for to some extent option. Percentages of different groups citing this option were 42.9% among farmers, 45.2% among government servants, 25.9% among housewives, 45.2% among jobless/unemployed, 46.6% among those having personal business, 33.8% among private job holders, and 42.5% among students. Responses to this question reveals that businessmen/traders and private job holders are the segments with most interest in politics while housewives are the least interested group.

The income-based analysis of responses showed that the lowest income groups have the least interest in politics while the highest income group (80,000 or above income per month) recorded both the highest percentage of those not interested at all and those too much interested. From the 80,000 and above income group (category-V), 21.1% respondents said they were too much interested in politics. For other income groups, it was 21.8% for 60,000-80,000 group (category-IV), 15.6% for 40,000-60,000 group (category-III), 13.6% for 20,000 to 40,000 (category-II), and 14.6% for up to 20,000 rupees per month group (category-I). The percentages of those saying they were not interested in politics at all were 20.5% for category-I, 15.6% for category-II, 11.5% for category-III, 10.9% for category-IV, and 21.1% for category-V. Figures of those saying they were either not much interested in politics or interested to some extent were 29.3% and 41.5% for category-I, 29.2% and 43.8% for category-II, 23.6% and 43.6% for category-III, 21.1% and 36.8% for category-IV, and 28.5% and 36.4% for category-V. The responses of different income groups suggest a broader pattern in which people

with low incomes take least interest in politics as compared to people with high incomes.

5.3 Source of Information about Politics

Internet use, political information, and participation in political activities are closely linked with each other and this trend plays a vital role in elections in developing countries like Pakistan (Ahmad, Alvi & Ittefaq, 2019). Therefore, political parties and politicians have started using social media pages/groups for interacting with people (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2012). Recent studies have established that the internet plays an important role shaping political views of Pakistanis especially the youth (Ahmad. et al., 2019). Though net can also be used for mainstream media, social media has especially become a major source of political information for its users across the world. For example, in 2012, about 40% of Americans were using social media for getting political information. Similarly, in 2016, Facebook emerged as the forum visited the most by Americans for election related news. It even surpassed leading news outlets like CNN, Fox News, and leading national dailies (Garrett, 2019). This shows the increasing importance of the internet as a means of information including political ones.

Over the last few years, internet use in Pakistan too has tremendously increased. According to Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) website, there were 76 million 3G/4G and 78 million broadband subscribers in the country in December 2019 (PTA, 2020). This is a huge number and highlights the importance of this new technology.

Pakistan is a country with freedom of expression still a distant dream. Thus, the increased censorship in the country has also increased the importance of social media

as many people now use social media forums for sharing information which they cannot share through mainstream electronic and print media. It is an especially important forum for marginalized people and minorities in Pakistan. With mainstream media under tight military control, a civil rights movement PTM has attracted millions of people toward itself through social media. The comparatively easy availability of smartphones and internet has also enabled the previously excluded segments of society to become part of public debate and make the elite listen to them (Shackle, 2018). When this researcher asked the respondents about their main source of information about national politics, 37.6% mentioned *social media*, 23% *TV*, 10.6% *family/relatives*, 10.4% each *peers* and *newspapers*, 3.6% *political parties/leaders*, and 3.2% *radio*. These percentages show that social media and TV are the two major sources of political information for voters while Radio has almost lost its utility as a means of political information.

When it comes to gender and sources of political information, there are huge differences. For example, only 4.2% male respondents mentioned family/relatives as the source of political information while for females, it was 23.6%. Similarly, the percentage mentioning TV as the major source of information was double for females as compared to male respondents. Table 06 below contains complete details about gender and source of political information.

The gender-based statistics in the table show that for women, TV is the major source of political information while for men it is social media. In the age-wise breakdown of the respondents and their sources of information about politics, it emerged that TV is playing an equally important role in spreading political information among all age

groups. In the 19-30 age category, TV was cited by 22.8%, in the 31-45 category by 22.7%, in the 46-60 category by 23.1%, and in the above 60 years category by 24.5%.

Table No. 06: What is your main source of information about national politics?

Gender-wise		Female	Male	Total
Family/relatives	Count	39	14	53
	% within Gender	23.6%	4.2%	10.6%
Newspaper	Count	9	43	52
	% within Gender	5.5%	12.8%	10.4%
No Response	Count	0	6	6
	% within Gender	.0%	1.8%	1.2%
Peers	Count	4	48	52
	% within Gender	2.4%	14.3%	10.4%
Political party/leaders.	Count	4	14	18
	% within Gender	2.4%	4.2%	3.6%
Radio	Count	3	13	16
	% within Gender	1.8%	3.9%	3.2%
Social Media	Count	50	138	188
	% within Gender	30.3%	41.2%	37.6%
TV	Count	56	59	115
	% within Gender	33.9%	17.6%	23.0%
	Count	165	335	500
	% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Social media was mentioned by highest percentage among the first three age groups (48.5% in 19-30, 35% in 31-45, and 35.9% in 46-60) while in the last age group (above 60), only 12.2% people cited it. On the other hand, newspapers emerged as one of the main sources of information for the above-60 age category (20.4%). Among the other age groups, newspapers were mentioned by 11.1% in the 19-30 years category, 8% in the 31-45 years category, and 8.5% in the 46-60 years category. Role of family/relatives increased with the increase in age. For example, it was mentioned by 7.6% in the 19-30 years category, 10.4% in 31-45 years category, 12% for 46-60 category, and 18.4% in the last age category. Peers as a source of political information was highest (14.7%) for the 31-45 years category while it was 5.8%, 12%, and 8.2% for the groups of 19-30 years, 46-60 years, and above-60. Radio and political parties/leaders did not emerge to be significant sources of political information for the first three age groups though each was mentioned by 8.2% of the respondents in the last age group.

The responses to this question show that TV is equally popular among all age groups, role of family/relatives as source of political information increases with increase in age, social media is more popular among the youth as compared to other age group voters, social media plays least role in providing political information to aged people while newspaper is the most popular source of information in this age group.

According to the findings of this survey, level of education plays an important role in determining the source of political information. In this case, there is a positive relationship between level of education and use of social media and newspapers as the main source of political information. For instance, social media as the major source of political information was mentioned by 53.3% among those with masters or above qualification, 50.5% among bachelor degree holders, 34.3% among matric-intermediate pass, 26.6% among those educated up to middle, and 23.5% among illiterates. Similarly, newspapers as the major source of political information were cited by 13% among respondents with masters or above qualification, 12.4% among graduates, 12.7% among matric-intermediate pass, and 8.9% among those with up to middle qualification. Family/relatives emerged to be more important sources of information for the illiterate and less educated as 26.8% of illiterate and 11.4% of those with middle level of education mentioned it as the main source of political information. For the other categories, it was mentioned by insignificant numbers ranging from 5.2% to 6.5% in each category. Similarly, the highest percentage of respondents citing radio as the main source of information was among illiterate (7.2%), followed by those with education up to middle (3.8%) and matric-intermediate (3.7%). Of 189 respondents with graduation or master and above qualification, radio was cited by just one respondent as the main source of political information.

There is a positive relationship between level of education and use of social media and newspapers as the main source of political information. Percentage of respondents citing family/relatives and radio as the main source of political information was higher among illiterate and less educated people as compared to those with graduation or master and above qualification. TV is almost equally popular among all people irrespective of their level of education.

Income also seems to be a factor when it comes to sources of political information among the respondents. For example, radio was cited as the major source for political information by 4.6%, 3.4%, and 4.2% of the respondents from among income category-I, category-II, and category-III, respectively, while it was not cited by anyone from the two top income categories (category-IV and V). Similarly, newspapers were cited by 12.2%, 12.5%, 16.4%, and 13.2% respondents from income categories II, III, IV, and V while only by 4% in category-I (the lowest category). Peers cited as the major source of political information by income categories I-V was 11.9%, 10.2%, 11.5%, 9.1%, and 5.3%, correspondingly.

Though there is no direct proportional relationship between income and social media as source of political information, still the two middle income categories (III and IV) emerged with the highest percentage (46.9% and 52.7% respectively) citing social media as the main source of political information. The highest income group (category-V) emerged with the lowest percentage (23.7%) of social media as the main source of political information. For the first two income categories, it was 29.1% and 36.1%, respectively. TV was mentioned by 27.8%, 22.4%, 18.8%, 18.2%, and 28.9% respondents from category I-V. Family/relatives as the main source for information about national politics were mentioned by 15.9% respondents in category-I, 9.5% in

category-II, 4.2% in category-III, 1.8% in category-IV, and 23.7% in category-V. Political parties/leaders emerged as comparatively more important source of political information for the lowest (6%) and highest (5.3%) income groups. For category II, III, and IV, it was 3.4%, 2.1%, and 0%, correspondingly.

The profession-wise analysis of responses to this question reveals interesting trends. Among government servants, 43.5% mentioned social media, 21% newspapers, 19.4% TV, 6.5% peers, 4.8% radio, 3.2% family/relatives, and 1.6% political parties/leaders. In the private job category, 55.4% mentioned social media, 20.3% TV, 9.5% each newspapers and peers, 2.7% family/relatives, and 1.4% each radio and political parties. Among farmers/laborers, social media was mentioned by lowest percentage (31.4%) among all professions. Percentage of respondents among farmers/laborers using radio was highest (6.7%) among all professions while 21% cited TV, 19% peers, 7.6% newspapers, 6.7% family/relatives, and 4.8% political parties/leaders. In the businessmen/traders category, 43.8% cited social media, 17.8% peers, 15.1% TV, 9.6% newspapers, 5.5% political parties, 2.7% family/relatives, and 1.4% radio. For housewives, the main source of political information emerged to be family/relatives (35.8%) followed by TV with 33.3%, social media 13.6%, newspapers 6.2%, political parties 4.9%, peers 3.7%, and radio 2.5%. Among students, social media (43.8%) and TV (28.8%) together were mentioned by more than 70% respondents while 12.3% cited newspapers, 8.2% family/relatives, 2.7% each peers and political parties and 1.4% radio. In the jobless/unemployed category, 35.5% mentioned social media, 22.6% TV, 16.1% family, 9.7% each newspapers and peers, while 3.2% each radio and political parties.

The profession-wise analysis of responses show that family and TV are the most important means of political information for housewives while social media plays very little role for them. Newspapers are the second most important source of political information for government employees after social media. For farmers/laborers and businessmen/traders, peers are one of the most important sources of political information.

5.4 Do Voters Discuss Politics? And with Whom?

Political debates and conversations are considered as an essential component of a democratic system. Prominent American philosopher and psychologist John Dewey went to the extent to say that "democracy begins in conversation" (Mushtaq, Abiodullah, & Akber, 2011, p. 26). According to deliberative theorists, there is a close relationship between conversation and participation as people first get information from the media, debate on them in their everyday conversations that help them develop better understanding of these issues and then express their opinion in the form of some political action. These debates enable individuals to effectively participate in political and civic matters (Mushtaq. et al., 2011).

When the researcher asked his respondents whether they do discuss politics with people, 56% respondents replied in affirmative while 44% in negative. Among female respondents, 51.5% replied in affirmative while for male respondents the percentage of those who replied in affirmative was 58%. It means there is no significant difference in percentages of male and female respondents who do discuss politics. Within age groups, the percentage of respondents saying they do discuss politics was 62% in the 19-30 years age group, 53.4% in the 31-45 years, 55.6% in the 46-60 years and 44.9%

in the above 60 years age group. The responses show that youth discuss politics more than any other age group.

The responses to this question reveal that there is a positive relationship between level of education and possibility of discussion on politics. Percentage of respondents saying they discuss politics consistently increased with increase in level of education. The figures were 44.3% for illiterate, 49.4% for middle, 55.2% for matric-intermediate pass, 63.9% for graduates, and 66.3% for master and above. In the income based analysis, it emerged that people with high income are more expected to discuss politics. Figures for the five income groups (I through V) saying they do discuss politics were 56.3%, 46.3%, 65.6%, 63.6%, and 60.5%, respectively. Among various professions, students recorded the highest percentage (71.2%) of saying they discuss politics while housewives recorded the lowest (34.6%). Among others, traders/businessmen recorded 65.8%, government servants 62.9%, unemployed/jobless 61.3%, private job holders 58.1%, and farmers/laborers 47.6%.

The next question was as with whom you discuss it the most (for those who said they do discuss politics). Interestingly, 55% respondents who replied in affirmative mentioned peers/friends, 20% family/relative while 20% mentioned political leaders/workers/political opponents. Respondents from all age groups, genders, professions, educational qualifications, and income categories mentioned peers/friends and family/relatives the most. Political leaders/workers/opponents emerged as the third highest group in all groups though some groups mentioned it more than others.

5.5 Attending Political Rallies

After voting, attending campaign events or speeches by a political figure is the second most common political activity for the common people. The PRC and CSIS survey found that 33% of the respondents at least once attended such events. The survey also showed that there is a close relationship between the level of education of citizens and their participation in political events like making donations to political organizations, taking part in protest, and posting online comments (Wike & Castillo, 2018). When this researcher asked the respondents as to how often they attend rallies/meetings of political parties or candidates, 52.4% said they *do not attend rallies at all*, 32.2% said they attend rallies and meetings *rarely*, 9% said they attend rallies *frequently*, and only 4.6% said they attend rallies *regularly*. It shows that very few people attend rallies and meetings of political parties/candidates.

One reason for voters' lack of interest to attend rallies in recent times may be the sense of insecurity as several political gatherings have come under attack. For example, in Gallup Pakistan's 2013 survey, only 8% respondents said that it was safe to attend political gatherings/rallies while 28% said it was somewhat safe (Gallup, 2013d). The frequent bomb blasts before 2013 elections may have played some role in shaping this perception. However, it seems still people are not ready to attend rallies.

Among female respondents, 90.3% said they don't attend rallies at all, 7.3% mentioned the option of rarely, 1.2% of frequently, while 0.6% regularly. For the male respondents, the figures were 52.4% for do not attend rallies at all, 32.2% for rarely, 14% for frequently, and 6.6% for regularly. It means that women almost do not attend political rallies and gatherings. The major reason for this is the social structure in which women are mostly restricted to home. There may be many women who do not want to

attend rallies but there are also those who want to participate in rallies but they are not allowed by their menfolk. For example, a female student said that "we want to take part in politics and attend rallies but the problem is that our men don't allow us." The responses to one of the questions about women candidature also reveal that as compared to women, a much higher percentage of men oppose women candidature against men.

In the age-wise analysis of the responses, the youngest age group (19-30) emerged with highest percentage (61.4%) of those who do not attend rallies/meetings at all while lowest percentages of those who said they regularly (2.3%), frequently (6.4%), and rarely (29.2) attend rallies/meetings. Respondents among other age groups reported, comparatively, more participation in rallies/meetings. In the 31-45 years category, 51.5% said they do not attend rallies at all, 4.3% said they do so regularly, 11.7% said they attend rallies frequently and 30.1% said they attend rallies rarely. In the third age group (46-60 years), 42.7% said they don't attend rallies at all, 12% opted for regularly, 6% for frequently, and 39.3% for rarely. In the last age group, the percentages who opted for don't attend rallies at all, regularly, frequently, and rarely were 46.9%, 10.2%, 10.2%, and 32.7%, respectively. Thus, Younger people are the most inactive group when it comes to attending rallies and meetings while voters above 45 years of age are the most active ones.

Though the data did not show any thorough and consistent relationship between level of education and frequency of participation in rallies and meetings, still it was found that people with master and above qualification attend rallies and meetings the least while completely illiterate the most. For example, 65.2% respondents among masters and above said they do not attend rallies and meetings at all while for the illiterates, it was 44.3%, for middle 53.2%, for matric-inter category 51.5%, and for graduates

48.5%. Similarly, only 1.1% of respondents from masters and above category said they attend rallies/meetings regularly while for other categories it was 4.1% for graduation pass respondents, 7.5% for matric-intermediate pass, 3.8% for middle, and 4.1% for illiterate category. Likewise, only 3.3 respondents from master and above category said they attend rallies/meetings frequently while for others, it was 11.3% for graduation pass respondents, 11.2% for matric-intermediate, 7.6% for those with up to middle qualification, and 14.4% for illiterates. The figures for those who rarely attend rallies/meetings were 28.3% for masters and above, 36.1% for bachelor degree holders, 29.9% for matric-inter pass, 32.9% for middle, and 35.1% for illiterates. So, people with masters and above degrees are least expected to attend rallies while illiterate attend rallies and meetings more than any educational group.

In the profession-wise analysis, the data show farmers/laborers, traders/businessmen, and unemployed/jobless people to be, comparatively, attending rallies/meetings more frequently. Table 07 shows details of responses of different professions to this question.

Table No. 07: How often do you attend allies and meetings of political parties or candidates?

Profession-wise		Farmer/laborer	Govt servant	H. wives	Jobless/unemployed	Not Declared	Personal business	Private job	Student	Total
Do not attend rallies at all.	Count	29	29	74	10	1	25	42	52	262
	% within Profession	27.6%	46.8%	91.4%	32.3%	100.0%	34.2%	56.8%	71.2%	52.4%
Frequently	Count	16	6	2	2	0	11	6	6	49
	% within Profession	15.2%	9.7%	2.5%	6.5%	0%	15.1%	8.1%	8.2%	9.8%
No Response	Count	0	1	1	0	0	2	1	0	5
	% within Profession	.0%	1.6%	1.2%	.0%	.0%	2.7%	1.4%	.0%	1.0%
Rarely	Count	51	22	4	16	0	30	23	15	161
	% within Profession	48.6%	35.5%	4.9%	51.6%	0%	41.1%	31.1%	20.5%	32.2%
Regularly	Count	9	4	0	3	0	5	2	0	23
	% within Profession	8.6%	6.5%	.0%	9.7%	0%	6.8%	2.7%	.0%	4.6%
Total	Count	105	62	81	31	1	73	74	73	500
	% within Profession	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The figures in the above table show that Farmers/laborers attend political rallies/meetings more than any other professional group. Housewives almost don't

attend rallies and meetings. Unlike the common belief, private job holders attend political rallies/meetings 10 percentage points less than government employees.

According to income-based analysis of responses to this question, respondents from the lowest income group attend rallies more regularly or frequently (combined 16.5%) while the highest income group most infrequently (10.5% for both regularly and frequently). The combined percentages of regular and frequently attending rallies for income groups II through IV were 12.9%, 14.6%, and 16.4%. Percentages of respondents who said they don't attend rallies at all were 53% for category-I, 53.1% for category-II, 51 % for category-III, 47.3% for category IV, and 52.6% for category V. There was not much difference in the percentages (all were between 30-36% range) of different income groups saying they attend rallies rarely. The gist of income-based analysis is that the lowest income groups attend political rallies/meetings more frequently while the highest income group most infrequently.

5.6 Voters' Perceptions about Politicians' Abilities to Solve Pakistan's Problems

Deliberative democracy theorists believe that there is a positive relationship between citizens' trust in government and turnout in elections (Lee & Schachter, 2019). This low level of trust in politicians may be one of the major reasons for low turnout in Pakistan. In South Asia, Pakistan has the second lowest turnout after Afghanistan.

In 2017, Gallup Pakistan in collaboration with the Jang media group conducted a survey in which it asked people as to which form of government between democracy and military dictatorship they considered better. Eighty-one percent of the respondents said that democracy is the solution to problems faced by Pakistan while 19% mentioned military rule as the solution to Pakistan's problems. Keeping in view Pakistan's

chequered history, 81% is a satisfactory percentage. Though a high percentage of respondents preferred democracy over dictatorship, trust in politicians expressed by respondents in the same survey was quite low as only one-fourth (26%) respondents expressed their trust in politicians. Another survey conducted by Pulse Consultant in collaboration with Jang media group the same year revealed that 68% people believed that democracy was better than military dictatorship. Trust in politicians, according to findings of this survey, was only 22% (Elahi & Haider, 2017).

According to some political observers, civilian politicians have often been willing to do army's bidding and their accommodation of uniformed autocrats' demands has undermined people's trust in them (politicians). The amendment by the Parliament in Army Act 1952 to pave way for the extension of term of Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa is a good example of this practice. After the amendment, many people started questioning PPP and PML-N's commitment to democracy (Shah, 2020). The main allegations against politicians at the time of dismissal of elected governments have been inefficiency, corruption and nepotism. Thus, a common perception has developed that politicians cannot deliver, which by extension leads to increased level of distrust in politicians. The findings of this survey also revealed that a large number of voters don't believe in politicians' abilities to solve Pakistan's problems.

When asked as *to what extent you agree with the statement that politicians can solve Pakistan's problems*, only 12.6% said they *totally agree* with the statement while 45% said they *agree to some extent*. On the other hand, 11.2% said they *strongly disagree* with the statement while 13.6% said they *disagree to some extent*. As the respondents also had the option of *I have no idea*, so 17.6% of them opted for this option. The responses show voters' trust deficit in politicians is huge as only 12.6% said that they

totally agree with the statement. Dismissal of several civilian governments on corruption charges, political rivalries leading to cases against each other, and constant propaganda by the establishment seem to be some of the factors for this negative image of politicians among voters. Successive governments' poor performance also seems to be a reason for this trust deficit.

Among women, 11.5% mentioned the option of totally agree, 50.9% agree to some extent, 8.5% totally disagree, 7.9% disagree to some extent, and 21.2% I have no idea. Among male respondents, 13.1% cited totally agree, 42.1% agree to some extent, 12.5% totally disagree, 16.4 % disagree to some extent, and 15.8% I have no idea.

In the age-wise breakdown of responses to this question, there was not much difference as far as percentage of those totally agreeing with the statement is concerned. For instance, the four age categories recorded 11.7%, 11.7%, 14.5%, and 14.3% of those who said they totally agree with the statement. On the other hand, the totally disagree percentage of the youngest age group was much less (7%) than the other three age categories (16.6%, 10.3%, and 10.2%, respectively). The percentage of those saying they agree to some extent was 50.9%, 41.1%, 45.3%, and 36.7% for age groups I-IV. Figures of those who said they disagree to some extent were 12.9%, 16%, 10.3%, and 16.3%, respectively. The percentage of those citing "I have no idea" was 17.5%, 14.7%, 19.7%, and 22.4% for the four groups (I through IV).

It seems that education has a great impact on the political attitude of voters. The analysis of responses to this question on the basis of educational qualification reveal interesting trends that are shown in table 08.

Table No. 08: To what extent do you agree with the statement that politicians can solve Pakistan's problems?

Education-wise		Graduation	Illiterate	Masters and Above	Matric - Intermediate	Not Declared	Up to Middle	Total
Agree to some extent	Count	51	35	48	53	1	37	225
	% within Education	52.6%	36.1%	52.2%	39.6%	100.0%	46.8%	45.0%
Disagree to some extent	Count	13	13	11	17	0	14	68
	% within Education	13.4%	13.4%	12.0%	12.7%	.0%	17.7%	13.6%
I have no idea	Count	8	26	8	33	0	13	88
	% within Education	8.2%	26.8%	8.7%	24.6%	.0%	16.5%	17.6%
Totally agree	Count	15	10	14	18	0	6	63
	% within Education	15.5%	10.3%	15.2%	13.4%	.0%	7.6%	12.6%
Totally disagree	Count	10	13	11	13	0	9	56
	% within Education	10.3%	13.4%	12.0%	9.7%	.0%	11.4%	11.2%
Total	Count	97	97	92	134	1	79	500
	% within Education	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Education has positive impact on voters' attitude toward politicians. One of the explanation for this trend given by several FGD participants was that people become mature with increase in level of education and thus they can distinguish between propaganda against politicians and reality. This argument may be true to some extent but it should not be forgotten that highly educated people also fall prey to propaganda against politicians.

In the income-based analysis, the highest income group reported the highest percentage (15.8) of total agreement with the statement. It was followed by the lowest income category with 13.9%. Categories II, III, and IV reported 12.2%, 11.5%, and 10.9%, respectively. Responses of income groups I through V showing total disagreement with the statement were 13.9%, 7.5%, 16.7%, 1.8%, and 15.8%, correspondingly. Percentages of the five income groups (I to V) for the options of agree to some extent and disagree to some extent were 46.4% and 7.3%, 44.9% and 17.7%, 42.7% and 13.5%, 52.7% and 16.4%, and 34.2% and 21.1%. Their responses for I have no idea were 18.5%, 17.7%, 15.6%, 18.2%, and 13.2%. For detailed profession-wise breakdown of the responses, see table No. 78, Appendix No. 02.

5.7 Do Voters Believe in Politicians' Speeches During the Election Campaign?

When elections come close, politicians spring to action to engage the voters. During the election campaign, they highlight their past public works, make new promises, and belittle their political opponents. They sometimes resort to even very cheap language against each other. They devise different strategies for attracting voters toward themselves. Unfortunately, many people take their statements with a pinch of salt. In order to determine the level of voters' belief in politicians' statements and claims, the researcher asked the respondents as *to what extent do you believe in speeches delivered by candidates during their election campaign*. Only 3% respondents said they *totally believe* in speeches of politicians delivered during the election campaign while 47% said they *don't believe in them at all*. Among the rest, 40.2% said they believe in them *to some extent* while 9.6% said they believe in them *to a great extent*.

Majority of voters don't believe in speeches delivered by politicians during the election campaign as only 3% said they totally believe in speeches of politicians they deliver during the election campaign while 47% said they don't believe in them at all. This reflects a huge trust deficit. Even if we add the responses of *to a great extent* and *some extent* to those who said they totally believe in politicians' speeches, still it makes 53%, which cannot be termed to be satisfactory for a democratic system. When the researcher asked participants of a FGD, one participant said that keeping in view the pre-election stance of Prime Minister Imran Khan on various issues and his government's current policies, the gap between what politicians say and what actually they do becomes clearly visible.

Interestingly, only 1 out of 135 (0.6%) female respondents mentioned the totally believe option while for male it was 4.2%. On the other hand, 49.1% women mentioned not at all option as compared to 46% among male respondents. Two-fifths (40.2%) of the females mentioned to some extent while 8.5% mentioned to a great extent. Among male respondents, to some extent option was cited by 39.7% while to a great extent by 10.1%.

In the age-wise breakdown, the above 60 years category emerged to be the category with the highest percentage (8.2%) of respondents saying they totally believe in politicians' speeches. For the other three categories, it was (I-III) 2.3%, 2.5%, and 2.6%, correspondingly. Percentages of the four age groups saying they don't believe in politicians' speeches at all were 47.4%, 49.7%, 41.0%, and 51.0%, respectively. Those who mentioned the option of to some extent were 45%, 35%, 44.4%, and 30.6% while those who said they believe in politicians' speeches to a great extent were 5.3%, 12.9%, 11.1%, and 10.2%. The statistics show that it is the highest age group which recorded high percentages for the totally believe and believe to a great extent, collectively.

In the educational qualification analysis, if we put together the responses of totally believe and believe to a great extent, then we find a clear trend in decrease in trust in politicians with increase in educational qualification of respondents. For example, collective responses of these two options for the illiterate category were 19.6% and this percentage declined with increase in educational qualification. For those with up to middle schooling, it dropped to 17.7%, for matric-inter pass to 11.9%, for bachelor degree holders to 9.3%, and to 5.4% for master and above category. The percentages of those saying they don't believe in politician's speeches at all were 44.3% for the illiterate category, 50.6% for middle, 45.5% for matric-inter pass, 44.3% for graduates, and 52.2% for master and above. Those who said they believe to some extent were

35.1%, 31.6%, 42.5%, 46.4%, 42.4% for category-I to V. The findings show that there is a direct inverse relationship between belief in politicians' speeches and voters' level of education.

There was no systematic and consistent pattern in income-based responses. For details of income-based responses, see table 79, Appendix 02.

Among all professional groups, students recorded the lowest percentage (6.9%) of those who said they totally believe or to a great extent believe in politicians' speeches. They were followed, in ascending order, by traders/businessmen (9.5%), government employees (9.7%), and private job holders (10.8%). The jobless/unemployed category emerged with the highest percentage (22.6%) of respondents saying they either totally believe in politicians' speeches or to a great extent. For housewives, it was 13.5% and for farmers/traders 18.1%. The percentage of those saying to don't believe in politicians' speeches at all was 52.7% for private job holders, 50.5% for farmers/laborers, 49.3% each for students and businessmen/traders, 45% for government employees, 42% for housewives, and 29% for jobless/unemployed. The percentage for each professional group saying they believe to some extent was 31.4% for farmers/laborers, 45.2% for government employees, 43.2% for housewives, 48.4% for jobless/unemployed, 41.1% for traders/businessmen, 36.5% for private job holders, and 43.8% for students. The responses in this category of analysis show that the jobless/unemployed have the highest level of trust in speeches of politicians they deliver during election campaigns. It seems strange as mostly the unemployed don't trust politicians.

5.8 Do Politicians Serve the People?

One of the best ways to serve the people is to become their representative and represent their aspirations and needs as representatives can keep in touch with their people to promote their interests. As elected representatives are supposed to act as policy makers, so they are better placed than many other people as far as serving their communities is concerned as they can find solutions to the problems faced by their people (Hassan, 2018). Despite its great importance, politics is usually looked at with disdain in many countries. A question posed by a constituent to Charlotte Leslie, a former Conservative MP for Bristol, better explains people's perceptions of politicians. The constituent at a function asked the lawmaker that "[a]ll I ever see you politicians do is fight each other. You all have a vested interest in doing the others down, instead of working to make things better for us. Is there any alternative to politics?" (Leslie, 2008). Pakistan is no different when it comes to general perceptions about politicians. Most of the people have very negative perceptions about politicians and politics.

When asked as *to what extent you agree with the statement that political parties/candidates contest elections to serve the people*, only 5% respondents said they *strongly agree* while 48.6% saying they *agree*. On the other hand, 21.6% respondents mentioned the option of *strongly disagree* while 24% of *disagree*. Agreements put together make 53.5%, which means slightly more than half of the respondents. This lack of trust or belief in politicians' claim that they serve the people is a matter of serious concern as no democratic system can function smoothly without people's support to and trust in politicians.

In the gender analysis, there was not much difference in the responses of the two sexes though a higher percentage of male respondents strongly agreed/agreed with the

statement as compared to female respondents. Among women respondents, 2.4% strongly agreed and 48.5% just agreed (total females agreed (50.9%) while among male respondents, 6.3% strongly agreed and 48.7% just agreed (total male agreed 55%). Showing their disagreement, 20.6% of females strongly disagreed while 27.3% just disagreed. Among male respondents, 22.1% strongly disagreed while 22.4% simply disagreed.

The age-wise analysis did not reveal any clear pattern. For complete details of age-wise responses, consult table 80 in Appendix 02.

The analysis of responses on the basis of respondents' educational qualification revealed that a higher percentage of respondents from the three lower categories (illiterates, up to middle and matric-inter pass) strongly agreed or agreed with the statement as compared to percentages of the two higher categories (bachelors and master and above). Percentages of strongly agree and agree for the categories from illiterate to master and above were 58.7%, 57%, 57.4%, 49.5% and 44.6 %, respectively. The percentages of those who either strongly disagreed or just disagreed were 40.2%, 43%, 41%, 50.7%, and 54.3% for categories I (illiterate) to V (master and above). The statistics show that as compared to graduates and master and above qualified respondents, the percentage of those with no education or with lower educational qualification saying they either strongly agree or agree is much higher. In simple words, the educational group with the highest qualification showed the highest level of disagreement with the statement that politicians contest elections to serve people.

Though there was no constant and regular pattern of proportional relationship between income and level of agreement with the statement, the highest income category emerged

with the lowest percentage (47.4%) of respondents showing strong agreement or mere agreement with the statement. For the other four (II-V) categories, the agreement percentages were 53%, 61.9%, 51.1%, and 51%, respectively. Percentages showing strong disagreement or disagreement for the five income categories were 45%, 38.1%, 48.9%, 47.2%, and 52.6%, respectively.

Among respondents of different professions, jobless/unemployed showed the highest percentage (77.4%) of agreement with the statement followed by housewives (59.2%) while private job holders showed the lowest level of agreement (45.9%) followed by students (46.6%). For other categories, the figures were 53.4% for farmers/laborers, 53.3% for government servants and 52% for traders/businessmen. Disagreement percentages were 52.7% for private job holders, 52% for students, 48% for traders/businessmen, 46.8% for government employees, 46.7% for farmers/laborers, 38.3% for housewives, and 22.6% for unemployed/jobless.

5.9 Effects of Election Campaigns

The aim of election campaigns is to persuade voters to turn up for casting votes and to influence their behaviour to vote for specific candidate(s) if they are not already thinking so (Jacobson, 2015). Similarly, some undecided voters often develop preference for particular parties/candidates during the election campaign (Johann, Königslöw, Kritzinger, & Thomas, 2018). Many research studies have claimed that campaigns do increase turnout and influence voting behaviour. Scholars argue that campaigns provide information to voters about candidates' traits, qualifications, positions on different issues, competence, state of national economy, and problems faced by the country and thus ultimately influence voters' candidate choice (Jacobson,

2015). However, there is no agreement on the level of change that election campaigns do make.

On the other hand, there are also scholars who think that campaigns do not matter. The premise that election campaigns do not matter emerged as early as the beginning of scientific inquiry into voting behaviour. The early scholars of modern approach to voting behaviour concluded that elements like voters' social groups, real experiences between elections, partisanship, state of economy, and candidates' ideological positions determine voting behaviour with presidential campaigns having little impact in this regard (Jacobson, 2015). For example, Kalla & Broockman (2018) argue that campaign effects on voters in the US in general elections is zero. They base their argument on 49 field experiments. They further argue that persuasive effects can be observed only in two rare circumstances: (a) when candidates take bizarrely unpopular positions and campaigns invest abnormally heavily in finding persuadable voters and (b) when campaigns start contacting voters long before Election Day and immediately measure the effects (Kalla & Broockman, 2018).

The researcher, in order to know about voters' perceptions about the impact of election campaigns, included a question in his survey. The respondents were asked that *in your opinion, to what extent do speeches and campaigns by political parties/candidates influence voters' decisions?* Responding to this question, 19% respondents said that election campaigns *do not influence voters' choices at all*, 35.2% said that election campaigns and speeches by politicians influence voters' decisions *to a great extent* while 45.2% said that voters' decisions are influenced *to some extent*. Respondents' opinions show that election campaigns do have a crucial impact on choice of voters. Keeping in view these findings, we can easily understand the electoral losses suffered

by ANP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2013 and 2018 elections as it could not run its election campaign due to attacks and threats of militants' attacks. Senior ANP leader Khadim Hussain has also highlighted this aspect in his articles

Among females, 14.5% opted for not at all, 33.3% for to a great extent, while 50.9% for to some extent. Among male respondents, 21.2% cited not at all, 36.1% to a great extent, and 42.4% to some extent.

In the age-wise analysis, the youngest age group seems to be more open to the impact of the election campaign as just 12.3% respondents within this age group opted for the not at all option. For the other groups, it was 26.4% (31-45 years), 17.9% (46-60 years) and 20.4% (above 60 years). Similarly, those who opted for to a great extent and to some extent were 38.6%-48% for 19-30 years, 31.3%-42.3% for 31-45 years, 35.9%-45.3% for 46-60 years, and 34.7%-44.9% for above 60 years category. The difference in the opinions of the four age groups clearly shows that election campaigns have more impact on the young voters as compared to other age groups. The argument that party loyalty becomes stronger with passage of time and thus election campaigns don't have much effect seems to be relevant here to some extent.

After analyzing the responses on the basis of respondents' educational qualifications, there emerged a clear pattern in their responses of not at all and to a great extent options. However, this pattern does not apply to the illiterate category the responses of which have their own pattern. For example, *the not at all* percentages of the four groups (middle to master and above) were 30.4%, 18.7%, 13.4%, and 9.8%, respectively. The figures show decline in not at all responses with increase in educational level of the respondents. In the first category (illiterates), not at all option was mentioned by 23.7% and thus it deviated from the trend set by the other groups. The same pattern emerged

in the to a great extent percentages of the respondents of the five groups. Here, the level of agreement with the statement increased with increase in level of education. Like in the previous case, the illiterate category of respondents did not follow the trend set by the other groups. The percentages of to a great extent for categories II to V were 25.3%, 34.3%, 41.2%, and 41.3% while for category I, it was 33%. The option of to some extent was mentioned (category I through V) by 42.3%, 43%, 47%, 44.3%, and 48.9%, respectively. Thus, we can say that barring the first group, there is a clear pattern in which belief in the effectiveness of election campaign increases with increase in level of education.

The comparative analysis of responses to this question on the basis of respondents' incomes reveals no clear and persistent trend. However, the lowest income group seems to have less positive views about the impact of election campaigns. The income-based responses to this question are shown in Table 81, Appendix 02.

In the profession-based analysis of the responses, respondents from farmers/laborers recorded highest percentage (27.6%) of the *not at all* option followed by jobless/unemployed with 22.6%, traders/businessmen with 22.5%, housewives with 22.2%, private job holders with 14.9%, students with 12.3%, and government servants with 9.7%. Government servants also emerged with highest percentage (43.5%) of those citing to a great extent option followed by students (42.5%), traders/businessmen (39.7%), jobless/unemployed (35.5%) private job holders (32.4%), housewives (29.6%), and farmers/laborers (27.6%). Percentages of each group citing to some extent were 44.8% for farmers/laborers, 46.8% for government employees, 46.9% for housewives, 41.9% for unemployed/jobless, 39.7% for traders/businessmen, 52.7% for private job holders, and 42.5% for students. In short words, in this analysis, government

servants emerged as the group with the highest percentage of those considering election campaigns as effective while farmers/laborers emerged with the lowest percentage.

5.10 Voters' perceptions about the worth of their votes

A common perception among Pakistanis is that that their votes do not make any meaningful difference. However, survey data show that a high percentage of voters believe that their votes will make a difference. In response to a question as *do you think that your vote will make any difference*, 35% respondents said it will *definitely* make difference, 19.8% said it will make difference *to a great extent*, 18.4% said it will make difference *to some extent*, 7.2% said it will *not at all* make any difference while 19.6% said it will make *not much* difference. The responses saying it will definitely make a difference or will make difference to a great extent collectively make 54.8%. Though it cannot be said to be a completely satisfactory figure but still keeping in view Pakistan's controversial electoral history marred by rigging allegations³⁵, it is not bad, especially if the responses of *to some extent* are also added to it. Among women respondents, 34.5% mentioned definitely, 23% to a great extent, 14.5% to some extent, 5.5% not at all and 22.4% not much. Among male respondents, 25.2% mentioned definitely, 18.2% to great extent, 20.3% to some extent, 8.1% not at all, and 18.2% not much. Taking into account responses of all options, it emerges that female respondents are slightly more disappointed as compared to their male counterparts.

In the age-based analysis of responses, the youngest age category emerged with the highest percentage of definitely and lowest percentage of not at all. This high level of confidence in their votes is a really encouraging phenomenon. As PTI chief Imran Khan

³⁵ For example, one participant in my focus group discussions said that their votes can make huge difference but the problem is that we do not have free and fair elections.

would constantly appeal to the youth and is considered to have mobilized young voters, so there seems to be some role of Imran Khan in giving hope to the young lot that they can bring change through their votes. Details of responses of different age groups are given in Table 82, Appendix 02. Among responses of educational groups, there was no clear pattern. For details, see table 83, Appendix 02.

The income-based break up of responses show that the lowest income category has the highest level of confidence in the impact of its votes while the highest income category has the lowest level of confidence in the utility of its vote. After adding each category's responses of definitely and to a great extent, the lowest income group recorded the highest percentage of 60.2%, followed by the second income category with 53.8%. For the other three categories (III-V), the percentages were 49%, 52.7%, and 47.7%, respectively. On the other hand, the lowest income group recorded the lowest percentage (22.5%) of responses of not at all and not much while the highest income group emerged with the highest collective percentage (41.1%) of responses to these two options. The remaining three income groups (II-IV) recorded percentages of 25.9%, 31.3%, and 23.7%, respectively. The figures for to some extent for the groups (I-V) were 17.2%, 20.4%, 19.8%, 23.6%, and 10.5%. Thus, the analysis revealed that the highest income group has the least confidence in the utility of its vote while the lowest income group has highest confidence in the impact of its votes.

In the profession-wise breakdown of the responses, students emerged with the highest collective percentage (60.3) of definitely and to a great extent. It was followed by housewives with 56.8%, traders/businessmen with 56.1%, farmers/laborers with 55.2%, jobless/unemployed with 54.9%, government employees with 50%, and private job holders with 48.2%. On the other hand, the lowest (22.5%) collective percentage of

not at all and not much was recorded by government employees. For the other categories, it was 22.6% by unemployed/jobless, 24.7% by housewives, 25.7% by farmers/laborers, 28.7% by students, 29.8% by private job holders, and 31.5% by traders/businessmen. The option of to some extent mentioned by different categories was 19.0% by farmers/laborers, 27.4% by government employees, 18.5% by housewives, 22.6% by jobless/unemployed, 12.3% by traders/businessmen, 21.6% by private job holders, and 11% by students.

Students have a more positive opinion of the impact of their votes. The most plausible reasons for higher level of confidence among the youth about the impact of their votes, as per this researcher's discussions with FGD participants, seem to be spread of education and widespread use of social media. As many unpleasant incidents of security personal and party supporters were recorded on mobile cameras in 2018 general elections and shared on social media, so many political observers believe that social media will ultimately emerge as a check on electoral fraud. Similarly, it is believed that the spread of education will strengthen democratic values in the country.

5.11 Women's Right to Vote Independently and Contest Elections

Equality of citizens is the fundamental principle of a democratic polity. In a true democracy, all citizens enjoy equal rights including the right to vote.³⁶ Every citizen not only has the right to vote but also the right to vote for the candidate of his/her choice without any coercion. Thus, the researcher wanted to know people's opinion about women's right to vote for candidates of their choice. The question asked was *do you think that women should have equal right to vote for the candidates of their choice?*

³⁶ Some people like unsound minded and convicted persons may be legally barred from voting.

The purpose of this question was to ascertain as to what percentage of respondents believe in equality between men and women with regard to voting rights.

Responding to this question, 80.8% of the respondents replied in affirmative while 18.8% replied in negative. An interesting finding of the gender-based analysis of responses to this question was that the percentage of women disagreeing with the statement was much lower as compared to among male respondents. For example, the percentage of women respondents who replied in the negative was only 8.5% while among male respondents, it was 23.9%. Similarly, the percentage of respondents who replied in affirmative was 91.5% for female and 75.5% for male. This is against the common belief that women themselves do not want to exercise their right to vote. It also suggests that one of the main hurdles for women for exercising their political rights is male.

It may be noted that Pakistan is not an exception when it comes to deprivation of women from voting rights. Generally speaking, there are fewer chances in developing countries that women will use their right to vote or use it independently. There can be various reasons for low turnout among females like socio-cultural values, mobility constraints, fear of violence at the polling stations, and lack of information about importance of vote (Giné & Mansur, 2018).

A comparative analysis of the responses to this question by the four age groups shows that the highest percentage (88.9%) agreeing with the statement that women should have freedom to vote for the candidates of their choice came from the youngest age category (19-30). For the other three age groups (II-IV), it was 76.7%, 79.5% and 69.4%, respectively. The figures show that the youngest age group has the highest level

of support for women's right to vote according to their choice while the oldest age group has the lowest approval rate for it.

The responses to this question revealed that there is a positive relationship between level of education and rate of approval for women's voting rights. For example, approval level among the master and above category was 90.2% which dropped to 89.7% for bachelor degree holders, to 79.1% for matric-intermediate pass, to 68.4% for middle and 75.3% for illiterate. It may be noted that the approval rate among the illiterate was slightly higher than those with middle level of school education. Thus, we can conclude that approval rate for women's voting rights increases with increase in level of education.

In the income-based analysis, the two highest income groups recorded highest approval rate for women's voting right while the three lowest income categories recorded lowest approval. However, no pattern could be found in these figures. For example, the percentages of approval recorded by the five income groups (I to V) were 78.8%, 81.6%, 77.1%, 87.3%, and 84.2%, respectively.

Among all professional groups, government servants recorded the highest percentage (93.5%) of those agreeing with the statement. This category was followed by students (90.4%) and housewives (87.7%). On the other hand, the farmers/laborers category was the one with lowest (64.8%), approval percentage followed by traders/businessmen with 71.2%, unemployed/jobless with 80.6%, and private job holders with 85.1%.

Those who did not agree with the statement, were further asked about the reason for their disagreement. The highest number of respondents cited religion (38.29%) as the reason while 31.91% mentioned social values. Among the remaining, 12.7% said

politics was male's business while 11.7% were of the view that women cannot properly judge candidates.

The next question was about women's right to contest elections against men. The purpose of this question was to know whether the society as a whole is ready to see women in the shape of candidates against male contenders. The question was, *do you think that women should have equal right to contest elections against men?* Unlike the responses to the previous question, the number of those who replied in affirmative sharply dropped as just 51% respondents replied in affirmative. On the other hand, 48.4% responded in the negative. Probably it is this strong opposition to women's candidature against men that so far, no women has contested elections from the district.

In 2014, Farmanullah reported that 28.5% of his respondents in Peshawar agreed with the statement that women should contest elections. According to the findings of this survey, this percentage is much higher (51%). There can be two possible explanations for the increase in the percentage of those agreeing that women should contest elections. Firstly, approval for the idea of women's candidature in elections has increased during the last few years. Secondly, voters of Peshawar are more conservative than those of Swabi. To this researcher, the first explanation seems to be more relevant than the second one.

Like in the previous question, there was a huge difference in the opinion of male and female respondents as far as contesting elections by women is concerned. Among female respondents, 67.3% said that women should have the right to contest elections against male while among male respondents, only 43% agreed with this idea. Those who said that women should not have the right to contest elections against men was 32.1% for females and 56.4% for male respondents. Among the four age groups, the

highest (56.7%) approval rate came from the youngest age group while the lowest (34.7%) from the oldest age group. For the other two groups, it was 47.2% and 54.7%, respectively.

The education-based analysis showed a clear pattern in which percentage of those replying in affirmative increased with increase in level of educational qualification. The highest approval rate (71.1%) was found among respondents with masters and above qualification, followed by bachelor degree holders with 51.5%, matric-inter-pass with 50.7%, up to middle with 44.3%, and illiterate with 36.1%. These figures show that there is a positive relationship between level of education and approval for women's candidature.

As far as income level and support for women's candidature is concerned, no relationship was found between them. The approval rate of the five income groups (I-V) were 43.7%, 54.4%, 51%, 60%, and 50%, respectively. The responses of different income groups to the previous question about women's right to vote independently also did not show any systematic pattern, which means that income level of voters have no relationship with their approval/disapproval of the idea that women should have freedom to vote independently or contest elections against men.

Among respondents from different professions, the highest rate of support came from government employees (67.7%) followed by housewives (71.7%), students and jobless (54.8% each), private job holders (54.1%), traders/businessmen (38.4%), and farmers (35.2%). Thus, the lowest support for the idea that women should have the right to contest elections against men came from farmers/laborers and traders/businessmen.

The researcher wanted to compare the responses of different political parties' voters³⁷ to some of the questions, so another variable was added to the data analysis for some of the questions. Under this variable, the responses were broken down on the basis of parties for which the respondents voted in 2018 general elections. Responding to the question whether women should have the right to contest elections against men, there emerged huge variations among the voters of different parties. Among the major political parties/coalitions, the highest level of support for this idea came from PTI voters (60.4%) while the lowest from MMA voters (33.3%). Support for this idea among voters of other parties was 54.4% among PPP, 49.4% among ANP, 46.9% among PML-N, and 20% among QWP voters.

When asked about the reason for their opposition to women's participation in electoral politics, 41.7% cited religion, 23.5% socio-cultural values, 16.9% said politics is not women's job, 6.6% said that women are physically weak, 3.7% said that women are more vulnerable to corruption, 1.7% said women do not understand politics while 3.3 cited *some other reasons*.

5.12 Electoral Fraud

A free and fair electoral system is considered as one of the basic requirements for a representative democracy. It creates sentiments of popular consent, ensures smooth transfer of governing authority, gives legitimacy to elected government's programs and policies and provides credibility to its actions. Because of its impact on democratic

³⁷ Respondents were thought to be affiliated with different political parties on the basis of their responses to the question as to which party you voted in the 2018 general elections.

dispensation, electoral fraud has emerged as a separate field of research in electoral studies (Zafarullah & Akhtar, 2001).

Voting fraud is fraudulent behaviour to influence election results (Lehoucq, 2003). Review of literature on electoral fraud in countries like Spain, Mexico, England, Germany, the US, Ireland, Taiwan, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Italy reveals that it exists in a variety of shapes. Purging electoral rolls of names of rival voters, stuffing ballot boxes with fabricated votes, substitution of ballot, creating hurdles in the way of rival voters to cast votes, establishing polling stations in places favoring certain candidates, making voters vote more than once or allowing them cast vote on behalf of absent or even dead voters, manipulation of results, pressurizing voters at polling stations to vote for candidates other than of their choice, late opening of polling stations, not posting the results outside of polling stations after completion of counting process, not dipping voters' thumbs in indelible ink thus allowing them to vote more than once, stealing ballot boxes, expulsion of voters or polling agents from polling station premises, voting by those who were either less than the required age or who were not registered as voters in that area, more votes cast than the registered voters, rejection of votes, and increasing total votes are the major forms of electoral fraud (Lehoucq, 2003).

The history of electoral fraud in Pakistan dates back to the 1950s when Muslim League's provincial governments massively rigged the provincial elections (Khan, 2010). The Election Reforms Commission formed in 1955 to investigate the allegations of rigging in NWFP, Punjab, and Sindh observed that the provincial elections were "farce, a mockery and fraud upon the electorate." It further noted that the central government acted with partiality and state functionaries interfered to influence the

election results (Kamran, 2002, p. 82). With more than 60 years down the road, Pakistan is still stuck in allegations of electoral malpractices and manipulation of election results (Zafarullah & Akhtar, 2001).

Owing to its long history of election rigging, the common perception in Pakistan is that except the 1970 elections, no other election has been completely free and fair. Pakistan's electoral history also shows that the establishment, polling staff, political parties, and candidates have been accused of rigging elections (Pasha, 2018). As different players have been involved in or accused of rigging, the researcher wanted to know about people's perceptions about rigging and the main culprits. Thus, a few inter-related questions were formulated in this regard. The first question asked in this regard was as *what is your opinion about transparency of elections in Pakistan?*

The responses to this question clearly revealed people's doubts about transparency of the electoral process as only 5.2% of the respondents said that elections are *completely free and fair* while on the other hand, 38.2% said that *they are rigged*. A large number of respondents (16.8%) opted for the '*I have no idea*' option while 39.6% said that elections *are free and fair to some extent*. Overall, people don't consider the election process to be completely transparent. The fact that a very small percentage of people consider the election process to be completely free is an issue of serious concern as transparency is key to the success of representative governments. The findings also reflect the need for immediate steps to make the electoral process more trustworthy and reliable.

The breakdown of responses on the basis of gender show that only 1.2% women believe that elections are completely free and fair as compared to 7.2% among men. On the other hand, a slightly higher percentage (39.1) among male respondents think that

elections are rigged as compared to women (36.4). The percentage of those saying they have no idea was also slightly higher for females (18.2%) than males (16.1%). Highest percentage of both female (43.6) and male (37.6) opted for the option of free and fair to some extent.

In the age-wise analysis, respondents from the two oldest age categories showed the highest level of trust in the electoral system while the two youngest age groups showed the least trust. The percentages of the four age groups (I-IV) saying elections are completely free and fair and that elections are rigged were 3.5%-39.8%, 3.7%-44.2%, 6%-29.1%, and 4.3%-34.7%, respectively. Percentages of those who said they have no idea were 18.7%, 12.9%, 15.4%, and 26.5% (from age group-I to IV). Those who said that elections are free and fair to some extent among the four age groups were 37.4%, 39.3%, 49.6%, and 24.5%, correspondingly.

Though no regular pattern was found between level of education and level of trust in the electoral process, still it emerged that the illiterate category of respondents have highest level of trust in the electoral process while the two the highest categories (bachelor degree holders and master or above) have the lowest level of trust in electoral process. The percentages of the five groups (I-V) saying elections are completely free and fair were 9.3, 3.8, 8.2, 2.1, and 1.1, respectively. On the other hand, those who said that elections are rigged among the five groups (I-V) were 30.9%, 36.7%, 36.6%, 52.6%, and 34.8%, respectively. The percentage of those who said they have no idea was 19.6 for illiterate, 19 for middle, 19.4 for matric-intermediate pass, 9.3 for graduates, and 16.3 for master and above respondents. The option of free and fair to some extent was mentioned by 40.2%, 40.5%, 35.8%, 36.1%, and 46.7% from group I to V, respectively.

The income-based analysis did not show any pattern of relationship between level of income and level of trust in the electoral process. For example, the completely free and fair percentages of the five groups (I-V) were 6.6, 4.1, 5.2, 3.6, and 7.9 while of those who said that elections are rigged the percentages were 41.1, 36.1, 41.7, 29.1, and 39.5, respectively. For details of responses of different professions, see table 84, Appendix 02.

The 2018 general elections are one of the most controversial elections in the history of Pakistan as all major parties refused to accept PTI's victory as they levelled allegations of election rigging. Following election results, all the major parties brought thousands of their workers to Islamabad to protest against the alleged rigging. In October-November 2019, JUI-F (MMA) chief Maulana Fazlur Rahman led a huge sit-in in Islamabad demanding fresh elections. Despite widespread rigging allegations, PTI is claiming to have won the mandate in a transparent manner. Political parties' claims about rigging are also reflected in the opinions of their voters. For instance, voters of PML-N (57.1%), MMA (53.6%), and ANP (50.6%) recorded the highest percentage of those saying that elections are rigged while PTI the lowest (25.8%). Many political observers believe that PPP suffered no fraud in the 2018 elections that is why it was able to form government in Sindh. Thus, the percentage of PPP voters who said that elections are rigged was comparatively low (27.3%). The percentages of those who said that elections are completely free and fair were 7.5 for PTI, 4.1 for PML-N, 2.3 for ANP, and 1.4 for MMA. Interestingly, 22.5% of PTI voters opted for the "I have no idea" option. Among others, it was 13.8% for ANP, 9.1% for PPP, 8.2% for PML-N, and 7.2% for MMA.

As compared to others, PTI voters have a much positive view about transparency of the election process. As PTI is believed to be the main beneficiary of the alleged rigging, so a positive attitude about the election process from its voters is something natural. However, some PTI voters also in private gatherings expressed their misgivings about the transparency of the electoral process. Similarly, despite the fact that a high percentage of ANP voters cried foul after the results were announced, there were also those who on the Election Day expressed their disappointment over lack of enthusiasm in party voters and their reluctance to come out and vote for the party.

When the researcher asked leaders of major political parties in the district, all except PTI labelled the elections as fraudulent. For example, M. Ahmad said that establishment employed huge resources for perception management before 2018 elections. According to him, it actually tried to show some political forces as "heroes" while others as "zero" and for this purpose, it used electronic, print, and social media, courts, and National Accountability Bureau (NAB). He added that some people were glamorized through extensive media coverage as Geo News would cover PTI's rallies for several hours consecutively. He thinks that election is not merely the expression of one's opinion, rather a complex phenomenon the management of which needs huge resources and energy.

M. F. A. Haqqani (personal communication, September 8, 2020) said that he was himself candidate in 2018 elections but army personnel would not allow him to enter polling stations. He added that one security personnel even pulled out his pistol when they (Haqqani and his supporters) objected to stoppage of his female voters from entering polling station. He said that his votes were snatched at "gunpoint." Similarly, S. Ahmad said that army's involvement and intervention in the 2018 elections to

manipulate it was unprecedented. He claimed that PTI candidates told their supporters about their victory even before the closing of polling time.

M. I. Khan when asked to comment on the survey findings, said that earlier people did not know much about election rigging but now mainstream media and social media regularly feed rigging related information to the voters and thus majority of them think elections are not free and fair. He said that in 2013, the results provided by polling agents from his constituency showed him as the winner but when official results were declared, PTI's Asad Qaisar was declared as the winner.

On the other hand, Aqibullah claimed that PTI's victory in the 2018 election was the result of its performance in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from 2013 to 2018. He said that PTI government introduced major reforms in health, agriculture, and education sectors due to which people again voted for it. According to Aqibullah, if the parties in opposition think that the elections were rigged then they should have challenged election results in court of law.

In Pakistan, the main accused for electoral fraud has been the army. Being the most organized group within the society, the army has the capability to bring what B. C. Smit, as quoted by Zafarullah & Akhtar (2001, p-74) calls "very effective political pressure on behalf of the interests and values it represents." The findings of this survey also show the army/ISI as the main suspect for rigging. For instance, 23.2% of the respondents mentioned the army/ISI as the main culprit for rigging. Political parties/candidates were named by 17.6%, ECP by 10.4%, civil bureaucracy by 6%, and judiciary by 2.2%. The largest percentage of respondents (40.6%) opted for the "*I have no idea*" option. Such a high percentage of respondents saying they have no idea may be because of the "sensitive" nature of the question and the possible answer to it. In

Pakistan, talking openly against the illegal deeds of the army/ISI is considered risky, so many people prefer to stay silent or express themselves in a way that does not reflect their true opinions. This high percentage restraining from expressing their opinion also seems to be something like this.

The widespread perception about the army's involvement in rigging has its reasons. For instance, in the 2018 general elections, each of the more than 80,000 polling stations was controlled by army personnel with civilian law enforcers and even electoral staff, in some cases, relegated to play supporting roles. Cases of refusal to let media staff enter the polling area despite proper accreditation were also reported. Opposition parties' allegations of rigging mostly centered on the vote counting process. At least half a dozen political parties claimed that their polling agents were barred from overseeing the voting counting process as authorized by the law (Hashim, 2018). According to Free and Fair Election Network's (Fafen) audit report of 249 out of 270 NA constituencies on which elections were held on July 25, 2018, 95%³⁸ of the Form-45³⁹ were not signed by the polling agents of political parties and candidates (Khan, 2018c).

These allegations were further strengthened by the sudden breakdown of the Results Transmission System (RTS) after initially working smoothly. Political parties allege that RTS was intentionally suspended to manipulate results. ECP's claim that RTS collapsed has also been challenged by National Database & Registration Authority (NADRA) which had developed the RTS mobile application. Incidents of altercation between personnel of security forces and supporters of different political parties

³⁸ Out of 78,467 forms, only 4,156 were signed.

³⁹ Form-45 contains results of the count of each polling station and is signed by polling agents of every contesting party/candidate.

recorded on mobiles also emerged after the elections. The researcher, who was on his fieldwork during elections, also noticed voters with ANP caps and badges complaining about unnecessary questioning by army personnel deployed for security. In one case, an ANP voter said that he was asked by the army personnel to display his identity card even outside of the polling station and when he did so the soldier told him that it seems to be a colored copy, so he should go back and bring the original card. In such circumstances, coupled with the army's alleged role in manipulation of the electoral process in the past, suspecting the army for rigging elections becomes a natural phenomenon.

When the researcher asked Aqibullah for his opinion about the survey findings about army's involvement in rigging, the lawmaker said voters are misled by political parties to believe that army is involved in election rigging. He said that if opposition parties have any proof of army's involvement in rigging then they should present it. He added that army is not a political party to defend itself in media, so political parties try to hide their own failures by blaming army.

Former ANP lawmaker Saleem Khan Advocate's opinion was totally opposite to that of Aqibullah as he stated that army and intelligence agencies do interfere in electoral process, so they were cited by highest percentage of the respondents (personal communication, September 30, 2020). Likewise, ANP's candidate for National Assembly M. I. Khan claimed that his polling agents were expelled from polling stations on gun point without providing them Form-45. According to MMA's candidate for NA-18 M. F. A. Haqqani (personal communication, September 8, 2020), the whole election process including preparation of electoral rolls and election staff is managed by the establishment, so it manipulates the process. He said that army and ISI have

always interfered in election process and it does not allow any political office holder including prime ministers to act independently.

Similarly, M. Ahmad said that ECP, in terms of actions, was totally dysfunctional as it had handed over all authority to someone else as the whole election process was completed under the supervision of establishment. He questioned that if the election was transparent then why is government not convening sessions of the commission formed to investigate the alleged rigging? He added that PTI was constantly demanding an investigation into alleged rigging in 2013 elections but now it is not ready for a probe into rigging allegations.

The percentage of male respondents (27.8%) citing army/ISI as the main suspect for rigging was double that of female respondents (13.9) while a much higher percentage of women (23) mentioned political parties/candidates as compared to male respondents (14.9). The percentage (46.1) of women respondents saying they have no idea was also much higher than among men (37.9). Civil bureaucracy was cited by 2.4% female and 7.8% male, ECP by 12.7% female and 9.3% male, while the judiciary by 1.8% female and 2.4% male respondents.

An interesting finding of responses to this question was that there was not much difference in the responses of respondents from different age groups, professions, educational backgrounds, and income categories. The variations in responses of different categories within each variable were small and also lacked any clear pattern. However, the vote-based analysis revealed a clear pattern in the responses. For example, the army was mentioned by a very high percentage of respondents who voted for ANP (43.7%), MMA (42%), and PML-N (28.6%) as compared to those who voted for PTI (11.3%). On the other hand, parties/candidates were mentioned by a much

higher percentage of PTI voters (24.6%) as compared to voters of ANP (5.7%), MMA (15.9%), and PML-N (8.2%). Those who said they have no idea were 25.35% among ANP, 30.4% among MMA, 36.7% among PML-N, and 50% among PTI voters.

When asked as *which factor among the following (a list of options provided) affects transparency of elections the most*, 23% mentioned incompetence/corruption of staff at polling stations, 20.2 % illiteracy, 19.6% each absence of rule of law and money distribution by candidates, 9.2% violence/intimidation at the polling stations, and 7.2% poverty.

This question was followed by another one about respondents' expectations about the quality of next general elections. The responses to this question show kind of disappointment among the voters with the electoral system as 36.8% of them said that there will be the same level of rigging in the next election as in the past while only 16.8% said that there will be less rigging as compared to the past. The worrying aspect of responses to this question is not only a high percentage of the respondents saying there will be the same level of rigging but also the fact that 3.4% of the respondents said that there will be more rigging. Among the remaining respondents, a high percentage of 42.2% opted for the "*I have no idea*" option. In 2010, Shakeel Ahmad claimed that 53% of his respondents said that there will be the same level of rigging in the next elections. It is unfortunate that ten years down the road, we have almost the same level of pessimism as more than 40% of the respondents in this survey either said there will be the same level of rigging or more in the next general elections.

The next question related to transparency of the election process was about making elections completely free and fair. The question asked was *how elections can be made completely free and fair*. While responding to this question, 36.4% of the respondents

said that elections can be made completely free and fair by posting honest staff, 19.6 said by completely abolishing the army's role in electoral process, 12% said by increasing literacy rate, 10.4% said by deploying army⁴⁰, 9.6% said by giving media access to inside polling stations, 5.6% said by training polling agents while 4.8% mentioned the option of *some other step*. Completely abolishing army's role was cited by the second highest number of respondents which shows that a large number of people see the army as part of the problem as far as rigging is concerned.

The responses to rigging related questions show that a large number of voters believe that the army is one of the main players in rigging elections. Those who clearly mentioned the army as responsible for rigging elections may not be the only ones thinking so as many respondents might have opted for the *I have no idea or some other step* option due to fear.

The above survey findings and the subsequent discussion about the role of the army in election rigging cannot be brushed aside as just allegations. The army must have been at some level involved in influencing election outcomes in one way or another to create this widespread impression about its role in election manipulation. These findings also necessitate immediate and concrete steps by the army to neutralize this perception and this can be done by completely distancing itself from electoral politics. However, claiming that the 2018 election was totally or massively rigged would be unjust. By 2018, PTI had emerged as a major political force in the politics of Pakistan. It had developed a strong anti-corruption narrative and had involved the youth in general in political debates.

⁴⁰ It may be noted that the army is already deployed at the polling stations. The researcher included this question just to check the ratio of people who consider it as the solution of every problem irrespective of ground realities.

A survey conducted by this researcher at Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad before the 2018 general elections revealed that 58% of the respondents expressed their intention to vote for PTI (Mahsud, Wasai, & Hussain, 2021). This clearly shows youth's inclination toward PTI in 2018 elections. Similarly, this researcher before the 2018 elections asked many people in different areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as for whom they would vote. Majority of them mentioned PTI and its leader Imran Khan. Even in Swabi, it does not seem that any organized or widespread rigging took place. Though leaders of various political parties levelled allegations of rigging as mentioned earlier and some voters complained against the unfriendly behaviour of army personnel on duty after knowing they were voting for parties other than PTI, still there is little concrete evidence to prove that the manipulation or interference was on a scale to change winners into losers. The gap between PTI candidates (winners) and candidates with the second highest votes was very big. For example, the margin of victory on the two NA seats was 44753 and 20616. Similarly, the margin of victory on the five provincial constituencies was 12859, 10857, 9945, 1388, and 14065. The PTI candidates' leads show that they enjoyed voters' support.

The major reasons for ANP's crushing defeat, which used to be the most dominant electoral player in the district, seems to be internal divisions and the emergence of PTI supported by influential families like the Tarakai Family⁴¹. Several ANP workers and local leaders in private discussions confessed that party was suffering from internal divisions. Several of them blamed top party leadership for the intra-party divisions.

Another comparatively strong political force was MMA but unlike in the 2002 elections this time it suffered from divisions. Some of its past leaders including a former

⁴¹ For details, see "post-1947 politics of Swabi" in the chapter 4.

parliamentarian Maulana Khalil Ahmad parted ways with it and joined JUI-Nazaryati. The youth factor also played important role in PTI's victory in the district.

According to the findings of the survey conducted by this researcher in Swabi, forty-eight percent of the respondents said they voted for PTI, followed by ANP with 17.4%, MMA with 13.8%, and PML-N with 9.8%. On the other hand, the shares of these parties in all valid votes (NA and PA put together) as per ECP results were 38.9% (PTI), 21% (ANP), 14.1% (MMA), and 12.8% (PML-N). The similarity in the ECP results and the survey findings suggest that no large scale rigging took place. It even suggests that PTI must have got more votes than the ones declared by ECP.

The attacks on ANP which restricted its capacity to hold public rallies and the media campaign propagating PTI as the savior might have influenced voters' choices. However, influencing voters' decision making process is something which occurs in almost all political systems though the factors may not be the same.

There again arises the question as why almost all political parties levelled rigging elections if elections were free and fair. Unfortunately, levelling rigging allegations by the losers has become a norm in Pakistani politics. In 2013, PTI levelled rigging allegations while PML-N claimed to have won public mandate. In 2018, it was PML-N which cried foul while PTI claimed to have come through votes. Rigging allegations is a phenomenon which is not restricted to the developing countries only. Even we see such allegations in well-established democracies. In June 2021, when Alternative for Germany (AfD) was defeated by Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Saxony-Anhalt state, the former levelled serious allegations of widespread rigging. For example, AfD's former chief in the province tweeted even before the polling stations closed that a "lunatic" campaign was underway to invalidate AfD's votes

(Moody, 2021). Similarly, there surfaced serious allegations of election rigging in the 2016 and 2020 US presidential elections. The bottom line is that rigging might have been taking place in Pakistan but not at a scale as usually believed.

In this chapter, topics like voters' attitudes toward electoral politics, politicians, election campaigns, voting rights for women, women's candidature against male contenders, and issues surrounding transparency of elections etc. came under discussion. In the next chapter, there will be discussion on voters' past voting behaviour in the light of data collected through the survey. An attempt has been made to present a comprehensive account of voters' behaviour during the past elections. Thus, there will be discussion on how voters made their voting decisions, why they voted for certain parties and candidates, why they voted for same parties/candidates consecutively or why they stopped voting for the same parties/candidates for whom they voted earlier, whether they have refrained from voting and why, have they been forced by someone to vote against their free will and whether they have ever voted for someone mistakenly etc.

Chapter 6

VOTERS IN THE POLLING BOOTH

6.1 Introduction

Voting behaviour refers to the decisions or indecisions (actions and inactions) of voters with regard to participation in the electoral process for members of elected bodies at local, regional and national level. Voting behaviour manifests itself either in support for political parties and candidates or abstention from the electoral process. In other words, voting behaviour is the manner in which voters tend to cast their votes or decide not to cast their votes. The purpose of studying voting behaviour is to know as to why people vote for various parties and candidates and how they reach at their final decision.

6.2 Do Voters Read Manifestoes before Casting Votes?

Issuing a manifesto before every election is a time-honored practice and every political party is supposed to do so. Its presentation by political parties is also a symbolic act which indicates the start of the election campaign's main phase. Manifestoes play an important role in comparative analysis of party competition as they provide a compendium of party positions in elections and are used as material for electoral campaigns. Manifestos also serve as a criterion for voters to evaluate parties' performance in government and see whether they fulfilled their promises made in their manifestos (Elder, Jenny & Müller, 2017).

As electoral programs (manifestoes) contain important information about parties' future policies, so studying and comparing them helps voters in making more informed voting

choices. However, research suggests that few voters do actually read party manifestoes because they happen to be tedious. Even in countries like the UK, where publishing manifestoes has a long history and are sold in book shops, few people read them. For example, a study on the UK's 2010 elections found that less than 10,000 printed copies of manifestoes of the three main political parties were sold (Merz, 2017). Similarly, a survey in the UK in 2010 found that just 27% voters do read manifestoes (Biswas, 2019). Some politicians even believe that manifestoes should not be distributed among the voters (Elder et al., 2017). For instance, Bahujan Samaj Party in India contests elections without any manifesto. In 2014, its chief termed a manifesto as "hollow claims which are never realized" (Biswas, 2019).

Though scholars do acknowledge that many citizens don't read manifestoes but still they argue that manifestos' contents do reach to the voters through mass media as it picks up content from manifestoes and disperse it through coverage of election news. The process of reaching manifesto contents to voters through mass media is referred to as "assumption mediation" (Merz, 2017, p, 5).

In Pakistan, few people do read party manifestoes. The researcher during his fieldwork asked many people whether they study manifestoes before elections and found that the overwhelming majority of voters do not study manifestos. The survey also revealed this trend. The question asked was *do you read manifestoes of various political parties before voting in the elections?* According to the responses received from the respondents, 38.6% voters said that they study manifestoes of parties before casting their votes, 60.4% said they don't read manifestoes while 1% did not answer this question. Forty percent is a very high figure for countries like Pakistan where, on the one hand, voters' trust level in the electoral system is low while on the other hand,

literacy rate is not much satisfactory. Though the researcher has no right to doubt the findings of the survey but still the possibility that some voters might have indicated to be reading manifestoes because of social desirability factor cannot be ruled out. There is also the possibility that respondents come to know about manifestoes through assumption mediation but they reported it (probably inadvertently) as reading manifestoes.

As compared to female respondents (36.4%), a higher percentage of male respondents (39.7%) said they read manifestoes before elections. In the age-wise analysis, the percentage of those who said they read manifestoes before casting their votes steadily decreased with increase in age. For example, the percentages of the four age groups (I-IV) were 48%, 38%, 32.5%, and 22.4%, respectively. The breakdown of responses on the basis of educational qualification also shows proportional relationship between level of education and reading manifestoes. The highest percentage (58.7) of those who said they read manifestoes was recorded by master and above category. Among others, it was (45.4%) for bachelor degree holders, 45.5% for matric-inter pass, and 24.1% for middle.

Like education, there also emerged a positive relationship between level of income and reading of manifestoes. The percentage of those who read manifestoes steadily increased with increase in level of income. The percentages of the five income groups in ascending order were 34.4%, 35.4%, 40.6%, 43.6%, and 50.0%, correspondingly. Among all the professional categories, government servants emerged with the highest percentage (59.7%) of those who read manifestoes. This category was followed by students with 50.7%, private job holders with 44.4%, traders/businessmen with 43.8%, unemployed/jobless with 35.5%, housewives with 25.9%, and farmers/laborers with

21%. When the researcher asked a government servant about the reason for this, he said that usually newspapers cover manifestoes and newspapers are easily available to government employees in offices. He added that government servants also take keen interest in manifestoes to see as which party will give them more benefits.

6.3 Turnout and Abstention Rate

In democracies, turnout is inversely proportional to level of alienation among voters as high turnout rate reflects increased level of people's trust in the system (Sharma, 2020). For example, turnout in the 2001 general elections in the UK dropped to 59.4% from 71.6% in the preceding election. It was found that turnout was low in constituencies faced with, comparatively, a high level of socio-economic deprivation (where it was as low as 34%) and among marginalized communities like ethnic minorities (Henn, Weinstein, & Forrest, 2005). Unfortunately, turnout in Pakistan is not very encouraging. In South Asia, Pakistan is the country with second lowest turnout. Between 2015 and 2019, parliamentary elections were held in all of the eight South Asian countries. They recorded voter turnout ranging from 81% to 45%. The turnout was 81.3% in Maldives (2019), 80% in Bangladesh (2018), 78.2% in Nepal (2017), 77.66% in Sri Lanka (2015), 71.46% in Bhutan (2018), 67.11% in India (2019), 50.14% in Pakistan (2018), and 45.4% in Afghanistan (2018). A negative aspect of turnout for Pakistan in 2018 elections was that it dropped as compared to the previous elections while turnout in all other South Asian countries increased as compared to their immediate previous elections (Aliff, 2016; Safi, Holmes, & Ahmed, 2018; Anuja & Khanna, 2019; Jha, 2019 & COG, 2019).

In order to know about voters' frequency of exercising their right to vote, the researcher asked the respondents as to when they first exercised their right to vote and how many

times have they voted in general elections so far. The responses showing the year (election) in which the respondents used their voting right for the first time and the total number of elections in which they voted till 2018 elections revealed a high rate of abstention. For example, there were 103 (out of 500) respondents who for the first time voted in 1993 or earlier. Thus, had these voters voted regularly then the number of those who mentioned the more than five times option throughout their life should have been 103. However, this was not the case as just 66 respondents (64.1%) said they have voted more than five times. It means that at least 33% of voters did not exercise their right to vote regularly even if we suppose that those who said they have voted more than five times have voted in all elections since they first used the right to vote. However, this seems highly improbable because 58 of these 103 respondents first used their right to vote before 1990 elections, which means that they have seen at least eight elections since they voted for the first time. Therefore, it is possible that even many of these 58 (64.1%) also did not vote regularly but still voted in more than five general elections. This pattern of abstention from voting can be seen among all age groups.

Responses to these two questions also revealed other interesting trends among the voters. For instance, the voting trend among females has developed comparatively recently as 83.3% of the female respondents mentioned one of the latest three general elections (2008, 2013, and 2018) in which they voted for the first time. On the other hand, the percentage of male respondents who first voted in one of these three elections was 53.7%. Similarly, only 4.8% female respondents said they have voted in more than five elections while among male respondents it was 17.3%. As per this researcher's discussions with voters and political activists in the district, mobilization by PTI and

the introduction of new election laws⁴² were the two major factors due to which a large number of female voters for the first time exercised their right to vote in the 2013 and 2018 elections (44.2% in 2018 only). Many people narrated their stories as how they broke their old family traditions and took their female family members to vote for PTI.

Another interesting aspect of responses to these two questions was the fact that many, much older, people used their right to vote for the first time in 2013 and 2018 elections. For example, 30.7% of the 31-45 years age category respondents voted in 2013 or 2018 for the first time. Similarly, 12.8% of the 45-60 and 10.2% of the above 60 years age category respondents voted in 2013 or 2018 for the first time. The major factor for many people including older ones to vote for the first time was the massive mobilization by PTI. This factor is also evident from the fact that 46% of those respondents who for the first time voted in 2013 and 63.9% of those who for the first time voted in 2018 voted for PTI in 2018 general elections. This clearly suggests that PTI in general and its chairman Imran Khan in particular played a crucial role in mobilizing voters including new ones to exercise their right to vote. For details about voters' choices in the 2018 general elections, see table 09.

Right to vote is one of the fundamental rights of individuals guaranteed by some of the most important international human rights treaties like International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). These treaties ensure voting rights to every citizen irrespective of his/her creed, color,

⁴² According to the Elections Act, 2017, "If the turnout of women voters is less than ten percent of the total votes polled in a constituency, the Commission may presume that the women voters have been restrained through an agreement from casting their votes and may declare, polling at one or more polling stations or election in the whole constituency, void." For example, the ECP after the 2018 general elections annulled election result of PK-23 Shangla (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and ordered fresh elections because women's turnout was less than 10% of all polled votes.

gender, place of birth, socio-economic status, and political affiliation. For example,

Article 25 of ICCPR states that every citizen shall have the right "[t]o vote and to be

Table No. 09: For which party you voted in 2018 general elections?

First time voted in		ANP	MMA	No Response	PML-N	PPP	PTI	QWP	others or didn't vote	Total
1970	Count	1	2	0	2	0	4	1	0	10
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	1.1%	2.9%	.0%	4.1%	.0%	1.7%	10.0%	.0%	2.0%
1977	Count	1	1	0	0	0	4	1	0	7
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	1.1%	1.4%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.7%	10.0%	.0%	1.4%
1985	Count	3	2	0	4	3	6	0	0	18
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	3.4%	2.9%	.0%	8.2%	27.3%	2.5%	.0%	.0%	3.6%
1988	Count	4	2	0	4	0	8 (34.8)	2	3	23
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	4.6%	2.9%	.0%	8.2%	.0%	3.3%	20.0%	11.1%	4.6%
1990	Count	3	3	1	0	0	5 (38.4)	0	1	13
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	3.4%	4.3%	14.3%	.0%	.0%	2.1%	.0%	3.7%	2.6%
1993	Count	5	5	0	9	1	8 (25)	0	4	32
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	5.7%	7.2%	.0%	18.4%	9.1%	3.3%	.0%	14.8%	6.4%
1997	Count	10	4	0	5	1	16 (42.1)	0	2	38
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	11.5%	5.8%	.0%	10.2%	9.1%	6.7%	.0%	7.4%	7.6%
2002	Count	20	10	0	1	2	25 (41.5)	0	2	60
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	23.0%	14.5%	.0%	2.0%	18.2%	10.4%	.0%	7.4%	12.0%
2008	Count	11	10	1	6	0	38 (52.8)	1	5	72
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	12.6%	14.5%	14.3%	12.2%	.0%	15.8%	10.0%	18.5%	14.4%
2013	Count	17	14	5	7	2	46 (46.5)	3	5	99
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	19.5%	20.3%	71.4%	14.3%	18.2%	19.2%	30.0%	18.5%	19.8%
2018	Count	10	15	0	10	2	78 (63.9)	2	5	122
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	11.5%	21.7%	.0%	20.4%	18.2%	32.5%	20.0%	18.5%	24.4%
No Response	Count	2	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	6
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	2.3%	1.4%	.0%	2.0%	.0%	.8%	.0%	.0%	1.2%
Total	Count	87	69	7	49	11	240	10	27	500
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors" (UN General Assembly, 1966, art. 25 (b). Similarly, article 21 of UDHR states

that "[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures" (UN General Assembly, 1948, art. 21 (3). Constitutions of democratic countries also ensure this right to their citizens.

Keeping in view its importance, several countries have made voting compulsory for their citizens. Despite vote's importance and legal safeguards, there are many people who don't regularly exercise their right to vote. When asked as *have you ever decided not to vote*, 58% of the respondents replied in affirmative, 41% in negative while 1% did not answer this question.

Fifty-eight percent is a huge figure keeping in view the fact that large number of respondents were first time voters and technically speaking they cannot be expected to have skipped voting as it was their first election as registered voters. In other words, this percentage will go further up if voters who became eligible for exercising right to vote in 2018 elections are excluded from the calculation and only those are considered who reached voting age in 2013 or earlier.

There was not much difference in the responses of male and female respondents (57% and 60%, respectively). On the other hand, as expected, there emerged a positive relationship between age and abstention from voting. The rate of abstention increased with increase in age and thus the percentages of the four age groups who said they have at least once decided not to vote were 36.8, 63.8, 68.4, and 87.8.

There emerged an inverse relationship between level of education and the decision not to vote as the rate of those saying they have at least once decided to abstain from voting

decreased with increase in level of education. However, the responses of just one educational group (bachelor degree holders) deviated from this principle. Those who replied in affirmative to the question were 80.4% among illiterates, 62% among up to middle, 59.7% among matric-intermediate pass, 40.2% among bachelor degree holders, and 47.8% among master and above qualification. Like education, there also appeared an inverse relationship between income and the chances to abstain from voting unless it reached at the top where the pattern deviated from the rule. The percentages for the five income groups from I to V were 64.9, 60.5, 47.9, 47.3, and 60.5, correspondingly.

There was no clear trend found in the responses of voters from various professions except that housewives recorded the highest percentage (71.6%) while students the lowest (35.6). For others, it was 65.7% for farmers/laborers, 58.9% for traders/businessmen, 58.1% for government servants, 55.4% for private jobholders, and 54.8% for unemployed/jobless.

The next question was about the reason for the decision not to vote. Among those who confirmed that they have at least once decided not to vote, 47% mentioned "some personal reason," 19% said that no candidate appealed to their mind, 8% cited religious reasons, 6% mentioned each inaccessibility of polling station and fear of violence at the polling station, 5% said their favorite party/candidate did not contest elections, 4% said their name was missing from voters list, while 6% did not mention any reason. The fact that 19% (highest percentage for any single factor) said that no candidate appealed to their mind corresponds to the observations of Zipp (1985) who writes that voters' decision not to vote may be a thoughtful and reasoned political stance to respond to lack of representative candidate. He writes, "recent research on nonvoting tends to treat it [non-voting] as the failure to act politically rather than as a chosen form of political

action." He adds, "... one of these reasons is that individuals do not have their interests represented in the political sphere. For some citizens, nonvoting may be a failure to act politically, but for others it is a chosen form of political action." (Zipp, 1985 p: 59).

6.4 Voting Against One's Will

Constitutional laws of democratic countries and international human rights treaties not only guarantee the right to vote but also state that this right is to be exercised with freedom. Thus, voters have to exercise the right to vote according to their own free will without any coercion or pressure. However, in practice there seems to be many people who don't exercise this right freely. Some scholars believe that the poor segments of society who are economically dependent on others do not exercise their right to vote independently (Alvi, 1996). Similarly, a common perception is that women do not vote independently of their menfolk. It was in this context that the researcher asked respondents *have you ever voted for a candidate who was not your first choice (have you ever voted against your own choice)*.

Responding to this question, 26.4% of the respondents replied in affirmative, 72.4% in negative, while 1.2% did not answer the question. Interestingly, there was no significant difference in the percentages of male and female respondents who replied in affirmative. Similarly, the data did not show any proportional or reverse relationship of level of education, income, and profession with possibility to be coerced to vote for someone who was not the first choice. However, the age-based analysis revealed that the youngest age group is the least affected as far as free voting is concerned while the oldest age group was the most influenced one.

The next question was directly related with the previous one as those respondents who had voted against their free will were asked about the reasons/causes for voting for someone who was not their first choice. Among those who said they have voted for someone who was not their first choice, 29.4% said they did so due to family pressure, 14.4% each mentioned religion and financial benefits, 13.6% acted so due to local influential figures, 2.3% were directed by their employers, 21.2% mentioned some personal/other reason while 3.8% did not answer the question. Thus, family, religion and financial benefits are the major factors due to which people vote for candidates who are otherwise not their first preference.

The gender-based breakdown of responses revealed that family pressure is more relevant for female voters (12.7%) as compared to male voters (5.4%). On the other hand, male voters are more vulnerable to the pressure of local influential figures (4.5%) and temptation of financial gains (5.1%). For females, percentages of pressure from local influential people and temptation of financial gains were 1.8% and 1.2%, respectively.

Among the four age groups, the youngest group reported the highest percentage (9.4%) of family pressure followed by the oldest age group (8.2%). For the other two groups, it was 6.1% and 7.7%, respectively. As far as pressure from the local influential people is concerned, the youngest group is almost free from it (0.6%) while for the other three age groups, it increased with increase in age (4.3%, 6% and 6.1%, correspondingly). There was no relationship between level of income and the possibility to vote for someone for financial benefits. Detailed responses

It may seem odd as to how these people are pressured as voting takes place through a secret ballot and every individual can vote for the candidate of his/her choice without

letting anyone know about it. However, this is a complex phenomenon and many voters do vote on the directives of others even though nobody can see them. When the researcher asked some voters as to why they simply do not vote for their favorite candidates and tell those who pressurize them for some other candidate that they voted as directed, there emerged diverse answers. For example, some people said that it is morally wrong to break your pledge if you have once promised with someone to vote for candidate of his choice while some tried to justify voting for someone who was not their first priority on the ground that for maintaining social relations and family bond, sometimes one has to sacrifice his own will. Still others said that Allah is present everywhere so He will punish them if they violated their promise. There were also people who said they don't violate their commitment because it will have consequences if at some stage it is known that they did not vote for the candidate they had promised to vote for.

6.5 Stability in Voting Behaviour

Before the 2018 elections, Punjab and Sindh, to a considerable extent, had stable and predictable voting patterns with PML-N and PPP as the dominant parties, respectively (Abbas, 2018). On the other hand, electoral history of KP shows that its voting behaviour has most of the time been fluid due to which the province experienced different coalition governments. Shah (2019), in his study of 2002, 2008, and 2013 elections, attributes these fluctuations to the presence of a large number of floating voters (Shah, 2019). On the other hand, Farmanullah and Islam (2019), in their study of the same three elections, argue that the frequent fluctuations in voting behaviour are due to the role played by issues raised by political parties (Farmanullah & Islam (2019). Some political commentators believe that the frequent changes in voting

patterns in KP is the manifestation of rational choice theory as voters reject the candidates/parties who don't deliver.

Whatever the reason may be, this fluctuation in voting behaviour in KP makes it difficult for political observers to predict election results in the province. In order to get an in-depth understanding of this phenomenon, the researcher asked a series of questions in this regard. The first question asked was, *have you ever voted for the same party in consecutive elections*. The purpose of these questions was to see as to how stable the voting behaviour is. Answering this question, 59.2% respondents responded in affirmative, 36.2% in negative while 4.6% did not answer this question.

An interesting finding was that the percentage of female respondents (41.8) saying they have voted for parties/candidates consecutively was much lower than those of male respondents (67.8). On the other hand, 49.1% females and 29.9% males said they have not voted for parties/candidates consecutively while 9.1% female and 2.4% male respondents did not answer this question.

The analysis of responses on the basis of respondents' level of education shows that stability in voting behaviour decreases with increase in level of education. For example, the percentages of different educational groups (from illiterate to master and above) saying that they have voted for parties/candidates consecutively were 73.2 for illiterates, 64.6 for middle, 64.2 for matric-inter pass, 51.5% for graduates, and 40.2% for master and above. Same pattern was observed in the data on the basis of income. Stability in voting behaviour decreased with increase in level of income. Thus, the percentages of the six income groups (I to VI) were 62.3, 60.5, 59.4, 54.5, 52.6, and 46.2, respectively. For income-based responses, see table 10.

Table No. 10: Have you voted for the same party/candidate in consecutive elections?

Monthly Income-Wise		20,000-40,000	40,000-60,000	60,000-80,000	More than 80,000	Not Declared	Up to 20,000	Total
No	Count	55	30	22	15	5	54	181
	% within Family's Monthly Income	37.4%	31.3%	40.0%	39.5%	38.5%	35.8%	36.2%
No Response	Count	3	9	3	3	2	3	23
	% within Family's Monthly Income	2.0%	9.4%	5.5%	7.9%	15.4%	2.0%	4.6%
Yes	Count	89	57	30	20	6	94	296
	% within Family's Monthly Income	60.5%	59.4%	54.5%	52.6%	46.2%	62.3%	59.2%
	Count	147	96	55	38	13	151	500
	% within Family's Monthly Income	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Among the various professions, traders/businessmen emerged with the highest percentage (80.8) of those saying they have voted for the same parties/candidates consecutively. This category was followed by farmers/laborers with 74.35, jobless/unemployed with 61.3%, government servants with 61.5%, housewives with 59.3%, private job holders with 44.6%, and students with 23.3%.

This question was followed by another one about the number of times they voted for the same parties/candidates consecutively. Out of 296 respondents who had in the previous question indicated that they have voted for the same parties/candidates consecutively, 160 respondents (54%) said they have twice voted consecutively for the same parties/candidates. Among others, 18% mentioned three times, 11% four times, 8% five times, 6% more than five times while 2% did not mention any figure. The figures clearly point to the unstable nature of voting behaviour or frequent fluctuations in voting behaviour.

The next question was that *for which party you voted in consecutive elections*. Through this question, the researcher wanted to know as to which parties have a more stable voting base. ANP emerged with the highest percentage (29%) of voters voting for it

consecutively. It was followed by PTI with 28%, religious parties with 18%, PML-N with 15%, PPP and QWP each with 3%.

Though PTI was mentioned by as many respondents as ANP but it may be noted that many people believe that there has been a PTI wave due to which many voters of other parties changed their voting preferences in favor of PTI⁴³. Swabi has been a stronghold of ANP and its predecessors even before the creation of Pakistan, so completely eliminating it from the district will not be an easy task. The next general election will play an important role as far as dominance over Swabi is concerned. Many voters who voted for PTI in the 2018 general elections expressed their unwillingness to vote for it in the next general elections. Similarly, there were people who said that they abandoned their forefathers' party for PTI which they are now repenting. This kind of observations on the part of voters in the district suggest possible reversal (may be partially) of voting trends with ANP and other political parties reclaiming their lost ground back. A senior political figure of Swabi S. Ahmad also predicted split mandate in the next general elections with ANP, PML-N, PTI, and MMA all winning seats.

The data show that as compared to female voters, male voters' percentage of voting consecutively for ANP is double (10.3% and 20.3%). Similarly, the percentage of male voters (11.9%) voting consecutively for religious parties is almost double of female voters (6.7%). Same is the case with PTI (10.9% female and 18.8% male) and PML-N (6.1% female and 9.9% male).

In the next question, those who voted for the same parties/candidates consecutively were asked about the reason for doing so. Thirty-five percent of them said that they did

⁴³ Some even say that the establishment paved ground for PTI with others even claiming that establishment rigged elections in PTI's favor.

so because of the performance of the parties for which they voted consecutively. Among others, 24% said there was no better candidate than the previous one, 15% said they were associated with the party, 12% said the candidate/party highlighted important issues every time, 9% said they had personal/family relationship with the candidate, 3% did so due to family pressure while 1% mentioned personal gains for doing so.

As stated earlier that KP is known for rejecting parties after giving them one chance, so the respondents were asked whether they have ever decided not to vote for the party/candidate for which they voted previously. Responding to this question, 39.8% respondents confirmed that they have at least once decided not to vote for the candidate/party for which they voted previously, 52.8% replied in the negative while 7.4% did not answer the question. It may be noted that 24.4% (122 respondents) of the total respondents had already indicated that they used their right to vote for the first time in 2018. Thus, replying in negative was natural for them. It means that out of 378 respondents who had exercised their right to vote at least twice, 199 respondents (52.6%) confirmed that they have changed their parties/candidates. This is also an indication of unstable voting behaviour in the district.

When asked about the reason for their decision not to vote for the same party/candidate, 36% said the candidate/party did not deliver, 24% said they discovered better candidate, 15% said they wanted change, 8% said they changed party, 7% said the party/candidate did not give them favors, 6% said that the new party/candidate highlighted more important issues than the previous one while 5% said there was some other reason. Though poor performance or failure to deliver on the part of political parties emerged as the major reason for not voting for the same party, it seems that voters' perceptions form an integral part of their conception of performance due to which it has become a

subjective phenomenon. During this researcher's interviews with senior members of different political parties including serving and former lawmakers, it emerged that people don't follow standard definition of performance. They seek personal and individual benefits instead of developmental works for collective good and failure on the part of politicians to give personal benefits is termed as performance. Even voters expect politicians to go out of the way in accommodating their voters. For example, one local politician's guesthouse was presenting the look of a parking area as many vehicles including rikashas were parked in it. When this researcher asked a local whether these vehicles are owned by the local politicians, he replied in negative adding that he is public figure and has to offer his place to those who don't have their own spaces for parking vehicles at night. Similarly, attending joyous and sorrowful events in the constituency also seems to be considered as part of performance of a candidate. PML-N's Sajjad Ahmad in an interview with the researcher said that Tarakai family wins seats from the district because it attends social events within the district on daily basis. These observations clearly show that the definition of performance varies from person to person.

6.6 Voting for Someone Mistakenly

In 2013 general elections, 1.5 million votes were rejected across the country. Five years down the road, this figure increased by 11.7% to reach 1.67 million in 2018 general elections (Khan, 2018b), which makes 3.13% of the total polled votes.⁴⁴ The highest

⁴⁴ Gallup Pakistan has in its report on 2018 elections identified the top five NA constituencies with highest percentage of rejected votes. These constituencies are in Sindh (2) and Balochistan. Gallup Pakistan has attributed the high percentage of rejected votes to low Human Development Index (HDI). This explanation, if subjected to thorough scrutiny, does not seem to be plausible. For example, the five NA constituencies with the highest percentage of invalid votes in 2018 are not necessarily at the bottom of HDI. Similarly, two NA constituencies of Karachi and one of Hyderabad were among the top five districts in terms of rejected votes in 2013 but both these cities usually score high on HDI. Even the same report of Gilani Research Foundation mentions percentages of rejected votes of regional countries

increase as compared to 2013 was recorded in Balochistan (40%) and KP including FATA (30%). In 49 out of 270 NA constituencies, the number of rejected votes surpassed the margin of victory. Likewise, the number of provincial constituencies where the rejected votes exceeded the margin of victory was 120 out of 570 (Khan, 2018b). Some losing candidates and parties also expressed their concerns over the fact that rejected votes exceeded the margin of victory ("Rejected Votes," 2018). They actually suspected fraud in the tabulation of results.

In KP, 2.74% votes were rejected in 2013 and the figure reached 2.95% in the 2018 general elections. Unlike 2013 when the rejected votes as percentage of total polled votes was higher in Punjab than KP, this time KP surpassed Punjab in terms of invalid votes as percentage of polled votes. In Swabi district, the number of rejected votes as percentage of total polled votes in 2018 was 3.76% in the two NA constituencies (ECP, 2018c) while 3.77% in the five PA constituencies (ECP, 2018d). As compared to the provincial average, Swabi's percentage of invalid votes was much higher.

Invalid votes are not the only mistake voters commit. Large number of people mistakenly vote for candidates other than those for whom they want to cast votes. Ahmad, (2010) has also discussed this issue in detail. Keeping in view the above facts, this researcher also asked the respondents whether they have ever voted for someone mistakenly. Sixteen percent of respondents confirmed that they have at least once voted for a candidate mistakenly, 83% said they have not committed this mistake, while 1%

(without mentioning the year). According to this list, the percentage of rejected votes was 5.18 in Nepal, 4.42% in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, 3.30% in Bangladesh, 3.13% in Pakistan and 0.05% in India. Ratio of Sri Lanka's rejected votes is the same as Afghanistan and even higher than Bangladesh while its HDI value in the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) 2019 report is much higher than other regional countries. Similarly, HDI value of Nepal and Bangladesh is also higher than Pakistan but still the percentage of rejected votes is low in Pakistan as compared to these two countries. This shows that low HDI value will not necessarily result in a high percentage of invalid votes.

did not answer the question. As compared to male respondents, the ratio of female respondents confirming they have voted for someone mistakenly was 7 percentage points higher (20.6% for females and 13.7% for males). The possible reason can be a lower level of literacy and exposure as most of the women mostly stay at home to manage their household affairs.

Among the four age groups, the lowest age category recorded the lowest percentage of those who have committed this mistake. The respective percentages of the four groups were 12.3, 18.4, 17.9, and 16.3. As compared to the elder people, younger generations have more and easy access to social and mainstream media due to which their level of awareness is much higher than their elders. The fact that young people have participated in fewer elections may also be a factor for their low percentage of voting mistakenly.

The analysis of data on the basis of educational qualification of respondents show a kind of inverse relationship between level of education and the possibility to vote for someone mistakenly. For example, the percentages of those who confirmed to have voted mistakenly were 13 for master and above, 13.4 for bachelor degree holders, 14.2 for matric-inter pass, 21.5 for middle, and 18.6 for illiterates. The data did not show any relationship between level of income and the possibility to vote for someone mistakenly.

6.7 Voting for Two Different Parties in Same Elections

In 2002, local leaders of JUI-F visited our home in District Tank for canvassing for votes as party Chief Maulana Fazlur Rahman was contesting election for NA seat from the district. My grandfather, being the chief of his extended family, straightaway told them that his family will vote for Maulana Sahib (Maulana Fazlur Rahman) but will

not vote for JUI-F's provincial candidate as he had already made a commitment with an independent candidate. This is not an isolated incident as many people do vote for candidates of different political parties in the same elections. For example, Tank's NA seat in 2002 elections was won by JUI-F (being part of MMA) while the provincial one by an independent candidate Tahir bin Yamin. Similarly, MMA won both NA seats from Swabi but it could win only two out of its six provincial seats with the rest being won by ANP (3) and independent candidate (1). It shows that thousands of voters voted for different parties at national and provincial level. In order to know about this trend, the researcher asked the respondents as *have you ever in the same election voted for two parties or candidates in which you polled NA vote for one party and provincial assembly vote for another party? Or you did cast one vote for a party and the other for an independent candidate.*

Responding to this question, 39.2% respondents replied in affirmative. Ratio of male and female respondents responding in affirmative was almost the same (38.8% for male and 40% for female). The data further revealed that the possibility of voting for two different parties in the same election increases with increase in age. For example, the percentages of the four age groups who said that they have voted for two different parties in the same elections were 32.2, 39.9, 45.3, and 46.9, respectively. In the education-based analysis, the researcher did not find any systematic relationship between level of education and the possibility of voting for two different parties in the same elections though the highest educated category recorded the highest percentage (45.7%) of those replying in affirmative. The data also did not show any relationship between level of income and profession on the one hand while possibility of voting for two different parties in same elections, on the other.

Those who responded in affirmative to the previous question were further asked about the reason for voting for two different parties in the same elections. Interestingly, the highest percentage (26%) said they did so because they did not want to put all their eggs in one basket.⁴⁵ Among others, 20% said that their favorite candidates were contesting from two different parties, 19% said that one candidate was from his party while with the other they had personal attachment, 18% said they had close association with candidates of two different parties contesting on national and provincial seats, 11% said they did so due to some personal reasons, while 6% said they used one vote independently while the other one under pressure from family.

The next question was about voters' decision making process. They were asked a simple question whether they make their decisions about their vote on polling day or before it. The question was that *when you make your decision about your vote*. An overwhelming

Table No. 11: Have you ever in same election voted for two different parties?

Overall	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	300	60.0	60.0
No Response	4	.8	60.8
Yes	196	39.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 12: If Yes, then why?

Overall	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Because one candidate was from your party while with the other you had personal relationship	37	19	19	19
Because you did not want to put all eggs in one basket	50	26	26	45
Because you had close association with candidates of different parties	36	18	18	63
Because you used one vote independently while for the other you were forced	11	6	6	69
Because your favorite candidates were contesting from different political parties	40	20	20	89
Due to some personal/other reason	22	11	11	100
Total	196	100.0	100.0	

⁴⁵ Voting takes place through secret ballot and thus voters cannot show the candidates for whom they vote. However, still supporters of candidates keep an eye on voters. Those who vote for someone who ultimately wins the contest also approach him for favors more boldly.

majority (85.8%) said that they make voting decisions before Election Day. This high percentage of respondents saying that they make their decisions before the Election Day means that voters enter polling booths with clear voting choices.

6.8 Voting In 2018 General Elections

In the 2018 general elections, PTI swept the Swabi district as it won all the NA and provincial assembly seats (two NA and five PA) from the district. According to the results released by ECP through Form 47, PTI secured 37% of the valid votes on the provincial level seats followed by ANP with 22%, PML-N with 15.45%, and MMA with 11.8% votes. At NA level, PTI got 40.8%, ANP 20%, MMA 16.4%, and PML-N 9.7% votes. The results of 2018 general elections revealed that PTI was the most popular party in the district but still the researcher wanted to know as to which kind of voters voted for it and why. Therefore, the respondents were first asked as for which party they voted and then they were asked about the reason due to which they voted for a particular party. Forty-eight percent of the respondents said that they voted for PTI, followed by ANP with 17.4%, MMA with 13.8%, PML-N with 9.8%, PPP with 2.2%, and QWP with 2%. Among the remaining respondents, 5.4% either voted for other parties/independent candidates or did not vote while 1.5% did not answer the question.

As different political parties received different percentages of votes at national and provincial level, so the findings of this survey cannot be directly compared with vote shares of the major parties. Therefore, the researcher added national and provincial level votes of each of the major political parties and then determined their share in total votes (total valid votes of national and provincial level constituencies). Then the vote

shares of the major parties were compared with the findings of the survey. According to this formula, PTI received 38.9% votes, ANP 21%, MMA 14.1%, and PML-N 12.8%. When the researcher compared the results of his survey and the actual vote shares of the major parties as just mentioned, it emerged that survey's findings were well within the 5% margin of error in case of ANP, MMA, and PML-N while in case of PTI, there was ten percentage point difference. Though the comparison of survey findings and actual votes received by different parties reflect a high level of representativeness of the sample, still the question arises as why the difference in case of PTI exceeded the 5% margin of error set by the researcher.

The most plausible explanation for this question may be found in the youth's share in the sample drawn for the survey. Pakistan being one of the youngest countries in the world with 64% of its population below 30 years of age (Kundi, 2018) and youth being at the forefront in the 2018 election campaign, the researcher allocated the largest share to the youngest voters in the sample. According to the survey findings, 56.1% of the youngest age category (19-30 years of age) said they voted for PTI in the 2018 elections. It was also the youngest age category which recorded highest support for PTI among all age groups in the survey. As the youngest age groups had the largest share in the sample and more than half of them said they voted for PTI, so PTI's share in the survey reached 48% while its actual vote share was 38%. The difference seems to be because most of the youngest voters in the sample said they voted for PTI but in the actual election, youth did not play as much part as anticipated. Therefore, there emerged a difference of ten percentage points in PTI's actual vote share and its share in the survey responses.

ANP and PML-N were the parties that received a higher percentage of male votes while PTI and PPP received more female votes as compared to male voters. A local PTI leader attributed this high rate of female voters to the youth of the party. He said that young voters played important role in bring their family female voters to polling stations to vote for PTI. In one case, a boy stole his parents' identity cards so they may not vote for PTI's rival party. In the case of MMA, the percentage of the two genders was almost the same. The age-wise breakdown of responses showed that more than 50% of the respondents in the youngest and oldest age categories voted for PTI. Complete age-wise details are presented in table 13.

Seen from educational qualification aspect, there were no trends found indicating popularity of a particular political party among voters with specific educational qualifications. However, the percentage of master and above qualification holders who voted for MMA was almost half of the votes it received from voters with lower educational qualifications. The percentages of voters with different educational qualifications voting for MMA were 17.5% among illiterates, 15.2% among up to middle qualification, 13.4% among matric-inter pass, 15.5% among bachelor degree holders, and 7.6% among masters and above. Furthermore, MMA's percentage of votes from different educational categories decreased with increase in level of education except for bachelor degree holders who recorded higher percentage (15.5%) than the category immediately below it. complete details of responses of different educational groups are given in table 14.

The income-based analysis revealed that 47% of the lowest and 55.1% of the second lowest income group voted for PTI, 21.2% and 9.5% for MMA, 12.6% and 4.8% for PML-N, and 11.9% and 19% for ANP. Interestingly, PTI's percentage of votes in the

Table No. 13: For which party you voted in the 2018 general elections?

Age-wise		19-30 years	31-45 years	46-60 years	Above 60 years	Total
ANP	Count	24	36	18	9	87
	% within Age	14.0%	22.1%	15.4%	18.4%	17.4%
MMA	Count	22	25	19	3	69
	% within Age	12.9%	15.3%	16.2%	6.1%	13.8%
No Response	Count	3	3	0	1	7
	% within Age	1.8%	1.8%	.0%	2.0%	1.4%
PML-N	Count	11	17	16	5	49
	% within Age	6.4%	10.4%	13.7%	10.2%	9.8%
PPP	Count	3	2	5	1	11
	% within Age	1.8%	1.2%	4.3%	2.0%	2.2%
PTI	Count	96	69	50	25	240
	% within Age	56.1%	42.3%	42.7%	51.0%	48.0%
QWP	Count	5	1	1	3	10
	% within Age	2.9%	.6%	.9%	6.1%	2.0%
Some other party/independent/didn't	Count	7	10	8	2	27
	% within Age	4.1%	6.1%	6.8%	4.1%	5.4%
Total	Count	171	163	117	49	500
	% within Age	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

highest income category was much low (31.6%) as compared to among other income groups while ANP's share in the highest income group was much higher (39.5%) as compared to its vote share among the four lower income categories (11.9%, 19%, 17.7%, and 10.9%). MMA got a higher percentage of votes (21.2%) among the lowest income group. Among the remaining four income groups, it got 9.5%, 9.4%, 14.5%, and 15.8%, respectively.

When this researcher put this finding before a senior JUI-F leader, he said that Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) himself has said that poor people will serve his Deen. The JUI-F leader continued that Allah wants to promote his Deen through poor people to show to the world that wealth has no importance for Deen. Another argument he presented was that leaders of religious parties, unlike other parties, are easily accessible to the poor people, so they prefer to vote for these parties. He said that religious parties are also the ones who raise voice for the poor. According to another senior MMA leader, middle class has always been a hurdle to revolution because it always thinks about material

gains. As people are supposed to contribute to religious parties' election campaign rather than expect something from them, so generally middle class voters do not support religious parties. He also acknowledged the role played by social media.

Leaders of other secular parties said that people who have financial resources send their children to colleges and universities for modern education who then end up supporting parties other than religious ones while poor children study in madrassahs and they prefer voting for religious parties. According to Saleem Khan Advocate (personal communication, September 30, 20202), less educated and poor people lack political awareness and thus religious figures exploit them for their own benefits. He said that religious parties' voters are blind followers without having the capability to raise questions over its conduct in politics. According to him, religious parties also do corporate politics as they prefer well off people over poor for awarding election tickets.

Details of respondents' distribution on the basis of income and their support for different parties are given in table 15.

Table No. 14: For which party you voted in the 2018 general elections?

Education-wise		Graduation (14 Years)	Illiterate	Masters and Above	Matric- Intermediate	Not Declared	Up to Middle	Total
ANP	Count	18	19	17	16	0	17	87
	% within Education	18.6%	19.6%	18.5%	11.9%	.0%	21.5%	17.4%
MMA	Count	15	17	7	18	0	12	69
	% within Education	15.5%	17.5%	7.6%	13.4%	.0%	15.2%	13.8%
No Response	Count	1	1	3	0	0	2	7
	% within Education	1.0%	1.0%	3.3%	.0%	.0%	2.5%	1.4%
PML-N	Count	9	9	11	17	0	3	49
	% within Education	9.3%	9.3%	12.0%	12.7%	.0%	3.8%	9.8%
PPP	Count	1	4	0	6	0	0	11
	% within Education	1.0%	4.1%	.0%	4.5%	.0%	.0%	2.2%
PTI	Count	44	38	49	66	1	42	240
	% within Education	45.4%	39.2%	53.3%	49.3%	100.0%	53.2%	48.0%
QWP	Count	3	4	2	0	0	1	10
	% within Education	3.1%	4.1%	2.2%	.0%	.0%	1.3%	2.0%
Other party/independent/ didn't vote	Count	6	5	3	11	0	2	27
	% within Education	6.2%	5.2%	3.3%	8.2%	.0%	2.5%	5.4%
Total	Count	97	97	92	134	1	79	500
	% within Education	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table No. 15: Monthly income profile of voters of different parties.

		20,000-40,000	40,000-60,000	60,000-80,000	More than 80,000	Not Declared	Up to 20,000	Total
ANP	Count	28	17	6	15	3	18	87
	% within Family's Monthly Income	19.0%	17.7%	10.9%	39.5%	23.1%	11.9%	17.4%
MMA	Count	14	9	8	6	0	32	69
	% within Family's Monthly Income	9.5%	9.4%	14.5%	15.8%	.0%	21.2%	13.8%
No Response	Count	2	1	0	2	0	2	7
	% within Family's Monthly Income	1.4%	1.0%	.0%	5.3%	.0%	1.3%	1.4%
PML-N	Count	7	14	4	1	4	19	49
	% within Family's Monthly Income	4.8%	14.6%	7.3%	2.6%	30.8%	12.6%	9.8%
PPP	Count	3	2	3	1	0	2	11
	% within Family's Monthly Income	2.0%	2.1%	5.5%	2.6%	.0%	1.3%	2.2%
PTI	Count	81	44	27	12	5	71	240
	% within Family's Monthly Income	55.1%	45.8%	49.1%	31.6%	38.5%	47.0%	48.0%
QWP	Count	1	2	3	0	0	4	10
	% within Family's Monthly Income	.7%	2.1%	5.5%	.0%	.0%	2.6%	2.0%
other party/independent/didn't vote	Count	11	7	4	1	1	3	27
	% within Family's Monthly Income	7.5%	7.3%	7.3%	2.6%	7.7%	2.0%	5.4%
Total	Count	147	96	55	38	13	151	500
	% within Family's Monthly Income	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Among the professions, PTI received the highest percentage of votes from students while the lowest from traders/businessmen. On the other hand, ANP received the highest percentage of votes from traders/businessmen. Complete details of profession-based voting in the 2018 general election is given in table 16.

Table 16: Voters' professions and their party choices in 2018 general elections.

Profession-wise		Farmer/aborer	Govt. servant	H/W	Jobless/unemplo	N/D	Person al	Private job	Student	Total
ANP	Count	18	9	14	7	0	20	9	10	87
	% within Profession	17.1%	14.5%	17.3%	22.6%	.0%	27.4%	12.2%	13.7%	17.4%
MMA	Count	12	4	17	5	0	12	7	12	69
	% within Profession	11.4%	6.5%	21.0%	16.1%	.0%	16.4%	9.5%	16.4%	13.8%
No Response	Count	0	2	2	1	0	1	1	0	7
	% within Profession	.0%	3.2%	2.5%	3.2%	.0%	1.4%	1.4%	.0%	1.4%
PML-N	Count	12	7	6	1	0	9	12	2	49
	% within Profession	11.4%	11.3%	7.4%	3.2%	.0%	12.3%	16.2%	2.7%	9.8%
PPP	Count	2	1	5	0	0	2	0	1	11
	% within Profession	1.9%	1.6%	6.2%	.0%	.0%	2.7%	.0%	1.4%	2.2%
PTI	Count	51	31	34	16	1	25	39	43	240
	% within Profession	48.6%	50.0%	42.0%	51.6%	100.0%	34.2%	52.7%	58.9%	48.0%
QWP	Count	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	4	10
	% within Profession	1.9%	1.6%	1.2%	.0%	.0%	1.4%	1.4%	5.5%	2.0%
Others/didn't vote	Count	8	7	2	1	0	3	5	1	27
	% within Profession	7.6%	11.3%	2.5%	3.2%	.0%	4.1%	6.8%	1.4%	5.4%
Total	Count	105	62	81	31	1	73	74	73	500
	% within Profession	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The above tables about voters of different parties show that more than half of the two lowest income group voters voted for PTI. Maybe it shows their disappointment with other parties and expectations from PTI, the leadership of which used to make unrealistic promises with the voters. ANP's share in the highest income group was much higher than in other income groups while MMA got a higher percentage among the voters of lowest income category. PTI received the highest percentage among students and lowest among traders/businessmen while ANP got the highest percentage of votes among traders and businessmen.

When in the next question the respondents were asked about the reason for voting for the parties of their choice, 28.6% mentioned parties' past performance, 22% party leadership, 18.6% party identification, 16.4% cited the candidate, 7.8% religion, 5.2% some other reason while 1.4% did not answer this question.

Among those who voted for PTI, 34.2% said they voted for it due to its past performance, 29.6% due to party leadership, 17.5% due to its candidates, 12.9% due to association with the party, and 5.8% due to some other reasons. In case of ANP, 40.2% mentioned party identification, 24.1% its past performance, 19.5% party leadership, 11.5% candidates, and 4.6% other reasons. Highest percentage of PTI voters cited its performance as the reason for voting it in 2018 but many believe that ANP, when in government, delivered far better than PTI which raises the question as why ANP could not attract the performance-based votes. For example, an elderly man associated with Jamaat-e-Islami said that were the people of Swabi voting on the basis of performance then it would have never voted against ANP as its developmental works exceeded all the past records.

In the case of MMA, 52.2% mentioned religion, 17.4% party identification, 11.6% party leadership, 8.7% its past performance, 7.2% mentioned candidates as the reason for voting for it, while 2.9% mentioned other reasons. Among PML-N voters, 44.9% cited its past performance as the reason for voting for it, 18.4% each party leadership and party identification, 8.2% some other reasons, while 10.2% cited candidates as the reason for voting for the party. Details for responses to this question are given in table No. 17.

Table No. 17: Why did you vote for this party (in the 2018 general elections)?

Voters' reasons for voting for different parties		ANP	MMA	No Response	PML-N	PPP	PTI	QWP	Others/ didn't vote	Total
Because of its past performance	Count	21	6	0	22	3	82	3	6	143
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	24.1 %	8.7%	.0%	44.9%	27.3 %	34.2 %	30.0%	22.2%	28.6%
Because of the candidate	Count	10	5	0	5	1	42	5	14	82
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	11.5 %	7.2%	.0%	10.2%	9.1%	17.5 %	50.0%	51.9%	16.4%
Because of the party leadership	Count	17	8	0	9	5	71	0	0	110
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	19.5 %	11.6%	.0%	18.4%	45.5 %	29.6 %	.0%	.0%	22.0%
Due to association with the party	Count	35	12	0	9	1	31	2	3	93
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	40.2 %	17.4%	.0%	18.4%	9.1%	12.9 %	20.0%	11.1%	18.6%
Due to religion	Count	0	36	0	0	0	0	0	3	39
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	.0%	52.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	11.1%	7.8%
N/A	Count	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	7
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.4%
Some other reason	Count	4	2	0	4	1	14	0	1	26
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	4.6%	2.9%	.0%	8.2%	9.1%	5.8%	.0%	3.7%	5.2%
Total	Count	87	69	7	49	11	240	10	27	500
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %

According to the survey data, PTI emerged as the party with the highest percentage of its voters citing party leadership as the major reason for voting for it. The study conducted by Lal Badshah and his colleagues in seven districts of KP with one district from each division also found the crucial role played by Imran Khan's personality in attracting voters in 2013 elections (Badshah, et al., 2018). Shah (2019) found that 34.8% respondents replied in negative when asked whether they will still vote for their parties if their current leaders are no more within their respective parties. This clearly

shows the personality oriented nature of political parties in Pakistan in general and PTI in particular. It may be noted that this phenomenon is not only limited to Pakistan. For example, Holmberg and Oscarsson, in their 2011 study argue that leaders enjoy more importance in younger parliamentary systems with weaker party systems. They write that "where parties matter less, leaders tend to matter more" (Garzia, 2017, 639).

This question was followed by another one about the level of satisfaction with the performance of parties for which they voted. The exact question was, *to what extent are you satisfied with the performance of the party for which you voted in the 2018 elections (Irrespective of whether the party for which you voted formed the government or not)*. Three-fourths (34.4%) of the respondents said that they were completely satisfied while 47.4% said they were satisfied to some extent. On the other hand, 12.4% of the respondents said that they were completely dissatisfied, 4.4% said they were not satisfied while 1.4% did not answer the question.

The party-wise analysis of the responses showed PTI voters the most dissatisfied and MMA's most satisfied among all the major parties in the district. For example, among the four major contestants in the district, PTI's voters recorded the highest percentage (14.2%) of completely dissatisfied voters. Among ANP, PML-N and MMA voters, the percentages who said they were completely dissatisfied were 10.3%, 10.2%, and 5.8%, respectively. Similarly, PTI's percentage (29.6%) of those who said they were completely satisfied with their party's performance was lowest among the four major parties (ANP 41.4%, PML-N 38.8%, and MMA 55.1%). For complete details, see table 18.

When the researcher asked a local leader of a religious party about the reason for high level of satisfaction among MMA voters and dissatisfaction among PTI voters, he said

that religious parties' pre-election narrative that Imran Khan is incompetent, he is an agent of Jews, and is being supported by the establishment still continues while PTI discarded its pre-elections narrative. He said that PTI totally failed to fulfil its promises with the people, so its voters are now disappointed and feel guilty for voting for it. Similarly, PML-N's S. Ahmad said that people especially the youth were fed up with PPP and PML-N and wanted change. Imran Khan had promised to make common man's life better but it not only failed to improve common people's life standard but created further difficulties for them due to unbridled inflation. This then results in disappointment, frustration, and anger among the populace.

Table No. 18: To what extent are you satisfied with the performance of the party for which you voted in the 2018 elections?

Satisfaction level of different parties' voters		ANP	MMA	No Response	PML-N	PPP	PTI	QWP	Others/didn't vote	Total
Completely dissatisfied	Count	9	4	0	5	2	34	3	5	62
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	10.3 %	5.8%	.0%	10.2%	18.2%	14.2%	30.0%	18.5%	12.4%
Completely satisfied	Count	36	38	0	19	1	71	1	6	172
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	41.4 %	55.1%	.0%	38.8%	9.1%	29.6%	10.0%	22.2%	34.4%
N/A	Count	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	7
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.4%
Not satisfied	Count	5	3	0	4	0	8	1	1	22
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	5.7 %	4.3%	.0%	8.2%	0%	3.3%	10.0%	3.7%	4.4%
Satisfied to some extent	Count	37	24	0	21	8	127	5	15	237
	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	42.5 %	34.8%	.0%	42.9%	72.7%	52.9%	50.0%	55.6%	47.4%
	Count	87	69	7	49	11	240	10	27	500
Total	% within For which party you voted in 2018 elections	100.0 %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0%	100.0%
	Total	17.4 %	13.8%	1.4%	9.8%	2.2%	48.0%	2.0%	5.4%	100.0%

According to a FGD participant, PTI did not know about the working of the system so made unrealistic promises with the voters. Thus its failure to deliver what it had promised before elections naturally results in dissatisfaction among its voters. However, Aqibullah rejected the argument that PTI voters are dissatisfied with its performance. Instead, he argued that many people seek personal benefits rather than

collective developmental works and when they are not given these benefits then they express their dissatisfaction with government's performance.

Ours is a diverse society with people having different priorities and values. When it comes to the most important basis for voting preferences, one finds no agreement among the voters as different people attach importance to different factors. Some value honesty while others religiosity, some attach importance to education while others to wealth, some give preference to candidates' family background while others to observance of socio-cultural values by the candidates. In this context, respondents were asked about the most important factor from among a given list. The highest number of responses (32.2%) came in favor of a candidate who is educated while the lowest in favor of the one who is wealthy (1%). The one who attends sorrowful and joyous events in the constituency was mentioned by 19.6%, religious by 18.4%, from good party by 17%, of good reputation by 6.8%, from a well-known family by 3.6%, while 1.4% did not answer the question. For details, see table 19.

The findings may create the impression that wealth does not matter for contesting and winning elections but this seems not to be the case. Candidates need huge resources for the election campaign that is why parties mostly prefer well-off candidates for tickets. In some cases, parties even demand money from candidates but they do so unofficially. For example, an applicant for PTI ticket from one of the tribal districts in 2018 elections told this researcher that one of the main questions asked by the ticket awarding committee was about his financial position and how much he was ready to spend. He added that it seemed that the ticket awarding committee was expecting the candidates to provide sufficient money to the party in addition to bearing expenses of their own

election campaigns. However, not all parties do demand money from candidates and sometimes tickets are also awarded to workers from lower middle class.

Table No. 19: Which quality do you value the most while deciding to vote for a candidate?

Overall	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Attends sorrowful and joyous events in the constituency	98	19.6	19.6
Educated	161	32.2	51.8
From a good party	85	17.0	68.8
From well-known family	18	3.6	72.4
No Response	7	1.4	73.8
Of good reputation	34	6.8	80.6
Religious	92	18.4	99.0
	5	1.0	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

A comparative analysis of responses from female and male respondents revealed that the options of 'educated' and 'from a good party' were mentioned by women more frequently than men while the options of 'attends sorrowful and joyous events in the constituency,' 'religious,' 'wealthy' and 'from a good family' were cited by men more often than women. The option 'of good reputation' was mentioned by both genders equally.

In the next question, the respondents were again asked to mark an issue from a list on the basis of which they would like to vote. The highest number (23.8%) of respondents cited implementation of Sharia while the lowest percentage (4%) came for controlling inflation. Implementation of rule of law was cited by second highest number (20.8%) followed by establishment of peace with 12.6%, eradication of corruption with 10.6%, reduction of unemployment with 9.6%, national security with 8.8%, alleviation of poverty with 5.4%, while 4% of the respondents did not answer the question. An interesting aspect of responses to this question was that issues like eradication of corruption and national security were mentioned by only 10.6% and 8.8% respondents

while implementation of sharia and rule of law by 23.8% and 20.8%, respectively. The fact that fewer respondents mentioned national security is probably an indication of a thinking in the society that our main problems are domestic in nature rather than concerns about security of the country. Similarly, the researcher, following his discussions with different people, reached at the conclusion that one reason for this high percentage for these two options may be people's dissatisfaction with the current legal system and their desire for a strict legal system applicable to all. This desire is a reflection of the common phrase across the country that law is only for the poor.

Voters' behaviour and decision making process during the past elections was discussed in detail in this chapter. The next chapter is about relevance of voting models in Swabi. The chapter presents a comparative analysis of the three major voting models and will show the relative relevance of each model in determining voting behaviour in the district. Furthermore, there will also be discussion on the relevance of each component within each theoretical model. The chapter also presents a critique of the earlier studies conducting on voting behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Chapter 7

VOTING MODELS AND THEIR RELEVANCE IN SWABI DISTRICT

7.1 Introduction

The scientific study of voting behaviour is approached through three main models: the sociological model which is also known as the School of Columbia, the psychosocial model which is also known as the School of Michigan, and Rational Choice Theory also called the School of Rochester or model of economic voting (Antunes, 2010). As all the three models have already been discussed in detail in the first chapter, the researcher will very briefly discuss them for refreshing readers' memory and then will proceed to the main theme of the chapter-relevance of theoretical models in Swabi.

7.2 Sociological Model

Sociological theory of voting behaviour focuses on the individual and the social structure surrounding the individual. Thus, it places votes in social context and then studies the effects of variables such as social class, religion, nationalism, language, and rural-urban divisions (Scott & Marshall, 2009). According to this theory, the individuals learn their partisan predilection corresponding to the political orientations of the group to which they belong. This approach gets hold of attitudinal (psychological) factors as dependent variables caused by daily experiences of the individuals in social relations (Aiba, 2002). The basic assumptions of sociological model are explained in three major works: The People's Choice (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet), Voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee,) and Personal Influence (Katz & Lazarsfeld) published in 1944, 1954, and 1955, respectively (Antunes, 2010).

7.3 Psychosocial Model

Psychosocial model of voting behaviour links voting decisions to the psychological predispositions of voters like their party identifications and attitudes towards the candidates etc. (Scott & Marshall, 2009). There are six psychological factors that may influence voters' decision-making process. These factors are: (I) Party identification, (II) Concerns with issues, (III) Personal attachment to candidates, (IV) Conformity to the group's standards, (V) Sense of efficacy and (VI) Sense of civic obligation to vote. Of these six factors, party identification, candidate orientation and issue orientation are considered to be the most important ones (Aiba, 2002). The psychosocial model has its origin in studies conducted by the Survey Research Centre at the University of Michigan. The main assumptions of this model have been outlined in *The People Elect a President* by Campbell and Kahn (1952), *The Voter Decides* by Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954), and *The American Voter*, by Campbell, Converse Miller and Stokes (1960) (Antunes, 2010).

7.4 Rational Choice Model

The third and last model of voting behaviour is the rational-choice model which tries to explain individuals' voting behaviour as an outcome of cost-benefit analysis. In this regard, voters look at issues addressed and policies supported by various political parties and candidates (Scott & Marshall, 2009). This model explains voting patterns in economic terms (Antunes, 2010). The premise of this theory is that if the functioning of the market can be explained with rational choice assumptions then they can also be applied to the explanation of the political system. The theory basically establishes an analogy, on the one hand, between consumers and voters and between enterprises and

political parties on the other hand. It argues that just like enterprises that want to maximize profits and consumers who desire to maximize utility, political parties struggle to maximize electoral gains and voters seek to maximize their votes' utility. The theory has its origins in the work of Anthony Downs entitled *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) (Antunes, 2010).

7.5 Political Model is the Most Relevant One in Swabi

As far as this study is concerned, all three models of voting behaviour have relevance, though the extent to which each model applies is not the same. In this chapter, an attempt is being made to locate the exact level of relevance of each model. As each model is made up of different components, the researcher also tried to know about the relevance of each of the major elements within the three models. In this regard, the researcher first presented the three models as three options in the same question and then presented the individual elements of each model as different options in separate questions. At the end, all the major components of the three models were presented as separate options. The purpose was to know about the most important or relevant single component among the components of all the three models collectively. The first question asked was that *on which grounds among the following you would like to vote* with the major components of the three models listed as three separate options.

The responses to this question showed that the psychosocial (political factors) model (party identification, issue and candidate orientation as its major components) of voting is the most relevant model in Swabi as it was mentioned by 55.4% of the respondents. Rational choice theory model was cited by 27.8% while the sociological model by 16% of the respondents. For details, see table 20.

Thus, the psychosocial model is the most relevant theoretical model in Swabi. The responses citing this model were 10 percentage points more even than the total responses for the other two models put together. Though the responses clearly establish dominance of political model over social and economic models, they also raise very pertinent question: if political factors

Table No. 20: On which grounds among the following you would like to vote?

Overall	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Economic development/developmental schemes for constituency/patronage/prospects of economic/social/political benefits/provision of employment etc.	139	27.8	27.8	27.8
No Response	4	.8	.8	28.6
Party identification/issues raised by candidate or party/personal/family relationship/attachment with the candidate/personality or reputation of candidate	277	55.4	55.4	84.0
Race/language/ethnicity/religion/clan/social class	80	16.0	16.0	100.0
Total	500	100.0	100.0	

play more important role in determining voting behaviour than why parties based on ethnicity (ANP) and religion (JUI-F and JI) have considerable following in the district as they are based on the social model of voting. The most probable explanation for this phenomenon seems to be that many voters among those who are affiliated with these parties look at them just like any other political party rather than a political force doing politics in the name of ethnicity or religion. The frequent change of loyalties on the part of some of these parties' leaders and workers also reflect this thinking. For example, Saleem Khan Advocate was elected to the provincial assembly on ANP ticket but later he parted ways with the party and joined QWP (Shah, 2018). Recently, he rejoined ANP (Farooq, 2019). In 2020, former PTI lawmaker Yasin Khalil joined ANP (Tareen, 2020). Similarly, Ghafoor Khan Jadoon was thrice elected to the provincial assembly on IJI and PML-N ticket but later he joined and his son even contested the 2013 election from Swabi on JUI-F ticket. JUI-F (Rauf, 2013).

At national level, Azam Khan Swati was elected senator on JUI-F ticket but he quit the party and joined PTI in 2011 ("Former senator Azam Khan Swati joins PTI," 2011). Jan Achakzai was JUI-F's spokesman but he left the party and joined PML-N (Aamir, 2016) from which he also resigned later on ("PML-N leader Jan Achakzai quits party," 2018). This brief account of frequent change of political loyalties show that many politicians look at religious and ethnicity-based parties as political platforms like any other political party. Thus they join and quit them whenever they consider it expedient.

Like politicians, many political workers also do not hesitate to switch loyalties if they see better prospects of achieving their narrow goals. Like workers of any other political party, voters of ANP and religious parties also expect from their parties to deliver and give them favors. For example, 17.6% in Shah's (2019) survey reported that they voted for religious parties in 2013 because of their good performance while 2.7% said they did so because religious parties provided jobs to their family members. It shows that many voters do not look at religious or ethnic parties in terms of their ideologies but just like any other political party.

During his interactions with people in the district during his field work including the period of election campaign for 2018 general elections, many voters told this researcher that earlier they were with ANP but this time they planned to vote for PTI. When asked whether they don't think that there is difference in the ideologies of the two parties, many said that they look at PTI as an alternative to ANP without going into details about their ideologies. This kind of thinking on the part of voters reflects many people's indifference toward the ideologies of political parties. The fact that ANP and religious parties also highlight issues raised by mainstream parties like unemployment, load

shedding, terrorism, accountability etc. also influences voters' perceptions about them and thus they look at them just like any other political party.

The gender-based analysis revealed that the psychosocial model is more popular among women (60%) as compared to men (53.1%). On the other hand, the percentage of male respondents (31) citing the rational choice model was much higher than among women respondents (21.2). The sociological model was also cited by a higher percentage of female respondents (18.2%) than male respondents (14.9%).

The age-based analysis did not reveal any clear and systematic pattern in the responses of the four age groups. On the other hand, the breakdown of the responses on the basis of educational qualification of the respondents showed that respondents with master and above qualifications have a much higher level of support for the psychosocial model and lower level of support for the social model than the other categories. For example, percentages of the various groups citing the psychosocial model were 64.1% for master and above, 56.7% for bachelor degree holders, 50% for matric-inter pass, 57% for middle, and 51.5% for illiterates. Similarly, those who cited the sociological model were 9.8% among master and above, 17.5% among graduates, 15.7% among matric-inter pass, 19% among those with middle schooling, and 18.6% among illiterates. The figures clearly show that voters with master and above qualification have highest support for psychosocial and lowest for sociological models. Role of education for strong party system.

In the income-based analysis, the data showed directly proportional relationship between level of income and support for psychosocial model of voting. The percentages of the five income groups (I through V) mentioning the psychosocial model were 48.3%, 55.8%, 54.2%, 67.3%, and 68.4%, respectively. To the contrary, voters' level

of income and support for the sociological model of voting are inversely proportional to each other. Five income groups' support rate for the sociological model was 21.2%, 18.4%, 11.5%, 9.1%, and 5.3%, correspondingly. The data did not show any systematic relationship between level of income and support for the rational choice model. In simple words, there is direct proportional relationship between level of income and support for the psychological model and an inverse proportional relationship between income level and support for the sociological model. For complete details of responses of different income groups for the three models, see table 21.

Among respondents from different professions, private job holders recorded highest support (63.5%) for rational choice model while housewives the lowest (19.8%). For other categories, it was 35.5% for jobless/unemployed, 29.5% for farmers/laborers, 28.5% for traders/businessmen, 24.7% for students, and 24.2% for government servants. For the

Table No. 21: On which grounds among the following you would like to vote?

Monthly income-wise		20,000- 40,000	40,000- 60,000	60,000- 80,000	More than 80,000	Not Declared	Up to 20,000	Total
Economic development/developmental schemes for constituency/patronage/prospects of economic/social/political benefits/provision of employment etc.	Count	36	32	13	10	3	45	139
	% within Family's Monthly Income	24.5%	33.3%	23.6%	26.3%	23.1%	29.8%	27.8%
No Response	Count	2	1	0	0	0	1	4
	Within income	1.4%	1.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.7%	.8%
Party identification/issues raised by candidate or party/personal-family attachment with the candidate/personality or reputation of candidate	Count	82	52	37	26	7	73	277
	% within Family's Monthly Income	55.8%	54.2%	67.3%	68.4%	53.8%	48.3%	55.4%
Race/language/ethnicity/religion/clan/social class	Count	27	11	5	2	3	32	80
	% within Family's Monthly Income	18.4%	11.5%	9.1%	5.3%	23.1%	21.2%	16.0%
Total	Count	147	96	55	38	13	151	500
	% within Family's Monthly Income	100.0 %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %	100.0 %

psychosocial model, the highest level of support came from students (63%) followed by government servants (59.7%), traders/businessmen (57.5%), farmers/laborers

(57.1%), housewives (54.3%), jobless/unemployed (51.6%), and private job holders (41.9%). In the case of the sociological model, housewives recorded the highest (24.7%) while students the lowest (12.3%) support for it. For others, it was 20.3% among students, 13.7% among traders/businessmen, 13.3% among farmers/laborers, and 12.9% among government servants.

In the party-based analysis, MMA voters recorded the highest percentage (63.8%) for the psychosocial model. MMA was followed by PML-N with 59.2%, PTI with 56.3%, PPP with 54.5%, ANP 52.9%, and QWP with 40.7%. In the case of the sociological model, the highest level of support (27.5%) again came from MMA followed by PPP with 27.3%, ANP with 21.8%, QWP with 20%, PML-N with 12.2%, and PTI with 9.2%. In case of rational choice model, the highest support came from QWP (40%), followed by PTI (34.2%), PML-N (26.5%), ANP (24.1%), PPP (18.2%), and MMA (8.7%). The findings showing MMA voters citing the psychosocial model more than voters of any other party also show that all voters do not look at religious parties exclusively from religion's point of view. Instead, they consider them as political players seeking political power.

As stated earlier, each voting model is made up of several components. Thus, it was essential to also determine the exact extent to which each component of the model is relevant. In this regard, the respondents were asked to mention the most important component within the above mentioned three models. In case of sociological model, religion emerged as the most important factor in determining voting behaviour as it was cited by 50% of the respondents. Social class/status was mentioned by 34.8%, ethnicity/language/clan/caste was mentioned by 13.6% while 1.6% respondents did not answer this question.

As compared to women (48.5%), a higher percentage of men (50.7%) respondents cited religion as the most important factor determining their voting choice. Ethnicity/language/clan/caste was cited by 12.1% women and 14.3% men while socio-economic class/status was mentioned by 37% females and 33.7% males. An interesting finding of the age-based analysis was that the *above 60 years* age category recorded lowest (44.9%) support for religion. Among other age groups (I-III), it was mentioned by 51.5%, 49.1%, and 51.3%. On the other hand, the highest percentage (16.3%) for ethnicity/language/clan/caste came from the oldest category. For other categories, it was 11.7%, 16%, and 12%, respectively. Responses in the four age groups indicating socio-economic class as the most important factor for voting were 36.3%, 32.5%, 34.2%, and 38.8% and there was no such clear pattern among them.

The analysis of the responses keeping in view respondents' educational qualification revealed just one trend: voters with master and above qualification have lowest support for voting based on religion and ethnicity/language/clan/caste while highest for voting on the basis of socio-economic class/status. Among income groups, relevance of ethnicity/caste/language increased with increase in level of income unless it sharply decreased among the respondents of the highest income group. For example, its relevance indicated by the five income groups (from I-V) was 9.9%, 14.3%, 17.7%, 20%, and 7.9%, respectively. On the other hand, the relevance of religion as a determinant of voting decreased with increase in income level. Relevance of religion from income group I-V was 60.9%, 46.3%, 45.8%, 45.5%, and 36.8%. In case of relevance of socio-economic class/status as a voting determinant, the data did not show any clear trend. The income and education-based analyses revealed that religion has lowest relevance among voters with highest income and educational qualification. For profession-based responses, consult table 22.

A very interesting aspect of the findings was that ANP voters mentioned religion (37.9%) as the most important factor to vote for within the sociological model more frequently than ethnicity/caste/language (25.3%). The percentages of other parties citing the two options of religion and ethnicity/caste/language as the most important factors to vote for were 76.8 and 10.1 for MMA, 55.1 and 4.1 for PML-N, and 45.4 and 10.4 for PTI. Among PPP voters, none mentioned ethnicity/caste/language. Those who mentioned socio-economic class/status among the major parties were 36.8% in case of ANP, 13% in case of MMA, 38.8% in case of PML-N, 27.3% in case of PPP, and 42.1% in case of PTI.

Table No. 22: Which one among the following you think to be the most important factor to vote for?

Profession-wise		Farmer/ laborer	Govt. servant	HW	Jobless/un employed	Not Declared	Personal business	Private job	Student	Total
Ethnicity/langu age/clan/caste	Count	15	9	11	9	0	7	8	9	68
	% within Profession	14.3%	14.5%	13.6%	29.0%	.0%	9.6%	10.8%	12.3%	13.6%
No Response	Count	0	1	2	0	0	3	1	1	8
	% within Profession	.0%	1.6%	2.5%	.0%	.0%	4.1%	1.4%	1.4%	1.6%
Religion	Count	55	32	41	12	1	31	38	40	250
	% within Profession	52.4%	51.6%	50.6%	38.7%	100.0%	42.5%	51.4%	54.8%	50.0%
Socio- economic class/status	Count	35	20	27	10	0	32	27	23	174
	% within Profession	33.3%	32.3%	33.3%	32.3%	.0%	43.8%	36.5%	31.5%	34.8%
Total	Count	105	62	81	31	1	73	74	73	500
	% within Profession	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

It may seem very strange that ANP is an ethnic party but its voters mentioned religion more frequently than ethnicity/caste/language which was cited by just one-fourth of the party voters. However, we should look at this phenomenon from different perspectives. There are many people who do not believe in ethnicity but still support ANP as a political party like any other party. Actually they look at ANP as one of the many political forces striving for political power rather than as an organization which wants to promote the cause of just one specific community. During his informal interactions

with voters in the district, the researcher realized that many people support ANP without knowing much about its origin, constitution, and current stance on issues. Probably, this is the reason that the highest percentage of respondents citing party identification as the most important element within the psychosocial model was recorded by ANP voters. Thus, we can safely assume that supporting ANP does not necessarily mean believing in ethnicity.

In the psychosocial model, party identification emerged as the most influential element as it was mentioned by 44.6% of the respondents. Issue orientation was cited by 36.6%, candidate orientation by 16.8% while 2% did not answer this question.

Table No 23: Which one among the following you think to be the most important factor to vote for?

Psychosocial model	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Issues highlighted by the candidate/party	183	36.6	36.6	36.6
No Response	10	2.0	2.0	38.6
Party identification	223	44.6	44.6	83.2
Personal/family relationship with the candidate/candidate's reputation, performance and personality	84	16.8	16.8	100.0
Total	500	100.0	100.0	

Interestingly, there was almost no difference in the responses of male and female respondents. Similarly, the age-based analysis of the responses also did not suggest any clear pattern though there were minor variations in responses of different age groups. Another finding of the data was that the components of the psychosocial model of voting have very little relationship with voters' level of education. To begin with, issue as a determinant of voting behaviour has no direct relationship, either proportional or inverse, with voters' level of education. For example, respondents from categories of graduates, up to middle, and illiterates cited issue orientation more frequently than those with master and above qualification. On the other hand, respondents of matric-inter pass cited it less frequently than those among bachelor degree holders and master and

above qualification. Same is the case with issue orientation and candidate orientation. However, the only somehow important finding was that voters with master and above qualification have the highest level of support for party identification and the lowest for candidate orientation. Details about the level of education and relevance of the psychosocial model are given in table 24.

The breakdown of responses on the basis of respondents' level of income indicates gradual decline in relevance of issue orientation with increase in level of income. However, the responses of the second highest income group deviate from this formula. The responses of the five income groups (I-V) indicating issue orientation as the most important factor within the psychosocial model were 39.1%, 37.4%, 35.4%, 36.4%, and 31.6%, respectively. In case of

Table No. 24: Which one among the following you think to be the most important factor to vote for?

Education-wise		Graduation	Illiterate	Masters and Above	Matric-Intermediate	Not Declared	Up to Middle	Total
Issues highlighted by the candidate/party	Count	36	37	34	43	1	32	183
	% within Education	37.1%	38.1%	37.0%	32.1%	100.0%	40.5%	36.6%
No Response	Count	0	2	2	4	0	2	10
	% within Education	.0%	2.1%	2.2%	3.0%	.0%	2.5%	2.0%
Party identification	Count	42	41	47	65	0	28	223
	% within Education	43.3%	42.3%	51.1%	48.5%	.0%	35.4%	44.6%
Personal/family relationship with the candidate/candidate's reputation, performance and personality	Count	19	17	9	22	0	17	84
	% within Education	19.6%	17.5%	9.8%	16.4%	.0%	21.5%	16.8%
Total	Count	97	97	92	134	1	79	500
	% within Education	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

relevance of party identification, the lowest two income groups have lowest support for this component. The responses of the five income groups citing party identification were 39.9%, 41.5%, 52.1%, 47.3%, and 50%. The data did not show any pattern with regard to relevance of candidate orientation among the different income groups. The

relevance of these groups was 19.9%, 18.4%, 10.4%, 14.5%, and 18.4%, correspondingly.

Among the respondents of various professions, government servants recorded highest percentage (45.25) for issue voting, followed by traders/businessmen with 39.7%, housewives with 38.3%, private job holders with 36.5%, farmers/laborers with 35.2%, students with 32.9% and jobless/unemployed with 22.6% (lowest). For party identification, the responses from various professional groups were 64.5% from unemployed/jobless, 50% from students, 46.7% from farmers/laborers, 44.6% from private job holders, 41.1% from traders/businessmen, 39.5% from housewives, and 35.5% from government servants. Percentages of different professions citing candidate orientation as the most important determinant of voting behaviour within this model were 18.9% for private job holders, 17.3% for housewives, 17.1% for farmers/laborers, 16.4% for traders/businessmen, 16.1% for government servants, 15.1% for students, and 12.9% for jobless/unemployed.

The examination of the data on the basis of respondents voting choice among major parties in the 2018 election revealed that party identification has the highest level of relevance among ANP voters as 55.2% among them cited partisanship as the most important factor within psychosocial model. ANP was followed by PTI with 44.2%, PML-N with 42.9%, MMA with 40.6%, and PPP with 36.4%. On the other hand, the highest percentage in favor of issue orientation among the major parties came from PML-N voters (42.9%), followed by MMA with 40.6%, PTI with 37.1%, ANP with 28.7%, and PPP with 27.3%. Percentages recorded by voters of different political parties in support of voting on the basis of candidate orientation were 36.4% for PPP voters, 16.7% for PTI, 15.9% for MMA, 13.8% for ANP, and 12.2% for PMLN.

When asked about the most important element within the rational choice theory model, 54.6% of the respondents mentioned national economic growth, 29.2% developmental works for the constituency, 14.2% personal and family benefits, while 2% did not answer the question.

Table No. 25: Relevance of components of rational choice model.

Rational choice model	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Developmental works for the constituency	146	29.2	29.2	29.2
National economic growth	273	54.6	54.6	83.8
No Response	10	2.0	2.0	85.8
Personal economic, social, and political benefits or for friends and family etc.	71	14.2	14.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	100.0	

As compared to female respondents, male respondents recorded a higher percentage of developmental works for the constituency (30.7%) and personal/family benefits (14.9%). Among women, 26.1% mentioned developmental works for the constituency and 12.7% personal/family benefits. On the other hand, a higher percentage (58.8%) of women respondents mentioned national development than male respondents (52.5%).

The responses show that the youngest age group has comparatively a broader outlook as three-fifths (60.2%) of the respondents from this age category mentioned national economic development as the most important factor for voting within the rational choice model. Similarly, this age group recorded the lowest percentage (10.5) of those citing personal/family benefits and the second lowest percentage (28.1) of those citing developmental works in constituency as the most important factor for voting. Percentages of the other three age groups were 52.8, 52.1, and 46.9 for national economic development, 29.4, 31.6, and 26.5 for developmental works in the constituency, and 15.3, 13.7, and 24.5 for personal/family benefits.

The analysis of data on the basis of respondents' educational qualification revealed just one clear trend: ratio of those who prefer personal/family benefits over national

economic development and developmental works for constituency decreased with increase in level of educational qualification. For example, the percentages of different groups who cited this option (personal gains or for family etc.) were 21.6 for illiterates, 16.5% for middle, 14.2 for matric-inter pass, 13.4 for bachelor degree holders, and 5.4 for master and above.

The examination of the responses on the basis of income level of respondents revealed that the lowest three income categories attach the highest level of importance to personal/family interests while making decisions about voting. Complete details are given in table 26.

Among respondents of different professions, the highest percentage citing national economic development as the most important factor to vote for came from private job holders (63.5%), followed by students with 61.6%, government servants with 61.3%, unemployed/jobless with 54.8%, traders/businessmen with 50.7%, housewives with 50.6%, and farmers/laborers with 45.7%. In case of developmental works for constituency, farmers/laborers was the group which recorded the highest percentage (37.1%) citing it as the most important determinant within the rational choice theory model. For others, it was 31.5% for students, 29% for govt. servants, 28.4% for housewives, 25.8% for jobless/unemployed, 24.7% for traders/businessmen, and 21.6% for private jobholders. Traders emerged with the highest percentage (23.3) of those citing personal/family interests as the major factor determining vote choice. For other groups, the percentage was 16.2% for farmers/laborers, 16.1% for jobless/unemployed, 16% for housewives, 12.2% for private job holders, 8.1% for government servants, and 6.8% for students.

Table No. 26

Income-based		20,000-40,000	40,000-60,000	60,000-80,000	More than 80,000	Not Declared	Up to 20,000	Total
Developmental works for the constituency	Count	42	33	19	7	5	40	146
	% within Family's Monthly Income	28.6%	34.4%	34.5%	18.4%	38.5%	26.5%	29.2%
National economic growth	Count	84	43	31	25	7	83	273
	% within Family's Monthly Income	57.1%	44.8%	56.4%	65.8%	53.8%	55.0%	54.6%
No Response	Count	3	1	1	3	0	2	10
	% within Family's Monthly Income	2.0%	1.0%	1.8%	7.9%	.0%	1.3%	2.0%
Personal economic, social, and political benefits or for friends and family etc.	Count	18	19	4	3	1	26	71
	% within Family's Monthly Income	12.2%	19.8%	7.3%	7.9%	7.7%	17.2%	14.2%
Total	Count	147	96	55	38	13	151	500
	% within Family's Monthly Income	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Among the voters of different political parties, MMA voters recorded the highest percentage (68.1) of those citing national economic development followed by PML-N with 59.2%, PTI with 55.8%, ANP with 48.3% and PPP with 45.5%. The highest percentage mentioning developmental works in the constituency came from PTI (32.9%). Among other parties, it was 30.6% among PML-N voters, 29.9% among ANP voters, 27.3% among PPP voters, and 11.6% among MMA voters. Among those who cited personal/family interests, ANP voters were at the top with 20.7%, followed by MMA voters with 18.8%, PTI voters with 9.2%, PPP voters with 9.1%, and PML-N voters with 8.2%.

As each voting model consists of different elements or components, so a question arises as which component among the components of all three models is more relevant or important as far as shaping of voting behaviour is concerned. For knowing relevance of all individual elements within the three models, the researcher included a question in the survey in which major components of the three models were presented as separate options (each component of all the models as separate option) and the respondents were asked to mark the most important one.

In response to this question, national economic development was cited by the highest number of respondents (25.2%) followed by party identification with 21.8% and religion with 19.4%. Among the other options, Developmental works for the constituency was mentioned by 13%, issues raised by party/candidate was mentioned by 11.4%, personal gains by 3.2%, Socio-economic status or class by 1.8% while ethnicity/clan/tribe/language and personal/family attachment with the candidate each by 1.6%. One percent of the respondents did not answer this question.

If we put the percentages of the components of each of the three models together, then we have 41.4% support for rational choice model, 34.8% for psychosocial model, and 22.8% for sociological model. The aggregate of responses in this question in favor of each of the three models is different from the responses recorded when the three models were presented as three options, which raises the question whether there are contradictions in the responses to two different questions. Though contradictions in responses to questions in the same questionnaire cannot be ruled out, yet the most likely explanation here seems to be in the nature of options presented. In the first instance, the respondents were given three packages with each containing different components while in this question, they were asked to choose one component from a mixture of the three models. When people are confronted with situations like this, their priorities naturally change.

Let's try to explain the above situation with simple examples. Suppose there are nine types of fruits (Mangos, bananas, grapes, pomegranates, peaches, apricots, apples, plums, guavas, and cantaloupes) in a basket and a person's favorite fruit is bananas, second favorite grapes, and third favorite apples while he/she totally dislikes mangos, peaches, and guavas. The nine types of fruits are presented to him/her in three

groups/packages out of which he/she will have to choose just one complete package. The three packages are bananas-mangoes-peaches, grapes-pomegranates-apricots, and apples-cantaloupes-plums. His/her favorite fruit is banana and we can imagine that the group containing bananas will be most probably selected. However, the group containing bananas also has mangos and peaches in it while he/she strongly dislikes these two. Therefore, this person will most likely abandon his/her first choice for the second or third group. And if he/she is again presented all the fruits of the three packages separately and asked to choose just one fruit, then he/she will definitely choose bananas. So it is possible that many respondents in this sample expressed different priorities keeping in view the nature of options available.

An interesting aspect of responses to this question was that elements of the three models retained their positions which they got within the model earlier. For example, party identification received the highest number of responses within the psychosocial model followed by issue orientation and candidate orientation. In this question too, among psychosocial model elements, party identification was cited by the highest number of respondents, followed by issue and candidate orientation. Same emerged for the other two models. In the social model, religion was cited by the highest number of respondents both in one of the previous questions and in this question. It was followed by socio-economic class/status and ethnicity. In the rational choice model, national development was cited by the highest number of respondents followed by developmental works for constituency and personal gains. The fact that all components of the three models retained their popularity level within the model suggests consistency in the opinions of the respondents.

7.6 Importance of Party vs Candidate

Well established political parties having proper organizations, programs and contact with the masses are must for democracy. In Pakistan, most of the political parties are groups of dynastic politicians, local power holders, and patron-client networks. They lack true intra-party democracy and revolve around few leaders. This then results in divisions within parties, frequent change of political loyalties, and floor crossing. (Samad & Gurmani, 2017, p-521). There are politicians who have contested elections on tickets of three different political parties without even realizing that changing political loyalties has negative impacts upon democratic process. For example, Shah Mehmood Qureshi was first in PLM-N, then he joined PPP and now he is in PTI. Fawad Chaudhary was first in APML, then joined PPP, and at present he is in PTI. Omer Ayub was in PML-Q, then in PML-N, and now in PTI. In Pakistan, changing political loyalties has almost become a common practice. One reason for politicians' frequent change of loyalties is that they have their own vote bank due to their personal qualifications, qualities, record, activities, and patronage they provide to voters. This vote bank, which Zittel (2017) terms as 'personal vote' is non-partisan rather than rooted in any ideology or policy. Due to this vote bank, political parties usually go for electables to increase their winning chances. Thus, many candidates win their seats irrespective of the party from the platform of which they contest elections. This principle also applies to Swabi, the district under study. The researcher has already discussed the issue of frequent change of political loyalties in Swabi district. It was in this context that the respondents were asked as to which one between party and candidate they attach more importance while making decisions about their votes.

Though the researcher was expecting a considerable number of responses in favor of the candidate, the findings were beyond his imaginations as 43.6% of the total respondents mentioned the candidate while the party was mentioned by 55.6% respondents with 0.8 skipping the question. Ahmad (2010) had also found almost a similar percentage (40%) among respondents from central Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Similarly, Badshah et al. in their study in 2018 reported that 36.2% of their respondents said that they attach more importance to candidates while making decisions about their vote while 48.7% mentioned party. These findings show a trend about the important role that candidates play in influencing voting behaviour in the province.

Interestingly, responses from male and female respondents in favor of the two options were almost the same (candidate was mentioned by 44.2% female and 43.3% male respondents while party by 55.2% female and 55.8% male respondents. Among different age groups, the percentage in favor of the party increased with increase in voters' age. For example, the responses of the four age groups (from I-IV) citing party as more important were 53.8%, 55.2%, 56.4%, and 61.2%, respectively. Complete age-wise details are given in table 27.

Table No. 27.

Age-wise analysis		19-30 years	31-45 years	46-60 years	Above 60 years	Total
Candidate	Count	79	70	50	19	218
	% within Age	46.2%	42.9%	42.7%	38.8%	43.6%
No Response	Count	0	3	1	0	4
	% within Age	.0%	1.8%	.9%	.0%	.8%
Party	Count	92	90	66	30	278
	% within Age	53.8%	55.2%	56.4%	61.2%	55.6%
Total	Count	171	163	117	49	500
	% within Age	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The education-based analysis revealed that support for political parties decreased with increase in level of education with the highest support (60.8%) for parties coming from the two lowest categories (illiterate and up to middle). Among other groups, it was

53.7% for matric-inter pass, 52.6% for graduates, and 51.1% for master and above qualification holders. On the other hand, support for the candidate increased with increase in voters' level of education. Thus, the support for the candidate among the educational groups was 37.1% among illiterates, 39.2% among middle, 45.5% among matric-inter pass, 47.4% among bachelor degree holders, and 47.8% among master and above qualification holders. Education-wise details are in table 28.

Table No. 28

Education-wise		Graduation (14 Years)	Illiterate	Masters and Above	Matric Intermediate	Not Declared	Up to Middle	Total
Candidate	Count	46	36	44	61	0	31	218
	% within Education	47.4%	37.1%	47.8%	45.5%	.0%	39.2%	43.6%
No Response	Count	0	2	1	1	0	0	4
	% within Education	.0%	2.1%	1.1%	.7%	.0%	.0%	.8%
Party	Count	51	59	47	72	1	48	278
	% within Education	52.6%	60.8%	51.1%	53.7%	100.0%	60.8%	55.6%
Total	Count	97	97	92	134	1	79	500
	% within Education	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In the income based analysis, it emerged that the lowest and highest income groups have the highest level of support for parties but the variations in the responses of the five income groups were not systematic and consistent. The percentages of the five groups (I-V) citing party as more important were 66.2%, 46.9%, 52.1%, 49.1%, and 68.4%, correspondingly. Among respondents of various professional groups, the highest ratio in favor of party was recorded by jobless/unemployed (61.3%), followed by farmers/laborers (61%), housewives (60.5%), traders/businessmen (57.5%), government servants (51.6%), private job holders (48.6%), and students (47.9%). Among the major political parties, the least support in favor of the party came from PTI voters (50%) while the highest from ANP voters (67.8%). In case of others, it was 65.2% for MMA, 63.6% for PPP, and 59.2% for PML-N. The party-based analysis of the responses also shows, on the one hand, the comparatively well-established structure

of ANP in the district and on the other hand, the personality-oriented organization of PTI.

7.7 Is Vote Commodity Which Can Be Sold For Money or Other Material Benefits?

A common perception in Pakistan is that many people sell their votes instead of using it as a sacred trust with long term implications for the whole country. Keeping in view this researcher's personal observations in other constituencies than Swabi, to some extent this impression is based on facts as there are many people who want to exchange their votes in return for monetary or some other benefits. The most unfortunate aspect of this phenomenon is that many people even don't consider it wrong. It was in this context that the researcher included a question about people's opinion about sale of votes. The exact question was "*in your opinion, should the voters have the right to receive monetary benefits in return for their votes.*

More than ninety percent (90.4%) of the respondents replied in negative while 9.2% responded in affirmative. There was a big difference in the responses of male and female voters. Among female respondents, only 4.2% responded in affirmative while among male the percentage of those replying in affirmative was 11.6%.

The data did not show any pattern in the responses of different age groups. The percentages of those who responded in affirmative among the four age groups were 7.6, 10.4, 7.7, and 14.3, respectively. The breakdown of responses on the basis of voters' educational qualification showed a kind of inverse relationship between level of education and the possibility of agreeing with the statement that voters should have the right to receive monetary benefits in return for their votes. For example, the percentages of the five groups based on educational level agreeing with the statement were 10.3%

for illiterates, 11.4% for middle, 9.7% for matric-inter pass, 9.3% for bachelor degree holders, and 5.4% for master and above. Except in one case, the percentage of those agreeing with the statement declined with increase in level of education.

A common perception in Pakistan is that poor people sell their votes, so we have mostly wealthy people in the assemblies. However, responses to this question revealed that the highest percentage of voters agreeing with the statement came from the top three income groups. The percentages of the five income groups agreeing with the statement were 8.6, 7.5, 11.5, 12.7, and 10.5, respectively.

This researcher's discussions with candidates and workers of different parties also revealed that some people do demand money from candidates in return for their votes but they are not all necessarily the poor ones. M. I. Khan said that people are so disappointed with the performance of political parties that they prefer to receive 1000-2000 rupees cash in return for their votes rather than wait for the candidate to win election and deliver. He said that one man told him to pay him 5 lakh rupees and he will ensure that all 500 voters of his locality vote for him. He said that even those running madrassahs approach them for funding for madrassahs in return for votes (personal communication, September 30, 2020). Another former candidate said that many people take money from candidates of different political parties in the same election with the promise that they will purchase votes for them. This shows that not only some voters try to get money in return for their votes but some local influential figures also try to act as middlemen between candidates and the voters. According to Saleem Khan Advocate (personal communication, September 30, 2020), a common perception among the voters is that candidates will earn huge amounts after they are elected, so they also try to get financial benefits from candidates in return for their votes.

Among the respondents from different professions, housewives emerged with lowest (2.5) and the jobless/unemployed with highest percentage of those agreeing with the statement. Among other groups, the percentage of those who responded in affirmative was 12.4% for farmers/laborers, 12.2% for private job holders, 8.2% for students, 6.8% for traders/businessmen, and 6.5% for government servants.

In the party-based analysis, PPP emerged with highest (18.2) and PML-N (2%) with lowest percentage of those who said that voters should have the right to receive monetary benefits from candidates in return for their votes. In the case of ANP, it was 12.6%, 8.7% for MMA, and 7.5% for PTI.

7.8 Critique of Earlier Studies on Voting Behaviour in Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa

Scholars and researchers of electoral studies are deeply divided over the issue of applicability of voting theories in Pakistan. We find scholars and researchers who claim that the major determinants of voting behaviour are social factors. On the other hand, there are those who argue in favor of political and economic factors. When it comes to voting behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the issue becomes further complicated. As most of the studies on voting behaviour in Pakistan have been focused on Punjab, so there are very few studies that exclusively focus on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In this section, the researcher would briefly discuss some of the findings of studies focusing on voting behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. At the end, there will also be mention of the new dimensions of this study.

Imdad Ali Khan (1986) in "*Voting Behaviour in Rural NWFP: A Study of People's Participation in Election*" has discussed voting behaviour during provincial elections

in mid 1980s. The author has tried to ascertain viewpoints of members of N.W.F.P Assembly about local councils and voters' aspirations to participate in the decision making process and the implementation of developmental projects. He has also presented brief explanations of social and political determinants of voting patterns (Khan, 1986). For this study, the researcher employed client-patron theory and found that clientelism was a major determinant of voting behaviour in the rural areas of the province. He found that voters mostly focused on issues of local nature like employment opportunities, poverty alleviation, educational and health facilities, water scarcity, and infrastructure etc. In addition to clientelism, the researcher found that social structure also influenced voting behaviour in the province. (Khan, 1986).

There passed a quarter of a century before there emerged another study focusing on electoral politics in the province. This study, "Electoral Politics in NWFP. 1988-1999," by Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad focusses on the role of social, economic, and political determinants of voting behaviour (Ahmad, 2010). He writes that "[t]he evidence indicates that party loyalty in urban areas and the performance of candidates in providing patronage and development to their constituents in rural areas play an important role in determining voting behaviour" (Ahmad, 2010, p. 369). In his conclusion, he argues that rational choice psychosocial models are the most relevant in context of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Ahmad, 2010).

Shakeel Ahmad has made an invaluable contribution to the field of voting behaviour as his work is the first of this nature focusing on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. He has made extremely relevant and pertinent insights while reaching his conclusions. However, his findings are mainly based on his analysis rather than any scientific data. One of the main arguments presented by Shakeel Ahmad about relevance of party identification is

the results of Gallup Pakistan's Election Day survey. The problem with this survey is that it was conducted across the country and thus carries findings for the whole country rather than Khyber Pakhtunkhwa only. As there are many differences in political dynamics of the four provinces, so applying the findings of this survey to the province may mislead us. Similarly, he has used Gallup Pakistan's survey reports for reaching his conclusion that patronage plays the most important role in shaping voting behaviour in rural areas. Again, Gallup Pakistan's survey was conducted across the country while there is huge difference in rural politics of, for example, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Though he has also cited his interviews with some politicians, still he has no quantitative data to base his claims on.

Another important work is Farmanullah's PhD dissertation entitled "*Voting Behaviour in Pakistan: A Case Study of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2008 General Elections.*" Farmanullah has tested the applicability of voting theories like clientelism, party identification, issue voting, ethnic and religious voting in three elections (2002-2013). The researcher argues that theories of clientelism and issue orientation have higher applicability as compared to the other three---partisanship, voting on the basis of religion and ethnicity (Farmanullah, 2014).

Farmanullah argues that theory of issue orientation is the most relevant in the context of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as 80.9% of the respondents said they vote on the basis of issues. He attributes the good performance of different parties/coalitions in the three elections to issues highlighted by them. After issue orientation, the second most relevant factor is clientelism which is applicable in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to greater extent (73%). He argues that voters demand different types of personal and community

related favors from politicians who do not hesitate to do so for increasing their vote bank (Farmanullah, 2014).

According to Farmanullah, religion, as a determinant of voting behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is relevant to some extent (54.1%). The comparatively poor performance of religious parties in the 2008 and 2013 election is presented as a justification to prove the point. Ethnicity as a factor in influencing voting behaviour is also applicable to some extent (52.2%). Farmanullah argues that ANP got majority seats in the 2008 elections because voters responded to the issues it highlighted. The findings of this study show that party identification theory is the least relevant factor in determining voting behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. He claims that it is applicable to a limited extent (35.4%). He argues that there are multiple political parties and voters don't remain loyal to them. He also presents the results of 2002, 2008, and 213 elections (in which different parties secured majority seats) as proof of inapplicability of party identification theory (Farmanullah, 2014).

There are no two opinions that Farmanullah has greatly enriched the fledgling field of electoral studies in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. However, there also seem to be some shortcomings in his work. It seems he miscalculated the role of party identification, issue voting, and religion.

For example, when asked as "to what extent it is important to vote on the basis of party loyalty, 19.6% mentioned to a great extent and 16.2% to some extent while 15% to a limited extent. In a weak multi-party system where candidates have personal following, where a continuous propaganda against political parties and politicians labeling them as corrupt, inefficient, and dishonest continues all the time, where voters, due to targeted delivery of public services and a dysfunctional institutional system, run after

patronage, where several issues always happen to be present on the political horizon to attract voters, and where religion and social values play important role, the response of the more than 35% respondents that it is important to vote on the basis of party is encouraging figure.

Another problem with his work is that he did not ask about the importance of candidate and issue orientation. Probably Farmanullah presented resolution of problems like load shedding and unemployment etc. as issue orientation. However, these also fall under the category of patronage/developmental works rather than issues.

Similarly, when he asked respondents as to what extent they voted for the promulgation of Sharia in 2002 elections then 72.6% mentioned the option of "to a greater extent." It seems that Farmanullah considers this high level of support for MMA's slogan of implementation of sharia as an issue but it is something related with religious parties' ideology and thus the support can be said to be for party (party identification). Same is the case with ANP's support in 2008. As protection of Pakhtuns' rights is part of ANP's ideology, so support for it means support for the party and its ideology.

Furthermore, he presented party identification, voting on the basis of religion and ethnicity, resolution of people's problems, provision of employment etc. separately and thus it is still not clear as which one is the most important determinant of voting behaviour. For instance, when asked in separate questions as to what extent they voted on the basis of solution of national issues, local development, and provision of employment, the percentages of those who mentioned to greater extent (the highest available option) were 63%, 49.8%, and 53.7%, respectively. Now the question is that all the three are almost equally important but a voter will have to choose one option only.

He argues that voters supported MMA in 2002 and ANP in 2008 because they highlighted issues like implementation of Islam (MMA) and Pakhtun rights, respectively. The implementation of Sharia and protection of Pakhtuns' rights have always been among the most important slogans of MMA and ANP, respectively, so the question is that why voters did not respond to the same slogans of MMA in 2008 and ANP in 2013. It seems that Farmanullah has actually reached at some conclusions without using required empirical data for his claims.

Farmanullah and Jan (2016) in their paper "Party Identification as a Determinant of Voting Behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: A Case Study of 2008 General Elections" have conducted their study on NA-2 Peshawar and found that party identification is applicable to only 1/3 voters (32.4%). They claim that party identification is not the key determinant, while issue voting plays an important role (Farmanullah & Jan, 2016). The authors have not provided any logical, coherent, and academic argument for supporting their claim of relevance of issue voting.

Farmanullah and Islam (2019) in their paper "Does Issue Voting Matter in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa? Empirical Evidence from 2002-2013 Elections" argue that issues played a dominant role in shaping voting behaviour in 2002, 2008, and 2013 general elections. In the case of the 2008 elections, they argue that ANP's slogans of safeguarding Pashtuns rights enabled it to win seats. Though such slogans and issues might have played a role but the question is that there was not much difference in ANP's election manifestos for the 2002, 2008, and 2013 general elections. If the issues that ANP raised in 2008 produced results then why it failed to get similar results in 2002 and 2013. It seems that they have oversimplified the phenomenon.

Shah, Shah, and Khattak (2019), in "Partisanship and Voting Behaviour: A Case Study of General Election 2008 in District Charsadda have tried to assess the relevance of candidates' personality in shaping voting behaviour. They argue that a candidate's personality plays an important role in determining voters' behaviour. However, they have not presented clear statistics about the responses. Another problem with this work is that the researchers have asked voters about their opinions about voting on the basis of candidate's personality, economic and political clout, and participation in sorrowful and joyous events in the constituencies but these options have been presented to them separately rather than in one question. Had they asked the voters to pick one between a political party and candidate, for example, then the findings would have been clearer (Shah, Shah, & Khattak, 2019).

Hassan Shah (2019) has conducted his PhD research on "Voting Behaviour in Pakistan: An Analysis of Partisan and Floating Voters in General Elections 2013 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa." This is very important and interesting. A very positive aspect of this study is that he conducted a survey in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's six districts with diverse social, economic, and political dynamics.

According to his findings, there is a large number of floating voters in the province that play a crucial role in determining final results of elections. Furthermore, partisanship, religion, issue, candidate's personality, social values, developmental works in constituency, participation in joyous and sorrowful events in the constituency, and social networks play important roles in determining voting behaviour. If we categorize these factors, we can conclude that all the three main voting models (sociological, psychosocial, and rational choice model) have relevance in the electoral politics of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

While determining the relevance of party identification, candidate and issue orientation, religion, patronage, social values, and social networks, etc. Shah asked respondents questions like whether they have membership of any political party, do they agree that vote should be given on the basis of party affiliation, do they approve of voting on the basis of candidate personality, whether vote should be given on the basis of issues like corruption, poverty, terrorism, energy shortage, and, illiteracy, do they agree that vote should be given for redressal of issues faced by constituency, do they agree that vote should be given to religious parties only, and whether they agree that vote should be given to the candidate who belongs to one's tribe or clan, and whether they agree that vote should be cast as per advice of family elder. No doubt such questions provide an insight into the thinking process of voters while making decisions about their vote choice, but they cannot produce a clear picture of the relevance of different theoretical models of voting behaviour.

For example, 88.8% of the respondents agreed with the statement that vote should be given on the basis of issues like corruption, poverty, terrorism, energy shortage, illiteracy (issue orientation). In another question, 83.9% of the respondents agreed that vote should be given on the basis of local developmental works (patronage). Now the question is as to which one between these two is more relevant. The exact answer would have been found had the researcher presented these options in the same question.

A major problem with the method of asking respondents whether they agree or not with voting on the basis of a single factor (like party affiliation or candidate/issue orientation) sometimes leads to responses that are technically incorrect. For example, Shah asked respondents whether they agree that vote should be given on the basis of party affiliation. Responding to this question, 54.2% of the respondents either strongly

agreed or just agreed while 13.6% said they don't know. In the next section when he asked the respondents whether they agree that vote should be given on the basis of candidate's personality, then 43.3% either strongly agreed or just agreed and 13.7% said they do not know. Let us suppose that the 13.7% who said they don't know are the same respondents who in the previous question had also said that they do not know. Now percentage of those who said they agree with the statement that vote should be given on the basis of candidate personality should not have exceeded 32.2% (as 54.2% had already in the previous question agreed on voting on the basis of party affiliation while 13.6% had said they don't know). However, the case is different as a total of 43.3% (instead of 32.2%) said that they agree with voting on the basis of candidate personality. Had the researcher presented both the options (and even more than two options) in the same question, it would have become clear as to how many respondents support each option.

In still another question, Shah asked respondents whether they agree that vote should be given to a candidate who attends joyous and sorrowful events in the constituency and 67.6% of the respondents recorded either strong agreement or just agreement. The options in the first two questions were from the psychosocial model (political factors) while the last one from the sociological (social determinants). The responses to these questions show that all are relevant as a high percentage of respondents expressed their agreement. However, the voters have limited choice as all the above mentioned qualities are almost impossible to be found in a single candidate. Thus, the voters have to make voting decisions on the basis of one factor which they consider as the most important. Had these options been presented in one question, the respondents would have been made to cite the most important one and thus the researcher would have

reached at a clear conclusion about the exact level of relevance of different voting models.

The most conspicuous shortcoming among all the above discussed works is use of proper theoretical models. The researchers applied theoretical models in random rather than systematic manner. Some have tested selected components of the three main voting models while others have selected one or two components from one model. On the other hand, the societal structure of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is complex with space for all kinds of political ideologies and actors. Thus, these works have been unable to clearly show the exact relevance of each voting model in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It was in this context that this researcher applied the theoretical approaches in a systematic manner.

In his questionnaires, this researcher first presented the components of the three voting models (sociological, psychosocial, and rational choice model) as three options to the respondents and asked them to choose the one on the basis of which they would like to vote. In the next stage, the researcher presented the major components (like party, candidate, and issue in psychosocial model) of each voting model separately and asked the respondents to choose the most important one. The aim for doing so was to first ascertain the exact level of relevance of each voting model and then each element within each model. Thus, in this study there emerged a clear and complete discussion about the relevance of theoretical models.

Chapter 8

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

This thesis started with some important questions about voting behaviour in Pashtun society. After conducting a thorough study on the subject matter, the researcher would like to present brief answers to these questions. However, before addressing these questions, he would first present a summary of the major themes/findings that emerged from his quantitative data. In other words, he would first present thematic analysis or discussion of his findings.

8.1 High Level of Voters' Distrust in Politicians

One of the major themes that emerged from the data is that in general, people have a very low level of trust in politicians, their intentions, promises, and competences. Responses to different questions throughout the questionnaire kept enforcing the perception that voters take politicians' claims, promises, commitments, statements, and rhetoric with a pinch of salt. Probably this low level of trust in politicians and their promises is one of the major reasons for less interest in politics among the common man. When the respondents were asked about their level of interest in politics, only 15% of the respondents said that they were much interested in politics. Similarly, when the respondents were asked as to what extent they agree with the statement that political parties and politicians contest elections to serve the people, only 5% respondents said they strongly agree with the statement while on the other hand, 21.6% of the respondents expressed their strong disagreement. Among the rest, 48.6% said they "agree" with the statement while 24% said they "disagree." The agreements put together make 53.5%, which is almost half of the respondents.

People's trust in politicians has reached such a low point that only 3% respondents said that they totally believe in speeches of politicians delivered during election campaigns while 47% said they don't believe in them at all. The trust deficit is not restricted to politicians' intentions only but also their capabilities to solve the problems faced by the country. For example, only 12.6% of the respondents said that they totally agree with the statement that politicians can solve Pakistan's problems. This high level of people's distrust in politicians then naturally leads to decline in people's interest in politics and political activities. This lack of interest in political activities like election rallies and other political gatherings was revealed by the responses to one of the questions. When asked about their frequency of attending political rallies etc., 52.4% of the respondents said that they don't attend rallies at all while 32.2% said that they do so rarely. To the contrary, only 9% said that they attend rallies frequently, and only 4.6% said they do so regularly.

As politicians and political parties are closely linked with the electoral process, so people also look at the elections with doubts. When they were asked about the difference that their votes will make, only 55% of the respondents mentioned either "definitely" or "to a great extent." This low level of people's confidence in the utility of their votes can be better understood when we look at their perceptions about the transparency of the electoral process. In response to a question about the transparency of elections, only 5.2% of the respondents said that elections are completely free and fair while 38.2% said that elections are rigged. Probably this lack of belief in the utility of their votes and the transparency of electoral process is one of the reasons for Pakistan's second lowest turnout in South Asia.

This lack of trust in politicians seems to be something which prevails throughout the country. For instance, Ahmad (2010), on the basis of his survey that he conducted across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa reported that 44% of his respondents expressed no trust at all in elected bodies while just 18% said that they have great deal of trust in them (Ahmad, 2010). In the same way, Gallup Pakistan in collaboration with Jang media group conducted a survey in 2017 in which it asked people as to which form of government between democracy and military dictatorship they considered better. Eighty-one percent of the respondents said that democracy was the solution of problems faced by Pakistan while 19% mentioned military rule. Keeping in view Pakistan's chequered history, 81% is a satisfactory percentage. Though a high percentage of respondents preferred democracy over dictatorship, trust in politicians expressed by respondents in the same survey was quite low as only one-fourth (26%) of the respondents expressed their trust in politicians. Another survey conducted by Pulse Consultant in collaboration with Jang media group the same year revealed that 68% people believed that democracy was better than military dictatorship. Trust in politicians, according to findings of this survey, was only 22% (Elahi & Haider, 2017). This kind of attitude among the voters reminds the words of Matthew Flinders who once remarked that one of the problems with politics is that a large number of people want democracy without politics (Rutter, 2014). This lack of trust or belief in politicians' intentions, sincerity, and capabilities is a matter of serious concern as no democratic system can function smoothly without people's support to and trust in politicians.

According to M. Ahmad, there are three major reasons for this trust deficit. They are (A) political parties lack internal democracy as they are "family outfits" where leadership is chosen on the basis of "DNA" rather than merit and where those who have

money land at the top positions through parachutes (B) politicians' failure to deliver when in power⁴⁶ (C) moral and financial corruption. He believes that politicians may be less corrupt as compared to other institutions but unfortunately their corruption is too much highlighted due to which they look as the most corrupt.

ANP's M. I. Khan looks at this phenomenon from different perspective. He said that politicians make unrealistic promises with voters which they cannot fulfil due to meagre financial resources and this leads to distrust in politicians among voters. According to Saleem Khan Advocate (personal communication, September 30, 2020), political environment in Pakistan has always been hostile for the growth and development of democratic institutions. He said that establishment has consciously been struggling to keep democratic and political institutions weak. Some politicians including Aqibullah said that many voters want individual favors rather than collective developmental works and when politicians fail to give personal benefits then voters become angry with politicians. M. F. A Haqqani also considers lack of real democracy as the major cause of voters' distrust in politicians and political process (personal communication, September 8, 2020).

It may be noted that dissatisfaction with politicians' performance or distrust in them is not only limited to Pakistan instead it is a global phenomenon including well established democracies like the US and UK. For example, Pew Research Centre in its 2018 survey of 27 countries from North America, South America, Africa, Middle East, Europe, Oceania, and Asia found that negative opinion in twelve out of these 27 countries outpaced positive opinion about democracy by at least 10 percentage points. Interestingly, the UK and the US were also included among these twelve countries. In

⁴⁶ He added if politicians make compromises on their legitimate authority with behind the scene forces then it is their (politicians') mistake.

seven out of the twelve countries with the highest level of dissatisfaction, at least more than 60% of the respondents said that most of their politicians are corrupt and the US was also included among these seven countries (Kent, 2019). Though distrust in politicians is a global phenomenon but still there is a difference in its level as in Pakistan it has reached a very low level.

8.2 Women are Not as Conservative, Politically Unaware, and Uninterested in Politics as Generally Assumed

One of the common beliefs in Pakistan in general and Pashtun society in particular is that women as a whole neither understand politics nor take interest in it. It is argued that women are conservative than men and thus want to keep themselves restricted to household affairs rather than indulging in politics. Furthermore, it is believed that women do not understand the intricacies of politics and thus act as per the wishes of their menfolk. However, the findings of this study show that women have as much political awareness as men, if not more, and a higher percentage of women want an active role for women in politics than is generally assumed.

The analysis of survey data on the basis of gender revealed many interesting insights into women's understanding of politics, their perceptions about working of the political system, and their desire to become part of the political and electoral process. Though female respondents reported some 6 percentage points less interest in politics than male respondents, but the data showed significant differences in opinions and experiences of male and female respondents which suggest that women do not necessarily follow instructions from their family members, as is usually believed.

The common perception is that women are more conservative and are thus more inclined to vote on the basis of religion. The findings of this study point to the opposite---females are less expected to vote on the basis of religion. For example, female's percentage mentioning the sociological model (with religion as its main component) as the most important to vote for was 10 percentage points lower than male respondents (21.2% for females and 31% for males). Similarly, when the respondents were asked to choose one element within the sociological model, religion was mentioned by a higher percentage of male respondents than females. When all the components of the three models were presented in same question and the respondents were asked to choose the most important one, male respondents mentioned the options of religion, personal gains from the candidate, and developmental works for constituency more frequently than women while women mentioned party identification, issues, and national economic growth more frequently than male respondents. The polling-wise data of the two National Assembly constituencies in 2018 general elections also show that a lesser percentage of women voted for religious parties as compared to men. For instance, MMA and JUI-Nazaryati collectively received 19.55% of the male valid votes while their share in female votes was 15.6%⁴⁷. So, on the basis of data, it is argued that female voters are less likely to vote for religious parties than male voters. Ahmad (2010), on the basis of his survey findings, had also reported that as compared to male voters, female voters were less likely to vote for religious parties.

The data also revealed that women want a greater political role for themselves. When asked whether they agree with the statement that women should have the right to vote

⁴⁷ Out of 762 polling stations established in the two constituencies, 744 were segregated while 18 were combined for both sexes. So, these figures do not include the valid votes of combined polling stations. Votes received through postal ballot are also excluded.

independently, only 8.5% of the female respondents expressed their disagreement while among males, it was 23.9%. Similarly, when they were asked whether women should have the right to contest elections against men, 67.3% of the females expressed their agreement while it was only 43% among male respondents. These figures reflect the huge difference between political attitudes of men and women, with the latter preferring a greater role for themselves than the one conceded by males. When the researcher asked Saleem Khan Advocate about survey's findings, he said that the easy access and availability of smartphones has brought drastic changes in the thinking of females, which is reflected in their desire for greater role in politics. He said that our society is passing through transformation and nobody can stop women from claiming more political role in the country.

As compared to females, male emerged to be more subject to the temptation of financial gains, benefits for family, and constituency etc. instead of voting on the basis of partisanship, issues orientation, and national economic development. For instance, when all the components of the three models were presented in same question and the respondents were asked to choose the most important one, male respondents mentioned the options of personal gains from the candidate and developmental works for constituency more frequently than women who mentioned party identification, issues, and national economic growth more frequently than male respondents. Likewise, the psychosocial model emerged to be more popular among women voters as compared to males while the rational choice model has higher applicability to male voters than females. When a list of qualities was presented to the respondents and they were asked to choose the most important one on the basis of which they would like to vote, Female respondents mentioned the options of 'educated' and 'from a good party' more frequently than

men while the options of 'attends sorrowful and joyous events in the constituency,' 'religious,' 'wealthy' and 'from a good family' were cited by men more often than women. Similarly, only 4.2% of the female respondents agreed with the statement that voters should have the right to receive monetary benefits in return for their votes while for men, it was 11.6%. These statistics simply show that female voters are more broad minded and selfless as compared to their male counterparts.

Women also expressed more trust in politicians and the voting process than men. When asked as to what extent they agree with the statement that politicians can solve Pakistan's problems, female respondents expressed more positive opinion about politicians than male respondents. For example, among women, 62.4% either completely agreed or agreed to some extent while 16.4% expressed either strong disagreement or disagreement. For male, the percentage who expressed agreement (both strong and to some extent) was 55.2% while 29.9% expressed disagreement. In the same way, the percentage of female respondents saying their votes will make a difference was higher than male respondents.

In short, on the basis of his data, this researcher can claim that women are ready, desirous, and capable of asserting themselves as a political agency if a better environment is provided to them.

8.3 Younger Voters Have More Positive Attitude toward Electoral Politics

An encouraging aspect of the findings is the comparatively positive attitude of the young voters. Responses to different questions in the questionnaire show that young voters are somehow different in their outlook, vision, thinking, and aspirations. As compared to the rest of the voters, the youngest ones (19-30 years of age) have a more

positive attitude toward electoral politics, confidence in politicians, role of women in politics, worth of their votes, and responsibilities of elected officials. For example, it was the youngest age group which recorded the highest level of interest in politics, highest degree of trust in politicians' capabilities to solve Pakistan's problems, highest rate of debate on politics, and highest level of confidence about the utility of its votes. Similarly, the highest percentage among the four age groups saying they read manifestoes of political parties before elections also came from the youngest age category.

Women's participation in electoral politics received the highest level of support from the youngest age group. When the respondents were asked whether they agree with the statement that women should have the right to vote for candidates of their own choice, the youngest age group emerged to be the most open to this idea. The percentages of the four age groups (I-IV) agreeing with this idea were 88.9, 76.7, 79.5 and 69.4, respectively. Likewise, the highest rate of agreement (56.7%) for women's candidature against men candidates was recorded by the youngest age group. Approval rate among the other three age groups was 47.2% and 54.7%, and 34.7%, correspondingly. These figures show that the highest level of acceptance for women's participation in electoral politics is among the youth. The youth is also the group which is least influenced by external forces while making voting decisions.

Another positive aspect of responses from the youth is that it, as compared to older voters, has a broader outlook. On the one hand, the highest percentage of this group mentioned national development as the most important factor to vote for while on the other hand, it recorded the lowest percentage of those citing personal and family gains as the most important factor for voting. This reflects the broader outlook of the young voters, which is a positive indication for the future of the country. When the respondents

were asked whether they agree that voters should have the right to receive monetary benefits from the candidates in return for their votes, the highest rate of opposition to this idea was also recorded by the youngest age category votes.

Though responses to a few questions by the youngest age group were not better than the responses by the older voters, still this group emerged as more forward looking, liberal, and broadminded. Youth being an asset for any country, the positive attitude by the youth toward electoral politics in the country can be thought as a sign of a bright future for democratic values.

8.4 Political Factors Play More Important Role in Determining Voting Behaviour than Social and Economic Factors

One of the common perceptions about voting behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is that social factors like religions, ethnicity, caste, and family etc. play more important role in determining voting behaviour than political factors. However, the findings of this study present a totally different picture with political factors (party identification, issues and candidate orientation) being the most important and decisive players in shaping voting behaviour.

In order to get a clear understanding of voters' choices with regard to relevance of the voting models, components of all the three models were presented as three separate options and the respondents were asked to choose one on the basis of which they would like to vote. The political model of voting behaviour (psychosocial model) emerged not only more popular than the other two but the percentage of respondents who cited this model was ten points more than the other two put together (political model mentioned by 55.4%, rational choice model by 27.8%, while sociological by 16%). Thus the

findings of the survey established the dominance of political factors over social and economic ones beyond any doubt.

As each model is made up of several components, questions were also included in the questionnaire to determine the importance of each major element within the three models. In the political model, party identification emerged as the most important factor followed by issue orientation and candidate orientations. Within the sociological model, religion was mentioned by the highest number of respondents. In the rational choice model, national economic growth emerged as the most important factor.

When the major elements of the three models were presented as separate options in one of the questions, party identification, religion, and economic development emerged as the most important factors. It means that some elements within sociological and rational choice models may be preferred by more people than elements within the political model, but as a whole political model is more important than sociological and economic models. Thus, this researcher would like to conclude his argument by saying that political factors play the most important role in shaping voting behaviour in Swabi.

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, this study started with some very important questions about voting behaviour in Pashtun society in general and Swabi District in particular. After comprehensive discussion on the thematic findings of this study, this researcher would like to conclude this thesis by addressing, on the basis of his data, these research questions.

The first question was about the key determinants of voting behaviour in Swabi District. According to this survey's findings, political determinants like party identification, issue orientation and candidate orientation play the most important role in shaping

voting patterns in the district. All the three major voting models (social, rational choice, and political) were presented as alternative choices and the respondents were asked to pick the most important one on the basis of which they would like to vote. Political model was mentioned by 55.4% of the respondents. Rational choice model was cited by 27.8% while social one by 16% of the respondents. Within political model, party identification emerged to be the most important element for shaping voting behaviour.

The second question raised in the start of the thesis was about Pashtun electorate's attitude toward electoral politics. For deeper understanding of the question, the researcher included several questions in his questionnaire pertaining to voters' opinions about politicians' intentions, abilities, and sincerity. The responses to these questions revealed that voters, generally speaking, distrust politicians and have doubts about their intentions to serve people and their abilities to resolve Pakistan's problems. For example, in response to a question as *to what extent you agree with the statement that politicians can solve Pakistan's problems*, only 12.6% expressed their total agreement with the statement. Similarly, just 3% of the respondents claimed that they fully believe in speeches of politicians delivered during election campaigns while 47% said they *don't believe in them at all*. In response to a question whether politicians contest elections to serve the people, only 5% said they strongly agree while 21.6% of the respondents recorded their *strong disagreement* with it. The voters also have serious doubts about the transparency of electoral process as only 5.2% of the respondents said that elections are completely free and fair while on the other hand, 38.2% said that they are rigged. These examples from findings of this survey clearly show that majority of the voters have a negative attitude toward electoral politics.

The next question was about level of voters' participation in electoral politics. For knowing about level of participation of voters in politics, the researcher framed several questions. The questions were designed to know whether people take interest in politics and discuss it, what is their level of participation in electoral politics like rallies, corner meetings, election campaigns, and other activities of political parties. To the bitter surprise of the researcher, only 15.4% of the respondents confirmed that they take keen interest in politics while about half of the total respondents said they don't discuss politics. Similarly, only 4.6% of the respondents said they attend rallies regularly while 52.4% said they don't attend rallies at all. These statistics present a dismal picture as far as level of participation of voters in electoral politics is concerned. They reveal that casting votes in elections is the only activity of active participation in politics for majority of the voters. Thus, we can safely claim that voters' participation level in electoral politics is very low.

Voting patterns in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have always been unstable. Therefore, one of the research questions for this study was about reasons of frequent oscillations in voting behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. For knowing about the causes of frequent fluctuations, the researcher first asked the respondents whether they have ever decided not to vote for the party for which they voted in the previous elections. Responding to this question, 39.8% respondents confirmed that they have at least once decided not to vote for the candidate/party for which they voted previously. It may be noted that 24.4% (122) of the total respondents had already indicated that they used their right to vote for the first time in 2018. Thus, replying in negative was natural for them. It means that out of 378 respondents who had exercised their right to vote at least twice, 199 respondents (52.6%) confirmed that they have changed their parties/candidates. This shows that

more than half of the voters have at least once decided not to vote for the party/candidate for which they voted in previous election. Those who responded in affirmative were further asked to mention the reason for doing so. Interestingly, poor performance of the party was mentioned by highest (36%) number of respondents as the reason for voting for some other party in the next elections. Among the remaining, 24% said they discovered better candidate, 15% said they wanted change, 8% said they changed party, 7% said the party/candidate did not give them favors, 6% said that the new party/candidate highlighted more important issues than the previous one. Thus, it emerged that the perceived poor performance of political parties is the major factor behind frequent oscillations in voting behaviour. It may be noted that several senior politicians told the researcher that voters mostly demand personal and individual favors and politicians' failure to fulfill such demands displeases voters.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Questionnaire

My name is Noor Hamid Khan. I am a PhD candidate in Dept. of Politics and International Relations, International Islamic University Islamabad. My research topic is "Voting Behavior in Pashtun Society: A Case Study of Swabi District." This questionnaire is for collecting quantitative data for my research from voters of Swabi (through sampling). The data collected through this instrument will be used only for research purposes.

Details about the respondent:

Note: Respondents' details: Providing basic information is must for filling the questionnaire.

1. **Age:** (A) 19-30 (B) 31-45 (C) 46-60 (D) Above 60
2. **Gender:** (A) Male (B) Female
3. **Education:** (A) Illiterate (B) Up to middle (C) Matric-intermediate (10th to 12th grade) (D) Graduation (14 years of education) (E) Master and above.
4. **Monthly Income:** (A) Up to 20,000 (B) 20,000-40,000 (C) 40,000-60,000 (D) 60,000-80,000 (E) More than 80,000.
5. **Profession:** (A) Farmer/labourer (B) Government servant (C) Housewife (D) Personal business (E) Private job (F) Student (G) Jobless/unemployed.

1. To what extent are you interested in national politics: (A) Too much (B) To some extent (C) Not much (D) Not interested at all.
2. What is your main source of information about national politics? (A) Radio (B) TV (C) Newspaper (D) Social Media (E) peers (F) family and relatives (G) political party/leaders.
3. Do you discuss electoral politics with people? (A) Yes (B) No.
4. If yes, then with whom you discuss it the most. (A) Political leaders (B) Peers and friends (C) Family members and relatives (D) Political workers (E) Political rivals/opponents (F) Others.
5. How often do you attend rallies of political parties/candidates? (A) Regularly (B) Frequently (C) Rarely (D) Don't attend rallies at all.
6. To what extent do you agree with the statement that politics/politicians can solve our problems? (A) Totally agree (B) Agree to some extent (C) Totally disagree (D) Disagree to some extent (E) I have no idea.
7. To what extent do you believe in speeches delivered by candidates during election campaign? (A) Completely (B) To greater extent (C) To some extent (D) Not at all.
8. To what extent you agree with the statement that political parties/candidates contest elections to serve the people? (A) Strongly Agree (B) Strongly Disagree (C) Agree (D) Disagree.
9. In your opinion, to what extent do speeches and campaign by political parties/candidates influence voters' decisions? (A) Not at all (B) To a great extent (C) To some extent.
10. Do you think that your vote will make any difference? (A) Definitely (B) To a great extent (C) To some extent (D) Not much (E) Not at all.
11. Do you think that women should have equal right to vote for candidates of their choice? (A) Yes (B) No.
12. If Not, then why? (A) Religion does not allow (B) It is against our social and cultural values (C) Politics is men's business (D) Women cannot judge candidates properly (F) Some other reasons.

13. Do you think that women should have equal right to contest elections against men? (A) Yes (B) No.

14. If Not, then why? (A) Religion does not allow (B) It is against our social and cultural values (C) Politics is not women's job (D) Women are physically weaker than men (E) Women are more vulnerable to corruption (F) Women don't understand politics (G) Some other reasons.

15. What is your opinion about transparency of elections in Pakistan? (A) They are completely free and fair (B) They are rigged (C) They are free and fair to some extent (D) I have no idea

16. If elections are rigged then whom you think to be the main culprit? (A) Candidates/parties (B) ISI/army (C) Civil Bureaucracy (D) Election Commission of Pakistan (E) Judiciary (G) I have no idea.

17. In your opinion, which factor among the following affects transparency of elections the most? (A) incompetence/corruption of staff at polling stations (B) Illiteracy (C) Absence of rule of law (D) Violence/intimidation at polling stations (E) Poverty (F) Money distribution by candidates.

18. What is your opinion about the quality of next general elections? (A) There will be less rigging and fraud (B) There will be more rigging and fraud (C) Same as in the previous elections (D) I don't know.

19. In your opinion, how elections can be made completely free and fair? (A) By posting honest staff (B) By training polling agents (C) By deploying army (D) By giving media access to inside polling stations (E) By increasing literacy rate (F) By completely abolishing army's role (G) Some other step.

20. Do you read manifestoes of various political parties before voting in the elections? (A) Yes (B) No.

21. When you exercised your right to vote for the first time? (A) 1970 elections (B) 1977 elections (C) 1985 elections (D) 1988 elections (E) 1990 elections (F) 1993 elections (G) 1997 elections (H) 2002 elections (I) 2008 elections (J) 2013 elections (K) 2018 elections.

22. In how many of the above national elections did you vote? Count from above and then mention the number here-----

23. Have you ever decided not to vote? (A) Yes (B) No.

24. If yes, then why? (A) Due to fear of violence at the polling station (B) Because your favorite party/candidate did not take part in the elections (C) Due to religious reasons (D) Because no candidate appealed to your mind (E) Because your name was missing from voters' list (F) Because polling station was inaccessible for you (G) Due to some personal/other reason (s).

25. Have you ever voted for a candidate who was not your first choice? (A) Yes (B) No.

26. If Yes, then why? (A) To get financial benefits (B) Due to religion (C) Due to family/friends pressure (D) Influential figures of the area forced you (E) Your employer directed you (E) Due to some other reason.

27. Have you ever voted for the same party in consecutive elections? (A) Yes (B) No.

28. If yes, then how many times? (A) 1 (B) 2 (C) 3 (D) 4 (E) 5 (F) More than 5.

29. For which party did you vote in consecutive elections? (A) ANP (B) PPP (C) PML-N (D) MMA/JI/JUI-F (E) PTI (F) QWP (G) Some other/Independent.

30. What was the reason for voting for the same party consecutively? (A) Because of its performance. (B) There was no better candidate/party than the previous one (C) Because you are/were associated with the party (D) Have personal/family relationship with the candidate (E) Because of personal gains (F) Because of family pressure (G) It highlighted important issues every time (H) Other reasons.

31. Have you ever decided not to vote for the party/candidate for which you voted in the previous elections? (A) Yes. (B) No.

32. If yes, then why? (A) The party/candidate failed to deliver (B) He did not give you personal favors (C) You discovered a better candidate/party (D) You changed your party (E) The new candidate highlighted more important issue than the previous one (F) You wanted change (G) Some other reason.

33. Have you ever voted for a candidate mistakenly? (A) Yes (B) No.

34. Have you ever in same election voted for two different parties? (A) Yes (B) No.

35. If yes, then why: (A) Because you did not want to put all eggs in one basket (B) Because you had close association with candidates of different parties (C) Because your favorite candidates were contesting from different political parties (D) Because one candidate was from your party while with the other you had close association (E) Because you used one vote independently while for the other you were forced (F) Some other reason.

36. When you make your decision about your vote? (A) Before Election Day (B) On Election Day.

37. For which party you voted in 2018 general elections? (A) ANP (B) PPP (C) PML-N (D) MMA/JI/JUL-F (E) PTI (F) QWP (G) Some other/Independent/ Did not vote.

38. Why you voted for this party? (A) Because of its past performance (B) Because of the candidate (C) Because of the party leadership (D) Because of your association with the party (E) Due to religion (F) Some other reasons.

39. To what extent are you satisfied with the performance of the party for which you voted in 2018 elections? (Irrespective of whether the party for which you voted formed the government or not). (A) Completely satisfied (B) Completely dissatisfied (C) Satisfied to some extent (D) Not satisfied.

40. Which quality you value the most while deciding to vote for a candidate? He be: (A) Educated (B) From a good party (C) Wealthy (D) Religious (E) From well-known family (F) Of good reputation (G) Attends sorrowful and joyous events in the constituency.

41. Which one among the following you think is the most valid ground for voting for a candidate? (A) Alleviation of poverty (B) Controlling inflation (C) Enforcement of Sharia (D) Eradication of corruption (E) Establishment of peace (F) Implementation of rule of law (G) National security (H) Reducing unemployment.

42. On which grounds among the following you would like to vote? (A) Economic development/developmental schemes for constituency/patronage/prospects of economic/social/political benefits/provision of employment etc. (B) Party identification/issues raised

by candidate or party/personal/family relationship/attachment with the candidate/personality or reputation of candidate (C) Race/language/ethnicity/religion/clan/social class.

43. Which one among the following you think to be the most important factor to vote for? (A) Ethnicity/language/clan/caste (B) Religion (C) Socio-economic class/status.
44. Which one among the following you think to be the most important factor to vote for? (A) Issues highlighted by the candidate/party (B) Party identification (C) Personal/family relationship with the candidate/candidate's reputation, performance and personality.
45. Which one among the following you think to be the most important factor to vote for? (A) Developmental works for the constituency (B) National economic growth (C) Personal economic, social, and political benefits or for friends and family etc.
46. In your opinion, which factor among the following is the best to vote for? (A) Developmental works for the constituency (B) Ethnicity/clan/tribe/language (C) Issues raised by candidate or party (D) National economic growth (E) Party identification (F) Personal gains from the candidate (G) Personal/family attachment with the candidate (H) Religion (I) Socio-economic status or class
47. During elections, which one you value the most? (A) Party (B) Candidate.
48. In your opinion, should the voters have the right to sell their votes in return for money or other material benefits? (A) Yes (B) No.

Appendix 2: Tables

Table No. 29: To what extent are you interested in national politics?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Not interested at all	84	16.8	16.8
Not much	141	28.2	45.0
To some extent	198	39.6	84.6
Too Much	77	15.4	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 30: What is your main source of information about national politics?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Family/relatives	53	10.6	10.6
Newspaper	52	10.4	21.0
No Response	6	1.2	22.2
Peers	52	10.4	32.6
Political party/leaders.	18	3.6	36.2
Radio	16	3.2	39.4
Social Media	188	37.6	77.0
TV	115	23.0	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 31: Do you discuss politics with people?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	219	43.8	43.8
No Response	1	.2	44.0
Yes	280	56.0	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 32: If yes, then with whom you discuss it the most?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Family members /relatives	57	11.4	11.4
N/A	220	44.0	55.4
No Response	6	1.2	56.6
Others	7	1.4	58.0
Peers/friends	154	30.8	88.8
Political leaders	4	.8	89.6
Political rivals/oppontents	33	6.6	96.2
Political workers	19	3.8	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 33: How often you attend rallies of political parties/candidates?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Do not attend rallies at all.	262	52.4	52.4
Frequently	49	9.8	62.2
No Response	5	1.0	63.2
Rarely	161	32.2	95.4
Regularly	23	4.6	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 34: To what extent you agree with the statement that politicians can solve Pakistan's problems?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Agree to some extent	225	45.0	45.0
Disagree to some extent	68	13.6	58.6
I have no idea	88	17.6	76.2
Totally agree	63	12.6	88.8
Totally disagree	56	11.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 35: To what extent do you believe in speeches delivered by candidates during their election campaign?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Completely	15	3.0	3.0
No Response	1	.2	3.2
Not at all	235	47.0	50.2
To greater extent	48	9.6	59.8
To some extent	201	40.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 36: To what extent you agree with the statement that political parties/candidates contest elections to serve the people?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Agree	243	48.6	48.6
Disagree	120	24.0	72.6
No Response	4	.8	73.4
Strongly Agree	25	5.0	78.4
Strongly disagree	108	21.6	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 37: In your opinion, to what extent do speeches and campaign by political parties/candidates influence voters' decisions?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative percent
No Response	3	.6	.6
Not at all	95	19.0	19.6
To a great extent	176	35.2	54.8
To some extent	226	45.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 38: Do you think that your vote will make any difference?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Definitely	175	35.0	35.0
Not at all	36	7.2	42.2
Not much	98	19.6	61.8
To a great extent	99	19.8	81.6
To some extent	92	18.4	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 39: Do you think that women should have equal right to vote for candidates of their choice?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	94	18.8	18.8
No Response	2	.4	19.2
Yes	404	80.8	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 40: If Not, then why?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
It is against our social and cultural values	30	6.0	6.0
N/A	406	81.2	87.2
No Response	2	.4	87.6
Politics is male's business	12	2.4	90.0
Religion does not allow	36	7.2	97.2
Some other reasons	3	.6	97.8
Women cannot properly judge candidates	11	2.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 41: Do you think that women should have equal right to contest elections against men?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	242	48.4	48.4
No Response	3	.6	49.0
Yes	255	51.0	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 37: In your opinion, to what extent do speeches and campaign by political parties/candidates influence voters' decisions?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative percent
No Response	3	.6	.6
Not at all	95	19.0	19.6
To a great extent	176	35.2	54.8
To some extent	226	45.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 38: Do you think that your vote will make any difference?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Definitely	175	35.0	35.0
Not at all	36	7.2	42.2
Not much	98	19.6	61.8
To a great extent	99	19.8	81.6
To some extent	92	18.4	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 39: Do you think that women should have equal right to vote for candidates of their choice?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	94	18.8	18.8
No Response	2	.4	19.2
Yes	404	80.8	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 40: If Not, then why?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
It is against our social and cultural values	30	6.0	6.0
N/A	406	81.2	87.2
No Response	2	.4	87.6
Politics is male's business	12	2.4	90.0
Religion does not allow	36	7.2	97.2
Some other reasons	3	.6	97.8
Women cannot properly judge candidates	11	2.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 41: Do you think that women should have equal right to contest elections against men?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	242	48.4	48.4
No Response	3	.6	49.0
Yes	255	51.0	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 42: If Not, then why?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
It is against our social and cultural values	57	11.4	11.4
N/A	258	51.6	63.0
No Response	6	1.2	64.2
Politics is not women's job	41	8.2	72.4
Religion does not allow	101	20.2	92.6
Some other reasons	8	1.6	94.2
Women are more vulnerable to corruption	9	1.8	96.0
Women are physically weaker than men	16	3.2	99.2
Women do not understand politics	4	.8	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 43: What is your opinion about transparency of elections in Pakistan?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative percent
I have no idea	84	16.8	16.8
No Response	1	.2	17.0
They are completely free and fair	26	5.2	22.2
They are free and fair to some extent	198	39.6	61.8
They are rigged	191	38.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 44: If elections are rigged then whom you think to be the main culprit?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Candidates/parties	88	17.6	17.6
Civil Bureaucracy	30	6.0	23.6
Election Commission of Pakistan	52	10.4	34.0
I have no idea	203	40.6	74.6
ISI/army	116	23.2	97.8
Judiciary	11	2.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	100.0

Table No. 45: In your opinion, which factor among the following affects transparency of elections the most?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Absence of rule of law	98	19.6	19.6
Illiteracy	101	20.2	39.8
incompetence/corruption of staff at polling stations	115	23.0	62.8
Money distribution by candidates	98	19.6	82.4
No Response	6	1.2	83.6
Poverty	36	7.2	90.8
Violence/intimidation at the polling stations	46	9.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 46: What is your opinion about the quality of next general elections?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
As compared to the past, there will be less rigging and fraud	84	16.8	16.8
As compared to the past, there will be more rigging and fraud	17	3.4	20.2
I have no idea	211	42.2	62.4
No Response	4	.8	63.2
Same as in the previous elections	184	36.8	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 47: In your opinion, how elections can be made completely free and fair?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
By completely abolishing army's role in elections	98	19.6	19.6
By deploying army	52	10.4	30.0
By giving media access to inside polling stations	48	9.6	39.6
By increasing literacy rate	60	12.0	51.6
By posting honest staff	182	36.4	88.0
By training polling agents	28	5.6	93.6
No Response	8	1.6	95.2
Some other step	24	4.8	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 48: Do you read manifestoes of various political parties before voting in the elections?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	302	60.4	60.4
No Response	5	1.0	61.4
Yes	193	38.6	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 49: When you exercised your right to vote for the first time?

Year	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
1970	10	2.0	2.0
1977	7	1.4	3.4
1985	18	3.6	7.0
1988	23	4.6	11.6
1990	13	2.6	14.2
1993	32	6.4	20.6
1997	38	7.6	28.2
2002	60	12.0	40.2
2008	72	14.4	54.6
2013	99	19.8	74.4
2018	122	24.4	98.8
No Response	6	1.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 50: In how many of the above national elections did you vote? Count and mention the number here.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	134	26.8	26.8
2	100	20.0	46.8
3	85	17.0	63.8
4	62	12.4	76.2
5	35	7.0	83.2
More than 5	66	13.2	96.4
No Response	18	3.6	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 51: Have you ever decided not to vote?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	205	41.0	41.0
No Response	5	1.0	42.0
Yes	290	58.0	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 52: If Yes, then why?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Because no candidate appealed to your mind	54	10.8	10.8
Because polling station was inaccessible for you	17	3.4	14.2
Because your favorite party/candidate did not take part in the elections	15	3.0	17.2
Because your name was missing from voters' list	13	2.6	19.8
Due to fear of violence at the polling station	17	3.4	23.2
Due to religious reasons	22	4.4	27.6
Due to some personal/other reason	136	27.2	54.8
N/A	210	42.0	96.8
No Response	16	3.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 53: Have you ever voted for a candidate who was not your first choice?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	362	72.4	72.4
No Response	6	1.2	73.6
Yes	132	26.4	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 54: If Yes, then why?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Due to family/friends' pressure	39	7.8	7.8
Due to religion	19	3.8	11.6
Due to some other reason	29	5.8	17.4
Influential figures of the area forced you	18	3.6	21.0
N/A	368	73.6	94.6
No Response	5	1.0	95.6
To get financial benefits	19	3.8	99.4
Your employer directed you	3	.6	100.0
Total	500	100.0	
Due to family/friends' pressure	39	7.8	7.8

Table No. 55: Have you ever voted for the same party in consecutive elections?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	181	36.2	36.2
No Response	23	4.6	40.8
Yes	296	59.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 56: If yes, then how many times?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
2	160	32.0	32.0
3	52	10.4	42.4
4	34	6.8	49.2
5	25	5.0	54.2
More than 5 times	19	3.8	58.0
N/A	204	40.8	98.8
No Response	6	1.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 57: For which party did you vote in consecutive elections?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
ANP	85	17.0	17.0
MMA/JI/JUI-F	51	10.2	27.2
N/A	210	42.0	69.2
No Response	3	.6	69.8
PML-N	43	8.6	78.4
PPP	10	2.0	80.4
PTI	81	16.2	96.6
QWP	10	2.0	98.6
Some other party/Ind/didn't vote	7	1.4	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 58: What was the reason for voting for the same party consecutively?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Because of family pressure	8	1.6	1.6
Because of its performance	100	20.0	21.6
Because of personal gains	3	.6	22.2
Because you are/were associated with the party	44	8.8	31.0
It highlighted important issue(s) every time	35	7.0	38.0
N/A	213	42.6	80.6
No Response	2	.4	81.0
There was no better candidate/party than the previous one	68	13.6	94.6
You have personal/family relationship with the candidate	27	5.4	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 59: Have you ever decided not to vote for the party/candidate for which you voted in the previous elections?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	264	52.8	52.8
No Response	37	7.4	60.2
Yes	199	39.8	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 60: If Yes, then why?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
He did not give you personal favors	14	2.8	2.8
N/A	301	60.2	63.0
The new candidate highlighted more important issue(s) than the previous one	12	2.4	65.4
The party/candidate failed to deliver	72	14.4	79.8
There was some other reason	9	1.8	81.6
You changed your party	15	3.0	84.6
You discovered a better candidate/party	47	9.4	94.0
You wanted change	30	6.0	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 61: Have you ever voted for a candidate mistakenly?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	415	83.0	83.0
No Response	5	1.0	84.0
Yes	80	16.0	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 62: Have you ever in the same election voted for two different parties?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	300	60.0	60.0	60.0
No Response	4	.8	.8	60.8
Yes	196	39.2	39.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	100.0	

Table No. 63: If Yes, then why?

General	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Because one candidate was from your party while with the other you had personal relationship	37	19	19	19
Because you did not want to put all eggs in one basket	50	26	26	45
Because you had close association with candidates of different parties	36	18	18	63
Because you used one vote independently while for the other you were forced	11	6	6	69
Because your favorite candidates were contesting from different political parties	40	20	20	89
Due to some personal/other reason	22	11	11	100
Total	196	100.0	100.0	

Table No. 64: When you make your decision about your vote?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Before Election Day	429	85.8	85.8
No Response	4	.8	86.6
On Election Day	67	13.4	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 65: For which party you voted in the 2018 general elections?

ANP	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
MMA	69	13.8	31.2
No Response	7	1.4	32.6
PML-N	49	9.8	42.4
PPP	11	2.2	44.6
PTI	240	48.0	92.6
QWP	10	2.0	94.6
Some other party/independent candidate or did not vote	27	5.4	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 66: Why did you vote for this party (in the 2018 general elections)?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Because of its past performance	143	28.6	28.6
Because of the candidate	82	16.4	45.0
Because of the party leadership	110	22.0	67.0
Because of your association with the party	93	18.6	85.6
Due to religion	39	7.8	93.4
N/A	7	1.4	94.8
Some other reason	26	5.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 67: To what extent are you satisfied with the performance of the party for which you voted in the 2018 elections? (Irrespective of whether the party for which you voted formed the government or not).

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Completely dissatisfied	62	12.4	12.4
Completely satisfied	172	34.4	46.8
N/A	7	1.4	48.2
Not satisfied	22	4.4	52.6
Satisfied to some extent	237	47.4	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 68: Which quality do you value the most while deciding to vote for a

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Attends sorrowful and joyous events in the constituency	98	19.6	19.6	19.6
Educated	161	32.2	32.2	51.8
From a good party	85	17.0	17.0	68.8
From well-known family	18	3.6	3.6	72.4
No Response	7	1.4	1.4	73.8
Of good reputation	34	6.8	6.8	80.6
Religious	92	18.4	18.4	99.0
Wealthy	5	1.0	1.0	100.0
Total	500	100.0	100.0	

candidate?

Table No. 69: Which one among the following you think is the most valid ground for voting for a candidate?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Alleviation of poverty	27	5.4	5.4
Controlling inflation	20	4.0	9.4
Enforcement of Sharia	119	23.8	33.2
Eradication of corruption	53	10.6	43.8
Establishment of peace	63	12.6	56.4
Implementation of rule of law	104	20.8	77.2
National security	44	8.8	86.0
No Response	22	4.4	90.4
Reducing unemployment	48	9.6	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 70: On which grounds among the following you would like to vote?

Three Voting Models	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Economic development/developmental schemes for constituency/patronage/prospects of economic/social/political benefits/provision of employment etc.	139	27.8	27.8	27.8
No Response	4	.8	.8	28.6
Party identification/issues raised by candidate or party/personal/family relationship/attachment with the candidate/personality or reputation of candidate	277	55.4	55.4	84.0
Race/language/ethnicity/religion/clan/social class	80	16.0	16.0	100.0
Total	500	100.0	100.0	

Table No. 71: Which one among the following you think to be the most important factor to vote for?

Sociological Model	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Ethnicity/language/clan/caste	68	13.6	13.6	13.6
No Response	8	1.6	1.6	15.2
Religion	250	50.0	50.0	65.2
Socio-economic class/status	174	34.8	34.8	100.0
Total	500	100.0	100.0	

Table No. 72: Which one among the following you think to be the most important factor to vote for?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Issues highlighted by the candidate/party	183	36.6	36.6	36.6
No Response	10	2.0	2.0	38.6
Party identification	223	44.6	44.6	83.2
Personal/family relationship with the candidate/candidate's reputation, performance and personality	84	16.8	16.8	100.0
Total	500	100.0	100.0	

Table No. 73: Which one among the following you think to be the most important factor to vote for?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Developmental works for the constituency	146	29.2	29.2	29.2
National economic growth	273	54.6	54.6	83.8
No Response	10	2.0	2.0	85.8
Personal economic, social, and political benefits or for friends and family etc.	71	14.2	14.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	100.0	

Table No. 74: In your opinion, which factor among the following is the best to vote for?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative percent
Developmental works for the constituency	65	13.0	13.0
Ethnicity/clan/tribe/language	8	1.6	14.6
Issues raised by candidate or party	57	11.4	26.0
National economic growth	126	25.2	51.2
No Response	5	1.0	52.2
Party identification	109	21.8	74.0
Personal gains from the candidate	16	3.2	77.2
Personal/family attachment with the candidate	8	1.6	78.8
Religion	97	19.4	98.2
Socio-economic status or class	9	1.8	100.0
Total	500	100.0	

Table No. 75: During elections, which one you value the most?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Candidate	218	43.6	43.6	43.6
No Response	4	.8	.8	44.4
Party	278	55.6	55.6	100.0
Total	500	100.0	100.0	

Table No. 76: In your opinion, should the voters have the right to sell their votes in return for money or other material benefits?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	452	90.4	90.4	90.4
No Response	2	.4	.4	90.8
Yes	46	9.2	9.2	100.0
Total	500	100.0	100.0	

Table No. 77: Relationship between level of education and interest in politics

Education-wise		Graduation (14 Years)	Illiterate	Masters and Above	Matric-Intermediate	Not Declared	Up to Middle	Total
Not interested at all	Count	10	20	10	25	0	19	84
	% within Education	10.3%	20.6%	10.9%	18.7%	0%	24.1%	16.8%
Not much	Count	27	31	20	44	0	19	141
	% within Education	27.8%	32.0%	21.7%	32.8%	0%	24.1%	28.2%
To some extent	Count	42	35	41	47	1	32	198
	% within Education	43.3%	36.1%	44.6%	35.1%	100.0%	40.5%	39.6%
Too Much	Count	18	11	21	18	0	9	77
	% within Education	18.6%	11.3%	22.8%	13.4%	0%	11.4%	15.4%
Total	Count	97	97	92	134	1	79	500
	% within Education	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table No. 78: To what extent you agree with the statement that politicians can solve Pakistan's problems?

Profession-wise		Farmer/ laborer	Govt. servant	Housewife	Jobless/un employed	Not Declared	Personal business	Private job	Student	Total
Agree to some extent	Count	45	27	36	17	1	24	36	39	225
	% within Profession	42.9%	43.5%	44.4%	54.8%	100.0%	32.9%	48.6%	53.4%	45.0%
Disagree to some extent	Count	16	5	8	5	0	17	9	8	68
	% within Profession	15.2%	8.1%	9.9%	16.1%	.0%	23.3%	12.2%	11.0%	13.6%
I have no idea	Count	22	9	23	5	0	8	9	12	88
	% within Profession	21.0%	14.5%	28.4%	16.1%	.0%	11.0%	12.2%	16.4%	17.6%
Totally agree	Count	12	12	7	3	0	13	8	8	63
	% within Profession	11.4%	19.4%	8.6%	9.7%	.0%	17.8%	10.8%	11.0%	12.6%
Totally disagree	Count	10	9	7	1	0	11	12	6	56
	% within Profession	9.5%	14.5%	8.6%	3.2%	.0%	15.1%	16.2%	8.2%	11.2%
Total	Count	105	62	81	31	1	73	74	73	500
	% within Profession	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table No. 79: Relationship between voters' income and level of their belief in politicians' speeches.

Income-wise		20,000- 40,000	40,000- 60,000	60,000- 80,000	More than 80,000	Not Declared	Up to 20,000	Total
Completely	Count	5	3	1	1	0	5	15
	% within Family's Monthly Income	3.4%	3.1%	1.8%	2.6%	.0%	3.3%	3.0%
No Response	Count	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Family's Monthly Income	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	7.7%	.0%	.2%
Not at all	Count	66	51	20	18	9	71	235
	% within Family's Monthly Income	44.9%	53.1%	36.4%	47.4%	69.2%	47.0%	47.0%
To greater extent	Count	20	6	6	4	0	12	48
	% within Family's Monthly Income	13.6%	6.3%	10.9%	10.5%	.0%	7.9%	9.6%
To some extent	Count	56	36	28	15	3	63	201
	% within Family's Monthly Income	38.1%	37.5%	50.9%	39.5%	23.1%	41.7%	40.2%
Total	Count	147	96	55	38	13	151	500
	% within Family's Monthly Income	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table No. 80: To what extent you agree with the statement that political parties/candidates contest elections to serve the people

Age-wise		19-30 years	31-45 years	46-60 years	Above 60 years	Total
Agree	Count	83	79	57	24	243
	% within Age	48.5%	48.5%	48.7%	49.0%	48.6%
Disagree	Count	48	35	26	11	120
	% within Age	28.1%	21.5%	22.2%	22.4%	24.0%
No Response	Count	1	3	0	0	4
	% within Age	.6%	1.8%	.0%	.0%	.8%
Strongly Agree	Count	5	7	12	1	25
	% within Age	2.9%	4.3%	10.3%	2.0%	5.0%
Strongly disagree	Count	34	39	22	13	108
	% within Age	19.9%	23.9%	18.8%	26.5%	21.6%
Total	Count	171	163	117	49	500
	% within Age	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table No. 81: In your opinion, to what extent do speeches and campaign by political parties/candidates influence voters' decisions?

Income-based responses		20,000-40,000	40,000-60,000	60,000-80,000	More than 80,000	Not Declared	Up to 20,000	Total
No Response	Count	1	0	0	1	0	1	3
	% within Family's Monthly Income	.7%	.0%	.0%	2.6%	.0%	.7%	.6%
Not at all	Count	22	21	5	8	4	35	95
	% within Family's Monthly Income	15.0%	21.9%	9.1%	21.1%	30.8%	23.2%	19.0%
To a great extent	Count	60	39	22	16	4	35	176
	% within Family's Monthly Income	40.8%	40.6%	40.0%	42.1%	30.8%	23.2%	35.2%
To some extent	Count	64	36	28	13	5	80	226
	% within Family's Monthly Income	43.5%	37.5%	50.9%	34.2%	38.5%	53.0%	45.2%
Total	Count	147	96	55	38	13	151	500
	% within Family's Monthly Income	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table No. 82: Do you think that your vote will make any difference?

Age-wise		19-30 years	31-45 years	46-60 years	Above 60 years	Total
Definitely	Count	71	49	36	19	175
	% within Age	41.5%	30.1%	30.8%	38.8%	35.0%
Not at all	Count	7	11	14	4	36
	% within Age	4.1%	6.7%	12.0%	8.2%	7.2%
Not much	Count	40	33	20	5	98
	% within Age	23.4%	20.2%	17.1%	10.2%	19.6%
To a great extent	Count	29	32	26	12	99
	% within Age	17.0%	19.6%	22.2%	24.5%	19.8%
To some extent	Count	24	38	21	9	92
	% within Age	14.0%	23.3%	17.9%	18.4%	18.4%
Total	Count	171	163	117	49	500
	% within Age	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table No. 83: Do you think that your vote will make any difference?

Education-based		Graduation	Illiterate	Masters and Above	Matric-intermediate	Not Declared	Up to Middle	Total
Definitely	Count	38	29	31	45	0	32	175
	% within Education	39.2%	29.9%	33.7%	33.6%	.0%	40.5%	35.0%
Not at all	Count	6	11	3	13	0	3	36
	% within Education	6.2%	11.3%	3.3%	9.7%	.0%	3.8%	7.2%
Not much	Count	19	12	21	26	0	20	98
	% within Education	19.6%	12.4%	22.8%	19.4%	.0%	25.3%	19.6%
To a great extent	Count	20	25	18	27	1	8	99
	% within Education	20.6%	25.8%	19.6%	20.1%	100.0%	10.1%	19.8%
To some extent	Count	14	20	19	23	0	16	92
	% within Education	14.4%	20.6%	20.7%	17.2%	.0%	20.3%	18.4%
Total	Count	97	97	92	134	1	79	500
	% within Education	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table No. 84: What is your opinion about transparency of elections in Pakistan?

Profession-wise		Farmers/ laborers	Governmen t servants	H. wives	Jobless/un employed	Not Declared	Traders businessmen	Private job	Students	Total
I have no idea	Count	16	12	18	5	0	10	12	11	84
	% within Profession	15.2%	19.4%	22.2%	16.1%	.0%	13.7%	16.2%	15.1%	16.8 %
No Response	Count	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	% within Profession	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.4%	.2%
They are completely free and fair	Count	10	4	1	3	0	3	4	1	26
	% within Profession	9.5%	6.5%	1.2%	9.7%	.0%	4.1%	5.4%	1.4%	5.2%
They are free and fair to some extent	Count	42	28	33	10	1	29	25	30	198
	% within Profession	40.0%	45.2%	40.7%	32.3%	100.0%	39.7%	33.8%	41.1%	39.6 %
They are rigged	Count	37	18	29	13	0	31	33	30	191
	% within Profession	35.2%	29.0%	35.8%	41.9%	.0%	42.5%	44.6%	41.1%	38.2 %
Total	Count	105	62	81	31	1	73	74	73	500
	% within Profession	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %

Table No. 85: NA and PA seats of the four electoral regions of KP

	Northern KP	N. Eastern KP	Central KP	Southern KP
Provincial Assembly	24 seats (PK-1 to PK-24)	18 seats (PK-25 to PK-42)	37 seats (PK-43 to PK-79)	20 seats (PK-80 to PK-99)
National Assembly	10 seats (NA-1 to NA 10)	7 seats (NA-11 to NA-17)	14 seats (NA-18 to NA 31)	8 seats (NA-32 to NA-39)

Table No. 86: ANP's decline in Swabi in terms of seats

ANP's decline in terms of seats			
From 1988 to 2008		From 2013 to 2018	
Provincial Assembly	17/28 (60.71%)	Provincial Assembly	0/11
National Assembly	4/8 (50%)	National Assembly	0/4

Table No. 87: Independent candidates' share at national and provincial levels

Independent candidates' seats in provincial assembly since 1988		Independent candidates' seats in National Assembly since 1970	
Central KP	10/252 (3.96%)	Central KP	1/101 (0.99%)
Northern KP	7/154 (4.54%)	Northern KP	1/67 (1.49%)
N.E KP	45/141 (31%)	N.E KP	9/66 (13.63%)
Southern KP	46/139 (33.09%)	Southern KP	1/57 (1.75%)
Impact of PTI on independent candidates' success ratio in Southern and N. Eastern KP			
1988-2013 (7 elections)		2018 elections	
An average of 12.14 seats per election		Dropped to 6 seats per election	

