

# **The Politics of New Provinces in Pakistan: An Application of Horizontal Inequalities Model**



## **Researcher**

Misbah Shaheen

Reg. No. 09-FSS/PHDPS/S16

## **Supervisor**

Dr. Sadaf Farooq

Assistant Professor

Department of Politics & IR

IIUI

## **Co-Supervisor**

Dr. Amna Mehmood


Professor

Dean of Social Sciences

IIUI

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD**

**August 2021**



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Horizontal Inequalities Model**



**Thesis Submitted in the Partial Fulfillment  
Of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in  
Political Science**

**Researcher**

Misbah Shaheen  
Reg. No. 09-FSS/PHDPS/S16

**Supervisor**

Dr. Sadaf Farooq  
Assistant Professor  
Department of Politics & IR  
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
## Certification

Certified that contents and form of thesis entitled "The Politics of New Provinces in Pakistan: An Application of Horizontal Model" submitted by Misbah Shaheen Reg#9-FSS/PHDPS/S16, have been found satisfactory for the requirements of the degree of PhD Political Science.

Supervisor:


Dr. Sadaf Farooq  
Assistant Professor  
Department of Politics and International Relations,  
International Islamic University, Islamabad

Co-Supervisor:




Prof. Dr. Amna Mahmood  
Professor  
Department of Politics and International Relations,  
International Islamic University, Islamabad

Internal Examiner:




Dr. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
Department of Politics and International Relations,  
International Islamic University, Islamabad

External Examiner:



Prof. Dr. Shaheen Akhtar  
Deptt. of Contemporary Studies  
National Defence University, Islamabad

External Examiner:



Prof. Dr. Saif Ur Rehman Malik  
Institute of Strategic Studies  
Islamabad



Dr. Noor Fatima  
Acting Chairperson  
Politics and International Relations  
International Islamic University Islamabad.



Dean  
Faculty of Social Sciences,  
International Islamic University Islamabad

## **Declaration**

I hereby declare that the thesis, submitted by me for examination for the PhD degree in Political Science is solely my own research work and it has not been submitted currently to any other university for any other degree.

Misbah Shaheen

Registration No: 09/FSS/PHDPS/S16

Department of Politics & International Relations,

Faculty of Social Sciences,

International Islamic University,

Islamabad.

## **Dedication**

It is dedicated to the minorities of the world facing severe horizontal inequalities.

## **Abstract**

Pakistan is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state that has been facing multi-dimensional inter-group conflicts across all its constituent units, as multiple ethno-linguistic groups constitute the social fabrication of these units. Sindhi-Mohajir antagonism, Punjabi-Siraiki friction, Pakthun-Hindkowan conflict and Baloch-Pakthun dissension are prevailing in Sindh, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan respectively. The latter (minorities) complaint to be dominated by the former and consider them monopolizer of all the socio-economic and political resources and feel disenfranchised. Reviewed literature identified political exclusion, economic inequalities, social disparities and cultural denial a stimulation for the demand of separate provinces. Since in case of having separate provinces, minority groups would employ the politico-economic resources of their regions for the betterment of their own masses. Hence, the present study hypothesized that there is a positive correlation between the demand of new provinces and horizontal inequalities. The hypothesis was tested in two stages; at first, the data was analyzed to identify the existence of horizontal inequalities in Punjab and KP. The analysis confirmed that sever inequalities prevail in the study areas. To authenticate evidence and to verify the hypothesis, a public opinion survey was conducted at second stage. Statistical analysis corroborated the hypothesis proving positive relationship between the demand of new provinces and horizontal inequalities. Accordingly, the study concludes that horizontal inequalities provided sound basis for inter-group conflict earlier and for the demand of new provinces later. The study suggests that the adoption of rightful and appropriate policies can efficiently combat inequalities between identity groups, which can avoid unpleasant situation and consequently the inter-ethnic conflicts can be mitigated.

## **Acknowledgement**

I am grateful to Almighty Allah for giving me the strength to complete this long journey. I would like to register indebtedness to my supervisors, Dr. Sadaf Farooq and Dr. Amna Mehmood. It was not possible to complete this laborious assignment without their guidance and support. Throughout my research work, they both provided an endless source of enormous intellectual inspiration. Their kindness and encouragement have always helped me find the strength to persevere.

The contribution of my other respectable teachers such as Dr. Muhammad Mushtaq, Dr. Sultan Mubaraz was very significant throughout my studies, and without their guidance, affection, and hard work, I could have been nowhere. The faculty of the Department of Politics and International Relations deserve special gratitude as their words and actions really inspired me during my research endeavor. I am especially indebted to my respondents whose prompt and kind responses made this research possible. I appreciate the cooperation and encouragement of my friends. Lastly, I would like to thank my husband for his unfailing support, patience, and encouragement, and my mother and sister for their prayers and support at every difficult time.



## **Table of Contents**

Declaration .....	ii
Dedication .....	iii
Abstract .....	iv
Acknowledgement .....	v
List of Tables .....	xi
List of Figures .....	xvi
List of Abbreviations .....	xx
<b>Chapter 1. ....</b>	<b>1</b>
Introduction.....	1
1.1 The Rationale of the Study .....	12
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....	13
1.3 Objectives of the Study.....	13
1.4 Research Questions.....	14
1.5 Significance of the Study .....	14
1.6 Delimitations of the Study .....	15
1.7 Literature Review.....	16
1.8 Research Methodology .....	27
1.8.1 Research Design.....	28
1.8.2 Population.....	28
1.8.3 Sampling.....	28
1.8.4 Instrumentation.....	29

1.8.5	Pilot Testing.....	31
1.8.6	Date Collection.....	31
1.8.7	Data Analysis Techniques.....	32
1.9	Conceptualization and Operationalization.....	32
1.9.1	Horizontal Inequalities.....	32
1.9.1.1	<i>Political Horizontal Inequalities (PHIs)</i> .....	33
1.9.1.2	<i>Economic Horizontal inequalities (EHIs)</i> .....	34
1.9.1.3	<i>Social Horizontal Inequalities (SHIs)</i> .....	34
1.9.1.4	<i>Cultural Horizontal inequalities (CHIs)</i> .....	35
1.10	Structure of the Study.....	35
<b>Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework.....</b>		<b>38</b>
2.1	Horizontal Inequalities' Indicators.....	43
2.1.1	Economic Horizontal Inequalities (EHIs).....	46
2.1.2	Political Horizontal Inequalities (PHIs).....	49
2.1.3	Social Horizontal Inequalities (SHIs).....	50
2.1.4	Cultural Horizontal Inequalities (CHIs).....	51
2.2	Horizontal Inequalities and the Demand of New Provinces in Pakistan: The Nexus.....	52
<b>Chapter 3. The Evolution of the Demand of New Provinces in Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal.....</b>		<b>57</b>
3.1	Sindhu Desh Movement.....	59
3.2	Pakhtunistan Movement.....	61
3.3	Greater Balochistan Movement.....	63
3.4	Demand of New Provinces in the Post-1971 Contemporary Pakistan.....	65

3.4.1 Muhajir Province Movement.....	67
3.4.2 Bahawalpur Province Movement.....	71
3.4.3 Siraiki Province Movement.....	73
3.4.4 Hazara Province Movement.....	75
3.4.5 FATA Province Movement.....	78
3.4.6 Demand of Pakhtuns Balochistan Province.....	81
3.4.7 Demand of Gilgit Baltistan for Provincial Status.....	82

#### **Chapter 4. Horizontal Inequalities and the Demand of Siraiki Province: A Study of Punjab..... 86**

4.1 Punjab Province: An Overview .....	86
4.1.1 Demography of South Punjab.....	88
4.1.2 Linguistic Identity of South Punjab.....	89
4.2 Horizontal Inequalities.....	90
4.2.1 Political Horizontal Inequalities.....	91
4.2.1.1 Representation in Provincial Parliaments and Cabinets.....	91
4.2.1.2 Representation in Judicial Institutions and Police Department.....	93
4.2.1.3 Reform Projects and Annual Development Program (ADP).....	94
4.2.2 Economic Horizontal Inequalities.....	95
4.2.2.1 Employment Opportunities and the Unemployment Rate.....	95
4.2.2.2 Income Ratio.....	97
4.2.2.3 Industries Ratio.....	99
4.2.2.4 Poverty and Districts Development Ranking.....	102
4.2.3 Social Horizontal Inequalities.....	105

4.2.3.1	<i>Literacy Rate and Education Completion Rate</i> .....	106
4.2.3.2	<i>Health Institutions</i> .....	109
4.2.3.3	<i>Household</i> .....	112
4.2.4	Cultural Horizontal Inequalities.....	113
4.3	Correlation between the Demand of Sirai Province and Horizontal Inequalities: Statistical Analysis.....	113

## **Chapter 5. Horizontal Inequalities and the Demand of Hazara Province: A Study of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ..... 141**

5.1	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province: An Overview.....	142
5.1.1	Demography of Hazara Division.....	142
5.1.2	Linguistic Identity of Hazara Division.....	144
5.2	Horizontal Inequalities.....	144
5.2.1	Political Horizontal Inequalities.....	144
5.2.1.1	<i>Representation in Provincial Parliaments and Cabinets</i> .....	145
5.2.1.2	<i>Representation in Provincial Judicial Institutions and Police Department</i> ... ..	146
5.2.1.3	<i>Reform Projects and Annual Development Program (ADP)</i> .....	147
5.2.2	Economic Horizontal Inequalities.....	150
5.2.2.1	<i>Employment Opportunities and the Unemployment Rate</i> .....	150
5.2.2.2	<i>Income Ratio</i> .....	152
5.2.2.3	<i>Industries Ratio</i> .....	154
5.2.2.4	<i>Poverty and Districts Development Rankings</i> .....	156
5.2.3	Social Horizontal Inequalities.....	159
5.2.3.1	<i>Literacy Rate and Education Completion Rate</i> .....	159

5.2.3.2	<i>Health Institutions</i> .....	162
5.2.3.3	<i>Household</i> .....	163
5.2.4	Cultural Horizontal Inequalities .....	164
5.3	Correlation between the Demand of Hazara Province and Horizontal Inequalities: Statistical Analysis.....	165
<b>Chapter 6. Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion .....</b>		<b>193</b>
6.1	Findings.....	193
6.2	Recommendations to Combat Horizontal Inequalities .....	195
6.2.1	Policies to Combat Socio-Economic Horizontal Inequalities.....	195
6.2.2	Policies to Combat Political Horizontal Inequalities. ....	198
6.2.3	Policies to Combat Cultural Horizontal Inequalities.....	204
6.3	Recommendations to tackle the demand of New Provinces .....	207
6.3.1	Provincial Boundaries Reorganization Commission.....	208
6.3.2	The Criterion for the Boundaries Readjustment. ....	209
6.3.3	Challenges in the Way of the Creation of New Provinces.....	209
6.4	Conclusion .....	210
References.....		212
Appendices.....		231

## List of Tables

Table 1: Administrative Bifurcation of South Punjab -----	87
Table 2: Demography of South Punjab -----	88
Table 3: Bifurcation of South Punjab in Terms of Lingual Identity -----	90
Table 4: Share of South Punjab in Privileged Posts (From Grade 18-22) -----	91
Table 5: Ratio of Successful CSS Candidates from South Punjab-----	92
Table 6: Ratio of ADP Allocated to South Punjab (2003-4, 2014-15) -----	94
Table 7: Comparison of Poverty Level between Southern and Northern Punjab -----	96
Table 8: Comparison of Unemployment Rate Between South, Northern and Central Punjab-----	97
Table 9: Top Ten and Bottom Ten Districts of Pakistan, in Terms of Average Monthly Income -----	98
Table 10: Industrial Statistics of Sothern Punjab -----	99
Table 11: Industrial Statistics of Northern and Central Punjab-----	100
Table 12: Annual Production of Wheat and Cotton in South Punjab-----	100
Table 13: Annual Production of Wheat and Cotton in Northern and Central Punjab ---	101
Table 14: Districts' Ranking in Terms of Poverty-----	103
Table 15: Intra-Provincial Disparities in Socio-economic Development -----	104
Table 16: Comparison of Higher Education, Technical and Vocational Training Institution Between South Punjab and Rest of Province -----	108
Table 17: District Wise Human Development Index Ranking -----	110
Table 18: Sample Size Formula-----	114
Table 19: Margin of Error Formula-----	114

Table 20: Sample Selection from the Pool of Universal Population-----	116
Table 21: Division of Sample by Profession -----	116
Table 22: Linguistic Identity of Respondents -----	117
Table 23: Division of Sample by District-----	119
Table 24: The Academic Level of Respondents -----	121
Table 25: Division of Sample by Gender -----	122
Table 26: Political Affiliation of the Respondents -----	123
Table 27: The current federal structure of Pakistan with four provinces has the administrative capacity to accommodate ethnic identities -----	125
Table 28: There is sufficient representation of South Punjab in National and Provincial Parliament and Cabinet-----	126
Table 29: Power Devolution Arrangements are Satisfactory -----	127
Table 30: The Provincial Governmental Policies are Satisfactory -----	128
Table 31: Representation in Judicial Institutions is Satisfactory -----	129
Table 32: Representation in Police Department is Satisfactory -----	130
Table 33: Economic Disparity in the Region has created the Demand of Separate Province -----	131
Table 34: South Punjab has due share in Development Plans and Employment Opportunities such as NFC Awards -----	132
Table 35: South Punjab has Due Access to Fundamental Rights of Education and Health -----	133
Table 36: Measures taken for the Propagation and Promotion of Siraikis' identity and culture are Satisfactory -----	134

Table 37: Ethnic Grievances and Identity Denial Led Towards the Demand of Separate Siraiki Province-----	135
Table 38: Exclusively, the primary factor in triggering the demand for a new province in the region is -----	136
Table 39: The Criterion for the Creation of New Provinces -----	137
Table 40: Any Other Acceptable Alternative for the Demand of Siraiki Province -----	138
Table 41: Suggestion to Overcome the Grievances of Ethnic Groups -----	139
Table 42: Demography of Province -----	142
Table 43: Demography of Hazara Division -----	143
Table 44: Linguistic Identity of the Dwellers of Hazara -----	144
Table 45: District Wise Ranking by Human Development Index-----	147
Table 46: ADP Allocated To KP-----	149
Table 47: Comparison of Employment and Unemployment Rate between Hazara Division and Rest of the Province -----	150
Table 48: District-Wise Incidence of Poverty in KP-----	151
Table 49: Top Twenty and Bottom Twenty Districts of Pakistan, In Terms of Average Monthly Earnings (Pak. Rupees)-----	153
Table 50: Comparison of Industries between Hazara and Rest of KP-----	154
Table 51: Comparison of Wheat, Maize, Rice and Tobacco Annual Production between Hazara and Rest of KP -----	155
Table 52: Percentage of Revenue Generated by the Fisheries Department of Hazara with KP -----	156
Table 53: District Development Ranking-----	157



Table 54: Intra-Provincial Disparities in Socioeconomic Development -----	157
Table 55: Comparison of Literacy Rate between Hazara Division and Rest of KP -----	159
Table 56: District Wise Ranking in terms of Education Score -----	160
Table 57: Comparison of Educational Institutions -----	161
Table 58: Comparison of Higher, Technical and Vocational Training Institutions -----	162
Table 59: Comparison of Health Institutions-----	162
Table 60: Sample Size-----	166
Table 61: Margin of Error-----	166
Table 62: Sample Selection from the Pool of Universal Population-----	167
Table 63: Division of sample by profession-----	168
Table 64: Linguistic Identity of Respondents -----	169
Table 65: Division of Sample by District-----	170
Table 66: Academic Level of Respondents -----	172
Table 67: Division of Sample by Gender -----	173
Table 68: Political Affiliation of the Respondents -----	174
Table 69: The current federal structure of Pakistan with four provinces has the administrative capacity to accommodate ethnic identities -----	177
Table 70: There is Sufficient Representation of Hazara Division in National and Provincial Parliament and Cabinet-----	178
Table 71: Power Devolution Arrangements are Satisfactory -----	180
Table 72: The Provincial Governmental Policies Are Satisfactory -----	180
Table 73: Representation in Judicial Institutions is Satisfactory -----	181
Table 74: Representation in the Police Department is Satisfactory-----	182

Table 75: Economic Disparity in the Province has catered the Demand of Separate Province -----	183
Table 76: Hazara Division gets its due share in Development Plans and Employment Opportunities such as NFC Award -----	184
Table 77: The Hazaraeivals have due access to fundamental rights of education and health -----	185
Table 78: Measures taken for the Propagation and Promotion of Hazarvals' identity and culture are Satisfactory -----	186
Table 79: Ethnic Grievances and Identity Denial Led Towards the Demand of Separate Hazara Province -----	187
Table 80: Exclusively, the Major Factor behind the Development of the Demand of Hazara Province is -----	188
Table 81: Criterion for the Creation of New Provinces-----	189
Table 82: Any Other Acceptable Alternative for the Demand of Hazara Province -----	189
Table 83: Suggestion to Overcome the Grievances of Ethnic Groups -----	190

## List of Figures

<i>Figure 1: Sample Flow Chart.</i>	29
<i>Figure 2: Percentage of Mohajirs' Population According to the 1951 National Census</i>	68
<i>Figure 3: Percentage of Mohajirs' Share in Manufacturing Industry of Karachi</i>	69
<i>Figure 4: Representation of Different Identity Groups in Civil Bureaucracy and Military Leadership</i>	69
<i>Figure 5: Mohajir vs. Sindhi Beneficiaries of Quota System in Sindh</i>	70
<i>Figure 6: Mohajir vs. Sindhi Representation at Privileged Posts</i>	70
<i>Figure 7: Literacy Rate in Southern Punjab</i>	107
<i>Figure 8: Literacy Rate in Northern and Central Punjab</i>	107
<i>Figure 9: Division of Sample by Profession</i>	117
<i>Figure 10: Mother Tongue of Respondents</i>	118
<i>Figure 11: Association between Gender Type and Mother Tongue of Respondents</i>	119
<i>Figure 12: Division of Sample by District</i>	120
<i>Figure 13: Division of Sample by Academic</i>	121
<i>Figure 14: Percentage of Gender having Different Level of Education</i>	122
<i>Figure 15: Political Affiliation of Respondents</i>	123
<i>Figure 16: Correlation between Gender Type and Political Affiliation</i>	123
<i>Figure 17: Ratio of Respondents Participating in the Processions</i>	124
<i>Figure 18: Association between Political Affiliation and Mother Tongue of Respondents</i>	125
<i>Figure 19: The current federal structure of Pakistan with four provinces has the administrative capacity to accommodate ethnic identities</i>	126

<i>Figure 20: There is sufficient representation of South Punjab in National and Provincial Parliament and Cabinet</i>	127
<i>Figure 21: Power Devolution Arrangements are Satisfactory</i>	128
<i>Figure 22: The Provincial Governmental Policies are Satisfactory</i>	129
<i>Figure 23: Representation in Judicial Institutions is Satisfactory</i>	130
<i>Figure 24: Representation in Police Department is Satisfactory</i>	131
<i>Figure 25: Economic Disparity in the Region has created the Demand of Separate Province</i>	132
<i>Figure 26: South Punjab has due share in Development Plans and Employment Opportunities such as NFC Awards</i>	133
<i>Figure 27: South Punjab has Due Access to Fundamental Rights of Education and Health</i>	134
<i>Figure 28: Measures taken for the Propagation and Promotion of Siraikis' identity and culture are Satisfactory</i>	135
<i>Figure 29: Ethnic Grievances and Identity Denial Led Towards the Demand of Separate Siraiki Province</i>	136
<i>Figure 30: Exclusively, the primary factor in triggering the demand for a new province in the region is</i>	137
<i>Figure 31: The Criterion for the Creation of New Provinces</i>	138
<i>Figure 32: Any Other Acceptable Alternative for the Demand of Siraiki Province</i>	139
<i>Figure 33: Suggestion to Overcome the Grievances of Ethnic Groups</i>	140
<i>Figure 34: Comparison between Hazara Division and Rest of Province</i>	146
<i>Figure 35: Comparison between Hazara and Rest of Province.</i>	146

<i>Figure 36: Comparison of ADPs Allocation between Nowshera and Kohistan</i>	148
<i>Figure 37: Division of sample by profession</i>	168
<i>Figure 38: Linguistic Identity of Respondents</i>	168
<i>Figure 39: Association between Gender Type and the Linguistic Identity of Respondents.</i>	170
<i>Figure 40: Division of Sample by District.</i>	170
<i>Figure 41: Academic Level of Respondents</i>	171
<i>Figure 42: Division of Sample by Gender</i>	172
<i>Figure 43: Percentage of Gender having Different Level of Education</i>	173
<i>Figure 44: Political Affiliation of the Respondents</i>	174
<i>Figure 45: Correlation between Gender Type and Political Affiliation</i>	175
<i>Figure 46: Respondents' Ratio to Participate in the Processions of HNPs.</i>	175
<i>Figure 47: Association between Mother tongue &amp; Political Affiliation of Respondents</i>	176
<i>Figure 48: The current federal structure of Pakistan with four provinces has the administrative capacity to accommodate ethnic identities</i>	177
<i>Figure 49: There is Sufficient Representation of Hazara Division in National and Provincial Parliament and Cabinet</i>	178
<i>Figure 50: Power Devolution Arrangements are Satisfactory</i>	179
<i>Figure 51: The Provincial Governmental Policies Are Satisfactory</i>	180
<i>Figure 52: Representation in Judicial Institutions is Satisfactory</i>	181
<i>Figure 53: Representation in the Police Department is Satisfactory</i>	182
<i>Figure 54: Economic Disparity in the Province has catered the Demand of Separate Province</i>	183

<i>Figure 55: Hazara Division gets its due share in Development Plans and Employment Opportunities such as NFC Awards</i>	184
<i>Figure 56: The Hazaraeals have due access to fundamental rights of education and health</i>	185
<i>Figure 57: Measures taken for the Propagation and Promotion of Hazarvals' identity and culture are Satisfactory</i>	185
<i>Figure 58: Ethnic Grievances and Identity Denial Led Towards the Demand of Separate Hazara Province</i>	186
<i>Figure 59: Exclusively, the Major Factor behind the Development of the Demand of Hazara Province is</i>	187
<i>Figure 60: Criterion for the Creation of New Provinces</i>	188
<i>Figure 61: Any Other Acceptable Alternative for the Demand of Hazara Province</i>	189
<i>Figure 62: Suggestion to overcome the grievances of ethnic groups</i>	190
<i>Figure 63: Comparison of Horizontal Inequalities between Punjab and KP</i>	191

## List of Abbreviations

A: Agree .....	146
ADP: Annual Development Plan .....	88
ANP: Awami National Party .....	59
APMSO: All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organization .....	68
BLA: Baloch Liberation Army .....	61
BLF: Baloch Liberation Front .....	61
BNF: Bulwaristan National Front .....	79
BPLF: Balochistan Peoples' Liberation Front .....	61
BSO: Baloch Student's Organization .....	61
CDDR: Commission on Demarcation/Delimitation of Regions .....	20
CESP: Compendium on Environment Statistics of Pakistan .....	32
CHIs: Cultural Horizontal inequalities .....	35
CPEC: China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor .....	80
CSS: Central Superior Services .....	86
CUs: Constituent Units .....	13
D: Disagree .....	146
DMG: District Management Group .....	87
EHIs: Economic Horizontal inequalities .....	34
FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas .....	75
FPTP: First-Past-The-Post .....	173
FTD: Federal Territory Day .....	21
HDI: Human Development Index .....	129

HDIR: Human Development Index Ranking.....	100
HDIV: Human Development Index Value .....	100
HHDD: High Human Development Districts .....	100
HIs: Horizontal Inequalities .....	33
HMHDD: High Medium Human Development Districts .....	100
HNF: Hazara National Front.....	73, 75
HNPs: Hazara Nationalist Parties .....	153
HPM: Hazara Province Movement.....	73
HRM: Hazara Rights Movement .....	73
IGs: Inspector Generals.....	129
JI: Jamat-e-Islami.....	67
JSMM: Jiay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz .....	58
JUI: Jamiyat Ulma Islam .....	67
KKM: Khudai Khitmatgar Movement.....	59
KP: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.....	23
KPPFCA: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Finance Commission Awards.....	32
LMHDD: Low-Medium Human Development Districts.....	100
MCPs: Middle Class Professionals .....	147
MHDD: Medium Human Development Districts.....	100
MQM: Muthida Qoumi Movement .....	58
NAP: National Awami Party .....	59
NFCA: National Finance Commission Awards.....	32
NWFP: North-West Frontier Province .....	23



OLPB: Organic Law on Provincial Boundaries.....	18
OMG: Office Management Group.....	87
PDHS: Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey .....	32
PHIs: Political Horizontal Inequalities .....	33
PMAP: Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party.....	78
PML-N: Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz .....	70
PML-Q: Pakistan Muslim League- Quaid .....	74
PMS: Provincial Management Services.....	86
PPFCA: Punjab Provincial Finance Commission Awards .....	32
PPP: Pakistan People’s Party .....	57
PRA: Punjab Reorganization Act .....	15
PSLM: Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey .....	32
PSP: Pakistan Siraiki Party .....	69
RD: Relative Deprivation .....	38
SA: Strongly Agree.....	146
SD: Strongly Disagree .....	146
SDLA: Sindhu Desh Liberation Army .....	58
SDM: Sindhu Desh Movement.....	54
SE: Social Exclusion.....	38
SHIs: Social Horizontal Inequalities.....	34
SNPs: Siraiki Nationalist Parties .....	111
SPSS: Statistical Package for Social Sciences .....	32
SRA: State Reorganization Act .....	15

SRC:States Reorganization Commission.....	14
US: United States.....	18
UTs: Union Territories.....	13
VIs: Vertical Inequalities .....	33

## Chapter 1. Introduction

Intrastate territorial restructuring is not a novel and strange phenomenon; indeed, the practice of existing boundaries' revisionism, and consequently, the formation of the new constituent units<sup>1</sup> (CUs) has remained very common nearly in all types of states; whether they are the parliamentary or presidential, unitary or federal, punctuated<sup>2</sup> or consolidated democracies<sup>3</sup> or authoritarian states. History is the eyewitness of various such cases where the number of CUs was less at the time of states' inception. However, later several new CUs were demarcated either to meet the administrative challenges and ensure good governance or to appease the ethno-lingual concerns of identity groups to beat the internal conflicts and intra-national security challenges.

India is a classic example in this context that has constituted more than fifteen new states since its genesis. Many of those were formed on ethno-linguistic lines and several others were delineated on administrative basis (Mawdsley, 2002). According to the first population and housing census 1951, India was a home of 340 million populace that has been increased up to 1.21 billion by the last census held in 2011 (King, 1999). With the addition in population, the number of CUs has also increased to twenty-nine, while seven union territories (UTs) were created too; however, on 31<sup>st</sup> October 2019, the state of Jammu

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<sup>1</sup>. Nomenclature of constituent units differ from state to state as in USA, Malaysia, Mexico, Australia, Nigeria and India provincial units are named as "states". In Turkey, Iran, China and Pakistan known as "Province". In Switzerland and Germany, they are called "Cantons and Landers" accordingly. Throughout this document, the term constituent units refer to state, province or lander respectively.

<sup>2</sup>. By the term "punctuated democracy" means controlled democracy that has the democratic norms in principle but has strong tendencies towards authoritarianism in its political spectrum.

<sup>3</sup>. By the term "consolidated democracies" means a state which has been observed at least six consecutive general elections at defined regular interval.

and Kashmir has been turned into two union territories and hitherto the present Indian union consists of twenty-eight states and nine UTs<sup>4</sup> (Tillin, 2013).

Soon after establishment, the demand for the reorganization of the existing boundaries and the creation of new constituents units started to appear in different parts of the country. Eventually, in 1953 Madras became the pioneer state that was reconstituted by splitting into two; Andhra<sup>5</sup> and Madras<sup>6</sup>. Thence, Andhra set the first example to be established on linguistic grounds to facilitate the long-term demand of the Telugu speaking community of India (Tillin, 2013). It was formed as a consequence of violent struggle when a Telugu<sup>7</sup> speaking nationalist “Potti Sreeramulu” died due to a fast-unto-death strike demanding statehood<sup>8</sup>. Andhra state’s formation on linguistic grounds unlocked the floodgate of the demands of other states to reorganize the boundaries and the formation of new CUs on linguistic basis. To tackle this complicated and delicate issue, the Union government of India appointed a three-member commission, States Reorganization

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<sup>4</sup>. States; Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Punjab, Rajasthan, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh were founded in 1956, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Goa in 1987, Assam, Odisha, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in 1950, Chatisgarh, Uttarakhand and Jharkhand in 2000, Gujarat and Maharashtra in 1960, Haryana in 1966, Himachal Pradesh in 1971, Manipur and Meghalaya in 1972, Nagaland in 1963, Sikkim in 1975, Tripura in 1972 and the last state “Telangana” was established in 2014. Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep UTs were formed in 1956, Chandigarh in 1966, Delhi in 1905, Puducherry in 1954, and Ladakh in 2019 and Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu in 2020.

<sup>5</sup>. Currently known as Andhra Pradesh.

<sup>6</sup>. The states was renamed as Tamil Nadu in 1969).

<sup>7</sup>. Telugu is the 4<sup>th</sup> major language of India spoken by almost 6.70% population according to last population census 2011.

<sup>8</sup>. Potti Sreeramulu had fasted for about fifty-eight days and passed away on 12<sup>th</sup> December 1953 due to fast. His sacrificial bore fruit and on 1<sup>st</sup> October 1953 Andhra state was carved out of the parent sate Madras.

Commission (SRC).<sup>9</sup> After two years of pondering, the commission submitted its report by emphasizing that significant ethno-lingual communities' demands to constitute linguistic-based states should be acquiesced for the upholding of the unity and security of the nation and to pacify the linguistic and cultural affinity of the people. Simultaneously, the report accented that no single and uniform criterion could be a panacea of this issue; it showed the caveats about the potential repercussions of the linguistic division of the country for national integration and emphasized on the need of good governance and administrative efficiency to meet such challenges (Singh, 2008). Resultantly many new CUs were established, and from 1953 to date, the process of formation of new CUs is continued. In 2014, the 29<sup>th</sup> state Telangana was carved out from Andhra Pradesh (from Telugu speaking districts) state for equitable economic development and administrative efficiency.

The case of multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Nigeria is another exquisite example that has established thirty-three new CUs over the period of only thirty-six years (1960–1996). At the time of its independence in 1960, it was a federation comprising of only three CUs; Northern Nigeria, Western Nigeria, and Eastern Nigeria, each constituent unit was dominated by a larger ethnic group namely Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo respectively (Anderson, 2015)<sup>10</sup>. Very soon after independence, in January 1966, Igbo military officials

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<sup>9</sup>. Three-member State Reorganization Commission was appointed by the then prime minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru, in 1953 to get the opinion of all the stakeholders and to submit the report accordingly. The Commission was comprised of Kavalam Madhava Panikkar, Hridya Nath Kunzru and was headed by the retired chief justice of Supreme Court, Fazal Ali. Nationalists and the masses submitted several proposals to the commission and finally commission submitted its report after two years' working in 1955. In 1956, State Reorganization Act 1956 was passed by the parliament and through 7<sup>th</sup> Amendment made this act a permanent part of the constitution.

<sup>10</sup>. Hausa is the largest, Yoruba 2<sup>nd</sup> largest and Igbo is the 3<sup>rd</sup> largest ethnic group of Nigeria which make up 25%, 21% and 18% of the total population respectively. While the rest of 36% population is comprised of various other minority identity groups such as Ijaw, Kanuri, Ibibio, Tiv, Fulani, Igala etc.

made a military coup effort to capture political power of the state that was immediately countered by Hausa military officers of Northern Nigeria and resultantly, General Gowon (from Hausa community) became the head of state and remained in power until in 1975 (Ojo & Adebayo, 2008). He enunciated principles for the alteration of the existing boundaries and the division of the country into twelve states. However, geographical compactness, administrative efficiency, and the wishes of the concerned nationalists and public were utterly overruled. Accordingly, in 1967, twelve states federation<sup>11</sup> was manufactured by executive order. In 1975, General Gowon was forcibly overthrown, and his successor, General Murtala Mohammed, set up the Irikefe Panel<sup>12</sup>, chaired by a Supreme Court Justice, to investigate the demand of new states (Alkali, 2017). The panel recommended an increase in the number of constituent units up to nineteen (McHenry, 1986). Thereby, seven new CUs were created<sup>13</sup>, and in this way, Nigeria became a nineteen-state federation in 1976. General Muhammadu Buhari, who seized power from the Second Republic in 1983, quickly precluded the consideration of new states but could not fulfill his whims.

However, the successor government set up a seventeen-member Political Bureau to probe the ongoing issues, including the formation of new constituent units. On the recommendations of the bureau, two new states were formed in 1987 (Amuwo, 1998). However, in 1991, further nine states were created to counter the intense political pressure. The agitation for the creation of more constituent units doubled in 1993 when General

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<sup>11</sup>. Northwestern, Kano, Northeastern, North-Central, Kwara, Benue-Plateau, Western, Mid-Western, Lagos, Rivers, Southeastern and East-Central State.

<sup>12</sup>. On 7<sup>th</sup> August 1975, Six-member panel under the chair of Justice Ayo Irikefe was established to investigate the issue of the creation of more states.

<sup>13</sup>. Bauchi, Benue, Borno, Imo, Niger, Ogun and Ondo states were created.

Abacha took over control; hence, in October 1996, he ordered to form six more states, bringing the total constituent units to thirty-six. However, none of the states created under the military regime was formed neither to meet the administrative efficacy nor to address the ethno-lingual concerns of nationalists (Babalola, 2016). Preferably, new states were formed only to overcome the political pressure and to legitimize their own rule. Therefore, the agitation for the creation of more states still exists as it can be observed in the recommendations given by a national conference in 2014 that eighteen more constituent units should be constituted in Nigeria.

Papua New Guinea is another noticeable demonstration that has practiced the activity of provincial boundaries' reorganization over time. It is a state located in the Oceania continent and is considered the most diverse country of the world where more than seven hundred languages and dialects are spoken. It became a sovereign state in 1975 by getting independence from Australia. At the time of its birth, the total population was 2.8 million, and the country was divided into twenty CUs at that moment; however, after thirty-six years, in August 2012, boundaries of two provinces were reorganized, and two new provinces were formed; Hela and Jiwaka. They were formed to pacify the constant demands of Hela and Jiwaka nationalists, as they had been demanding separate provinces for decades to promote their distinct religious and cultural identity. Hela province was established by readjusting the boundaries of the existing Southern Highlands province, while Jiwaka province was created from the Western Highlands province (Zurenuoc, 2017). In September 2002, a five-member parliamentary committee was appointed to investigate the issue of Hela and Jiwaka provinces that was directed to work in collaboration with the boundaries' reorganization commission. The Parliamentary

committee submitted two submissions; one for Hela province and the other for Jiwaka. The report stated that Western-Highlands provinces could be divided into major ethnic groups; Waghi and Mepla arguing that Waghi community is numerically less and is being underrepresented and marginalized in the provincial governmental structure. Hence, it is imperative to reconstitute provincial boundaries to strengthen Waghi ethnic group's representation. Resultantly, in 2009, The Organic Law on Provincial Boundaries (OLPB) was approved, and two new provinces were constituted constitutionally. With this development, it was perceived those other deprived and disaffected ethnic groups, which were not happy with the existing provincial structures, might demand to form new provinces on ethnic basis. However, no such demand was observed hitherto, proving the parliament's decision fruitful and successful. In July 2019, the population of the country was reported as eight and a half million, and interestingly, there are twenty-two CUs for only 8.5 million people.

On 6<sup>th</sup> July 1776, the former thirteen British colonies emerged as an independent state and was eventually known as "The United States of America"; 1. Delaware, 2. Pennsylvania, 3. New Jersey, 4. Georgia, 5. Connecticut, 6. Massachusetts, 7. Maryland, 8. South Carolina, 9. New Hampshire, 10. Virginia, 11. New York, 12. Rhode Island, 13. North Carolina (Hafeez, 2014). While at present, it is a federation of fifty states. Though the majority of the new states joined US federation through annexation and admission, however, four states were created by reorganizing the existing states' boundaries; Maine, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Vermont (Marshall, 2010). Maine was drawn from Massachusetts in 1820, West Virginia, and Kentucky from Virginia in 1863 and 1792, respectively. Moreover, the boundary of Vermont State was drawn from New York in



1791. Initially, Maine was a district in the state of Massachusetts, and the Mainers had been complaining to be deprived politically and marginalized economically by Massachusetts's. Gradually a sense of deprivation increased among the claimants, and they started the demand to upgrade the Main district into the state. Ultimately, after thirty-five years, their struggle bore fruit, and the federal and state government of Massachusetts accepted the demand and granted it the status of statehood. While Kentucky and West Virginia both got separation from the state of Virginia as a consequence of the civil war of four years. Vermont was separated from its parent state for good governance, to ensure socio-political and economic development and to overcome the intrastate conflicts. Thence it can be argued that intrastate territorial restructuring is not a strange and new practice; instead, the well-established and developed countries do this activity when needed to address the multiple demands of their denizens.

Another neighboring state of Pakistan, Iran, previously had only ten provinces<sup>14</sup> from 1906 to 1950 with 16 million population. Nevertheless, in the 1960s, provincial boundaries were revised, and several the then governorates that had been subordinate to provinces were upgraded to provinces (Chehabi, 1997). Further, in 1993, Tehran was split into two provinces, known as; Ardebil and Tehran, and very recently, in 2010, another new Alborz province was drawn from Tehran. Therefore, presently, the number of CUs has reached to thirty-one (Shaffer, 2000). As the population multiplied, the number of CUs was also increased by the state authorities to address the ethno-lingual and administrative issues. This exercise was started in the 1960s and is still practiced time and again to deal with multiple demands.

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<sup>14</sup>. Gilan, Tehran, East Azarbaijan, West Azarbaijan, Kermanshahan, Khuzestan, Fars, Kerman, Khorasan, and Esfahan.

South Africa became the sovereign state in 1910 as a result of an amalgamation of four former British colonies<sup>15</sup> which were given the status of provinces and, consequently, South Africa became a republic constituting four provinces. However, in 1993, a fifteen-member parliamentary commission (CDDR) was formed for the reorganization of existing provincial boundaries and the creation of more constituent units<sup>16</sup>. It was directed to consider four critical aspects while submitting the recommendations; economic feasibility, geographic compactness, institutional viability, and socio-cultural concerns. The report proposed nine provinces, and in 1994, the then-existing provincial boundaries were redrawn into nine provinces (Choudhry, 2015). The bigger Cape Province was subdivided into three new provinces; Western Cape, Eastern Cape, and Northern Cape (De Visser, 2012).

China, Austria, Mexico, Canada, Spain, Switzerland, Yemen, Russia, Germany, Australia, Malaysia and many other states have reorganized their provincial territories several times since their inception. The configuration of constituent units within a state, their number, demography, the relative size in terms of population, and socio-political peculiarities are essential for the efficient and successful operation of a political regime (Tey Nai Peng, 2015). The adherents of the creation of new constituent units either on the ethno-linguistic basis or on administrative grounds contend that the division of a state's territory into smaller constituent units would probably foster the socio-political and

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<sup>15</sup>. 1. Cape Colony, 2. Natal Colony, 3. Transvaal Colony, 4. Orange River Colony.

<sup>16</sup>. Commission for the Demarcation/Delimitation of States/Provinces/Regions named (CDDR) was established in May 1993. Fifteen members nominated to constitute commission were selected in a way to reflect the equal representation of the political, gender, and racial makeup of the country. Though the members' political affiliation was different from one another, they were ambitious to find practical proposals for territorial restructuring.

economic developments in the respective state. Since it unleashes growth and development potentials of the peripheral zones of a larger state, which can resultantly weaken the sense of alienation and deprivations among those regions (Ray, 2018). It would ultimately enhance the nation-building capacity on one side and lower the secessionist and separatist tendencies on the other that are taken as prerequisites to achieve national integration (Alvi, 2015). They further argue that the alteration of subsisting boundaries and the creation of more constituent units would ensure the administrative efficacy on the one hand; and on the other hand, the process would satisfy the ethno-lingual considerations of the diversified groups as smaller spatial constituent units having linguistic congruity and cultural homogeneity, eventually lead towards efficient management. Furthermore a fair allocation of development resources that can provide the necessary social and economic infrastructure facilities to the general masses of their regions (Arif, 1998). A relatively homogeneous and smaller constituent unit ensures effective communication between representatives and electorate and ultimately empowers the marginalized groups to articulate their demands and needs and to participate in the political and economic activities of the region. This process eliminates the sense of alienation among the masses, and they can play a constructive role in the human, social, economic, and political development of a state.

Reviewed literature reveals that the division of larger provinces/states into smaller constituent units improved governance and administrative capacities. The practice also reduced the ethnic rifts and tensions among the multiple ethnicities and strengthened national integration and helped to achieve unity in diversity. However, the primary condition to get these objectives effectively is to adopt a constitutional mechanism while taking into consideration the wishes and aspirations of the nationalists and masses, socio-

economic aspects, and political institutions' administrative capacity of the concerned region. Contrary to it, if the process is followed only to get the electoral support and to release political pressure, it could be a floodgate of further ethnic, political, and economic issues.

At the eve of its inception Pakistan was a state consisting of five CUs<sup>17</sup>, several princely states<sup>18</sup> and tribal areas<sup>19</sup>. According to the first population census 1951, it had only seventy-five million population. However, after East Bengal tragedy in 1971, the post-1971 contemporary Pakistan, having a total population of about sixty-five million is comprised of ICT, tribal areas and four provinces; Punjab, KP, Sindh and Balochistan. The population increased rapidly. In addition, as per the recent sixth population census 2017, it has reached up to one hundred and ninety-seven million. However, the number of constituent units has not been increased accordingly, and not even a single new constituent unit has been created since 1971 to date in the political history of Pakistan.

All four constituent units are heterogeneous, having multi-ethnic and multilingual nationalities. Approximately sixty different languages and dialects are spoken, and about a dozen ethnic groups live in them (Ahmar, 2016). However, Punjabi, Sindhi, Baloch, Pakhtun, Mohajir, and Siraiki are considered as the major ethnic groups (Mushtaq, 2016). Every province's demography demonstrates a significant minority group residing in it besides the majority group<sup>20</sup>. Those provincial minority groups are geographically

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<sup>17</sup>. East Bengal, West Punjab, North-West Frontier Province NWFP (currently known as KP), Sindh and Balochistan.

<sup>18</sup>. State of Amb, Chitral, Dir, Phulra, Swat, Kalat, Las Bela, Kharan Makran, Bahawalpur, Hunza, Nagar, Gilgit Baltistan, Khairpur and Umerkot

<sup>19</sup>. FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas comprising of seven agencies; Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan.

<sup>20</sup>. Punjabis in Punjab, Sindhis in Sindh, Pakhtun in KP and Baluch in Balochistan.

concentrated in particular areas of the respective provinces such as; the Siraikis in southern Punjab, Hazaraeval in the Hazara region of KP, the Pakhtuns in northern Balochistan, and Mohajirs in urban Sindh, Karachi, Hyderabad and some areas of Sukkur.

The provincial minorities are demanding the up-gradation of their respective regions into provinces. The Siraikis initiated a movement for the inception of Siraiki province; the Hazaraeval raised their voice for Hazara province, the Mohajirs are asserting for Mohajir province. Likewise, the Pakhtuns of north Balochistan are demanding a separate province or the merger of Pakhtun districts with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. However, the demand for new provinces has attained significant attention at both the levels; provincial and national. However, in Punjab and KP, the demand has become relatively more vocal and widespread. As in 2012, Punjab provincial assembly passed resolutions for the establishment of Siraiki, Bahawalpur provinces, whereas a resolution for Hazara province was passed by the KP provincial assembly in the same year (Asghar, 2012). Moreover, in 2013, a national parliamentary commission<sup>21</sup> was also formed to analyze the demand for the creation of new province (s) in Punjab by the then Pakistan People's Party Government (Baber, et al., 2013). It is palpable that the demand for new provinces is getting impetus and political acknowledgement inside and outside the parliament in both the cases of Punjab and KP.

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<sup>21</sup>. Senator Farhatullah Babar was the chairman of the commission. While Syeda Sughra Imam (Senator of PPP) Haji Mohammad Adeel (senator of ANP), Kamil Ali Agha (Senator of PML-Q), Malik Muhammad Rafique Rajwana (Senator of PML-N), Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haidri (Senator of JUI-F), Arif Aziz Sheikh, Jamshed Ahmed Dasti, Syed Ali Musa Gilani, Tehmina Daultana, Chaudhry Saud Majeed, Dr Farooq Sattar MNAs from PPP, PML-N and MQM. There were twelve member of the commission, six from the upper house (Senate) and six from the lower house (National Assembly) of the parliament were nominated. Commission submitted its report on 28<sup>th</sup> January, 2013 to the National Assembly secretariat. Full report is available at the following link: <http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/province-reoprpt.pdf>.

## **1.1 The Rationale of the Study**

The demand for new constituent units in Pakistan has become an active political debate inside and outside the parliament since the incorporation of the 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendment in 2010, in which a province was renamed (from NWFP to KP) on ethnic lines to appease an ethnic community “Pakhtun”. Resultantly, the minority ethno-linguistic groups from the other provinces rejuvenated their demand for new provinces more vigorously. The claimants of the demand being minority complain to be marginalized and dominated by the majority groups of the respective provinces. Although the demand for new provinces prevails in all parts of the country, however in Punjab and KP, it has become relatively more vocal and widespread and has the potential to lead to ethnic conflicts and severe tensions between minority vs majority groups. Thereby, it is pertinent to address such issues immediately with adequate measures by the state officials to prevent them from leading to unpleasant circumstances. To deal with such issues, it is needed to investigate the underpinned factors behind the development of such demands of new constituent units in Pakistan generally and to find out the reasons, which have been considered responsible in strengthening the demand in Punjab and KP particularly. Hence, the present study is primarily focusing on understanding; how and why the demand for new constituent units emerged over time and which factors are involved in its evolution. Moreover, to analyze the pattern of the demand of new provinces in Punjab and KP, a comparative analysis has been made, which can become a potent tool in providing insights about the actual factors responsible for the demand in Pakistan regarding the politics of new provinces.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

The demand for new constituent units from minority ethno-linguistic groups prevails in all the four provinces of Pakistan generally and in Punjab and KP more emphatically. In Punjab, Siraikis are demanding the establishment of a new Siraike province, and in KP, Hazaraeal are raising voice to upgrade the Hazara division into a province. Both the demanding groups complaint to be marginalized and underrepresented in terms of socio-political development and economic opportunities and justify their demand based on such horizontal inequalities. Therefore, it is essential to investigate systematically the correlation between the demand of new provinces and regional inequalities and how regional inequalities become a stimulus force to trigger such demands in the region.

## **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

Following are the fundamental objectives of this study:

- To analyze the evolution of the demand for new provinces in Pakistan
- To evaluate the application of Horizontal Inequalities Model in the context of the demand of new provinces in Pakistan
- To ascertain the relationship between horizontal inequalities and the demand of new provinces in Punjab and KP
- To explore similarities and contrasts in the applicability level of horizontal inequalities model between Punjab and KP with reference to the demand of new provinces
- To delve into acceptable alternative options of the demand except for the demarcation of new provinces in Punjab and KP

#### **1.4 Research Questions**

On the bases of objectives mentioned above, the study has developed the following research questions.

##### **Main Research Question.**

To what extent the Horizontal Inequalities Model is applicable in Pakistan with reference to the demand of new provinces?

##### ***Sub Research Questions.***

1. Why did the demand for new provinces evolve in Pakistan?
2. How did horizontal inequalities contribute towards the procedural development of the demand for new provinces in Punjab and KP?
3. What are the similarities and contrasts in the applicability level of horizontal inequalities model between Punjab and KP?
4. What could be the acceptable alternative options of the demand except for the creation of new provinces in Punjab and KP?

#### **1.5 Significance of the Study**

The present study is a pioneering step based on primary sources of material to evaluate the relationship between horizontal inequalities and the demand for new provinces in Pakistan. This correlation has been analyzed by applying the horizontal inequalities model in Punjab and KP. By reviewing the available literature on the scholarship, no study was found that has examined the application of the horizontal inequalities model in the context of the demand of new provinces in Pakistan. Moreover, comparative analysis of the demand in the two provinces is an endeavor to highlight the contrasts and similarities



between applicability levels of the model in both cases. This comparative analysis will highlight the variation of the demand pattern of new provinces in both regions that is necessary to know because the identical measures to address the demand of new provinces in Punjab and KP can prove detrimental and cause further chaos and grievances and cannot bring the required optimal results. The dynamics of the relationship between the demand of new provinces and horizontal inequalities would have been beneficial to explore the new dimensions of research for academicians as well as, it would open further avenues of research for future researchers. The findings of the study would also be helpful for policy framers to devise rightful policies to address the issue of the demand for new provinces more appropriately.

#### **1.6 Delimitations of the Study**

Although the minority ethnic groups of all the four provinces of Pakistan are demanding existing boundaries restructuring, yet, the present study has been limited to the case studies of two provinces; Punjab and KP. Secondly, there exist many indicators to measure the social-cultural, political, and economic inequalities among the ethnically distinct communities that lead to such demands of provincial autonomy and the establishment of more provinces. However, the present study has used a few of them to measure the horizontal inequalities as contributing factors towards the demand of new provinces in Pakistan. Lastly, the survey has been conducted on a limited number drawn from the pool of universal population, as it is not possible to conduct it on a large scale due to financial constraints and time restrictions.

## 1.7 Literature Review

Political and fiscal autonomy, ethnic conflict and the quest for new constituent units are the worldwide phenomena. However, post-colonial societies are facing these challenges in an acute form (Bujra, 2002). Sometimes, provincial autonomy demands lead to violent conflict between the center and constituent units and in the worst case can tend to political violence and civil war (Crawford & Lipschutz, 2014). The failure to get sufficient provincial autonomy and the provincial boundaries' reconstruction can stimulate to separatist tenancies that result in the dismemberment of states (Christie, 1996).

Paul Robert Brass (1991) argues that the uneven distribution of socio-political and economic resources is not the only stimulating factor behind the emergence of conflicts and provincial autonomy demands. Furthermore, the relative deprivation and regional disparities also develop an atmosphere of ethnic antagonism that gradually leads to such demands for the creation to have their own independent CUs. If this pattern of horizontal inequalities persists over a long time; then the ethnic elite of deprived groups struggles to promote regional culture, norms, language, traditions and customs to demonstrate its distinctiveness. The fate of an ethnic group to get its due share depends upon its potential to mobilize masses, internal unity and the type of political system. Brass favors federalism for heterogeneous societies to accommodate ethnic diversity (Brass, 1991).

Frances Stewart (2001) considers multi-dimensional conflict "a pre-eminent problem" of the twenty-first century found in various multiethnic societies of the developing world. Conflict lays its roots in horizontal inequalities existing among ethnically distinct groups. Inequalities range from political exclusion to cultural denial practices (Stewart, 2001). Stewart (2011) explores the effects of horizontal inequalities on the social, economic and

political stability of countries. In her study, she makes an effort to investigate nine case studies; 1. Chiapas<sup>22</sup>, 2. Fiji, 3. Uganda, 4. Malaysia, 5. Sri Lanka, 6. South Africa, 7. Northern Ireland, 8. Brazil and the USA. She concludes that horizontal inequalities are one among the neglected dimensions of development. The socio- economic instability and political marginalization can negatively influence the development process very significantly. Monopolization of state power structure either by the hands of one group or the other ultimately leads to ethnic rift and violence. Thus political inclusion of all the significant ethnic groups is needed to overcome the worse outcomes of ethnicity. Since it becomes a piece of cake for the ethnic elite to mobilize the deprived community against the socially privileged class. Stewart suggests an inclusive and participatory power structure in multi-ethnic and diverse societies to lessen horizontal inequalities (Stewart, 2011).

Rounaq Jahan (1994) contends that the centripetal policies introduced by the Pakistani state are responsible for the development of the challenges of ethnicity. He expostulates that due to chauvinistic approach and biased policies of Ayub regime and constant refusal to allow democratic institutions to function smoothly, a sense of alienation and deprivation started to grow among Bengali nationalists since they were not made the part of the political decision-making process. That led them to fight for provincial autonomy at an early stage and later to independence. Jahan emphasizes to ensure the just and due participation of all the ethnic groups in the political system of the state to eschew the worse repercussions of ethnicity and ethnic conflict (Jahan, 1994).

Khawja Alqama (1997) declares that the monopoly of state apparatus by Punjabi and Mohajir elite classes and the undemocratic military regimes are the factors which paved

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<sup>22</sup> A state of Mexico

the way to formation and development of ethnic nationalism in the united Pakistani state that later facilitated the disintegration of the country in 1971. He outlines that political development and ethnic marshalling have a reciprocal effect on each other. Therefore, it is necessary to include all the ethnic groups in the power-sharing process to get the positive results of economic growth and political development. He suggests that the inclusion of all identity groups in the political structure of the state is the only key to get unity in diversity (Alqama, 1997).

Tahir Amin (1988) focuses on the role of domestic and international factors behind the rise and decline of three ethno-nationalist movements (Pakhtunistan movement, Jeeya Sindh movement and greater Balochistan movement) of Pakistan in the post-1971 scenario. He envisages that the nature of political policies of the state decides the fate of ethnic movements. If the state adopts the accommodative and inclusive approach, it leads to the decline of such movements. Conversely, the monopolization of state power by a few ethnic groups stimulates those who are excluded from the power-sharing structure to contrive secessionist ideologies that lead to the emergence of ethno-nationalist movements. He considers inequalities the fundamental factor to produce ethnic conflict and the demand for provincial autonomy in the Pakistani federation. Amin suggests political and fiscal decentralization along with the inclusive state policies to bring such movements down (Amin, 1988).

Farhan Hanif Siddiqi (2012) discusses the politics of ethnicity in Pakistan with the particular reference of Mohajir, Sindhi and Baloch ethno-nationalism. He opines that the relative marginalization of ethnic groups in terms of economic and political resources is the prime factor that contributes mainly towards the development of the ethnic conflict. He

points out that ethnic identity is mediated and politicized by the political agents and argues that the denial of ethnic identification leads to ethnic assertiveness and political mobilization. He justifies that Pakistan has been experiencing the problems of ethnic conflict in the same pattern (Siddiqi, 2012).

Feroz Ahmed (1998) enumerates the essential elements of ethnic conflict in Pakistan and explores the correlation between ethnicity and state. He contends that the suppressive policies of the state in the name of integrity, security and unity would have adverse effects and can lead to ethnic polarization and extensively examines the case studies of Sindh and Balochistan. He concludes that intergroup ethnic conflict is the result of the subjective state policies and analyzes that ethnic polarization has become widened due to refusal of regional autonomy, inter and intra- provincial large-scale migration, unfair resource allocation and the negation of language and culture of minority groups. Ahmed recommends the recognition of identities, the promotion of their unique culture and language and the equal participation of ethnic groups can boost the process of national integration in Pakistan with less cost (Ahmed, 1998).

Gulshan Majeed (2010) theoretically analyzes the various conflict driving forces such as; religion, territory, caste, culture and language and contends that ethnicity converts into ethnic conflict when it receives imbalanced treatment by state officials. She argues that the uneven distribution of various economic resources triggers the feelings of marginalization and deprivations, which can ultimately adopt the form of ethnic and violent conflict. She extensively investigates the case of Baloch nationalism and concludes that the underdevelopment caused nationalist sentiments among the Baloch community. Majeed

suggests the adequate representation of all the ethnic groups in political and economic opportunities generated by state (Majeed, 2010).

Sadia Mariam Malik (2009) makes an effort to locate the socio-economic basis of the religious confrontation and violent conflict in Pakistan by applying a model proposed by Frances Stewart that “horizontal inequalities” are the most significant force behind the emergence of ethnic and violent conflicts in the developing countries. She explores horizontal inequalities, and bad governance are responsible for increasing religious militancy and ethnic conflicts. Malik suggests a multi-pronged approach to tackle the growing problem of religious and ethnic conflict (Malik, 2009).

Hussain Ahmed Khan (2004) opines that socio-political benefits of the ethnic elite are the significant forces to motivate them to mobilize masses and to develop the ethno-nationalist sentiments. He argues that Siraiki sub-nationalism is not a primordial phenomenon; instead, the ethnic elite to get their own motives is manipulating it as an instrument. Since their desire for power rescinds unique Siraiki identity in south Punjab. He systematically analyzes the impact of state policies on the construction of Siraiki nationalism and concludes that subjective state policies provided a suitable atmosphere for the construction of Siraiki identity as independent and separate from Punjabis (Khan, 2004).

Nukhbah Taj Langah (2012) argues that social, economic, cultural and political grievances are the stimulating factors that have considerably influenced the genesis of ethno-nationalist sentiments in south Punjab. The uneven development pattern and the denial of ethno-linguistic identity forced Siraikis to launch a mass movement for the establishment of a Siraiki province. She investigates the impact of 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional

amendment on the demand of Siraiki province and argues that the insertion of this amendment into the constitution of Pakistan has strengthened the rationale of “Siraikistan” more vigorously. She suggests that the recognition of ethnic identities at both national and provincial level will help to minimize the sense of alienation among ethnic groups (Langah, 2012).

Umbreen Javed (2018) provides a complete analysis of the demand of Bahawalpur province. Moreover, she discusses that though Pakistan adopted a federal political system since her birth, yet the true essence of federalism remains absent and it has been facing many challenges including the problem of the creation of new provinces since beginning. She explores the cardinal factors behind the demand of Bahawalpur province and argues that the backwardness of the region in comparison with northern and central regions of Punjab, and uneven resource distribution are the stimulus forces. She suggests the establishment of many new provinces by holding a referendum in the respective regions to ensure fiscal decentralization and devolution of power as in this way, Pakistani federation would be strengthened (Javed, 2018).

Sana Ullah, Ijaz Khalid & Shazia Hassan (2017) present an analysis of the demand of Siraiki province in the context of the post 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendment scenario. The study explores that 18<sup>th</sup> amendment brought a positive impact on the rationale of separate Siraiki province since through 18<sup>th</sup> amendment the unique identity of Pakhtun people were recognized by changing the provincial name. Hence, this measure justifies their demand on the ethno-linguistic basis as well. Their study concludes that there exist severe socio-economic deprivations in South Punjab; hence, the re-demarcation of Punjab province is

necessary to uplift the impoverished condition of South Punjab masses (Ullah, Khalid & Hassan, 2017).

Akhtar Hussain Sandhu (2015) analyzes the viability for the creation of Siraiki province from various perspectives. He explores the main hurdles faced by Siraiki intellectuals and nationalists. He concludes that Siraiki province movement is not strong enough to get its ultimate objective of the establishment of separate Siraiki province since there is no internal unity among the various Siraiki nationalists. Moreover, they are unable to get electoral support of the people of South Punjab at the name of the slogan of "Siraikistan" (Sandhu, 2015).

Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi & Shahid Ali Khattak (2014) analyzes the negative impacts of the demand of new provinces on the national integration of Pakistan. They contend that though it seems an easy task to carve out new provincial units, yet in practice, it is very complicated and challenging. Hence, instead of forming new provinces, local governments should be strengthened, and good governance needs to be ensured by living within the existing provincial map. They conclude by arguing that creation of new provinces would have worse effects on Pakistani federation so ethnic prejudices should be avoided (Soherwordi & Khattak, 2014).

Muhammad Feyyaz (2011) makes an effort to explore the salient dynamics supporting the demand of a separate Siraiki province and the perspectives of the antagonists of this demand. He states that the demand for separate Siraiki province is not a new voice; instead, has been present since the dissolution of one-unit scheme in 1970 when Bahawalpur state was made a part of Punjab. The region is poor and politically dominated by certain landlords who are only concerned with their interests. The antagonists of the demand claim



that it is not a popular and vocal demand and is being championed by only a few nationalists to get their own motives. He concludes that the failure of the demand to get its objectives lies in its leaders' shortsightedness, disharmony, internal disunity and failure to get the electoral support of their masses (Feyyaz, 2011).

Muhammad Mushtaq & Misbah Shaheen (2017) examine the Siraiki province movement and its significant achievements and impediments in its way to get the ultimate objective of the creation of Siraiki province. They state that Siraikis are demanding a separate province since the 1970s, but the demand got impetus after the incorporation of 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendment. Siraiki movement successfully achieved some of its primary objectives such as; recognition of Siraiki as a separate language by state and other ethnic groups. However, it is still far away to get its primary goal that is the up-gradation of the region into a separate province. The study concludes that to get this dream fulfilled, Siraiki nationalists, need to transform their ideology, strategy and criteria as the region is home of an overwhelming non-Siraiki population too (Mushtaq & Shaheen, 2017).

Khalid Manzoor Butt & Burhan Ahmed (2016) argue that in a situation where uneven development pattern persists over a long period, separatist and nationalist tendencies are very much prone to grow. Same happened in the case of Pakistan; the long run presence of regional disparity in terms of health, education and employment opportunities provided a fertile environment for the genesis of ethno-nationalism. They analyze the demand of Siraiki province in the context of socio-economic underdevelopment and conclude that there exist sharp inequalities in Siraiki region as compared to central and northern regions of Punjab (Butt & Ahmed, 2016).

Muhammad Farooq & Muhammad Farooq (2017) examine the historical and political discourse of Siraiki movement from 1971 to 1977. They discuss the initial stage of development of Siraiki movement that it was initiated to preserve the unique Siraiki identity, culture and language but later became a political movement with its sole objective to get a separate Siraiki province. They conclude that state-sponsored injustices provide incentives for the development of ethno-nationalist sentiments. Hence, the national and provincial governments should ensure the provision of necessary facilities and even development opportunities for all the regions (Farooq & Farooq, 2017).

Sultan Mubariz Khan, Misbah Shaheen & Manzoor Ahmad (2019) examine the correlation between horizontal inequalities and identity conflicts in the context of the demand of new provinces in Pakistan. The study explores a positive and direct relationship between the identity conflicts and horizontal inequalities by unveiling the fact that political exclusion; economic underdevelopment and the denial of culture and identity cause to kindle the conflicts. Immediate measures to resolve the issues originated due to the presence of multiple inequalities can avoid conflicts' escalation and the eruption of political violence. The study concludes that the establishment of small size constituent units in a country makes the prospects of separatism less feasible as it is relatively more challenging for the smaller units to launch successful secessionist movements and convert their respective region into sovereign states. They recommend that the Pakistani state's integrity would be strengthened by creating smaller units (Khan, Shaheen & Ahmad, 2019).

Moonis Ahmar (2013) examines possible approaches to prevent ethnic conflict in case the new provinces are created. He states that the establishment of new provincial units without considering the wishes and whims of all the direct and indirect stakeholders can

open a floodgate for future tensions. He explains the dynamics of ethnic conflict with the particular reference of Hazara province and concludes that the up-gradation of existing unit “divisions” into provinces can help to curb negative nationalist tendencies (Ahmar, 2013).

Muhammad Usman Asghar, (2012) argues that due to underdevelopment and uneven distribution of socioeconomic resources, the demand for more provinces is increasingly getting popularity. He states that the demarcation of more and new provinces would probably bring economic prosperity for the deprived and neglected masses of the concerned regions. He discusses the legal and administrative perspective to create new provinces and suggests a four-tier model that has been successfully applied in Papua New Guinea to resolve the issue of the creation of more provinces (Asghar, 2012).

Saman Zulfiqar (2012) argues that although Pakistan claims to be a federal state, yet it lacks its true spirit and specific contentious issues remain present between the federation and federating units. Pertinent among them are the demands of greater provincial autonomy and the distribution of resources. However, a new challenge in the form of the demand of new provinces has been added up in the existing troubles. She analyzes the arguments and rationale of the proponents and the opponents of the demand of new provinces and concludes that provincial boundaries should only be readjusted by adopting constitutional measures and through developing national consensus. (Zulfiqar, 2012).

Malik Muhammad Hafeez (2014) analyzes the constitutional and legal framework for the establishment of new constituent units in Pakistan. He presents a comparative analysis of the provincial structure of India, United States of America and Australia and supports his argument in favor of the formation of new provinces. He deeply investigates legal procedure to be adopted in this regard to establishing new provinces. Article 239 of the

constitution of Pakistan, which deals with such issues, needs to be amended, as in the presence of existing political structure and political parties, it does not seem possible to get a two-third majority either in the national or provincial parliament. He suggests that while making legislation for the formation of new provinces, historical affinities, linguistic differences and administrative efficiency must be kept in consideration to get the optimal results (Hafeez, 2014).

Muhammad Mushtaq (2016) correlates the quest of regions for separate provinces with the challenges faced by Pakistani federation. He explains that the center-province relations have been sour and bitter since the inception of Pakistan. Provinces had been demanding provincial autonomy while the center was not ready to accept this demand. However, in 2010, this demand of greater provincial autonomy was endorsed through 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendment. The minority ethnic groups started to demand the separate provinces to enjoy provincial autonomy fully as in the existing provincial adjustment; they are treated as minority groups and are deprived. He concludes that it seems that federation is reluctant to accept this demand of more provinces as in case of creation of one new province; it can open a floodgate of many new such demands (Mushtaq, 2016).

#### **Gaps identified in the Reviewed Literature.**

Though, previously many renowned scholars have explored various vital perspectives in the originating process of ethnicity, ethnic conflict, provincial autonomy, ethno-nationalist movements, demand for a new provincial map and the creation of new provinces. However, very limited literature based on the empirical data is available to analyze the role of horizontal inequalities (HIs) in the genesis of the demand of new provinces in Pakistan. Hence, to bridge this gap identified by reviewing the literature, the

present dissertation is staunch to explore the dynamic pattern of the demand for a new provincial map in Pakistan with the reference of two case studies; Hazara province and Siraiki province. The study is based on primary data inferred from the various reports as well as the direct observation of opinion of general masses of the target area regarding their complaints to be deprived in terms of socio-political and economic development. Furthermore, comparative analysis of the four facets of inequalities apprehends the demand pattern by analyzing that either it is the case of the denial of identity and other cultural deprivations or uneven allocation of political and economic resources is the real stimulant driver behind the development of the demand for new provinces. Therefore, this research unveils the role of horizontal inequalities on the one hand and the nature of the demand of new provinces on the other hand. Hence, the present study aims to bring a significant contribution (based on the most recent literature and primary data) to the existing scholarship on Horizontal Inequalities and the demand of new provinces.

### **1.8 Research Methodology**

This study is based on deductive reasoning along with conclusive (descriptive (what) and explanatory research design (how; cause and effect)) approach as the general theoretical assumptions of a well-established model have been applied in the specific context of the demand of new provinces in Pakistan. The Explanatory research method has been found appropriate to explain the cause and effect relationship between horizontal inequalities (cause) and the demand for new provinces (effect). Hence, the independent variable of the study is “horizontal inequalities,” while the dependent variable is “demand of new provinces.”

### **1.8.1 Research Design.**

Primarily, this study is based on quantitative methods design. Quantitative data were collected in two stages; at first, the data was extracted from the various reports and was analyzed statistically to examine the nature and type of horizontal inequalities. In the second stage, to verify and authenticate the results of the data collected through published sources, a close-ended questionnaire was designed to collect the opinion of the masses of the region.

### **1.8.2 Population.**

According to the sixth census, 2017 the total population of the three divisions (Multan, Bahawalpur, Dera Ghazi Khan) of Punjab is 34,743,590 whereas the population of Hazara division of KP is 5,325,121 that is the target population of this study.

### **1.8.3 Sampling.**

Since the universal population of the present study is heterogeneous in terms of language, ethnicity, culture, profession, and academic level, hence to draw a representative and appropriate sample size for the study, two steps nested stratified random sampling technique has been utilized. Four non-overlapping strata were formed (groups - based on specific shared characteristics) from the sample frame as; academicians<sup>23</sup>, middle-class professionals<sup>24</sup>, politicians and journalists<sup>25</sup>. Then, the sample was drawn from each stratum independently.

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<sup>23</sup>. Academicians include teachers, researchers and students.

<sup>24</sup>. Middle Class Professionals include doctors, advocates, poets, writers, farmers and bankers.

<sup>25</sup>. Journalists include analysts, newspaper editors, blog and column writers and reporters.




Figure 1. Sample Flow Chart.

#### 1.8.4 Instrumentation.

A structured questionnaire based on the assumptions of the horizontal inequalities model developed by the researcher has been used as an instrument to get the opinion of the

sampled population. It is comprised of two parts. The first part deals with the preliminary information of the respondents, such as; age, academic qualification, profession, gender, district of residence, linguistic identity, and political affiliation. The second part of the questionnaire is based on the theoretical assumptions of the horizontal inequalities model. The rating scale for response administration has been provided with four response categories: 'Strongly agree', 'agree', 'disagree', 'strongly disagree' with scores 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively. The scale consists of a set of items (measures) to which the respondents were asked to show their opinion. Measures that are seemed to be either definitely favorable (strongly agree) or definitely unfavorable (strongly disagree) to the attitude under study are used. The "Neutral" response category was eliminated after pilot testing. The respondents indicate their agreement or disagreement against each statement. Each respondent's total score indicates his or her tendency on a scale of favorable–unfavorable attitude towards the said statement.

Before getting the opinion, the respondents were briefed about the purpose of the survey that it is a part of academic research carried out by a PhD student from International Islamic University, Islamabad. They were assured that their confidentiality would be kept intact, data will be processed anonymously, and the identifiable information would only be available to the researcher. The respondents were not forced to participate and were told that participation in this survey is voluntary; you can stop participation at any moment. If you withdraw consent to use data, all of your data will be removed from the data file used for analysis. Only literate population (at least having primary school education) was included in the sample, but no exclusion was made based on age, gender, religion, lingual identity or minorities.



### **1.8.5 Pilot Testing.**

To ensure the reliability and validity of the instrument (questionnaire), a pilot study was conducted. 18% of the respondents were taken randomly from the pool of sampled populations in both the targeted regions and were pursued to fill the close-ended questionnaire. As the sample calculated for this study is 1067 and 532 from Punjab and KP respectively, therefore 193 and 96 respondents were chosen from the pool of sample size from Punjab and KP accordingly. Cronbach's alpha and correlation analyses were performed on the collected data for statistical analysis. 0.77 value of Cronbach's alpha and the significance level of correlations at 0.01 and 0.05 levels (2-tailed) proved that the questionnaire is reliable and valid as per the objectives of this study. Hence, it can be used as a reliable and valid instrument for public opinion survey.

### **1.8.6 Data Collection.**

Both primary and secondary sources have been used for data collection. Primary sources include public opinion survey, Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS), Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM), Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES), Compendium on Environment Statistics of Pakistan (CESP), District Census Reports, Economic Survey of Pakistan, National Finance Commission Awards (NFCA), Punjab Provincial Finance Commission Awards (PPFCA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Finance Commission Awards (KPPFCA) and other reports published time to time by Pakistan Bureau of Statistics and Non- Governmental Organizations have been used for data collection. The secondary sources of material, such as books, journal articles, periodicals, magazines, newspapers, archives, and websites are

utilized. All the sources remained much fruitful to interpret the data and to draw the pertinent findings.

#### **1.8.7 Data Analysis Techniques.**

The responses of the sampled population have been quantified, and to perform statistical analysis, Descriptive statistics such as frequency and contingency tables have been used by using SPSS and Minitab software. The text and statistical analysis have been interpreted accordingly. Regression and correlation analysis techniques have been performed to analyze the similarities between the applicability levels of the model in the context of the demand of new provinces in both the provinces.

### **1.9 Conceptualization and Operationalization**

Operationalization is an operation/process to define and lemmatize the well-established variables used in a particular study into measurable indicators. The process determines the variables and makes it possible for the researcher to measure them quantitatively. Thereby, to avoid the definitional issues, the operational definitions of all the essential concepts used throughout the study have been described precisely.

#### **1.9.1 Horizontal Inequalities.**

The central concept and the independent variable of the study is “Horizontal Inequalities (HIs)”;

however, the critical issue with the measurement and the analysis of the concept of HIs is how groups are formed, constructed and defined. The general masses can be classified using different indicators; by gender, ethnicity, race, religion, region, profession, age or political affiliation. Sometimes these markers overlap in-group association; however, only those classifications are considered significant that appear to be

of paramount importance to them. (Inside a group as well as outside the group). Probably the conspicuousness of a specific identity would be accentuated due to the presence of severe inequalities and chauvinism among the groups. Groups' distinct identities can not be of much importance where there is equality and even development. The nature of a group and constituting marker constructed that group; it can influence the impact of HIs. Throughout this study, the term group/groups are referred to identity groups distinct from other sorts of groups based on shared regional identity. The other relevant term used in this study, "Horizontal Inequalities" (HIs) is defined as inequalities found among groups of people with common identity (ethnic, religious, racial, regional, class, gender).

Contrary to it, there is a concept of Vertical Inequalities (VIs), which refer to the inequalities that exist among households or individuals of the same ethnic group. HIs are multidimensional, including political and social dimensions, as well as economic and cultural. The elements in each of these dimensions are different from each other but are interrelated. HIs arise where group boundaries are relatively impermeable. Even if group boundaries are relatively tight, if HIs of all sorts (including political as well as economic) are low, group identity is unlikely to be necessary as a source of political identity.

#### ***1.9.1.1 Political Horizontal Inequalities (PHIs).***

This type includes inequalities in the distribution of political opportunities and other sources of power among different ethnic groups, including control over the army, the cabinet, local and regional governments, parliamentary assemblies, the police, and the presidency. They also encompass inequalities in people's capabilities to participate

politically and to express their needs, such as budget, taxation and welfare reform projects.

In this study PHIs have been measured through the following indicators;

- The relative representation in provincial parliaments and cabinets
- The relative representation in judicial institutions and police departments
- Reform Projects and Annual Development Funds

#### ***1.9.1.2 Economic Horizontal inequalities (EHIs).***

The economic dimension of HIs includes; income and access to assets of various kinds, especially access to land and employment opportunities. EHIs are input types of inequalities as they are primarily based on income, and income is based on three types of sources; financial, human, and social. In contrast, SHIs are considered the output types of inequalities. If input inequalities would be less, output inequalities would automatically be lesser, and in case of sharper input inequalities, the output inequalities would be more severe. EHIs have been measures through the following indicators;

- Income
- Employment
- Poverty Level
- Land Acquisition

#### ***1.9.1.3 Social Horizontal Inequalities (SHIs).***

The social dimension incorporates different social outcomes, such as life expectancy, infant and child mortality rate, educational attainment level, access to services, such as health institutions, schools, colleges and universities, sanitation facilities, potable water supplies and housing. It is evident that the above-listed list is not only a matter of

output; instead, it is an amalgamation of both inputs and output. However, the outcomes are directly relevant to the prosperity and well-being, but to reach them, proper access to input measures is prerequisite; hence, it is pertinent to append both. SHIs have been measured with the help of following indicators;

- Literacy
- Health services
- Household

#### ***1.9.1.4 Cultural Horizontal inequalities (CHIs).***

Cultural dimensions include societal respect from one identity group for other group's religious practices, norms, customs, language and cultural recognition (public holidays, local newspapers, language recognition in a political and educational institutions), and dress. CHIs have been measured with the help of following indicators;

- Public holidays at provincial and national level
- Newspapers, TV and Radio Programs
- Language recognition at provincial and national level
- Religious and Cultural Festivals

### **1.10 Structure of the Study**

The present study has been organized into six chapters. It begins with the introductory chapter, which uncovers the rationale of the study, objectives, research questions, significance, research methodology, and delimitations of the study. The preceding chapter of the study elucidates the theoretical and conceptual framework by bordering on the important studies within the literature of horizontal inequalities. The

hypothetical statement that the chapter seeks to unravel is: conflict-prone states are more likely to be impacted by the presence of horizontal inequalities. An effort has been made to investigate the correlation between the development of the demand of new provinces and horizontal inequalities generally and particularly in the context of Pakistan.

The next chapter named “The Evolution of the Demand of New Provinces in Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal” provides a detailed account of the demand for new provinces. The chapter is a detailed note on the available studies, made on the topic of the demand of new provinces by different scholars. The fourth chapter lays out an empirical analysis of the demand for a new province in Punjab. The opening section of the chapter presents the historical discourse on the development of the demand in the province. The nature of the demand of the new province has been investigated while employing the different measures of horizontal inequalities. The underpinned factors and the reasons behind the socio-cultural and political mobilization of Siraiki identity, which triggered the demand of new provinces in the provinces, have been examined with the help of statistical analysis performed on the data generated through the public opinion survey and from the insights of experts’ interviews.

The fifth chapter deals with the case study of the demand for a new province in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The first section of the chapter presents the historical discourse of the demand over time. The nature of demand has been investigated while employing the different measures of horizontal inequalities. The underpinned factors and the reasons behind the socio-cultural and political mobilization among the Hazaraeval have been examined with the help of statistical analysis performed on the data generated through the survey and from the insights of experts’ interviews.

The last chapter consists of two sections. The first section logically concludes the empirical findings and elaborates the evidence-based comparison between the applicability levels of horizontal inequalities with the reference of the demand of new provinces in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The similarities and contrasts between both the case studies is a pivotal portion of the chapter. The second section proposes some policy implications and recommendations to tackle the dilemma of horizontal inequalities to avoid the worse consequences of the demand of new provinces and to get the unity in diversity within the existing territorial structure.

## **Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework**

The present chapter begins with the introduction of horizontal inequalities model and precedes explaining the justification underlying the perusal of this model in the study. The next section follows the extensive elaboration of the four dimensions, i.e. political, social, cultural, and economic, and how studies conducted previously measured these variables in multiple case studies by using different indicators. The concluding section investigates the correlation between the demand of new provinces in Pakistan and the horizontal inequalities model.

Indeed, an intrinsic feature of human life is to live in communities and to form groups; it is this, which makes up the identity of individuals and groups. As Ernest Gellner argued, “there is a universal human need to “belong, to identify and hence to exclude oneself from others” (Gellner, 2008). Moreover, this need leads towards identification based on certain distinctions such as language, culture, religion, profession, class, region etc. Gradually the urge to be identified independently and distinctively paves the way for the formation of identity while region, religion, culture, language, etc. become the identity markers distinguishing one from the others. Initially such identities become a strong source of influence on individuals and on later stages; they acquire potential to induce groups as well. The majority has multiple identities, some region-based, profession-based, religion-based and some culture-based. The individuals who share common identities form groups and consider themselves distinct from others. The binding marker can range from cultural homogeneity to common ancestry. On a broader level, these distinct groups form societies; however, in some societies, they are living peacefully and in others, there are riots, violent conflict, and civil wars between them. Hence, it is pertinent to investigate about the drivers



of conflict among these ethnically distinct groups. The theoretical propositions of Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) proposed by Frances Stewart assert that when social, economic, cultural and political inequalities persistently exist between the identity groups<sup>26</sup>; a sense of deep resentment and marginalization is instigated and if not addressed adequately by the state authorities; on later stages, it can lead to ethnic struggle, provincial autonomy, the demand of new constituent units and sometimes in worse circumstances; can even allure to violent conflict and civil war resulting into separatist and secessionist tendencies as it happened in Sri Lanka, Spain and Azerbaijan (Stewart, 2001).

This theory was considered fit in the contextual framework of the study due to the following reasons; the theory is a blend of the assumptions of multiple theories such as; relative deprivation (RD) and social exclusion (SE). The basic unit of analysis used in relative deprivation theorem is an individual of a group while income and the wealth consumption rate among the members of a certain group are the indicators to measure relative deprivation among the members of that group. Relative deprivation is an instrument to analyze vertical inequalities (VIs) as Vertical inequalities exist among households and individuals and not among the groups. The primary focus of the RD is to investigate only the economic disparities among the individuals; secondly, political, social and cultural disparities are not evaluated and relatively ignored in this theory. On the other side, social exclusion theory states a situation, which prevents both individuals and groups' full participation in the economic, social and political power structures at the national, regional and local levels; it consequently develops a sense of alienation and deprivation

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<sup>26</sup>. Who consider themselves distinct from other groups owing to unique ethnicity, race, religion, gender, region, class or profession.

among them, based on the exclusionary relationship. While it ignores an important dimension of the cultural aspect that is measured by culture and linguistic identities and has potential to become a muscular impulse to mobilize groups when social, political, and economic grievances are present.

In contrast to RD and SE theories, “Horizontal inequalities” is a multidimensional theory including four facets; political horizontal inequalities (PHIs), social horizontal inequalities (SHIs), cultural horizontal inequalities (CHIs), and economic horizontal inequalities (EHIs). These four aspects cover almost all types of inequalities and stress upon group-based inequalities, which is considered a prerequisite to induce group-based grievances that can become a source of ethnic conflict, political violence, and provincial autonomy, the demand of separate constituent units and even of separatist propensity in some cases. Thereby, such identity based socio-economic conflicts are the most suitable candidates to analyze the relationship between the demand of new constituent units (new provinces) and horizontal inequalities in Pakistan as the demanding regions and groups (South Punjab (Siraiki) and Hazara division (Hindkowan)) of new provinces complaint to be socio-economically marginalized and culturally deprived by the other regions and groups. Therefore, the framework of horizontal inequalities theory fits best for the present study to investigate the correlation between the demand for new provinces and horizontal inequalities.

Horizontal inequalities model refers to such type of inequalities, which are found among those identity groups that share identical regional identities. They establish the most significant types of inequalities, precisely, due to their significance for social steadiness and justice, where pertinent categories of the group include religion, region, race, class,

ethnicity, age, and gender. Individuals can be clustered through different means, and most of the people adhere to or are affiliated with several groups. The conundrum while evaluating horizontal inequalities found in any country; is to fix the criteria for formation and classification of groups. The most suitable classification is one that contemplates the distinctions of identity that are substantial to people, in terms of both their peculiar apparent identity and how others perceive them. Some of the group categories are likely to be insignificant or temporary, for instance, specific club membership. However, other group categorizations determine the way individuals see themselves and how they are treated and interacted (Stewart, 2016).

Available research studies show that there are several reasons and origins of organized dissimilarities amid different religious, ethnic, and regional conflicts. They are associated with different aspects, for instance, climatological and ecological differences, natural resource endowments distribution, the derivative effect of colonialism, and several economic policies (Brown & Langer, 2010). The origin of horizontal inequalities is in their historical situation – frequently the colonial policies that remained more favorable for some of the groups over others. Though horizontal inequalities are not often instigated deliberately and cautiously, thus, merely become evident. Horizontal inequalities are inclined to repeat over some time and frequently endure for decades. The benefit in beginning results in long-term snowballing and provides advantages since education and resources allow the more favored groups to assure further benefits (Stewart, 2009).

For instance, children growing up in poor and low-income communities generally have either less or no access to standard schools, and due to having no access to these resources, people from such communities have to travel long distances in geographical and

social terms, for the upbringing of their children out of immiserating (Stewart, 2009). According to the horizontal inequality theory, the jeopardy of mobilization of the violent group is high when people have this perception in their minds that their deprivation in terms of social and economic basis is deliberately caused by the government (Langer & Brown, 2008).

In the global political discussion, the growing importance of inequalities has heated the debate about how to conceptualize inequalities in the present era; this complicated situation has raised two questions; what exactly is inequality? Moreover, inequalities between whom? (McDoom, 2018). The term “Horizontal inequalities” was first conceptualized, presented, and developed primarily by Frances Stewart (2002), and became significant for both consequentialist and normative reasons. Stewart & Langer (2006) define horizontal inequalities as “the inequality amid culturally constructed or characterized groups”, and it is contrary to vertical inequality, which is defined as “the inequality amid individuals or households of the same group”. The political, social, and economic inequality amid ethno-linguistic groups within a country is referred to as horizontal inequality (Sande, 2016). Normative concerns for fairness in society have emerged through material differences amid ethno cultural groups that result, such as, from present-day prejudice or historical drawbacks and discrimination (McDoom, 2018).

“Horizontal inequalities” is considered to be significant since it has evident contrary consequences, and researchers have identified several indicators to measure it. The definition of horizontal inequality by Stewart (2002) also clearly recognizes the socially raised nature of ethno cultural groups (McDoom & Gisselquist, 2016). Researchers have carried out extensive empirical work on horizontal inequality which connects with

underprivileged social integration (McDoom, 2018), under-provision of public goods (Baldwin & Huber, 2010), unstable democracy (Huber & Suryanarayan, 2014), economic under-development (Stewart, 2002), and more generally with social conflict and civil war (Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2013). Unequal access to social, economic, and political resources to different ethnic groups can decrease the individual benefits in the following groups over and above what their discrete emplacement would value since their self-confidence is wrapped up with the development of the group. Merely of better importance is the contention that where there are dissimilarities in access to resources and outcomes, agreeing with differences in cultures and later can become an influential rallying representative that could result in a series of political disturbances (Stewart, 2002)

## **2.1 Horizontal Inequalities' Indicators**

The research study of Ostby (2003) identified armed conflict as an indicator of horizontal inequalities. She contends that armed conflicts involve high social, economic, and human costs, which become a key source of poverty and underdevelopment across the globe. A civil war in the contemporary era has become more common than interstate conflicts. She took thirty-six case studies from developing countries including Pakistan over the period of 1986–2004 and investigated the relationship between political violence and horizontal inequalities (social and economic inequalities). Her study concludes that ethnic mobilization and social horizontal inequalities has a positive relationship in the outbreak of violence (Gurr, 1993; Gurr, 2000). It is contended by Murshed & Gates (2005) that a sense of shared identity builds the bonds between different ethnic groups, and hence minimizes the intra-ethnic conflict. It is if groups have become the fundamental units in conflicts; however, the question arises how they are mobilized. Stewart (2000), in her

research study, demonstrated how different grounds of identity have the source for mobilization and differentiation of group.

Ethnicity in central Africa has been the foremost foundation of group categorization. Group identification and organization in Central America have been established along the lines of social class with partially coinciding dimensions of ethnicity. Whereas, the regional location has become a source of group categorization in Northern Ireland and the Balkans region, with some overlapping ethnic or linguistic segmentations (Kanbur & Venables, 2003). In general, it is where switching is problematic that horizontal inequalities become applicable to social stability; therefore, in any specific circumstances, social and historical context might influence the possibilities. For instance, changing religion for an individual in Europe is relatively easy in the contemporary era; however, it was not easy in earlier times when religious divisions in Europe were the foremost reason for conflict while individuals might find it problematic in switching ethnicities (Querol, 2002).

Esteban & Ray (2011) stated that income inequalities are directly connected to horizontal inequalities and gradually such persistent pattern of inequalities become the driving force to ethnic and violent conflicts. Separation apprehends the degree to which society is constellated around a small number of remote and relatively homogeneous groupings. It intends that society be more paralyzed; firstly, there is a much wider gap amid groups that creates a sense of alienation. Secondly, it creates more demographic separation through the structure of the population to the perfect distribution of a population. Lastly, when a group is internally more homogenous, it creates inequalities within the groups. Thus, separation leads to inequality among groups (Zhang & Kanbur, 2003).

Horizontal inequality is connected to the collective acts of violence through the relative deprivation theory. It is experiencing an undesirable comparative counterpart, another individual on the cornerstone of an inconsistency amid anticipated wellbeing, and achieved wellbeing, that they think are admissibly entitled to. When such type of inequalities is believed to be unlawful and dishonest or more indubitably to be caused by any other source leads to frustration, which can transform into aggression. Anger, resulting in aggression and frustration, is comprehended to be a function related to the extent of relative deprivation. Hence, the more extreme the inequality and deprivation become more potential for aggression it results (Zanden, 2017).

Horizontal Inequalities are present within the countries and societies as well as between the countries and societies. Stewart points out inequalities between Muslims and non-Muslims across the globe. She took three case studies from Europe; France, Britain, and the Netherlands, six case studies from Asia; Malaysia, Indonesia, India, China, Philippines, and Thailand; three from West Africa; Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria and Palestine and Israeli from the Middle East. The Muslim community in the Netherlands and France forms about six percent of the total population of each country while in Britain; they are approximately two percent of the whole population. Nevertheless, their representation in educational, health and political institutions is much lower than their proportion of the population. The majority of Muslims live in low-income regions, and their educational attainment level is low while the dropout level is relatively higher than non-Muslims are. Cultural inequalities are also very evident in countries such as dress code issues, headscarf problems, and national holidays. Muslims are also facing political inequalities as despite being six percent and two percent of the total population; their

representation is hardly about one percent or less than one percent in political institutions of France, Netherlands, and Britain, respectively. In Asian countries, they are also suffering from multiple inequalities such as in Malaysia. Though, Muslims account for a two-third population of the country; they are facing severe economic horizontal inequalities in terms of income growth and access to wealth resources. In Indonesia, Muslims form an overwhelming majority of eighty-four percent of the total population; however, their income level is significantly low than other non-Muslim groups.

In India, the Muslim population is about fourteen percent, but their ratio in the political institution is hardly about seven percent. The literacy rate is reported comparatively low among Muslims, and their share in public jobs is less than half of their proportion of the population. Among Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria, Ghana and Nigeria's socio-economic situation are worse in the regions where the Muslim community resides. Political and cultural inequalities are relatively less in Ghana and Nigeria but in Cote d'Ivoire Muslim community has been completely excluded politically and culturally that lead towards the outbreak of violent conflict in the country in 2002 (Stewart, 2013).

### **2.1.1 Economic Horizontal Inequalities (EHIs).**

The economic horizontal inequalities encompass inequalities of assets – natural resource-based, financial, social, and human – and inequalities of incomes and opportunities of employment that rely on these assets and general conditions of the economy (Langer & Brown, 2008). Majority of the inequality and conflict studies carried out by researchers entirely focus on economic inequality, more specifically operationalized as land distribution inequality or income inequality (Ostby, 2006). It is argued by Stewart (2002) that in the horizontal inequalities, it is not only imperative to be mindful of the



group boundaries, but also the inequality as a multidimensional concept, which is the objective to encompass the complete depiction of the relationship between inequality and conflict. Therefore, inequalities should be measured along several dimensions and not only with economic inequality. However, it is argued that the most significant and frequently encountered issue emerges from focusing on economic inequality, and it is considered the main concentration of attention in the analysis of inequality (Ostby, 2008).

Few of the research studies have laid stress on economic inequality amid religious and ethnic groups. A significant but seldom unambiguous, dissimilarity in the empirical examination of economic horizontal inequality is the dissimilarity amid inequality summary indices and relative position measures. The earlier information on both comparatively rich and comparatively poor groups within a topographical, region or country is, generally to make available collective measures of total inequality, i.e., distribution of wealth in each region. This approach simplifies the anticipations of how an expected a conflict is to erupt in a specific region or country (Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010).

Income inequality is one of the aspects of economic horizontal inequality. Kanbur (2007) suggests three main characteristics of the national income distribution, which are fundamental to policy arguments, firstly the mean or average of the income distribution, the distribution spread, and the distribution lower tail. Secondly, it is apprehended by several inequality measures, for instance: the Gini coefficient. Lastly, it attempts to define poverty. However, to measure poverty, it is essential to determine the line of poverty or to break off that delineates the poor. Theoretically, either income inequality can fall or rise when poverty is falling, and average growth is rising (Ostby, 2013). The instigating point

that connects economic development and income inequality is documented by (Kuznet, 1955), a noble prizewinner in his work by developing the basic notion of an inverted U-relationship amid economic development and income inequality. However, generally, it is accepted that poverty spawns conflict (Buhaug, Gleditsch, et al., 2011).

Another significant aspect of economic horizontal inequality is land distribution inequality. The land is considered as a fundamental asset and factor of production in economics. Even in the contemporary era, the land has retained the source of status and wealth. However, research studies show that in developing economies, lands in rural areas are used mainly for agricultural productivity and it is contended that land inequality results in low agricultural productivity, high poverty rates, low growth, and tyrannical social relations (Faguet, 2016).

Collier (2007) contends that the most significant driver of civil wars is greed. The results of the study illustrate that there is little evidence found that grievances, for instance, economic or political inequality correlates to civil wars. The findings of the study were in line with the results of Stewart (2002), who emphasized more on inequalities and grievances. She stated that when governments start winning confidence and trust in societies, inequalities and grievances are reduced. Furthermore, it is revealed that economic inequalities are not the only reason for violent conflicts and they are driven by several other factors that frequently interrelate with each other (Keen, 2012). Whereas Cederman, Wimmer, & Min (2010) show that, there is a correlation amid the vast extent of economic horizontal inequalities and sublime risk of violent conflict.

### **2.1.2 Political Horizontal Inequalities (PHIs).**

Political horizontal inequalities encompass inequalities regarding political opportunities, distribution of power among groups, encompassing control over the army and police, local and regional governments, the cabinet, presidency, and parliamentary assemblies. Political horizontal inequalities also include those inequalities in the capabilities of individuals to contribute politically and to convey their demands (Stewart, 2010). Inequalities in the political contribution are not new-fangled. Researchers have consistently documented organized transformations in contribution throughout groups; specifically, highly educated people's participation is active as compared to less educated (Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 2012). Such kinds of inequalities can be traced to inadequate access to essential resources for contribution, for instance: money, civic skills, time, low recruitment rates into political activities through organization memberships and social networks. Political inequalities have become a key challenge for democracies in several countries since it entails that some of the citizens' voices are louder than others in public scope (Thorson, Xu & Edgerly, 2018).

It is explicitly contended that both grievances and ethnic identities reciprocally make each other stronger: "grievances and possibilities for political mobilization of a group are both determined by the group identity strength" (Gurr, 1993). It is argued by Petersen (2002) that people sometimes resent, and resentment is the sense of being politically prevailed by a group having no right to be in a position of superiority". On the other hand, groups who are comparatively benefited might also go through collective grievances owing to their concerns that the underprivileged group can benefit from political power and calls

for more redistribution of resources or instigate armed violence due to aggression to compensate their grievances (Sambanis & Milanovic, 2011).

Cederman, Wimmer, & Min (2010), in their study, attempted to relate political inequalities with conflict. They examined one hundred and twenty-five ethnic conflicts, which took place over the period of 1946 to 2005. They tested hypothesis linking ethnic groups' admittance to power and conflict. The results of the study indicated that conflict increases when exclusion from political activities occurs.

### **2.1.3 Social Horizontal Inequalities (SHIs).**

Social horizontal inequalities involve inequalities in admittance to various services, for instance: health care, education, housing, and the access to advantages of health care and educational outcomes as well (Stewart, 2010). Some of the governments and dominant ethnic groups often use educational policies as discriminatory policies to halt down minorities (DiGiuseppe, Barry, & Frank, 2012). In some of the developing countries, the public sector is comparatively large and frequently the critical source of specialized and proficient employment. Prejudicial governments impede the recruitment of minorities, confine the economic opportunities of individuals in the group, and try to uphold material drawbacks of that group (Gurr, 2000). The blacks in South Africa were omitted from most of the professional and skilled jobs. The non-presence of social opportunities related to inadequate access to appropriate education and skills based on ethnicity is supposed to contribute to the peril of civil war (Mansoor & Gates, 2005).

Moreover, the absence of standard occupations among young males has been significantly contributing to jeopardies, since the difference in societies contemplates and sustains ethnic gratifications, and they improve the desires of people to compensate and

revenge (Collier, 2007). The study of Bahgat et al. (2017) induces consideration of the effect of ethnic division in combining inequality and underdevelopment. Furthermore, it is revealed that ethnic and racial divisions have fewer inducements for individuals to be generous to others through social wellbeing and destabilize the government support on public spending. It is observed in the study that the least ethnically divided societies in Sub-Saharan Africa are spending five times greater per capita on HIV treatment and prevention as compared to most divided societies (Bahgat, et al., 2017).

#### **2.1.4 Cultural Horizontal Inequalities (CHIs).**

The cultural status of horizontal inequalities encompasses differences in the acknowledgement and position of different languages, customs, groups, practices, religion, and norms (Stewart, 2010). The cultural status inequalities not only add to the grievances but also to the predicament of the groups more firmly (Langer & Stewart, 2013). The definition of cultural status inequality addresses a wide range of practices. It is asserted that the final form of cultural status inequality comprises of the physical process, often considered as ethnocide or cultural genocide, through which the government acquires the cultural garb of the first group and renounces the appearance of various other cultural identities, not only in the public arena but also in the private arena (Langer & Brown, 2008). Cultural status inequality also takes place wherever the government accompanies principally, although not entirely with one cultural group. However, some of the official empty talks of cultural inclusion are used to disguise various other kinds of inequalities, which is also considered as the dark side of cultural status inequality. Some of the governments officially recognize cultural status equality, along with symbolic ethnic or religious diversity promotion just to use it as a political agenda to divert the attention of

individuals and groups from several underlying social, economic and political inequalities (Parekh, 2004).

The study of Khosla (2000) on cultural status inequalities finds that several restrictions imposed on cultural and religious practices in Tibet by the Chinese Officials are a practice of de-culturing a specific group by destroying their religious symbols and Buddhist monasteries, which is a cultural genocide and a form of cultural, social inequality. Parekh (2004) stated that the government might not ultimately bring into the line itself with specific cultural groups but yield them with a real higher status. Moreover, it is revealed that in most of the Western European countries, a group of immigrants is confronted with a real white Christian state.

## **2.2 Horizontal Inequalities and the Demand of New Provinces in Pakistan: The Nexus**

The history of Pakistan, like many other developing states is documented by various types of conflicts, like many other developing nations. These conflicts range from ethnic conflicts in Karachi to insurgencies in Balochistan and religious violence in different parts of the country. The extraordinary growth of religious extremism in the northwestern region of Pakistan, along with other conflicts, poses a severe threat to security and peace. Therefore, it is essential to comprehend the root causes of these conflicts in Pakistan by presenting the indications how horizontal inequalities, social and economic deprivation, and undermining of social contract between government and inhabitants might have contributed in terms of marshalling support for conflicts, radicalization and religious militancy (Malik, 2009).

Pakistani society is suffering from all types of horizontal inequalities, such as economic, social, political, and cultural. The growing economic inequality in Pakistan is a serious threat as poverty is broadly measured by an index that employs multiple indicators. These indicators are widely categorized as social, economic, and demographic indicators associated with wealth and income, communication and transport, housing, health, education, and gender equality. Forty percent of the country's population lives below the line of poverty on \$1 or less per day. Moreover, the urban and rural divide in Pakistan has also created disparities of opportunities with poor people in most of the rural areas. They have either no or limited access to financial services and health facilities (Fazl-e-Haider, 2018).

Economic inequality has affected economic growth, increased crime rates, wasted multi-talented individuals, and impeded social mobility. Several factors have been identified that are pushing people in Pakistan below the line of poverty. One of the significant factors is unemployment, and it has reached up to 10 per cent. The unemployed youth in the country endures the spasms of poverty since they are incapable of carrying out their basic needs of life (Fazl-e-Haider, 2018). Other significant horizontal inequalities are social horizontal inequalities and, more specifically, educational inequalities, which have been a matter of policy concern. Education is considered vital for an individual's effectiveness and his/her capacity to flourish. The measure of inequality emphasizing on years of education; however, is disparaged since it ignores schooling quality. For instance, a year of schooling in cities like Lahore, Karachi or Islamabad is not comparable with a year schooling of small villages in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Sindh. Such kinds of inequalities are highly essential to be considered as they are generally

accompanied by political tensions and sometimes in extreme situations by civil wars (Memon, 2013; Lessman, 2015).

The previous literature on inequality in Pakistan mostly focuses on inclinations in a disparity of income and consumption assets inequality, and gender inequality in education (Arif & Farooq, 2012; Burki, Memon, & Mir, 2015; Chaudhry & Rahman, 2009). It is essential to analyze the horizontal inequalities through regions as trends are changing. However, the social inequalities at the regional level are ignored. The development and prosperity of a country rely on the provision of better education and health facilities. In Pakistan, health and education are also provided by provincial governments; however, usual complains are the unequal distribution of health facilities, education, and income sources (Wasim & Munir, 2017).

One of the primary reasons for the demand for more provinces in Pakistan is horizontal inequalities. This demand emerged when the amendment was made in the constitution of Pakistan in 2010, which was supposed to give control of financial resources to provinces. The proponents of establishing more provinces in Pakistan prophesied that it was going to improve the country politically and economically. There have been four popular demands for additional provinces in the four provinces of Pakistan. There are proponents of the Siraiki and Bahawalpur provinces in Punjab. Currently, 50 percent of quota in federal services is held by Punjab, and most of the jobs are given to people of upper and central Punjab, whereas southern Punjab candidates are incapable of competing for jobs. One of the main reasons for demanding a new province is the inequality of employment opportunities and the quality of education (Chandio, 2015).



People have provided several justifications in favor of more provinces in Pakistan. Among them are, lack of economic development and poor governance, sense of isolation in current provinces on geographic or ethnic lines, sense of being minorities or being treated as minorities, lack of educational quality and health care facilities and income inequality as well as the disparity in employment opportunities (Chandio, 2015). It is quite clear that disparity in the region and economic developments in a country are interconnected, which are further classified in social and economic inequality. However, the area can not be considered either prosperous or developed, where all citizens living is wealthy or provided with basic living standards (Jacka, Kipnis, & Sargeson, 2013). It is highly essential to control horizontal inequalities; however, it requires much effort to distribute the benefits of development equally. On the other hand, fiscal policies can reduce and control income inequality by diverting most of the public services to health, education, and a better living standard of people. However, people in Pakistan cannot take advantages of these measures unless a proper strategy is implemented to alleviate all sort of inequalities by comprehending the needs of all people and mediating factors since the land and income distribution in Pakistan is highly skewed towards the wealthiest people (Yasmeen, Begum, & Mujtaba, 2011).

Social HIs, Cultural HIs, Economic HIs, and Political HIs are the core elements of this school of thought. Inequalities to job and employment opportunities and the distribution of economic and financial resources are included in the category of Economic HIs. Unfair distribution of educational facilities, insufficient health service centers, and inequalities to the access to housing facilities fall in the category of Social HIs. Political horizontal inequalities range from the unfair distribution of political opportunities such as

representation in the armed forces, police department, parliaments, local and regional governments. Disparities in recognition of language, customs, norms, literature, religion, and daily practices include in Cultural HIs (Stewart, 2013).

Any type of HIs can create a situation, and an opportunity for political mobilization, but the economic and political HIs are the most effective forces to push the leaders of ethnic groups to instigate the conflict and to demand maximum autonomy and share in the power structure. However, Social HIs and Cultural HIs motivate the masses to support the demand presented by their leaders (Mancini, 2007). To empirically study the demand of new provinces in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, it is essential to analyze which type of horizontal inequalities significantly exist in the respective regions that paved a way to the demands.

### **Chapter 3. The Evolution of the Demand of New Provinces in Pakistan:**

#### **A Critical Appraisal**

The present chapter comprises of two sections; first section deals with the historical background of various ethno-nationalist movements such as; Sindhu Desh Movement (SDM) from Sindh, Pakhtunistan Movement from the then NWFP and greater Balochistan Movement from Balochistan and the later section briefly discusses the historical discourse of the demand of new provinces over the years. It systematically investigates how the demand of new provinces evolved and what prospects and challenges in this perspective have taken place until today.

Ethnicity, regional identity and religious affinities are considered standard identity markers to delineate one ethnic group from the other. Ethnicity can be defined as individuals' group living alongside but not merging their traditions. These traditions include religious beliefs and practices, common ancestry, sense of historical continuity, place of origin, and language. Such people are gathered together based on professions, geography, territory and languages without disagreeing with each other until and unless they are prompted to do so (Crystal, 1991; Majeed, 2010). On the other hand, the only form of self-love probably is nationalism, which acquires life-blood from an institution, the modern state. Nationalism cannot be treated only as a health problem of the contemporary world but it is used as a feeling or an emotion and as a philosophy. It is the sole hapless way to address a hapless world. However, as a power game and politics, nationalism is deadly and destructive (Khan, 2002).

There is lack of precise definition of ethno-nationalism in the literature on ethnic and nationalist conflicts. However, Connor Walker (1973), who coined the term "ethno-

nationalism” used it to indicate both loyalties to a nation underprivileged by its own state and the loyalty to an ethnic group embodied in a particular state (Morriss, 2008). Whereas, the exclusivist ethno-nationalism is described as the classification among diverse entities while living in the same region or territory. Nevertheless, to accommodate one another, if these entities fail to establish attributes of social integration or social capital, they will ultimately lead to isolationism with profoundly engrained boundaries delineated among different ethnic groups (Younis & Shahzad, 2017). Neglecting social diversity and ignoring the interests of regional and ethnic groups by the ruling classes of Pakistan, have given the ultimate deathblow to the country. Since, majority of the country’s population had left to form a separate country Bangladesh (Laif & Hamza, 2009).

Pakistan has remained under the siege of sectarian and ethnic conflict, political instability, economic inequality, and religious terrorism since the partition of Bangladesh. Ethnic movements in Pakistan have been of different varieties, and these movements have shifted from looking for benefits within the state to moving beyond into the region of ethno-nationalism, instead of lapsing to the earlier position. Such shifts have been principally associated with some internal political developments, for instance; in the “Sindhu Desh” movement case, and some external developments, for example, “Pakhtun” movement and “Greater Balochistan” movement (Laif & Hamza, 2009). Intra-wing heterogeneity in terms of socio-economic conditions is portrayed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, Balochistan and Punjab (Shehzad, 2012). The different variables identified having a significant impact in producing more ethno-nationalist conflicts are the religious basis, linguistic basis, territorial basis, caste basis, provincial autonomy, allocation of resources, and inter-province migration (Laif & Hamza, 2009).

### **3.1 Sindhu Desh Movement**

The sentiments of ethno-nationalists have influenced politics in the Sindh province. Its roots lie in the era of pre-partition. These sentiments were intensified by the inflow of refugees known as Urdu-speaking refugees or Muhajirs at the time of partition, and later with the oppression of Sindhi language by Urdu, i.e. using the Urdu language as a medium of instruction rather than Sindhi in 1958 (Khan, 2002). Since many decades, Sindhi nationalists have been experiencing tense relations with other ethnic groups, in particular with Punjabis and Mohajirs in the urban areas. On the other hand, the relationship between the federal government and the provincial government has established a strong desire for Sindhi interests to be staged and protected at both federal and provincial levels. Irrespective of such trends, the nationalist parties of Sindh have always managed under the weather at the elections, and it is contended that Sindh nationalist parties are merely popular among youth and students from rural backgrounds (Yusuf & Hasan, 2015).

Ghulam Murtaza Syed presented the concept of Sindhu Desh, meaning independent nation-state for the Sindhis in 1972. He was one of the first nationalist politicians in supporting such a policy stance, who demanded the independence of his land after the partition of East Pakistan in 1971. Whether contended out of the relative weakness of the Pakistan army and Bangladesh's independence, the contention of G. M. Syed was interesting since it happened at the time of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a Sindhi leader and head of state (Siddiqi, 2012). A sense of deprivation aggravated during the British rule became more intensified after the partition. A massive influx of outsiders settling in Sindh triggered the fear that they would become a minority in their homeland. During one-unit system, the sense of deprivation increased because of increased grievances, as they were deprived of

the share in financial and administrative affairs of the province. Pakistan People's Party (PPP) adopted a better stance to address grievances of Sindhis. They demanded a parliamentary democratic system so that the representatives of smaller provinces would have a role in the decision-making process. When PPP won the election, a relatively prosperous and peaceful era started, and Sindhis indulged in reaping the benefits that were offered to them rather than engaging in the demands of Sindhu Desh movement (Khan & Mushtaq, 2017). G.M. Syed despised Zulfikar Ali Bhutto since he considered him as the laughingstock of Muhajirs-Punjabi alliance. Although G. M. Syed belonged to the influential family of Sajjada Nashins and Pirs, yet, he had little political following as compared to Bhutto's PPP. The failure of G.M. Syed's political party to compete with Bhutto's PPP at the level of the election was remindful of the fact that the nationalist constituency of G. M. Syed was propagated and that his following was confined within the rural public of Sindh (Siddiqi, 2012).

Putting aside the political process, many of the Sindhi separatist and national elements have adopted rebels' campaigns and strategies in an attempt to protect the territorial unity, resource rights, and political interests of Sindh province. Among these separatist and nationalist groups, some of the most well-known are: the political arm of the militant Sindhu Desh Liberation Army (SDLA), commanded by Shafi Burfat, banned in 2013 due to its suspected participation in acts of violence in the province, and Jiay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz group (JSMM). These groups lack resources, recruits, and training. Therefore, they are mainly involved in disruption and interruption, for instance: minuscule assaults against electricity lines, banks, and railway tracks (Yusuf & Hasan, 2015). The ouster of Bhutto and his hanging by Zia changed the whole scenario, Sindhis considered

him a murderer. Martial law administrators exercised most of the powers. Sindhis felt deprived again, and their hatred for Punjabis was further intensified. General Zia expelled a considerable number of Government employees from federal and provincial services, as they were considered supporters of Bhutto. Nationalist sentiments and hatred against Punjab and center reached its peak.

Furthermore, it is also contended that the seeds of the Sindhu Desh movement had been propagated by Zia-ul-Haq, who established the Muthida Qoumi Movement (MQM), to counter the Pakistan People Party. In August 1986, the declaration of provincial autonomy was a significant event, and Benazir Bhutto was the front-runner of the campaign. In the late 80s and early 90s, there was a shift of sentiments from the right of self-determination to accommodation within the federation, though demanding greater provincial autonomy (Khan & Mushtaq, 2017).

### **3.2 Pakhtunistan Movement**

Pakistan is known for being a multilingual and multi-ethnic country with several and diverse ethnic groups living in its all provinces. Pakhtuns are one of the major ethnic groups in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. They have a history of an active Pakhtun ethno-nationalist movement before Pakistan's independence and after its independence. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who is also known as Bacha Khan started Khudai Khitmatgar Movement (KKM) in 1929 and sowed the concept that being Muslims, Pakhtuns are expected to serve God (Ghufran, 2009). However, upon the independence of Pakistan, the Pakhtun nationalists of KKM started becoming apprehensive about the Punjabi domination in the country.

Consequently, Pakhtun nationalists started demanding “Pakhtunistan” as an independent state for their own identity. When KP, formerly known as North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) legitimately became Pakistan’s part through a referendum held in 1947. KKM boycotted the referendum since it did not provide an option of either joining with Afghanistan or an independent state (Khan, 2003). Bacha Khan along with other political leaders, namely G. M. Syed and a Bengali political leader: Abdul Hameed Khan Bashani formed National Awami Party (NAP) in Dhaka in 1957, intending to favour provincial autonomy and increased rights for ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, the NAP split in 1967 due to ideological rivalries within the group (White, 2008). The sentiments of Pakhtuns escalated after the regime of Bhutto, due to the state’s irruptive intervention in sacking government of NAP in Balochistan. Wali Khan, the son of Bacha Khan, took the lead and Awami National Party (ANP) emerged in 1986 (Aman & Jan, 2015). On the other hand, India, Soviet Union, and Afghanistan have also politically supported the separate identity of Pakhtuns in the shape of independent state “Pakhtunistan”. However, the Pakhtun movement never posed a severe menace to the country since it never received widespread support among the Pakhtuns (Ahmed, 1998).

Furthermore, the demand of Pakhtun nationalists regarding independent Pakhtunistan failed to gather a support from a large number of the individuals from the Pakhtun workers. Such disinclination fallouts from the concern of losing supports from workers in other regions of the country and the likelihood of settlement outside the KP province in case of the legal ouster, as occurred under the green revolution (Aman & Jan, 2015). Among the provinces, the competition regarding resources equitable distribution still prevails in the country. The Pakhtun nationalists experienced that lack of increased



provincial autonomy would result in bitterness between smaller provinces will cultivate, which will risk the survival of the state. Pakhtun nationalists have long been demanding to rename the province as “Pakhtunkhwa”. Finally, after winning elections in 2008, the Pakhtun nationalists, “ANP” with the acceptance of coalition partner PPP renamed the province name to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Ghufran, 2009).

### **3.3 Greater Balochistan Movement**

Balochistan is one of the most diverse provinces of Pakistan in terms of ethnicity and linguistic. The largest ethnic group in the province is the Balochis. However, they do not constitute the majority as they are closely followed by Pakhtuns and Brahuis (Khan, 2009). The province of Balochistan has so far witnessed five insurgencies: 1948, 1958, 1962, 1973-1977, and 2002 since Pakistan’s independence. The Baloch nationalists came into power vigorously for the first time in 1970 when Bhutto permitted regional parties to form the government and later on sacked them on charges of treason. The dismissal of NAP provincial government in Balochistan led to rebellion in Balochistan, and the military force interfered and coped with Baloch nationalists carrying insurgent activities. Help from the government of Iran was also sought to suppress the resistance of Baloch nationalists (Hassan, 2016).

Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan, and this province is full of natural resources, but it is the least developed province. The Balochis have no access to their natural resources. Balochis have a prolonged history of grievances. In a multi-ethnic society like Pakistan, minority groups like Baloch suffer the most. The participation of Balochis in politics, bureaucracy, educational system, and armed forces is minimal. The lacks of a shared sense of identity, not only alienated Balochis, but also lead them to create

separatist organizations. Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), and Baloch Republic Party are the examples of these separatist movements. The concerns of Iran regarding the “Greater Balochistan Movement” in Pakistan were mostly due to its effects on Iranian Balochis. Several insurgent groups came out and took up arms against the government. Insurgent activities were frequently launched by Baloch Student’s Organization (BSO) and Balochistan Peoples’ Liberation Front (BPLF). The Baloch nationalists disrupted deployment movements of Pakistan army and communication links in the Mas-Bugti areas. However, the Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Bhutto’s regime, and the conflict with Baloch nationalists was ended in 1977 with the subsequent release of Baloch leaders (Hassan, 2016). The Greater Balochistan is used to gather support for the declaration of greater autonomy for the province from the central government of Pakistan since Balochis expressed themselves as peaceful people however they have been pushed to fight for their national identity and existence (Mazhar, Javaid, & Goraya, 2012). Balochis do not agree with an interpretation that they are an ethnic group since they regard themselves as a nation having culture, religion, language and territory (Hashmi, 2015).

To the extent that the Baloch rights movement is concerned, there are two groups namely: the Baloch nationalists having anti-Pakistan sentiments and promoting the voice of “independent Balochistan”, and the moderate Balochis who call for maximum provincial autonomy (Hashmi, 2015). Whereas, the recent conflict between Baloch nationalists and the federal government was initiated during the exertions of Balochistan development. Since the province has long confronted severe negligence and discrimination from the federal government, the exploitation of mineral, gas resources, and mega projects being carried out in the presence of military forces within the province were the perceived

grievances of the Baloch nationalists. The insurgent groups kept on attacking the projects and military personnel in the region. The current trend in violence has been evidenced after the interlude of three decades (Iqbal, 2011).

The conflict increased in the first quarter of 2005 when war was waged in Balochistan by General Parvez Musharraf. Nawab Akbar Bugti, the chief of the Bugti tribe along with other tribesmen in the wake of this development, carried out insurgent activities against the federal government (Iqbal, 2011). The situation further worsened when Nawab Akbar Bugti was killed in 2006 operation by armed forces. The entire Baloch political spectrum addressed his death as a nationalist martyr and further sent an upsurge of barbarity across the Baloch nationalists (Gazdar, 2006). With the construction of Gawadar port in the province and becoming an emerging economic giant, it has attracted the interests of several countries, namely: China, U.S. Afghanistan, Iran, and India. Pakistan has accused India, Afghanistan, and Iran of arming and financing rebels in Balochistan (Khan, 2009). The major reasons identified which cause or provide opportunities for nationalists to carry out political agenda on insurgencies are health, education, water, sanitation, and resources exploitation, such as mineral and gas (Iqbal, 2012).

### **3.4 Demand of New Provinces in the Post-1971 Contemporary Pakistan**

Unfortunately, the federation of Pakistan has been suffering from numerous dilemmas since its genesis in 1947. On the one hand, the issue of power-sharing between the federation and federating units and on the other hand, the demand of maximum provincial autonomy and the distribution of resources among provinces and their representation in federal institutions have exacerbated the tensions among the provinces and the federal government, some of which have resulted in violent actions and ethnic

conflicts. Most of these tensions are presumed as ethno-linguistic (Adeney, 2012). Demand for the creation of new provinces in the country is a practical demonstration of those ethnic conflicts (Soherwordi & Khattak, 2014). The demand for the creation of separate new provinces in the country has become the basis of both negative as well as positive transformation of intra-national security. For many years, the call for drawing a new provincial map of Pakistan has become a foundation of discussion and national political debate (Ahmar, 2016).

The issue of new provinces got momentum with the enactment of the 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendment that was unanimously passed by both the federal institutions: national assembly and senate in 2010 (Adeney, 2012). As far as the demand for new provinces is concerned, there exist two schools of thought. Those who prefer a centralized state structure and oppose the reconstitution of the existing provincial boundaries, belong to first school. They perceive that the demand for a new provincial map is a potential source, which can open a pandora box, which could result in violent conflicts between the majority vs. minority groups in the different parts of the country. They further contend that the creation of Pakistan is based on ideology, and it cannot allow supporting ethnic identities and creating new provinces based on ethnicity and language (Wirsing, 1988).


On the contrary, the second school of thought contends for a decentralized structure of administration in the country. They hold the view that identifying and recognizing the sub-provincial identities will have a favourable and constructive effect on transmuting the old-age conflicts among ethnic, cultural, and lingual groups (Ahmar, 2016). As in general, it is accepted that Pakistan's every province relates to an ethno-linguistic group, namely: Sindh province with Sindhis, Punjab province with Punjabis, Balochistan province with

Balochis, and KP province with Pakhtuns. Though in each province, the ethno-linguistic composition illustrates a considerable minority group, yet these minority groups are concentrated in a specific region of each province, namely: Pakhtuns in northern Balochistan, Siraikis in southern Punjab, Muhajirs in the urban Sindh, specifically in Hyderabad and Karachi, and Hazaraeval in Hazara division of KP. These provincial minorities are demanding separate provinces for their groups in their respective provincial regions (Mushtaq, 2016).

#### **3.4.1 Muhajir Province Movement.**


The word Mohajir is associated with the Arabic term “Hijra” that is meant the movement from one place to another and is generally referred to the journey of Prophet and His companions from Makkah to Madinah. Later the term is connoted to migration movement in 1920 when Indian Muslims migrated to Afghanistan during Caliphate Movement. Most commonly, the term was applied for those Indian Muslims who migrated from India to Pakistan during or after sub-continent’s partition. It is witnessed by history that an extraordinary number of about eight million people, including Punjabi, Bohra, and Memon community migrated to Pakistan (Khan, Shaheen, & Ahmad, 2019). However, the term Mohajir became more common for Urdu speaking immigrants and they were labelled as Mohajir (Raza, 2003). Most of the immigrants who came to Pakistan were from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Deccan, Bombay, and central Indian provinces. However, more interestingly the immigrants, who shifted from Indian Punjab to Pakistan’s Punjab, were not termed as Mohajirs since they adjusted quickly and assimilated with the natives due to shared norms, culture, and language. On the other hand, the case of Muhajirs who settled in Sindh was very different since they kept their distinct identity intact in Sindh due to their

diverse culture and language (Baig, 2005; Khan, Shaheen & Manzoor, 2018). About seventy percent of immigrants were settled in Punjab, twenty percent in Sindh and the rest of the ten percent in other provinces of Pakistan.




**Figure 2.** Percentage of Mohajirs' Population According to the 1951 National Census.

Contrary to other ethnic groups, Mohajirs possessed a high literacy rate and professional skills; hence, they remained unbeaten in holding a dominant position in the socio-economic and political structure at national as well as at the provincial level. They kept their distinct identity intact and did not do any struggle to assimilate with Sindhi culture. Resultantly, a dichotomy of two ethnicities emerged in the province (Verkaaik, 2004).



**Figure 3.** Percentage of Mohajirs' Share in Manufacturing Industry of Karachi.


Since it is evident that Mohajirs were the primary beneficiaries of the industrial development of Karachi and Memons, Bohras and other immigrants were holding the Business. This privileged position of Mohajirs started to develop a sense of resentment among native Sindhis who were less educated and less skilled in administrative and political affairs. In civil-military leadership, Mohajirs were also in a superior position than locals.




**Figure 4.** Representation of Different Identity Groups in Civil Bureaucracy and Military Leadership.

However, the situation started to change when Z.A. Bhutto, a Sindhi, became the prime minister of Pakistan. The quota system was redefined, and the share of rural Sindh was increased. Other direct governmental policies enhanced the representation of Sindhis

in all the sectors as was explained in the below-given figures. This situation developed a sense of fear and relative deprivation among Mohajirs. They sought to redefine their distinct identity.



**Figure 5.** Mohajir vs. Sindhi Beneficiaries of Quota System in Sindh.



**Figure 6.** Mohajir vs. Sindhi Representation at Privileged Posts.

Language controversy further exacerbated the conflict between Sindhis and Mohajirs. Later the Sindhi prime minister's removal intensified Sindhis' resentment. In spite of being the most influential community, Mohajirs did not establish their specific political party and supported other political parties like Jamat-e-Islami JI and Jamiyat Ulma Islam (JUI). However, these political parties became loyal to General Zia and did not raise their voice for Mohajirs' concerns, and they decided to establish their own party to safeguard their



interests. Furthermore, on June 11, 1978, when they formally announced All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organization (APMSO) at the University of Karachi, Altaf Hussain became its chairperson and Azim Ahmad Tariq, the vice-chairman of the organization. Later, it was formally transformed as a political party named the Muttahida Qoumi Movement (MQM) in 1984. The party became a platform of conscious efforts for the re-strengthening of Mohajir culture and identity. The party received support mainly in Karachi and Hyderabad in many general elections. They have contended during Sindh assembly sessions that Urdu-speaking people in urban Sindh are discriminated. Hence a new separate province is demanded them (Mushtaq, 2016). It is considered that the demand for creating Karachi and Hyderabad as a separate province is lethal. Its severe repercussion is that Sindhis are united against the creation of separate provinces (Ahmar, 2016). MQM leaders in Sindh provincial assembly have presented many \ resolutions but PPP government having overwhelming majority always condemns all such resolution and do not let them pass by the assembly.

#### **3.4.2 Bahawalpur Province Movement.**

Punjab is one of the most densely inhabited and flourishing provinces of Pakistan. The province has long-familiar three regions, namely: the Siraikis speaking, south Punjab; the Punjabi speaking, central Punjab; and the Pothowari speaking, Northern Punjab. The three divisions of south Punjab named as, Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan, and Bahawalpur, constitutes a Siraiki community in the majority (Mushtaq & Shaheen, 2017). Bahawalpur is one of the nine divisions of Punjab province, and it was merged into one unit in 1955. Its status as a state was abolished. Two political movements have been identified in the region of South Punjab, the Siraiki province movement and the Bahawalpur province

movement. Both the movements have been vigorous at different times in the region. The Siraiki province movement was initiated in the 1960s; however, in the beginning, it was not a political movement but more of a linguistic and cultural movement. The Siraiki province movement expanded in the early 1970s when the Bahawalpur province movement disappeared in 1971 (Javed, 2018).

Most of the activists of Bahawalpur province movement joined the literary and cultural movement active at that time in Multan and envired to integrate several groups of sub-culture of the region into the identity of greater Siraiki. Progressively, this lingual and cultural movement was transmuted more into a political group, i.e. Pakistan Siraiki Party (PSP). The Bahawalpur movement activists joined their hands with counterparts in the region of Multan. The Siraiki nationalists of Multan and Bahawalpur region coined the term "Siraikistan" for the separate province of Siraikis (Langah, 2011). Area wise Bahawalpur is the largest division of Punjab, yet it is one of the most underdeveloped, in nearly all fields. The Siraiki province movement started due to relatively slow development in the areas, which started grievances among the masses, as they were deprived of their share in goods and services. The fertile agricultural land produces cotton, but the income generated by the cotton production is not spent on the area. Among many demands, is the demand for the rise in the quota of employment for Siraikis.

However, the movement remained highly marginalized among the Siraikis, as the Punjabi speaking residents are against the creation of the separate province. Due to this reason, in the last few elections, no candidate of Siraiki party has been able to get even a respectable number of votes (Javed, 2018). Nevertheless, many of the Bahawalpur movement proponents relinquished the jointure of both regions in a single administrative

unit. They contended that the Bhutto administration sponsored the Siraiki province movement to counter the Bahawalpur province movement. (Mushtaq & Shaheen, 2017). Furthermore, from the perspective of political analysts in the country, two separate provinces: Siraiki and Bahawalpur would have an outcome of two economically poor provinces (Langah, 2011).

Currently, the country is determined for providing a rational solution to the demand for the creation of new provinces. It is observed that in development, the provincial assembly of Punjab has approved the resolutions in favor of restoring the Bahawalpur province and the establishment of a new province in southern Punjab unanimously. Both of the resolutions were presented by the Rana Sana Ullah, a political leader of Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N), and a commission on this regard was planned to be established (Asghar, 2012). It is contended that people in southern Punjab have several grievances and among those, the most concerned is that the earnings from cotton produced in Bahawalpur are not spent on the region for their better lives. The estimates show that 43 percent of the people in the south Punjab region live below the line of poverty relative to the rest of Punjab, which depicts the 27 percent poverty growth (Ullah, Khalid, & Hassan, 2017).

### **3.4.3 Siraiki Province Movement.**

The first Siraiki literary conference took place in 1975, which manifested a noteworthy turning point for Siraiki identity. Specific measures were suggested by the conference to promote the culture and language of Siraikis (Rasoolpuri, 2006). The allotment of lands to non-Siraikis in the Cholistan was condemned by the speaker at the conference and they emphasized on the adjustment of the quota system for jobs. Furthermore, the conference

generated political activity based on identity in the region. Besides, the political and cultural groups in the region started flourishing. Some of the devoted groups in the region for the Siraiki cause are Siraiki National Movement, Siraiki People's Cooperative Society, Siraiki Conference, and Siraiki Province Front (Baloch, 2014; Mushtaq & Shaheen, 2017). These political and cultural groups have strengthened the distinctive identity of Siraikis among the people. However, they have not been yet able to mobilize their identities effectively (Baloch, 2014). Furthermore, these parties are also being renounced in numerous elections (Mushtaq & Shaheen, 2017).

The three divisions of Punjab namely, Multan, Bahawalpur and Dera Ghazi Khan, constitute the majority of Siraiki community. Historically, no substantial ethnic-based movement has been witnessed in Punjab, but recently that Siraiki speaking areas have made movements to preserve their ethnic identity, by distancing themselves from dominant groups in Punjab. They envisage that the creation of separate province not only will preserve their ethnic identity, but it will also ensure their share in the economic and administrative machinery of the state, which has been long neglected. Though, the Siraiki nationalist parties have been rejected by the general masses, as they failed in getting electoral support. However, the demand for new province surfaced more vigorously. As the Bahawalpur Province completely disappeared in 1972 since it was undoubtedly expressed that demand for the creation of a separate province was not precedence. Subsequently, the prominent leaders Riaz Hashmi and Ubaid-ur-Rehman, of the movement started their activities for the Siraiki province as they joined Pakistan Siraiki Party (Hashmi & Majeed, 2014). The Siraikis activists believe that Bahawalpur province movement except for the local language did not patronize lingual ethnicity. Progressively, Siraikis

nationalists in the process raised voice against inequality and discriminatory policies of the ruling government. The Siraiki Province Front was created in Multan in 1984 and lately, several divisions of the party were created at Dera Ghazi Khan, Layyah, Bahawalpur, and Rajanpur. The party collaborated with many well-established political parties of the country, and it professed unconditional support to PPP. Many members of the Siraiki Province Front were not influenced to leave their party since it was deliberated that it should be replaced with the Siraiki Nationalist Party (Langah, 2012).

The case of the creation of a separate province introduced by Siraikis mostly based on socio-economic inequality. Earlier, the need for enhanced recognition of Siraiki language has supported the Siraikis to show their desire toward more fair treatment (Zulfqar, 2012). The creation of Siraikistan or Siraiki province includes the divisions of Bahawalpur, Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan, and the districts of Dera Ismail Khan and Jhang. However, an indication discloses that there are diverse viewpoints regarding the boundaries and the name of the proposed province (Mushtaq, 2011). The Siraiki nationalists call for a Siraiki province, i.e. Siraikistan, completely based on the identity of their people. Several other groups contend the creation of separate province, i.e. south Punjab province, on administrative basis, whereas the people of Bahawalpur division call for the creation of Bahawalpur province outside the idea proposed for Siraiki province. (Mushtaq, 2016)

#### **3.4.4 Hazara Province Movement.**

Since before Pakistan's independence, the KP province has been famous for its Pakhtun nationalist politics. Bacha Khan initiated and led the Pakhtunistan as a separate state movement for Pakhtuns. It remained famous mostly in the Pashto speaking areas, for instance: the valley of Peshawar and its environs (Mushtaq, 2016). One of the most

astronomical divisional units of KP province is the Hazara division. The division is stretched from the region of Kohistan to Kaghan Valley, and it is inhabited mainly by Hindko and Pashto speaking people (Ahmar, 2013). Historically, the Hazaraevals have continued their diverse identity and distanced themselves from the Pakhtunistan movement and nationalist politics of Pakhtuns. Hazaraevals are the second largest group after Pakhtuns in the KP province. Most of the Hindko speaking indigenous are concentrated in the region of Hazara. The region comprises of six districts, namely: Abbottabad, Battagram, Torgarh, Haripur, and Mansehra. Hindko speaking Hazaraevals comprise 87 percent of the total population in the region (Mushtaq, 2016).

The movement to create separate Hazara province has become a source of conflict in the region since long. The people supporting the movement of separate Hazara province contend that their demand is valid since they meet the foremost requirements that are called for having a separate status. However, the opponents of the movement, namely: ANP being a Pakhtun dominated party in the KP province mentions that the aimed Hazara province is not executable, and it will result in hurting the interests of the significant community in KP (Ahmar, 2013). The passage of the 18th amendment to Pakistan's constitution in 2010 allowed further financial autonomy to all provinces and renaming NWFP to KP deeply affected the people of Hazara. It resulted in elevating the demand of Hazara province and it gained momentum (Ahmar, 2016). Different activist groups took part in the movement of Hazara province, which include the Hazara National Front (HNF), Hazara Rights Movement (HRM), and Hazara Province Movement (HPM) (Mushtaq, 2016).

Another important factor that created the grievances among the Hazaraevals was the immigration of Afghanis after the USA's intervention. A considerable number of Afghan

immigrants moved in KPK, and the demography of the district started to change after their arrival. These immigrants were a direct threat to the interests of the local communities, as they were becoming a minority in their areas. According to the local population, the government has been doing injustice to locals, and they are of the view that the government is trying to isolate the locals further (Bangash, 2018). The Tank, which has been a tehsil of DIK till 1992, has been declared a district, and the leaders are of the view that from every perspective declaring Tank as a district was wrong and against the locals, as 80% of the Tank population had been Pashto. "There are many other areas which deserved to become a district," says a local leader (Mehdi, 2009). The Afghan immigrants have been settling in D.I Khan, especially in Tank area with the help of local elites. The Tank was tehsil previously, and it was declared as a district. The local community of D.I Khan feels very bitter about it. According to the locals, Tank was one of the smallest tehsils and declaring it, a district was an injustice to the locals of D.I Khan. Locals are of the view that the political Elites of D.I Khan are trying to convert locals into a minority ethnic group. Due to the massive number of Afghan immigrants settled in the district, 80% of the population of Tank is Pakhtuns. Therefore, the elites are manipulating the locals and have been doing injustice to the locals by settling a large number of immigrants and converting them into the majority. The locals complain that elites are trying further to isolate the Siraiiki people for their interests (Mehdi, 2013)

The Hazara province movement got stimulated in April 2010 in the Abbottabad region when seven Hazaraevs were killed as police opened fire on protestors demanding the creation of separate Hazara province. The struggle for the dominance in the region started after the Afghan immigration, which was a threat to the interests of Hazaraevs as the

overwhelming majority took up the important businesses in the region. The political parties, lawyers and other segments of civil society in Hazara, since then have carried out rallies and protest meetings against the repressive policies of the KP government in renouncing the Hazara province movement and the due rights as well as the status of the Hazaraeals (Ahmar, 2013). The race for the acquisition of local business and administration further lead to the conflict among the locals and immigrants, and hundreds of people died in that ethnic and racial based violence. Creation of separate Hazara province also got political support from the large political parties of the country, namely: PML-N and Pakistan Muslim League- Quaid (PML- Q).

Furthermore, renaming the N.W.F.P as the KP province has been controversial in the sense that it fashioned further dissonance in the country. Activists and political members have indicated that it could have been renamed as Hazara Pakhtunkhwa, rather than Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Adeney, 2012). However, these rightful demands of Hazaraeals for a separate province are still not fulfilled.

#### **3.4.5 FATA Province Movement.**

FATA is referred to as Federally Administered Tribal Areas; it was a semiautonomous tribal region of Pakistan adjacent to the Afghan border called Durand Line (Begum, 2018). The region is home to Pashto speaking tribes who pursue their social system based on tribal customs and traditions (Khan, 2016). FATA was a group of seven administrative units known as agencies, namely: North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Mohmand, Bajaur, Kurram, and Aurakzai agency along with six frontier regions. The region also has different passes that form primary trade routes between the subcontinent and Central Asian states (Noor, Hashmi, & Bukhari, 2018). The FATA has an approximate population of 4.2 million



in an area of 27,220 km<sup>2</sup>. Therefore, it represents 1.6 percent off the country's total population (Ullah, Idrees, Shouaib, Saud-Ur-Rehman, & Fahad, 2017). There are several essential building blocks of the tribal system, which include the tribal custom, assemblies, levies, Pakhtun code of honour, and the Frontier Crimes Regulation, among others (Chowhan, 2019).

Historically, in human history, FATA has faced more invasions than most of the regions in the world. Many great powers had influenced geopolitics since the 17th century; however, the tribal powers in the FATA never accepted other kingdoms ruling the region and advocated their values and independence. The invaders, namely British, Mughals, Sikhs, Greeks, Turks, Persians, and Afghans, conquered South Asia (subcontinent), however, they failed to invade the tribal areas. The clans and tribes in the region defended their values, culture, and honor determinedly and religiously (Malik & Asrar, 2019). After a decade of militancy and military operations against the militants to restore peace in the region, the social and political pressures in the region have highlighted delicate fault lines. Regardless of the enormous investments in reconstruction, development, and rehabilitation in the FATA, the course for reaching essential freedom and political rights, and basic services are plateau. Thus, the tribal areas remain to depict the lowest human development indicators with overall literacy rate lower than 18 per cent, and much worse, i.e. 3 percent among women (Chowhan, 2019).

Less than 11 percent of the total population of the region has access to adequate sanitation. The primary reason for such issues is the absence of local and provincial governments' representatives (Begum, 2018). The demand for bringing FATA into the mainstream is not new, and many efforts have been carried out to initiate reforms in the

region since 1977. The first serious struggle concerning the FATA reform was the appointment of a committee by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto under General Nasarullah Babar. The committee aimed to establish a foundation for making FATA a part of the KP. However, this step went in vain, as the military regime took over in 1977 (Babar, 2018). Some of the guidelines were formulated based on the recommendations of FATA reform committee such as, to make sure that reforms should result in the betterment in the lives of inhabitants, and these reforms should not disrespect the customs, values, and culture of the region (Noor, Hashmi, & Bukhari, 2018).

Many Pakhtun leaders of FATA are against its merger in KP, they are of the view that the people of FATA are different ethnically and culturally, and the merger of FATA with KP is not justified. They further said that they would soon launch a movement for the separate province, named as Qabilitan. For the last 40 years, consequential consultations have been held by civil society and the government, which pointed out the increasing demand for mainstreaming FATA (Jamal, 2018). The FATA reforms committee presented a report and recommendations in 2016 and a cabinet meeting after careful consideration and discussion, Nawaz Sharif approved the 24 step action points to execute FATA reforms. Furthermore, many political leaders, like Mahmood Khan Achakzai and Maulana Fazal - Ur- Rahman opposed the idea of FATA merger with KP province and considered it as interference with traditional autonomy enjoyed by the Pakhtun tribes in the region (Aftab, 2018). However, President Mamnoon Hussain on Jan 31, 2018, made history by signing the bill to complete the constitutional process of the FATA merger with KP province. This decision effectively ended the special status of FATA, which had been entitled to it for 70 years.

#### **3.4.6 Demand of Pakhtuns Balochistan Province.**

According to data released by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics in 1998 on mother tongue as a proxy for ethnicity, Balochis have a majority in Balochistan. They comprise 55 per cent, whereas Pashto speakers residing in Balochistan are 30 per cent, and they are the second-largest ethnicity in the province after Balochis. Despite being the largest and rich in minerals and energy resources provinces in the country, it is the least developed province. The province has also suffered from terrorism as well as ethnic conflicts (Shahid, 2019). Pakhtuns have the majority group in the northern Balochistan. Pashto speaking population in the province has been demanding for the merger of the Pakhtun belt with KP province or a separate province (Mushtaq, 2016). Both Balochistan and KP province have been hosting millions of Afghan refugees since 1979. However, Pakhtuns in Balochistan had lived long before even before the Afghanistan crisis (Ahmar, 2016).

The resemblances between the recent manifestation of Pakhtun nationalism and awareness and Baloch nationalism are very few. Both the Pakhtun and Baloch nationalisms are in very smaller national groupings in Pakistan. The nationalism in Pakhtun is very diverse, advance and mature in different ways. One of the primary reasons could be that the awareness regarding nationalism in Pakhtuns is decades old and mature, in addition they have sizeable political representation in the country (Bangash, 2018). The Pakhtuns, similarly to the Baloch nation, have also remained victims of external as well as internal forces and the prey of the policy of divide and rule. The British incorporated some of the districts of the Pakhtun majority into Balochistan following the Gandmak agreement in 1879. The Pakhtun population in the Balochistan province since then has not accepted Balochistan from their heart as a home province. The Pakhtun population in Balochistan

province has always demanded to be integrated either with KP or with Afghanistan as a separate Pakhtun division (Ahmar, 2019).

The interests of Zia-ul- Haq in Balochistan province came from a strategic perspective, which was aimed to publicize development in the province. Furthermore, the strategic importance of the province intensified after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The two trends prevailed the politics of Balochistan amid the Zia-ul-Haq regime; first, the ethnic conflict between Pakhtuns and Baloch; second, intensification of tribal feuds. The ethnic conflict resulted due to the arrival of 1 million Afghan immigrants in Balochistan out of 3 million refugees (Ahmar, 2016). The Afghan refugees outnumbered the indigenous inhabitants in the district of Chaghai, whereas in many other districts the number of immigrants reached half. It created a fear of minorities in the indigenous Baloch in their province. In reality, the immigrants became a valuable political asset for the federal government in counterbalancing the elements of ethno-nationalism in Balochistan. The immigrants established tacit grouping with Pakhtuns in Balochistan, which resulted in the formation of Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP). The agenda of the PMAP was eventually the demand for the creation of a new province for Pakhtuns in Balochistan province (Wirsing, 1991).

#### **3.4.7 Demand of Gilgit Baltistan for Provincial Status.**

The Gilgit Baltistan region spreads over three high ranges of mountains, namely: Karakoram, Hindukush, and the Himalayas. It is located amid; KP province of Pakistan; Indian occupied regions, Ladakh, Azad Jammu and Kashmir; Xinjiang province of China; and Wakhan corridor of Afghanistan. Gilgit Baltistan region holds immense geo-economic and geo-strategic significance because of geo-politics coming forth. Culture heritage of the

region is diverse, and languages spoken in the region are Balti, Kohistani, Kashmiri, Urdu, Hindko, and Pashto. The indigenous population is divided into diverse ethnic groups, such as Dhom, Yashkun, Shin, and Kamin. The population of the region is also divided significantly based on religion, i.e. Ismailis, Noorbakhshi, Sunni, and Shia. Furthermore, the region has three divisions, namely: Baltistan, Gilgit, and Diamer (Shigri, 2019). It has been part of the conflict-baited region, i.e. Jammu and Kashmir, which has been argued between Pakistan and India since August 1947 (Khan, 2018).

Gilgit Baltistan was initially made part of KP province, and Frontier Crimes Regulations were imposed in the region. Later in the 1950s, it was taken under control of central government rule as part of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs (Khan, 2017). The region was named Northern Areas in the 1970s, and it was classified as a separate administrative body. Frontier Crimes Regulations were lifted off and replaced with local laws; such reforms eradicated the Rajgiri and Jageerdari system from the region (Khan, 2017). Nawaz Khan Naji established a nationalist party, Bulwaristan National Front (BNF) in 1992 that was based in the region of Majini Mohalla in Gilgit. The BNF has demanded an independent state called “Balwaristan” and interpreted the grievances of the indigenous people of Gilgit Baltistan. The nationalists in Gilgit think that Pakistan has illegally controlled the region according to international law. The leader of the BNP has also appealed to the Indian government for the resolution of the cumulative grievances of the indigenous people (Abbas, 2017).

Historically, Pakistan has consistently maintained that Gilgit-Baltistan is a part of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. The enormous Chinese investment in infrastructure development projects through the China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor (CPEC) has started

a new debate among the policymakers that either it should be granted the provincial status or not, although many Policymakers are in favor of granting it the provincial status. The leadership of Gilgit-Baltistan is demanding the provincial status, as they want to represent in the National Assembly, Senate, and other policy-making institutions. However, due to the paradoxical situation that exists because of Pakistan's stance that Gilgit-Baltistan is the part of the disputed territory, several Kashmiri leaders including Syed Ali Gilani, Mir Waiz Umer Farooq, and Yasin Malik stated that merger of Gilgit-Baltistan into Pakistan could be disastrous as it would provide India with an excuse to revoke the special status of Indian-held Kashmir (Mushtaq, 2016).

Many people and groups in the region call for a provincial status and argue that it is time of Gilgit Baltistan to be provided with full provincial status. It is believed that the region has provided unambiguous support to Pakistan. Therefore, the federal government and its institutions are compelled to grant it the status of the fifth province of Pakistan. Since Gilgit Baltistan was epitomized in neither Pakistan's parliament nor the senate, it was not allowed to contribute in numerous institutional structures, for instance: the National Economic Council, Council of Common Interests, and National Finance Commission (Singh, 2013). A study was carried out regarding the constitutional status of Gilgit Baltistan, and the result was surprising, as over 85% of the Gilgit Baltistan indigenous people supported the status as Pakistan's fifth province (Khan, 2017).

Some of these demands for the formation of new provinces are more vocal than others, depending upon the level of grievances. The demand for the formation of Hazara province is more vocal as they have been brutally targeted. They face target killings, and their businesses have been taken over by the Afghan immigrants, which force them to be more

vocal about the formation of a separate province. A shared sense of National identity plays a crucial role in the peace; the sense of alienation stems the grievances among the masses. The Balochi have a long history of deprivation, and they feel a sense of alienation, which caused the rebellion. The Balochis have been vocal about their demands for separate status. The Siraiki also has been vocal about the demand of separate provinces. Some of the regions like D.I Khan have been facing violence from the Afghan immigrants. At the same time, other demands have been comparatively less vocalized. In the demands for new provinces, Bahawalpur, and Mohajir did not face violence as Hazaraeval and Balochi have faced.

## **Chapter 4. Horizontal Inequalities and the Demand of Siraiki Province:**

### **A Study of Punjab**

The present chapter consists of two sections; section one begins with the general introduction of Punjab province and proceeds with explaining South Punjab in detail. It presents its demographic and ethnic structure and continues illustrating its socioeconomic situation in terms of education, health, and infrastructure. A comparison between South Punjab and the rest of the province has also been made to comprehend the horizontal inequalities existing between the regions which follows the description of horizontal inequalities and how they have been measured using various indicators to explicate their correlation with the demand of a new Siraiki province. The second section is based on the statistical analysis of the opinion of the respondents gathered through public opinion survey to supplement the evidence regarding the relationship between the demand of new province and horizontal inequalities in the first section. This section supplements the arguments made in the former part; based on the data inferred from different published sources, i.e. development reports, household surveys, census reports and other governmental and non-governmental documents. The latter section is a sort of verification of the facts and arguments made in the first part because it is based on the information directly collected from the affected and concerned masses.

#### **4.1 Punjab Province: An Overview**

Punjab is the most populous province constituting 52.94% (110,012,442) (207,774,520) and 25.8% of the total population and landmass of Pakistan (Pakistan, 2019).



It is divided into nine administrative divisions, which further have been divided into thirty-six districts. To comprehend the lingual, cultural and geographical diversity, the province can be split into three geographies; Upper North Central Punjab, Northern West Punjab and Southern West Punjab. Although the boundaries of these three regions are not conclusive, as the regions are not officially recognized yet there are cultural and lingual boundaries that make them distinct from one another. Upper North Central Punjab stretches from Sialkot to Lahore and has a significant majority of Punjabi speakers while Pothohari is spoken in North Western Punjab that is stretched from Rawalpindi to Chakwal. In South Punjab, there is an overwhelming majority of Siraiki speakers, who reside in three divisions: Bahawalpur, Multan and Dera Ghazi Khan and each administrative division is further divided into districts, tehsils and union councils respectively.

Table 1

*Administrative Bifurcation of South Punjab*

Bahawalpur Division		Dera Ghazi Khan Division		Multan Division	
01	Bahawalpur (Tehsils)	01	Dera Ghazi Khan (Tehsils)	01	Multan (Tehsils)
	1. Bahawalpur		1. Dera Ghazi Khan		1. Jalalpur Pirwala
	2. Hasilpur		2. Taunsa Sharif		2. Multan City
	3. Khairpur Tamewali				3. Multan Saddar
	4. Ahmadpur East				4. Shujabad
	5. Yazman				
02	Bahawalnagar (Tehsils)	02	Layyah (Tehsils)	02	Lodhran (Tehsils)
	1. Bahawalnagar		1. Layyah		1. Lodhran
	2. Minchanabad		2. Chaubara		2. Dunyapur
	3. Chishtian		3. Karor Lal Esan		3. Kahrar Pakka
	4. Haroonabad				
	5. Fortabbas				

03	Rahim Yar Khan (Tehsils)	03	Muzaffargarh (Tehsils)	03	Khanewal (Tehsils)
	1. Rahim Yar Khan		1. Alipur		1. Khanewal
	2. Sadiq Abad		2. Jatoi		2. Mian Channu
	3. Khanpur		3. Kot Addu		3. Kabirwala
	4. Liaquatpur		4. Muzaffargarh		4. Jahanian
		04	Rajanpur (Tehsils)	04	Vehari (Tehsils)
			1. Jampur		1. Vehari
			2. Rajanpur		2. Mailsi
			3. Rojhan		3. Burewala

Note. Developed by the researcher based on the information inferred from development reports and district census reports.

South Punjab is stretched on 98573-km<sup>2</sup> area, which is about 48.5% of the total territory of Punjab. Figure 48.5% indicates that the Siraiki speaking region constitutes nearly half of the landmass of the province. According to 1998 census, the population of eleven districts of the region was 30.67 % of the total population of Punjab Province which has grown up to 31.58 % by the population census 2017 (Pakistan, 2019).

#### 4.1.1 Demography of South Punjab.

Demographic characteristics of Siraiki speaking region like population, area, population density, education facilities, literacy rate, and unemployment rate have been figured out in the table.

Table 2

#### *Demography of South Punjab*

S. No	Districts	Area (Km <sup>2</sup> )	Population	Ranking in Education Score	Education Score
1	Bahawalnagar	8,878	2,981,919	51 <sup>st</sup>	63.25
2	Bahawalpur	24,830	3,668,106	10 <sup>th</sup>	73.27

3	Dera Ghazi Khan	11,922	2,872,201	35 <sup>th</sup>	68.03
4	Khanewal	4,349	2,921,986	30 <sup>th</sup>	69.51
5	Layyah	6,291	1,824,230	38 <sup>th</sup>	66.76
6	Lodhran	1,790	1,700,620	49 <sup>th</sup>	63.4
7	Multan	3,720	4,745,109	21 <sup>st</sup>	71.25
8	Muzaffargarh	8,249	4,322,009	--	38.69
9	Rahimyarkhan	11,880	4,814,006	39 <sup>th</sup>	66.39
10	Rajanpur	12,318	1,995,958	62 <sup>nd</sup>	59.31
11	Vehari	4,364	2,897,446	54 <sup>th</sup>	62.44
	South Punjab	98,573	34,743,590		
	Punjab	205,344	110,012,442		

Note. Tehsil wise population census of 1998 and 2017 and district wise ranking reports published by Alifailaan website; <http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/block-wise-provisional-summary-results-6th-population-housing-census-2017-january-03-2018>; <https://www.alifailaan.pk/>.

The demographic picture of the region shows only district “Bahawalpur” that is ranked among the top ten districts of Punjab in terms of education score. The other ten districts are low ranked despite constituting 48.5% and 31.58% landmass and the populace of province.

#### **4.1.2 Linguistic Identity of South Punjab.**

South Punjab does not characterize homogeneity in terms of language and culture. Siariki is an overwhelming language spoken in eight districts while in the rest of three

districts, Punjabi is the mother tongue, spoken by more than eighty percent of people. Table 3 depicts the linguistic composition of the region more precisely.

Table 3

*Bifurcation of South Punjab in Terms of Lingual Identity*

S. No	Districts	Urdu (%)	Siraiki (%)	Punjabi (%)	Others (%)
1	Muzaffargarh	4.9	86.3	7.4	1.4
2	Dera Ghazi Khan	3.2	80.3	1.3	15.2
3	Rajanpur	3.2	75.8	3.3	17.7
4	Lodhran	9.1	69.6	18.6	2.7
5	Bahawalpur	5.5	64.3	28.4	1.8
6	Layyah	3.1	62.3	32.6	2.0
7	Rahim yar khan	2.9	62.2	27.3	7.6
8	Multan	15.8	60.67	21.64	1.3
9	Bahawalnagar	5.2	11.4	82.9	0.5
10	Khanewal	3.7	1.2	94.6	0.5
11	Vehari	5	11	83	1

Note. Tehsil wise population census of 1998 and 2017; <http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/block-wise-provisional-summary-results-6th-population-housing-census-2017-january-03-2018>

## 4.2 Horizontal Inequalities

Horizontal Inequalities are inequalities that exist between the groups with distinct identities such as; blacks and whites, Sinhalese and Tamils, men and women, Muslim and Hindus, Hindus and Sikhs, Hutus and Tutsis (Stewart, 2013). Such disparities and inequalities create resentment among those who consider themselves deprived and marginalized by the other groups. When such inequalities become persistent and significant, they can stimulate the marginalized community to initiate nationalist movements, riots, civil wars, and in worst cases, separatist movements (Stewart, 2010). They are multidimensional, i.e., political, social, cultural and economic.

#### **4.2.1 Political Horizontal Inequalities.**

This type includes inequalities in the distribution of political opportunities and other sources of power among different ethnic groups, including control over the army, the cabinet, local and regional governments, parliamentary assemblies, the police and the presidency (Stewart, 2002). They also encompass inequalities in people's capabilities to participate politically and to express their needs such as budget, taxation and welfare reforms projects (Stewart & Fitzgerald, 2001). In this study PHIs have been measured through the following indicators;

##### ***4.2.1.1 Representation in Provincial Parliaments and Cabinets.***

The literature review indicates that South Punjab is comparatively more deprived and underdeveloped. Hence, political horizontal inequalities are prevalent in this region due to not getting a fair share in resource allocations, job opportunities, academic outlooks, and other developmental projects (Zaman, 2012). Punjab's share in federal bureaucratic jobs is 50% according to the quota allocated for all the provinces and federal capital territory (Saleh, 2018). As per its population ratio, South Punjab should receive 31.58% share of Punjab's quota, but it is receiving only 12 to 15% which is very minimal and unfair (Raja & Hussain, 2015; Babar, et al., 2013). Throughout 1947 to 2013, there had been 23 Chief Ministers of Punjab while the ratio of chief ministers belonging to Southern Punjab is 18% only. Whereas there have been 35 governors from 1947 to 2013, the percentage of governors from South Punjab is just 17% (Alvi, 2017). Below given table portrays the percentage of top-level employees belonging to south Punjab.

Table 4

*Share of South Punjab in Privileged Posts (From Grade 18-22)*

Grades & (Total Employees)	Multan	Bahawalpur	D.G. Khan	Total	Percentage
22 (46)	3	1	Nil	4	8.7
21 (127)	6	9	5	20	15.7
20 (437)	26	11	11	48	11
19 (1055)	51	31	24	106	10
18 (1870)	28	90	43	161	8.6

Note. (Alvi, Issues of Ethnic Federalism in Pakistan: A Case Study of Siraiki Belt, 2017).

Other provinces, except Punjab, are further divided into different zones for the allocation of quota. This intra-provincial division provides a significant safeguard against the over-representation of developed areas and under-representation of developing regions (Latif, 2017). However, due to the absence of this safeguard, candidates from central and Northern Punjab are in a better position to succeed in Central Superior Services (CSS) and Provincial Management Services (PMS) examinations since they have better educational facilities as compared to the candidates who are from South Punjab. The below table depicts six years of data and reveals that only 5.6% of candidates passed CSS examination over six years. This tendency is a substantial evidence to support the argument that the educational facilities available in the region are deplorable and insufficient. Since educational institutions are considered the nurseries for the nourishment of future builders of the country such as engineers, doctors, academicians, scientists, artists, politicians, journalists, executives etc., if such nurseries are not well equipped then the graduates they are producing will not be able to compete. That is obvious in the table given below showing the number of successful candidatures from south Punjab.

Table 5

*Ratio of Successful CSS Candidates from South Punjab*

CSS Examination Year	Multan	Bahawalpur	D.G. Khan	Total
2017	13	6	4	312
2016	7	4	0	202
2015	14	6	3	379
2014	18	4	4	439
2013	12	2	3	238
2012	23	7	3	799
Total	87	29	17	2369
Percentage	3.67%	1.22%	0.71%	100%

Note. Saleh N. (2018) Revisiting Quota System in Civil Service of Pakistan. In: Farazmand A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5\\_3487-1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3487-1)

Since South Punjab is under-represented in almost all the provincial institutions of the state, this relative deprivation has reinforced the nationalist ideas in the region.

#### ***4.2.1.2 Representation in Judicial Institutions and Police Department.***

During the year 2013, around 1086 Punjab officers were serving in three important civil services sectors, i.e. District Management Group (DMG), Office Management Group (OMG) and Police, but only 157 were from the three divisions of South Punjab, and the rest were from northern and central Punjab (Mushtaq & Shaheen, 2017; Akhtar, Rafiq, Asif, Saeed, & Kashif, 2012). Many enlightened and well-educated individuals from South Punjab started raising objections against this acute inequality, which is being shown continually because of the dominance of central Punjab (Khan, Shaheen, & Ahmad, 2019). The absence of a provincial zoning system further intensified this aggrieved reaction towards marginalization in Punjab.

#### ***4.2.1.3 Reform Projects and Annual Development Program (ADP).***

In a ranking of the regions according to the level of progress, Multan was at fourth position, and Rahim yar Khan was at the sixth position during the 1970s. However, in 2011, Multan and Rahim yar Khan were dropped to 13th and 16th positions, respectively (Alvi, 2017). The healthcare system in Southern Punjab needs drastic reforms because it comprises 48% percent of the total area of Punjab, and there are merely 95 healthcare providing locations. The remaining 52% of Punjab have access to 245 healthcare facilities (Butt & Ahmed, 2016), which show extensive inequality in the said region. In the industrial sector, the number of industries in Northern Punjab is almost double as compared to the Southern regions.

In all the provinces, including Punjab, financial resources are allocated based on NFC Award (National Finance Commission Award). Punjab gets the largest share in NFC Award as it is the most populated province and since South Punjab consists of 31.58% of the entire provincial population, it should get at least one-third of the allocated amount (Baqai, 2004). However, the actual amount received by this region is far less than its due share. Based on regional financial status, South Punjab comes in "poor, very poor, and extremely poor categories" (Canelas & Gisselquist, 2019). During the year 2009, eight projects were initiated in Central and North Punjab from the 20 billion dollar loan obtained from World Bank, and not a single project was initiated in the Southern region (Akhtar, Rafiq, Asif, Saeed, & Kashif, 2012).

Table 6

*Ratio of Annual Development Plan (ADP) Allocated to South Punjab (2003-4, 2014-15)*

Financial Year	Total ADP (In millions)	Allocation to Punjab	to South Allocation to South Punjab in percentage
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2003-04	30.500	7.100	23.279
2004-05	43.440	9.460	21.777
2005-06	63.000	11.790	18.714
2006-07	100.000	17.760	17.760
2007-08	150.000	22.040	14.693
2008-09	160.000	25.700	16.063
2009-10	172.000	41.880	24.349
2010-11	182.000	52.819	29.021
2011-12	188.000	60.160	32.00
2012-13	210.000	67.200	32.00
2013-14	240.000	76.800	32.00
2014-15	330.000	118.800	36.00

Note. (Reports (Analysis Of Annual Development Programme 2015-16 And Analysis Of Annual Development Program 2016-17) published by Punjab Economic Research Institute; Sandhu, Siraiki Suba Movement In Punjab: Viability In Focus, 2015; (Feyyaz, Demand For Siraiki Province: Background Paper, 2011). Reports can be assessed here: <https://peri.punjab.gov.pk/system/files/ANNUAL%20DEVELOPMENT%20PROGRAMME%20201516.pdf#overlay-context=reports>; <https://peri.punjab.gov.pk/system/files/ANNUAL%20DEVELOPMENT%20PROGRAMME%20201617.pdf#overlay-context=reports>.

#### **4.2.2 Economic Horizontal Inequalities.**

The economic dimension of HIs includes; income and access to assets of various kinds, especially access to land and employment opportunities. EHIs are input type of inequalities as they are primarily based on income and income is based on three types of sources; financial, human and social. In contrast, SHIs are output type of inequalities. If input inequalities would be less, output inequalities would automatically be lesser, and in case of sharper input inequalities, the output inequalities would be more severe. EHIs have been measured through the following indicators; (Chaudhry, 2000).

##### ***4.2.2.1 Employment Opportunities and the Unemployment Rate.***

There exists a sharp difference between the occurrence of poverty within the southern and northern districts of Punjab (Chaudhry, 2019). It cannot be a mere chance that radicalization and antagonism are rapidly increasing in the southern Punjab where there

exist extensive poverty and high level of illiteracy and unemployment. This situation has caused a comparatively more significant potential of jobless and irritated youth, joining hands with the militant groups (Khan, Shaheen, & Ahmad, 2019). That is a crucial premise that has to be verified more extensively and methodically.

Table 7

*Comparison of Poverty Level between Southern and Northern Punjab*

Southern Punjab Districts	Incidence of Poverty <sup>27</sup> (%)	Northern Punjab Districts	Incidence of Poverty (%)
Rahim yar Khan	56.8	Rawalpindi	7.5
Layyah	45.6	Lahore	4.3
Bahawalpur	53	Sheikhupura	21.4
Khanewal	39.9	Attock	9.9
Rajanpur	64.4	Gujranwala	14
Vehari	41.9	Chakwal	12.9
Dera Ghazi Khan	63.7	Narowal	26.6
Bahawalnagar	50.1	Sialkot	14
Muzaffargarh	64.8	Sargodha	35.4
Lodhran	46.8	Jhelum	8.5
Multan	55.9	Gujarat	18.4

Note. Report (Punjab Economic Report 2017; Chapter 2: Poverty Profiling In Punjab) Published By Punjab Economic Research Institute, 2015. Report Can Be Assessed By Clicking The Link; [https://Peri.Punjab.Gov.Pk/System/Files/Chapter%202%20Poverty%20Profiling%20in%20Punjab\\_0.Pdf#Overlay-Context=Reports](https://Peri.Punjab.Gov.Pk/System/Files/Chapter%202%20Poverty%20Profiling%20in%20Punjab_0.Pdf#Overlay-Context=Reports).

Violent conflict and increasing religious violence in Punjab have turned into a complex phenomenon with various roots that rise from geostrategic issues to lack of socio-economic, regional discrimination, and poor performance of the government (Khalid & Leghari, 2014). The unemployment rate is high in South Punjab as compared to central and northern parts

<sup>27</sup>. Incidence of Poverty means the proportion of those families or individuals with per capita income or expenditure less than the per capita poverty threshold to the total number of families or individuals.

Table 8

*Comparison of Unemployment Rate Between South, Northern and Central Punjab*

Districts (South Punjab)	Unemployment Rate	Districts (Northern & Central Punjab)	Unemployment Rate
Bahawalnagar	7.3	Attock	3.1
Bahawalpur	15.1	Faisalabad	5.9
Layyah	17.4	Gujranwala	6.3
Dera Ghazi Khan	24.8	Gujrat	4.1
Khanewal	19.6	Lahore	4.7
Lodhran	18.9	Mani Bahuddin	5.4
Multan	20.5	Narowal	5.3
Muzaffargarh	20.9	Rawalpindi	3.4
Rahim Yar Khan	18.9	Sargodha	7.2
Rajan Pur	19.3	Sialkot	2.3
Vehari	17.5	Jhelum	2.7

Note. Report (Punjab Economic Report 2017; Chapter 4 Industrial Growth and Competitiveness) Published By Punjab Economic Research Institute, 2015. Report can be Assessed by clicking the link; [https://peri.punjab.gov.pk/system/files/Chapter%204%20Industrial%20Growth%20and%20Competitiveness\\_0.pdf#overlay-context=reports](https://peri.punjab.gov.pk/system/files/Chapter%204%20Industrial%20Growth%20and%20Competitiveness_0.pdf#overlay-context=reports).

**4.2.2.2 Income Ratio.**

Income disparities increase the level of poverty since there is a positive relationship between inequality of income and poverty. When income inequality increases, the poverty also increases (Sattar, Yasin, & Afzal, 2012). Poverty restricts not only the access to basic requirements but also “generates inequality of opportunities” (Stewart, 2009) which can further intensify the income gap among individuals from different socioeconomic stratum. Unjust land ownership in Punjab is also one of the critical factors leading to income inequalities in southern Punjab. It is reported that approximately 500,000 acres of agricultural land were allotted to the military officials belonging to central and northern parts. The share of monthly spending also shows the inequality of utilization between the individuals from the top and bottom quintile (Mohey-ud-din, 2017). Those belonging to

the top quintile use a more substantial portion of their income on education; whereas, those belonging to the bottom quintile cannot spend the required amount on education. This situation shows that the literacy rate is connected to household income (Brown, 2014).

Table 9

*Top Ten and Bottom Ten Districts of Pakistan, in Terms of Average Monthly Income*

<b>Top Ten</b>	<b>Bottom Ten</b>
Gujranwala	Muzaffar Garh
Islamabad	LakkiMarwat
Lahore	Mirpur Khas
Karachi	Umer Kot
Rawalpindi	Khanewal
Faisalabad	D.G.Khan
Mandi Bahuddin	Tando M. Khan
Peshawar	Tando Allah Yar
Hafiz Abad	Rajanpur
Zhob	Mianwali

Note. Data was collected from the Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) 2015-16.

The distribution of expenditure is like income distribution. The expenditure profile reveals the imbalance of income among the well-off landowner and the remaining farmers. It shows that people first allocate their income to their basic requirements and then for their luxuries (Latif, 2017). Since the initial call on expenditures is food, the families having low-income level allocate a significant portion of their income to groceries and comparatively a lesser portion to other items. In the same way, families with high-income levels are left with a significantly more substantial portion of their income even after fulfilling their food requirement (Pervaiz & Akram, 2018).

#### **4.2.2.3 Industries Ratio.**

The financial wellbeing of any region is reliant on the industries because the industries create employment prospects and boost the regional markets (Hashmi & Majeed, 2014). This increases the trade activities and as a result, additional employment opportunities are generated and a better standard of living is achieved. Unfortunately, southern Punjab severely lacks this industrialization and according to the statistics, this region suffers from the inequality in industrial distribution and professional prospects (Baqai, 2004).

Southern Punjab is underdeveloped and is facing several challenges due to owing low literacy rate, increasing unemployment rate, and a severe shortage of industries. Industrial production has a key part in the progress of any region (Sikander & Shah, 2010). The following tables highlight the industrial statistics for Southern and Northern Punjab.

Table 10

#### ***Industrial Statistics of Sothern Punjab***

District	Total Factories	Estimated Employment
Bahawalpur	346	14374
Mianwali	70	4365
Bahawalnagar	205	7025
Bhakkar	24	2266
Rahim Yar Khan	200	13100
Vehari	177	10364
Dera Ghazi Khan	97	8330
Lodhran	125	3025
Layyah	127	8076
Khanewal	164	14510
Muzaffargarh	131	24010
Multan	428	27440
Rajapur	73	2420

Note. Reports published by Bureau of Statistics, Government of Punjab. They can be assessed here; <http://bos.gop.pk/system/files/PDS-2019.pdf>.

Table 11

*Industrial Statistics of Northern and Central Punjab*

District	Total Factories	Estimated Employment
Attock	47	6078
Sialkot	775	40428
Gujranwala	1066	33541
Sargodha	356	12900
Gujrat	540	17875
Rawalpindi	310	19950
Sahiwal	220	8500
Hafizabad	63	6670
Okara	78	7130
Jhelum	95	7786
Mandi Bahauddin	85	5860
Kasur	575	96800

Note. Punjab Development Statistics 2019 published by Bureau of Statistics, Government of Punjab. It can be assessed here; <http://bos.gop.pk/system/files/PDS-2019.pdf>.

Here, it is to be noted that even though industrial statistics of Lahore are not mentioned in table 11, the total number of industries is almost double as compared to South Punjab. In the same way, the employability ratio of the southern region is lagging behind as compared to that of northern Punjab. Lack of industrial units and the unjust allocation of land are the two fundamental causes of unemployment, leading to a further increase in the poverty level of southern Punjab (Chaudhry, 2019).

Table 12

*Annual Production of Wheat and Cotton in South Punjab*

District	Production of Wheat (thousand tons)	Production of Cotton (thousand tons)
Bahawalpur	910	1060

Mianwali	510	96
Bahawalnagar	1170	990
Bhakkar	545	65
Rahim Yar Khan	1042	1241
Vehari	875	975
Dera Ghazi Khan	560	450
Lodhran	670	852
Layyah	664	215
Khanewal	730	710
Muzaffargarh	990	532
Multan	605	718
Rajapur	562	720

Note. Punjab Development Statistics 2019 published by Bureau of Statistics, Government of Punjab. It can be assessed here; <http://bos.gop.pk/system/files/PDS-2019.pdf>.

Table 13

*Annual Production of Wheat and Cotton in Northern and Central Punjab*

District	Production of Wheat (Thousand Tons)	Production of Cotton (Thousand Tons)
Attock	310	0
Sialkot	590	0
Gujranwala	801	0
Sargodha	611	35
Gujrat	374	0
Rawalpindi	231	0
Sahiwal	521	321
Hafizabad	564	0
Okara	875	96
Jhelum	165	0
Mandi Bahauddin	455	5
Kasur	635	40

Note. Punjab Development Statistics 2019 published by Bureau of Statistics, Government of Punjab. It can be assessed here; <http://bos.gop.pk/system/files/PDS-2019.pdf>.

As evident from Table 12 and Table 13, most of the Siraiki region is agricultural, and its production forms the major part of entire Punjab's agricultural production. There is

a strikingly high yield of agriculture in the southern region of Punjab in comparison to the northern region. Cotton yield from southern Punjab is the key source of raw material for the country's textile sector. Likewise, the production of wheat caters to the dietary needs of over 50 percent of the entire Punjab province (Naveed & Khan, 2018). Hence, by considering these facts, it can be easily noticed that regardless of the high agricultural yield, southern Punjab lacks industrial development because of the negligence of the government.

There is a dire need for the proper industrial infrastructure and suitable distribution system. If the distribution problem is resolved and southern Punjab start getting its fair share, there would be a possibility of opening new industries. Moreover, this region would have space for its specialized industrial development because the resources could be more focused (Sattar, Yasin, & Afzal, 2012). For instance, the Siraiki region, which is known for its cotton, could get a chance to differentiate within the area.

#### ***4.2.2.4 Poverty and Districts Development Ranking.***

Rural poverty is comparatively more severe and deeply rooted within Southern Punjab as opposed to the northern part of Punjab province. Southern Punjab is often categorized by weak socio-economic indicators, low literacy rates, and a higher rate of malnourishment. The principal causes of this situation in southern Punjab are the unjust allocation of land and other assets, restricted access to clean, drinking water, poor access to social services such as healthcare and schooling, unsatisfactory skill-development options, insufficient employment prospects, and inadequate funding (Chaudhry, 2000). Punjab receives the significant chunk from NFC Award for being the most densely populated province. Taking into consideration the fact that the southern region of Punjab province holds 31.58% of the entire provincial population, (Shahzad, 2015) it should get



at least one-third of the allocated amount. However, the actual amount received by this region is far less than its due share.

In southern Punjab, more than 43% of people are living below the poverty line, whereas, only 27% of people are below the poverty line in the whole Punjab province (Canelas & Gisselquist, 2019). The poverty approximation from the year 2016-17 indicated that the level of poverty was 51%, 58%, and 65% in Bahawalpur, Rahim yar Khan, and Bahawalnagar, respectively (Shahzad, 2019). Furthermore, for the same year, the depth of poverty was 16.02 in Bahawalpur, 15.07 in Rahimyar Khan, and 14.09 in Bahawalnagar (Hasan & Malik, 2019). Such high level and depth of poverty in these southern regions show the presence of severe poverty within south Punjab (Asghar, 2012).

Table 14

*District Ranking in Terms of Poverty*

Extreme Poor Districts	Least Poor Districts	Top Most	Bottom Most
Rajapur	Jhelum	Lahore	Bahawalpur
Muzaffargarh	Gujrat	Rawalpindi	Rahim yar Khan
D.G. Khan	Chakwal	Jhelum	Muzaffargarh
Bahawalpur	Mandi Bahuddin	Attock	Dera Ghazi Khan
Layyah	Gujranwala	Chakwal	Rajapur
Lodhran	Sialkot		
Pakpattan	Rawalpindi		
Multan	Faisalabad		
Khanewal	T.T. Singh		
Bhakkar	Attock		

Note. IPP's 5<sup>th</sup> Annual Report 2012: The State of the Economy: The Punjab Story published by Institute of Public Policy Beacon house National University. The report can be assessed here; <http://www.sjbipp.org/publications/AR/reports/AR-05-12.pdf>.

Lack of industrial infrastructure, low literacy rate and an increasing rate of poverty are the major causes of unemployment. This region has a thin population and low

population density in comparison with northern Punjab; however, employment opportunities are also minimal, giving further rise to the level of poverty (Mushtaq & Shaheen, 2017). Mitigating poverty requires continuous efforts by the concerned authorities starting from a grassroots level and “funding the public service delivery” (Mushtaq & Shaheen, 2017). And to achieve this, a scaled-up programmatic strategy is required with a high level of government buy-in, political assurance and larger amount of funding.

Table 15

*Intra-Provincial Disparities in Socio-economic Development*

Districts	Development Score	Development Index
Rajanpur	1.570	3.92
Dera Ghazi Khan	2.811	7.03
Rahim Yar Khan	3.957	9.89
Muzaffar Garh	5.524	13.82
Bhakar	5.561	13.91
Lodhran	6.050	15.13
Layyah	6.083	15.22
Jhang	6.622	16.57
Khushab	6.723	16.82
Bahawalpur	7.093	17.75
Bahawalnagar	7.730	19.34
Narowal	8.259	20.66
Khanewal	8.361	20.92
Chakwal	19.270	23.19
Multan	9.781	24.47
Vehari	9.867	24.69
Mianwali	10.092	25.25
Kasur	11.039	27.62
Sargodha	11.166	27.94
Pakpatan	11.291	28.25
Chiniot	11.556	28.91
Jehlum	12.365	30.94

Sahiwal	13.096	32.77
T.T Singh	14.923	37.34
Nankana Sahib	15.168	37.95
Faisalabad	15.190	38.01
Okara	15.363	38.44
Ättock	16.422	41.09
Hafaizabad	18.046	45.16
Sheikhupura	19.475	48.73
Sialkot	20.722	51.85
Mandi Bahauddin	26.627	66.63
Rawalpindi	26.815	67.10
Lahore	30.258	75.72
Gujranwala	31.229	78.15
Gujrat	33.569	84.01

Note. Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) (2014-15).

To reduce the poverty level, any region requires sufficient developmental efforts. Moreover, since these developmental efforts are entirely reliant on the budget that is usually provided by the government, southern Punjab is facing higher poverty rate because it is not receiving its fair share of the government funding (Raja & Hussain, 2015). For instance, during the year 2010, five billion rupees were granted for the developmental efforts in southern Punjab. However, not a penny from this amount was spent in the southern region, which pushed it towards further poverty and deprivation (Butt & Ahmed, 2016).

#### **4.2.3 Social Horizontal Inequalities.**


Social horizontal inequalities are the inequalities in the availability of necessary facilities such as education, healthcare services and housing (Sattar, Yasin, & Afzal, 2012).

#### ***4.2.3.1 Literacy Rate and Education Completion Rate.***

Even though the overall structure of public schooling in Punjab needs much improvement, government schools of southern Punjab particularly require some drastic steps for the betterment of the quality of education. The southern region of Punjab is at the bottom of lists regarding the academic performance within the entire Punjab province (Hashmi & Majeed, 2014). Areas of south Punjab have long been the lowest performers in academic in contrast to the students from northern and central Punjab. These rankings monitor educational and noncurricular activities in all 36 districts of Punjab province by focusing on the presence of the teachers during school time, frequency of visits by education officers, level of student retention, proper sanitary facilities (Raja & Hussain, 2015). Out of these 36 districts, the bottom four districts according to the rankings are from south Punjab – Muzaffargarh at 33<sup>rd</sup> position, Rajanpur at 34<sup>th</sup> position, Bahawalnagar at 35<sup>th</sup> position, and Dera Ghazi Khan at 36<sup>th</sup> position (Khan, Shaheen, & Ahmad, 2019). Concerning student attendance, Bahawalpur scored the lowest (Shahzad, 2019).


The unfortunate condition of educational facilities in South Punjab can be understood by the fact that though it comprises the more substantial part of the entire Punjab province, south region of Punjab only has four medical colleges and two universities. The severe lack of basic facilities in the region as well as zero inclination of government to take any affirmative steps are the two main reasons of low literacy rate in south Punjab (Khalid & Leghari, 2014).

The following figures indicate the literacy rate of people from southern and northern Punjab.



**Figure 7.** Literacy Rate in Southern Punjab.

Note. Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) (2014-15; Punjab Development Statistics Reports) published by Government of Pakistan; Statistics Division; Pakistan Bureau of Statistics; Islamabad and Government of Punjab respectively.



**Figure 8.** Literacy Rate in Northern and Central Punjab.

Note. Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) (2014-15; Punjab Development Statistics Reports) published by Government of Pakistan; Statistics Division; Pakistan Bureau of Statistics; Islamabad and Government of Punjab respectively.

It can be observed that Khanewal tops the list with 59% literacy rate. Khanewal is located beside the district Sahiwal; hence, there is a strong possibility that the location of the district plays a significant role in the level of literacy. Similarly, Rajanpur has the lowest literacy rate (52%) (Ullah, Idrees, Shouaib, Saud-Ur-Rehman, & Fahad, 2017). It is located at the farthest part of Punjab and joins borders with KP and Punjab. Again, it is evident that the location of this district is the reason for the lowest literacy rate. Northern Punjab's literacy rate is much better as compared to southern Punjab. Figure 2 indicates that Rawalpindi has the highest literacy rate (78%), and Kasur has the lowest literacy rate (49%). The average literacy rate of northern Punjab is 67%, whereas the southern Punjab lags behind with only 49% literacy rate (Latif, 2017).

Table 16

*Comparison of Higher Education, Technical and Vocational Training Institution Between South Punjab and Rest of Province*

Institutions	Total in Punjab	Total in South Punjab	Total in Northern and Central Punjab
Public Sector Universities	22	4	18
Engineering Institutions	35	5	30
Medical Colleges	18	5	13
Technical and Vocational Training Institutions	371	181	190
Teaching Hospitals	23	5	18

Note. Data was collected from the different official website of Higher Education Commission, Islamabad, Pakistan Medical and Dental Association, Pakistan Engineering Association.

#### ***4.2.3.2 Health Institutions.***

Another essential factor for the evaluation of the human development index is the provision of healthcare services. By and large, these services must be proportionate to the population of the region. However, people of Southern Punjab are facing a decline in both primary as well as tertiary health care. For this region, the delivery of quality health care services was never a matter of priority for the governmental bodies or the regional policymakers (Chaudhry, 2000).

Table 17

*District Wise Human Development Index Ranking*

HHDD <sup>28</sup>	HDI-R <sup>29</sup>	HDI-V <sup>30</sup>	HMHDD <sup>31</sup>	HDI-R	HDI-V	MHDD <sup>32</sup>	HDI-R	HDI-V	LMHDD <sup>33</sup>	HDI-R	HDI-V
Lahore	1 <sup>st</sup>	0.877	Gujrat	7 <sup>th</sup>	0.795	Khanewal	30 <sup>th</sup>	0.699	Muzaffar Garh	58 <sup>th</sup>	0.584
Rawalpindi	3 <sup>rd</sup>	0.871	Chakwal	8 <sup>th</sup>	0.792	Jhang	33 <sup>rd</sup>	0.682	Dera Ghazi Khan	64 <sup>th</sup>	0.535
Sialkot	5 <sup>th</sup>	0.834	Attock	9 <sup>th</sup>	0.786	Pakpattan	39 <sup>th</sup>	0.66	Rajan Pur	69 <sup>th</sup>	0.506
Jhelum	6 <sup>th</sup>	0.829	Faisalabad	10 <sup>th</sup>	0.782	Lodhran	41 <sup>st</sup>	0.659			
			Gujranwala	11 <sup>th</sup>	0.769	Chinot	42 <sup>nd</sup>	0.657			
			Toba Tek Singh	12 <sup>th</sup>	0.763	Vehari	43 <sup>rd</sup>	0.655			
			Narowal	15 <sup>th</sup>	0.748	Bahawalpur	46 <sup>th</sup>	0.645			
			Nankana Sahib	16 <sup>th</sup>	0.74	Mianwali	47 <sup>th</sup>	0.644			
			Sheikhupura	17 <sup>th</sup>	0.738	Bahawalnagar	49 <sup>th</sup>	0.63			
			Layyah	19 <sup>th</sup>	0.729	Bhakkar	50 <sup>th</sup>	0.628			
			Sargodha	20 <sup>th</sup>	0.728	Rahim Yar Khan	51 <sup>st</sup>	0.625			
			Multan	21 <sup>st</sup>	0.718						
			Mandi Bahudin	23 <sup>rd</sup>	0.716						
			Kasur	24 <sup>th</sup>	0.714						

<sup>28</sup> . High Human Development Districts<sup>29</sup> . Human Development Index Ranking<sup>30</sup> . Human Development Index Value<sup>31</sup> . High Medium Human Development Districts<sup>32</sup> . Medium Human Development Districts<sup>33</sup> . Low-Medium Human Development Districts



Sahiwal	25 <sup>th</sup>	0.71
Khushab	26 <sup>th</sup>	0.706
Okara	27 <sup>th</sup>	0.705
Hafiz Abad	28 <sup>th</sup>	0.704

Note. Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) (2014-15; Punjab Development Statistics Reports) published by Government of Pakistan; Statistics Division; Pakistan Bureau of Statistics; Islamabad and Government of Punjab respectively.

The healthcare system in southern Punjab is in dire needs drastic reforms because despite encompassing a more substantial part of the entire area of Punjab province, there are only 95 healthcare providers. However, in contrast, the remaining area of Punjab province - including northern and central regions of Punjab - has more than 200 healthcare facilities (Ullah, Khalid, & Hassan, 2017), which indicates vast inequality. Moreover, in the industrial sector, the number of industries in northern Punjab is almost double as compared to the Southern regions indicating the lack of reforms (Alvi, 2017).

#### ***4.2.3.3 Household.***

Level of household income inequalities, specifically in southern Punjab, is increasing with year. This form of inequality highlights that gap between the people belonging to different income groups in the society. Household income inequalities are also one of the leading causes of severe mental conflicts between people (Burki, Memon, & Mir, 2015). Households with a developed region have low-income inequalities because sources of income can be abundantly found in a developed region as compared to a rural area. Since north Punjab is better developed, a large number of individuals have the chance to engage in a different sector, which increases their total household income the employed people get more or less the same income every month (Akhtar, Rafiq, Asif, Saeed, & Kashif, 2012). On the other hand, because of being underdeveloped, southern Punjab's population have restricted job opportunities and fewer earning options and hence; as a result, lesser wages higher-income differences (Hasan & Malik, 2019).

#### **4.2.4 Cultural Horizontal Inequalities.**

Cultural dimension includes societal respect from one identity group for the other group's religious practices, norms, customs, language and cultural recognition (public holidays, local newspapers, language recognition in a political and educational institution) and dress code. Cultural horizontal inequalities include differences in recognition and hierarchy in social standards, traditions and practices of different groups. Cultural horizontal inequalities primarily create the circumstances that later initiate the sense of marginalization and discontent. Therefore, such circumstances ultimately lead to the political mobilization of ordinary people. Thus, cultural horizontal inequalities play a significant part in "conflict development and in ethno-nationalist movements" (Canelas & Gisselquist, 2019). The nonviolent political movements for the demand of new province can turn violent if they think that governmental bodies are not taking it seriously and not paying enough attention. Political elimination is one of the triggering factors that trigger conflict development and hence, should be avoided by "political inclusion" (Canelas & Gisselquist, 2019). South Punjab's population is about 32% while only one newspaper "Jhook" in Siraiki language is being published from Multan. Since decades, it had been considered as a dialect of either Punjabi or Sindhi, but, in 1981, it was given full-fledged language status and it appeared as a separate language on the Performa used in 1981 population census.

### **4.3 Correlation between the Demand of Siraiki Province and Horizontal**

#### **Inequalities: Statistical Analysis**

The present section of the chapter explores the correlation between the demand of Siraiki province and Horizontal Inequalities Model as was explained earlier in the

theoretical framework of the study that there are four dimensions in this model such as; PHIs, SHIs, EHIs and CHIs. This part presents an extensive analysis about the variation in the applicability level of the four dimensions; which type (s) is most significant and which is least significantly applicable in the context of the demand of Siraiki Province. The available literature and official documents reveal that PHIs, SHIs and EHIs are more prevalent in the province. The application of the model has been assessed with the help of statistical analysis based on public opinion survey conducted in three divisions comprising South Punjab. The survey is comprised of 1067 respondents who are categorized into four types; politicians, journalists, academicians and middle-class professionals. Respondents of the study belong to eleven districts of the region, and the sample size was drawn by using a two-stage stratified random sampling technique. Following formula was used to draw the sample from the universal population.

Table 18

*Sample Size Formula*

Confidence Level	95%
Margin of Error	4.25
Population (According to recent sixth census of 2017)	34,743,590
Sample size	1067

Table 19

*Margin of Error Formula*

Confidence Level	95%
Sample size	1067
Population (According to recent sixth census of 2017)	34,743,590
Percentage	50

The responses collected from the sampled population were codified numerically to prepare data sheet for SPSS software, which was used for statistical analysis. Though it was a tough and rough task yet was completed successfully. A measure (Questionnaire) based on the theoretical assumptions of horizontal inequalities was designed to judge the opinion of the public about the inequalities found through available literature review. The questionnaire is attached as appendix<sup>34</sup>.

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<sup>34</sup>. Questionnaire consists of seventeen statements, divided into three sections. The section A deals with the preliminary information about the respondents such as; age, academic level, gender type, profession and political affiliation, while in the section B, the respondent's opinion was asked about certain types of inequalities. Each statement is measured at a four-point Likert Scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). When the pilot study was conducted, it was observed that when "neutral" response option was given in the response category the majority of the respondents did not show their agreement or disagreement towards the asked statements. Instead, they remained neutral. Hence, a pilot study was conducted again on the same respondents by using the same questionnaire; however, the response category was specified from strongly agree to strongly disagree ranging from 1 to 4 (Strongly Agree =1, Agree =2, Disagree = 3, strongly Disagree = 4). This time respondents showed their clear indication against each statement either towards agreement or towards disagreement. Therefore, the modified questionnaire with four response categories was used for data collection in the study. Since the respondents of the targeted areas have variations in the literacy rate, gender and technical issues (access of the internet, etc.), both online (using web document, email and social media) and field survey techniques have been used for the data collection. Before getting the opinion, the respondents were debriefed about the purpose of the survey that it was a part of academic research carried out by a PhD student from the department of Politics & International Relations (DPIR) at International Islamic University, Islamabad. They were assured that their confidentiality would be kept intact, data will be processed anonymously, and the identifiable information would only be available to the principal investigator. The respondents were not forced to participate and were told that participation in this survey was voluntary; they could stop their participation at any moment. If they withdraw consent to use their data, all their data will be removed from the data file used for analysis. Only literate population (at least having primary school education) was included in the sample, but no exclusion was made based on age, gender, region, religion or lingual identity. Nested stratified random sampling technique was used to draw the sample size. It was done into two stages; firstly, startas were made on district basis in the proportion of their population in the total population of the district and secondly the nested startas drawn on district-based population were divided into two sub-startas based on linguistic identity and on the proportion of an ethnic group in the total population of that district.

Table 20

*Sample Selection from the Pool of Universal Population*

1. First Stage Stratification (According to District)					
Rajan Pur	Multan	Layyah	Muzaffargarh	Dera Ghazi Khan	Khanewal
66	149	53	128	85	85
Rahim Yar Khan	Bahawalpur	Lodhran	Bahawalnagar	Vehari	
150	117	53	96	85	
2. Second Stage Stratification (According to Linguistic Identity) Siraiki: Punjabi: Others					
S : P: O <sup>35</sup>	S : P: O	S : P: O	S : P: O	S : P: O	S : P: O
50:3:13	90:31:28	32:13:8	110:10:8	68:2:15	5:68:12
S : P: O	S : P: O	S : P: O	S : P: O	S : P: O	
93:40:17	75:32:10	37:6:10	4:90:2	10:70:5	

Note. District census reports, 2017

**Demographics of Respondents**


Section 'A' deals with the demographic information of respondents and shows the breakdown of sample size in terms of profession, gender type, academic level, linguistic identity, district of residence and political affiliation.

Table 21

*Division of Sample by Profession*

Profession of Respondents	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Academician	538	50.4	50.4	50.4
Journalist	108	10.1	10.1	60.5
Middle Class Professionals	334	31.3	31.3	91.8
Politicians	87	8.2	8.2	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	

<sup>35</sup> Siraiki, Punjabi and Others



**Figure 9.** Division of Sample by Profession.

The most important part of a public opinion survey is to include all the pertinent units in the sample so that the estimates/results would be generalized to the universal population. Therefore, the due care has been made, and the sample size of the study has been sub divided considering the various essential features; including different professions, different regions of the targeted area, academic levels, and the lingual identity of the respondents to make the sample size more representative. The details of the frequency of the sample information regarding these essential demographic characteristics have been illustrated in the below given tables and figures. Moreover, to ensure appropriate representation of masses from various professions, the sample has been drawn using stratified random sampling with proportional allocation from four strata; academicians, middle-class professionals, politicians and journalists. Five hundred thirty-eight academicians, three hundred and thirty-four MCPs, eighty-seven politicians and on hundred and eight journalists were taken for sample size.


**Table 22**

*Linguistic Identity of Respondents*

Linguistic Identity	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Siraiki	570	53.4	53.4	53.4
Punjabi	368	34.5	34.5	87.9


Others	129	12.1	12.1	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	

Although initially the demand of Siraiki province was being raised only by the Siraiki speaking nationalists, yet the region has a significant number of Punjabi speaking community. Therefore, it is pertinent to know their opinion about the demand of the province, as they would equally enjoy the benefits of the up-gradation of the region into the province. In Bahawalpur division, there is an overwhelming majority of Punjabi speakers. Hence, they were also added in sample size to make it representative so that the results of the survey could be generalized to the universal population.



**Figure 10.** Mother Tongue of Respondents.





**Figure 11.** Association between Gender Type and Mother Tongue of Respondents.


The figures 10 and 11 explain the language preference of respondents; belonging to the eleven districts of South Punjab. 48% are Siraiki speakers, 30% are Punjabi speakers, while 22% speak other languages. Male to female ratio of Siraiki speakers is 72:28, 74:26 of Punjabi speakers, and 88:12 percent of others respectively. Overall male to female ratio of respondent remains 76:24 percent.

**Table 23**

*Division of Sample by District*

Districts	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Rajan Pur	66	6.2	6.2	6.2
Multan	150	14.1	14.1	20.2
Layyah	53	5.0	5.0	25.2
Muzaffargarh	128	12.0	12.0	37.2
Dera Ghazi Khan	85	8.0	8.0	45.2
Khanewal	85	8.0	8.0	53.1
Rahim yar Khan	150	14.1	14.1	67.2
Bahawalpur	117	11.0	11.0	78.2

Lodhran	53	5.0	5.0	83.1
Bahawalnagar	96	9.0	9.0	92.1
Vehari	84	7.9	7.9	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	



**Figure 12.** Division of Sample by District.

Table 23 and figure 12 manifest the number and percentage of respondents from each district of Multan, Bahawalpur and Dera Ghazi Khan Divisions. In terms of population, Rahim yar Khan district ranks at first number by constituting 13.85%, Multan at second by 13.65%, Muzaffargarh at third by constituting 12.43%, Bahawalpur at fourth by constituting 10.55%, Bahawalnagar at fifth by constituting 8.58%, Khanewal at sixth by constituting 8.41%, Vehari at seventh by constituting 8.33%, Dera Ghazi Khan at eighth by 8.26%, Rajan Pur at ninth by 5.74%, Layyah at tenth by 5.25% and Lodhran at eleventh by 4.89% of the total population of the targeted region, therefore the frequency of respondents has been taken accordingly to make the sample size more representative. Rahim yar Khan is the largest while Lodhran is the smallest district of the region under

study; accordingly, the number of respondents from Rahim yar Khan is higher and smaller from Lodhran.

Table 24

*The Academic Level of Respondents*

Education	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
PhD	22	2.1	2.1	2.1
MS	103	9.7	9.7	11.7
MA	169	15.8	15.8	27.6
BA	268	25.1	25.1	52.7
FA	233	21.8	21.8	74.5
Matric	156	14.6	14.6	89.1
Other	116	10.9	10.9	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	




Figure 13. Division of Sample by Academic.

Table 24 and figure 13 portray the academic level of the sample. The highest ratio in the sample size is of graduate and twelve years level of educated respondents. The literacy rate of the districts under study is relatively lower than the other districts of the province. Multan ranks at the first number by having 43.4%, Khanewal at second by having 39.9%, Layyah at third by having 38.7%, Vehari at fourth by having 36.8 %, Bahawalnagar

at fifth by having 35.1%, Bahawalpur at by sixth by having 35.0 %, Rahim yar Khan at seventh by having 33.1%, Dera Ghazi Khan at eighth by having 30.6%, Lodhran at ninth by having 29.9%, Muzaffargarh at tenth by having 28.4% and Rajan Pur at eleventh by having 20.7% literacy rate respectively.

Table 25

*Division of Sample by Gender*

Gender	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Male	812	76.1	76.1	76.1
Female	255	23.9	23.9	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	



**Figure 14.** Percentage of Gender having Different Level of Education.

Table 25 presents a division of sample by gender type. 76.1 % male respondents and 23.9% female respondents form the sample. It was comparatively challenging to approach female respondents to get their opinion, and they were less interested in filling the questionnaire due to lack of knowledge about the demand of the province. Figure 14 exhibits the association between the gender type and education level of the respondents. It

was observed that the academic level of males was higher than female respondents. The correlation coefficient of the gender and level of education is 0.52 and is statistically significant at 95% confidence interval.

Table 26

*Political Affiliation of the Respondents*

Name of the Political Party	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
PTI	660	61.9	61.9	61.9
PML-N	141	13.2	13.2	75.1
PPP	107	10.0	10.0	85.1
Siraiki Nationalist Parties	74	6.9	6.9	92.0
Other	85	8.0	8.0	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	




Figure 15. Political Affiliation of Respondents.





Figure 16. Correlation between Gender Type and Political Affiliation


Majority of the respondents have political affiliation with Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) (61.9%), 13.2% showed their affiliation with Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N), mere 10.0% expressed their political affiliation with Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and just 6.9 % have affiliation with Siraiki Nationalist Parties (SNPs), and 08.0% respondents had the political affiliation with other political parties. The political affiliation with SNPs is very limited. It is interesting to note that the nationalist parties, which claim to be the advocate of the demand of Siraiki province, fail to get the electoral support of masses and to attract them to join their processions. When the respondents were asked to show their participation level in the processions of SNPs, only a minimal number of 19.2 % showed positive responses; while the significant majority about 80.5 % of respondents said that they never participated in such meetings and processions. It shows the lack of trust of the masses to the nationalist leaders.



**Figure 17.** Ratio of Respondents Participating in the Processions.

Majority of respondents showed their disagreement towards the statement asked about the participation in the processions of SNPs. Only 22.39% affirmed their

involvement and participation in such processions and meetings. It is noticeable that in spite of being Siraikis, their inclination towards SNPs is less as was argued by one respondent that Siraiki Nationalists lack clear vision about the establishment of separate province.



**Figure 18.** Association between Political Affiliation and Mother Tongue of Respondents.

Section B deals with the statements in which respondents are required to show their tendency either towards agreement or disagreement about certain types of horizontal inequalities that are found in their respective region.

**Table 27**

*The current federal structure of Pakistan with four provinces has the administrative capacity to accommodate ethnic identities.*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	229	21.5	21.5	21.5
A	470	44.0	44.0	65.5
D	254	23.8	23.8	89.3
SD	114	10.7	10.7	100.0

Total	1067	100.0	100.0
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


Figure 19.

A significant number of 65.5% of respondents showed the faith that the current federal structure of Pakistani federation has the administrative capacity to accommodate the concerns of multiple ethnic identities. In contrast, 34.5 % of the respondents disagreed to the statement.

Table 28

*There is sufficient representation of South Punjab in National and Provincial Parliament and Cabinet.*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	172	16.1	16.1	16.1
A	334	31.3	31.3	47.4
D	232	21.7	21.7	69.2
SD	329	30.8	30.8	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	






Figure 20.

52.5 % respondents of the sample manifested their disagreement towards the statement which indicates that they are not satisfied with the performance of the representatives elected from the region and they do not consider them as the true representative of their demands and concerns as was complained by one respondent that MNAs and MPAs forget the cause of Siraiki province once they assume power. On the other hand, 47.5% of the respondents showed a tendency towards the agreement.

Table 29

*Power Devolution Arrangements are Satisfactory.*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	240	22.5	22.5	22.5
A	559	52.4	52.4	74.9
D	225	21.1	21.1	96.0
SD	43	4.0	4.0	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	




Figure 21.

74.9% of the respondents showed their agreement towards the perception that if the power is devolved into grass root level, and the local administration is empowered; it can be a panacea of their multiple problems. It shows the nature of their concerns and issues that they are much concerned about socio-economic issues. However, 25.1 % respondents argued that the devolution of power would not dilute the demand of the province, and they did not consider power devolution as a useful tool to solve their problems.

Table 30

*The Provincial Governmental Policies are Satisfactory.*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	81	7.6	7.6	7.6
A	284	26.6	26.6	34.2
D	377	35.3	35.3	69.5
SD	325	30.5	30.5	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	




Figure 22.

Majority of the respondents showed a healthy level of disagreement towards the policies of Punjab provincial government. 65.8 % of respondents are not satisfied with the socio-economic policy measures of the provincial government, and they showed resentment against them. To them, governmental policies are not pro south Punjab, and central and northern areas are getting more considerable advantages of them at their expense. Only 34.2% responses were obtained that are satisfied with the current policies and in which majority respondents were Punjabi speaker.

Table 31

*Representation in Judicial Institutions is Satisfactory.*

Category of responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
S	81	7.6	7.6	7.6
A	284	26.6	26.6	34.2
D	377	35.3	35.3	69.5
SD	325	30.5	30.5	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	




Figure 23.

65.8% of respondents said that south Punjab did not have a due share in the provincial and national judicial institutions. It is interesting that both the ethnic groups responded almost same and showed their dissatisfaction about the representation in the judiciary. It can be inferred that the inhabitants of the region are not happy with the current share and they are demanding more share in the judicial institution at both provincial and national levels.

Table 32

*Representation in Police Department is Satisfactory.*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	67	6.27	6.27	6.27
A	341	32.0	32.0	38.22
D	474	44.42	44.42	82.7
SD	185	17.3	17.3	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	




Figure 24.

About 61.72 % of respondents show disagreement that the region has a due share in armed and paramilitary forces. In comparison, 38.28 % of respondents said that the region had due representation in armed forces and police department.

Table 33

*Economic Disparity in the Region has created the Demand of Separate Province.*

Category of responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	291	27.3	27.3	27.3
A	596	55.9	55.9	83.1
D	121	11.3	11.3	94.5
SD	59	5.5	5.5	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	





Figure 25.

83.2% of the respondents responded to the statement positively and affirmed the assumption that the economic disparity in the province had played a vital role to develop a sense of identity consciousness in the region. It can be argued that they became more concerned with their ethno-lingual sentiments due to the regional inequalities found in the province. However, 16.8% of respondents rejected the supposition and rejected the correlation between the demand of new province and regional inequalities.

Table 34

*South Punjab has due share in Development Plans and Employment Opportunities such as NFC Awards.*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	167	15.7	15.7	15.7
A	341	32.0	32.0	47.6
D	374	35.1	35.1	82.7
SD	185	17.3	17.3	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	



**Figure 26.**

47.6% of the respondents show their level of agreement towards the statement that South Punjab is enjoying a due share in the power structure of the province. The term “Power structure “refers to the composition of the provincial cabinet and the share in the top bureaucracy. In comparison, 52.4% disagree with the statement that indicates their dissatisfaction towards the existing power-sharing structure of the province.

**Table 35**

*South Punjab has Due Access to Fundamental Rights of Education and Health.*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	116	10.9	10.9	10.9
A	292	27.4	27.4	38.2
D	382	35.8	35.8	74.0
SD	277	26.0	26.0	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	




Figure 27.

61.8% of respondents show a negative opinion about the statement that the region has sufficient health and educational facilities. It means that the social horizontal inequalities are very much significant in the region. However, 38.2% of respondents responded positively by showing their agreement towards the statement.

Table 36

*Measures taken for the Propagation and Promotion of Siraikis' identity and culture are Satisfactory.*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	80	7.5	7.5	7.5
A	338	31.7	31.7	39.2
D	349	32.7	32.7	71.9
SD	300	28.1	28.1	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	






Figure 28.

60.8% of respondents disagree to the statement that the distinct identity and culture of Siraikis are being propagated and promoted with due attention. They showed a great resentment about the recognition of their identity and culture. Only 39.2% of respondents show their agreement that their identity is being projected quite well, and they do not have any type of ethnic deprivations. The analysis of the responses by the respondents shows that there exist substantial cultural horizontal inequalities in the province.

Table 37

*Ethnic Grievances and Identity Denial Led Towards the Demand of Separate Siraiki Province.*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	196	18.4	18.4	18.4
A	671	62.9	62.9	81.3
D	161	15.1	15.1	96.3
SD	39	3.7	3.7	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	




Figure 29.

81.3% of the responses confirm the assumption that these are the ethnic grievances along with political and economic grievances, which lead towards the demand of separate province. They confirmed the assumption drawn by the literature review that with the renaming process of the province from NWFP to KP strengthened the ethnic deprivations of minorities and justified their stance. Thence they started to raise their voice for separate province more rigorously. 18.7% disagreed with the statement.

Table 38

*Exclusively, the primary factor in triggering the demand for a new province in the region is.*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Uneven development	858	80.4	80.4	80.4
Denial of Identity	209	19.6	19.6	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	




Figure 30.

Though the denial of linguistic identity and de-recognition of cultural distinctiveness played a stimulating role in the formation of the movement for the up-gradation of Siraiiki region into a separate province, yet 80.4% of the respondents said that the primary factor behind the development of the separate province was uneven development and regional disparity. As the present name of the province is a reflection of only one ethnic group that is Punjabi. It only promotes their identity, language and culture, and they have become a minority in their province.

Table 39

*The Criterion for the Creation of New Provinces*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Administrative Basis	845	79.2	79.2	79.2
Linguistic Basis	222	20.8	20.8	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	




Figure 31.

When it was asked to the sampled population about the criterion to establish new provinces in Pakistan generally and Siraiki province specifically. A substantial majority of 79.2% showed their agreement for the creation of new provinces on administrative basis instead of linguistic basis.

Table 40

*Any Other Acceptable Alternative for the Demand of Siraiki Province*

Category of Responses			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
No, Only the creation of the new province	682	63.9	63.9	63.9		
Yes, Equal Development	385	36.1	36.1	100.0		
Total	1067	100.0	100.0			





Figure 32.

It was attempted to investigate the acceptable alternative option except for the demand of a new province from the sampled population. 63.9% ratio strongly stressed the establishment of Siraiki province, and they did not agree on any other option such as equitable development and decentralization in the region. However, 36.1% of the respondents said that equitable development for all the ethnic groups in the region could be an acceptable and viable alternative of the demand for a separate province.

Table 41

*Suggestion to Overcome the Grievances of Ethnic Groups*

Category of responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Creation of more provinces	789	73.9	73.9	73.9
Power Devolution	278	26.1	26.1	100.0
Total	1067	100.0	100.0	



**Figure 33.**

It is evident from the above graphical representation and table that significant majority of the sample size about 74% argued that the grievance of various ethnic groups might be addressed by the creation of more provinces instead of decentralization at the grass-root level. However, 26% of the respondents showed their agreement in favour of power devolution instead of the demarcation of new provinces.

All the four dimensions of horizontal inequalities model are significantly applicable in the case study of South Punjab with the reference of the demand of Siraiki province. The region is homeland of about 32% of the total population of Punjab but the share it gets in political and economic resources is very less. Same is the case with health and educational institutions; they lack the basic facilities and qualified workers. Most of the professionals prefer to work in the Northern and Central Punjab as these areas are developed and have all the facilities, they need. Public opinion survey confirms the supposition that horizontal inequalities are the actual drivers and the triggering force behind the development of the demand of separate Siraiki province.

## **Chapter 5. Horizontal Inequalities and the Demand of Hazara Province:**

### **A Study of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**

The present chapter consists of two sections; section one begins with the detailed introduction of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. It begins with the brief introduction of the province and presents its demographic and ethnic structure. Afterwards, it proceeds with explaining socioeconomic status of the province in terms of education, health, and infrastructure, which follows a detailed description of the targeted region "Hazara". A comparison between Hazara division and the rest of the province has also been made to comprehend intra-provincial horizontal inequalities; the section proceeds by describing the horizontal inequalities and how they have been measured using various indicators to explain their correlation with the demand of a new Hazara province. The second section is based on the statistical analysis of the opinion of the respondents gathered through public opinion surveys to supplement the evidence regarding the positive and direct relationship between the demand of new province and horizontal inequalities in the first section. This section supports the argument made in the preceding section, which is based on the data gathered through different development statistical reports, household surveys, census reports and other governmental and non-governmental documents. The latter section is a sort of verification and authentication of the facts and arguments made in the first part because it is based on the information directly collected from the affected and concerned masses.

## 5.1 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province: An Overview

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is the third largest province in terms of population but the smallest in terms of area constituting 14.69% and 11.53% of the total population and total landmass of Pakistan respectively (Pakistan, 2017). Formerly, the province was called as North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) but was renamed in 2010 through 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendment as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). It is divided into seven administrative divisions, which are sub-divided into twenty-five districts. To comprehend the lingual, cultural and ethnic diversity, the province can be split into three regions; Hindko speaking region (Hazara and Kohat divisions), Pashto speaking region (Malakand, Bannu, Peshawar and Mardan divisions) and Siraiki speaking region (Dera Ismaeil Khan division). Although the boundaries of these three parts are not conclusive, as the regions are not officially recognized yet there are cultural and lingual distinctions that make them separate and distinct from each other.

Table 42

### *Demography of Province*

Division	Kohat	Hazara	D. I. Khan	Bannu	Peshawar	Mardan	Malakand
Population	2,218,971	5,325,121	2,019,017	2,044,074	7,403,817	3,997,677	7,514,694
Area km <sup>2</sup>	2,545	17,194	9,005	4,391	4,001	3,046	29,872
Major Languages	Hindko	Hindko and Pashto	Siraiki	Pashto	Pashto	Pashto	Pashto

Note. KP Provincial Census Reports 1998 and 2017

### 5.1.1 Demography of Hazara Division.

Hazara division is located in the northeastern side of the province and is stretched on 17,194 km<sup>2</sup> area which approximately constitutes 24.54% of the total territory of Khyber



Pakhtunkhwa. The figure 24.54% indicates that Hazara division covers about one-fourth part of the landmass of the entire province. According to 2017 census, the total population of six districts of the region has been reduced to 17.44 % from 19.75% (Wazir & Goujon, 2019). Demographic characteristics of Hazara region like population, area, population density, education facilities, literacy rate, and unemployment rate have been figured out in the below-given table.

Table 43

*Demography of Hazara Division*

Districts	Area (Km <sup>2</sup> )	Population	Population Density/ km <sup>2</sup>	Education Score	Unemployment Rate (%)
Kohistan	7492	784,711	105	63.25	-
Battagram	1301	476,612	366	73.27	-
Mansehra	4124	1,556,460	377	68.3	24.8
Torghar	454	171,395	0	69.51	19.6
Abbottabad	1967	1,332,912	678	66.76	-
Haripur	1725	1,003,031	581	63.4	18.9
Hazara	17063	5,325,121 (17.44%)			
KP	101741	30,523,371			

Note. Tehsil wise population census of 1998 and 2017 and district wise ranking reports published by Alifailaan website; <http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/block-wise-provisional-summary-results-6th-population-housing-census-2017-january-03-2018>; <https://www.alifailaan.pk/>.

The division is comprised of six districts viz. Abbottabad, Haripur, Torghar, Kohistan, Mansehra and Battagram and is inhabited by three major ethnic groups;

- Hindkowan (Hindko speaking)
- Pakhtun (Pashto speaking)
- Kohistanis (Kohistani speaking)

Majority of Hindkowan is concentrated in Abbottabad, Haripur and Mansehra districts while the Pakhtun majority lives in Battagram and Torgar districts and Kohistanis live mostly in Kohistan District. However commonly all the inhabitants living in the region are known as "Hazaraeval".

### 5.1.2 Linguistic Identity of Hazara Division.

Table 44

#### *Linguistic Identity of the Dwellers of Hazara*

Districts	Hindko (%)	Pashto (%)	Urdu (%)	Others (%)
Abbottabad	70	20	7.4	10
Haripur	87	05	1.3	8
Mansehra	60	10	3.3	30
Kohistan	11	12	18.6	77
Battagram	10	80	28.4	10
Torgar	10	78	32.6	12

Note. District Census Reports, 1998 and 2017

## 5.2 Horizontal Inequalities

Horizontal Inequalities are the inequalities exist between the groups with distinct identities such as; blacks and whites, Sinhalese and Tamils, men and women, Muslim and Hindus, Hindus and Sikhs, Hutus and Tutsis. Such disparities and inequalities create resentment among those who consider themselves deprived and marginalized by the other groups. In acute form, they can lead to nationalist movements, riots, civil wars, and separatism. They are multidimensional, i.e., political, social, cultural and economic.


### 5.2.1 Political Horizontal Inequalities.

This type includes inequalities in the distribution of political opportunities and other sources of power among different ethnic groups, including control over the army, the

cabinet, local and regional governments, parliamentary assemblies, the police and the presidency. They also encompass inequalities in people's capabilities to participate politically and to express their needs such as budget, taxation, welfare reforms projects. In this study PHIs have been measured through the following indicators;

#### ***5.2.1.1 Representation in Provincial Parliaments and Cabinets.***

Hazara division is relatively more deprived and underdeveloped in terms of political representation. Hence, political horizontal inequalities are very much prevalent in this region because of not getting a due share in resource allocations, job opportunities, academic outlooks, and other developmental projects (Khan & Rehman, 2012). KP's share in federal bureaucratic jobs is 11.5% according to the quota allocated for all the provinces and federal capital territory (Brown & Langer, 2010). As per its population ratio, Hazara division should receive at least 14.87% share of KP's quota (11.5%), but it is receiving only 08 to 09%, which is minimal, and unfair (Raja & Hussain, 2015). Throughout 1970 to 2018, there had been 20 chief ministers of KP while the ratio of chief ministers belonging to Hazara is 10% only. Whereas, 24 governors have been passed over the period of 1970 to 2018, only 4.16% came from Hazara region (Alvi, 2018). As far as the provincial ministers and parliamentary secretaries are concerned, they have been taken disproportionately from the region. The below-given figure depicts the data of previous four parliaments, which were established in 2002, 2008, 2013 and 2018.




**Figure 34.** Comparison between Hazara Division and Rest of Province

Note. Data was generated from KP provincial assembly

#### 5.2.1.2 Representation in Provincial Judicial Institutions and Police

##### Department.

Throughout 1970 to 2019, there had been twenty-four Inspector Generals (IGs) and thirty-six chief justices of provincial high court (Peshawar High Court). However, only two chief justices from Hazara division served the highest judicial institution of the province. The case is worse in the police department where not a single IG was chosen from the region. This meager representation in the two most important and prestigious institutions is an indication that there are sharp political horizontal inequalities in the province.



**Figure 35.** Comparison between Hazara and Rest of Province.

Source: Data was inferred from the official websites of Peshawar High Court and KP police department.

### 5.2.1.3 Reform Projects and Annual Development Program (ADP).

According to development ranking and Human Development Index (HDI), from twenty-five districts of the province only two (Haripur and Abbottabad) of Hazara division fall in the category of High Medium Human Development Index while the rest of four districts (Mansehra; Battagram; Kohistan and Torghar) come in Medium Human Development, Low Medium Human Development and Very Low Human Development Districts. The below-given table depicts the impoverished condition of Hazara districts.

Table 45

#### *District Wise Ranking by Human Development Index*

HHDD <sup>36</sup>	HMHDD <sup>37</sup>	MHDD <sup>38</sup>	LMHDD <sup>39</sup>	LHDD <sup>40</sup>	VLHDD <sup>41</sup>
None	Abbottabad	Nowshera	Hangu	Shangla	Torghar
	Haripur	Malakand	Lakki Marwat	Upper Dir	Kohistan
	Mardan	Mansehra	Buner		
	Peshawar	Chitral	Battagram		
		Charsadda	D.I.Khan		
		Swabi	Tank		
		Kohat			
		Swat			
		Karak			
		Bannu			
		Lower Dir			

<sup>36</sup> High Human Development Districts

<sup>37</sup> High Medium Human Development Districts

<sup>38</sup> Medium Human Development Districts


<sup>39</sup> Low Medium Human Development Districts

<sup>40</sup> Low Human Development Districts

<sup>41</sup> Very Low Human Development Districts

Note. Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) (2014-15; KP Development Statistics Reports) published by Government of Pakistan; Statistics Division; Pakistan Bureau of Statistics; Islamabad and Government of KP respectively.

These figures indicate that the reform projects and other development plans are concentrated in the Pakhtun dominated districts like Nowshera and Swabi. During the four financial years of 2013-14 to 2016-17, the total budget allocation to six Hazara districts was only Rs.22.8 billion while only one district "Nowshera" the hometown of former Chief Minister Pervez Khattak received Rs.15.73 billion. All the provinces, including KP, get financial resources based on NFC Award distribution (National Finance Commission Award). The seventh NFC Award is based on four weighted criteria: population (82 per cent), poverty (10.3 per cent), revenue capacity (5 per cent) and area (2.7 per cent). Hazara division consists of 14.87% of the entire provincial population; hence it should get at least one-third of the allocated amount (Baqai, 2004). However, the actual amount received by this region is far less than its due share. The comparative analysis of two districts; one from Hazara division and the other from Peshawar division shows downward and upward trends respectively.



**Figure 36.** Comparison of ADPs Allocation between Nowshera and Kohistan.

Note. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Budgets: 4-year scorecard FY2013-14 to FY2016-17 report published by Omar Asghar Khan Foundation in 2016. The report can be assessed here: <http://www.oakdf.org.pk/pdf/KP%20Budgets%204-Year%20Scorecard%202013-14%20to%202016-17.pdf>.

A district wise comparison of development allocations shows the fact that the region with less political power is denied development benefits.

Table 46

*ADP Allocated To KP*

District	FY 2013-14 TO FY 2016-17, the amount allocated for ADP
Nowshera	15.73
Swat	12.97
Mardan	8.63
Swabi	7.59
Torghar	6.73
Haripur	6.55
Charsadda	5.94
Abbottabad	5.54
D.I.Khan	5.33
Malakand	5.20
Lower Dir	4.86
Kohat	4.24
Chitral	3.69
Upper Dir	3.51
Bannu	3.28
Buner	3.04
Hangu	2.56
Mansehra	1.73
Kohistan	1.70
Karak	1.56
Shangla	1.52
Tank	0.79
Lakki Marwat	0.76
Battagram	0.36

Note. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Budgets: 4-year scorecard FY2013-14 to FY2016-17 report published by Omar Asghar Khan Foundation in 2016. The report can be assessed here: <http://www.oakdf.org.pk/pdf/KP%20Budgets%204-Year%20Scorecard%202013-14%20to%202016-17.pdf>.

In 2017-18 annual budget, the allocation for Hazara's six district, Abbottabad, Battagram, Haripur, Kohistan, Mansehra and Torghar also illustrates sharp differences. They cumulatively received Rs.5.9 billion, while Rs.5.47 billion was given to the single district of Nowshera. Hazara's population as per the 1998 census was 5,137,289; which is

six times more than Nowshera. Nevertheless, its share in development remains 2.84 percent compared to Nowshera's 2.63 per cent.

### **5.2.2 Economic Horizontal Inequalities.**

The economic dimension of HIs includes; inequalities in terms of access to various assets, especially access to land and employment opportunities. These are the input type of inequalities as they are primarily based on income and income is based on three types of sources; financial, human and social. In contrast, SHIs are the output type of inequalities. If input inequalities would be less, output inequalities would automatically be lesser, and in case of sharper input inequalities, the output inequalities would be more severe. EHIs have been measured through the following indicators; (Chaudhry, 2000).

#### ***5.2.2.1 Employment Opportunities and the Unemployment Rate.***

There exists a sharp difference between Hazara districts and the rest of the province in terms of the unemployment rate and employment opportunities. Below given table explains this type of inequalities found in the province.

Table 47

*Comparison of Employment and Unemployment Rate between Hazara Division and Rest of the Province*

District	Total Employed Population	Percentage to Total Employment	Total Unemployed	Percentage to Total Unemployment
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2518368		873408	
Abbottabad	121211	5%	54820	6%
Bannu	97345	4%	30877	4%
Battagram	40766	2%	28276	3%
Buner	79976	3%	18122	2%
Charsadda	161231	6%	48436	6%



Chitral	37248	1%	25997	3%
D.I.Khan	141607	6%	39731	5%
Dir Lower	86838	3%	27717	3%
Dir Upper	62341	2%	36838	4%
Hangu	27485	1%	18066	2%
Haripur	90115	4%	38665	4%
Karak	38784	2%	22720	3%
Kohat	59731	2%	37735	4%
Kohistan	81825	3%	34194	4%
Lakki	59715	2%	20140	2%
Malakand	53838	2%	22614	3%
Mansehra	157985	6%	62716	7%
Mardan	237171	9%	67607	8%
Nowshera	139178	6%	5392	1%
Peshawar	322627	13%	69975	8%
Shangla	69422	3%	28629	3%
Swabi	153652	6%	46181	5%
Swat	169549	7%	74132	8%
Tank	28728	1%	13828	2%
Torghar	- <sup>42</sup>	-	-	-

Note. Reports "Important District Wise Socio-Economic Indicators of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2018" and "Development Statistics of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2018" published by Bureau of Statistics: Planning and Development Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Battagram and Kohistan are less developed districts having only 2% and 3% employed population. In terms of incidence of poverty, the three districts of Hazara out of six fall in the category of extreme poor districts. Specifically, Torghar and Kohistan are underdeveloped, and the poverty level is very high in them. Most of the residents are living below the poverty line.

Table 48

*District-Wise Incidence of Poverty in KP*

Hazara Districts	Incidence of Poverty (%)	Rest of the Provincial Districts	Incidence of Poverty (%)
------------------	--------------------------	----------------------------------	--------------------------

<sup>42</sup> Not Available

Abbottabad	32.9%	Peshawar	31.5%
Mansehra	40.7%	Mardan	33.8%
Haripur	24.7%	Nowshera	37.4%
Kohistan	95.8%	Malakand	37.1%
Battagram	75.2%	Lower Dir	41.6%
Torghar	92.0%	Chitral	43.3%

Note. Report "Multidimensional Poverty in Pakistan at the National, Provincial and District levels 2014-15" published by Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF).

The figure shows that the developmental funds allocated for these districts are not spent on the development of these districts and are being spent on those districts in which the executive body and the bureaucrats live. Consequently, poverty level is high in the region as compared to other regions of the province. This extreme poverty can force the inhabitants to indulge in extra-legal and violent activities that would not be a good situation for provincial as well as the federal government.

#### **5.2.2.2 Income Ratio.**

Income disparities increase the level of poverty since there is a positive relationship between income inequality and poverty level. When income inequality increases, the poverty level also increases (Pasha, 2018). Poverty restricts not only the access to basic requirements but also "generates inequality of opportunities" (Stewart, 2009) which can further intensify the income gap among individuals from different socioeconomic stratum. Unjust land ownership in the province is also one of the critical factors leading to income inequalities. The share of monthly spending shows the inequality of utilization between the individuals from the top and bottom quintile (Qureshi & Sadozai, 2016) Those belonging to the top quintile use a more substantial portion of their income on education; whereas, those belonging to the bottom quintile cannot spend the required amount on education.

This situation shows that the literacy rate is directly connected to household income, and income is associated with poverty or development (Brown, 2014). The below-given table shows that two districts of Hazara division lie in the category of bottom twenty districts in terms of average monthly earnings.

Table 49

*Top Twenty and Bottom Twenty Districts of Pakistan, In Terms of Average Monthly Earnings (Pak. Rupees)*

Top Twenty		Bottom Twenty	
Gujranwala	Quetta	Muzaffargarh	Nawabshah
Islamabad	Sibbi	LakkiMarwat	Dadu
Lahore	Sialkot	MirpurKhas	Lodhran
Karachi	Malakand	Umerkot	Tank
Rawalpindi	Sargodha	Khanewal	Badin
Faisalabad	Abbottabad	D.G.Khan	Chitral
Mandi Bahuddin	Kasur	Tando M. Khan	Attock
Peshawar	Ghotki	Tando Allah Yar	Layyah
Hafiz Abad	Mekran	Rajanpur	Shikarpur
Zhob	Bhakhar	Mianwali	Charsada
Hafizabad	Sukhur	Tharparker	Kohistan
Okara	T.T.Singh	Vehari	Torghar
Norowal	Kalat	Matiari	Battagram
Nankana Sahib	Jhang	Sanghar	Jhelum
Swabi	Shangla	Bahawal Nagar	Kohat
		Rahim Yar Khan	Thatta

Note. Data was collected from the Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) 2015-16.

The distribution of expenditure is similar to income distribution. The expenditure profile reveals the imbalance of income among the well-off landowner and the remaining farmers. It shows that people first allocate their income to their basic requirements and then for their luxuries (Latif, 2017). Since the initial call on expenditures is food, the families having low-income level allocate a significant portion of their income to groceries and

comparatively a lesser portion to other items. In the same way, families with high-income levels are left with a significantly more substantial portion of their income even after fulfilling their food requirement.

### ***5.2.2.3 Industries Ratio.***

The financial wellbeing and prosperity of any region are reliant on the industries because the industries create employment prospects and boost the regional markets (Hashmi & Majeed. 2014). That increases the trade activities, and as a result, additional employment opportunities are generated and consequently it improves the standard of living. Unfortunately, Hazara division lacks this industrialization, and according to the statistics, this region suffers from the inequality in industrial distribution and professional prospects (Baqai, 2004; Fazl-e-Haider, 2018). The following tables highlight that only 13% of industries operate in the region.

Table 50

#### ***Comparison of Industries between Hazara and Rest of KP***

KPK Total	Hazara Total	Percentage of Hazara to KPK
2584	339	13%

Note. KP Development Statistics Reports) published by Government of KP.

The region is contributing well in the revenue generation for the province by producing about 18%, 31%, 6% of wheat, maize, rice and tobacco respectively. The fisheries department contributes a significant share of approximately 58% in revenue collection. Though the region is contributing largely, yet three of its districts are very poor and underdeveloped almost in all the occupations.

Table 51

*Comparison of Wheat, Maize, Rice and Tobacco Annual Production between Hazara and Rest of KP*

Districts	Wheat	Maize	Rice	Tobacco
Abbottabad	22976	23056	0	0
Bannu	33618	9764	5185	0
Battagram	17402	22452	3443	0
Buner	73842	73877	635	5400
Charsadda	85407	28247	99	6780
Chitral	18474	14328	4559	0
D.I.Khan	92834	5451	28582	0
Dir Lower	53355	30058	21832	16
Dir Upper	45772	11696	14905	0
Hangu	15837	6690	269	0
Haripur	76512	52112	0	0
Karak	4022	123	0	0
Kohat	34141	3974	97	0
Kohistan	4111	59685	183	0
Lakki	17731	1071	81	0
Malakand	35463	10736	10966	1900
Mansehra	96676	105554	3574	4400
Mardan	85945	79033	2958	11900
Nowshera	53133	26901	205	2100
Peshawar	72223	30363	720	0
Shangla	46505	61425	3490	0
Swabi	72742	66394	763	38540
Swat	132546	121667	15803	69
Tank	25246	0	373	0
Tor Ghar	0	0	0	0
Total	1216513	844657	118722	71105
Percentage of Hazara Division	18%	31%	6%	6%

Note. Reports “Important District Wise Socio-Economic Indicators of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2018” and “Development Statistics of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2018” published by Bureau of Statistics: Planning and Development Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Table 52

*Percentage of Revenue Generated by the Fisheries Department of Hazara with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*

Total Revenue of KP 2017-18	Total Revenue of Hazara Division 2017-18	Percentage of Total Revenue of Hazara to KP
69,545,649.00	40,095,312.00	58%

Note. Reports “Important District Wise Socio-Economic Indicators of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2018” and “Development Statistics of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2018” published by Bureau of Statistics: Planning and Development Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

There is a dire need for the proper industrial infrastructure and suitable distribution system. If the distribution problem is resolved and the region starts getting its fair share, there would be a possibility of opening new industries. Moreover, this region would have space for its specialized industrial development because the resources could be more focused (Sadiq, Chaudhary, & Aslam, 2018).

**5.2.2.4 Poverty and Districts Development Rankings.**

Torghar and Kohistan are categorized as extremely poor and very poor, respectively. At the same time, Mansehra and Battagram lie in the category of poor and vulnerable poor. Astonishingly, the Mansehra has a high literacy rate, but despite this unemployment and poverty index is significant. That indicates the unjust allocation of funds, land ownership, insufficient employment prospects and other assets by the provincial government. In NFC award, the division should get at least 17% as a proportion to its population. However, the actual amount received by this region is far less than its due share.

Table 53

*District Development Ranking*

Least Poor	Vulnerable Poor	Poor	Very Poor	Extremely Poor
Abbottabad	Battagram	Karak	Swat	Upper Dir
Haripur	Chitral	Hangu	Lower Dir	Torghar
		Peshawar	D.I.Khan	
		Kohat	Swabi	
		Mansehra	Kohistan	
		Malakand	Tank	
		Mardan	Shangla	
			Lakki	
		Charsaddah	Marwat	
		Buner	Swat	

Note. Report "Multi-dimensional Poverty in Pakistan" published by Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, University of Oxford. The report can be assessed here: <https://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Multidimensional-Poverty-in-Pakistan.pdf>.

Mitigating poverty requires a continuous effort through engagement of concerned authorities starting from a grassroots level and "funding the public service delivery" (Mushtaq & Shaheen, 2017). In addition, to achieve this, a scaled-up programmatic strategy is required with a high level of government buy-in, political assurance and the larger amount of funding. As far as intra-provincial disparities are concerned, Torghar and Kohistan are the most affected districts having the lowest development score.

Table 54

*Intra-Provincial Disparities in Socioeconomic Development*

District	Development Score	Provincial Rank Order (1-25)
Torghar	0.036	1
Kohistan	0.039	2
Tank	0.621	3
Upper Dir	0.738	4
Shangla	1.305	5

D.I.Khan	1.322	6
Chitral	3.040	7
Lakki Marwat	3.908	8
Bannu	4.452	9
Karak	4.592	10
Hangu	5.050	11
Swabi	5.375	12
Bonair	5.705	13
Mardan	7.226	14
Kohat	7.239	15
Lower Dir	7.518	16
Charsada	7.815	17
Manshera	8.338	18
Battagram	8.623	19
Swat	9.949	20
Nowsehra	11.384	21
Peshawar	13.462	22
Abbottabad	13.888	23
Malakand	17.472	24
Haripur	23.629	25

Note. Spatial Disparities in Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Pakistan; IBA Working Paper 15-3 July 2015.

To reduce poverty, any region requires sufficient developmental efforts. Moreover, since these developmental efforts are entirely reliant on the budget that is usually provided by the government, Hazara division is not receiving its fair share of the government funding and has to receive small and dwindling allocations. However, some other districts like Nowshera and Swabi manage to use political power to get more funds than others. Hazara's six districts: Abbottabad, Battagram, Haripur, Kohistan, Mansehra and Torgar received Rs.22.8 billion in four annual budgets. It was even less than funds given to only two the favored districts of Nowshera and Swabi.



### 5.2.3 Social Horizontal Inequalities.

Social horizontal inequalities are the inequalities in the availability of necessary facilities such as education, healthcare services and housing.

#### 5.2.3.1 Literacy Rate and Education Completion Rate.

Education is a prerequisite for economic prosperity and development as the educated and literate population play an active role in interest articulation and aggregation. They have excellent skills to grab multiple employment opportunities. Among the twenty-five districts of KP province, three districts of Hazara division have the highest literacy rate while three others Battagram, Torghar and Kohistan have only 49%, 25% and 20%. Torghar and Kohistan are the two bottom-most districts having lowest literacy rate. The following figures indicate the literacy rate of all the twenty-five districts.

Table 55

#### *Comparison of Literacy Rate between Hazara Division and Rest of KP*

District	Literacy Rate in Percentage	District	Literacy Rate in Percentage
Haripur	69	Kohat	44
Abbottabad	67	Charsadda	43
Mansehra	56	Swat	42
Malakand	56	Hangu	42
Chitral	55	Karak	39
Tank	54	LakkiMarwat	38
Bannu	53	Mardan	36
Peshawar	53	Upper Dir	36
Lower Dir	51	Buner	34
Battagram	49	Shangla	32
Swabi	48	Torghar	25
Nowshera	45	Kohistan	20

Note. Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) (2014-15; KP Development Statistics Reports) published by Government of Pakistan; Statistics Division; Pakistan Bureau of Statistics; Islamabad and Government of KP respectively.

In terms of education score, three Hazara districts Haripur, Abbottabad, and Mansehra have a sound education score. On the other hand, Battagram, Torghar and Kohistan are ranked at 69<sup>th</sup>, 140<sup>th</sup> and 141<sup>st</sup> respectively. Torghar and Kohistan are the most destitute and most impoverished districts of province lagging in all political, economic and social realms.

Table 56

*District Wise Ranking in terms of Education Score*

District	Ranking	Education Score	District	Ranking	Education Score
Haripur	1 <sup>st</sup>	81.62	Kohat	77 <sup>th</sup>	56.02
Abbottabad	16 <sup>th</sup>	71.62	Charsadda	78 <sup>th</sup>	55.95
Mansehra	23 <sup>rd</sup>	70.59	Swat	86 <sup>th</sup>	53.1
Malakand	40 <sup>th</sup>	66.2	Hangu	93 <sup>rd</sup>	51.66
Chitra	46 <sup>th</sup>	64.04	Karak	95 <sup>th</sup>	51.5
Tank	47 <sup>th</sup>	77.44	Lakki-Marwat	98 <sup>th</sup>	50.91
Bannu	63 <sup>rd</sup>	58.91	Mardan	99 <sup>th</sup>	50.56
Peshawar	64 <sup>th</sup>	58.63	Upper Dir	117 <sup>th</sup>	46.24
Lower Dir	65 <sup>th</sup>	58.38	Buner	129 <sup>th</sup>	43.6
Battagram	69 <sup>th</sup>	57.48	Shangla	130 <sup>th</sup>	42.29
Swabi	70 <sup>th</sup>	56.99	Torghar	140 <sup>th</sup>	34.11
Noshewra	71 <sup>st</sup>	56.98	Kohistan	141 <sup>st</sup>	20.67
Dera Ismail Khan	76 <sup>th</sup>	56.27	-	-	-

Note. Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) (2014-15; Punjab Development Statistics Reports) published by Government of Pakistan; Statistics Division; Pakistan Bureau of Statistics; Islamabad and Government of Punjab respectively.

Though the number of primary, middle and high schools is significant with the proportion of Hazara division's population, however, higher education institutions' number is less as compared to its population. It is the situation with professional and poly technical institutions.

Table 57

*Comparison of Educational Institutions*

School Category	KPK Total	Hazara Total	% of Hazara to KPK
Primary	25,919	5,164	20%
Middle	3,175	625	20%
High	2,586	457	18%
Higher Secondary	664	107	16%
Degree Colleges	217	31	14%
Post Graduate Colleges	21	6	29%
Poly technical Institutes	36	3	8%

Note. KP Development Statistics Reports) published by Government of KP

Engineering and medical colleges are vital as they produce social workers to serve society. However, the studies of medical and engineering are relatively expensive; along with university/ college expenditures, to manage hostel and other expenses is not an easy task for middle and lower-middle classes. Sometimes many brilliant students have to give up their studies due to financial issues. If a student finds such an institution in his district, he will not have to travel long and to bear accommodation expenses etc. Therefore, the establishment of such institutions in the regions where their number is less can lessen social inequalities. In the case of Hazara division, as the below-given table portrays, the number of higher technical and vocational training institutions is less than their need. Resultantly

the students of these districts have to travel to other districts like Peshawar, etc.; the distance of Peshawar from Torghar and Kohistan is about 300km and 400km respectively. If Hazara division is upgraded into province while declaring Abbottabad as its capital city, the distance from Torghar and Kohistan to Abbottabad will be reduced to 90 km and 250 km accordingly.

Table 58

*Comparison of Higher, Technical and Vocational Training Institutions*

Institutions	Total in KP	Total in Hazara	Percentage
Public Sector Universities	20	2	10%
Engineering Institutions	18	1	6%
Medical Colleges	9	1	11%
Technical and Vocational Training Institutions	48	10	21%

Note. Data was collected from the different official website of Higher Education Commission, Islamabad, Pakistan Medical and Dental Association, Pakistan Engineering Association.

**5.2.3.2 Health Institutions.**

Another important factor for the evaluation of the human development index is the provision of healthcare services. Largely, these services must be proportionate to the population of the region. The below-given table pictures the situation of the health institution in KP province, and it is noticeable that a significant number of hospitals, dispensaries and rural health care centers exist in Hazara division.

Table 59

*Comparison of Health Institutions*

District	Hospitals	Dispensaries	R.H.Cs <sup>43</sup>	T.B Clinics	MCH Centers	Sub Health Centers	BHUs	Leprosy Clinics
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<sup>43</sup>. Rural Health Care Centers

Khyber	205	915	102	74	131	23	940	26
Pakhtunkhwa								
Abbottabad	11	44	2	1	2	1	54	1
Battagram	2	9	2	1	1	0	28	2
Haripur	10	11	5	1	2	6	40	1
Kohistan	0	2	4	1	0	0	33	2
Mansehra	12	59	9	1	3	0	58	1
Torghar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total of Hazara Division	35	125	22	5	8	7	213	7
%age of Hazara to KP	17%	14%	22%	7%	6%	30%	23%	27%

Note. Reports “Important District Wise Socio-Economic Indicators of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2018” and “Development Statistics of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2018” published by Bureau of Statistics: Planning and Development Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Though a significant number of health institutions exist in Hazara division, yet it is debatable that whether the facilities available in those hospitals are equal in standard provided in the hospitals of other regions of the province.

### **5.2.3.3 Household.**

Level of household income inequalities, specifically in two districts of Hazara division; Torghar and Kohistan, is increasing with every passing year. This form of inequality highlights that gap between the people belonging to different income groups in the society. Household income inequalities are also one of the leading causes of severe mental conflicts among the people.

Households with a developed region have low-income inequalities because sources of income can be abundantly found in a developed region as compared to a rural area. Since western districts are better developed, a large number of individuals have the chance to engage in a different sector, which increases their total household income the employed people get more or less the same income every month. On the other hand, because of being

underdeveloped, Hazara division's population has restricted job opportunities and fewer earning options and hence; as a result, lesser the wages is higher-the income differences are.

#### **5.2.4 Cultural Horizontal Inequalities**

Cultural dimension includes societal respect from one identity group to the other group's religious practices, norms, customs, language and cultural recognition (public holidays, local newspapers, language recognition in a political and educational institution) and dress code. This type of inequalities primarily has a possible potential to create the circumstances that later can aggravate the sense of political marginalization and socio-economic discontent. Therefore, such conditions ultimately trigger the political mobilization of masses by the groups' elites. Thus, cultural horizontal inequalities play a significant role in "conflict development and in the genesis of ethno-nationalist movements" (Canelas & Gisselquist, 2019). They are likely to transform the nonviolent socio-political movements into violence if group elites perceive that governmental bodies are not taking their demands seriously and are not paying enough attention. The real driving force is the political exclusion that can trigger conflict and violence, and the presence of cultural inequalities provides a conducive environment for mass mobilization. However, the situation can be avoided by ensuring a participatory culture and "political inclusion" (Canelas & Gisselquist, 2019).

As far as the status of Hindko language is concerned; it remained unrecognized and was contemplated as a dialect of Punjabi language since the inception of Pakistan and got recognition recently in 2017 census. Before that, it was put under the category of "Others" in the census form instead of being mentioned as a separate language like Pashto, Sindhi,

Balochi or Punjabi. Oppositely, Pashto has been given due respect and recognition at both provincial as well as at the national level in educational and political institutions. The renaming process of the province in 2010 from NWFP to KP is a practical manifestation of the respect, recognition and promotion of Pashto language at the national level. Despite being the sixth most spoken language, not a single national, provincial or local newspaper is being published in it, and there is only one TV Channel broadcasting programs in Hindko, but most of the times it remains functional. To preserve the literature, folklore and poetry of Hindko language for posterity, no institutionalized efforts have been made either by the provincial government or by the federal government. No provincial holiday is awarded to commemorate Hindkowan heroes and historical figures and to celebrate Hindko culture or language.

### **5.3 Correlation between the Demand of Hazara Province and Horizontal**

#### **Inequalities: Statistical Analysis**

The present section of the chapter explores the correlation between the demand of Hazara province and Horizontal Inequalities Model as is explained earlier in the theoretical framework of the study that there are four dimensions in this model such as; PHIs, SHIs, EHIs and CHIs. This part presents an extensive analysis about the variation in the applicability level of the four dimensions; which type (s) is most significant and which is least significantly applicable in the context of the demand of Hazara Province. The available literature and official documents reveal that CHIs are more prevalent in the province as compared to the other types of inequalities. Two indicators; language and culture are the crucial factors, which are playing the most significant role in the development of the demand among Hazaraevals. The application of the model has been

assessed with the help of statistical analysis based on a public opinion survey conducted in the Hazara division of KP. The survey is comprised of 532 respondents who are categorized into four types; politicians, journalists, academicians and middle-class professionals. Respondents of the study belong to six districts of the region, and the sample size was drawn by using a stratified random sampling technique. Following formula was used to draw the sample from the pool of the universal population.

Table 60

*Sample Size*

Confidence Level	95%
Margin of Error	4.25
Population (According to recent sixth census of 2017)	5,325,121
Sample size	532

Table 61

*Margin of Error*

Confidence Level	95%
Sample size	532
Population (According to recent sixth census of 2017)	5,325,121
Percentage	50

The responses collected from the sampled population were codified numerically to prepare data sheet for SPSS software, which was used for statistical analysis. However, it was a tough and rough task but was completed successfully.



The questionnaire was based on the theoretical assumptions of horizontal inequalities designed to judge the opinion of the public about the inequalities found through available literature review. The questionnaire is attached as Appendix<sup>44</sup>.

Table 62

*Sample Selection from the Pool of Universal Population*

First stage stratification (District Wise <sup>45</sup> )					
Mansehra	Abbottabad	Haripur	Kohistan	Battagram	Torghar
155	132	102	80	47	16
Second stage stratification (According to linguistic identity; Hindko: Pashto: Others)					
H : P: O <sup>46</sup>	H : P: O	H : P: O	H : P: O	H : P: O	H : P: O
93: 47: 15	105: 14: 13	82: 07: 13	47: 06: 20	30: 12: 05	09: 05: 02

<sup>44</sup>. The Questionnaire consists of eighteen statements, divided into three sections. The first section deals with the preliminary information about the respondent such as; age, education, gender, profession and political affiliation, while in the second section the respondent's opinion was asked about certain types of inequalities. Each statement is measured at a four-point Likert Scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). When the pilot study was conducted, it was observed that when "neutral" response was given in the response category, the majority of the respondents did not show their agreement or disagreement towards the asked statements; instead, they remained neutral. Hence, a pilot study was conducted again on the same respondents with the same questionnaire: however, the response category was specified from strongly agree to strongly disagree ranging from 1 to 4 (Strongly Agree SA =1, agree A 2, Disagree D = 3, Strongly Disagree SD = 4). This time respondents showed their clear indication against each statement either towards agreement or towards disagreement. Therefore, the modified questionnaire with four response categories was used for data collection in the study.

Since the respondents of the study areas have variations in the literacy rate, gender type and technical issues (access of the internet, etc.), both online (using web documents such as Google Docs, email and social media) and field survey techniques have been used for the data collection. Before getting the opinion, respondents were briefed about the purpose of the survey and they were assured that their confidentiality would be kept intact, data will be processed anonymously, and the identifiable information would only be available to the investigator. The respondents were not forced to participate and were told that participation in this survey is voluntary; they could stop participation at any moment. If they withdraw consent to use their data, all of their data will be removed from the data file used for analysis. Only literate population (at least having primary school education) was included in the sample, but no exclusion was made based on age, gender, region, religion or lingual identity. Nested stratified random sampling technique was used to draw the sample size. It was done into two stages; firstly startas were made on district basis in the proportion of their population in the total population of the district and secondly the nested startas drawn on district-based population were divided into two sub-startas based on linguistic identity and on the proportion of an ethnic group in the total population of that district.

<sup>45</sup>. District wise sample was drawn based on proportion of the district population to the total population of Province.

<sup>46</sup>. Hindko:Pashto:Others

### Section A: Demographics of Respondents

Section 'A' deals with the demographic information of respondents and shows the breakdown of sample size in terms of profession, gender type, academic level, linguistic identity, district of residence and political affiliation

Table 63

*Division of sample by profession*

Profession of Respondents	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Academician	283	53.2	53.2	53.2
Journalist	35	6.6	6.6	59.8
Middle Class Professionals (MCPs)	116	21.8	21.8	81.6
Politicians	98	18.2	18.2	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	




Figure 38.

The most important part of a public opinion survey is to include all the pertinent units in the sample so that the estimates/results would be generalized to the universal population. Therefore, the sample size of the study has been sub-divided considering the various important features; including different professions, different regions of the targeted

area, academic levels, and the lingual identity of the respondents to make the sample size more representative. The details of the frequency of the sample information regarding these essential demographic characteristics have been illustrated in Table 1, figure 1. Moreover, to ensure appropriate representation of masses from various professions, samples have been drawn using stratified random sampling with proportional allocation from four strata; academicians, middle-class professionals, politicians and journalists. Two hundred eighty-three academicians, one hundred and sixteen MCPs, ninety-seven politicians and thirty-five journalists were taken for sample size.

Table 64

*Linguistic Identity of Respondents*

Language of Respondents	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Pashto	69	13.0	13.0	13.0
Hindko	379	71.2	71.2	84.2
Other	84	15.8	15.8	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	

Although it is stated that the demand of Hazara province is being raised only by Hindko speaking nationalists, yet the division has a significant number of Pashto speaking community. Therefore, it is pertinent to know their opinion about the demand of separate province, as they would equally enjoy the benefits of the up-gradation of division into the province. In Battagram and Torghar, there is an overwhelming majority of Pashto speakers. Hence, they were also added in sample size to make it representative so that the results of the survey could be generalized to the universal population.




Figure 39.




Figure 40. Association between Gender Type and the Linguistic Identity of Respondents.


Figures 39 and 40 show the language preference of respondents, belonging to the six districts of Hazara division. Majority of the respondents are Hindko speakers; numerically Hindko respondents are 71%, 13% of respondents are Pashto speakers, while the remaining 15% are the other language speakers. Male to female ratio of Hindkowan is 71:29, 75:25 of Pakhtun, 68:32 percent of others, respectively. Overall male to female ratio of the respondent is 71:29 percent.

Table 65

*Division of Sample by District*

Districts	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Mansehra	155	29.1	29.1	29.1
Abbottabad	132	24.8	24.8	53.9
Haripur	102	19.2	19.2	73.1

Kohistan	80	15.0	15.0	88.2
Battagram	47	8.8	8.8	97.0
Torghar	16	3.0	3.0	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	



**Figure 41.** Division of Sample by District.

Table 65 and figure 41 manifest the number and percentage of respondents from the six districts of Hazara division. In terms of population, Mansehra district ranks at 1<sup>st</sup> number by constituting 29%, Abbottabad at second by constituting 25%, Haripur at third by constituting 19%, Kohistan at fourth by constituting 15%, Battagram at fifth by constituting 9% and Torghar at six by constituting only 3% population of the targeted division. Therefore, the frequency of respondents has been taken accordingly to make the sample size more representative. Mansehra is the largest while Torghar is the smallest district of the region under study; accordingly, the number of respondents from Mansehra is higher and is smaller from Torghar.

Table 66

*Academic Level of Respondents*

Education	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
PhD	36	6.8	6.8	6.8
MS	80	15.0	15.0	21.8
MA	164	30.8	30.8	52.6
BA	190	35.7	35.7	88.3
FA	53	10.0	10.0	98.3
Matric	5	.9	.9	99.2
Other	4	.8	.8	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	





Figure 42. Academic Level of Respondents.

Table 66 and figure 42 portray the academic level of the sample. The highest ratio in the sample size is of graduate respondents. The literacy rate of the four districts of the division under study is much higher than the other districts of the province. Haripur ranks at second number having 81.62% literacy rate, Abbottabad at sixteenth number having 71.62%, Mansehra at twenty-third having 70.59%, Battagram at sixty-ninth having 57.48%, Torghar and Kohistan at one hundred and forty and one hundred and forty one are having 34.44% and 34.11% respectively.


Table 67

*Division of Sample by Gender*

Gender	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Male	379	71.2	71.2	71.2
Female	153	28.8	28.8	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	



**Figure 43.** Division of Sample by Gender.



**Figure 44.** Percentage of Gender having Different Level of Education.

Table 63, figures 43 and 44 present a division of sample by gender type. 71.2 % male respondents and 28.8% female respondents form the sample. It was comparatively challenging to approach female respondents to get their opinion, and they were less interested in filling the questionnaire due to lack of knowledge about the demand of the province. Figure 7exhibits the association between the gender type and education level of the respondents. It was observed that the academic level of males was higher than female respondents. The correlation coefficient of the gender and level of education is 0.52 and is statistically significant at a 95% confidence interval.

**Table 68**

*Political Affiliation of the Respondents*

Name of the Political Party	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
PTI	241	45.3	45.3	45.3
PMI.-N	79	14.8	14.8	60.2
PPP	31	5.8	5.8	66.0



HNP	13	2.4	2.4	68.4
Other	168	31.6	31.6	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	




Figure 45. Political Affiliation of the Respondent.





Figure 46. Correlation between Gender Type and Political Affiliation

Majority of the respondents has political affiliation with Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) (45.3%), 14.8% showed their affiliation with Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N), mere 5.8% expressed their political affiliation with Pakistan People's Party (PPP), just 2.4 % have affiliation with Hazara Nationalist Parties (HNPs), and 31.6% respondents had the political affiliation with other political parties. Not a single female respondent had the political affiliation with HNPs, and the ratio of male respondents having affiliation with HNPs is minimal. It is interesting to note that the nationalist parties, which

claim to be the advocate of the demand of Hazara province, fail to get the electoral support of masses and to attract them to join their processions. When the respondents were asked to show the frequency level of their participation in the processions of HNPs. Only 19.2 % showed a positive response and the significant majority about 80.5 % of respondents said that they never participated in such meetings and processions. It shows the lack of trust of the masses to their nationalist leaders.



**Figure 47.** Respondents' Ratio to Participate in the Processions of HNPs.

Majority of Hindko speaking respondents showed their political affiliation with PTI. Pashto speaking respondents showed their tendency towards other political parties, including ANP. Not a single Pakhtun had an affiliation with HNPs.




Figure 48.

Section B deals with the statements in which respondents are required to show their tendency either towards agreement or disagreement about certain types of horizontal inequalities that are found in their respective region.

Table 69

*The current federal structure of Pakistan with four provinces has the administrative capacity to accommodate ethnic identities.*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	45	8.5	8.5	8.5
A	196	36.8	36.8	45.3
D	153	28.8	28.8	74.1
SD	138	25.9	25.9	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	





Figure 49.

A significant number of 54.7% respondents showed their disagreement towards the statement that the current federal structure of Pakistani federation has the administrative capacity to accommodate the concerns of multiple ethnic identities. In contrast, 45.3% of the respondents agreed to the statement. It is noticeable that 38.72% of Hindko speakers showed their disagreement towards the current provincial territory arrangement. However, on the other side, only 7.70% Pashto speaker want the reconstruction of the existing provincial territories and the majority of them is satisfied with the present territorial boundaries and is not in the favour of the creation of new provinces.

Table 70

*There is Sufficient Representation of Hazara Division in National and Provincial Parliament and Cabinet.*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	80	15.0	15.0	15.0
A	126	23.7	23.7	38.7
D	215	40.4	40.4	79.1
SD	111	20.9	20.9	100.0



**Figure 50.**

61.3% respondents of the sample manifested their disagreement towards the statement, which indicates that they are not satisfied with the proportion of MNAs, MPAs, provincial ministers and parliamentary secretaries taken from the region. They consider that they do not have due representation in legislation and implementation process and the policies formulated by national and provincial parliaments are not equally beneficial for the whole province; instead, they benefit the Pakhtun disproportionately. They show dissatisfaction about their performance and argue that they are not the true representative of their demands and concerns. On the other hand, 38.7% of the respondents showed a tendency towards an agreement that the region has a due share in both national as well provincial political systems. 46.24 % of Hindkowan and only 7% of the Pakhtun disagreed with the statement. It can be inferred that majority of Hindkowan are not comfortable with the members elected from the region; the reason behind this can be that the majority of the MPAs and MNAs of the region are of Pakhtun, and they never want the establishment of Hazara province.

Table 71

*Power Devolution Arrangements are Satisfactory.*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	43	8.1	8.1	8.1
A	152	28.6	28.6	36.7
D	124	23.3	23.3	60.0
SD	213	40.	40	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	




Figure 51.

63.3% of the respondents' show their disagreement towards the perception that there is sufficient power devolution at the grass-root level and the local administration is empowered enough to address their day-to-day issues; they can give up their demand of separate province if power is decentralized within the existing framework. It shows the nature of their concerns that they are not much satisfied with the existing power-sharing mechanism and do not believe in the system that it can lessen their deprivations.

Table 72

*The Provincial Governmental Policies Are Satisfactory.*

Category of responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	58	10.9	10.9	10.9
A	120	22.6	22.6	33.5
D	203	38.2	38.2	71.6

SD	151	28.4	28.4	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	





Figure 52.

Majority of the respondents showed a strong level of disagreement towards the policies of KP provincial government. 66.4% of respondents are not satisfied with the socio-economic policy measures of the provincial government, and they showed resentment against them. To them, governmental policies are pro Pakhtun and Pakhtun are getting greater advantages of them at the expense of the Hindkowan community. Only 33.5% responses were obtained that are satisfied with the current policies and in which majority respondents were Pashto speaker.

Table 73

*Representation in Judicial Institutions is Satisfactory.*

Category of responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	175	32.9	32.9	32.9
A	169	31.8	31.8	64.7
D	124	23.3	23.3	88.0
SD	64	12.0	12.0	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	



**Figure 53.**

87.3% respondents said that Hazara division did not have due share in the provincial and national judicial institutions. It is interesting that both the ethnic groups responded almost same and showed their dissatisfaction about the representation in the judiciary. It can be inferred that the inhabitants of the division are not happy with the current share, and they are demanding more share in the judicial institution at both provincial and national levels.

**Table 74**

*Representation in the Police Department is Satisfactory.*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	70	13.2	13.2	13.2
A	96	18.0	18.0	31.2
SD	182	34.2	34.2	65.4
D	184	34.6	34.6	100
Total	532	100.0	100.0	






Figure 54.

68.8 % of respondents show their disagreement that the Hazara division has a due share in the police department. The opinion of the respondents asked in statements one to five supplements the findings of the reviewed literature that showed severe political horizontal inequalities found between Hazara division and remaining parts of the province. Thence it is proved that there is a positive and direct relationship between the demand of a new province and political horizontal inequalities.

Table 75

*Economic Disparity in the Province has catered the Demand of Separate Province.*

Category of responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	143	26.9	26.9	26.9
A	290	54.5	54.5	81.4
D	45	8.5	8.5	89.8
SD	54	10.2	10.2	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	




Figure 55.

81.3% of the respondents responded to the statement positively and affirmed the assumption that the economic disparity in the province had played a vital role in the development of the demand of separate province. It can be argued that Hazaraeals have become more concerned with their ethno-lingual sentiments due to the regional inequalities found in the province. However, 18.7% of respondents rejected the supposition and rejected the correlation between the demand of new province and regional inequalities.

Table 76

*Hazara Division gets its due share in Development Plans and Employment Opportunities such as NFC Awards.*

Category of responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	55	10.33	10.33	10.3
A	70	13.15	13.15	23.4
D	221	41.5	41.5	64.9
SD	186	34.9	34.9	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	




Figure 56.

76% of respondents disagree with the statement that the Hazara division gets a due share in development projects.

Table 77

*The Hazaraeals have due access to fundamental rights of education and health.*

Category of responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	127	23.9	23.9	23.9
A	231	43.4	43.4	67.3
D	108	20.3	20.3	87.6
SD	66	12.4	12.4	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	




Figure 57.

67.3% of respondents show a positive opinion about the statement that Hazarvals have sufficient health and educational facilities. It means that the social horizontal inequalities are also not much significant in the region; instead, the inhabitants of the province are pleased with the availability of such fundamental rights of education and health. However, 32.7% of respondents show their concerns, and they reject the statement that they have sufficient health and education facilities. Majority of such respondents belong to Kohistan and Torghar district of the division. The official statistical development reports and household surveys also reveal that Kohistan and Torghar have low HDI and low education index as compared to other districts of the division.

Table 78

*Measures taken for the Propagation and Promotion of Hazarvals' identity and culture are Satisfactory.*

Category of responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	52	9.8	9.8	9.8
A	101	19.0	19.0	28.8
D	192	36.1	36.1	64.8
SD	187	35.2	35.2	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	




Figure 58.

71.3% of respondents disagree to the statement that Hazaraeal' distinct identity and culture is being propagated and promoted with due attention. They showed a great resentment about the recognition of their identity and culture. Only 28.7% of respondents show their agreement that their identity is being projected quite well, and they do not have any type of ethnic deprivations. The analysis of the responses by the respondents shows that there exist substantial cultural horizontal inequalities in the province.

Table 79

*Ethnic Grievances and Identity Denial Led Towards the Demand of Separate Hazara Province.*

Category of responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SA	131	24.6	24.6	24.6
A	279	52.4	52.4	77.1
D	37	7.0	7.0	84.0
SD	85	16.0	16.0	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	




Figure 59.

77% of the responses confirm the assumption that these are the ethnic grievances, which lead towards the demand of Hazara province. They confirmed the assumption drawn by the literature review that with the renaming process of the province from NWFP to KP

strengthened the ethnic deprivations of Hazaraeal and they started to raise their voice for separate province more rigorously.

Table 80

*Exclusively, the Major Factor behind the Development of the Demand of Hazara Province is.*

Category of responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Uneven Development	200	38.0	38.0	38.7
Identity Recognition	306	57.0	95.0	95.0
Others	26	5.0	100.0	100.0




Figure 60.

57% of respondents say that the major exclusive factors behind the development of Hazara province are the denial of identity, language and culture. The present name of the province is a reflection of only one ethnic group that is Pakhtun. It only promotes their identity, language and culture, and they have become a minority in their own province. Hence, the fundamental factor behind the demand of a separate province is a quest for identity recognition.

Table 81

*Criterion for the Creation of New Provinces.*

Category of responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Administrative Basis	453	85.2	85.2	85.2
Linguistic Basis	79	14.8	14.8	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	




Figure 61.

When the opinion of the sampled population was asked about the criterion to create new provinces in Pakistan generally and Hazara province specifically. A substantial majority showed their agreement for the creation of new provinces on administrative basis instead of linguistic basis.

Table 82

*Any Other Acceptable Alternative for the Demand of Hazara Province*

Category of responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Equal development	193	36.3	36.3	36.3
Only the creation of new province	339	63.7	63.7	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	




Figure 62.


It was attempted to investigate the acceptable alternative option except for the demand of a new province from the sampled population. 63.7% ratio strongly stressed the establishment of Hazara province, and they did not agree on any other option such as equitable development and decentralization in the region. However, 36.3% of the respondents said that the equal development for all the ethnic groups in the region could be an acceptable and viable alternative of the demand for Hazara province.

Table 83

*Suggestions to overcome the grievances of ethnic groups*

Category of Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Creation of more provinces	319	60.0	60.0	60.0
Power Devolution	213	40.0	40.0	100.0
Total	532	100.0	100.0	





**Figure 63.**

It is evident from the above graphical and tabular presentation that significant majority of the sample size about 60% argued that the grievance of various ethnic groups might be addressed by the creation of more provinces instead of decentralization at the grass-root level. However, 40% of the respondents showed their agreement in favour of power devolution instead of the demarcation of new provinces. Majority of them belong to the Pakhtun community, and it is revealed from the literature review that Pakhtuns are not in favour of the creation of Hazara province.

Though, all the four dimensions of horizontal inequalities model are applicable in the case study of Hazara division with the reference of the demand of Hazara province. The region is homeland of about 18% of the total population of KP but the share it gets in the political and economic resources is very little. However, the situation of health and educational institutions is relatively satisfactory; perhaps that is the reason that three districts of the division have the highest literacy rate. Cultural inequalities are very prevalent in the region as since the inception of Pakistan, Hindko language has been treated as a variant of other languages. Recently in 2017, it was recognized as a full-fledged and distinct language. Public opinion survey confirms the supposition that horizontal inequalities are

the actual drivers and the triggering force behind the developemnt of the demand of separte  
Hazara province.


## **Chapter 6. Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion**

The present chapter consists of three sections; the first section logically concludes the empirical findings and elaborates the evidence-based comparison between the applicability levels of horizontal inequalities with the reference of the demand of new provinces in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The second section is further divided into two sub-sections, that are based on some key recommendations to tackle horizontal inequalities and the demand of new provinces in Pakistan inferred from the findings and the review of available literature. It proceeds to the last section that concludes the findings of the study in a logical manner stating that there is a positive and direct relationship between horizontal inequalities model and the demand of new provinces and by arguing that horizontal inequalities is not an unavoidable phenomenon and can be managed by adopting accommodative and collaborative policies.

### **6.1 Findings**

Two staged-extensive analysis indicates that there is a direct and positive correlation between the four facets of horizontal inequalities and the demand of new provinces in both the case studies; Punjab and KP. Existing literature used to investigate the applicability level of horizontal inequalities explores that political, economic and cultural horizontal inequalities are equally and significantly present in both the cases. However social horizontal inequalities were found less severe in Hazara division as the indicators used to measure this variable signals that literacy rate, education completion rate and the infrastructure of educational institutions was at satisfactory level. In addition, the number of educational, vocational, medical and technical institutions was nearly equal to the number of populace living there. Further, the response of the sample confirmed this proposition as respondents did not complain about them. Health institutions were also good and sufficient to fulfil the needs of the people living in that region. On the other hand, the inhabitants

of South Punjab showed their strong resentment and annoyance about the present situation of educational and health institutions. They lack the adequate human and infrastructure resources and they have to travel long either to central or north Punjab to avail the better facilities of education and health. Unfortunately, most of them remain unable to go to these areas due to owing very limited income and some others who managed to go, did not meet the various admission requirements and have to forgo their dreams. Precisely speaking, it can be argued that there are severe horizontal inequalities between South Punjab and the rest of Punjab and it is the case with Hazara division. Three districts (Kohistan, Batagarm, and Torghar) of Hazara lie under the category of the most impoverished and backward areas of Pakistan. The masses of these regions hope that in case of having their separate provinces, they will get better socio-economic and political opportunities to prosper and have a better living standard. The below given figure summarizes the difference in the applicability levels of political, economic, social and cultural horizontal inequalities model in Punjab and KP.



**Figure 64.**

## **6.2 Recommendations to Combat Horizontal Inequalities**

The prerequisite for sustained development and peace is the due participation of each identity group in the political system, and enough role in the power structure as political ostracism leads to a suitable environment for the political mobilization either against the groups who occupy the power structure and are privileged or against state authorities. Thence, it is necessary to ensure each identity group's just participation in the state structure. Horizontal inequalities owing to be an essential dimension of welfare and well-being, and more importantly, having socio-economic and political outcomes. Which can be highly detrimental to development, needs to be the essential part of development policies in all the societies irrespective of the differentiation that some are suffering from the consequences of such inequalities and some others are immune to them.

### **6.2.1 Policies to Combat Socio-Economic Horizontal Inequalities.**

Though there is a variety of potential policies for alleviating inequalities and many of them were adopted by various states. However, for the redressal of socioeconomic deprivations and political grievances complained by minority nationalities, two types of state policies have been proved effective and fruitful such as;

- Targeted Policies
- Universal Policies

Direct/ targeted policies are the tailored policies which primarily aim to counter the grievances of the specific groups that are claimant to be disparaged and marginalized. Such policies overtly give benefits to the deprived groups. However, they can be taken as negative measures by the privileged groups, for instance, the quota for women, minority and backward areas in educational institutions, vocational training institutions, engineering

and medical colleges or employment opportunities. Being target-oriented, direct policies can bring effective outcomes to reduce horizontal inequalities among the groups living in the same region. They have been applied by many states, for instance, Northern Ireland, United States, New Zealand, Fiji, India, Malaysia, South Africa and Sri Lanka and observed positive impacts. Demography plays a pivotal role to formulate policies, as only right and accurate policies would be able to combat inequalities. In the case where the claimant and marginalized group's size is comparatively small to the whole population of that region, direct policies are relatively more appropriate and effective as compared to universal policies in which the principal beneficiary is the whole population and majority groups constitutes the significant portion of that populace.

In the case study of KP, the group (Hazaraeal) considering itself marginalized and deprived is smaller in number relative to the whole population of the Hazara division. Hence, target-oriented policies in the entire four spheres; political, social, cultural and economic can reduce the horizontal inequalities, and the uneven development pattern can be addressed. The up-gradation of the division into province can also be a potent measure to lessen the inequalities.

Indirect policies are the universal policies, which are primarily formulated to advantage the entire population irrespective of any particular group or community. They aim to reduce horizontal inequalities indirectly through conventional policies; such as progressive taxation, and public spending that give fewer advantages to minority and deprived groups and benefits majority groups. Anti-discrimination legislation is an excellent example of a universal policy that is essential to counter horizontal inequalities. However, its practical implementation requires an unbiased and sound judicial system to prevent the violation

and to safeguard the interests of minority groups. The states became successful in combating horizontal inequalities by adopting both direct and indirect policies that supplement each other. Demographic characteristics of the related region are necessary to consider while forming the policies to overcome the regional disparities and inequalities because where the marginalized group's size is more substantial in number; indirect policies prove more useful as they involve fewer leakages and such leakages can be desirable, by fulfilling the needs of the deprived members of the privileged group. Effective targeting through group identity also requires that group membership is unambiguous and uncontroversial. It is challenging to apply it when there are many cross-group marriages and a significant 'mixed' population as in many Latin American cases (Stewart, 2016). Therefore, for South Punjab universal policies are more suitable in combating regional inequalities because Siraikis are large in number in the region. Secondly, it is hard to identify the members of a particular group because non-Siraikis had been living there for the past many decades. Cross-group marriages are ubiquitous and multiple groups living in the same region have a very close relationship with each other.

Many countries apply the direct and indirect policies get relieved from socioeconomic horizontal inequalities. Indirect policies are useful but they do not give results and appear with partial effects. The economic policies are challenging to adopt in macro and structural policies. Universal policies seem to be more appropriate as they do not widen the gulf between the groups, but their intended outcomes take several decades to appear significantly. The other essential requirement is the strict monitoring to ensure the equitable incorporation of each group; which is rare and absent completely in large scale policies.

Therefore, to overcome the shortcomings of universal policies, sporadic target policies can be applied.

### **6.2.2 Policies to Combat Political Horizontal Inequalities.**

Primary considerations in combatting political horizontal inequalities involve citizenship rights, the methods of the electoral system and the rules and standards of political competition, the structure of the executive body, the magnitude of administrative and fiscal decentralization, employment procedure and pattern in bureaucracy, the police and armed forces. The review of the existing literature indicates different standpoints about these core issues to tackle political horizontal inequalities within the general policy options highlighted above. In the matter of electoral system and political parties' regulations, sufficient empirical and theoretical literature is available explaining the suitability of various types of electoral arrangements for multicultural and multiethnic societies. However, there are two principal approaches– the consociationalism, introduced by Arend Lijphart (1977; 2004); and the internationalism, given by Donald Horowitz (1985). Consociationalism primarily promotes the institutionalisation (either formally or informally) by establishing a 'coalition' of multi-ethnic groups to establish political offices, ensuring all major groups' representation in government in proportion to their number in total population, thus assuaging political horizontal inequalities.

Contrary to it, the integrationists are not interested to achieve a 'balance of power' among major groups; they try to design strategies to reduce the stimulations for group mobilization which can or can not be effective for reducing PHIs, and might not be. The main issue with this approach is that if it fails in minimizing group imbalances in political power, the system can be broken down – as it has occurred in several cases where it was



tried (Lebanon and Sri Lanka). Switching to target-oriented measures, one strategy for mitigating political horizontal inequalities is comprised of the electoral system developed to guarantee a balanced representation of all groups in parliament and the executive. Consociationalism suggested a way of ensuring ethnic representation and that is to design separate electoral rolls according to seats allocated to groups instead of the geographic boundary, as it was practiced in Cyprus (for Turkish and Greek Cypriots) and in New Zealand, where a separate Mori electoral roll is kept (Lijphart, 1986). Another way is to design only one electoral roll but to reserve seats for identity groups. For instance, in India, 15% of seats are reserved for Scheduled Castes but registered voters from all groups in the constituency vote for them. The discussed mechanisms heretofore are direct, group-based mechanisms and therefore, make certain a minimum balance of political representation at the expense of possibly entrenching identity politics as the basis of electoral mobilization. Indirect and non-group-based electoral methods are also accessible, which can increase group balance inside parliament. For example, proportional representation method (PR) has a greater capacity to secure greater degree of balance than first-past-the-post (FPTP) method, in which minorities are inclined to be acutely under-represented or foreclosed' (Lijphart, 1986). Political parties are an important mediating source by which voter preferences are expressed and mobilized. In plural societies, there is a great tendency for political parties to become 'ethnic' as it looks an effective way of mobilizing voters (Horowitz, 1985). Restraints on political parties themselves are an alternative integrationist policy. Hence, in both Ghana and Nigeria, political parties have to nominate their representatives across the whole country, and given the geographic concentration of ethnic groups, this promotes multiethnic parties.

Another policy to manage political horizontal inequalities is the (de facto) one-party state. In many developing countries, severe restrictions on democratic institutions and norms (Malaysia, pre-1990 Zambia) or outright abrogation of democracy (Burma, Togo) have been justified by claims that multiparty democracy inevitably leads to ethnic polarization and mobilization and increases the risk of violent ethnic conflict. Nor are such arguments the sole purview of despots seeking justification for their rule – Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) have developed a model of ‘ethnic outbidding’ and democratic instability in multiethnic countries. However, the evidence suggests that where (de facto) one-party states emerge, these rarely fulfil their promise of inclusion. The one-party regime of Felix Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire has often been defended on such grounds. The quick descent of the country into ethnic strife following democratization only reinforces these claims. However, there are many other cases where authoritarianism in the name of ethnic peace became a little more than an oppressive vehicle for ethnic dominance – the 1962 coup in Burma was largely legitimized on the failure of democratic politics to hold the union together, yet the Ne Win regime that took power and its successors have concentrated power in the hands of the ethnic Bamar (Callahan 2005; Smith 1999); in Togo, the long dictatorship of Étienne Eyadema began with a 1967 coup ‘depicted as forestalling an overt confrontation between north and south’ (Brown 1983), yet in the latter years of his long rule, Eyadema stood accused of concentrating power not just in the hands of his regional compatriots but in the hands of his Kabye tribe.

The electoral methods discussed above can eliminate group exclusion from parliaments; groups can still be disqualified from political power unless there are certain mechanisms to ensure a proper power-sharing in the executive bodies. As the executive

body has a vital role in the decision-making process, that is why in several countries, the group which has the domination position in the executive distributes the resources in a way that primarily favours its own members. It was seen in the case of Burundi in the 1990s, when half of government investment volume went to only Bujumbura and its surroundings, from where the elite Tutsi (who dominated the government) belonged (Gaffney 2000). Besides, group preclusion has significant symbolic importance that can lead to group mobilization. For example, when in Côte d'Ivoire, Alassane Outtara (northerner) was excluded, to contest the presidential elections; it became a major stimulating factor in developing a sense of alienation and mobilization in northern groups against the Bédié regime (Langer, 2005). In several post-conflict countries, official mechanisms are present to 'share' the high profile governmental positions among major identity groups. For instance, in Lebanon, the top three political offices have been divided into the three major ethnoreligious groups, i.e. the presidency for Maronite Christian, the prime ministerial ship for Sunni Muslim, and the speakership for Shi'a Muslim. Same is the case in Cyprus, the president would be Greek Cypriot and vice-president would be Turkish Cypriots. This power sharing at the top level can be managed informally as well, as in Ghana, where a tradition has been grown that the president would be northerner while vice-president would be a southerner. Power sharing can rotate overtime to satisfy all the ethno-linguistic groups. As it happens in Bosnia Herzegovina, where, the chair of the three-member presidium swivels among the Bosnian, Croat and Serb communities' political leaders. Formal and informal methods complement each other. For example, in Ghana, the constitution states that each region must be represented in the Council of State, which advises the president on important public appointments and promotions. The formal, inclusive nature of this

institution thus contributes towards promoting more balanced appointment policies. At the same time, this is backed up by many informal mechanisms. The power-sharing is an important issue not only at the top level but also throughout the system, including, specifically, high-level positions in the bureaucracy, the armed forces and the police department. As the government is the greatest employer in several countries, therefore employment at bureaucratic ranks is very influential in terms of HIs. It was evidenced in some countries where there are sharp horizontal inequalities reflecting groups' domination at the civil service level. For example, in Kenya, the Kikuyu group, that forms only 20% of the entire population, held more than 30% of the permanent secretaries in the civil service in the period of the Kikuyu-dominated regime of Kenyatta, but was reduced to just 11% in 1994 after Moi's ten years rule. In the meantime, Moi's own ethnic group – the Kalenjin's ratio increased from 5% in 1978 to 35% in 2001. A similar pattern can be seen in the composition of ambassadors and district commissioners (Kanyinga, 2006). There are many countries where informal methods are applied for equal representation. The explicit application policies are needed to deal with extreme inequalities. For instance, in Ethiopia, the constitution demands a balanced representation in each sphere of the government.

The states can appoint and promote the civil servants according to ethnic proportion. As Ghana exhibits the models, where the council of state not only have balanced representation but also ensures it in appointments and promotions. The accumulation of power in center can damage the whole system while the balanced approach, as applied in the United States of America through the system of checks and balances has effective outcomes. The division of power in the United States leads to a balanced representation of Negros. However, the application of a similar system in

Indonesia has centralized power. Where groups are geographically concentrated, a federal constitution can empower different groups, by allowing them to have control over many areas of decision-making. The separatists' efforts are mitigated through the application of the federal system. The states like Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ethiopia, India, Malaysia, Nigeria and Switzerland have adopted the federal system. Malaysia and Nigeria have the exception as these have centralized the power. Nigeria has faced the Biafran separatism due to centralization, which indulges it to a civil war from 1967 to 1970. The federal system and decentralization are significant regarding the power sharing among different ethnicities of the state. The real devolution can be little even in the presence of decentralization. For instance, the majority of groups are empowered, and minorities are disempowered in Uganda. Moreover, the geographical concentration of groups also plays a role in the empowerment of a certain group. Econometric analysis has shown that decentralization is associated with lower levels of communal and secessionist violence, but this can be partly offset by the growth of regional political parties (Brancati, 2006). The subnational boundaries play a significant role to deal with the political horizontal inequalities. The consociationalists are in favor of drawing subnational boundaries around the ethnic groups. Federalists support the empowering of national minorities in their affairs. Integrationism argues that the ethnic group should allow the drawing of their subnational boundaries to mitigate their political issues. Critics of 'ethno federalism' have pointed to the collapse of the post-Soviet federations; Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR itself – as evidence of its weakness (Snyder, 2000). Although McGarry and O'Leary (2006) have argued that all these collapses were preceded by moves away from the principle of ethno regional autonomy. The subnational boundaries are not the only way to combat with

political horizontal inequalities, but the application of other policies like direct and indirect mechanism is also important.

Proportional Representation in both the parliaments and executive bodies can be a useful tool to reduce political horizontal inequalities in both the cases of Punjab and KP. As South Punjab and Hazara division constitute 32% and 17% of the total population of their respective provinces, there should be 32% and 17% seats reserved for these regions in both the provincial parliaments and cabinets so that no legislation or implementation could be performed that can be hazardous for the interests of their region. By ensuring the political inclusion, a sense of marginalization and political exclusion can be mitigated that would be very helpful for the economic growth and national integration of the state. On the same lines, a rotational policy can be adopted for chief executives and governors.

### **6.2.3 Policies to Combat Cultural Horizontal Inequalities.**

Cultural horizontal inequalities denote to the difference in recognition and acknowledgement of different identity groups' culture, customs, values and language. Except for the marginalization in the fields of political and socio-economic development, identity groups also complaint to be deprived in terms of denial of their language and cultural practices in both public and private spheres. CHIs differ from PHIs, EHIs and CHIs since the following types involve the redistribution of sources and opportunities while cultural horizontal inequalities involve recognition policies. They can be combatted by introducing an inclusionary approach in the three categories;

- a. Religious practices
- b. Language recognition
- c. Cultural practices

The freedom of religion has been accepted as a fundamental right universally. In comparison, any restraint on religious practices leads to cultural inequalities. Sometimes, the declarations of official religion by the states can privilege a specific religion. For instance, Pakistan and Malaysia have declared Islam as the state religion. In such a situation, non-Muslims living in their entities can face inequalities. Even it is also a trend in the secular states where there is no official religion; that the religion of majority is privileged as in many western secular countries, only Christian religious events are observed as national holidays. India is also the best example that is a secular state in principle, but non-Hindus, and particularly Muslims are facing severe restrictions on their religious practices. The introduction of cultural equality is possible by allowing all the religious groups to establish their holy places and burial grounds as per their rituals, acknowledging their religious and cultural festivals, and where necessary granting public holidays to celebrate them and dealing their marriages and inheritance problems according to their laws.

Ghana has become the very first state, which has policy measures to reduce cultural inequalities between Christians and Muslims by providing state support for “Hajj” and by declaring a public holiday on the eve of “Eid-ul-Adha”. This type of inequality is not found in the case of South Punjab, and Hazara as both the privileged and deprived groups are the followers of Islam. The second category is language recognition as UNDP Human Development Report, 2004 states, “Recognizing a language means more than just the use of that language. It symbolizes respect for the people who speak it, their culture and their full inclusion in society” (UNDP, 2004). The designation of a single or a specific language as official language often creates frustration and resentment among those who are not the

speakers of that language. Some states have designated multiple languages as official and national languages. For example, Singapore has declared the official status for four widely spoken languages as official languages. On the other hand, a multi-ethnic Nigerian state has to face immense scale resentment by the speakers of minority languages when it declared national status to the three languages of majority groups; Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo. The discussed policies are formal to accept the cultural status of languages, but there are specific other informal ways to vitalize the multiple languages equally. For instance, the prime minister of Belgium is restricted to speak in both French and Dutch in addressing parliament and media to create cultural equality. The education department is very much essential to combat language disparities. Education policy has options like “education only in official language”, “education in mother tongue and in official language” or “education in multiple languages spoken in that state”. Whatever the option is chosen, significantly affects not just the respect and cultural recognition of identity groups but also future economic opportunities because higher education and employment requires good knowledge of the national language (Watson, 2007). The multilingual education is significant as it is proved by the shreds of evidence that the students who have been taught in mother tongue and national lingua franca (3<sup>rd</sup> International Language), perform better to those who have been educated in one language. In case of South Punjab and Hazara, this type of cultural inequalities persistently exists as it is reported that until 1981, Siraiki was not designated as a complete language. Instead it had been considered as a dialect of Punjabi or Sindhi. This denial of language strengthened the sense of resentment in the region. Same is the case of Hazaraeval, the renaming process of the province from NWFP to KP purely promotes the identity and culture of majority group “Pakhtun” and other



groups of the province feel excluded and deprived. To conclude, there are specific symbolic steps; that states can take to ensure cultural equality. The recognition of various religions, languages and cultural practices bears no economic cost, but it can benefit significantly by reducing the sense of exclusion and deprivation among the minority groups.

### **6.3 Recommendations to tackle the demand of New Provinces**

Approximately more than two hundred countries and dependencies are smaller than one constituent unit (Punjab) of Pakistan both in terms of population and area. On the linguistic basis, the province could be divided into several smaller constituent units, and on administrative basis, the existing provincial boundaries could also be restructured. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa can also be split into two smaller provinces. Whatever the criterion is followed, an inclusive, accommodative and collaborative policy would be handier and more advantageous to address the issue efficiently. As it is evident from the reviewed literature that formation of new provinces is a historical process and the aspiration of the masses of the respective region can be considered to avoid the unpleasant consequences. State-creation exercise in India became a source of redressal of ethno-lingual grievances of the diversified communities. The state reorganization process also brought economic development and governance efficiency in both the new and parent states. However, the same practice of the creation of more states in Nigeria remained unable to overcome the intrastate conflict and to pacify the ethno-lingual concerns of the heterogeneous population. In the former case, the state-creation exercise was done by adopting an open and adaptive strategy through the constitutional mechanism, and a permanent commission (PRC) was appointed to handle the issue while analyzing the inputs of the masses of the concerned

state. While in the latter case, the new states were formed through decrees and executive orders without taking into account the sentiments of the populace. Thereby, despite having thirty-six constituent units, there is a growing agitation for further division of the country that can increase the ongoing ethnic conflict. Hence, it is argued that the exercise of the restructuring of the existing boundaries and the creation of more constituent units is a multifaceted process which should be carried out by considering the economic viability, geographic and historical affinities, socio-cultural factors and administrative efficiency. Language and ethnicity can not be taken as the sole criteria to redraw the new constituent units. Following suggestions can be helpful to tackle the issue wisely;

#### **6.3.1 Provincial Boundaries Reorganization Commission.**

Four commissions as; Punjab Boundaries Reorganization Commission, KP Boundaries Reorganization Commission, Sindh Boundaries Reorganization Commission and Balochistan Boundaries Reorganization Commission can be constituted permanently to deal with the present demand of new provinces in the respective regions. Indian model can be followed to take guidance to meet the ethno-lingual concerns and to ensure good governance and administrative efficiency. Creation of new CUs is not an easy and sloppy task; rather, it is a historical and slow process that needs an integrationist approach. Commissions should work on regular basis, and they should regularly let the public brief about the advantages and disadvantages of the forming of new CUs so that they could be able to decide freely and wisely. Their opinion should be incorporated in the decision of making new CUs through referendums and such other tools.

### **6.3.2 The Criterion for the Boundaries Readjustment.**

What criterion should be considered to establish new CUs? When this question was asked from the respondents, the majority of them both from South Punjab and Hazara region showed their tendency towards administrative grounds. However present study suggests that only one base (administrative basis) would not be a wise policy. Ethno-lingual concerns of identity groups should also be considered along with jurisdictional grounds. Whatever the criterion is adopted, it should be accommodative and inclusionary. It should be able to appease ethnic communities besides administrative efficiency as it was evidenced in the case of Nigeria where the new states were formed through decrees and executive orders without taking into account the sentiments of the populace. Thereby, despite having thirty-six constituent units, there is a growing agitation for further division of the country that can increase the ongoing ethnic conflict. Hence, it is suggested that the exercise of the restructuring of the existing boundaries or the creation of more constituent units is a multifaceted process which should be carried out by considering the economic viability, geographic and historical affinities, socio-cultural factors and administrative efficiency.

### **6.3.3 Challenges in the Way of the Creation of New Provinces**

Except from politico-economic challenges in the way of redrawing existing provincial boundaries, constitutional amendment would also have to be made particularly in the context of Article 139; Clause 4. Since this clause requires two-third majority of either house from the national legislature and same ratio from respective provincial legislature as well. Most of the time, there have been coalition governments at both provincial and national levels; thence to follow legal process within the existing constitutional framework

seems challenging. The other impediment can come from ethno-nationalists of the respective regions about the issue of naming of new provinces and the establishment criterion. As there is no consensus among the ethno-nationalists, some are adamant on ethnicity and demand to name the new constituent units on ethno-linguistic basis. While many others are ready to accept new provinces along administrative lines. Whatever the criterion is followed, the opinion of the masses needs to give due consideration in this whole process to get positive and optimal outcomes.

#### **6.4 Conclusion**

Horizontal inequalities can cause inauspicious and unpleasant repercussions, and the most dangerous is the outbreak of violent conflict and separatists' tendencies. Hence, it is imperative to formulate valid policies to mitigate them. Necessary and immediate actions are needed to lessen political horizontal inequalities, and to ensure cultural equality, as well as to reduce social and economic disparities. Complete knowledge about the dynamics and context of the type of HIs is pertinent to design appropriate and right policies. The study has discussed several policy options to combat HIs; however, two major approaches have been proved more effective; direct and indirect. The first involves giving entitlements to people, whether political or economic, because of their group affiliation, while the second involves correcting HIs by more general policies that have the effect of improving HIs but without specifying group affiliation. The combination of both direct and indirect policies in a systematic way is the most effective way to mitigate HIs and to get economic growth and endurable peace. The dynamics of horizontal inequalities change from time to time, and the pattern of the inequalities also appears with new paradigms. Therefore only the

policies based on the complete analysis of the context would be proved effective and result oriented.

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## Appendices

### Appendix No: 01

#### Questionnaire No: 01 (For the Respondents from South Punjab)

#### The Politics of New Provinces in Pakistan: An Application of Horizontal Inequalities Model

I am a PhD scholar at the department of Politics and International Relations of International Islamic University, Islamabad. I need your few minutes to fill this questionnaire. The objective of this questionnaire is to study the demand of new provinces in Pakistan while analyzing the applicability level of Horizontal Inequalities model. It is hoped, the respective respondents will show their opinion freely while encircling the response category in order to help the researcher to test investigate the study questions.

**1 = Strongly Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Disagree; 4 = Strongly Disagree**

#### Part: 01; The Demographics and Preliminary Information:

1. Name: \_\_\_, 2. Age: \_\_\_, 3. Race/Tribe: \_\_\_ 4. Mother Tongue: \_\_\_ 5. Education: \_\_\_\_\_,  
6. District: \_\_\_\_\_, 7. Gender. \_\_\_\_\_, 8. Profession: \_\_\_\_\_ 9. Political Affiliation: \_\_\_\_\_

- Have you ever participated in the processions of Siraiki nationalist parties? (a)Yes (b)No
- To which political party did you cast your vote in the 2018 general elections? (Please mention the name of party) \_\_\_\_\_

#### Part: 02 Survey Statements:

For each statement, kindly encircle the scale (ranges from strongly agree to strongly disagree) which corresponds your opinion best about it.

S.No	Statements	S.Agree	Agree	Disagree	S.Disagree
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01	The current federal structure of Pakistan with four federating units has the capacity to accommodate different ethnic identities.	1	2	3	4
02	Members of the National and Provincial assembly elected from South Punjab are the true representative of the region	1	2	3	4
03	Power devolution arrangements are satisfactory.	1	2	3	4
04	The governmental policies are satisfactory towards South Punjab region.	1	2	3	4
05	South Punjab region has due representation in the judicial institutions.	1	2	3	4
07	South Punjab region has due representation in the police department.	1	2	3	4
08	Underdevelopment of Siraiki region has caused the development of the demand of Separate province.	1	2	3	4
09	The region of South Punjab gets due share in the development funds.	1	2	3	4
10	The South Punjab population has due access to fundamental rights of education and health	1	2	3	4
11	Siraikis' unique identity is projected and promoted satisfactorily.	1	2	3	4
12	Ethnic grievances and identity denial led towards the demand of separate province.	1	2	3	4
13	Exclusively, the major factor to trigger the demand of new province in the region is	1.Regional Inequalities		2. Denial of Identity	
14	What should be the basis for the creation of new provinces?	1.Linguistic Basis		2.Administrative Basis	

15	How the state can manage the demand of new provinces?	1.By creating new provinces	2.By ensuring the equal development for all the regions
16	Which ethno nationalist movement is more popular?	1.Hazara	2. Siraiki
17	What way you will suggest to overcome the grievances?	1.Power Devolution	2. Creation of more provinces

**Thanks for your valuable opinion and cooperation**

**Researcher: PhD (Political Science): Misbah.phdps9@iiu.edu.pk**

**Supervisor: Dr Sadaf Farooq (Assistant Professor: International Islamic University, Islamabad)**

**sadaf.farooq@iiu.edu.pk**

## Appendix: 02

### Questionnaire No: 02 (For Hazara)

#### The Politics of New Provinces in Pakistan: An Application of Horizontal Inequalities Model

I am a PhD scholar at the department of Politics and International Relations of International Islamic University Islamabad. I need your few minutes to fill this questionnaire. The objective of this questionnaire is to study the demand of new provinces in Pakistan while analyzing the applicability level of Horizontal Inequalities Model. It is hoped, the respective respondents will show their opinion freely while encircling the response category in order to help the researcher to investigate the study question.

**1 = Strongly Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Disagree; 4 = Strongly Disagree**

#### Part: 01 The Demographics and Preliminary Information:

1. Name: \_\_\_\_, 2. Age: \_\_\_\_, 3. Race/Tribe: \_\_\_\_ 4. Mother Tongue: \_\_\_\_ 5. Education: \_\_\_\_\_,  
6. District: \_\_\_\_\_, 7. Gender: \_\_\_\_\_, 8. Profession: \_\_\_\_ 9. Political Affiliation: \_\_\_\_\_

- Have you ever participated in the processions of Hazara nationalist parties? (a)Yes (b)No
- To which political party did you cast your vote in the 2018 general elections? (Please mention the name of party) \_\_\_\_\_

#### Part: 02 Survey Statements:

For each statement, kindly encircle the scale (ranges from strongly agree to strongly disagree) which corresponds your opinion best about it.

S.No	Statements	S. Agree	Agree	Disagree	S.Disagree
01	The current federal structure of Pakistan with four federating units has the capacity to accommodate different ethnic identities.	1		2	3 4
02	Members of the National and Provincial assembly elected from Hazara division are the true representative of the region	1		2	3 4

03	Power devolution arrangements are satisfactory.	1	2	3	4
04	The governmental policies are satisfactory towards Hazaraevals.	1	2	3	4
05	Hazara division has due representation in the judicial institutions.	1	2	3	4
07	Hazara division has due representation in the police department.	1	2	3	4
08	Underdevelopment of the region has caused the development of the demand of Separate province.	1	2	3	4
09	The region of Hazara gets due share in the development funds.	1	2	3	4
10	The Hazaraeval population has due access to fundamental rights of education and health	1	2	3	4
11	Hazavals' unique identity is projected and promoted satisfactorily.	1	2	3	4
12	Ethnic grievances and identity denial led towards the demand of separate province.	1	2	3	4
13	Exclusively, the major factor to trigger the demand of new province in the region is	1.Regional Inequalities		2. Denial of Identity	
14	What should be the basis for the creation of new provinces?	1.Linguistic Basis		2.Administrative Basis	
15	How the state can manage the demand of new provinces?	1.By creating new provinces		2.By ensuring the equal development for all the regions	
16	Which ethno nationalist movement is more popular?	1.Hazara		2. Siraiki	
17	What way you will suggest to overcome the grievances?	1.Power Devolution		2. Creation of more provinces	

**Thanks for your valuable opinion and cooperation**

**Researcher: PhD (Political Science): Misbah.phdps9@iiu.edu.pk**

**Supervisor: Dr Sadaf Farooq (Assistant Professor: International Islamic University, Islamabad)**

**sadaf.farooq@iiu.edu.pk**