

Ph.D. Dissertation

**DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN THE POST-ARAB SPRING: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF TUNISIA AND EGYPT**



Researcher:

Name: Sania Zehraa

PhD (Political Science)

Reg No: 07-SS/PHDPS/S15

Supervisor

Prof. Dr. Muhammad Khan

Professor Pol. Science & IR.

Department of Politics and International Relations

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD



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
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**DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN THE POST-ARAB SPRING: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TUNISIA AND EGYPT**

Sania Zehraa

Reg. No. 07-SS-PHDPS/S15

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Ph.D
degree in Department of Politics & IR with specialization in
Political Science (Comparative Politics) at the faculty of social
Sciences.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Muhammad Khan". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, sweeping loop on the left side.

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Muhammad Khan

January, 2022

Certification

Certified that contents and form of thesis entitled "Democratic Transition in the Post-Arab Spring :A Comparative study of Tunisia and Egypt" submitted by Ms.Sania Zehraa Reg#07-SS/PHDPS/S15, have been found satisfactory for the requirements of the degree of PhD Political Science.

Supervisor:

Prof.Dr. Muhammad Khan
Professor
Department of Politics and International Relations,
International Islamic University, Islamabad

Internal Examiner:

Dr. Noor Fatima
Assistant Professor
Department of Politics and International Relations,
International Islamic University, Islamabad

External Examiner-I:

Lubna A. Ali

Prof. Dr. Lubna Abid Ali
Dept. of Contemporary Studies
National Defence University, Islamabad

External Examiner-II:

Qandeel Abbas
Dr. Qandeel Abbas
Assistant Professor
School of Politics & International Relation
Quaid.i.Azam University, Islamabad

Noor Fatima
Dr. Noor Fatima
Acting Chairperson
Politics and International Relations
International Islamic University Islamabad

Dean
Dean
Faculty of Social Sciences
International Islamic University Islamabad

DEDICATION

I dedicate this Ph.D. thesis to my treasured Parents

S. M. Baqir Shah

Syeda Tauqeer Zahra

For their inspiration, trust, spiritual guidance and unconditional support.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ARP	Assemblée des Représentants du Peuple
ATFD	Association Tunisienne des Femmes Democrates
BDAC	Bank of Development and Agricultural Credit
CSOs	civil society organizations
CTBT	Chemical And Biological Weapon Conventions and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party
GUTW	General Union of Tunisian Workers
GWOT	Global War on Terror
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LTDH	The Ligue Tunisienne pour la Defense des Droits de l'Homme
LTDH	Tunisian League for Human Rights (Ligue tunisienne des droits de l'homme)
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MEPI	Middle East Partnership Initiative
MMID	Mansour and Maghrabi Investment and Development
NCA	National Constituent Assembly
NDP	National Democratic Party
NGO	Non-Governmental organization
NPT	Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
NUG	National Unity Government
ONAT	Ordre public des avocats de Tunisie
PLO	Palestinian liberation organization
PREs	Political relevant elites
RCD	Constitutional Democratic Rally
RSF	Reporters Sans Frontières
SCAF	Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
SNJT	Syndicat National Des Journalistes Tunisiens
TGLU	Tunisian General Labor Union
UGTT	Tunisian General Labor (Union générale tunisienne du struggle)
UPL	Free Patriotic Union
USAID	US Agency for International Development

Abstract

The upheavals in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East have turned the region into a global focal point in recent years. The Arab Spring, the conflict between Israel and Palestine, and the development of political ideologies are amongst the key issues in international politics. Currently the Middle East and North Africa was engulfed in an unprecedented outburst of popular protests and demand for reform. It began in Tunisia and spread within weeks to Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria. Long-standing authoritarian leaders were swept from power, including Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. This study will assess the analytic opportunities that emerged when the Arab uprisings are conceptualized as moments of transformation rather than as emerging transitions to democracy. Highlighting critical issues that cut across and link the experiences of political relevant elites and mobilized publics in the cases of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, it identifies three sets of issues that certified further comparative research: the patterns of state-society relations on the trajectory of Arab uprisings; the role of identity politics and non-state forms of solidarity as drivers of political mobilization and collective action, and the impact of these forms of collective actions on possibilities for establishing stable, legitimate forms of governance: the limits of civil societies and the role of leadership in influencing transitional processes.

INTRODUCTION

Middle East comprise of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen, Iraq, and Turkey. The African countries of Mauritania and Sudan are also considered to be within the Middle East. It is the birth place of different religions like Islam, Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism (Britannica.com). Presently the Middle East is going through an era of revolutionary change, which is challenging the policies of all regional states. In this new scenario, opportunities and challenges exist for a number of regional and extra regional states to advance their national interest. The 2011 was the land mark year in the history of the Middle East. There were a series of protests and uprisings which began almost a decade ago which has toppled down many powerful regimes in the region and led to the strong call for political reforms in many Arab states (Zakaria, 2013).

The claim that democracy or a democratic form of governance would not grow in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has long been commonplace, especially in the Western scholarship. Embedded political framework, historical background, institutional legacy, and cultural baggage is believed to account for the failure or inadequacy to establish an accountable and functioning political system in the region (Brownlee, 2005:47-48; Bellin, 2005:24). Given the data provided by Freedom House annually, none of the political systems in the region was considered “free” before 2010. However, the Arab Spring unfolded a new political phase which has marked a critical moment in Arab political

history, variously labeled by many regional and international observers as Arab Awakening, Arab Uprisings, or Arab Spring. Intrinsically, it promised to redefine the relationship between the *ruled* and the *ruler* in the countries in which it occurred.

Tunisia is particularly important because it is the birth place of the Arab uprising. Demonstrations erupted in Tunisia in December 2010 after a young protester, Muhammad Bouzizi, set fire to himself. Protests later on spread to the country wide. As the result of mass destruction and anti-regime nationwide protests, Ben Ali was forced to resign in January 2011 after a twenty-three years long regime (Way, 2011). Tunisia's movement, named the Jasmine Revolution, was powered by largely nonviolent means and called for reform and democratization.

In three years, Tunisians created a constitution which was hailed internationally for its progressive focus on human rights and civil liberties. The document represented a genuine compromise overcoming the secular/religious divide that halted the progress of other transitioning countries in the Middle East and North Africa, such as Egypt. The two revolutions were produced by common factors, and both Tunisians and Egyptians protested peacefully, perhaps chanting the very same slogans. Tunisia forced former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to flee the country, while Egypt ousted former President Hosni Mubarak, referred him to trial and imprisoned him. (Diamond, 2011).

By extension, the two countries were shaken by seismic events after the revolutions. In Tunisia, following Ben Ali's departure from the country, a state of emergency was declared. A caretaker coalition government was also created, including members of Ben Ali's party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (CDR). However, daily street protests in Tunis and

other towns around Tunisia continued, demanding that the new government have no CDR members and that the CDR itself be disbanded (Noueihed & Warren, 2013).

However, it did not push things toward clashes like those that have plagued the Egyptian experience. In Egypt, the army turned against elected President Mohammed Morsi and ousted him and threw him in prison. They then concocted charges against him and Muslim Brotherhood (MB) party leaders (Noueihed & Warren, 2013). The new government declared that the Brotherhood was a terrorist organization, and demonized anyone who objected to the authority of the army. This transformed all of Egypt into military barracks and a site of conflict.

Upon reflecting on the Tunisian and Egyptian experiences, we can see that the first was accompanied by a popular wrath whose motives became apparent in the political moment in which (the revolution) broke out. Meanwhile, the Egyptian experience revealed that the popular wrath has deep roots that made many believe the coup against the elected authorities never occurred. This was the result of political errors made by the Brotherhood, their irrationalities in managing the state, their miserable failure and their political inexperience. There were reasons for popular anger buried deep within the Egyptian consciousness that was ready to get rid of the Brotherhood, to the point that many Egyptians would not even bat an eye if the Brotherhood were burned in gas furnaces. (Shehata, 2011).

In this context, the Egyptian experience faltered while the Tunisian one crossed the rough sea. This indicates the importance of the cultural context of the two countries. Here, the idea is that the mindsets of Egypt or Tunisia are linked to the cultural, psychological, social and historical components that contribute to the formation of a collective consciousness of

people in a specific geographic area that has witnessed various civilizations over the span of thousands of years.

1.1. RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

The 2011 was the land mark year in the history of the Middle East. The Arab spring has brought down many powerful regimes in the region and led to the strong call for political reforms in many Arab states. Because of the birth place of Arab Spring, Tunisia has the remarkable importance of studying the internal variables which were useful in the success of Tunisia. The study is based on the comparative analysis of Tunisia and Egypt with their respective internal variables, including civil society and the shift of power from elites to the masses and the emergence of new elites. The role of political parties and leadership can't be ignored in this regard. The study is focused on all possible internal factors playing their effective role in democratic transition also it explores the factors which are essential to contribute towards sustainable and consolidated democracy.

1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Egypt and Tunisia have shared the same culture, religion, Islamic history, language, and geography. Despite the similarities between the two countries, the transition period has not affected them likewise. The research will compare the Tunisian and Egyptian experiences in the context of the Arab Spring/revolutions. The path of achieving a peaceful democratic transition depends on the roles of the internal political variables such as the military, civil society institutions, leadership and the political parties. Despite the fact that these factors/institutions played an important role in the transition process, while socio-economic

developments are directly linked with sustainability of democratic transition. Tunisia is a success story while Egypt is back to military rule.

1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

- To compare the Tunisian and Egyptian transitional period.
- To focus on examining the role of the internal political variables (the role of the military, civil society organizations, leadership and political parties) in the transitional phase.
- To analyze the harmony of the roles of the internal political variables contributes to a smooth transition. Moreover, this study will argue that there are internal variables causing the difference between the change in Tunisia and Egypt.
- To investigate the structure of civil society and the mechanism of political influence established by social movements and protests.

1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Q.1: What are the leading factors of the democratic transition in Tunisia and Egypt?

Q.2: What steps are Tunisian and Egyptian elites taking to strengthen society politically?

Q.3: How can the structure of civil society and the mechanism of political influence established by the social movements and protests be transformed into a sustainable political system?

Q.4: What are the internal political factors that have contributed to the relative success of the transitional phase in Tunisia while failure in Egypt?

Q.5: What is the impact of the democratic transition in Tunisia and Egypt on the region?

Q.6: How do socio-economic developments lead towards a sustainable democracy?

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The study is significant because the subject of democratic transition is regarded as critical in the modern Middle East. The Middle Eastern countries have not experienced any process of democratic transition in their history. The experience of this transition is regarded as the first experiment in the region. The lack of scientific research on the subject of democratic change in the Middle East created the absence of a clear theory that can describe and explain the transition process. Moreover, knowing the nature of this political change leads us to understand the causes and the future of it. The nature of this transition is different from one country to another because of internal political differences. Some of the Arab Spring countries have entered into civil wars instead of moving towards democracy. The research is significant because it explains the factors that can contribute to the transition peacefully towards democracy. The study covers the different aspects of the literature which discussed the post-Arab Spring. This study adds to the literature that analyzes the post-Arab Spring with an extensive explanation on the subject of the democratic transition and the factors that support this shift. The study's goal is to compare two cases, Tunisia and Egypt, to demonstrate how Tunisia managed a peaceful transition and how Egypt failed.

Finally, research will be able to suggest concrete analysis on the success of Tunisia and the failure of Egypt.

1.6 Operational Definitions of Major Terms

1.6.1. Arab Spring

A series of uprisings in Arab countries, beginning in Tunisia in December 2010, in which protesters challenged the existing authoritarian regimes.

1.6.2. Transition

The process or a period of changing from one state or condition to another.

1.6.3. Civil Society

A civil society is comprised of groups or organizations working in the interest of the citizens but operating outside of the governmental and for-profit sectors. Organizations and institutions that make up civil society include labor unions, nonprofit organizations, religion, and other service agencies that provide an important service to society but generally ask for very little in return.

1.6.4. Political Parties

A political party is defined as an organized group of people with at least similar political aims and opinions, that seeks to influence public policy by getting its candidates elected to public office.

1.6.5. Leadership

The action of leading a group of people or an organization, or the ability to do this.

1.7. THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

This section aims to explain the democratic transition through a theoretical framework. In doing so, it seeks to define the concept of democratic transition. This section explains the levels of political development, and how these levels can apply to Rustow's theory. It analyzes the roles of the military, civil society, leadership and political parties during the transition in Tunisia and Egypt. Finally, it investigates the link between theory of democratization and its link with Modernization and how this connection paved the path towards consolidated democracy and guaranteed its sustainability.

Carothers claims "five core assumptions define the transition paradigm" (Carothers, 2018). "The first, which is an umbrella for all the others, is that any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition toward democracy." (Carothers). In the second assumption, he assumed that "democratization tends to unfold in a set sequence of stages". He explained that "democratic forms are transformed into democratic substance through the reform of state institutions, the regularization of elections, the strengthening of civil society, and the overall habituation of society to the new democratic values." (Carothers). The third assumption is the belief in the determinative importance of elections. He "assumed that in attempted transitions to democracy, elections will be not just a foundation stone but a key generator over time of further democratic reforms". The fourth assumption "is that the underlying conditions in transitional countries—their

economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, sociocultural traditions, or other" structural "features—will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the transition process" (Carothers, 2018). The fifth assumption is "the process of democratization is assumed to include some redesign of state institutions such as the creation of new electoral institutions, parliamentary reform, and judicial reform but as a modification of already functioning states" (Carothers, 2002).

The study agrees with the definition of Carothers according to the following considerations. First, the process of democratization goes through several stages. These stages begin with toppling the authoritarian regime and its end by establishing a democratic system. Second, the democratic transition process is completed through a political settlement between the political forces. The goals of a political settlement include the creation of a constitution and the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections. Third, the democratic transition process occurs due to internal political factors.

O'Donnell & Schmitter and Linz & Stepan (1986) argued that the democratization process has passed through several stages. It can be identified in three stages that explain the transition from a non-democratic regime to a democratic system. The first stage is starting to topple the authoritarian regime. At this stage, the ruling system is unable to impose its authority. This is the result of the internal political conflict inside society. In other words, the political forces are divided between supporters and rejecters of the transformation. "The popular revolution that claims for more rights; and the usual outcome of this is either a harsh (sometimes deadly) repression or the emergence of a soft-liner who accepts to negotiate and to grant more rights to the population" (Kamary, 2012).

The second stage is the start of the process of democratization. At this stage, all the political parties and state institutions have agreed to engage in the process of transition. This stage is one of the most important stages in the transformation because it aims to establish common rules among the political parties in order to reach a peaceful settlement.

The third stage is to find a democratic government. This stage aims to achieve the political settlement that was achieved by the political forces. The principles of the settlement include drafting a constitution and holding parliamentary and presidential elections. The success of this stage is dependent on the success of the political forces to implement these principles (drafting a constitution and holding parliamentary and presidential elections). According to O'Donnell, "transition is supposed to be from a democratically-elected government to a democratic regime or, equivalently, to an institutionalized, consolidated democracy." (O'Donnell, 1993). Moreover, the essential aim of the transition is to create a government that represents the people. The elected government is required to find a mechanism for the transition to a democratic system.

Dankwart A. Rustow (1970) is one of the transitional school's most prominent theorists. He identified some primary stages followed by all countries during the democratization process. These phases are background condition, preparatory, decision, and habituation (Rustow, 1970). The first phase aims to achieve national unity through a common political identity of the majority of the community. "The vast majority of citizens in a democracy to be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to." (Rustow, 1970). This phase is witnessing a sharp conflict between the political forces. This political conflict is "inconclusive".

The goal of this stage is to focus on the democratic process as the basis and essence of the political conflict. "A struggle is likely to begin as the result of the emergence of a new elite that arouses a depressed and previously leaderless social group into concerted action." (Rustow, 1970). In the next phase, the state begins to shift towards democracy, and that is when the political forces agree on a democratic choice. "The preparatory phase is a deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to institutionalize some crucial aspects of democratic procedure" (Rustow, 1970). The final phase is the consolidation of democracy. At this stage, the political forces get used to the rules of democracy. "A distasteful decision, once made, is likely to seem more palatable as one is forced to live with it."(Rustow, 1970).

In addition to the above, this research sees the theory of Rustow much closer to explaining the democratic process in the Arab spring, especially in Tunisia. The method of Rustow considered as a mechanism or model can be applied to the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. In the first phase of Rustow's theory, Tunisia managed to achieve political identity through the Troika experience (A coalition consists of Islamist and secular parties). While Egypt almost succeeded in achieving political identity, the military coup that took place on June 30, caused the failure of the first stage. In the second phase of Rustow's theory, Tunisian political forces succeeded in reaching an apolitical settlement. In the third phase of Rustow's theory, political forces decided to adopt the rules of the democratic game through the presidential election that took place in 2014. In the final phase of Rustow's theory, Tunisia is in the third phase. The consolidation of democracy might take a long time to happen in Tunisia. In other words, democratic rules of the game must be implemented at multiple stages.

Back to Rustow's theory, the elite plays a very important role in the democratization phases. By looking at the elites in Tunisia and Egypt, it can be found that they are an integral part of the military institutions, civil society organizations, and the political parties. In other words, we need to observe and analyze the role of the above stated institutions for democratic transition in both respective states.

1.8. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on this topic is quite extensive even though it has only been ten years since the Arab Spring occurred. Jamil Jreisat's book covers the developments, policies and the administrative capabilities to accomplish this within the Arab world. It does not play a major part in this research but has one nonetheless (1997). Almost all Arab leaders, points out Jreisat, have promised bureaucratic reforms. Their political administrative structures, however, have not been successful in establishing the institutions required to meet societal needs. And neither have they cultivated a professional managerial class with skills, commitment, and ethics compatible with development objectives.

From Dr. Sadri's book (1997), I adopted his process of analyzing leaders and their effect on foreign policy and what that means for the state. But this project also adds its own twist to Sadri's analysis, by looking at leaders and analyzing not just their foreign policy but also their domestic policy and how that policy either contributed to political instability or stability. Albert Korany (1998), Drawing on the theoretical insights offered in its companion volume, the book examines the processes of and prospects for political reform in 10 Arab countries—Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine,

Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—selected to demonstrate a broad range of contexts, trajectories, and political potentials. It gives a thorough analysis of the liberalization and democratic movements and politics of the Arab World up into the late 1990's, providing a large amount of background analysis for this study.

Abo Baaklini at el (1999) describes a comparative analysis of the legislative politics of the Arab world by analyzing them through the lens of the democratic institutions present and those institutions' capabilities. While none of these have an overarching impact on this project, they exemplify the related literature on the topic. As well as providing important background information about each case's unique experience with democratization and how that experience influenced each of the case studies Arab Spring experience.

A collection of essays complied by the academic journal *Foreign Affairs* discusses the Arab Spring and features all the Arab Spring articles published directly before and after the Arab Spring broke out. This collection brings together more than sixty articles, interviews, congressional testimony, and op-eds from experts and think tanks, including Bernard Lewis, Fouad Ajami, Richard Haass, Lisa Anderson, Martin Indyk, Isobel Coleman, Aluf Benn, Dirk Vandewalle, and Nassim Nicholas Taleb. It depicts the academic community's initial shock at populist movements, as well as the academic climate toward democratization in the Arab World.

The Brynen at el., (2012) book is published by a think tank as a means of giving a comparative analysis of what occurred during the Arab Spring and what it means for the region. As well as giving individual analysis of what the Arab Spring means for each

individual state and how each state reacted to it, which proved to be an invaluable source for this study.

Steven Heydemann (2015) presented the research by contributors to the special issues in the Middle East. This article assesses the analytic opportunities that emerge when the Arab uprisings are conceptualized as moments of transformation rather than as incipient, flawed or failed transitions to democracy. Highlighting critical issues that cut across and link the experiences of political relevant elites (PREs) and mobilized publics in the cases of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, it identifies three sets of issues that warrant further comparative research: the effects of state-ness and patterns of state-society relations on the trajectory of Arab uprisings; the role of identity politics and non-state forms of solidarity as drivers of political mobilization and collective action, and the impact of these forms of collective action on possibilities for establishing stable, legitimate forms of governance; and the limits of civil societies and civic sectors in influencing transformational processes.

The paper by Veronica Baker (2015) explores the effects of civil society's involvement in the Tunisian democratic transition through a case study on its contributions to the constitution drafting process. Tunisia gained widespread international attention following its popular uprising against authoritarian leader Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and successful transition to democracy. Many, however, have dismissed Tunisia's triumph as a lucky break aided by the country's small size, religious and ethnic homogeneity, preexisting liberal social values, and "relatively moderate" Islamist party. Those focused on such "Tunisian exceptionalism" conclude that the country's transition has little to teach other countries in political flux. This research contests that notion, and proposes that Tunisia's

transition has succeeded instead due to the presence of a strong and collaborative civil society, which grew discreetly throughout periods of authoritarianism and has matured in the post-revolution years. This paper specifically analyzes the debate concerning women's rights in the constitution as an example of state-civil society interaction during the transitional period.

The vast majority of observers and academic experts on the Arab world were taken by surprise by the popular uprisings that in 2011 toppled some of the world's most entrenched authoritarian leaders and shook some Arab regimes to their very foundations. Thus, the so-called "Arab Spring" has exposed deficits and gaps in the theoretical frameworks that have been applied to the study of the region so far. However, the search for new guiding theories and models may risk the rash dismissal of useful frameworks developed in the past. The paper by Jannis Grimm (2013) wants to explore what the rich academic literature on democratic transition, political transformation and democratization can contribute to our understanding of the transformation processes initiated in some Arab countries by the 2011 events.

The Arab Spring: The End of Post-colonialism by Hamid Dabashi is the pioneering explanation of the Arab Spring that will define a new era of thinking about the Middle East. In this landmark book, Hamid Dabashi argues that the revolutionary uprisings that have engulfed multiple countries and political climes from Morocco to Iran and from Syria to Yemen, were driven by a 'Delayed Defiance'-a point of rebellion against domestic tyranny and globalized disempowerment alike-that signifies no less than the end of Postcolonialism. Sketching a new geography of liberation, Dabashi shows how the Arab

Spring has altered the geopolitics of the region so radically that we must begin re-imagining the Middle East. Ultimately, the 'permanent revolutionary mood', Dabashi brilliantly explains, has the potential to liberate not only those societies already ignited, but many others through a universal geopolitics of hope.

In about three years, Egypt has transformed from a 30-year long military rule to a democratic form of government. This transformation has been well documented by Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar (2013); however, it soon became clear that the Egyptian state would eventually disintegrate into anarchy following the fall of Hosni Mubarak due to internal divisions within the security apparatus and inadequate training to control the post-Spring chaos. In the post-Mubarak era, confrontations began among political parties when Morsi was elected as president in 2012. Morsi moved to further strengthen his power by issuing controversial decrees that put the presidency above judicial review. These were condemned by the international community, and violence erupted in the streets of the Capital. After the fall of Morsi, the army and the post-Morsi government were unable to control the situation, especially in the Sinai Peninsula, which became the main ground for Islamist militants, and posed a serious threat to Egypt and beyond.

As explained in the article, *Assessing (In) Security of the Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt*, Egypt's state security apparatus has remained unchanged and largely unreformed even with the change of regime. The military is one of the main hurdles in the reform process because of its economic and military interests. After the fall of Hosni Mubarak, the situation in Egypt became more unstable because of the difference in opinion among different political leaders, and confrontation among different political parties. Egypt is a country that had only one president for 30 years, and now has an ex-president on trial, another president

detained and an interim president in office. It is in danger because political parties will use street demonstrations to distribute power among them in new Egypt.

Erin Snider and David M. Faris state in their article (2011) that the Bush administration launched the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) as an expression of its commitment to democratic reform in the region in 2002. The United States tempered its rhetoric and its willingness to challenge the Egyptian government following gains for the Muslim Brotherhood in parliamentary elections, the victory of the Islamist group Hamas in Palestinian parliamentary elections, and the escalation of conflict in Iraq. Bush's criticism of Egypt was followed by a refusal to extend additional foreign assistance beyond that already allocated, in a move Human Rights Watch called "the most significant step the United States has ever taken to defend human rights in the Arab world." The former director of the US Agency for International Development (USAID)'s Democracy and Governance Office relayed to Erin Snider that Egypt, as well as Pakistan, Nigeria and Indonesia, were the focus of initial efforts, due to their respective importance regionally, and that the Agency's perception that serious stakes for democracy existed in all of them. The exploration of these facts and the extent of their impact was compiled under the title, "The Arab Spring: U.S. Democracy Promotion in Egypt"

While none of these efforts greatly changed the day-to-day experience of authoritarianism for ordinary Egyptians, they contributed to a climate of confrontation between the regime and its citizens. None of these developments, save for connections between democracy promoters and independent trade unionists, seemed directly influenced by American democracy assistance. As a result, it is clear that social media played a critical role in the

Arab Spring. While the US-induced efforts to incorporate democratic reforms in Arab states were not as successful as perceived, the role of US democratic transformation/s in the aftermath of the social media-persuaded revolution in Egypt was a total debacle.

Billie Jeanne Brownlee used a qualitative approach in interpreting the knowledge collected in a 2015 article, "The Revolution" From Below "and Its Misinterpretations" From Above". The Case of Syria's Neglected Civil Society". It is basic in form as it fills a knowledge gap as a longitudinal cohort study. Her article discusses Syrian civil activism before and during the Arab Spring, and the inappropriate representation by Syrian journalists of their own people. It discusses how literature could not fill the gap of information about peaceful Syrians. It also discusses how the Westernized media played its part and how cybercrime surfaced.

The Arab Spring changed Western perception of the Middle East: that due to continuous authoritarian rule, its people had become obedient to it. With time, this self-perception went through a change and Arab Spring recorded this history. The implications of the insurrections of 2011 can't be calculated. The Middle East was thought to be repressed, politically and culturally unaware. Syria particularly, because people feared the regime and were regarded as non-thinking subjects. Scholars ignored the opposition of common men. Only a few academic scholars have looked at the grassroots level transformations of civil society in Pre-2011 Syria. The outset of the Syrian uprising was a clear indication that little attention had been paid to civil resistance. This civic resistance remains mostly voiceless. There is a scholarly void in analysis of the Syrian case, which needs to be filled to interpret it correctly.

In Asef Bayat's words, "the MENA region requires the development of a 'scholarship of silence', a study of the voiceless." This paper aimed to offer a new reading of the Syrian narrative. It emphasized the long-term growth of civic resilience that has turned into a civil war. This civil society activism has been able to grow under autocratic regime restrictions, such as those in Syria. Western journalists have been unable to represent them fairly by calling it a revolt from below and by using comparative parameters which belong to the Western world and hardly fit other contexts, like the Arab region.

Coincidentally, the democratic wave had completely skipped the Arab shores. The use of terms like Arab Awakening meant that they had been sleeping. Did the Arabs wake up overnight or did the West neglect their transformation of society? Was it the Arabs or the West who were actually sleeping? Several scholars admit missing the revolts. They made new terms like Arab Winter, disappointing the change. A sense of passivity of action lurked below the surface. Syria fits completely. It is not surprising if we view their civil society. Syrian people are also being mocked by their own experts and representatives.

The literature about Syrian civil society activism seems to recount only those events that were manifest politically. However, the Arab uprisings have gone down in history as the most well documented revolutions on Facebook, Twitter or YouTube. However, its reliance on digital media made one think that it was caused by Western technology or Silicon Valley rather than the people.

The new generation has become IT-savvy and peaceful. But before 2011, the Arab world was underdeveloped technology-wise, being last in the region to allow Internet access to the public. Did they become IT-savvy overnight? Actually, it was the people who acted as

bridge leaders according to the "two step flow theory". Citizens who had internet access connected it to the population without access. They were mostly western, but practically illiterate. Moreover, the protestors were initially peaceful, but when the regime crushed them they did not stay peaceful. However, this did not receive much coverage.

Syrians did not all unite against the regime. The Internet presented a 360° view, making the narrative confusing and, at times, contradictory. How reliable has the coverage been? Western media are looking for new stories and Syria has been an excellent case. It is harmful as it makes people accustomed to such news. Citizens turned into journalists, armed with cell phones to protect the revolution.

The international community started efforts to establish a weapons free zone in the Middle East in May 2010, but then the whole scenario changed. The conference was supposed to be held in 2012 and all Middle Eastern states were invited to attend that conference, but there was a drastic change in the form of the Arab Spring. That has the potential to change the political and regional security landscape. Erzsebete N.Rozsa analyzes, in a study with multiple other scholars, how the Arab Spring changed regional foreign and security policies in the context of conflict formation and arms dynamics (Abu-Dalbouh et. al., 2012). It is important to analyze how eager the Middle Eastern states were to participate in the Middle East conference.

There are three basic phases of transformation: opening up of the established regime, the transition to democracy, and democratic consolidation. But this model does not fit all the conditions of the Arab Spring countries because, while some states have successfully displaced their authoritarian rulers, few have started institutionalizing democracy and none

have adopted the third phase of consolidating democracy. Demonstrations in Tunisia led to the ousting of President Ben Ali in January 2011. It then faced a new challenge in how to respond to the demands for democracy and freedom, and improve the standard of living of people. Unfortunately, the basic aim of the new government was to protect the national interest of the state instead of prioritizing their self-interests.

Tunisia became prominent in Middle Eastern affairs in the late 1980's, and in the beginning of the 1990s when it hosted the headquarters of the Palestinian liberation organization (PLO). Tunisia has also signed the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical and Biological Weapon Conventions and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Tunisia has also signed the Pelindaba Treaty and always supported every effort regarding disarmament. So Tunisia had no reason to oppose the upcoming Middle East conference; rather, it was likely to support the conference because of its opposition to weapons of mass destruction.

In Egypt, the protests were caused mainly by the authoritarian rule of Hosni Mubarak and the Mubarak regime that allowed only limited freedom and crushed opposition in a harsh way. Post-revolution, the state was challenged to formulate a strong foreign policy and tackle a list of various problems (addressing the economic challenges and improving the standard of living), but in reality there was no major change, and few modifications took place. The main concern of the foreign policy of Egypt was the Arab-Israel conflict.

Before Arab Spring, Hosni Mubarak supported some Israeli policies like the blockade of Gaza, which created problems between the regime and the people. But the new government revised those policies and supported Hamas, also promising to provide defense and

economic aid to the Palestinians. Hence, the new government adopted a more balanced approach. A peace treaty with Israel was another important factor in Egypt's foreign policy that was signed in 1979, but the Egyptian military and president Morsi declared that this accord should be abolished/Egypt may revise its proposal or renegotiate.

Egypt was in favor of the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. However, Egypt had used chemical weapons in 1960 in the Yemeni civil war and still wanted to possess them. Egypt has ratified the NPT and signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and the Pelindaba Treaty (African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), but it is unwilling to make further commitments to disarmament. Overall, Egypt was still ready and willing to play a role in the Middle East conference and also play an important and active role in promoting the participation of all Arab countries in the Middle East, and also in drafting a common Arab League position.

Arab Spring developments in a variety of Middle Eastern countries have impacted states that were not directly affected by it. Israel, Palestine and Turkey felt the winds of change moving across the region. Palestinians viewed the Arab Spring as a window of opportunity, with the hope that the new Arab regime would be more supportive of the Palestinian cause, and the Arab Spring events provided an opportunity to bring the issue of Palestine before the United Nations in September 2011.

However, the Arab Spring also provided an opportunity to improve relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors (if the peace treaty with Jordan and Egypt remains enforced). Apart from this, the reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas was a positive move and it was only possible because of the mediating efforts of President Morsi of Egypt. Hamas also turned

into a more normal political power (as opposed to militarist) because of pressure from the wider Muslim Brotherhood umbrella. As far as the Middle East conference is concerned, the Israeli government neither rejected nor confirmed its participation.

The Arab Spring led to the democratization of the region, but the West has concerns that even in a free and impartial election, if Islamic parties win with a vast majority, like in Tunisia and Egypt, they will turn their backs on the democratic process that brought them to power. The most important transformations occurred in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, while other monarchs have resisted revolutionary change. The current focus of states which were affected by the Arab Spring is mostly on domestic issues which were responsible for the revolutions and transformations.

It is expected that by the year 2020, the expenditure of annual tourism will reach 2 trillion USD and the number of foreign tourists will reach 1.5 billion. Hanaa Abdelaty Hasan Esmail examines the impacts of the 2011 revolution on the Egyptian and Tunisian tourist industry. Egyptian tourism represents 6.5% of the country's GDP. After the 2011 revolution, the GDP of the country was 1.8% while in 2010 it was 5.1%. All the revolutionary events had a negative impact on the Egyptian economy and Egyptian tourism revenue dropped to 50% and in the case of Tunisia (which was in its recovery process), the state again faced uncertainty. In 2013, the level of tourists was on par, but in 2014 again it reached a lower level. On 26th June, an attack on travelers led to a state of emergency in Tunisia. The Tunisian tourism industry is facing difficulties as the numbers of visitors has decreased as a result of the unfortunate incident.

In an article, *The Role of Social Media in Arab Spring*, the author discusses the significance of technology and its unique role in the 2011 series of revolutions (Eltantawy, 2011). The methodology of the research is a qualitative case study approach used to analyze the events that resulted in the resignation of the Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, in 2011. The references used, such as El Baradei being the principal architect of the whole phenomenon, and of Tunisia (from where the fire of disaffection spread to the other areas of the region) having close approximation to Egypt, is a positive aspect of the article. But the lack of emphasis on the economic side of the phenomenon means a key factor is missing in ensuring an accurate analysis.

Without mentioning the real term, however, the author does give an explanation of the world being converted into a compressed social space due to developments in Information Technology. The necessity of wide accessibility and effective usage of social media resources for mobilization of the masses is another key highlight of the article. Besides this, the statistics provided, regarding the usage of social media, reflect a conclusive image of how the forums of Facebook and Twitter have been utilized by the Egyptians to stand against the oppressive government of President Mubarak. In addition, the article also mentions other tools and media like Twitter and YouTube videos that helped in mobilizing the masses in the 18-day protests against the government.

The systematic, event-based explanation of the anti-government protest is another important factor in the article. That said, the methodology could have been better if, instead of focusing on events, the author had selected International Political Economy and

Globalization as driving forces of social media revolutions around the globe. The model of manufacturing consent given by Noam Chomsky might also have provided the readers with a better understanding of how and why the Egyptian Revolution became that effective.

According to Jason William Booze (2013), understanding the bleak realities of revolutionary failure and a likely return to authoritarian government is the best way to look comparatively at the literature to understand why a democratic transition in the Middle East overall is highly unlikely. The author of *Democratization and civil society: Libya, Tunisia and the Arab Spring*, focuses on analyzing possible sources of instability in the region by focusing on the significance of civil societies in democratic transitions. This paper is especially a comparison of two states experiencing democratic transitions, Libya and Tunisia. The comparison is based on a theoretical framework of weak and strong state transitions so as to draw some general conclusions and explore possible factors that result in the success or failure of democratic transition/s.

The paper states that a robust civil society is a necessary precondition for a successful democratic transition. Thus, Libya is failing at achieving any level of democracy while Tunisia is comparatively successful in that perspective. This article also highlights a central debate in civil society literature: whether civil society develops before or after the actual process of democratization. Some state that they develop after transition, while others mostly argue from a sociological and cultural perspective that civil society develops before, and is in fact the main cause of transition to a democratic system. In Libya's case, civil society was not that strong because of oppression in the state. However, Tunisia has a strong civil society.

The end of the totalitarian governance model in the Arab world and the out-throwing of regimes in Arab Spring countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen was a benefit for the western powers (Mohamed, 2013). The article Post Political Transitions in Arab Spring countries: the Challenges, is written about the international support which made these countries unsure about economic growth, employment and the emergence of the middle class. After the 9/11 attack, the US changed its policy in the favor of authoritarian Arab regimes by supporting the repressive systems against individual freedom. The social conditions and protests by the Arabs against their governments led to an increase in economic problems, and the start of the era of Arab transition. The year 2011 saw a political change which affected the Arab people & led to an uprising of Arab people from Tunisia to Egypt and Libya. These events led to a "democratic transition".

Transition is not an easy task. It involves many concerns, worries and political-economic stakes. As per a study, Arab Spring countries have found it difficult to install democracy despite freedom of speech; despite the revolution, these states failed to change the unhealthy situation. A successful transition can only be carried out if human development is taken into account. The education system should be improved, law making institutions should function effectively, investment increased, and a step towards a developing and innovative economy should be taken. Most importantly, corruption should be fought because it undermines state institutions.

In Tunisia, the start of the Arab Spring was because of unemployment and social injustice. As a result of this revolution, the presence of important social and development factors was seen. However, politicians started debating on religion, which divided them instead of

uniting them and also created political and economic challenges. In countries like Turkey, there is a religious civil society which chooses a religious-oriented party, but religion is not consulted in state matters. Politics and religion are two separate things to them. This discrepancy tells us two things: First, social protest should not validate religion. Second, religion should not be used as a tool in fights between two communities. In Arab countries, democracy will prevail if politics and religion are balanced. Democracy will improve the economy and help to fight corruption.

Victoria Carty, in her 2014 article, begins her discussion by saying that over the past few decades, there have been several youth-based protests and revolutionary movements to change the politico-economic system for the better. The writer further quotes Henry Giroux, a scholar who emphasized the reality that the media either accelerates or hinders major political change. Emerging media platforms have also been used not only for this purpose but to hold authorities accountable for their responses to protest activity.

Her study reflects an interdisciplinary approach that includes political science, media studies and sociology, and evaluates the varied ways in which structural and micro level mobilization struggles are mitigated by new technology to maintain contentious politics in public spheres. The writer has an edge in social movement theories, and relates them to the impact of the digital revolution as it affected the political set up in the Middle East.

For this, she chose the cases of Tunisia and Egypt because of their commonality; the demand in both state movements was the end of nepotism, political corruption and economic injustice, a democratic system bringing economic growth and holding political and economic elites accountable. While stating major elements of such movements, the

writer mentions campaigns, unity, worthiness and commitment. According to her, the key to any social movement is mobilizing strategies (either formal/informal) used by social movement actors.

In late 1992, Tunisia's economy showed significant change and it's said that Na-Nahdho no longer posed a serious threat while Ben Ali claimed to have saved Tunisia from economic issues and civil war. Alexander C. explains pre-Arab Spring contacts and sheds light on Ben Ali and Bourgaiba's authoritarianism in his 1997 article "Back from the democratic brink: Authoritarianism and civil society in Tunisia". Ben Ali expanded Tunisia's internal security apparatus while critics argue that things take place outside the interior ministry and other police forces.

The Tunisian first president, Bourgaiba, hated the party and state bureaucracies in the 1950s and again in the 1980s, and he used labor as a tool. He used the prime minister's authority as a tool for turning the elite competition for his benefit. The National Assembly passed an order by his order stating that the prime minister would be the president's successor in the president's absence, despite the fact that the radicalization of the labor movement in 1977 demonstrated that he had no control over economic growth. In the 1970s, he supported a succession of wage increases and an extensive system of consumer subsidies; the worker and student union reliance on public funds allowed Bourgaiba to intervene and to manipulate internal politics.

Bourgaiba's planning against Islamic Tendency Movement set the plan in action that brought Ben Ali to power in 1987. To protect his own position, he tried to firstly prevent

state and party officials from developing a center of power; he selected individuals who had no political background, and frequently shuffled the cabinet. Secondly, he worked carefully to break the tie between the elite and popular politics.

Some of the oppressive strategies have developed Tunisia's difficult civil society in different ways, making collective action and engaging in protest much harder to organize. A scenario which involves Ben Ali's own security apparatus; if he ever became unable to continue economic favors agreed for political reforms, then these forces might act against him. Ben Ali promised a kind of multiparty democracy a decade ago, but it still looks like there is a long time to go.

To examine the effects of the Arab Spring on Egypt's economy, Dr. György Iván Neszmélyi said we first need to understand what the Arab Spring is. It is said to be the movement challenging the quasi-dictatorial regimes. These have been operating for decades, mainly in the form of a state of republic in North Africa and in the Middle East. There have been radical changes in the political and partly in the economic situation of the countries in the Middle East. In his article, "The Impact of Arab Spring on the Egyptian Economy", the author studies the economy of post-Revolution Egypt.

The national economy of Egypt, till the beginning of the transformation, remained stable. Since 25th January 2011, significant demonstrations against the regime of Mubarak were raised, and in June 2012, presidential elections were held and Mohamed Morsi won. His presidency lasted nearly one year as he was not successful in seeking to preserve the unity of the Egyptian nation; the people of Egypt revolted with the aim of obtaining human rights

and better living. He was deposed similar to Mubarak, and presidential elections were again held in May 2014.

Due to the adverse economic trends of the past three years, the Egyptian currency was devalued in a shorter time than it could have occurred. The economic performance of Egypt, which used to be classified as really good, was almost destroyed. Foreign Direct Investment was reduced to less than half. The economic performance in industrial production and tourism also notably decreased. Only the performance of the primary sector, such as the prices of petrol, natural gas, agriculture and the earnings after the usage of the Suez Canal, stayed nearly at their previous levels. The most significant part of Egypt's GDP originated from the tourism, service sector, real estate sector, transport, energy sector, financial and insurance and one third of the GDP from the industry. A SWOT analysis done by the article writer highlights the impact of the Arab Spring on the future of Egypt.

Egypt has gone through a transitional state since the Arab Spring. After the revolution, the situation that occurred was still not encouraging. There was no assurance that the elections to be held would be different to what happened in 2012. Egypt has experienced a number of crises in its politics and its economy remained static. When the election of General Sisi as President was held, it could have played a stabilizing factor, but the support of the majority population was not in his favour. Egypt's stability could be restored and international confidence in the country could be re-established by having a favorable situation for a long time. But this can only be done when Egypt puts its economy on a path of growth again.

The factors that resulted in the 2011 Egyptian transition and to what degree it led to the process of democratization in Egypt are discussed by Martini and Miller in chapter 5 of their book published by RAND (2012). A brief background is discussed from before the revolution, and the role of the military and Islamic groups like the Muslim brotherhood in the revolution is also highlighted. The modern political history of Egypt can't be simply characterized. Since the 1952 Free Officers Revolution till February of 2011, the state's politics has been controlled by the military. After the victory of the 1973 war, Egyptians had a very profound admiration for the military and this admiration increased because of the role that the military played during the January 25 revolution.

During the transitional period, the relationship between political parties and SCAF was destroyed, but the community still supported and favored the military because they thought that the military would help them to turn over the power to the civilians. Though the trust and support the public showed to the military in the early stages was gradually vanishing, the military still believed that they could implement democracy and restore relations with the civilians.

As for breaks with the prior regime, upon taking power, the SCAF realigned the transitional government, and also SCAF laid out timelines for the transitional period. The transfer of power would include a first round of revisions to the constitution, parliamentary elections in September 2011; and a presidential one; But the multi round parliamentary elections were delayed from November 2011 to March 2012, with presidential elections appointments (only two-thirds of its members are directly elected) as of early 2012. Unable to fulfill the promise made to the public, SCAF became the target of criticism though SCAF

operates as the country's executive authority, and shares the power with the civilian cabinet. At the end of the day, it is SCAF that elects the cabinet members. Another major drawback is that SCAF failed to define where its powers ended, and where those of the cabinet begin.

The core demand of the revolution was to increase the wages and to focus on improving the economic conditions of the public by the government. Thus, it was due to this revolt that the economic conditions of the civilians improved as compared to the last ten years. Though there was a healthy growth rate in the economy, there still existed insecurity among the lower class, and uncertainty about receiving equal rights as the upper class.

Estimates of the scope of the civil society in Egypt vary widely, but all figures of civic organizations upon which to build a democratic culture show that there is nothing inherently "civil" about Egyptian civil society. According to this view, civil society in Egypt is actually dominated by illiberal forces. Civil society organizations are apprehended by the state, meaning they are not independent organizations. The Mubarak administration followed a multipronged approach that included co-opting organizations, creating a class of government-supported international organizations and granting government-wide direction in dissolving organizations.

In the post-Mubarak era, NGOs in Egypt continued to be vulnerable to government efforts to constrain their activities; many organizations were searched on suspicion of operating without a license (The government refuses to grant them the license in the first place). Egyptian "opposition" parties share many of the weaknesses of party politics, and are even more restricted than those applied by the government to associations. Furthermore, these parties' commitment to democracy is questionable. A frequent critique of Egyptian

opposition groups was that, due to their fractiousness, the regime was able to exploit the liberals' distrust of Islamist forces.

The January 25 revolution was successful in a way because it helped in removing President Mubarak from power and transferred it to civilians, though the military was involved in the political affairs of the state prior to the revolution, and still remains one of the main decision making bodies. The revolution's main focus was economic betterment and equality among the public and political rights, but the fact is that despite the improvement in the economic standards after the revolution, inequality is still present and currently Egypt is facing an economic crisis despite the government's attempts to stabilize the economy. The people who are suffering from this economic crisis are the working class. As far as political rights are concerned, there are still some restrictions on the public. Meanwhile, democracy still eludes the state of Egypt.

The continuing chapter provides a look at the transition and challenges faced by Tunisia as well (Martini et. al., 2012). The political background of Tunisia is similar to that of Egypt in the sense that both were strictly authoritarian states with a rigid framework that monopolized power in the hands of the elite. However, Tunisia has had less turbulence and a better economic performance, factors that can be directly linked to its traditions of result based legitimacy and secularism. The government-imposed restrictions mean that Tunisia has a weak, inexperienced political legacy. Despite the presence of a relatively advanced level of state institutions, political awareness remained successfully minimal, which only made the incumbent 2011 revolution more unexpected. The depoliticization is also due in

some measure to the disillusionment of the public due to systematic electoral manipulation and corruption.

The post-revolution elections demonstrated Tunisian politics' perplexity; the moderate, Islamist Ennahda party won a majority in the Constituent Assembly, while the leader of the leftist party was elected interim president; however, parties were led by people who had recently returned from exile. Another comparison can be made to Egypt in the role played by their military in domestic politics following the Arab Spring; Tunisia had a far smaller, thus far less impactful armed force to help the transit of power. Instead, the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) was amongst the largest and most significant political actors in the state.

It is a significant relationship that Tunisia had the best regional economic performance despite a lack of natural resources to build its state wealth on. On the contrary, it followed the Western policies of privatization relatively closely, and boasted the largest middle class of all Middle Eastern states by developing its private and tourism sectors etc. However, these positive statistics were unable to explain the prevalent unemployment, a factor that ultimately proved fatal for the Ben Ali regime. Private debts and regional inequity were also significant economic concerns at the time of the Arab Spring.

These factors were the primary causes that initiated the revolutionary protests in early 2011. The early post-Revolution times, however, were marked by uncertainty, confusion and vague concerns, but despite the imposing challenges, the state managed to straighten its affairs and hold elections without aggravating the situation. A positive aspect was the

emergence of more than 100 new political parties following the dissolution of the Parliament, and the swift court decisions condemning Ben Ali and his wife the same year.

The case presented by Tunisia seems miraculous and at times riddled with paradoxes. Nevertheless, it has provided the Middle East and the world with a unique model that is nothing short of an exception in its respective contexts. The revolutionary movement it began was initially a solidarity campaign with the underprivileged and unjustly treated community that eventually resulted in the overturning of a regional political mainstay order. Despite the countless challenges and pitfalls waiting ahead for the fledgling democratic state to take its first tentative steps into the world, the magnitude of this revolution and all that it has gained can't be undermined. Without being too ambitious, the authors cautiously predict a promising future for Tunisia.

The author Abdesselem Mahmoud discussed the extent to which, he thinks, the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt can be related to Social Movements against Capitalist and Authoritarian Systems around the world. He links the causes of the Arab uprisings to the causes behind any Social Movements. He is of the opinion that these uprisings are basically linked to the changing political and social situation in the Middle East and the Arab World (2016). In his research titled "SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN TUNISIA AND EGYPT; A TALE OF TWO REVOLUTIONS, he points out that in the contemporary world, the social movements are also driven by other deprived social groups like Blacks, Immigrants, students, women, unemployed youth and many others. Though the social movements lack ideologies and are usually leaderless without any political party, nor do they concern any religious sects, the information and communication networks, for example, Facebook,

Twitter etc., are the channels or tools through which protests are recorded nowadays. The term "New Social Movements" refers to social movements because their concerns are different from traditional social movements, and as mentioned earlier, the tools used to communicate were different from traditional media like newspapers, TV etc.

The author explained the occurrence of Social Movements with the functioning of the human body; it feels many emotions like hope, anger, joy, disdain, happiness, sadness and outrage, and these emotions usually trigger a person to act when he/she gets an opportunity. This is exactly how social movements start. These emotions were triggered by state injustices and forced out a reaction from the Tunisian people, and they started to express their anger and hurt through these Social Networking sites. Young and powerless, they turned towards these sites and found them the most suitable way to communicate. After overcoming their fear, they occupied streets and spaces throughout Tunisia. In short, wireless social media activists played a key role in both the pre and post Arab Revolution periods in Tunisia.

There are two popular ideas that:

1. Bouazizi's self-immolation sparked Arab Spring protests in Tunisia.
2. Some radical movements triggered the Tunisian Revolution.

Similarly, in Egypt, Internet Activism has come a long way and has been expressed in many forms. The Egyptian Regime made a black out of the internet in the country. In Alexandria, young people were outraged by the brutal murder of a 28-year-old Khaleed Said at the hands of the Egyptian Police. His death became a core cause for Internet activists. The

author concluded his article by saying that modern social movements in Arab states are not disconnected from social movements worldwide.

Moez Chakchouk, Danielle Kehl and Jochai ben-Avie (2013) narrate about the cause of the Arab Spring protests; a lack of genuine democracy, unemployment, corruption etc., highlighting the role of technology. Technologies played a critical role in the pre and post revolution period and they will be influential in the coming years, playing an important role in shaping Tunisian political and social development. After the revolution, the public commitment to online freedom and freedom of the media and freedom of expression was very encouraging. The interim government recognized that there was a need to increase access to traditional and web based media and encourage freedom of expression which was restricted by the government of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, so it made reforms for the media and telecommunication sectors and encouraged media pluralism and independent regulatory systems or institutions.

A Spectrum policy was designed to enhance the democracy that can help Tunisia to maintain its competitive position in the region by increasing broadband Internet penetration, for sharing information and ideas, and technological innovation for the long term economic growth of a country. In their research titled "From revolutions to reforms: recommendations for spectrum in transitional Tunisia", the writers identify that Spectrum policy should be a major priority in the restructuring of Tunisia's media environment, and that this process sets an example for other countries in MENA that are seeking to reform communications policies to similar ends.

For a better environment of democratic media, a set of policy reforms is required. And to enable access to information, freedom of expression and media, a spectrum policy can play an important role. By following the examples of other countries, a license to FM broadcasting could be offered by spectrum regulators. The National Forum on Internet Governance was launched by the government in September 2012 in which the Information and Communications Minister declared the end of Internet censorship in Tunisia, and joined the Freedom Online Coalition. It remains to be seen how these developments will impact the legal and regulatory framework in practice in Tunisia in the long term. Since the revolution, infrastructure and access have grown, and citizens have had access to the global Internet and freedom of expression.

Starting from the view that the achievement of a revolt from underneath against a despot organization lays on a specific cross-class and cross-ideological coalition, Gianni Del Panta is keen on evaluating the importance of laborers in the 2010-2011 uprisings in three North African countries (2016). The enormous spread of radical social disputes which hit every country in the Middle East in 2010-2011 has been a champion among the most basic political events on the all-inclusive scene in recent decades. In his article Labour Movements and the Arab Uprisings: Comparing Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, del Panta states that the accomplishment of an uprising from underneath is an issue of first significance, and to improve our understanding of the events, it is fundamental to study the specific part played by each social class and character in the uprising. In this study, he focuses on workers and their activities because it was the sure advancement of the workers' coalition in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as its non-establishment in the latter that elucidated the various political headings.

As comprehensively known, the Middle East is one of the most clear and homogenous world regions. Nations in the area, such as Tunisia, run from aggravating lavishness to difficult destitution, and from evidently end-less hydrocarbon assets to energy shortages. Relating to Egypt and Tunisia, it is possible to show a practically identical association in class terms; their starting stage was a more unequal society that only got more unequal over time. The threatening nature of their protests against Ben Ali and Mubarak's norms transformed workers into a source of inspiration for other social classes and political powers too, in a roughly equivalent tradeoff among rules, framework gatherings and budgetary fights.

Meanwhile, the relatively direct difficulties in Muhammad VI's kingdom of Morocco and the limit of his organization to curb them have frequently been uncovered, demonstrating the specific institutional condition. If the 20 February movement remained coordinated in its requests, it failed to address the monarchical state and the circumstances of Muhammad VI's regime. This was also the result of the absence of an integral fortification between the two wings of workers. A long way from giving a complete elucidation, this examination has proposed some new encounters. The author has similarly endeavored to highlight another basic theoretical point of view. It is evident that regular workers can't have a quick and proactive impact on working up another demand without working through their own specific bodies, i.e. trade affiliations and work parties. In this regard, this article suggests that workers may have had a more critical impact on these political changes than has been assessed by past examinations.

A scholar Danielle Meltz in her undergraduate thesis in 2016 sought to address the topic of NGO limitations by state institutions, and to what extent a civil society can limit the violence of a revolution such as that of the Arab Spring. She focuses her study on the analysis of the significance of strong civil societies and specifically on their mediation capability to contribute to the development of the state while also maneuvering conflicts, again, for the betterment of the state. Simply titled, Civil Society In The Arab Spring: Tunisia, Egypt And Libya, the author keeps the paper simple by highlighting shared statistics of the 3 mentioned Arab Spring states to support her point. Thus, she is able to account for the respective fortunes of the 3 case studies and provide a clear picture of the relevance of their state societies.

As Tunisia has not only been the originator of the Arab Spring but also the state with the strongest civil society (Boose, 2013; Kehfi, 2015), it predictably achieved its revolution with the least amount of bloodshed. It is also the state with the most controlled violence since 2011. Egypt, by comparison, had a more protracted era of clashes, and simultaneously less adept civic bodies to coordinate efforts. Libya ranks last in a list of least developed civil societies and also the most peaceful protests. Conversely, it does rank higher in the number and intensity of disturbances in the years following the Arab Spring. The author also highlights how external aspects influenced the Libyan revolts, namely the militarist factor. This leads to an analysis of the military and judicial restraints on the formation of civil societies. These are surely the obstacles to the stimulation of a healthy democratic environment and culture, and prevent such organizations from becoming strong enough to challenge their authority.

A civil society is that foundational element where the democratic spirit flourishes and is fomented; when an individual joins a group, participates actively in its policymaking and cooperates with one another on an individual and inter-organizational level as well, he gains democratic awareness and political experience. It is these qualities that shape and strengthen civil societies and NGOs. Despite their limited role in influencing a state during a period of revolution in comparison to state institutions and their vulnerability to the same institutions as well, it is precisely the democratic nature of decision-making of these NGOs and civic bodies that can help in organizing movements and maintain order and control of proceedings. They may be mere "public spaces where citizens can gather", but they can serve as a powerful force that channels public opinion, desires and complaints and forcibly aligns them into a civilized form of expression. This is in sync with their primary purpose of aiding the progression of their state and society.

According to a similar issue tackled by Ridha Kehfi in 2015, to measure the importance of the role played by the civil society in Tunisia in preventing the chaos currently reigning in the other Arab Spring countries, everyone should recall the action civil society organizations took during the crisis arising after the political assassinations of the two left-Wing leaders, Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi. That was summer 2013 when thousands of Tunisians started protesting to dissolve the Government of Ali Laarayedh. As expected, these were a result of the rising economic crisis, religious extremism, insecurity, inflation and terrorism.

Tunisia was divided into two inept factions at the time: Islamists and secularists; the country was on the verge of civil war, the constitution had been suspended, and all political leaders were paralyzed. Once again, the Civil Society intervened to rescue their political

and social structure. By arranging many meetings and negotiating desks under the national organizations such as the Tunisian General Trade Union and Tunisian Union for Industry, the heads of these organizations succeeded in reconciling the positions of party leaders, bringing them to the negotiation table and stabilizing their political institutions. Undoubtedly, Tunisian civil society has never lost its strength and vitality.

In Libya, Syria and Yemen, the Revolution was followed by civil wars and strife, but Tunisia exceptionally overcame chaos and ethnic conflicts. Tunisia did not win the title of democratic state overnight but through immense struggle, negotiations and democratic aspirants of its population. The author's findings in Tunisia: Civil Society, the Driving Force behind the Democratic Transition have established that this transition has succeeded due to the presence of a strong and collaborative civil society. The endeavors of the activists, non-governmental organizations, unions and media remarkably changed the outcomes of political decision making in Tunisia's transitional period post-Arab Spring.

This use of the term "island" as a metaphor for Tunisia was reused by Zuzana Hudakova to describe its civil society organization/s, in her research titled, Civil society in Tunisia: from islands of resistance to tides of political change (2019). This article lauds the role of Tunisia's CSOs in the 2011 revolution, but also highlights that this active participation was not always so. Rather, Tunisian CSOs had negligible participation in its state affairs predating the Arab Spring. This was partly owing to the lack of independence of the Tunisian civil society from the authoritarian regime that dictated its political choices. An in-depth look at the history of the development of Tunisian CSOs is more beneficial for understanding and appreciating their upgradation today.

The author proceeds to detail the biography of Tunisia's CSOs at length and systematically, and shares data to accompany the trends identified in the emergence, diversity and popularity of NGOs and civic bodies. Like all other political actors, CSOs are influenced and shaped in many different ways by a myriad of factors external and internal; type, background, goals, experience and status of the CSOs are just a few of these. The attitude and political context of the Ben Ali regime are much to blame for the suppressing of Tunisia's civil society.

Only a select few organizations managed to defy the government and ultimately build up the revolution that was necessary for the regime shift. Once it had begun, the CSOs already in action received more support from both home and abroad. They played many roles during the protests to promote, support, donate, negotiate and coordinate efforts between the opposing sides in a supreme feat of management. This widespread participation allowed the civil society structure to flourish in the democratic Tunisia that emerged after 2011. They now have not only substantial funding for their efforts, but also valuable experience and resources to navigate the complex path to fostering a real and thriving democracy as proper political forces.

A latitudinal analysis is also enlightening for grasping the varied activities and actions of CSOs; the different purposes of different groups naturally result in different levels and forms of functions they perform/conduct. It also identifies which organization is best suited for a particular event and format of expertise. Lastly, the limitations of CSOs are mentioned by referring to the real-time case of Tunisia. They can't always instigate radical change or always realize their objectives. They can even have negative, divisive impacts at times. Yet

their usefulness can't be denied due to the numerous ways they can directly and indirectly contribute to a magnanimous cause by educating, protecting and encouraging citizens.

1.9. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Essentially, this study is based on a qualitative analysis, focusing primarily on an extensive literature review of democratization processes in states going through the transitions. It will take a comparative approach in investigating the prospects and pitfalls of the democratic transition processes. The Arab Spring, as a whole, provides a significant study area to observe the process of moving away from authoritarianism as well as the transitional challenges while tipping towards democracy. In examining this issue, a case study method is used.

The study is based on the method of comparative politics, comparing politics of different countries that have similar systems with different outcomes. "Most similar systems design" (MSSD) seeks to compare political systems that share a host of common features in an effort to neutralize some differences while highlighting others" (Landman, 2000). Egypt and Tunisia have shared the same culture, religion, Islamic history, language, and geography. Despite the similarities between the two countries, the transition period has not been affected by those links. One of the most critical areas that MSSD focuses on, is the transition from authoritarian rule. Moreover, the study seeks to compare the changes in Tunisia and Egypt. This study assumed that the transition process in Tunisia and Egypt is very similar, but the results are very different in these countries. The transition from an

authoritarian state to a democratic state is considered as the primary dependent variable for this study.

The study is qualitative which is based on descriptive, explanatory and analytical methods. Since the study is a comparative analysis of two states, apart from publicly accessible primary sources such as interviews and statements of the leading political actors responsible for overseeing their countries' transitions, I largely rely on secondary sources such as articles, books, and reports written on the Arab Spring and the country-specific trajectories in its aftermath.

Primary sources includes online government documents, official statements by policymakers, statements by public leaders/activists, and political party leaders, among others. These documents will be analyzed through content analysis. Since the research is qualitative, interviews (from experts and analysts) will be conducted when required. Convenient sampling techniques will be used. Secondary data will be gathered from books, edited books, articles from journals, political party's constitution and manifestos and electronic media.

	Sources	Nature of document	Availability	Information to be extracted
1	Books and articles	Academics and semi-academics	Libraries, Archives	Information about historical background, post Arab Spring period, and new political reforms
2	Policy papers, online government document and Organizational reports.	National and international	IPRI, RAND, and official websites,	Information regarding Arab Spring, institutions like military, leadership, civil society organizations and policy making.

1.10. ORGAZNIZATION OF THE STUDY

This research is partitioned into five chapters respectively, each chapter examines different topics however, all are interconnected with the main topic. Every single chapter starts with an introduction consist of a summary and discusses all the major events. Chapter I provides an overview of the Arab uprisings and their place in the studies of democratization. It also provides a literature review discussing the prospects and pitfalls of a transitional period.

Chapter II consist of a theoretical framework of democracy and democratization. It suggests that post-revolutionary politics is more prone to transforming back to the old authoritarian regime than holding on to the democratization process. A sound democratic

transition requires a set of factors that could keep a country on the transitional path, using the cases of Tunisia and Egypt to trace the importance of these factors.

Chapter III and IV are organized similarly. There is devoted to historical backgrounds of the uprisings specific to each case, Tunisia and Egypt. Events that began in Tunisia on December 17, 2010, have encouraged scholars to revisit the existing scholarship of the resiliency of authoritarianism in the region. The Post-Arab Spring process has shown that authoritarian regimes can re-stabilize themselves or adapt to different conditions in various ways. I will first trace the mechanisms/determinants sparking the mass revolts and demands to which they gave rise and then how political elites oversaw the transitional period in both countries.

Chapter IV is the core of this study, propounding a multifaceted approach that combines differing analytical applications. It suggests that four significant stages determine whether a country makes a successful transition to democracy or transforms back to authoritarianism. First, I examined the formation of the state in MENA, focusing specifically on civil-military relations, political parties, civil society, and its impact on a country's democratic transition. This is large because the regimes in MENA are often structured around the governments' security apparatus. Transitional processes are likely to be slowed down (or hindered under differing conditions) when the ouster of the autocrat leaves the political landscape to the remnants of the old regime. For this reason, the military officers are highly likely to play a proactive role during the transitional process as arbiters to maintain their current political ambitions, and if possible, to enhance their institutional autonomy at the expense of civilian authority.

Thus, I argued that the prospect of power-sharing compromises among political elites in the transitional process. Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt received the majority of votes in the first democratic elections, but the way they channeled this support into resolving the problems of the transitional process differed significantly in the two cases under study. Third, I analyzed the relationship between the moderation of Islamist parties in both cases and its impact on these countries' democratic transitions. Finally, I examined the role that civil society plays in democratic transitions and how civil-society groups, socio-economic factors, demography, rule of law, and role of political institutions contributed to political transitions in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Revolutions have played an important role in the formation of the modern world. To comprehend the present political system, it is inevitable to study and analyze the political jolts of the past. In social sciences, we refer to the term revolution as the change of government or transfer of power. However, its meaning has changed over time. Different philosophers describe the revolution according to their need for time. In the ancient period, the Greek philosopher Aristotle was the first who spoke about political revolutions and the transfer of power through uprisings. According to his thoughts, revolution is all about political change, power, and the constitution (Epstein et, al, 2006: 551-569; Field, 2004; Geddes, 1999).

After the French Revolution of the eighteenth century, which toppled the government and attempted to change society from the ground up, the revolution became inextricably linked to the extremist defeats of the past. A Revolution, many came to accept, must be accomplished through such fierce and complete change (Peter, 2007). In social and political theory, a revolution is a notable, unexpected, and thus conventionally unpleasant change in government related affiliations and structures. The term is used by comparability in such verbalizations as the Industrial Revolution, where it insinuates a fanatic and noteworthy change in monetary associations and inventive conditions. However, the way that the possibility of revolution was initially related to the Aristotelian idea of intermittent changes

in the types of government, and by proposes a significant departure from any previous true model (Field, 2005).

A revolution entails a test of the developed political interest and the unavoidable establishment of another solicitation that is significantly different from the first. The unimaginable revolutions of European history, especially the Glorious (English), French, and Russian revolutions, changed the game plan of government just as the economic system, the social structure, and the social assessments of social desires. Besides, the possibility of revolution was seen as a terrifying force, from old Greece to the European Middle Ages (Geddes, 1999).

The previous Greeks believed revolution to be an opportunity just after the foundation of the key great and exacting essentials of society. Plato acknowledged that a steady, determinedly uneven code of beliefs could hinder revolution. Aristotle elucidated this thought, thinking that if a culture's fundamental value system is damaged, the overall population will be powerless against revolution. Any extraordinary change in basic benefits or beliefs gives the ground to a revolutionary change (Frances, 1990). The preservation of established beliefs and forms of government remained a necessity during the middle ages.

Much thought was given to finding techniques for battling revolution and covering changes in the public field. The assembly guided people to recognize the inconsistencies of power, rather than upsetting the strength of society, because the authority was so strong and its confidence in the help of interests was so strong. There are two important types of political change:

(a) Transformation

(b) Transition

Transformation can be explained as a revolutionary change that leads to wide and complete socio-economic and political change in the host society, while Transitional change is called an evolutionary and gradual political change (David et al, 2006).

2.1. REVOLUTIONS IN MIDEAVEL PERIOD

Following the rise of secular individualism during the Renaissance, the concept of revolution as a cause of societal contamination shifted to a more modern perspective. The sixteenth-century Italian author Niccolò Machiavelli perceived the significance of selfexpression that could bear the danger of revolution; however, simultaneously, his observation of intensity prompted another faith in the need for changes in the structure of government on specific events (Allen, 2003). This new acknowledgment of progress put Machiavelli at the critical edge of a present-day revolutionary idea, even though he never utilized the word revolution in his writings, and he was essentially worried about the production of a genuinely steady-state (Bosker et al, 2013).

The seventeenth century English author John Milton was an early adherent to the revolution's characteristic capacity to enable the general public to understand its latent capacity. He additionally considered revolution to be simply the privilege of society to shield against harsh dictators, making another demand that mirrored the requirements of the individuals. To Milton, a revolution was the method for achieving opportunity (De Long and Shleifer, 1993). Afterward, in the eighteenth century, the French, Haitian, and American revolutions were endeavors to make sure of the opportunity for aggressive ingenuities. Nowadays, revolutions have oftentimes consolidated idealistic standards as a

reason for the change. Immanuel Kant, the eighteenth-century German rationalist, had faith in revolution as a power for the progression of mankind. Kant accepted that revolution was a "characteristic" step in the acknowledgment of a higher moral establishment for society (Grief, 2006). This thought helped fill in as a reason for the American and French revolutions.

The nineteenth-century German thinker G.W.F. Hegel was an imperative motivation in the development of the twentieth century's revolutionary idea. He considered revolutions to be the fulfillment of human fate, and he considered revolutionaries to be those who initiate and carry out changes. Hegel's hypotheses filled in as the establishment for the most compelling revolutionary mastermind, Karl Marx. Marx utilized Hegel's reflections as the reason for an arrangement of class battles, fixated on a battle for the control of the monetary cycles of society. Marx had confidence in the reformist phases of mankind's set of experiences, finishing in the common topple of the bourgeois class. For society to propel, the common laborers, or low class, must assume control over the means of conception. Marx saw this inevitability as the texture of the human battle for opportunity and a ridiculous society, along these lines dispensing with the requirement for additional political change (Stasavage, 2007). Socialist revolutions driven by Marxists occurred in Russia, Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam, and Cuba, among different nations, in the twentieth century.

In the mid-20th century, the American historian Crane Brinton analyzed the tendencies of society before a major revolution. He saw a pre-revolutionary society as having a combination of social and political tensions, caused by a gradual breakdown of the society's values. This leads to the breakage of political authority, as the governing body must rely

upon an increasingly desperate use of force to remain in power. Commensurate with this is the emergence of reformist elements that serve to emphasize the corruption of the political authority. As the existing political order begins to lose its grasp on authority, momentum builds among the diverse forces of the opposition. As the government becomes more precarious, the splinter groups that form the threat to the existing order band together to topple the authority (Stasavage, 2011).

Following the overthrow of an administration, there is usually a period of idealistic optimism, during which the revolutionaries engage in a much stickler manner of speaking. Yet, this stage doesn't keep going long. The handy undertakings of administering must be confronted, and a split created among conservatives and extremists. It closes with the thrashing of the conservatives, the ascent of fanatics, and the grouping of all forces in their grasp. For one group to win and keep up its power, the utilization of power is practically unavoidable.

The objectives of the revolution blur, as an authoritarian system takes order. A portion of the fundamental precepts of the first revolutionary development, nonetheless, are inevitably joined at long last (Cantoni, 2012). The French and Russian revolutions followed this course of advancement, as did the Islamic revolution in Iran in the late twentieth century. A carefully planned political revolution, free of social change, lacks a comparable example of pre and post-revolutionary occasions. It might be just a change in political position (as in numerous upsets *d'état*) or a fairly more extensive change of the structures of intensity

(as in the American and Mexican revolutions) (Dumolyn and Hamers, 2005; Luther, 1966).

The motivation for some twentieth-century revolutions was the Russian Revolution of 1917, driven by Vladimir Lenin and propelled by the thoughts of Marxist Communism. Marx accepted that revolution was important to move social orders starting with one authentic stage, then onto the next, and his definition fortified the view of revolution as an all-inclusive and unavoidable cycle in world history. For over 50 years, the Russian Revolution gave would-be revolutionaries all through the world a model for political revolution and financial change. The Soviet Union's model was particularly helpful against frontier and patriot revolutionaries, from China's Sun Yat-sen to Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh, who found in the experience of the USSR answers to the difficulties of their nations (Wahl, 2014).

The Iranian Revolution of the late twentieth century gives one more model of revolution. The Islamist revolution of 1979 looked for the extreme change of a state and society witnessed by numerous individuals as excessively mainstream and influenced by Western qualities and culture. The Iranian Revolution set nationalist and Islamic qualities at the focal point of government and society and turned out to be one more case of the present day, the revolutionary change. The 20th century was a period of revolution in quite a bit of Asia (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001).

One factor advancing radical change in numerous Asian countries was the weight of EuroAmerican dominion, beginning in the nineteenth century. As England, at that point, France, Germany, and the United States industrialized in the nineteenth century, their worldwide hash out extended alongside their interest in an assortment of raw materials. Confidence in the predominance of Western potential joined with financial and mechanical

advancements in shipbuilding, weaponry, and interchanges to make a strong blend that would challenge

Asian social orders from various perspectives (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).

The Asian experience of government and revolution has as fluctuated as Asia itself. India, legitimately colonized by Britain beginning in the late eighteenth century, saw the improvement of a small, proficient working class and a political association, the Indian National Congress, which initiated the nationalism against frontier development of the twentieth century. China, mortified in the Opium Wars of the mid-nineteenth century, was never colonized yet lost significant financial and political power as European countries, the US and Japan built up to deal with ports and effective reaches in the nation. An important factor which energized the principal revolution in Asia in the twentieth century was the Republican Revolution of 1911 (Kluge, 2009).

Japan, weakened by unpredictable deals it had to sign with Western forces during the 1850s, changed itself by the start of the twentieth century into a modern force to be reckoned with provinces of its own — a cycle antiquarians have faltered to call a "revolution" yet one which was evidently "revolutionary." Southeast Asian social orders, from the Philippines to Vietnam, would likewise become states of different Western nations. The experience of dominion helped spark huge numbers of the revolutions of twentieth-century Asia. It was the recorded condition that radicalized revolutionaries from Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tsetung to Mohandas Gandhi and Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Haggard et al, 1995).

Numerous Asian revolutionaries looked not just to accomplish autonomous nationhood, yet in addition to change their social orders inside. In the mid-twentieth century, many accepted that turning out to be present-day required the end of old pecking orders and the making of new, more equivalent social relations (Wahl, 2014). In China, this implies denouncing old Confucian traditions and progressive systems and undertaking essential financial and political changes. Mohandas Gandhi adopted an alternate strategy, dismissing Western-enlivened "civilization" and pushing a re-visitation of customary Indian ways. In the two models, inward change was viewed as a fundamental segment of the revolution for public autonomy (Stasavage, 2011). These differing encounters and understandings of revolution underline the significance of political and social revolution to current Asian history.

Lately, with the destruction of revolutionary systems in the Soviet Union and somewhere else and China's development toward a market economy, a few antiquarians have started reconsidering their understandings of revolution and its results. Indeed, even considering these re-assessments, there can be no uncertainty about the significance of revolution — as both an objective and recorded cycle to the development of current Asia and the advanced world. The vast majority of the above examined political and social developments drove towards democracy in their particular social orders (Wahl, 2014; Haggard et al, 1995).

2.2. DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION

Discussions about the idea of democracy are old for sure, and it is difficult to give an exact diagram here. To an impressive degree, Schumpeter's definition, zeroing in on discretionary rivalry among political elites and masses. The democratic strategy is an institutional plan for showing up political choices where people gain the ability to choose by methods for a serious battle for individuals' vote. Schumpeter's definition has been changed in two different ways. Numerous definitions demand almost all-inclusive testimonials, a model that Schumpeter disregarded.

By adding this component of cooperation to Schumpeter's accentuation on rivalry, we show up in Dahl's (1971) compelling plan for conceptualizing oligarchy. Also, most meanings of democracy presently incorporate the thought of essential common freedoms: opportunity of the press, the right to speak freely in discourse, the privilege of habeas corpus, and so on. This measurement is significant because a system can hold serious races with wide cooperation, yet without assurances of common freedoms, it isn't unequivocally democratic. Contemporary El Salvador represents the point, as Karl (1986b) has opposed.

According to Scott Mainwaring (1992), a democracy must contain three main benchmarks:

- Elections
- Citizenship
- Liberties and Rights

Competitive elections must be the chief course to political office. There must be serious mainstream elections for the assembly and generally are for the president too in a presidential system. Misrepresentation and pressure may not decide the result of democratic elections. There must be expansive grown-up citizenship. In many years, this has implied almost general citizenship. Almost every country has a few rejects; lawbreakers, the military faculty, and the uneducated are frequently among them (Lopez, 1976).

The ignorant, notwithstanding, might be various to such an extent that their rejection sabotages the idea of a summed-up grown-up testimonial. It is difficult to build up a precise limit at which avoidances imply that a system is not, at this point, democratic, to some extent because the capacity to bear prohibitions has decreased after some time. Majority rule governments fundamentally give certifications of customary common freedoms for all minority rights must be secured (Peter, 2007).

There have risen formal, protected majority rule systems all through the region, loaded with nearly legitimate and open elections, dynamic gathering rivalry, and a moderately uncensored press. By mid-decade, just Chile and Paraguay appeared to be impenetrable to the pattern (Seligson, 1987: P.3). Notwithstanding dismissing cases, for example, Cuba and Haiti that didn't meet their own rules, Seligson puzzles the holding of serious elections with the presence of democracy. Schumpeter's moderate meaning of democracy demanded the chance of variation in power, a condition that Mexico has never met and that Nicaragua neglects to. Genuine cut off points on common freedoms make the incorporation of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Peru questionable. It can presumably be remembered

for the arrangement of popular governments, yet such incorporation is a long way from planned (Wahl, 2014).

By examining all the above debates over democracy, we can't reach a conclusion or explanation of what democracy is and how to get its exact definition. Regardless of whether we use a procedural definition, deciding what governments should be delegated democratically isn't always easy. This issue is especially intense when a few significant Latin American countries with officially democratic governments are in a cycle of fast social crumbling, and when democracy is enduring less in light of its accomplishments on account of the appearing depletion of choices. Mindful that they contributed powerfully to the current emergencies and that they have no new answers, the military is hesitant to mediate once more. Conaghan (1985) instituted the term democracy by whittling down to portray the progress in Ecuador, and a few years after the fact, this fitting expression depicts the truth in a few different nations too.

2.3. ELITES, MASSES, AND DEMOCRACY

In the previous years, political specialists have focused generally on the function of political elites in supporting vote-based systems. As a result of elite cooperation, the transition writing has enhanced the investigation of democracy. Rustow (1970) contended that democracy "is obtained by a cycle of conscious choice in any event concerning the top political initiative. A skewed job will most likely be assumed by a small group of pioneers." According to Huntington (1984), "democratic systems that last have rarely, if ever, been established by mass mainstream activity."

Democracy has frequently emerged from the top as well as from the bottom; it is equally likely to be the result of theocracy as it is of rebellious opposition to the government" (P. 212). Regardless of its cautious phrasing, this entry misses one of the basic highlights of numerous transitions to democracy, that they include a powerful association among elites and masses. Huntington is correct that suffering majority rule governments are not made by mass activity alone, yet Therborn (1977) and Stephens (1987) are similarly right in demanding the crucial commitments of work development to democratization in Europe.

Transitions, for the most part, start with parts inside dictator systems, yet after some time, an ever-increasing number of entertainers become included. Putting the spotlight on elite entertainers will not accomplish this; the efforts of famous areas to rethink the political scene are also important. Throughout the majority of the ongoing transition measures, a number of well-known organizations fought against dictatorships and for the establishment of democracy. Worker's organizations, laborer gatherings, neighborhood affiliations, and church groups played obvious parts in the battles that ended the dictator's rule. Without some underlying splits in the dictator alliances, their effect was restricted. However, once such breaks showed up, they reinforced the endeavors to expel totalitarian governments (Acemoglu, 2008).

Similarly, the linkages between elites and the masses are regularly vital in transition periods. As progress continues, governments and resistances alike strive to strengthen their bargaining power. Resistance groups regularly endeavor to sort out well-known parts and to win the help of surviving famous associations in their fights against tyrants. When

elections are held, the competing parties race to ensure that they have widespread support (Acemoglu et al, 2006).

The inclination to downplay the effect of average citizens and consider governmental issues to be a select elite undertaking has extended to conversations about the new majority rules systems in Latin America. Truly, the vast majority of these carefree vote-based systems have neglected to actualize arrangements that protect well-known interests. Notwithstanding, their disappointments don't suggest that democratic legislative issues are only an elite undertaking, or even that the majority are missing in the current political situations in these nations (Bosker et al, 2013).

A few experts have exaggerated the degree to which "the individuals" are not intrigued by, or don't participate in democratic legislative issues. In an assortment of ways, average citizens do take an interest in developments, foundations, and practices that either are controlled or just don't exist under tyrant governments. Individuals, and particularly heads of mainstream gatherings, may think more about safeguarding democracy than a portion of the writer recommends. Thinking about this issue may not generally lead to a compelling capacity to add to democratic solidification.

Yet, a general public where there is wide help for brutality as a method for acknowledging interests doesn't bode very well for democracy. According to Oliver (1986), in Argentina, widespread recognition of barbarity in the mid-1970s gave legitimacy to guerrilla associations, illegal intimidation of the right, and extraordinarily dictator origins and practices among, for all intents and purposes, every single political entertainer. Alternately, where famous pioneers are focused on democracy and appreciate wide authenticity in their

associations and developments, possibilities for democracy are greatly improved (Bosker, 2013).

Generally, hardly any residents are all-around educated, and because the dynamic cycle in popular governments is to a great extent confined to elites, it can give the idea that democratic legislative issues depend solely on elite cooperation. In any case, elites should continually strive for famous feelings on the off chance that they are to assemble effective political vocations. Democratic legislative issues are a network of connections and responsibilities between rulers and ruled. One need not romanticize how compelling responsibility is to see that the situation of the rulers relies upon their capacity to engage the dominant part (Dahl 1956: 124-151; Dahl 1961; Sartori 1987: 86-130). This responsibility of elites to the majority through elections is one of the trademark highlights of democracy.

The nature and convictions of the electorate influence what sorts of gatherings are feasible. This is one of the numerous manners by which the convictions of the majority influence the work of democracy. Resident inclinations are not interminably flexible, even though they are formed by elite organizations. Communication is common: the idea of ideological groups shapes the qualities of the electorate, similarly as the electorate's inclinations shape the gatherings (Reis, 1988).

States, through their political elites, are self-ruling to the degree that the plans and objectives they seek after don't just mirror the requests or interests of social gatherings, classes, or society, of the regions or individuals they guarantee to control (Skocpol, 1985). The Ideology, Information, and Analogy in customary perspective on the pluralist

democracy and the party in question model portray, in its optimal structure, that residents can screen, control, thus impact elite choices, which are electorally responsible and authoritatively mindful of looking for reelection (Cox and McCubbins, 2005; Downs, 1957; Mayhew, 2004; Miller and Stokes, 1963).

Democracy is widely accepted to be a system of mass conventional monitoring of elites through both periodic and unrestricted political interest, yet residents' psychological capacities to meet the enormous duties that democratic systems impose on them are widely acknowledged to be limited (Bennett, 2006; Converse, 2006a; Fishkin, 2006; Hardin, 2006; Somin, 1998, 2006). In this line, a few researchers set up a causal association between open obliviousness and state self-sufficiency, where the ignorance of the overall population on political issues leaves space for the elites to seek after self-with respect to interests (DeCanio, 2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006, 2007; Edelman, 1964; Somin, 1998, 2006).

Accordingly, the degree to which residents can apply control decides the self-governance from social inclinations that political elites appreciate. Educated residents can undermine political elites with their interests and, hence, constrain them to push toward their inclinations. However, if elites know that residents are politically illiterate, the pursuit of their advantages will not jeopardize their chances of reelection, and thus either elite can compel their electorate to move to the positions they desire, or the gap between elites and citizens' inclinations expands without producing constituent results (Converse, 2006).

While these histories place the principal impact of public obliviousness on state selfsufficiency, they have for the most part excused the expected impact of philosophical consistency on residents' data. Maybe it is because the greater part of the writing

underestimates the end of philosophy time declared sometime prior by which philosophical consistency and citizens' advancement were two inseparable sides of a similar coin (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 2006a).

Nevertheless, a few creators have added to clarify such a relationship and unravel the two ideas as various applied real factors (Kerlinger, 1984; Jost, 2006). They are particular and their inseparable association must not be expected. Both may have a free as well as joint impact on the political responsibility that the masses apply to elites, which, as an outcome, can impact their self-sufficiency as to social inclinations. In this manner, individuals' degree of philosophical consistency ought to be considered as an autonomous and mediator impact on the connection between open obliviousness and state self-rule. (Speak, 2006b: 207).

How many situations along with conflictive policy driven issues are interrelated describes the degree of philosophical limitation that an individual has. A belief system-based consistency, in any case, has two unmistakable sides: an instrumental or a predominance, contingent upon the sources and elements of the consistency. From one perspective, philosophies may serve to arrange and structure the intricacy of legislative issues by arranging thoughts and adjusting issues along different lines of the expected clash, which may facilitate the best approach to successfully controlling political elites.

Then, philosophy can likewise be perceived to be social, rather than sensible or mental, and, in this manner, the consequence of a top-down actuation measure in which masses assimilate the socially diffused "bundles" of thoughts that are introduced to them as regular by the elites (Converse, 2006b; Marx and Engels, 1970). In this, elites have methods for

interfacing issues with which they are normally associated, including an important apparatus to actuate residents' amiable proclivity to hose their political responsibility.

On the whole, the different sides mirror the way that philosophy breeds as much data and advancement as twisting, misrepresentation, specific articles to corroborative existing data, and preparing channels (Congleton, 1991; Hart, 2009; Galdi et al., 2012; Garrett, 2009; Glaser, 2005; Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas, 2005; Smith, Fabrigar, and Norris, 2008). Because of the mix of the two cycles, electorates portrayed by significant levels of political information may see their basic judgment and capability of compelling command over elites disabled by their serious philosophical consistency because of its strong side.

2.4. LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY

Being legitimate is inevitable for any regime. According to political scientists, declining legitimacy can also be a threat to an authoritarian regime. If a regime loses legitimacy, it can't survive. According to Przeworski, we can understand this phenomenon with two explanations. First, no regime can survive without legitimacy, it collapses. Second, a clash of interests between ruling elites can lead to the involvement of other interest groups in governmental issues.

Przeworski inclines toward the subsequent other option; interests, and not emotional assessments, structure the premise of the clarification. Be that as it may, the polarity somewhere, between authenticity and clashes inside the decision coalition, may not be as sharp as Przeworski recommends. The route clashes inside the decision coalition develop and are taken care of at last, can't be separated from the subject of authenticity. At the point

when a system appreciates authenticity, the issues that administrations unavoidably face are more averse to releasing unresolvable clashes inside the decision alliance (1986).

One of the most basic situations for modern dictatorships is the need for legitimizing formulae. The destruction of fundamentalist nations in World War II resulted in an overshadowing of belief systems and hierarchical models that could make long haul legitimacy for dictator systems, at any rate in the west since 1945 (Linz, 1973). This scenery clarifies why tyrant systems in the west have colossal trouble supporting themselves in control over an extensive period. Tyrant systems would be better prepared to confront issues without internal splits and rebellions if they had suffered authenticity. Consequently, system dependability can be clarified by three variables:

- People are intimidated and forced into obeying.
- People follow the rules out of self-interest.
- It does not occur to people that a different kind of regime could exist, so they passively agree.

In any case, none of these three factors, or even all of them, can sufficiently explain system dependability (Higley et al, 1989). The composure of a method of control dependent on intimidation, personal responsibility, or lack of concern/renunciation is questionable. "Custom, individual favorable position, simply effectual or ideal intentions of solidarity don't frame an adequately dependable reason for a given mastery" (p. 213). Successful pressure requires extensive attachment inside the harsh contraption itself, and this union is practically sure to disintegrate if ground-breaking figures in the dictator alliance don't acknowledge the authenticity of tyrant rule. The coercive device doesn't exist in seclusion,

even though correspondence between it and common society might be restricted (Weber, 1978: 31-38, 212-271).

The personal responsibility clarification of agreement is critical to normal decision models. This clarification needs not to hypothesize that an entertainer endeavors to sabotage democracy essentially because his/her advantages are not understood. The expense of endeavoring to undermine a democratic system when no different entertainers are doing so could clarify why an entertainer doesn't act against democracy each time his/her advantages are countered. Objective entertainers would join an intrigue against democracy to increase their advantages, in particular if there is a sensible possibility of progress. To some degree, the expenses of activity would radically exceed the expenses of passive consent (Karl, 1987).

However, without some idea of authenticity, it is difficult to comprehend why the expenses of activity are so high in united majority rules systems. Since entertainers trust in the framework, they are happy to make concessions to submit to the principles of the game. Where personal responsibility is the basis for dutifulness, the soundness of the political framework lays vigorously on adjustments, particularly of a material sort (Jelin & Hershberg, 1996; 1985: 133-169).

However, all political frameworks have phases when settlements are low, and such phases don't sabotage democratic organizations. The contrast between merged vote-based systems and popular governments that waver isn't the capacity of the previous to deflect downturns to such an extent as the acknowledgment by major political entertainers of low adjustments when downturns come. The cost of democratic activity is high because various entertainers

do not support it, regardless of their goal circumstances. Authenticity is just as much the basis of democratic soundness as target settlements, and it is less subject to financial adjustments than Przeworski (1985: 133-169) and Lipset (1959) indicate. As numerous Latin American cases manifest, where elites and mainstream associations buy into democracy principally out of personal responsibility, democratic solidness is unsafe.

Finally, the facts demonstrate that numerous individuals inactively consent to a given method of supremacy. In any case, no political system in the contemporary world can exist basically on account of the dormancy of the public. This is especially the situation of democracy, where the rulers need occasional discretionary sanctification to hold their places of intensity. Additionally, where individuals latently consent since they can't think about an alternate sort of system, this very actuality communicates a type of legitimacy (Kluge, 2009).

Przeworski's (1985) evaluation of the idea of authenticity guesses that the Legitimacy shouldn't be general in the early phases if democracy is to succeed. However, if a promise to democracy doesn't develop after some time, democracy is in a tough situation. Where normal residents are not dedicated to democracy, they will be available to "unfaithful resistance" pioneers and gatherings, and such entertainers are frequently deadly. This is not to deny the difficulties in operationalizing the concept of authenticity; however, a few ideas have heuristic value even if they cannot be perfectly operationalized. Nor is this to lessen all clarifications of system change to contentions about authenticity. Przeworski is correct that an emergency of authenticity isn't adequate to clarify system changes. However, in opposition to his contention, it might be fundamental.

Three alerts are all together. To start with, authenticity among the majority is more significant in democratic systems than in tyrant ones. On the off chance that the military is the primary column behind a tyrant system, as long as it stays joined together, the system can withstand low degrees of authenticity in common society. Second, in every single political system, the authenticity of entertainers who participate effectively in legislative issues is a higher priority than the authenticity of detached residents (see Dahl 1971; Lamounier 1979a; and Linz 1978, P. 21). This distinction is particularly articulated in tyrant systems.

At long last, the thought of authenticity ought not to be glorified. It doesn't suggest that residents effectively take a government interest or that they uphold a specific government. Or maybe, it recommends an expansive acknowledgment of a political system, far from a specific government and set of meaningful issues. Linz's definition (1978, P. 18) is valuable: "An authentic government is one viewed as minimal evil of the types of government. Finally, democratic authenticity depends on the conviction that for that specific nation at that specific chronicled crossroads, no other kind of system could guarantee a more fruitful quest for aggregate objectives. "(Van Zanden et al. 2012).

2.5. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

The Democratic transition can be defined as the transition to a more law-based political system, including substantive political changes that move country in the right direction. It might be the transition from an authoritarian system to a full democratic rule, a change from an authoritarian political framework to a semi-majority rule government, or progress from a semi-tyrant political framework to a democratic political framework.

The outcome could be solidified (as it was in the United Kingdom), or democratization could face visit inversions (as it did in Chile in 1973). Various examples of democratization are frequently used to clarify other political marvels, for example, regardless of whether a nation goes to a war or whether its economy develops. Democratization itself is affected by different variables, including monetary improvement, history, and common society. The perfect outcome of democratization is to guarantee that individuals reserve the option to cast a ballot and have a voice in their political framework (Karl & Schmitter, 1991).

According to Schmitter and O'Donnell (1986), we can define the democratic transition as the "interval between one political regime and another". In this way, the moderate time frame begins with the disintegration of the tyrant system and ends with the establishment of a democratic government (Cortona 1991). This is defined as a political development cycle aimed at establishing a democratic political framework, advancing democratic qualities and objectives, enduring resistance, allowing bartering and bargaining among various political powers for the purpose of social clashes, and regulating the pluralist structures and systems through which diverse political powers are permitted to compete.

In this decade, broad writing has risen on changes to democracy and possibilities for democracy. This writing has reacted to two key improvements in the various social orders. To start with, the current investigations have shown up with regard to the shrinking of numerous dictator systems and their substitution by democratic governments. At no other time in history have so numerous democratic governments made due for such a long time as in this decade (Lawrence, 2002). The total number of changes and the power of democratic governments have animated scholarly discussions about advances. The subsequent advancement is the expanded scholarly enthusiasm for and promise of democracy. Intelligent people have communicated more enthusiasm for clarifying and supporting democracy than at any other time (Rudra, 2005).

In past democratic phases, numerous scholarly people stayed apathetic or even threatening to liberal democracy. Scholars became convinced of the attractive quality of democracy after enduring horrifying persecutions, witnessing the passing of companions and associates, and observing the obvious decrease in types of openness amid the previous influx of dictator rule. This shift is most noticeable in Latin America, but it has also had an impact on the ominous atmosphere of Central American countries embroiled in common wars (Ward & Gleditsch, 1998). Along with the re-energized commitment to democracy has come a renewed interest in examining democratic transitions and cycles. Regarding sheer amount and frequently regarding quality also, the new writing regarding these matters speaks to a jump over what was created a long time ago in Latin America.

A generally new subject despite a lot more established scholastic worry about democracy, the investigation of transitions turned into a genuine development industry for quite a

while. Along with partners occupied with research on Southern Europe, Latin Americans and Latin Americanists have been the pioneers in opening this new field of exploration. Perhaps because sociology is a more settled subject, no similar developments have yet emerged in the blossoming writing on the democratic combination. All things considered, the writing on this subject has improved our comprehension of current issues in Latin America, yet additionally of democracy all in all (Svolik, 2008).

Transition itself is the result of a key decision by elites, albeit another inspiration for transition is the danger of revolt (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; Smith 2005). To forestall mass brutality, elites regularly find that their most ideal alternative is to democratize and seek after an equivalent dispersion of intensity during elections. Collaboration between occupants and resistance is the best way for change to occur because it limits savagery and allows genuine democracy to take hold (Acemoglu et.al, 2006).

These modes of transition exemplify the difficulties that can come from social movements that push for inclusion in the political arena, but then face conflict with both the outgoing regime and between themselves. The government structures that emerge from transitions often come from long periods of negotiation, as all parties feel as though they then have a "right" to get in their thoughts and opinions on policy (Munck & Leff 1997, 357). Some contend that transition through the breakdown of an old system through uprising makes a smoother transition than participation, as the new government can hold free elections and the previous elites are left to fight for power in the democratization cycle.

Munck and Leff (1997) contended that change through break was the simplest technique for the transition since it prompts a total move in a nation's perspective about administration

and political investment. Nonetheless, the expulsion of elites in a quick or rough cycle denies the capacity to have an agreeable discourse that would hope to make associations with the new government. System collaboration is the main strategy to accomplish high post-transition levels of democracy and hence viciousness isn't great for democracy. Another remarkable instance of transition was in Chile (Russett, 1993).

The driving force for change originated from a gathering outside of the decisive military class and the officeholder president, General Augusto Pinochet. On account of being denied from prompting a system change, adversaries of Pinochet had to propel their thoughts inside the current framework at that point. They formed an alliance to fight the decisionmaking class from the outside, effectively creating rivalry in the political framework

(Valenzuela, 1995, 7-62). The alliance, notwithstanding, had to twist the status of Pinochet's system, for example, tolerating Pinochet's part as armed force president following his ouster, just as giving numerous other military forces.

They were in this way made to acknowledge a restricted adaptation of democracy, as the old elites showed high authority over the democratic transition measure and new constitution (Munck, 1994). By compelling what the future government would resemble, Chile's previous system and method of transition influenced post-transition legislative issues pushing ahead, molding the foundations that were intended to move towards a democratic combination. The Democratic transition adjusts the reaction of previous pioneers, the individuals who feel that they have been insulted under the previous system, and the individuals who need only harmony, all while maintaining a pledge to democracy.

Hence, characterizing being a democratic government is significant in investigating democratic transition (Morlino, 1998).




Fig. 1. Transitional Model of Robert Dahl

To strengthen the debate over democracy and democratization, Robert Dahl used the six basic institutions to elaborate the ideal democratic system. These six institutions are competitive elections, elected officeholders, citizenship, natural liberties, alternative information, and associational autonomy. Meanwhile, as social scientists, we are aware that governments cannot meet such democratization idea criteria, but states, according to Dahl, are vulnerable to this vulnerability. Numerous endeavors to transition to democracy bring about a central scope of the democracy scale and consequently are hard to evaluate (Hegre et al, 2001).

This is particularly troublesome when utilizing lists like the democracy index to assess if a transition has been fruitful. In case of the Arab Spring, many of the nations that sought after democracy fell into common war and, in this manner, their legislatures are practically difficult to contrast with setting up majority-rule governments. The country additionally needs information on states with under 500,000 occupants in this manner, not speaking to microstates, which make up a huge level of the world's majority rules systems (Anckar, 2008).

Numerous researchers have additionally centered on the issues of solidification of systems as opposed to unmodified transition to democracy (Di Palma, 1990; Linz and Stepan, 1996). This field of examination takes a gander at nations that are as of now considered to some degree democratic and assesses expanding democratic beliefs inside the current framework. While this is significant, a large portion of the world is still undemocratic, so transitions and what factors contribute to them remain a topic worth considering. Most data about the subtleties of democratic transition can't be applied to numerous cases as a result of how interesting each case is. Further exact investigation, explicitly across territorially, is required in the field all in all to counter clashing perspectives on what makes up a transitional period.

2.5.1. The Concept Of Democratic Transition

Carothers claims "five core assumptions define the transition paradigm" (Carothers, 2002, p. 6). "The first, which is an umbrella for all the others, is that any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition toward democracy" (Carothers, p. 6). In the second assumption, he assumed that "democratization tends to

unfold in a set sequence of stages". According to Carothers (p. 7), "democratic forms are transformed into democratic substance through the reform of state institutions, the regularization of elections, the strengthening of civil society, and the overall habituation of society to the new democratic.

The third assumption is the belief in the determinative importance of elections. He "assumed that in attempted transitions to democracy, elections will be not just a foundation stone but a key generator over time of further democratic reforms". The fourth assumption "is that the underlying conditions in transitional countries, their economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, sociocultural traditions, or other" structural "features—will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the transition process" (Carothers, p. 8).

The fifth assumption is "the process of democratization is assumed to include some redesign of state institutions—such as the creation of new electoral institutions, parliamentary reform, and judicial reform—but as a modification of already functioning states" (Carothers, p. 6-8). This study agrees with the definition of Carothers according to the following considerations. First, the process of democratization goes through several stages. These stages begin with toppling the authoritarian regime and its end by establishing a democratic system.

Second, the democratic transition process is completed through a political settlement between the political forces. A political settlement is intended to draft a constitution and hold parliamentary and presidential elections. Third, the democratic transformation process

occurs due to internal political factors (Mainwaring, Scott & Timothy R. Scully. 1995; Maoz & Nasrin, 1989; Maoz & Russett. 1993).

2.5.2. The Modes of Democratic Transition:

Why do modes of transition matter, and how do they matter? Transitions matter because they generate fairly durable legacies that affect the post-transitional regime and politics (Munck and Leff, 1997: 345). The different modes of the shift indicate the political differences and the extent of the success of the transition process. Determining the patterns of transformation is very significant because it contributes to understanding the nature of political change.

Some significant basic focuses can be found in most contemporary transitions. However, an extraordinary arrangement is lost on the off chance that we stay just at this overall level, for the elements in transitions very extraordinarily. Without dismissing general tendencies and nation-level specificities, it is critical to put nation-level focal points in a similar light and, on the other hand, to distinguish between types of transitions into more broad reflections. The two undertakings require contemplating the fundamental methods of contemporary transitions (Michael, 2002; Moore, 19662; Morlino, 1998).

O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986) investigation, for the most part, separates between modes of transitions. They effectively contend that the elements of transitions are different in instances of "fruitful" instead of "ineffective" authoritarian systems. Wherever, O'Donnell (imminent) has expanded this investigation in productive ways. Now and again, in any case, they make general assertions that properly describe a few transitions yet that don't

have any significant bearing on other people. Two models describe the point (Bermeo, 1990). Advancement and possible democratization "includes a critical part of assembly and association of huge quantities of people" (p. 18). This might be valid, however, it ignores essential contrasts between transitions.

In Argentina in 1982-83, preparation happened simply after an exceptional annihilation of the authoritarian system, and that being said, shockingly little assembly occurred in the quick repercussions of the Falklands-Malvinas war. In a comparative vein, the declaration that "political popular governments are typically brought somewhere around maneuverings, including hardly any entertainers" is far from being true. In Chile in 1973 and Brazil in 1964, a mass assembly against democracy happened.

O'Donnell and Schmitter additionally contend that a pattern of preparation goes with transitions. In the beginning stages, the resistance is quite a direct result of the huge cost of restricting authoritarian principles. In any case, after some time, advancement empowers the resistance to assemble, and a "restoration of civil society" happens. At long last, after the transition follows a cycle of deactivation with a re-visitation of democratic regularity.

Regardless, this cycle is dependent on the type of transition and explicit cases. In Argentina, in 1982-83, there was no gigantic assembly following the military's aggressive experience. Preparation expanded strikingly after elections were at that point declared.

Consequently, after a transition was everything except certain (Di Palma, 1990). O'Donnell and Schmitter express that "the mainstream upsurge during the transition is in no way, shape or form consistent" (p. 54). The "huge build-up of outrage and struggle (that)

aggregates during these authoritarian systems" (p. 53) again can't be summed up. There was no such far-reaching aggregate outrage toward the Franco system (McDonough et al. 1981; López; Pintor 1987) or the Brazilian system. Then again, not all transitions are trailed by grounding. Argentina, somewhere in the range of 1973 and 1976, was not a deactivated society (see Viola, 1982).

The democratic transitions that happened in the late 20th century as "democracy's third wave," and he proposes that the primary long influx of democratization started during the 1820s in Europe and North America (the United States), giving an enormous portion of the white male populace the option to cast a ballot in open elections. After a century, the world saw the principal turnaround wave, which decreased the number of democratic states from 29 to 12. After the annihilation of the fundamentalist forces in World War II, the subsequent wave appeared and arrived at its peak in 1962, raising the number of democratic states to 36. A subsequent inversion happened from the mid-1960s through 1975, dropping the number of democratic states to 30. This subsequent opposite was trailed by the third flood of democratization during the 1970s and 1980s (Huntington. 1991a).



Fig. 2. Waves of democracy in the world

He addresses the causative elements of this opposite wave in certain nations, and he asserts that the third flood of democratization that cleared the world during the 1970s and 1980s

may have turned into a predominant aspect of Middle Eastern and North African legislative issues during the 1990s. The postponement in this prediction for twenty years spurs us to address whether the Arab Spring is important for Huntington's third flood of democratization or another fourth rush of democratization, or even a bogus beginning to democracy, as depicted by Larry Diamond (2011). Huntington (1991) identified four main patterns in the context of the democratic transition. These patterns appear as follows:

The first pattern is the change by the ruling authority. This change occurs when the ruling authority wishes to change without any internal or external pressure. "The result of such a transition is likely to be, at best, a limited democracy notable for the continued political dominance of a relatively small number of elite figures, often those who enjoyed power under the ancient regime" (Haynes, 2001).

The second pattern is the change through a joint settlement between the ruling power and the political opposition. This transformation happens through initiatives between the ruling power and opposition forces. This shift may also occur as a result of resolving the political conflict. In this mode, the primary objective "is rarely to encourage popular political participation; rather, it is to resolve elite differences to strengthen elite influence to channel political actions in ways favorable to their interests" (Haynes, 2001).

The third pattern is the change brought about by people. The change occurs via an uprising or popular revolution. In this pattern, the people impose a democratic transition on the ruling power, due to the deterioration of living, social and political conditions. "Change comes primarily-at least, initially-from bottom-up pressures, and elites are compelled to accede to the popular will" (Haynes, 2001).

The fourth pattern is changed by external factors. This change happens through the intervention of one state or group of states against another to change the political system. Also, change may be the result of external pressures. This foreign intervention could take several forms, such as economic sanctions and military intervention. For example, "foreign intervention has brought about regime change in countries such as Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan, and Iraq" (Stradiotto, Sujian Guo, p. 19)

The application of these patterns in Tunisia and Egypt shows that these cases can fit under the second mode. The shift began when the people of Tunisia and Egypt dislocated their systems. For example, the fall of the regime of Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak came as a result of popular pressure. Also, the revolution has imposed political change in the state institutions and the political forces. In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, the state institutions have relented to the process of democratic transition. Meanwhile, in his article "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship," Michael McFaul isolates post-socialist system changes from Huntington's third influx of democracy, by contending that the "transitions from socialist guidelines to new system types are so not quite the same as the third rush of democratic transitions during the 1970s and 1980s" and ought not even to be assembled under a similar rubric (McFaul, 2002: 213). He orders these post-socialist transitions as another fourth rush of system change because their results brought about both new democratic and authoritarian systems. McFaul's announcement licenses us to contend that the transition cycles of the Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen can barely be arranged under Huntington's three waves hypothesis, as their results showed themselves in various types of governments lacking — except for Tunisia — the three significant necessities of any democratic framework: rivalry, comprehensiveness, and civil freedoms.

Meanwhile, the political history of the Arab world has matched Huntington's third wave hypothesis. However, these patterns have neither similar power nor worldwide scope. Thus, he considers the political transitions that occurred in the Arab world in the last quarter of the 20th century "the third flood of political progression in the Arab world" (el-Sayyid, 1994:178–189). As this wave started after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when King Hasan of Morocco accommodated with resistance ideological groups in 1975, trailed by Anwar alSaddat of Egypt's re-visitation of multiparty governmental issues in 1976. This cycle of political advancement bit by bit came to fruition in Arab nations, for example, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen, and Jordan. In the fallout of the main Gulf war, the emir of Kuwait held administrative elections in October 1992, a shura chamber was chosen in Oman in 1991, and it was guaranteed that a comparative shura board would be set up in Saudi Arabia.

These top-down changes didn't deliver democratic changes in the area, but instead reshaped authoritarian systems — an "up-reviewing of authoritarianism" — because of outer and inward difficulties ("Arab Uprisings," 2012). With the beginning of the Arab Spring, transition measures in Tunisia and Egypt took a base-up move in energy, since they were impacted by the dissenters' requests. Accordingly, post-Arab Spring changes made ready for the rise of another fourth-provincial flood of democratization in the Arab world.

The grouping of the Arab Spring as a fourth territorial flood of system change (or democratization) doesn't reject that a few parts of Huntington's hypothesis are appropriate to our conversation of the Arab uprisings that have occurred over the most recent 5 years. The five key elements which Huntington built up to inspect the ascent and spread of the

third flood of democratization in various parts of the world are profoundly pertinent while examining the Arab uprisings.

These elements incorporate the wide dispersion of democratic qualities in the last quarter of the 20th century, the extension of a metropolitan taught class, the advancement of democracy by outside entertainers (the European Community and the United States), and the snowballing of the democratization cycle, which are all pertinent methodologies, and refine our evaluation of the Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.

Baloyra's endeavor (1987b) to develop a model of transitions is less receptive to contrasts among cases. He contends that the system transition is started by the crumbling of the authoritarian government, wrongly expecting that decay is consistently a condition for starting the cycle of removal. Indeed, some authoritarian systems start a cycle of advancement at a snapshot of solidarity instead of from a place of shortcoming. The authoritarian systems in Brazil, Spain, and perhaps Ecuador are models. Baloyra contends that "a breakdown of the occupant government followed by a stamped intermittence in the idea of the system" is an essential condition for system transition (p. 10). Among the ongoing transitions in Latin America, just in Argentina would we be able to talk about system breakdown. The other authoritarian systems endured inner disintegration (fluctuating in greatness starting with one case then onto the next).

However, none of the fallen. Baloyra built up a typology that recognized among four examples of democratic transitions: early-inner, postponed outside, deferred inward, and late-outer. Nevertheless being to some degree awkward, these terms are neither simple nor all-around clarified. Baloyra says that the initial two examples are hard to recognize (p.

17), which implies that system transitions as profoundly extraordinary as those in Spain and Argentina are assembled near each other. Then again, transitions that contrast in principal respects, for example, those in Ecuador and Portugal, are gathered in a similar class.

Despite the part's relative broadness and fascinating contentions, it doesn't completely succeed. The issues start with the idea of re-democratization, which is utilized unreasonably freely. Aimless utilization of the word re-democratization can cloud one of the most significant contrasts in current political cycles in Latin America: a few nations truly are going through a cycle of re-democratization, while others are unexpectedly having a sensibly continued encounter with oligarchy (Stepan, 1986). Uruguay's democratic foundations are stronger than those of any other country that has recently gone through a transition, and this distinction stems in large part from the fact that it is Latin America's exceptional case of re-democratization (Gillespie 1986; González 1988).

This array of ways to democracy conveniently causes us to notice the assortment of manners by which popular governments can be established. Overall, the fact that there are so many invalid sets highlights an issue: we are not consistently managing ways to democratization or types of transitions, but rather occasionally with an order of what powers lead to various transitions. The motivation behind why barely any transitions fit well into the classifications is that most transitions have an intuitive character.

They depend on arrangements, exchanges, feigning, and strategic maneuvers among various system and resistance powers, as opposed to being driven by a specific entertainer from start to finish. This point, caught by O'Donnell and Schmitter, is commonly absent

from Stepan's examination. It makes this nonappearance amazing that Stepan's fantastic book (1988) on the military in cycles of democratization in Brazil and the Southern Cone demands this point. He demonstrates how intrastate clashes have prompted military leaders to seek assistance from civil society in order to facilitate their ventures.

At the opposite end of the range, in a transition through the exchange, the authoritarian government starts the cycle of advancement and stays a definitive entertainer all through the transition. It decides to make estimates that will eventually lead to democratization. This doesn't infer that the resistance assumes an unimportant part simultaneously or that the administration controls the whole cycle. There is a transition through removal in the center; an authoritarian government is debilitated, but not as completely as in a transition by route. It can arrange urgent highlights of the transition, however, in a place of less quality than in instances of transition through the exchange.

The hidden thought of this typology is to demonstrate differential places of intensity in the arrangements, discourse, strategic maneuvers, and different associations that describe every contemporary transition. This typology underscores unequivocal contrasts in how many authoritarian systems impact the transition cycle. Transitions through the exchange are particularly vital due to the component of the decision by government pioneers. It appears to be confusing that an authoritarian government would seek after arrangements that could prompt its annihilation.

However, some system chiefs may see significant advantages in doing as such (Mainwaring and Share 1986; Stepan 1988). The cognizant decision of an administration to advance democratization can be perceived regarding the expenses and advantages of

authoritarian standards. As Dahl (1971: 15) put it, "The more the expenses of concealment surpass the expenses of lenience, the more prominent the possibility for a serious system." To put it another way, the obvious costs of remaining in power rise while the obvious costs of undertaking democratization fall.

The apparent expenses of remaining in force may increase for three chief reasons (Mainwaring and Share, 1986). An authoritarian system may face grave challenges as a result of a progression emergency. Progression rules are plainly explained in democratic systems, yet this is typically not the situation in authoritarian systems. This reality in itself makes progression a more troublesome issue for authoritarian systems to confront. Likewise, most authoritarian systems are "unbalanced" in the dynamic cycle; the president and a couple of close partners settle on a large portion of the profound choices. The chronicles of numerous authoritarian systems are vitally associated with a solitary character.

Frequently, this individual is the main individual who can keep up the authoritarian alliance unblemished. This might be a result of his/her specific political abilities, or because nobody else has the trust of the significant entertainers who uphold the authoritarian alliance, or both. Initiative progression will in general be generally convoluted in situations where a solitary chief has governed for quite a while and where he/she appreciates alluring authenticity among some definitive political entertainers. Yet, nearly regardless, progression presents major issues for authoritarian systems. It isn't uncommon for authoritarian systems to fall when a ruler bites the dust or shows up liable to kick the bucket in the short term (Geddes, 1999).

Then again, the challenges made by progression may lead new officeholders to conclude that staying in power is probably going to be excessively expensive. Military systems by and large face pressures that can lead them to pull back from office. Specifically, there is perpetually some pressure between the military as a government and the military as a foundation. The military as an establishment endeavors to stay above legislative issues and to keep flawless the demonstrable skill and solidarity of the military. The military as government, on the other hand, includes the military in legislative issues, yet to changing degrees. Political contrasts inside the military as a government or between it and the military as an organization can cause inconvenient divisions inside the military. Military pioneers may select leaving office as a method for decreasing these divisions (Geddes, 1999).

Most authoritarian governments at first look for a sort of "negative authenticity": they are against confusion, defilement, dissolving virtues, expansion, and socialism. Such bids can have significant success in praetorian minutes; apparently, what the majority of residents most need from the government is soundness. However, negative authenticity formulae are characteristically temperamental in the contemporary western world. If a government "reestablishes order" in the economy and the nation, the issues that justified military intervention are no longer present. If it fails to reestablish request, its failure to manage the "dangers" to the country may imply that it is no more viable than the civilian government that came before it. Garretón (1986) named this underlying stage a "responsive" period and noticed the shaky basis of such advances.

The expenses of democratization for an authoritarian system can diminish for two principal reasons. First and generally significant, if the system has crushed the "incendiary" danger that tested the prevailing request, restoring a more open political framework doesn't appear to be undermining. In numerous South American cases, the military cleared out guerrilla associations, consequently wiping out the greatest "foe." In many cases, the enduring left began to reject savage revolution as an ideal, and the possibility of revolutionary change faded. Second, what's more, the military has dealt with some financial triumphs, the possibility of monetary mayhem appears to be distant. This is particularly so if the economy has done well over some undefined time frame.

Specifically, to impact a transition through exchange, an authoritarian system must have an elevated level of help in civil society. Amusingly, notwithstanding, when authoritarian governments have extensive help, they by and large oppose making changes. Most authoritarian governments embrace changes just because of emergencies, while controlling the significant forms of a transition is amazingly troublesome, given prominent rebellions from the system and support of the resistance.

2.5.3. The Levels of Democratic Transition

The democratization process has passed through several stages. It can be identified in three stages that explain the transition from a non-democratic regime to a democratic system.

The first stage is starting to topple the authoritarian regime. At this stage, the ruling system is unable to impose its authority. This is the result of the internal political conflict inside society. In other words, the political forces are divided between supporters and rejecters of the transformation. "The popular revolution that claims for more rights; and the usual

outcome of this is either a harsh (sometimes deadly) repression or the emergence of a softliner who accepts to negotiate and to grant more rights to the population" (Kamary, 2012).

The second stage is the start of the process of democratization. At this stage, all the political parties and state institutions have agreed to engage in the process of transition. This stage is one of the most important stages in the transformation because it aims to establish common rules among the political parties to reach a peaceful settlement.

The third stage is to find a democratic government. This stage aims to achieve the political settlement achieved by the political forces. The principles of the settlement include drafting a constitution and holding parliamentary and presidential elections (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). The success of this stage is dependent on the success of the political forces to implement these principles (drafting a constitution and holding parliamentary and presidential elections). According to O'Donnell, "transition is supposed to be from a democratically-elected government to a democratic regime or, equivalently, to an institutionalized, consolidated democracy" (O'Donnell, 1993).

Moreover, the essential aim of the transformation is to create a government that represents the people. The elected government is required to find a mechanism for the transition to a democratic system.

2.6. The Transitional Theory

One of the most prominent theorists in the transitional school is Dankwart A. Rustow. According to him, a researcher from a developing country, such as the Middle East, Southern Asia, tropical Africa, or Latin America, has a fairly unique interest in democracy. The distinction that will most likely perplex them is that between developed majority-rule governments, such as the United States, Britain, or Sweden today, and nations that are battling for democracy, such as Ceylon, Lebanon, Turkey, Peru, or Venezuela. This will lead them to the hereditary inquiry of how a democracy appears in any case. The inquiry is (or if nothing else was, until the Russian intrusion of Czechoslovakia in 1968) of practically equivalent enthusiasm for Eastern Europe. Along these lines, the beginning of democracy has more prominent logical pertinence than additional panegyrics about the ideals of Anglo-American democracy or regrets over the deadly diseases of democracy in Weimar or a few of the French Republics.

Many current theories about democracy appear to imply that in order to advance democracy, you must first cultivate democrats--whether through preaching, deliberate publicity, instruction, or as a planned result of development flourishing. Rather, we ought to consider the likelihood that conditions may drive, stunt, bait, or wheedle non-democrats into democratic conduct and that their convictions may be modified at the appointed time by some cycle of legitimization or variation.

Any hereditary hypothesis of democracy would do well to expect a two-route stream of causality, or some type of roundabout communication, between governmental issues from

one perspective and financial and social conditions from the other. Any place social or financial foundation conditions enter the hypothesis, it must try to determine the instruments, apparently partially political, by which these infiltrate the democratic frontal area. The political researcher, besides, is qualified for his privileges inside the overall division of work and may wish to focus on a portion of the political variables without keeping the essentialness from getting the social or financial ones.

Military tyranny, for example, frequently begins stealthily plotting and furnishing revolt while sustaining itself through massive exposure and coalitions with non-military personnel allies. Magnetic pioneers, as per Max Weber, set up their case for authenticity by performing appearing supernatural occurrences yet protecting them through routinization. An inherited government lays most safely regarding the matters' unquestioning acknowledgment of prehistoric convention; it clearly can't be raised on such a rule. Rustow identified four primary stages followed by all countries during the democratization process. These phases are background condition, preparatory, decision, d habituation (Rustow, 1970).

2.6.1. Background Conditions (National Unity)

The first phase aims to achieve national unity through a common political identity of the majority of the community. The first is the background condition. The model starts with a single background condition which is national unity (Rustow 1970: 350). This is the phase when national unity within a given territory is being established. As Potter et al. (1997: 14) explain, Rustow does not see it as a consensus here, but rather that the vast majority of

populations begin to share political identity, such as "we are Americans," "we are British," "we are Egyptians," and so on.

National unity is listed as a background condition in the sense that it must precede all the other phases of democratization. To single out national unity as the sole background condition, it implies that no minimal level of economic development or social differentiation is necessary as prerequisites to democracy (Rustow 1970: 351-352). Democracy is an arrangement of rule by impermanent greater parts. Altogether, rulers and approaches may unreservedly change, the limits must suffer, and the organization of the populace is ceaseless.

As Ivor Jennings stated shortly, "individuals can't choose until someone chooses who individuals are." National solidarity is recorded as a foundation condition as it must go before the wide range of various periods of democratization. However, generally, its planning is immaterial. It could have happened on ancient occasions, as in Japan or Sweden, or it could have happened hundreds of years ago, as in France, or many years ago, as in Turkey. Nor does it make a difference by what implies public solidarity has been built up. The geographical situation may be such that no genuine alternative has ever emerged in Japan, despite being the best model. Or then again, a feeling of identity might be the result of an unexpected heightening of social correspondence in another maxim created for the reason. Then again, it might be the tradition of some dynastic or regulatory cycle of unification.

2.6.2. Preparatory Phase:

Secondly, the preparatory phase. As Potter et al (1997: 14) demonstrates, this national community undergoes a preparatory phase marked by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle. Each country goes through a different struggle; the historical details differ in each case, but there is always a major conflict between the 'in-group' and the 'outgroup' rather than some bland pluralism of group conflict. Democracy is believed to be so fragile in the early stages, which led so many states to not make it through the preparatory phase to the first transition.

To begin with, national solidarity, according to Deutsch, is the result of responsiveness and complementarity rather than imparted mentalities and insights. Second, "agreement" implies an intentionally held conclusion and purposeful arrangement. The foundation condition, be that as it may, is best satisfied when public solidarity is acknowledged carelessly, is quietly underestimated. Any vocal agreement about public solidarity, indeed, should make us watchful. The vast majority of the manner of speaking of patriotism has poured from the lips of individuals who had a sense of safety in their feelings of public personality, Germans and Italians in the previous century and Arabs and Africans in the present, never Englishmen, Swedes, or Japanese.

To single out public solidarity as the sole foundation condition suggests that no negligible degree of financial turn of events or social separation is essential as essential to democracy. These social and monetary elements enter the model just by implication as one of a few elective bases for public solidarity or dug-in struggle (see B underneath). Those social and

monetary pointers that creators are partial to referring to as "foundation conditions" appear to be to some degree impossible at any rate.

The majority of citizens in a democracy must-have mental reservations about the political community they belong to (Rustow: 350). This phase is witnessing a sharp conflict between the political forces. This political conflict is "inconclusive". The goal of this stage is to focus on the democratic process as the basis and essence of the political conflict. A struggle is likely, to begin with, the emergence of a new elite that arouses a depressed and previously leaderless social group into concerted action (Rustow, 1970: 352).

2.6.3. Decision Making

In the third phase, the state begins to shift towards democracy and that is when the political forces agree on a democratic choice. The preparatory phase is a deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to institutionalize some crucial aspects of democratic procedure (Rustow: 355).

What Rustow means by decision is choice, and while the choice of democracy does not arise until the background and preparatory conditions are in hand, it is a genuine choice and does not flow automatically from those two decisions (Rustow 1970: 356). Thus, democracy is attained through a process of conscious decision on the part of the top political leadership. In Rustow's theory, there is always a conscious decision by political elites to adopt democratic rules and this decision phase may well be considered an act of deliberate and explicit consensus.

2.6.4. Consolidation of Democracy

The fourth phase is the "consolidation of democracy". At this stage, the political forces get used to the rules of democracy. A distasteful decision, once made, is likely to seem more palatable as one is forced to live with it (Rustow, 1970: 358). Fourth, there is the habituation phase. According to Rustow (1970), the transition to democracy may require some common attitudes and some distinct attitudes on the part of the politicians and the common citizens. The conscious adoption of democratic rules during the decision phase may have been seen by the parties to view the inconclusive struggle as necessary rather than desirable due to compromises that have to be made; gradually, however, such rules, once made, are likely to become a habit.

Some of the political elites who were party to the compromised decision to establish democracy may have only grudgingly put up with it in the early years, but they were eventually succeeded by a new generation of elites who have become habituated to democratic rules and who sincerely believe in them. With that, a democratic regime may be said to be firmly established. Overall, the model proposed by Rustow does not pretend to be a detailed roadmap to democracy; rather, it successfully creates a framework upon which to base a more in-depth analysis of any country's process of democratization, which might be useful to study the case of the Egyptian revolution and Tunisian political transition in 2011-2012.




Fig. 3. Rustow phases of Democratic Transition

In addition to the above, this thesis sees the theory of Rustow much closer to explaining the democratic process in the Arab Spring, especially in Tunisia. The method of Rustow considered as a mechanism or model can be applied to the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. In the first phase of Rustow's theory, Tunisia managed to achieve political identity through the Troika experience (A coalition consists of Islamist and secular parties). While Egypt almost succeeded in achieving political identity, the military coup that took place on June 30, caused the failure of the first stage.

In the second phase of Rustow's theory, Tunisian political forces succeeded in reaching a political settlement. In the third phase of Rustow's theory, political forces decided to adopt the rules of the democratic game through the presidential election that took place in 2014.

In the final phase of Rustow's theory, Tunisia is still in the third phase. The consolidation of democracy might take too long to happen in Tunisia. In other words, democratic rules of the game must be implemented at multiple stages.

Previous suppositions associating the presence of democracy with specific preconditions, for example, per capita pay, broad education, and shared traits of the metropolitan home ought to be returned to. Without a doubt, they dishonestly assume that the equivalent strides must be followed or searched after in each nation nearly a democratic change. These "procedural necessities" don't generally correspond; ordinarily, a few nations may meet a portion of these conditions that others may not.

Also, in any event, when a portion of these imperatives is in play, it is still impossible that they would, bit by bit, prompt a democratic opening under an authoritarian system. Back to Rustow's theory, this study agrees that the elites play a very important role in the democratization phases. By looking at the elites in Tunisia and Egypt, it can be found that they are an integral part of the military institutions, civil society organizations, and political powers.

Take civil society, for instance. It is regularly said that civil society activism would force authoritarian pioneers to be more open-minded toward the democratic requests of people in general. However, the issue with this contention is that it disregards the coercive contraption of the authoritarian system. When the despots realize their system's survival is in jeopardy, they don't waste time relying on power against their subjects.

Subsequently, the improvement of civil society doesn't make the way for a democratic system. Besides, when the system breakdowns, civil society may start assuming a connecting function among political elites in pushing them to take a more consensual position towards one another, which is basic to the combination of the transitional cycle. Furthermore, Rustow emphasized that "the beginning" of democracy does not have to be geologically, temporally, or socially uniform; in fact, democracy can emerge from many streets. He proposed that a system would better deal with its democratization cycle not by "duplicating" the encounters of different nations, but instead by understanding the *sui generis* challenges confronting the transition at that point and by embracing pertinent and compelling practices for the possibility of the transitional process.

Rustow likewise has a theoretical effect on "democracy" and "democratic transitions" when he censures prior methodologies for normally lumping these two ideas together. He accentuates that the last supposed guarantees, for example, "better economy" or "high education rates" ought to be inspected independently when we look at democratic transitions. He broadly stated that the variables that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into reality; clarifications of democracy must recognize capacity and beginning.

2.7. Towards a Post-Revolutionary Theoretical-Analytical Model

The process of transition enables us to build on the foundation laid by earlier scholars, and to move away from a country and regional focus. We will also see the link between transition and consolidation; one can't be discussed without the other, and transitions directly affect the prospects for democratic survivability. The underlying conditions of societies around the world point to a more complicated reality. The bad news is that it is unrealistic to assume that democratic institutions can be set up easily, almost anywhere, at any time. Although the outlook is never hopeless, democracy is likely to emerge and survive only when certain social and cultural conditions are in place (Inglehart, 2009).

The Bush administration ignored this reality when it attempted to implant democracy in Iraq without first establishing internal security and overlooked cultural conditions that endangered the effort. However, the conditions conducive to democracy can and do change – and the process of "modernization," according to abundant empirical evidence, advances them (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009).

Modernization is a syndrome of social changes linked with industrialization. Once set in motion, it tends to penetrate all aspects of life, bringing occupational specialization, urbanization, rising educational levels, rising life expectancy, and rapid economic growth. These create a self-reinforcing process that transforms social life and political institutions, bringing rising mass participation in politics and— in the long run— making democratic political institutions increasingly likely (Inglehart and Norris, 2013).

Today, we have a clearer idea than ever before of why and how this process of democratization happens. The long-term trend toward democracy has always come in surges and declines. At the start of the twentieth century, only a handful of democracies existed, and even they fell short of being full democracies by today's standards. There was a major increase in the number of democracies following World War I, another surge following World War II, and a third surge at the end of the Cold War. Each of these surges was followed by a decline, although the number of democracies never fell back to the original base line.

By the start of the twenty-first century, about 90 states could be considered democratic. Although many of these democracies are flawed, the overall trend is striking: in the long run, modernization brings democracy. This means that the economic resurgence of China and Russia has a positive aspect: underlying changes are occurring that make the emergence of increasingly liberal and democratic political systems likely in coming years. It also means that there is no reason to panic about the fact that democracy currently appears to be on the defensive. The dynamics of modernization and democracy are becoming increasingly clear and it is unlikely that they will fail to function in the long run (Inglehart & Baker, 2000: 19-51).

Welzel and Inglehart's work on Democratization and Modernization has provided an overview of the factors that have been proposed previously as determinants of when, where, and why democratization happens. According to Welzel (2009), all the related factors affecting democracy and the pathway to democratization are: capitalism; industrialization; social divisions; distributional equality; colonial legacies; religious tradition; international conflict; regime alliances; elite pacts; mass mobilization; state

repression; mass pressures; and mass beliefs. All these factors have been derived from previous scholarly works on democratization. Interestingly, his ideas of mass mobilization, state repression and mass beliefs seem to reflect closely the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions.

As proposed by Welzel, there is a positive role of non-violent mass opposition in knocking over authoritarian regimes and establishing democracy. Democracy is, in most cases, achieved when ordinary people struggle for it against reluctant elites. Furthermore, the democratization process of recent decades has been the most far-reaching and most successful where the masses are mobilized into democratic movements in great numbers and so ubiquitously that state authorities could not suppress them easily (Welzel 2009: 83). This is absolutely true if we refer to the event of Tahrir Square's protest against Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi, and also the civil resistance and street demonstrations that took place in Tunisia some time in December 2010. In these cases, most regimes did not survive because of their ability to repress mass opposition. Only the Assad regime in Syria, to this day, still managed to secure power despite facing heavy protest from the Syrian rebels.

Furthermore, Welzel (2009) has agreed with McAdam (1986) that powerful mass movements do not simply emerge from socio-economic problems, but they must be inspired by a common cause, so called the 'mass beliefs' that motivate their supporters to take costly and risky actions. This requires ideological 'frames' that create meaning and grant legitimacy to a common cause so that people will follow it with inner conviction (Snow & Benford, 1998, cited in Welzel, 2009). In other words, to spark the wave of

democratic transition, one has not only shown their capability to struggle for democracy but also their willingness to do so. If people have acquired both the capability and the willingness to join forces in struggling for democracy, at some point a critical event will prompt people to act together to fight for this democratic freedom. Moreover, the role of motivational mass tendencies, as claimed by Welzel (2009), is that they shape the intentions that inspire collective actions. In some cases, it is immediately caused by a dramatic event that provides a trigger for collective actions.

In Tunisia, for example, we can refer to the case of Mohamed Bouazizi, a young street vendor who set himself on fire after trying in vain to fight against an inspector's small fine and appealing to the police, municipal authorities and to the region's governor. Frustrated by the lack of economic opportunities, unresponsive bureaucracy and thuggish security apparatus, he set himself alight, which led to the massive mass protest throughout the country (Howard & Muzammil 2013: 18). It is undeniable that the role of mass mobilization and collective actions is capable of constituting a challenge that, when becoming strong enough, leads to political change (Welzel: 2009: 89).

But since the end of the Cold War, the concept of modernization has taken on new life, and a revised version of modernization theory has emerged, with clear implications for where global economic development is likely to lead. Stripped of the oversimplifications of its early versions, the modernization concept sheds light on the recent wave of democratization, the Democratic Peace proposition, and ongoing cultural changes, such as the rise of gender equality (Snow & Benford, 1998). For most of human history, technological progress was extremely slow, and new developments in food production

were offset by population increases – trapping agrarian economies in a steady-state equilibrium with no growth in living standards (Inglehart, 2009).

History was seen as either cyclic or on a long-term decline from a past golden age. The situation began to change with the Industrial Revolution and the advent of sustained economic growth – which led to both the capitalist and communist vision of modernization. Although the ideologies competed fiercely, they were similarly committed to economic growth and social progress and brought mass participation in politics. And both sides believed that the developing nations of the Third World would follow a certain path to modernization (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009: 33-48).

2.7.1. Link between Democratization and Modernization

In reconsideration, it is obvious that early versions of modernization theory were wrong on several points. Today, virtually nobody expects a revolution of the proletariat that will abolish private property, bringing a new era free from exploitation and conflict. Nor does anyone expect that industrialization will automatically bring democratic institutions; communism and fascism also emerged from industrialization. Nonetheless, a massive body of evidence suggests that the modernization theory's central premise was correct: economic development does tend to bring important, roughly predictable, changes in society, culture and politics. But earlier versions of modernization theory need to be revised in several respects (Asseburg & Wimmen 2016).

First, modernization is not linear. It does not move indefinitely in the same direction; instead, the process reaches inflection points. Empirical evidence indicates that each phase of modernization brings distinctive changes in people's worldviews. Industrialization leads

to one major process of change, bringing bureaucratization, hierarchy, centralization of authority, secularization, and a shift from traditional to secular-rational values. The rise of postindustrial society brings another set of cultural changes that move in a different direction: instead of bureaucratization and centralization, the new trend is toward increasing emphasis on individual autonomy and self-expression values, which bring growing emancipation from authority (Inglehart, 2009).

Thus, other things being equal, high levels of economic development tend to make people more tolerant and trusting, bringing more emphasis on self-expression and participation in decision-making. This process is not deterministic, and any forecasts can only be probabilistic, since economic factors are not the only influence; a given country's leaders and nation-specific events also shape what happens. Moreover, modernization changes are not irreversible. Severe economic collapse can reverse them, as happened during the Great Depression in Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain and during the 1990s in most of the Soviet successor states. Similarly, if the current economic crisis becomes a twenty-first-century Great Depression, we could face a struggle against renewed xenophobia and authoritarianism (Garnato et al, 1996: 607-631).

Second, socio-cultural change is path dependent: history matters. Although economic development tends to bring predictable changes in people's worldviews, a society's heritage—whether shaped by Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Confucianism, or Communism—leaves a lasting imprint on a society's worldview. A value system reflects an interaction between the driving forces of modernization and the persisting influence of tradition. Although the classic modernization theorists in both the West and East thought

that religion and ethnic traditions would die out, they have proven to be highly resilient. Although the public of industrializing societies are becoming richer and more educated, that is hardly creating a uniform global culture. Cultural heritages are remarkably enduring (Welzel, 2009).

Third, modernization is not Westernization, contrary to early ethnocentric versions of the theory. The process of industrialization began in the West, but during the past few decades, East Asia has had the world's highest economic growth rates, and Japan leads the world in life expectancy and some other aspects of modernization. The United States is not the model for global cultural changes, and industrializing societies in general are not becoming like the United States, as a popular version of modernization theory assumes. In fact, the United States retains more traditional values than most other high-income societies (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009).

Fourth, modernization does not automatically bring democracy. Rather, it, in the long run, brings social and cultural changes that make democracy increasingly probable. Simply attaining a high level of per capita GDP does not produce democracy: if it did, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates would be model democracies. (These countries have not gone through the modernization process described above.) But the emergence of postindustrial society brings certain social and cultural changes that are specifically conducive to democratization. Knowledge societies cannot function effectively without well-educated citizens who have grown accustomed to thinking for themselves.

Furthermore, rising levels of economic security bring a growing emphasis on a syndrome of self-expression values – one that gives high priority to free choice and motivates political

action. Beyond a certain point, accordingly, it becomes difficult to avoid democratization, because repressing mass demands for more open societies becomes increasingly costly and detrimental to economic effectiveness. Thus, in its advanced stages, modernization brings social and cultural changes that lead to the emergence and flourishing of consolidated democratic institutions (Inglehart, 1971).

2.7.2. Democratic Consolidation and Modernization

The pre-eminent role of elites during democratic transitions and the early democratic consolidation period, when the institutions of the old regime are dissolved or restricted and new rules of the political game are yet to be established, is undisputed in transition theory and the broader democratization literature (e.g., Linz & Stepan, 1996; Munck & Leff, 1997; O'Donnell et al., 2013; Rustow, 1970). Leading transition scholars have shown that this wisdom remains relevant regarding the Arab Spring (Stepan & Linz, 2013), with even proponents of structuralism explanations recognizing this finding (Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015:186–198).

While in transition theory, the concept of 'elite' is rarely precisely defined, we draw on Asseburg and Wimmen (Asseburg & Wimmen 2016: 5) to focus on those elite actors' who yield significant influence over the political process during the transformation period. Moreover, in line with Geddes (1999: 136) finding that pact making seems to require the prior existence of well-organized parties able to make and keep commitments, we analyze political party elites as one important sub-section of the national elite. Political negotiations by post-transition elites commonly include highly contentious issues, such as creating

constitution-drafting mechanisms, structuring new institutions, and determining whether and what limits should be placed on religious, military, and security institutions.

Such controversial matters normally have to be resolved through compromises rather than zero-sum approaches (Hassan, 2013a), requiring elite adversaries to cooperate. As early as 1970, Rustow (1970: 358) stressed the necessity of a 'first grand compromise that establishes democracy.' If major elite sections fail to reach such a compromise, powerful veto players—such as the military—can intervene to block democratization. But what are the conditions that enable such a compromise? Research on trust shows that trust is usually the 'precursor' of compromise and consensus-building (Leach & Sabatier, 2005: 491). Trust is especially important in periods of uncertainty consensus-building political transformations (McKnight and Chervany, 1996). It is defined as "having faith or confidence in another's propensity to keep promises, negotiate honestly, and show respect for other points of view" (ibid: 492). Our theoretical-analytical model states that successful democratic transition information often depends on a reasonable degree of inter-elite trust.

Keeping all the above discussion in view, we can relate that democratization in Tunisia and Egypt has hinged on the widely celebrated mechanism of consensus and modernism among political adversaries in parliament, and among key political and civil society actors. Yet, instead of achieving consensus on critical political and economic-structural reforms, compromise-based arrangements have fallen apart due to intense party infighting, regular resignations of governments, and enormous public pressure resulting from a stagnating economy and lack of vision for comprehensive and equitable economic reform (Leach & Sabatier, 2005: 420).

The effect has been sustained infighting over economic and social policy, which in turn has resulted in diminishing public trust in political parties and new democratic institutions, an all-time low level of satisfaction with the government's performance and a significant rise in contentious politics, particularly between 2019 and 2021. The proliferation of microparties (209 registered political parties for a population of 11.8 million) has resulted in confusion among the electorate, while the economic reality of a suffocating international debt crisis, which has only been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, has rendered levels of public trust in government to an all-time low. At this pivotal moment, Tunisia and Egypt need a clear political plan that encompasses a framework for productive political competition and a sound economic vision.

To enter into the phase of democratic consolidation – defined as the moment of political, economic and societal stability when authoritarian rule begins to diminish – Tunisian elected authorities and the international community must address rising public demands, which emanate from across all socioeconomic classes, for wealth redistribution and sound fiscal policy reform. More effective and transparent public spending will alleviate issues of public trust in all aspects of governance. Reconstructing trust in new democratic institutions is key and also requires a concerted effort to build democracy from the bottom up, particularly in marginal and impoverished areas where socio-economic ills are deeply entrenched, and where political contention is rampant and highest.

CHAPTER 3

TUNISIA AND ARAB SPRING

Tunisia is located on the Mediterranean shoreline of North Africa, halfway between the Atlantic Ocean and the Nile Delta. It is flanked by Algeria on the west and Libya on the south east. Tunisia has incredible natural variety because of its north-south degree. Its east west degree is restricted. The nation has north, east and complex east to north drifts, including the bended Gulf of Gabès, which shapes the western aspect of Africa's Gulf of Sidra. The nation's geographic directions are 34°00'N 9°00'E (Ethnologue, 1999). Tunisia possesses a territory of 163,610 square kilometers, of which 8,250 are water. The head and solid waterways ascend in the north of the nation with a couple of prominent special cases from north-east Algeria and course through the northern plain where adequate precipitation underpins various plant spread and inundated farming. The majority of Tunisians (around 98%) are Muslims, with only about 2% practicing Christianity, Judaism, or other religions (*ibid*).

3.1. History of Tunisia

3.1.1. Ancient Tunisia

By around 8,000 BC, individuals lived in what is currently Tunisia by chasing and assembling. They began cultivating after around 5,000 BC, despite the fact that they used stone tools. At that point, from around 1100 BC, the Phoenicians, based in what is presently

Lebanon, settled and exchanged the region. In 814 BC, the Phoenicians established Carthage. Gradually this city got more grounded and, after 500 BC, Carthage became autonomous of Phoenicia. Besides assembling a realm in the Mediterranean, the Carthaginians clashed with Rome. The primary Punic War between Carthage and Rome started in 263 BC and went on until 241 BC. It finished with the Carthaginian destruction (Nelson, 1986).

A subsequent war continued in 218 BC. This time, Hannibal drove the military over the Alps into Italy, but he neglected Rome. Last, in 202, the Carthaginians were squashed by the Romans at the skirmish of Zama. A third war was battled somewhere in the range of 149 and 146 BC. This time, Carthage was obliterated. Anyway, the Romans later modified Carthage as a Roman city. Under Roman standards, Tunisia thrived and it traded grain and olive oil to different parts of the realm. Besides, numerous Romans got comfortable in the territory and exchange prospered (Calvocrecci, 2001).

Anyway, by the fifth century, the Roman Empire was disintegrating. The people called the Vandals had vanquished Spain. In 429, 80,000 Vandals drove by Genseric and crossed to North Africa. In 439, they captured Carthage and established a new realm. In the interim, the Roman Empire had parted into 2 parts, East and West. The Eastern half is known as the Byzantine Empire. In 533, the Byzantine Emperor Justinian sent a military under his overall Belisarius, which squashed the Vandals and took Carthage. The Byzantine principle in Tunisia endured till 698. In that year, the Arabs took Carthage. From the start, Arab Tunisia was administered by the Caliphs, yet in 800, Ibrahim ben el Aghlab was made inherited leader of the nation. Under the Aghlabid line, Tunisia thrived and exchange prospered (Calvocrecci, 2001).

3.1.2. Modern Tunisia

In 1574, Tunisia was vanquished by the Ottoman Turks. During the seventeenth, eighteenth and mid nineteenth hundreds, numerous Tunisians were privateers. They were called Barbary privateers. (The term Barbary is derived from the Berber language.) Every now and then, European forces made a move against the Barbary privateers. (for example, in 1655, the English Admiral Blake assaulted Porto Farina). The Europeans additionally blackmailed different arrangements, none of which finished the theft. In the interim, Turkish guidelines in Tunisia finished in 1705 when Hussain Ibn Ali started the Hussainid line. At that point in 1881, French soldiers entered Algeria and constrained the Tunisians to acknowledge a French protectorate (Brynen, 1995).

As the nineteenth century initiated, the nation stayed semi self-sufficient, albeit formally still an Ottoman region. Exchange with Europe expanded significantly with western vendors showing up to set up organizations in the nation. In 1861, Tunisia ordered the main constitution in the Arab world. However, a push toward a modernizing republic was hampered by the helpless economy and by political agitation. Credits made by outsiders to the administration were getting hard to oversee. In 1869, Tunisia pronounced itself bankrupt; a worldwide monetary commission, with agents from France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, assumed responsibility for the economy.

At first, Italy was the nation that showed the most craving to have Tunisia as a province, having speculation, residents and geographic nearness as inspiration. Anyway, this was rebuked when Britain and France co-worked to forestall this. During the years 1871–1878,

Britain supported the French invasion of Tunisia in exchange for territory over Cyprus. France actually had the issue of Italian impact (identified with the enormous settlement of Tunisian Italians who immigrated to Tunisia) and, in this manner, chose to discover a reason for a pre-emptive strike (Bellin, 2004; Brynen, 1995; see more Calvocrecci, 2001)).

In the spring of 1881, the French armed force invaded Tunisia, asserting that Tunisian soldiers had crossed the fringe to Algeria (France's essential state in Northern Africa). Italy, likewise keen on Tunisia, dissented, however, didn't hazard a battle with France. On May 12 of that year, Tunisia was authoritatively made a French protectorate with the mark of the settlement of Bardo (Al Qasr as Sa'id) by Muhammad III as-Sadiq. This gave France control of the Tunisian administration and made it an accepted French protectorate (Chomiak and Parks, 2019).

In 1911, civil squabbles erupted within the colleges. An ideological group was started, alIttihad al-Islami [Islamic Unity], which was favorable to Ottoman leanings. Issues concerning a Muslim graveyard, started huge exhibitions which finished with military law and the slaughtering of numerous Tunisians in late 1911. Further exhibitions in 1912 prompted the end of the patriot papers and the ousting of the patriot leadership.

Composed patriot notion among Tunisians, driven underground in 1912, reemerged after the Great War support came from a variety of sources, for example, the formation of the League of Nations in 1919. Patriots set up the Destour [Constitution] Party in 1920. Habib Bourguiba set up and drove its replacement, the Neo-Destour Party, in 1934. French specialists later restricted this new gathering, while the associations of the Tunisian Italians upheld it (Mussolini got the freedom of Bourghiba from a Vichy prison in 1942) (Lewis,

2002).

During World War II, the French experts in Tunisia upheld the Vichy government which controlled France after its capitulation to Germany in 1940. After beginning triumphs toward the east, the German General Erwin Rommel, lacking supplies and fortifications, in 1942 lost the definitive skirmish of al-Alamein (close to Alexandria in Egypt) to the British General Bernard Montgomery (Lewis, 2000).

In the wake of learning of Allied arrivals in the west (Operation Torch), the Axis armed forces withdrew toward the west to Tunisia and set up protective positions. The British, after behind him in the end, broke these lines, in spite of the fact that Rommel had some early accomplishments against the "green" American soldiers progressing from the west, until the appearance of General George Patton, who halted Rommel in the fight. The battle finished in May 1943. The German Afrika Corps gave up on May 11. After the breakdown of the fifth German Tank Army, the fall of Tunis, and the encirclement of the first Italian Army, which was actually hanging tight at Enfidaville, the Italian general Messe officially surrendered to the Allies two days later, on May 13 (Kort, 2002; Lewis, 1980; Lenczowski, 1980; Lewis, 2000; Marks and Omar, 2013).

After World War II, the battle for public autonomy proceeded and heightened. The Neo Destour Party reappeared under Habib Bourguiba. However, with an absence of progress, rough protection from French standards started in the mountains during 1954. The Tunisians were facilitated by autonomy developments in Algeria and Morocco, in spite of the fact that it was Tunisia that originally got free. Eventually, the Neo-Destour Party figured out how to pick up power for its kin by moving and finessing. Independence from

France was accomplished on March 20, 1956. The State was set up as a protected government with the Bey of Tunis, Muhammad VIII al-Amin Bey, as the lord of Tunisia (Lewis, 2000).

3.2. Political history of Tunisia

Tunisia was a constitutional republic, with a president acting as head of state, a leader acting as head of government, a bicameral parliament, and a court system influenced by the French civil war. Tunisia was officially a democracy with a multi-party framework, but the common Constitutional Democracy Rally (RCD), formerly Neo Destour, had ruled the country as one of the most abusive systems in the Arab World since its independence in 1956 (Heydemann, 2007).

Tunisia has experienced two periods of autocracy since its independence on March 20, 1956. The main period was under Habib Bourguiba, the established father of autonomy and present day Tunisia, from 1956-1987. Habib Bourguiba built the state and the monetary system without any planning, separated religion from the state, and built the economy with sweeping changes (Lewis, 2002).

President Ben Ali, beforehand Habib Bourguiba's (Tunisian legislator, the Founder and the main President of the Republic of Tunisia from July 25, 1957 to November 7, 1987) served as a military figure, held office from 1987 to 2011, agreed to be the leader of office of Habib Bourguiba after a group of clinical specialists judged Bourguiba ill-suited to practice the elements of the workplace as per Article 57 of the Tunisian constitution (The New York Times. (1987, November 07).). He was reliably reappointed in each election, the last being October 25, 2009.

The President's Constitutional Democratic Rally, or then again RCD (French shortened form), had reliably won vast dominant parts in nearby and parliamentary elections. Since 1987, Tunisia has officially transformed its political framework a few times, abrogating life administration and opening up the parliament to resistance groups. Allegations were made against the old system, blaming the administration for being corrupt with undermined individuals from the Trabelsi family (the group of Ben Ali's subsequent spouse, Leiba) controlling a great part of the business area in the country (Aidan, 2012)

3.2.1. The Era of Habib Bourguiba:

In 1957, Prime Minister Habib Bourguiba (Habib Abu Ruqaiba) resigned and established his Neo Destour (New Constitution) party. The system tried to run a carefully organized system with productive and impartial state activities, yet not democratic-style governmental issues (Brody-Barre, 2013). The bey, a semi-monarchist foundation based on Ottoman principles, also came to an end. At that point, Bourguiba started to rule the nation for the following 31 years, administering insightful projects yielding strength and financial advancement, quelling Islamic fundamentalism, and setting up rights for ladies unequaled by some other Arab nations. The vision at Bourguiba offered was of a Tunisian republic. Bourguiba at that point saw an eccentric, mixed future joining convention and advancement, Islam with a liberal prosperity (Zubaidah, 2013).

"Bourguibism" was also faithfully anti-military, arguing that Tunisia would never be a reliable military force and that the establishment of a massive military foundation would eat up scarce speculation assets and possibly push Tunisia into the patterns of military

mediation in legislative issues that afflicted the rest of the Middle East. Bourguiba nationalized various strict land property and destroyed a few strict institutions in order to achieve a financial turn of events. In view of Cavatorta (2010), Bourguiba's extraordinary resource was (Tunisia had an experienced patriot association) the Neo Destour Party. It had put forth its defense to the city laborers in the advanced economy and to national society in the customary economy; it had great pioneers who deserved admiration and, for the most part, created sensible government programs (Middle East Critique, 2010).

One genuine opponent to Habib Bourguiba was Salah Ben Yusuf. He was imprisoned in Cairo in the mid-1950s after consuming the container Arab patriotism associated with Egypt's president, Gamal Abdul Nasser. However, because of his solid resistance to the Neo Destour authority during their dealings with France for self-sufficiency preceding autonomy, Ben Youssef was eliminated from his situation as secretary-general and removed from the gathering (Cavatorta, 2010).

Communism was not at first a significant aspect of the Neo Destour venture, but the administration had consistently held and actualized redistributive strategies. An enormous public works program was dispatched in 1961. Nonetheless, in 1964, Tunisia entered a fleeting communist period. The Neo Destour party turned into the Socialist Destour (Parti Socialiste Destourien or PSD), and the new clergyman of arranging, Ahmed Ben Salah, defined a state-drove plan for agrarian cooperatives and public-area industrialization.

The communist examination raised extensive resistance inside Bourguiba's old alliance. Ahmed Ben Salah was inevitably excused in 1970, and many mingled activities (e.g., the homestead cooperatives) were gotten back to private possession in the mid-1970s. The

administration used its powers of murdering handfuls to put a stop to a general strike in 1978, and association pioneers were imprisoned.

After autonomy, the Tunisian monetary approach had been fundamentally to advance the light industry and the travel industry, and build up its phosphate stores. The significant area remained horticulture with little homesteads winning, but these didn't create well. In the mid-1960s, the economy eased back down, yet the communist program didn't end up being the fix. During the 1970s, the economy of Tunisia extended at a sound rate. Oil was found, and the travel industry proceeded. City and field populaces attracted generally equivalent numbers. However, agrarian issues and metropolitan joblessness prompted an expanded movement to Europe (Lewis, 2000; Lewis, 2002).

3.2.2. Ben Ali and His Regime

After the attending physician to the former president filed an official medical report declaring Habib Bourguiba medically incapacitated and unable to fulfill the duties of the presidency, Ben Ali ascended to the office of President. This was on November 7th, 1987 and done in accordance with article 57 of the Tunisian constitution (TUNISIA CONSTITUTION, Chapter 3). Two of the names were given to Ben Ali's rise to the presidency in "the medical coup d'état" and the Jasmine Revolution.

Ben Ali promised a gradual transition towards democracy, though in his first two presidential polls – in 1989 and 1994-he was elected unopposed. From 1990 onward, the country's average rate of growth per capita fluctuated between 3.5 to 7 percent (El-May,

2008). During Nicolas Sarkozy's (former French president) visit in 2008, he was made an honorary citizen of Tunis and praised the Ben Ali government for expanding liberties in Tunisia (World News, 2008). When multi-party presidential elections were introduced in 1999, they were still one-side affairs, with Ben Ali winning huge majorities (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). After amending the constitution to allow a president to run for three consecutive terms, Ben Ali was re-elected in 1999, 2004, and 2009—each time by implausibly high margins (BBC News, 2011).

Under Ben Ali's rule, Tunisia saw steady economic growth. It was praised for a progressive stance on women's rights and for economic reforms, but unemployment among a swelling population of young people remained high, and large sections of the Tunisian interior remained poor (Mansar, 2009). By the dawn of the 21st century, Ben Ali was reckoned as leading one of the most repressive regimes in the world. His regime consistently gained poor ratings from human rights and press freedom agencies (Bellin, 2004). Bourguiba had left a country free of corruption, whereas in the 23 years of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's rule, his family and his wife Leila Trabesi's family stole at least 2 percent of the country's growth. The World Bank estimated that Tunisia's growth rate could be 2 or 3 percent points and higher if corruption and nepotism were removed. Starting in December 2010, Tunisian citizens began mass protest against unemployment and Ben Ali's corruption (Mabrouk, 2011).

3.3. Jasmine Revolution

The historical backdrop of the Jasmine Revolution needs to start toward the beginning of Ben Ali's administration. Ben Ali's upset in 1987 was essential for a bigger development in the last part of the 1980s to change the political frameworks of the Middle East. At an opportune time, his bureau advanced the holiness of basic liberties, democracy, and law. Ben Ali's changes in the primary year of his administration included conceding reprieve to a great many political detainees and the approval of the UN show on torment. He was seen globally as advancing the working class and opening up Tunisia to the worldwide travel industry, a dynamic aspect of their economy. His supportive of Western demeanor and open-market neighborly way to deal with strategy toward the beginning of his initial term made him a well-known president universally. The wedding trip of his initial years in office didn't last. Locally, his common approaches were driving Islamists underground and denying any contribution to political life.

During the 1989 elections, Ben Ali wouldn't recognize Hisb Ennahda, later the Renaissance Party, the biggest Islamic association in the nation. This renunciation highlighted the growing gap between Ben Ali's common arrangements and the developing Islamist populace, as fights erupted not long after his gathering won every get together seat. Suppression strategies followed, with late night attacks and searches becoming basic in Tunis in the mid-90s. By 1992, resistance constraint strategies included controlling the press, reconnaissance and telephone tapping, identification seizures, beatings, and a few deaths of well-known Islamist pioneers (Alexander 1997, 35-6).

The Jasmine revolution is the name given to the revolution which is going on in Tunisia. This is a dissent driven by the individuals of Tunisia against the neighborhood government driven by Ben Ali, the president. This dissent arose primarily as a result of issues such as high rates of unemployment, food inflation, financial stagflation, and defilement; a lack of articulation and political opportunities; and helpless everyday environments (Spancer, 2011).

3.3.1. Major Causes of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia

3.3.1.1. Economic Crises

Generally speaking, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a long way from being financially homogeneous. Nations in this region differ greatly in terms of both their degrees of monetary turn of events and their financial structures. It is not difficult to see how GDP per capita in oil-producing countries is two to ten times higher than in the rest of the world (with Israel being an outlier) (Hirschman, 1997). Barring Libya, the advancement levels of North African nations are lower than the territorial normal. Prior to 1950, North African nations were among the world's most un-created states. During the 1960s and 1970s, they encountered continued monetary development, in light of a high pace of interest in physical capital (Yousef, 2004).

Somewhere in the range between 1960 and 2010, the pace of GDP development has been generally high: around 5 percent in Egypt and Tunisia, 4 percent in Morocco and 3.4 percent in Algeria. Due to the continued segment dynamic, the development pace of GDP per occupant has, nonetheless, been sub-par. Over the most recent 15 years, development rates have been somewhat higher than those during the period 1960-2010 (DEVCO, 2017).

During the worldwide emergency of 2008-2010, development decelerated; by the way, total and per capita earnings have kept on expanding, in spite of the fact that at a moderate movement (EU COM, 2014).

Since the mid-1990s, North African nations, under the support of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have executed a progression of changes pointed toward expanding the level of worldwide receptiveness and the advancement of certain areas (Dasandi et.al, 2019; Krisch, et.al, 2017; EU, 2018). Except for Libya, these nations have privatized differing public undertakings, diminished state impedance in the money related and banking areas, improved financial and financial strategies, and disentangled work market guidelines (Rashid, 2008).

These endeavors have, notwithstanding, created unassuming impacts with respect to the allure of the districts: FDI inflows in North Africa have spoken to, indeed, a small portion of the streams towards the agricultural nations. Considering the compression dictated by the worldwide emergency, and the nearby political unsteadiness, in 2010 North Africa pulled in 1.2 percent of worldwide FDI inflows, which is, however, strikingly higher than that of earlier years when the figure was 0.2 percent (Pritchert and Worker, 2012).

It is plausible that both the changes that improved the business climate in certain nations, especially Egypt, and their attachment to the peaceful accords with respect to the Mediterranean bowl (Barcelona) and, all the more explicitly, the North Africa area (Agadir) have added to this exhibition (Péridy, 2007). All the more, as of late, business associations set up with the USA (Morocco), China (Libya and Egypt) and with Middle Eastern and

developing nations have all contributed altogether to advancing fares outside conventional European objections (Vanheukelom, 2012).

A more prominent worldwide transparency produces benefits yet additionally opens economies to more serious dangers of viruses in case of a global emergency. The worldwide emergency hit the economies of the Maghreb both in the more 'powerful' areas, through the fall in oil costs, for crude materials, and the drop in the travel industry, and in the more 'delicate' area, that is fabricating (Behr, 2012). The critical drop in oil prices – such a drop between the late spring of 2008 and the first long stretches of 2009 – directly affected sending out nations, for example, Algeria and Libya, and had indirect consequences for other nations in the region, because of the decrease in capital flow and traveler settlements in the oil delivering nations (Byiers and Vanheukelom, 2009).

During the crisis, global interest in manufactured goods, particularly in Europe and America, has declined or been re-oriented toward Asian production. As of now, somewhere in the range of 2008 and 2009 – the most recent figures accessible-the fall in trade was, in genuine terms, near 14 percent in Egypt and Morocco, 3 percent in Algeria and Tunisia (Capacity4Dev Team, 2012-13). The drop turns out to be more critical whenever communicated at current quality, in order to mirror the incomes created by trade.

The most elevated abatements were recorded in Algeria (-21%) and Libya (-28%), which are moderately secured by a steady interest in characteristic assets and, together, profoundly powerless against value instability. The drop in new interest produced a stoppage in development rates. This impact has been declined by the fall of settlements from travelers who in their host nations (Europe, Persian Gulf nations) speak to the

humblest and most weak gathering of laborers, exceptionally presented with the impacts of the worldwide emergency as far as loss of work and wages.

Agreeing with the March 2011 report from the National Lawyers Guild (US), Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers (UK) and Mazlumder (Turkey), the Tunisian revolutionaries were prodded on to rampage by endemic destitution, rising food costs, and constant joblessness (Rouine, 2020). Regardless of its monetary development and macroeconomic execution in the mid-2000s, nonetheless, Tunisia is a perplexing case, with a fragile authoritarian deal occurring between the system and society (Nash, et al, 2020).

For quite a while, the system had the option to give monetary and social additions to huge assessments of the populace and secure its authenticity and political soundness consequently. The authoritarian deal notwithstanding, had separated because of the developing failure of the economy to make occupations for informed work, the multiplication of ineffectively paid positions in the casual area, and the rising pay imbalance and provincial differences (Achy 2011: 5).

Indeed, the European downturn in 2009 influenced the Tunisian economy, creating a diminishing in fares and lower development in administrations (Arieff 2012: 34; Honig, 2018; Faust, et al, 2016). The Euro-zone emergency kept on fueling in 2010, which further declined the travel industry's incomes and shut down both neighborhood and unfamiliar organizations as the global credit crunch proceeded. Before the revolution, the joblessness emergency in Tunisia had guaranteed its casualties for quite a while, for the most part among youth and college graduates because of the financial shakiness (Haouas et al 2012).

This announcement is upheld by Driss (2011: 21-22) by demonstrating the effect of the monetary emergency which prompted the rebels against the system. The decrease in spending power, rising costs, developing family obligation, elevated levels of joblessness, especially youth joblessness (23%) and youthful alumni joblessness (37%) were among the issues looked at by Tunisians because of terrible monetary strategies. Furthermore, for young alumni, joblessness is frequently accompanied by a sense of wrongdoing, as well as their perception that jobs are frequently assigned in a straightforward manner, and that defilement and bias are deciding factors in getting work.

It has become something a long way from amazing when Tsai (2012: 187) claims that high joblessness has been a reliable issue in Tunisia for more than twenty years. As Driss (2011) has pointed out, these elements were unquestionably the engines of dissent development in Tunisia that drove the system to collapse. Monetary complaints, with joblessness at the bleeding edge, were at the core of the revolution (Chang 2012: 175).

3.1.1.2. Corruption

One of the primary drivers of government outrage is the unity and nepotism rehearsed by Ben Ali's family. The individuals from Trabeshi's family control a dominant part of monetary resources in nearly all areas in Tunisia, for example, banks, protection, conveyance, transportation, the travel industry, and genuine property. They aren't just held just in Tunisia, yet also in far off nations such as France, Switzerland, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates.

Corruption is a destabilizing power in Tunisia, contaminating all degrees of its economy, security, and political framework. Once firmly controlled under previous president Zine

elAbidine Ben Ali, corruption has now become endemic, with ordinary residents participating in and profiting from degenerate practices (Ang, Y.Y, 2020). Tunisia's high levels of public corruption enabled a massive concentration of wealth at the top, exacerbating disparity.

Richard Joseph authored the term pre-bendalism to portray the authorities' apportionment of public office. Such authorities see public office as close to home property implied for private advantage or the administering of support (Joseph). Ben Ali's system was characterized by thin pre-bendalism, in which benefits were granted to an undeniably small circle of relatives, most notably the more distant family of his subsequent wife, Leila Ben Ali. In 2009, for example, the winner and sprinter up of a state closeout for Tunisia's third cell phone permit were the two organizations claimed by Ben Ali's daughters' spouses.

Moreover, the nearby vendors of Fiat, Ford, Jaguar, Volkswagen, Audi, Seat, Land Rover, Hummer, Porsche and Mercedes were completely possessed by either similar two previously mentioned family members or by Leila Ben Ali's siblings (Noueihed and Warren, 2012). Belhassen Trabelsi, one of Leila's 10 known kin, was the proprietor of a carrier, a few lodgings, one of Tunisia's two private radio broadcasts, vehicle gathering plans, Ford appropriation, a land organization and then some. In a July 2009 political link, the U.S. Envoy to Tunisia acknowledged that the rise in corruption of Ben Ali's internal hover remained a stark contrast to the developing imbalances, which jeopardized the system's long-term solidity ("Viewing link 08TUNIS679").

The profoundly degenerated internal circle and preference toward more distant family individuals expanded the grouping of abundance in the possession of a couple. This

prebendarist¹, customized economy rose above high-level occurrences and created a culture and framework that encouraged corruption. The presence of a heap of various permits to operate and send out endorsements permitted the system to give specific support to followers. Furthermore, the system frequently purposefully ignored the tax avoidance practices of small, unsophisticated businesses. The absence of brought together duty assortment permitted nearby authorities to blackmail pay-offs from these microenterprises that were generally untaxed and immaculate by the government. Critically, the Ben Ali system was known for its dominance of utilizing government-supported nongovernmental associations (Weitzman, 2011).

Such associations, such as Leila Ben Ali's supported Bessma Society for the Handicapped, allowed the legislature to offer social assistance and favors in exchange for system assistance. Tax avoidance, pay off coercion and an organization of support conceding NGOs made an inescapable culture of clientalism and pre-bendalism. A significant wellspring of the economy, mining, speaks to the association between pre-bendalism and financial disparity (Andreoni, et.al. 2019).

¹ Prebendalism refers to political systems where elected officials and government workers feel they have a right to a share of government revenues, and use them to benefit their supporters, co-religionists and members of their ethnic group.

In 2008, corruption in the system's portion of occupations, such as close to home kindness in the Gafsa Phosphate Company, prompted strikes and a half-year of road battles, with security forces inevitably laying attacks on Gafsa. Continuing fights during Ennahda's standard over corruption in the mining industry suggest that pre-bendalism is a state-level issue rather than a government-level issue. In February 2014, 60 farming specialists, some of them old laborers without contracts, went on strike to keep phosphates from leaving plants in Redeyef, central Tunisia (Andreoni, et.al. 2019).

These laborers, and others in Gafsa, blamed Ennahda for making arrangements based on political dependability to the state-run Gafsa Phosphate Company. Mining-rich zones, tormented by higher joblessness rates when contrasted with the waterfront area, outline the effect of corruption on local inequalities. The provincial imbalances and discontent in the mining business speak to a genuine test for Tunisia's economy during a crucial season of democratic union. Tunisia is the world's second biggest maker and driving exporter of trisodium phosphate, with 21.7 percent of worldwide creation and 31.2 percent of worldwide fares ("Tunisia Economic Outlook"). Nonetheless, the cost of phosphate keeps on declining from its pinnacle of \$430 per metric ton in September 2008 to \$103 in February 2014 ("Rock Phosphate Monthly Price").

Not only is the price of phosphate falling, but labor strikes in the phosphate-rich Gafsa district and central Tunisia have also reduced output. Slowdowns because of strikes have diminished yield from a yearly normal of 7.5 million tons before the 2011 revolution, to 3.3 million every 2013. Work strikes and stoppages have decreased deals in a significant industry for Tunisia's inland economy. The declining execution of the fundamental

phosphate industry represents a genuine test of Tunisia's possibilities for diminishing discontent and brutality during a crucial season of democratic solidification (Bossuyt, 2013).

3.3.2. Political Causes

Since Ben Ali's ascent to control in 1987, Tunisia's fake security has been guaranteed at the expense of profound political relapse. Long term, the country was home to one of the most oppressive and authoritarian systems in the region, which undermined Ben Ali's political legitimacy until 14 January 2011. The system appears to have efficient political suppression through far reaching infringement of basic liberties, corruption at different levels and the absence of political opportunity (Ayadi et. al. 2011: 2).

As asserted by Ayeb (2011: 468), Tunisia had a sort of total autocracy with an innovator face. He contends that the main source of the fall of the Ben Ali system was its ruthless decision nature. All likely spaces for articulation, for example, the media, research focuses and civil society associations were shut down during his period. In the interim, Bishara has called attention to that Tunisia was a system which left no space for people or substances to intervene between individuals and the state. The security device performed admirably in protecting the Ben Ali system from open defiance and obstruction, including from members of resistance groups.

There was no opportunity for the press. The couple of ideological groups that were endured would not have been endured on the off chance that they had assembled more than three percent of the votes. The system does not only regard human and civil rights, yet it likewise utilizes powers to efficiently stomp on them (Bishara 2011: 5).

The 'political police', authoritatively the State Security Department, fill in as the implementers of Ben Ali's tenet of political authenticity. As detailed by Machado (2012: 155), the techniques for political police resembled those of the mafia, yet instilled with the assets and authority of a country grabbing, coercion, even torment and undoubtedly murder-the plausible destiny of the numerous political detainees who 'vanished' throughout the long term.

Aside from that, one of the issues concerning political authenticity during the revolution was the extraordinary pomposity of Ben Ali, his family and his administration. Ben Ali himself began to turn out to be progressively withdrawn, was being threatening to reactions and all the more close-disapproved, as some had noted, at the start of 2005. All political choices were made by him. Aside from that, his family's nepotism, particularly his better half, Leila Trabelsi, was a major source of opposition to the government's actions. The individuals from the 'Trabelsi faction' held a significant portion of advantages in the nation in all areas of the economy, going from banks, protection, dispersion, transport, the travel industry and property. As indicated by El-May (2012: 57), in the 23 years of Ben Ali's standard, his family took at any rate two percent of the Tunisian development.

This over centralization and maltreatment of intensity imply that the state's authenticity has declined impressively subsequently, opening the space for mass revolution against tyranny as happened in the past floods of democratization in a few European and South American states, thinking back to the 1970-1990s (Hinnebusch, 2006). The way that a huge number of Tunisians crashed into the roads to communicate their complaints, uncovered the degree

to which the Tunisian populace no longer felt that their formal political framework was receptive to their requests (Hamblin 2012: 93).

3.3.2.1. Shrinking Press Freedom

Firmly connected to democracy, the opportunity of articulation and the opportunity of the press structure a resolute entirety. The majority of the set up popular governments will in general profit by working in open arenas; spaces for equivalent, comprehensive, objective, and free pondering. For Habermas, the press is the open arena's most conspicuous organization (Calhoun 1992). As indicated by him, pondering discovers its material space in the media where participating in broad daylight and basic discussion is conceivable.

For more than 23 years, Tunisians couldn't do this. Stifling individual flexibilities, Ben Ali's system had a total hold over the conventional media and, in later years, the Internet. During those long stretches of tyranny, a few NGOs, for example, Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF), Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, consistently censured the various basic liberties infringements submitted by the Tunisian system. This situation is the characteristic perfection of long stretches of bracing down on basic voices. Scarcely any nation, confronting more monetary and security issues, forces less limitations on their media (Anderson, 2011). Parties and free newspapers grew in importance in the late 1970s, while government-supporting media declined.

However, that force didn't endure past the mid-1990s. Tunisia is portrayed as one of the harshest systems by common liberties guard dogs (Tunisia Country Report, 2014). Foreign columnists have named Ben Ali as the main "Hunter of Press Freedom." The private media was only claimed as well as overwhelmed by Ben Ali's internal circle. A gathering of

supportive of government columnists has held onto control of Tunisia's writer association (SNJT). Unfamiliar media are prohibited, and the couple of columnists who irregularly visit the nation are firmly controlled.

In 2005, just before the World Summit on Information Society in Tunis, Christophe Boltanski, a journalist with the French Day *Libération*, was beaten and cut. His associate, Florence Beaugé, from *Le Monde*, was more fortunate on the grounds that she had just halted at the Tunis air terminal and removed from the nation hours before the 2009 official election. As indicated by the RSF's Press Freedom Index, Tunisia has a long picture of limitations on the privileges of articulation and press.

A report from the International Federation of Journalists asserts that, from May 2009 to May 2010, the press confronted "one of its most exceedingly awful years since autonomy" (IFJ, 2012). Neighborhood TV slots are governed by state-run TV, and the Internet is similarly governed by the administration. Tunisia's rank continued dropping from 2002 onwards, until in 2010 it arrived at its most minimal position: 164th spot. The NGO likewise appraised Tunisia as a 'Foe of the Internet' for more than five continuous years (RSF, 2010). Numerous onlookers were persuaded that what lay behind these limitations was the conviction of the system in the significance of a free media for democracy. At the point when fights broke out in December, the system's first impulse was to heighten its restrictions and terrorize the media.

Oussama Romdhani, the president's personal interpreter and correspondence service, is accused of inflicting a total news power outage on the social mobs in Sidi Bouzid, which quickly spread to other areas. He followed through on an extremely hefty cost when Ben

Ali supplanted him in an administration reshuffle; however, it is far-fetched that he could singularly have taken such measures. Despite the fact that Ben Ali's system spends a lot of money on advertising to improve its image, it loses credibility because it lacks the ability to move toward political transparency and trustworthiness. Tunisia, on the other hand, has one of the most noticeably poor basic liberties records in the region, and opportunities don't appear to be forthcoming for some time. What's more, while coming to an end, the undemocratic Tunisia's decision elite simply continues smothering contradicting voices (Natsios, 2010).

3.3.3. Protests

The protest was incited by the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi on December seventeenth, 2010 (BBC News, 2011). Since he was unable to secure a position, his chariot, where he sold vegetables and natural products without a permit, had been seized. He had no other source of income for his family. He consumed himself before the territorial government central command in the wake of being embarrassed by a female metropolitan authority on that day. Because of Bouazizi's emotional demonstration, individuals began precipitously protesting in the city. The system's reaction to this development was fourteen days of police restraints.

Towards the end of the week, a few hundred teenagers smashed windows, damaged vehicles, and clashed with revolt police in Sidi Bouzid, about 200 kilometers south-west of Tunis. Allegedly, many young people defied police who utilized nerve gas to attempt to scatter them (The Observers, 2012). Numerous days after the fact, a couple of men and the graduate ended it all, as a result of joblessness and business obligation identified with

government programs (Sadiki, 2012). On December 24, during the protest, Mohammed Amari was shot and murdered by the cops. Another ten individuals were harmed. A huge exhibit was held in Tunis on December 28 at the base camp of the General Union of Tunisian Workers (Bajpai, 2013).

The fast spread of development in all the urban communities of the republic was conceivable because of online media (predominantly Facebook) and the web when all that is said is done. 20% of ten million Tunisians have a Facebook account (El-May, 2013). Individuals were sharing stories and photographs about the decision family, such as their abundance and way of life, on social media. Also, inside the days, the thoughts that characterized the development changed from straightforward interest, for example, "Pride, work, and opportunity" to "Ben Ali Out!" The uprising didn't, notwithstanding, have a political figure to unite behind as another option. (Ian Black, 2010)

On 13 January 2011, Ben Ali pronounced in a discourse, that everything would be transformed; he would frame an Anti-corruption Committee and resign toward the end of his command in 2014. (El-May, 2013) After he gave his discourse, the worldwide network saw that there were backwards assessments among some Tunisian individuals who acknowledged giving him a period, but other people who didn't. The next days, hundreds of individuals went to the road and yelled against the administration. That is the first run through in the Arab World; a despot is obviously approached to "Disappear" and was told the "Game Is Over." (Bajpai, 2013)

On January 13, 2011, Ben Ali asked the military boss Rachid Ammar to shoot protesters partaking in the protest. As per neighborhood media, the armed force boss is making

arrangements for the activity. During these functions, the Tunisian armed force exhibited a case of control and "conservative conduct," acting within the limits of constitutional rights (IDEAS Report, n.d.).

The military wouldn't utilize power against the demonstrators and even put tanks among demonstrators and police so as to shield individuals from police powers. The military informed the President on January 14 that he would be advised to leave. The military boss, General Ammar, guaranteed the safety of demonstrators, that the military would be the Guarantor of the Revolution (Bajpai, 2013). Ben Ali left his office at 5 p.m. on 14 January without leaving. He'd flown out of Tunisia, but his better half refused to let him on the plane.

The Tunisian government's reaction to the protests pulled in worldwide analysis when many protesters were slaughtered in conflicts with police. In the midst of allegations of utilization of unnecessary power, Ben Ali excused the priest of the inside, Rafik Belhaj Kacem, and pledged to set up an insightful panel to look at the administration's reaction to the emergency. Be that as it may, conflicts between police and protesters proceeded and spread to the capital, where the legislature conveyed troops to control the agitation. Since previous attempts to control the revolting had failed, Ben Ali appeared on public television on January 13 and made more extensive concessions to the resistance, vowing not to seek another term as president when his term expired in 2014. He expressed sorrow over the deaths of protesters and promised to get police to stop using live fire except in self-defense. Tending to a portion of the protesters' complaints, he said he would reduce food costs and release limitations on Internet use.

Nonetheless, Ben Ali's concessions did not satisfy the protesters, who continued to clash with security forces, resulting in a few deaths. On January 14, a highly sensitive situation was announced, and Tunisian state media detailed that the legislature had been broken down and that authoritative elections would be held in the next year. That declaration also failed to quell unrest, and Ben Ali stepped down as president, leaving the country (Joffe, 2011). The leader, Mohamed Ghannouchi, expected force. The next day, Ghannouchi was supplanted as president by Fouad Mebazaa, the previous speaker of the lower place of the Tunisian parliament. Both were individuals from Ben Ali's ideological group, the Democratic Constitutional Rally (French: Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique; RCD).

Turmoil waited in Tunisia in the days after Ben Ali's takeoff. Protests proceeded, with many protesting the investment of RCD legislators by the government. There were likewise inconsistent flare-ups of viciousness that numerous Tunisians credited to Ben Ali's followers endeavoring to plant tumult in the nation. On January 17, Ghannouchi, indeed going about as PM, reported the arrangement of another solidarity government that joined a few resistance figures in bureau posts closed by a few sitting clergymen from the Ben Ali system.

Ghannouchi safeguarded the presence of pastors from the past system in the new government, saying that the priests had not partaken in Ben Ali's endeavors to viciously smother protests. He additionally declared that the government would act rapidly to safeguard financial solidness and to build up political opportunity in Tunisia, delivering political detainees and wiping out media restrictions. The following day, however, the

eventual fate of the interval government appeared to be in jeopardy when some of the bureau's new clergymen from resistance groups surrendered due to new road protests over the consideration of pastors from the previous system.

Mebazaa, Ghannouchi, and the between-time government's bureau priests who had served under Ben Ali all distanced themselves from the RCD, attempting to signal a break with the past. The interim government announced yet another set of changes, lifting Ben Ali's restrictions on resistance ideological groups and granting amnesty to all political detainees. In February, the administration authoritatively suspended all RCD exercises.

The evident accomplishment of the mainstream uprising in Tunisia motivated comparative developments in various other North African and Middle Eastern nations, giving occasion to feel qualms about the solidness of a portion of the area's longest-standing systems (Anderson, 2006). In the weeks following the uprising in Tunisia, nations including Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Yemen, Iran, Bahrain, Syria, and Libya experienced noteworthy mass shows requesting political change.

3.4. Political Reforms in Tunisia after Arab Spring

3.4.1. Elections and Political Parties

Ideological groups have since quite a while ago battled to pick up a foothold in the Arab world because of various hindering elements, among them an intense blend of constraint and government co-optation. However, it is not necessarily the case that the area needed suitable resistance powers. Islamist developments—the vast majority of which are branches or relatives of the Muslim Brotherhood—have after some time combined their situation as driving political entertainers in the district (Merminod and Tim, 2013).

However, such developments are a long way from conventional, Western style parties. Most ideological groups, on the whole, don't double as states within states, with equal organizations of mosques, facilities, banks, organizations, childcare centers, and even Boy Scout troops. Islamist parties do. It was their prolonged emphasis on education and social assistance arrangement—rather than on challenging elections—that eventually propelled Islamist developments, and later their related gatherings, to political prominence (Cenciarell, 2015).

In the 1959 constitution, one of the prerequisites of democracy was accessible (UNPAN, 1991) reasonable and free elections. Notwithstanding, both the Bourguiba and Ben Ali systems were authoritarian in the mask of "reasonable and free democratic". The aftereffects of the elections were not dependable, and most Tunisians quit any pretense of

deciding in favor of this explanation. A Majoritarian elective framework was being utilized for the decision party Neo-Dustur (Angrist, 1999). This framework created disproportional outcomes for the circulation of the seats in parliament for a long time. In any case, after the Jasmine revolution, things have changed quickly.

Since January 2011, the rising ideological group scene has been dynamic. Around 107 new ideological groups were certified after the revolution; eight previously existed before (AlAnani, 2012). Different gathering alliances and collusions were fabricated, separated once more, reconfigured, and changed their names, targets and methodologies various times.

The public enthusiasm for the democratic surveys of October 28 for the constituent get together was somewhat high. 90% of the electors went to the surveys (Ulutas and Torlak, 2011). The Election Board, as well as the perceptions of numerous global affiliations and governments, including the Turkish Foreign Ministry, heavily influenced the execution of the elections.

Aside from the late arrival of the outcomes, everything went straightforwardly during the elections (Turkish Foreign Ministry, 2011). It tends to be gainful to manage the four major ideological groups quickly:

1. Ennahda Party. Moderate Islamist or focal right gathering, which is composed of the base of people in general under the administration of Ghanouchi. The gathering advances a democratic framework with a conservative system, and the equity of Islam.

2. Congress Party for the Republic. Common development, focal radical gathering.

Advances in the dissemination of assets, social equity and free media fortify democracy.

3. Requests of the Public Party. Established in Ennahda, yet isolated in 1992.

Promotes a democratic constitution, fundamental freedoms, and a formal framework.

4. Democratic Forum Party. As a member of the Socialist International, I am a social

liberal and a member of the common gathering. Advances in the new system finish the old system and support secularism, equity in organization, citizenship rights, and opportunity for the media (Ulutas and Torlak, 2011).

Regardless, the time government was not widely supported, as protestors were dissatisfied with the lack of significant change in the months following the uprising. Doubt stayed between dissidents (secularists) and Islamists, as the two sides accepted that they held the way to securing the beliefs of a prosperous Tunisia (Allani, 2013). In any case, they requested another constitution be drafted and Ghannouchi's legislature be supplanted. On February 27, 2011, Beji Caid Essebsi took over as brief head administrator after Mohamed Ghannouchi and his legislature surrendered. He zeroed in on shaping an administration liberated from the harsh belief systems of Ben Ali (Brody-Barre, 2013: 211-230).

In April 2011, the Essebsi set up a conventional system or the democratic transition, settling on a mainstream election that would choose individuals from a constituent gathering and just not arranging an official election at an opportune time. This guaranteed that Tunisia

would be initially represented by agreement through the constituent get together, making more prominent collaboration and goals of a prosperous Tunisia. Regardless, they requested another constitution be drafted and Ghannouchi's legislature be supplanted.

Tunisia's discretionary arrangement has one-round relative portrayal elections, implying that any single gathering increasing a total lion's share was improbable at the time, particularly with the reappearance of resistance ideological groups following the end of Ben Ali's abusive strategies. The Progressive Democratic Party, one of the main residual gatherings that had connections to the old system, scarcely got any votes (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014: 994). The Ennahda Party won 89 seats out of 217 in the gathering and accordingly was made to frame an alliance with two mainstream parties: the Congrès pour la République, a middle left ideological group, and Ettakol, a social democratic faction, together called "Carriage" (El Sharnoubi, 2012).

Ennahda's Hamadi Jebali became PM, Congrès' Moncef Marzouki became president, and Ettakol's Mustapha Ben Jaffar turned into the speaker of the gathering (Ghanem, 2016: 23). Ennahda's appointive achievement in 2011 was grounded in its boss grassroots assembly and its picture as a principled adversary of the previous system. Notwithstanding, once in power, the gathering attempted to oversee in the midst of financial and security challenges.

Nidaa Tounes was established in 2012 to mobilize secularist resistance to the Ennahda drove government. In a multicandidate challenge in November 2014, Caïd Essebsi came in first with 39% of the vote, trailed by Marzouki, who won 33%, regardless of the way that his Congress for the Republic (CPR) party had won just four seats in parliament (2%). Caïd Essebsi won a December run-off against Marzouki with 56% of votes (Angrist, 2013).

Although both Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda have public voting demographics, the discretionary results also revealed a suffering provincial divide among the electorate. Nidaa Tounes won greater parts in the vast majority of the metropolitan locale along the northern coast, while Ennahda and Marzouki came in first in a great part of the south and inside (Wolf, 2014; Angrist, 2013).

In January 2015, Nidaa Tounes proposed a bureau that included just a single other significant gathering, the Free Patriotic Union (UPL after its French abbreviation). The UPL was established by Slim Riahi, a rich money manager and soccer club proprietor, and has minimal evident philosophical support. Ennahda and other significant gatherings flagged that they would cast a ballot against affirmation, driving Nidaa Tounes to propose a more expansive based alliance (Laurence, 2015).

The new alliance and bureau, approved by parliament in February 2015, include the UPL, the secularist party Afek Tounes ("Tunisia Horizons"), which has emphasized market radicalism and youth administration, and Ennahda, which was given the Ministry of Employment and three junior positions. The key services of inside, guard, and equity were gone by free thinkers thought about near Nidaa Tounes (Marzouki, 2015).

During that time, secularists regularly contended that the development was looking to drag out its hang on power, support strictly moderate social change, and exercise hardliner command over state organizations. Ennahda pioneers, as far as it matters to them, highlighted their rehashed readiness to make concessions to secularists—for instance, not supporting a reference to sharia in the new constitution, and consenting to venture down from the legislature in 2014—in any event, when such choices infuriated the gathering's

base. Ennahda pioneers keep on reprimanding what they see as secularists' endeavors to banish religion from public life, and seem to expect that secularists may look to control the appointive or political cycle to bar them from government (Amrani, 2015).

Not the entirety of Tunisia's Islamists back Ennahda, and the gathering's ability to bargain may have cost it some help among more extreme groups of popular sentiment. Some strictly traditionalist Salafists openly support the establishment of an Islamic state in Tunisia, and some have put government officials—along with craftsmen, labor activists, writers, academics, and ladies regarded as insufficiently humble—to the test through protests, threats, or potentially brutality (Cavatorta et al., 2012).

After one year—through an activity of bargain, inclusivity, and restriction—the nation embraced another constitution, supplanted the occupant government with a technocratic bureau, and effectively held the second democratic public elections (Middle Eastern Report, 1993). The National Dialog Quartet, a group of civil liberties activists, labor union leaders, and legal advisers who assisted the fighting political entertainers in reaching an agreement and who were later awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize, played an important role in that effort.

After the 2014 authoritative elections, wherein Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda won 85 and 69 seats, individually, the two gatherings decided to share power (Cenciarell, 2015). The alliance between the two biggest political powers denoted another stage in the Tunisian transition: one that would tame political polarization and set philosophical contrasts aside to zero in on Tunisia's earnest financial needs.

In July 2016, President Beji Caid Essebsi and his coalition, Nidaa Tounes, expanded the political tent even further by signing the Carthage Agreement, which formalized the foundation of a National Unity Government (NUG). Under the NUG, the decision alliance (Ennahda, Nidaa Tounes, Afek Tounes, and the Free Patriotic Union) extended to five resistance groups (Machrou Tounes, al-Moubadara, al-Joumhouri, al-Massar, and Harakat el-Chaab), just as three associations (the Tunisian General Labor Union, the Tunisian Union for Industry, Trade, and Handicrafts, and the Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Fishery) (Boukhars, 2017).

The objective of the NUG was to settle the nation by permitting major ideological groups and persuasive civil society gatherings to assume a proper function in helping the nation accomplish its most significant needs: combatting psychological oppression, improving administration and financial approach, diminishing joblessness, battling corruption, and tending to local disparities. The alliance government's first significant activity was to supplant then executive Habib Essid with Youssef Chahed, whose new bureau was entrusted with propelling the Carthage Agreement's change agenda (Ratka, 2017; Ozlem et al, 2018).

In August 2016, Parliament picks Youssef Chahed as PM subsequent to expelling his archetype for moderate advancement in ordering financial changes as the International Monetary Fund arranges a credit program worth around \$2.8 billion. Be that as it may, the economy approaches emergency point as the import/export imbalance takes off and the cash slides to its most vulnerable level in 16 years. As swelling arrives at 7.8%, the Central Bank raises financing costs to record levels. As a result, protesters walk in urban

communities across the country and settle for the most convenient option as a result of financial issues and government efforts to alleviate the shortage by reducing endowments and increasing charges (McCarthy, 2016; Ratka, 2017; Ozlem et al, 2018).

In May 2018, Ennahda showed improvement over different gatherings in city elections. Tunisia's Ennahda Movement won local elections with 27.5 percent of the vote. Nidaa Tounes party, the second biggest ideological group with 55 agents in the parliament, positioned second in the elections with 22.5 percent of the votes. Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes were additionally alliance accomplices in the public government. They were expected to overwhelm the previously postponed surveys as authorities chose in 350 districts unexpectedly after a 2011 uprising ended many years of authoritarian rules (Dasandi, et.al, 2019; Honig, 2018; Laws and Marquette, 2018).

In the 2019 general elections, newcomers and free movers beat many set up government officials. Recently, President Kais Saed, who ran as an independent, is a constitutional law professor who is new to constituent governmental issues. President Saïed's avalanche triumph (73%) in the October 13 run-off vote against rival Nabil Karoui—a secularist news investor and so-called libertarian who burned through the majority of the mission time frame in prison on tax evasion charges—seemingly gives him a solid mainstream command and authenticity, albeit a considerable lot of his approach inclinations stay to be openly characterized (khan & Andreoni, 2019).

The outcomes obviously mirrored "a groundswell of help from youthful electors." Turnout for the run-off, at 55% of registered voters, was more than six percentage points higher

than in the first round vote, which featured 24 candidates, and in apparently unrestricted public road cleaning activities to communicate support after he won (Allahoum, 2019).

3.4.2. The Constitution

The way toward planning a constitution matters not exclusively to forming the end result, rather to guaranteeing that the last objective is accomplished in any case. The cycle becomes even more important during the period of constitutionalism, when constitution making frequently coincides with seismic political changes and holds the key to resolving anticipated clashes. A good cycle can securely manage drafters and the society they speak to the end result, whereas a bad cycle can stymie a generally possible public agreement.

It is not necessarily the case that a decent constitution-production cycle will ensure concurrence on a constitution. Setting matters, and the public situation may block concession to a constitution or power components of it to be settled sometime in the future, even among earnest political entertainers. Nor is there any one "great" measure that prompts a superior result. Here as well, the setting characterizes what is functional and unworkable at some random time and spot. In light of these constraints, the Tunisian experience provides a few avenues for understanding its own success and assisting future constitution-making efforts (Honig, 2018).

Tunisia was the primary state in the area to receive a constitution (1861) and the main Muslim state to nullify bondage. Presently, amidst transition, Tunisia is the main state in the district to start increasing the political and financial organizations of an authoritarian state. The first to oust a pioneer and disintegrate a decision party, the Democratic

Constitutional Rally Party (RCD), Tunisia is additionally the first to start the way toward changing authoritarian structures founded in the course of recent years (Zemni, 2015).

Authoritarianism, first organized under the system of President Bourguiba from freedom to 1987, proceeded after the overthrow arranged by his replacement, Ben Ali. Both endeavored to degenerate the Tunisian Constitution, Bourguiba succeeding, expanding the residency and the life span of their individual systems. Political change in Tunisia started in 2011 with a cycle of constitutional change (Zemni, 2005; McCarthy, 2016).

The institutional changes started with the more significant position authority, rearranging the boundless forces of the president to choose public delegates. Tunisia's interim government established boards to address constitutional issues such as security and corruption, as well as truth and compromise concerns. Under the leadership of resistance basic liberties pioneer Kemal Jendoubi, a discretionary commission was formed to set the boundaries for the primary National Constituent Assembly (NCA) elections. Agents were chosen through corresponding records for areas, including locales for Diaspora Tunisians living abroad. With more than 41 percent of the vote, the Ennahda (Renaissance) party was elected to lead the interim NCA (Sold, 2018).

The drafting cycle on the new Tunisian Constitution was initiated in February 2012, with extensive strain among Islamists and Secularists. The Assembly gave a first draft constitution on August 14, 2012 and a second draft on December 14, 2012. The death of the resistance chief, Shoukri Belaid, on February 6, 2013, quickly interfered with the drafting cycle. In any case, the cycle continued and the Assembly gave a third draft on April 22, 2013.

On June 1, 2013, the council accountable for drafting the constitution at last concurred on a draft, which was submitted to the temporary lawmaking body. Following quite a while of protests and gridlock, the draft was then passed by a two-third greater part of the National Constituent Assembly and on 26 January 2014. The Coming Constitution is a liberal book that expresses that Islam is the nation's religion, while simultaneously perceiving opportunity of soul and conviction, and fairness between the genders.

(Merminod and Tim, 2013; Cenciarell, 2015; McCarthy, 2016; Al-Anani, 2012: 466-472; Allani, 2013: 131-140; Anderson, 2011: 2-7; Brody-Barre, 2013: 211-230; Cavatorta, 2010: 230).



Fig. 5. Key Drafting Index

3.4.2.1. The 2014 Constitution

3.4.2.1.1. Executive Branch

The 2014 Constitution establishes a semi-presidential system similar to that of France, with the exception that the Prime Minister, who is appointed by Parliament rather than the President but in consultation with the latter, will be significantly more powerful. The Prime Minister appoints all government ministers except those for defense and foreign affairs. The President has exclusive control over these two ministries. The Prime Minister presides over the administration and negotiates international agreements of technical nature. The Council of Ministers meets on convocation by the Prime Minister, who fixes the agenda. Overall, executive authority is exercised by the President of the Republic, who is the Head of State, representing its unity, securing its independence and continuity. The President of the Republic is elected by general, free, secret and direct elections.

3.4.2.1.2. Legislative Branch

Legislative power is vested in a single Assembly of Representatives. Members are elected by universal suffrage for a term of five years. Members enjoy parliamentary immunity but are subject to arrest in case of a flagrant delicto. Voting in the assembly is personal and may not be delegated. The assembly can, through the initiative of a majority of its members, vote to impeach the President for grave violations of the Constitution.

3.4.2.1.3. Judicial Branch

The judiciary is divided into four branches. Firstly, there is the regular judiciary headed by a Supreme Court (Cassation) which deals with criminal and civil appeals from lower courts falling within this branch. Next is the administrative judiciary, consisting of administrative courts and tribunals dealing with all administrative cases with appeals lying from there to the Supreme Administrative Court. Then, there is the financial judiciary comprising a special Court of Audit for financial matters. Lastly, there is the Constitutional Court with jurisdiction over constitutional disputes.

The Constitutional Court is composed of 12 members having no less than 15 years of high expertise, two thirds of whom must be legal specialists. The President of the Republic, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, the Prime Minister, and the Supreme Judicial Council shall each nominate six candidates, two thirds of whom must be legal specialists. Judges enjoy statutory criminal immunity unless this is lifted. Other auxiliary bodies of the judicial branch include the Supreme Judicial Council, which manages the profession of judges, and the State Counsel.

3.5. The role of youth and civil society in Tunisia Revolution

The role of Tunisian civil society in mobilizing resistance to a system that has been systematized for more than 55 years is critical to academics, system change scholars, policymakers, and activists' understanding of the causes and outcomes of the Arab uprisings. A survey of Tunisia's civil society organizations (CSOs) provides insights into pockets of public activism, CSO movement, and post-revolutionary government endeavors to create newly regulated systems forming resident cooperation in administration (Laws & Marquette, 2018).

Besides, the two-year Tunisian experiment gives some of the helpful exercises to organizations that drove contemporary political changes in the Middle East (Civil Society in Tunisia: from Islands of Resistance to Tides of Political Change, 2019). An investigation of Tunisia's CSOs gives the degree to investigate civil society affiliations working in a severe authoritarian state and in a post-revolutionary democratizing state. Tunisia's inventive opportunity of affiliation guidelines offer an occasion to consider CSO reactions to institutional and administrative changes in the changing engineering of political foundations in MENA states in transition.

Most of the Tunisians who rioted were youthful, jobless and underemployed alumni who were baffled by the legislature. A significant number of them have finished advanced education yet were as yet incapable of looking for some kind of employment. Some youthful Tunisians were incredibly critical in the toppling of the Ben Ali system as they

joined to communicate their solidarity with Bouazizi's demise and to protest against the monetary difficulty and youth joblessness (Howana 2011: 2).

It is along these lines, worth understanding that perhaps the best worry of the young from this revolution was looking for equity, for Bouazizi, their companions, relatives and for the entire country. As indicated by Marzouki et al (2012: 238), the Tunisian revolution was completely and suddenly determined by the adolescents who were the main entertainers on the stage during the uprisings. Other than that, civil society groups made out of instructors, columnists, legal counselors and worker's guilds had all around upheld the young in the showings.

As indicated by Honwana (2011: 13), the support of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) and the Bar Association helped structure a more extensive public alliance against the system. Now, the young revolt has changed into a revolution as the requests extended from an answer to financial complaints to system change and they effectively figured out how to end Ben Ali's profession. The year 2011, by no uncertainty, was the time of a worldwide youth revolt.

Hardly any Tunisian CSOs worked and significantly less worked freely of the system's corporatist civil society instruments. The Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (Association Tunisienne des Femmes Democrats, ATFD), set up in 1989, is one such association. The Ligue Tunisienne pour la Defense des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH), founded in 1977, was one of the most important politically autonomous associations in Tunisia, alongside the ATFD, but the historical background of the association and its system relations demonstrates the challenges faced by CSOs working within the type of

authoritarian corporatist civil society structure that existed in Tunisia prior to the revolution (Almajdoub, 2019).

Twenty Eight Of the customary civil society groups in Tunisia, one association demonstrated outstanding: The public worker's guild, known as the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), is liable for the worker's organization strikes in Gafsa in 2008 and Sfax in 2010. The strikes made the impulse for more prominent cooperation across CSOs. The UGTT is an association with a long history of testing the legislature. Set up in 1946, the worker's guild was the objective of government constraint from the 1960s onwards. In 1978, when the work chiefs established an overall strike calling for higher wages, they were vigorously smothered (Almajdoub, 2019; Boubeker, 2016; Robbins, 2016; Rahman, 2019; Drissi, 2014).

On 26th January 1978, known as Black Thursday, 42 individuals were killed and 325 injured before the system reestablished request. The UGTT, in the same way as other CSOs entrusted with successful protection from authoritarian systems, is compelled by the very system it is entrusted with changing or democratizing (John and Putzel, 2009). CSOs are immediately co-selected by the state in a corporatist civil society-state course of action of the sort frequently found in authoritarian Arab systems, or they are seen as a stabilizer to the state and free of it (Boubeker, 2016).

The order of the CSO, regardless of whether it is an assistance arrangement CSO and bound to be consistent or support driven and more reproachful of the administration, shapes the system's reactions. The authoritarian state customarily tries to stifle CSOs working through an assortment of components: restrictions on the receipt of unfamiliar assets,

assaults on the press and hindering types of grants and permits all serve to restrict CSOs. These systems have generally been dispensed with in Tunisia (Gabsi, 2017).

No state or society is safe from the impact of the more extensive global setting, and Tunisia was no special case. Miserable financial conditions and raising state suppression assembled Tunisians, making new social relations in comprehensively independent spaces inside society not represented by the state (Halliday, 2005). The requirement for powerful participation among Tunisians, which was prohibited by the elitist nepotistic and kleptocratic Ben Ali system, gave rise to new diffuse even relationships in Tunisia.

Tunisia's changes address the privilege of affiliation and gathering for CSO groups just as for residents. New organizations of affiliations are created, reinforced by laws encouraging more noteworthy press opportunities, and laws on defamation and criticism, public law and respectability (Carothers, 2018). Fundamentally, new Tunisian laws of affiliation started amidst the revolution are currently systematized in making novel legitimate arrangements for affiliation networks in Tunisia. Article 26 expresses that at least two affiliations may set up an affiliation organization; Article 29 that the organization procures legitimate character free from the character of its party affiliations; and Article 30 that the organization may acknowledge parts of unfamiliar relationships in its enrollment (Almajdoub, 2019; Boubekeur, 2016; Robbins, 2016; Rahman, 2019; Drissi, 2014).

Financial and social changes brought about by the global downturn, rising unemployment, and illegal migration of Tunisian youth sparked new Tunisian city activism against the rotting Ben Ali regime. The decay of the system was delineated in the expanding financial

hole among Tunis and the metropolitan waterfront urban communities and the truly underestimated, drained and oppressed districts of the inside.

Moreover, the system's utilization of extreme power and leader capacity to stifle the strikes in 2008 and 2010 recommended it was attempting to keep up power against a quickly evolving society. Tunisia exemplifies how much segment changes in the MENA region have changed the political scene in the last 20 years (Owen and Williams, 2020). The two determinants of segment change incorporate the part of ladies and admittance to training. After autonomy from France in 1956, Tunisia passed the Personal Status Code abrogating polygamy and making sure the decision in favor of ladies and initiating free anti-conception medication the exact year. In the early long stretches of freedom, Tunisia extraordinarily spent 33% of its spending plan on training. In 2011, Tunisia had a lower richness rate than France, with its absolute ripeness rate at substitution level (Fargues, 2012).

Today, female understudies constitute a sizable portion of the college understudy body, and women effectively participate in societal and legislative issues. Preceding the election in 2011, ideological groups were utilizing ladies' privileges as an election issue in their missions. During the election, people were similarly spoken to on discretionary records with a specification that each rundown needed to substitute male and female up-and-comers (Almajdoub, 2019).

Ladies currently make up 24 percent of the Tunisian Constituent Assembly. Ladies activists were apprehended and detained under the Ben Ali regime. Many female students joined Ennahda for family ties rather than political reasons, while others are now smallscale business owners or caregivers for their families. Islamist female activism in Tunisia has

evolved and, as a result, erased the traditional perception of the role of female activists in Islamic political life (Marks, 2012).

Following the weighty concealment of the UGTT and worker's organizations in 1978 and 1984, as well as the strikes in 2008, and the restraint of Ennahda in the 1990s, Tunisian activists knew how to best rethink their relationship with the system. Tunisians, including the 120,000 jobless alumni, realized that, to trigger another flood of protest against the system, they would need to utilize data, admittance to policymakers and activity to bind together against the regime. (Tarrow, 2005, p.103).

Access to data given by Tunisian bloggers, common liberties promoters and WikiLeaks – which uncovered US archives reprimanding the Ben Ali system – empowered the change to come to fruition in Tunisia. Tunisian civil society acted in solidarity after the 2010 strike in the second city of Sfax. A board of trustees for the Support of the Mining Region was set up. A mix of common liberties activists, legal counselors from the bar affiliation, worker's guild individuals, the understudy association (UGET) and notable Tunisian people facilitated the council's exercises around three particular destinations:

1. To shield the heads of the development in court;
2. To end the mass of quiet, the system worked around the development of strikers and resistance.
3. To help (monetarily) the groups of those imprisoned. (Romdhani, 2012)

The new organization of Tunisian civil society activists called for portrayal and the reviewing of social treacheries of a degenerate system, helping the enormous scope of

joblessness and territorial imbalance. The civil commitment of Tunisians joined 'Islamists of different stripes, left-wing exchange unionists, financial and social dissidents, and French-style secularists, in solidarity against the officeholder system without pressure. Tunisia's new civil commitment was brought together around monetary and social requests for change. Requests for change were produced by the collaboration and coordination of new and existing gatherings and activists, locally, broadly and practically (Andrews, et.al. 2016).

The Ben Ali system and its "versatile authoritarian" instruments of overseeing civil society and metro activism were feeble to subdue Tunisia's new social capital. Tunisia's new social capital is best depicted as the effect attributed to informal communities and related standards of correspondence made by activists and associations, in the capital and the inside, joined in their resistance to the Ben Ali system. Tunisia's community activists prevail with regards to holding comparative gatherings, while at the same time overcoming any issues between assorted gatherings around their resistance to the system, and their requests for the free exercise of their privileges as residents. Tunisians made another organization of relations and new standards of civil commitment over a progression of social ties (Putnam, 2000). Putnam sees that a society where individuals are more associated is set apart by a more prominent level of tolerance (Putnam, 2002).

According to Granovetter (1973: 1360-80), in a society rich in social capital, there is more noteworthy resilience of contrasts because of a combination of various frail ties, as opposed to a predetermined number of center (ethnic, strict, family) ties that dilemma individuals solely to each other. Tunisia's revolution prevailed in terms of crossing significant social,

political, and financial divisions between focus and outskirts, and social divisions between common and strict, youthful and old, people, holding in any case, unmistakable gatherings and affiliations made unlawful by system laws of relationship, with the desire to unseat the system.

Another "soul of solidarity" made the social capital that shaped the focal point of the Tunisian revolution. Nonetheless, social capital can likewise fuel strife by worsening clashes separating lines (Nan.S, 2008). Tunisia's social capital could be sabotaged if the standards of correspondence made by activists and associations during the revolution are not kept up. A lively associational life, without shared standards of prohibition instead of correspondence, could subvert democratic solidiness for the new government (Berman, 1997).

Most notably, four prominent CSOs dispatched a 'Public Dialog' activity to serve as arbiters amid the 2013 political stalemate that threatened to derail Tunisia's political transition following the progressive deaths of two remaining wing resistance figures. The activity was awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize for its "unwavering commitment to the construction of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia in the aftermath of the Jasmine Revolution of 2011" (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2015).

Three of the associations, the Tunisian General Labor (Union générale tunisienne du travail, UGTT), the Tunisian League for Human Rights (Ligue tunisienne des droits de l'homme, LTDH), and the Tunisian Bar Association (Ordre public des avocats de Tunisie, ONAT) – appreciated significant emblematic capital for their part as uncommon voices of resistance during the Ben Ali regime (Ruthven, 2016).

In the nonattendance of a feasible, commonly worthy political option fit for breaking the stop, they had the option to effectively intervene among the different political entertainers. Coming during a period of significant civil society disappointment with government strategies and cultural dissatisfaction with the lack of progress on the socio-economic complaints that had fueled the revolution, the Nobel Peace Prize was intended not only as a "support to the Tunisian public," but also as an overall acknowledgement that "civil society establishments and associations" (Almajdoub, 2019).

In the repercussions of the revolution, Tunisia saw a generous increment in CSOs. In the first two years alone, around 5,000 new associations were made, generally identified with good cause, culture and expressions, and development (Foundation for the Future2013). The surge in new affiliations was fueled not only by genuine local enthusiasm for civil society activism, but also by the availability of unfamiliar financing, which provided an alternative to unemployment for many Tunisians, particularly the younger generation (Sold, 2018).

The post-revolutionary period also saw the rise of an enormous number of social movements and informal, horizontally composed single-issue crusades assembling accordingly to specific political turns of events. In the new political setting, new entertainers flourished, while a large number of the older, state-adjusted associations like the UNFT attempted to reclassify their role and ward off pressure to disband. Criticism for trading off positions during and before the revolution notwithstanding, the set up CSOs with a background marked by political resistance assumed a significant function during the political transition, introducing significant options in contrast to political entertainers. This

was the case, particularly in the beginning phases, as they had both the experience and the fundamental hierarchical structures (Almajdoub, 2019).

In February 2011, 28 political parties and civil society met to form the 'National Council for the Protection of the Revolution,' despite the fact that the CNLT, ATFD, SNJT, and LTDH withdrew due to a preference for consultative rather than *de facto* government positions (ICG2011,13–14). In March, the body, which included the UGTT and ONAT, met with the 'High Commission for Political Reform' to create the 'More Significant Position

Authority for the Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform, and the Democratic Transition,' which was extended and approved to analyze legislation, propose changes, and express their opinion on government activities. CSOs' straight-up political function, on the other hand, was brief (Rahman, 2019).

After the election of the National Constituent Assembly in October 2011, a great part of the political movement of civil society moved into effectively partaking in the constitution drafting measure. During this time, significant discussions and assemblies, which occurred around disputable issues, for example, the status of ladies or the part of religion in the state, were molded by set up associations like the ATFD as well as by an enormous number of new civil society entertainers. The strict common polarization—despite the fact that it was somewhat politically instrumentalized—ran its course among mainstream and Islamist ladies' gatherings (Charrad and Zarrugh, 2014; Khalil, 2014).

However, significant divisions emerged also among mainstream CSOs themselves, most notably between those active during the authoritarian time frame and those whose activism

began after the authoritarian time frame. The function of the more basic CSOs from the Ben Ali period, in any case, didn't fade. Rather, they kept on driving political change in the nation, promoting their experience as well as their ability and emblematic importance. Specifically, they effectively intervened in the political emergency in 2013 and further kept up their predominant situation on a large number of policy-centered issues from that point. This stands rather than numerous new CSOs battling to move past their unique venture, professionalize, or secure funding (Robbins, 2016).

The various kinds of more basic CSOs have not had the option to do this in a similar way, be that as it may. While a few of the more youthful, already illicit or repressed associations like the ALTT or UDC had the option to arrive at more full potential after the revolution, many of the more seasoned CSOs lost unmistakable individuals or saw their enrollment decline as new roads for political and civil society activism opened up. Albeit common freedoms and ladies' associations were to a great extent ready to keep up their noticeable situations by zeroing in on their specific information, the overall associations have been battling with huge declines in enrollment and interior requests to zero in more solely on proficient as opposed to policy driven issues (Boubekeur, 2016).

The inward battles, suggestive of the authoritarian time frame, didn't make them insignificant, but debilitated their function as political entertainers. Professional associations and their members, who have been completely politicized both by the revolution and during the transition period, generally struggle to avoid taking positions that interfere with a fair direction of their profession. Together with the other political and civil society entertainers, the three kinds of more basic CSOs keep on introducing a flourishing

power in an early democratic society (Sold, 2018; Boubeker, 2016; Robbins, 2016; Rahman, 2019; Drissi, 2014; Almajdoub, 2019).

CHAPTER 4

ARAB SPRING AND EGYPT: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

The topography of Egypt identifies two areas: North Africa and Southwest Asia. Egypt has coastlines on the Mediterranean Sea, the River Nile, and the Red Sea. Egypt fringes Libya toward the west, the Gaza Strip toward the upper east, and Sudan toward the south (Harrel and Brown 1992). Egypt has a region of 1,002,450 km² (387,050 sq mi), which makes it the 31st biggest nation on the planet. The longest straight-line distance in Egypt from north to south is 1,024 km (636 mi), while that from east to west is estimated at 1,240 km (770 mi). Egypt has in excess of 2,900 km (1,800 mi) of coastline on the Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf of Suez, and the Gulf of Aqaba (Cambridge Geological Magazine, 2009). It has an Exclusive Economic Zone of 263,451 km² (101,719 sq mi) (Brittanica.com).

4.1. The Ancient History of Egypt

The historical backdrop of Egypt has been long and rich, because of the progression of the Nile River with its fruitful banks and delta, just as the achievements of Egypt's local occupants and outside impact. A lot of Egypt's old history was a secret until Egyptian pictographs were decoded with the disclosure and help of the Rosetta stone. Among the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World is the Great Pyramid of Giza. The Library of Alexandria was just one of its sort for quite a long time. Antiquated Egyptian civilization blended around 3150 BC with the political unification of Upper and Lower Egypt under

the principal pharaoh of the First Dynasty, Narmer. Prevalently, local Egyptian guidelines went on until the victory by the Achaemenes Empire in the 6th century BC (Asad, 2013).

In 332 BC, the Macedonian ruler Alexander the Great vanquished Egypt as he brought down the Achaemenes and set up the Hellenistic Ptolemaic Kingdom, whose first ruler was one of Alexander's previous officers, Ptolemy I Soter. The Ptolemais needed to battle local uprisings and were associated with unfamiliar and civil wars that prompted the decrease of the realm and its last addition by Rome. The demise of Cleopatra finished the ostensible autonomy of Egypt, bringing about Egypt's becoming one of the regions of the Roman Empire (Brown, 1992).

The Roman principle in Egypt (counting Byzantine) endured from 30 BC to 641 AD, with a concise interval of control by the Sasanian Empire during 619–629, known as Sasanian Egypt. After the Muslim triumph of Egypt, Egypt got areas of progressive Caliphates and other Muslim lines: Rashidun Caliphate (632–661), Umayyad Caliphate (661–750), Abbasid Caliphate (750–935), Fatimid Caliphate (909–1171), Ayyubid Sultanate (1171–1260), and the Mamluk Sultanate (1250–1517). Ottoman king Salim I captured Cairo in 1517, engulfing Egypt in the Ottoman Empire (Asad, 2015; Brown, 1992; Beinin and Vairel, 2013a; BRITTANICA.COM).

4.2. The Modern History of Egypt

Specifically, after the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Egypt started colonizing exercises by Western European nations, while the response to such occasions happened inside "the Egyptian public development." The European impact on Egypt, which started with Napoleon Bonaparte's mission in the years 1798-1801 (Djurant, 2001: 404) and the changes embraced by Mehmet Ali Pasha, who is viewed as the author of Egypt, opened the way to numerous progressions that were going to happen later. After the control of Egypt by the British in 1882, the metro groups that were looking for change attempted to mirror their endeavors with the idea of "Islamic Union and the Islamic Resurrection" (Qevaqebi 2007: 49). They attempted to make a political development against the spread of a referenced view and way of life as the European view spread.

Researchers, for example, Jamaluddin Afghani, called for solidarity against what they called the "English fight" (Abduh, 1993: 14). They began emphasizing looking for a change in religion and solid administration, expecting to play a significant role in forming the concept of "Arab patriotism. "Thanks to the solidarity among minorities, Egypt had an organization and united success contrasted with other Arab nations, since Egypt was homogeneous as far as a populace. Khaldun, in his sociological works, underlined this viewpoint by focusing on that in a society like that of Egypt, where there are no clans of various divisions, it isn't important for the state to depend on the intensity of the clans to remain steadfast.

Hence, he trusts it is simpler to set up the state and move it into metropolitan life (Ibn Khaldun, 2004: 121). Passing under the standard of the Ottoman Empire, this didn't stop the Mamluk Movement in Egypt. In particular, despite the fact that Egypt was under the Ottoman organization and the place where Egypt had a place with Sultan Osman, the genuine bearing was given to Mamluk Begs.

They, as nearby pioneers, had assumed control over duty regarding the utilization of land, charge assortment, and installment of vassalage to the Sultan. Yet, then again, they had proceeded with the support of the political force. Mamluks Begs in this period were essential for some rebellions against the Sultan or diverse force competitions (Husain, 2010: 679). Egypt had not faced a foreign occupation since the reign of Yavuz Sultan Selim in 1798. Nonetheless, since that date, the domains of the Ottoman Empire began to be under the military, social, financial, and political impact of English and French dominion.

Undoubtedly, one of the main explanations behind Napoleon's mission in Egypt was to forestall the British entry to India through the Red Sea (Winter, 2001: 42). Napoleon's mission in Egypt, which can be considered as the start of the "French provincial development", should be viewed as the principal illustration of French impact in the fields of legislative issues and culture in the domains they During the Egyptian lobby, Napoleon had endeavored to discuss straightforwardly with individuals by distributing his discourse as booklets in Arabic (42-45).

Napoleon, who took care to begin the discourse with "for the sake of God" or 'Kelime-I Tawhid', had frequently focused on that this was the best approach to winning the hearts of the Egyptians. In these booklets, he additionally leveled analysis against the Mamluks,

attempting hence to legitimize the French occupation. In 1801, the Ottoman and British powers shut down the French control of Egypt. As a result, Egypt will begin the reign of Mehmet Ali Pasha, who arrived in the early nineteenth century, aided by the Ottoman armada, and managed to become one of Egypt's most powerful individuals throughout its history. Mehmet Ali Pasha was given the title "Vali of Egypt" by Sultan Osman in 1805, and along these lines, Egypt was isolated from the managerial focus of the Ottoman Empire. (Ozer, 2007: 78).

4.3. Government Period

With its set of experiences of 5,000 years, Egypt is viewed as the main current condition of the Arab world. Stool military agent Mehmet Ali Pasha assumes an extraordinary position through his commitment to this cycle. He is viewed as a legislator who conveyed significant changes, which can be contrasted even with the ones of Tanzimat. He figured out how to fabricate Egypt as a free state from the Ottoman Empire, remaining in its own capacity (Ozer, 2007: 96-102).

The enormous change that Egypt went through in the nineteenth century can't be clarified simply by the impact of Mehmet Ali Pasha, since this period of Egypt is loaded up with various measurements and suggestions. Be that as it may, under its establishment lie changes and triumphs accomplished by Mehmet Ali Pasha, particularly in the military field. Mehmet Ali Pasha was cautiously keeping inseparable ties with the Ottoman Empire in the early long stretches of his standard, and subsequently, he accomplished extraordinary triumphs for the sake of Sultan Osman (Winter, 2001).

In any case, the way that since the 1830s, the Egypt of Mehmet Ali Pasha was not, at this point, an inside undertaking of the Ottoman Empire, brought the competition of the "Incomparable Powers" on account of Egypt. Accordingly, Mehmet Ali Pasha started to extend his control throughout the long term of 1831-1840 by searching for additional advantages for his children by the Ottoman Empire. In the nineteenth century, when Mehmet Ali Pasha showed up in Egypt, he won the "Property System" and the terrains were planted and gathered by the townspeople (Ozer, 2007).

In this period, around four-fifths of the Arab populace who comprised most of the Egyptian populace were laborers who worked in the field of farming. Despite updates and changes in legal terms, the use of the "Private Property System" began in the second half of the nineteenth century (Gurbal, 2012: 24-27).

Mehmet Ali Pasha, who was not of Arab origin, can be regarded as a legislator with a cosmopolitan outlook. Regardless of the absence of a stream that could speak to this patriotism, it is realized that the principal approaches of patriotism in the Arab world started to be formed in Egypt. After the passing of Mehmet Ali Pasha, Abbas Pasha (1848-1854), Said Pasha (1854-1863), and Ismail Pasha (1863-1879) were designated as Wali (head) of Egypt. From this period begins the cycle of Egypt's obligation, which began with the appearance in office of Mehmet Ali Pasha's child, Said Pasha (1854-1863), who resulted in these current circumstances post-Abbas Pasha, and who became the Political history of current Egypt and Iliria College, Pristina, Kosovo known particularly for his new approaches that were applied in 1861 (Lewis, 1995; 1998; 2000).

In 1882, Colonel Ahmet Arabi rose up with his troopers. The Arabi Pasha Movement was likewise upheld by the reformist wing of Arab scholarly people in Egypt and by the military officials. The Movement was also supported by excused specialists who lost their jobs as a result of the economy's deterioration, the rise in charges, and the attempt to implement preventive measures. Because of the formation of patriot cognizance in Egypt and the association on 9 September 1881, the gathered dissenters in Abidin square concentrated on the fact that they required the public parliament to assemble and eliminate the Minister of War, Rifkin Pasha, who, despite his Turkish ancestry, was offering unfairness in the kindness of foreign officials who worked in the Egyptian government. Because of these occasions, the "Egypt issue" can be viewed as a hazardous case managed (Lewis, 1995; 1998; 2000; Ozer, Gurbal. 2012).

4.4. Period of Jamal Abdul Nasser

Like the Soviet Union, the United States also at first experienced issues in their situation towards the "Free Officers" who came into power through an upset in 1952, on the grounds that such an unexpected change that occurred in Egypt astonished the two sides. In this manner, the Soviet Union viewed free government officials as "a development related to the USA," while the People's Republic of China considered it to be "hostile to revolutionary tyranny." In such a climate, Nasser's decision in Egypt limited the country's relations with the Soviet Union and other communist countries to a commercial position (Asad, 2015).

Then again, due to colonizing encounters, Arab egalitarians were baffled by Westerners. Another reason for obstruction against Westerners was the formation of the Israeli state and the presence of the Palestinian-Israeli issue (Said, 2002, p. 123). The Soviet Union

upheld Egypt's position against England during the years 1953-1954 and in January 1954, the Egyptian Minister of Defense paid a long visit to the Soviet Union. Following these contacts, the Soviet Union utilized unexpectedly the privilege of blackball at the Security Council of the United Nations with respect to the utilization of the Suez Canal by Israel. In such a manner, the Soviet Union kept on supporting the system in Egypt, and the relations kept on developing until 1955.

The year 1955 is significant because it marks the beginning of the Egyptian international strategy. During the Cold War, the arrangement of the Baghdad Pact quickened the polarization in the Arab world, comprising of significant advancements in the pivot of the West wing. Egypt didn't go to the Baghdad Pact since it trusted it would kill the Arab Defense Agreement, endorsed in 1950. By blaming Iraq for the joint effort, Egypt upheld developments for change of the system in this nation (Alkaid, 2008, p. 36).

The Baghdad Pact can be viewed as the occasion that carried Jamal Abdul Nasser close to the Soviet Union. Iraq, challenging Egypt's responsibilities to the "Arab Protection System", partook in the Baghdad Pact, alongside Pakistan and Turkey, while Israel assaulted military situations in Gaza on 28 February by executing 38 individuals. The third significant occasion of 1955 was the Bandung Conference in April, the exact year where Nasser had taken an interest (Said, 2002, p. 106). The United States and England reacted to the refusal of the Baghdad Pact by Nasser and, along these lines, they pulled out monetary help for the arranged force plant that was intended to be underlying Aswan. Accordingly, Nasser's organization chose to "nationalize" the Suez Canal in July 1956.

These common responses were trailed by an exchange blacklist forced by Britain and

France (Ridvan, 1986, p. 63). The assault led by Israel on 28 February 1955 in the Gaza Strip, which was under the oversight of the Egyptian military, constrained Nasser's organization to purchase weapons from the United States. However, the simple truth that the presence and security of Israel was a central issue of the US international strategy, caused the US Senate to expand the systems for the acquisition of weapons by Nasser, and therefore, his organization chose to purchase the weapons from Czechoslovakia on 27 September 1955.

The exchanges for the acquisition of weapons by the Soviet Union had begun in 1953 and until when they were bought, Egypt held equal talks with America, yet then-Secretary of State John Foster Dulles adopted Egypt to go to the West Axis to purchase the weapons. The year 1958 can be considered the year when Russian-Egyptian relations experienced a rise and fall because in that year, Syria and Egypt chose to join forces, forming the United Arab State, and Nasser's influence on the Arabs grew as a result. On July 14, an uprising occurred in Iraq, bringing General Qasim Abdul Kerim to power and bringing to light Iraq's possible entry into the Union (Shadi, 2005:23).

Nasser made his first trip to the Soviet Union in April 1958, where he was hosted by then-Soviet President Nikita Hrushçev for 18 days. Along these lines, the Soviet Union attempted through Egypt to build an impact in the Middle East, and in this way, the great relations with Nasser were significant. In October 1958, the Chief of the General Staff of Egypt, Abdul Hakim Amir, visited Moscow. During this time, Nasser's organization began to look for obligations because, because the money had gone to another country, salaries were required for the venture. At first, it was imagined that the assets for all the undertakings could be given by the US and the United Nations. Nasser was even picked as

"Man of the Year" by Times magazine in 1956. However, the advancements around then empowered the Arab and Egyptian organizations to give more weight to communist practices to pronounce freedom and create monetary models (Fauzi, 1990: 33).

Great relations with the United States started to separate with expecting the part of a pioneer in the Arab world by Nasser. In April 1954, the US chose to offer weapons to Iraq by heightening its procedure on this nation. In this specific circumstance, America, as opposed to interfacing with the political history of current Egypt, a patriot chief like Nasser, wanted to endow the customary chosen ones in Iraqi organization. Egypt's inclinations and position began to shape when Nasser began to cultivate close relationships with Non-Aligned Movement leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Josip Broz Tito. The time frame when the Movement showed up and Nasser's goal to profit by joining this Movement can be considered as a significant improvement for Egypt's inward governmental issues, just as its admittance to Third World nations.

Beginning there, Egypt's free and unprejudiced position, as well as Nasser's significance in international relations, will grow, particularly in the late 1960s. After 1959, Egypt started to seek a more dynamic arrangement in African governmental issues by supporting their wars, and accordingly, nearly twenty African nations pronounced autonomy in 1961 (Hejkel, 2003, p. 18). A progression of preliminary gatherings and meetings with respect to the Nonaligned Movement Countries occurred in Egypt. The Cairo Conference in 19571958 was organized within the framework of the Bandung Conference arrangements, and it began on December 26, 1957, at the University of Cairo. Number two of the system,

Anwar Sadat, was likewise associated with the association of the Cairo Conference, to which Nasser's organization committed a unique criticalness.

In contrast to the Bandung meeting, the one in Cairo was gone to by agents of states as well as by delegates of resistance to political developments in various nations. After a thrashing in the equipped Israeli-Arab conflict in 1967, Egypt gradually withdrew from its situation in Yemen. In this way, Nasser's impact on the district was tumbling down, while systems like those of Saudi Arabia and Jordan have started to sparkle. Alongside the thrashing, the conclusion of the Suez Canal would bring about a colossal loss of income for Egypt, and an alternative was examined, in any event, refining of Egypt's oil in Aden. In continuation of these occasions, Egypt entered a period of redefinition of relations with all Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia.

Yet, the US stopped the monetary guide and grain fare to Egypt, which incited Egypt to align with the Soviet Union. All in all, during all his decisions, Nasser didn't just arrange international strategy, but, on the other hand, was associated with interior political issues in the nation separated from the issues of "Arab patriotism" and "Arab Union." After his passing from respiratory failure in 1970, his post was taken over by Anwar Sadat (Hamood, 2000, p. 5).

4.5. Period of Anwar Sadat

At the point when Jamal Abdul Nasser kicked the bucket on 28 September 1970, he gave up an emergency in the framework, individuals who were ethically debased, a partitioned social structure, while the main thing was who might acquire his capacity. Vulnerabilities with respect to the nation's organization caused divisions among the individuals, and to

stay away from potential unsettling influences, consistent with the constitution, Nasser's appointee should be selected. Consequently, his representative Anwar Sadat assumed control over the president's seat, and his position was endorsed by the individuals in the choice hung on 15 October 1970 (Sadat, 1979, p. 286).

Despite the fact that he didn't participate successfully during Nasser's organization, Anwar Sadat was the individual who was generally observed close to Abdul Nasser. During the principal respiratory failure that Nasser endured in 1969, Sadat headed "the Presidency of the Arab Socialists League" and after his recuperation, he was designated a bad habit administrator of the Arab Summit held in Rabat. Anwar Sadat affirmed all that Nasser did and, accordingly, he was nicknamed "Yes President." However, notwithstanding this epithet, Sadat is viewed as an individual who applied strain to accomplish what he needed. This component made him assume control over the post of the head of state in spite of all protests (Emin, 2007, p. 101). It tends to be expected that the resistance's help for Sadat's official position was on the grounds that he resembled a "feeble man" on the grounds that, through his conduct, the resistance figured he would not act as "a solitary man."

Thus, the resistance figured it could understand its arrangements, and this was the motivation behind why they supported his office. The conflict between the Free Officers and the elite agents encompassing Sadat was more because of fears that force could be aggregated distinctly in the hand of one man, as it occurred in the time of Abdul Nasser. This in light of the fact that the two gatherings attempted to keep away from the way that all the force was collected in Sadat's grasp, and needed this capacity to be shared among them.

During this cycle, Anwar Sadat made some basic choices in regards to international strategy, expanding the truce concurrence with Israel until February 1971, which finished in September 1970, and was endorsed in 1967 during the time of Abdul Nasser under the guise that the nation was not yet ready to battle. Most of the opposition dismissed Anwar Sadat's methods because he believed that Egypt and Israel could reach an agreement on a non-aggression treaty. In his address to parliament on 4 February 1971, Sadat stated that if Israel withdraws from the Sinai Peninsula, the Suez Canal could be reopened, a nonaggression treaty could be signed with Israel, and efforts could be made to improve relations with the United States.

His discourse was unequivocally restricted by the resistance. Such a methodology dismissed by the resistance, and upheld by the United States, is additionally significant for the way that he was the main leader of an Arab state who expressed that a ceasefire could be endorsed by Israel (Sadat, 1978: 143). Another component when the resistance's responses against Sadat arrived at the pinnacle was the subject of collusion between Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. While in Egypt, won the assessment that the coalition with Syria would last only three years, ending in 1971, and by observing the country's financial and political circumstances, began the arrangements for a three-nation agreement.

On 17 April 1, 1971, the assignments of the three nations assembled in Benghazi within the sight of heads of states and, in spite of the positions of the resistance, Anwar Sadat alongside different presidents marked the Plan for the declaration of the Federation of Arab Republics. In order for the agreement to be effective, it must first be distributed to a few state bodies. As a result, Sadat submitted a request to the Arab Socialist League's Executive

Council, but his request was denied. Such dismissal infers dismissal by the most noteworthy state body. Following the dismissal by the League of Arab Socialists, Sadat requested that the arrangement be reviewed by the Central Committee; however, discussions about the arrangement continued.

Hence, to guarantee acknowledgment of his arrangement, Sadat attempted to roll out certain improvements, and the main one was that the embraced choices are not engaged with a larger vote of the presidents, yet by a consistent vote. In the wake of rolling out this improvement and his conversation at the Central Committee, the Plan was consistently acknowledged on 19 April 1971. Anwar Sadat trusted that a helpful second would take out the resistance to beat the troublesome circumstances, and accepting that he appreciated the vital help in homegrown legislative issues, he attempted to take a few actions in international strategy.

At the gathering with the minister of the Soviet Union, he focused on that the nation couldn't manage the cost of another fight for power, and thus, he had chosen to excuse Ali Sabri, who was considering getting a charge out of the help of the Soviet Union. Thus, he asked the Soviet Union not to see such a move as an individual demonstration or as an affront. Anwar Sadat told the diplomat that after the excusal of Ali Sabri, he would show cautiously to keep up great relations with the Soviet Union. In his discourse on the event of the first of May, Sadat noticed that Ali Sabri and his partners thought they had acquired force from Abdul Nasser, which they discovered unsatisfactorily, and blamed Ali Sabri and his supporters.

On the second May 1971, Sadat released Ali Sabri of all obligations, and on the following stage, he changed all delegates to the League of Arab Socialists. Hence, he figured out how to kill the resistance and guarantee the force he held until his demise. Sadat initially named the main day after the end, 15 May, as Audit Day and afterward renamed it as the Audit Revolutionary Day, making it a public occasion. Time of Hosni Mubarak Following the death of Anwar Sadat as a result of a death attempt in 1980 (Hamood, 1985, p. 9), Hosni Mubarak will assume control of the workplace.

Mubarak, who had attempted to lead the nation that was under attack, imagined that strategically, yet additionally, financially, there was a need to make changes and changes. Since these progressions could hurt the social structure, Mubarak accepted that liberal strategies should be applied in the monetary and political existence of Egypt. This period, which coincided with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and global democratic developments, included political developments in Egypt as well as requests for the release of numerous detainees.

Regarding basic freedoms, Hosni Mubarak's period comprised of the extension of a few rights contrasted with past systems (Ann 1989). In this specific circumstance, Mubarak submitted not many measures for non-limitation of the privilege of the media and mentioned a decrease of controls around there, yet the democratization cycle didn't arrive at the fitting level (Emin, 2011: 39). Mubarak's era, which can be characterized as a period in which state pressure on the populace was intense, is seen as his inconsistency with the changing world and the new global balance, and as a result, no extreme measures were taken to meet the needs of the people. Mubarak himself gave more significance to the development of his political force.

As far as international strategy, the time of Mubarak proceeded with the positive approach line for Israel and the United States, dispatched during Anwar Sadat's period, attempting to improve individuals' negative picture with respect to this issue (Qamil, 2012: 267). In the current context, Egypt is viewed by the US as an entertainer who has leveled out revolutionary components in the region, particularly Iran, and as a result, it is a nation with the most given military guidance after Israel. This circumstance, which on account of Egypt could be viewed as an advantage, didn't proceed in the time of Mubarak, and conciliatory emergencies experienced in various cases, was an explanation behind the EgyptianAmerican key organization to endure harm in specific cases.

In this manner, US President George Bush, concerned about Mubarak's organization rehearsals, stated at the start of the Davos Forum in 2008 that there would be a freeze between the two nations following Mubarak's response to US strategies. In this manner, the two billion dollars help that the US gave to Egypt since 1979, will shrivel into 1.3 billion beginning in 2009 (Hejql, 2012: 268). Then again, Mubarak's organization, regardless of the responses in the nation, in the 2005 elections had attempted some legitimate guidelines and made a few stages to improve the current ones.

In this period, Hosni Mubarak, given the rights perceived in Article 189 of the constitution, proposed a protected change that official elections are held by mystery vote and more than one contender to partake in the elections. The cycle of official elections with more than one applicant was applied in Egypt after the correction of point 76 of the constitution in 2005. At this point, Egypt was driven by a framework where the parliament selected the official competitor and introduced him to the individuals. In any case, the difference in point 76 of

the constitution made it conceivable that, beyond that, one applicant could run in the official elections. This cycle was significant, yet it acquired snags in the cycle of a selection of applicants (Joel 2005).

For example, the current law states that the applicant who will run in the 2011 elections must receive at least 5% of the parliament's vote. Additionally, the current framework likewise gave some different measures which came about to be restrictive for competitors who needed to run as autonomous applicants. For instance, they needed to get the help of 65 MPs from the Parliament and from 25 agents of the Shura Parliament, just as to guarantee topographical portrayal and to likewise get the help of 10 of 14 individuals from the Council of Mayors. Such legitimate guidelines show that despite the fact that democratic reforms for the presidential elections were introduced by Mubarak since 2005, in fact, these reforms bore difficulties for other presidential candidates (Joel, 2005).

The upgrades of the lawful angle were at first invited by the US and later by numerous other European nations. For instance, the then High Representative of the European Union Javier Solana talking about the changes attempted by Hosni Mubarak, focused on that they should be considered as an expectation of the democratization cycle in the Middle East (Siraxhudin, 2016: 388). Be that as it may, the Egyptian public was not reasoning like Mubarak and the US. Individuals believed that Mubarak made these means just to fortify his own capacity. Likewise, Mubarak, by noticing that the Muslim Brotherhood was an illicit structure, emerged as an opponent of their application proposition for president.

Hence, he attempted to make it troublesome the running for official elections of an individual getting a charge of global significance like Mohamed ElBaradei or other expected up-and-comers. During such circumstances, ten applicants other than Mubarak ran for the official elections held in Egypt on 7 September 2005. The election results were reported on 9 September and Mubarak won 88.7% of the votes of Egyptians and was proclaimed president for an additional six years. In the 1999 official elections, he won 93% of the votes. Just 23% of the 31 million citizens partook in the official elections of 2005 and, consequently, they were considered as elections that didn't mirror the democratic outcomes. This figure shows that rules and democratic changes set simply by Mubarak were not assessed equivalent by individuals. After the 2005 official elections, the elections for 454 Members of Parliament were likewise held in Egypt.

The parliamentary elections, held in three stages, finished in December and were held in a more democratic climate than the official ones, closing with the triumph of the gathering in force. Lawfully precluded, the "Muslim Brotherhood" turned out in elections with free competitors winning 88 MP seats in the Parliament. Until this time, for around 30 years of his administration, Hosni Mubarak didn't permit any likelihood of extremist political developments. Mubarak administered the nation with continually announced highly sensitive situations and subsequently figured out how to get the individuals far from the public authorities.

He strengthened the insight administration and other security components to keep a strategic distance from any potential upheaval, and in this unique situation, he did not name a VP, which was a sacred responsibility, in 2011. Such a stage taken by Mubarak inferred

the chance of arrangement to the post of his child Jamal Mubarak, which caused discontent in the state's administrative structure. Similarly, his use of Israeli security strategies, his support for Israeli methodology, and his inability to develop a public strategy on the Palestine issue caused the Egyptian public to betray him.

In the financial setting, regardless of the disappointment in the political field, Egypt has figured out how to increase per capita pay in 2005-2010 during Mubarak's decision, turning out to be subsequently the 26th most evolved nation on the planet. Yet, this development in the public economy likewise brought different issues. The rich had become more extravagant, while the poor had become less fortunate, pushing the majority of Egypt's population below the poverty line (Ahram Online 2011).

Hosni Mubarak's period was a period that brought significant issues for Egypt, in light of the fact that, as during the time of Anwar Sadat, in Mubarak's decision too, the utilization of liberal governmental issues comprised in acquiring obligations from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, by making Egypt in this manner a needy nation. Hosni Mubarak's state board restricted the formation of political gatherings with strict character, who figured out how to hold under tension the strict developments, which caused concern among the people, through components of the highly sensitive situation.

This absence of correspondence and the division between individuals and their administration expanded step by step and started to straightforwardly influence public activity (Beinin 2011). In this manner, in January 2011, the fights began because of the previously mentioned conditions, and individuals figured they could communicate their sentiments simply by turning out on the roads (El-Mahdi 2011).

To confront these fights, Omar Suleiman was brought to the post of VP, while Mubarak expressed he would take an interest in the forthcoming official elections. Mubarak, who acknowledged he couldn't avoid the weight, since the principal day of the dissent, began to utilize the words that he "needed to pass on in Egypt". However, the boycott of resistance groups and youth developments was not, at this point, conceivable. Consequently, on 11 February 2011, Mubarak declared his renunciation from office. Individuals documented claims in court against him for infringement of common freedoms, the awful organization of the nation, the abuse of individuals, and the homicide of 800 people during 30 years of Mubarak's administration (HRW 2011:21-28).

This included his son Jamal Mubarak, as well as Interior Minister Habib el-Adly, who was also mentioned as being tried. In this specific circumstance, 84-year-old Hosni Mubarak, who attempted to oppose the fights dispatched since January 2011, was seen as liable for all charges beginning from the "Egyptian revolution" onwards, being condemned to life detainment (Shehib, 2011, p. 123).

4.6. Opinion on Tunisian Domino Effects

The Tunisia Revolution, held by the public against unemployment and social gap which is caused by a repressive regime, has spread to its neighboring countries in the Arab World. The facts are that the corruption, political system, and military in Tunisia are somewhat different from its Arab countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Syria, and Morocco (El-May, 2013). The ideas that the people in those countries decide to stand against their rulers are the ideas of freedoms and employment. Those people do not want the leaders that have

ruled countries for several years who tend to govern through dictatorship and corruption among the families and middle class.

Thus, the revolution in Tunisia plays as the model of other countries that have some similar or identical system of governing to Tunisia. The people follow the example of Tunis, sacrificing themselves against the rulers. Recently, the idea of the Jasmine revolution has been spreading to other countries on different continents, which is what we call the Turkish Spring. See more at (Parashar, 2013), Thai Spring (Sattaburuth, 2013), etc. Those countries expand their protest through online systems and social media.

4.7. Arab Spring in Egypt

4.7.1. Protests:

Revolutions by and large are not conceived as revolutions, rather it is the void made by the breakdown of the old system that changes aggregate activity into revolutionary activity. The revolution is the impression of the host society. It is often motivated by external influences, but it cannot be separated from the social and social standards of the society in which it occurs. The self-immolation of Muhammad Bouazizi in Tunisia turned into the defining moment that began another period of political preparation in the Middle East (Times, 2011). The revolution was traded to the neighboring Muslim nation's torture with the basic highlights of defilement, monetary emergency, and oppressive guidelines (Abdel Rahman 2011).

The Egyptian revolution occurred across all the nation on 25 January 2011 as serene and peaceful social development with requests for opportunity and social equity (Beinin, 2011).

Starting in December 2010, extraordinary mass exhibitions against destitution, debasement, and political suppression broke out in a few Arab nations, testing the authority of probably the most dug-in systems in the Middle East and North Africa (Fawzy 2010: 269). Such was the situation in Egypt, wherein 2011 a well-known uprising constrained one of the district's longest-serving and most powerful pioneers, Pres. Ḥosnī Mubārak, from power.

In 18 days, the roof of dissent raised to the expulsion of Mubarak and his system. A huge number of Egyptian protestors from multi-class alliances and an assortment of financial and strict foundations have partaken in dissent (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2011: 5-29). The 2011 Egyptian revolution began with the brutal assassination of Khalid Said in Alexandria on June 6, 2010, at the hands of security administration officials. It drove towards genuine mayhem in Cairo, Alexandria, and numerous different urban areas of Egypt. Despite Husni Mubarak's resignation, security forces failed to improve the country's legal situation (Londono, 2011). The dissidents and Cairo Central Tahrir Liberation Square were met with constraint and savagery by the Egyptian security powers and allies of the decision party.

In Egypt, shows coordinated by youth gatherings, to a great extent free of Egypt's set up resistance groups, grabbed hold in the capital and in urban communities around the nation (Shehata, 2011). Dissenters called for Mubārak to venture down promptly, making room with the expectation of complimentary elections and democracy (Joya, 2011). As the exhibitions assembled strength, the Mubārak system turned to progressively brutal strategies against nonconformists, bringing about many wounds and passings.

Mubārak's endeavors to pacify the dissidents with concessions, including a vow to venture down toward the end of his term in 2011 and naming Omar Suleiman as VP the principal individual to fill in as such in Mubārak's almost three-decade administration—did little to subdue the turmoil (Bush 2011). After nearly three weeks of mass fighting in Egypt, Mubārak ventured down as president, leaving the Egyptian military in charge of the nation.

Despite the fact that dissenters in Egypt zeroed in a large portion of their indignation on homegrown issues, for example, destitution and government mistreatment, numerous spectators noticed that political change in Egypt could affect the nation's international concerns, influencing long-standing strategies. Under another system, focal components of Egypt's international strategy under Mubrak and his archetype as president, Anwar elSaadat, such as Egypt's political-military arrangement with the US and the 1979 EgyptIsrael truce, grasped by Egypt's chiefs but disagreed with the Egyptian public, could be debilitated or dismissed.

The dissenters' essential requests were the end of the Mubarak system. Strikes by workers' organizations added to the tension with government officials. During the uprising, the capital, Cairo, was portrayed as "a war zone" and the port city of Suez saw incessant brutal conflicts. Nonconformists opposed an administration forced check-in time, which was difficult to authorize by the police and military. Egypt's Central Security Forces, faithful to Mubarak, were continuously supplanted by military soldiers. In the tumult, there was plundering by agitators which was incited (as indicated by resistance sources) by casually dressed cops. Accordingly, watch groups were coordinated by civilian vigilantes to ensure their neighborhoods (Abdelali, 2013).

On 11 February 2011, Vice President Omar Suleiman declared that Mubarak surrendered as president, giving the capacity to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). On 13 February, the military junta, led by the powerful head of state Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, announced that the constitution had been suspended, the two houses of parliament had disintegrated, and the military would be in charge for a half year (until elections could be held). The past bureau, including Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik, would fill in as an overseer government until another one was formed (Puspitasari. 2017).

4.8. Causes of revolution in Egypt

Like Tunisia, there are several causes in Egypt which boosted the protests in the country. Some major reasons are as follows:

4.8.1. Political Causes

4.8.1.1. Concentrated Power

The political framework over which Mubarak managed packed force in the presidential part of the government. The People's Assembly chose the possibility of a president, which was supported by a public vote in which the decision was "yes" or "no." The president served a six-year term, inexhaustible inconclusively by submission. He had the ability to name — and then remove — the Prime Minister and the Pastors' Committee, to break down the bicameral parliament whenever he pleased, to blackball laws, and to bypass the assembly by putting issues to a vote in open referenda (Hale, 2013).

The NDP controlled, at any rate, 75% of the seats in the People's Assembly, aside from 1995 and 2010, when the NDP won 94 percent and 97 percent of the seats, individually. Besides, the president named all the lead representatives, civic chairmen, and agent city hall leaders. Nearby gatherings were chosen by a champ to bring home all the glory framework that ensured the NDP's syndication of intensity. This restraining infrastructure energized boundless defilement among neighborhood government officials (Chad, 2011).

The State of Emergency combined the president's supreme authority by engaging him and by assignment, the PM and pastor inside — to control the development of people, search people or places without warrants, tap phones, screen and boycott distributions, dis-allow gatherings and assistant suspects without preliminary (Amnesty International, 2010).

Social affairs of in excess of five individuals were illicit. The state could decide to allude civilians not exclusively to the criminal courts but additionally to Emergency State Security Courts and draconian military courts, where officials filled in as judges and there was no legal advance measure (Rosiny, 2012).

Security powers were at first released against rough Islamist groups that destabilized Egypt during the 1990s. Notwithstanding, after the Islamist groups disavowed brutality in 1997, the crisis and military courts kept on working. They indicted civilians accused of peaceful infractions, for example, Muslim brothers who met to plan for proficient organization elections or columnists who "defamed" system figures. Police progressively annoyed individuals in the city, requesting pay-offs from retailers and minivan drivers and free food from sellers and eateries. They seized and beat individuals to force bogus admissions or to constrain them to become sources. They badgered individuals who went to the police

headquarters to get IDs or other routine records, and they caught the individuals who "argued" with them (AFTE July-December 2010 Report).

Absolution International presumed that torment was "deliberate in police headquarters, jails and [State Security Investigations] SSI confinement focuses and, generally, dedicated without risk of punishment.... [Security and casually dressed police attack people] straightforwardly and in broad daylight as though indifferent to conceivable consequences." Even the public authority named National Council on Human Rights, in its first yearly report (2004), communicated profound worry about the 74 instances of "unmitigated" torment and 34 people who had passed on in police or SSI confinement that year. A U.S. representative cabled in 2009 to Washington that Omar Suleiman, overseer of the General Intelligence Directorate, and Interior Minister Habib al-Adly "keep the homegrown monsters under control, and Mubarak isn't one to lose rest over their tactics" (Goldstone, 2011; Bakr, 2012; Cook, 2012).

All parts of public life were controlled, going from oversight of social and media creation to the activity of worker's guilds (HRW, 2005:29-35). Public-area laborers were needed to join an association under the authority of the Egyptian Trade Unions Federation (ETUF), which was driven by NDP authorities who were frequently finance managers themselves. Laborers were prohibited from striking and, since the adjustment in the work law in 2003, were frequently employed on momentary agreements, under which they had no clinical — or social — protection benefits (El-Mahdi 2011).

Month to month, the minimum legal wage has not been raised since 1984, when it was set at LE 35 (equivalent to \$6 in 2011). Private-area laborers endured significantly more, as

the 2003 work law neglected to give any assurance to representatives arranging the length of the agreement, pay level, hours at work, extra time remuneration, excursion, or mid-day breaks. Laborers frequently need wellbeing and injury protection. Numerous private-area firms constrained fresh recruits to sign, alongside the agreement, Form No. 6, which permitted the business to fire them all of a sudden, cause, or severance pay (Cook, 2012:281-290).

Nongovernmental associations (NGOs) were directed under laws declared in 1964 and 2002 by the Ministry of Social Affairs, later renamed (without incongruity) the Ministry of Social Solidarity. The service affirmed NGO local laws, sheets of chiefs, spending plans, and movement programs directed at raising support and could shut down the NGO, supplant individuals from the overseeing sheets, and move assets to another NGO (ElGhobashy, 2012).

In spite of the fact that the public authorities applied tight command over political and public activity, it privatized the economy. In 1991, Egypt marked an Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The public authorities dropped reformist personal duties that year, privatized almost 200 firms during the decade and suddenly finished the 1954 Land Reform arrangements by passing Law 96 of 1992, executed in 1997 (Sharp, 2011: 3).

Tenant ranchers, whose tenures were perpetual (and acquired) under Land Reform, lost every one of their privileges. Landowners could reclaim the land or force whatever rental rate they wanted. Security powers assisted landowners with holding onto land, cutting off whole towns while they scoured houses and captured the sharecroppers. In cases where

landowners did not keep the land, they increased the lease tenfold or more, which the residents found difficult to pay (Bush 2005). They likewise rented the land for a year or less, crushing the occupants' motivator to put resources into long-haul enhancements (Sharp, 2011: 6).

Because the government had just closed the agrarian helpful administrations and stopped financing manures and pesticides, small landowners frequently relied on usurious advances from the Bank of Development and Agricultural Credit (BDAC) to purchase necessities. At the point when they couldn't take care of the advance, BDAC held onto the property and tossed them behind bars. Everyday costs additionally rose when the public authorities privatized water, power, and telephone benefits, and quit cleaning water system channels (Darwish 2007).

To endure, cultivating families turned to everyday wage work on the landowners' bequests, in any event, indenturing their youngsters by getting money against the kids' work time (Darwish 2007). As anyone might expect, elementary school enlistment dropped notably after 1997, fueling an endless loop to the extent that the most noteworthy destitution rates in rustic territories are found among the unskilled and the landless.

The impoverishment of the country and metropolitan workforce appeared differently in relation to the expanded convergence of riches and attendant defilement. The Central Auditing Organization disclosed various outrages, which now and then brought about jail sentences and fines. In any case, those who were dependable were often let off with no consequences or fled abroad (Ghanam 2001). Cases incorporated those of seven senior authorities condemned for misappropriation in the Port Said Free Zone and bank authorities

imprisoned for encouraging advances and credit to financial specialists without the necessary assurances.

A few pastors and state representatives went around state terrains to help people or sell land at suspiciously low prices. Maybe the most infamous authority was Ibrahim Suleiman, a clergyman of lodging and new metropolitan networks. He gave 8,000 sections of land free during the 1990s to the Talaat Mustafa Company to assemble the sumptuous Madinaty gated network (an arrangement that the legal executive voided in fall 2010); 8 sold land in Marina resort and along the Fayoum desert street at negligible costs; annihilated 129 squares of low-pay lodging in Qatameya in 1996, when an upscale fairway and estate complex was constructed close by; and attempted to hold onto two islands in the Nile in southern Cairo for a retreat (Taha, et.al. 2013).

4.8.1.2. The New Actors in Political Scenario

During the 2000s, a generally new coalition of lawmakers was led by the president's young child. Gamal sidelined the "privileged few" who had settled themselves in the public authorities, the NDP and parliament during the initial 20 years of Mubarak's standard.

Gamal went back to Cairo in the last part of the 1990s, following a six-year stretch in London as a venture financier with Bank of America. His dad selected him for the NDP general secretariat in February 2000. At that point, when the NDP performed inadequately in the parliamentary elections in pre-winter 2000, Gamal quickened his takeover (Brownlee 2008).

Secretary-General in 2002 and lost the Agricultural Ministry portfolio in 2004, which he had held for a very long time. At the NDP congress in September 2002, met under the trademark "A New Style of Thinking," Gamal made and headed the gathering's incredible Policies Secretariat. In his view, "We need bold pioneers who can set up their nation for the future and execute a few changes in any event, when they are disliked" (Cook, 2012: 282)

The key move came in the July 2004 bureau reshuffle that raised Atef Ebeid from the clergyman of correspondence and data innovation to head administrator. The 14 new bureau individuals spoke to a generational change as well as an adjustment in methodology.

Praised as "modernizers," they guaranteed that they would diminish the regulatory stranglehold and revive financial development (Özhan, 2013: 13).

Cornering power was revived in 2005, regardless of the way that a genuine authority election was held out of the blue, and opposition administrators won 23 percent of the seats in the People's Assembly that fall. The official election was significantly perilous. After the Wafd's Numan Gomaa won a straightforward 2.7 percent of the votes (according to the official check), the public position planned parts that stifled the social occasion. Ayman Nour, caught in mid-2005 on charges that he made blemishes on petitions to set up the alGhad party, got 7.6 percent of the votes but was rapidly rearrested and sentenced to five years in prison.

Clearly, the framework would not persevere through the littlest protection from Mubarak — or to his kid's anticipated movement. One of the issues was that, despite the fact that

judges sat in polling stations to ensure democratic transparency, they did not completely regulate the election cycle. NDP agents drove public-sector workers to polling places, gave voters pre-stamped voting forms, lavished kindness and pay-offs, and used the police to prevent people from entering polling places. When the Judges Club campaigned to keep legal freedom and voting transparency, the government retaliated by referring two senior adjudicators to a disciplinary council and removing judges from polling stations.

It even dropped the Higher Judiciary Council's position to delegate judges, giving that over to the presidential branch. Then, the president raised Gamal in February 2006 to be one of three appointee secretary officers in the NDP and remembered him for conciliatory missions. Gamal's Policies Secretariat drafted the 2007 sacred alterations that cleared the obstructions to his own progression. At the NDP yearly congress in September 2008, Gamal dispatched and headed the new 46-part Higher Policies Council.

The strategic maneuvers finished in the explicit gear of the fall 2010 parliamentary elections by NDP Secretary-General of Organizational Affairs Ahmed Ezz. This brought about the NDP's (counting associated autonomous competitors) winning 97 percent of the seats. Eight seats were consigned to resistance groups. The public authorities had captured many Muslim brothers during the prior year, making it almost unthinkable for the brothers to run solid applicants.

One of their chiefs finished up, "The elections are totally in the possession of the inside priest now. He chooses who wins and who loses and who can run. "The Wafd gathering and Muslim Brothers boycotted the run-off elections so as not to legitimize the result. Regardless, at the NDP congress in December, Gamal and Ezz pompously announced that

the NDP's "devastating triumph" approved their arrangements for another flood of neoliberal monetary strategies.

Coming in the wake of the president's not kidding activity in spring 2010, and months before the fall 2011 official elections, this developed desires — and fears — that Gamal was the blessed replacement. An NDP individual from parliament remarked by and large that Ahmed Ezz went excessively far: "The idiotic part is, we had resistance inside the parliament under a covered rooftop. He brought the resistance onto the road" (Cook, 2012: 282; Anderson, 2011:2; Korotayev & Zinkina, 2011:145)

4.8.1.3. Censorship and Lack of Freedom of Expression

The restriction on media and people's access to the internet ushered in an extraordinary marvel, i.e., correspondence through web-based media to exchange messages for democracy and system change (Taylor, 2011). Despite the fact that the Egyptian Constitution was changed in 2005, yet not to bring democracy, rather to additionally fortify one man's standard of Mubarak. The assembly elections were misrepresented, which was followed by the deception in the 2010 elections. Tahrir Square has been restricted to any show since 1981, when Hosni Mubarak came into power. The authoritarian standard of Mubarak for a very long time aliened the informed youth to the degree that they had planned gatherings via online media like, Egypt isn't my mom (HRW, 2005). This occurred at an unprecedented pace and when Mubarak attempted to take action against web assets,

it was past the point of no return, rather demonstrated counterproductive (Social Capital Blog, 2013).

It was astounding coordination via web-based media that a huge number of individuals turned out all the while to dissent and the Mubarak system was trapped in shock. Around 250,000 individuals assembled at Tahrir Square in Cairo, the capital of Egypt, for what they consider the "day of fury" (UNDP, 2011) against the Mubarak system. On the example of Tunisia, the 14-day exhibition sparked ridiculous clashes between professionals and those opposed to Mubarak's power. It was a reliable and long battle by the average folks that began in January 2008, prompting Tahrir square showings in January 2011 (Baron, 2012). It was joined by all the groups of society, including nonconformists, Islamists, ladies and minorities, which at long last established Mubarak to leave on 11 February 2011 (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2011:145).

4.8.2. Economic Challenges

One of the other significant purposes behind this mass uprising was the long-standing dissatisfaction towards the public authority arrangements, boundless debasement, monetary emergency, joblessness, and unfair mentality toward minorities. The entire annoyance was set apart towards a degenerate non-delegate authoritarian government, which couldn't address the issues of the individuals (Glassman and Glickmen, 2011). Its global trade offer had tripled, GDP increased by 5 to 7 percent between 1990 and 2008, and direct foreign investment remained \$46 billion between 2004 and 2009 (A Special Report on Egypt, 2010).

The question now is, if the economy was growing at such a rapid pace, why was financial dissatisfaction so high? The appropriate response is that, in a near sense, the monetary presentation was noteworthy, yet it couldn't come up to the desire of the general population. Also, the improvement was lopsided, dissemination of the abundance in the nation was not equivalent, and leaving a few regions completely denied, like Sinai and Upper Egypt (Barro, 2000). The hole between rich and poor was increasing and the joblessness rate increased to 9.7 percent. The college has become estranged from Mubarak's system as a result of this.

Noha Bakr (2012: 65-66), an expert on the Egyptian Revolution, discovered that the political mindset in Egypt prior to the revolt was critical and loaded with sharpness during Mubarak's 30 years in power. When the constitution was changed on numerous occasions explicitly to suit the November 2011 official election, which apparently favored Mubarak's child, Gamal Mubarak, the political framework in Egypt with the incorporated organization was accepted to have demanded clearing the way to genetic guidelines, killing any opportunity for free and reasonable rivalry. It was claimed that the outcome of the previous 2010 Parliamentary election, which gave the decision party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), a phenomenal lion's share win, was a forgery.

This election extortion, which likewise occurred in the 2005 administrative election, prompted the Egyptian desire that a similar plan would be shown in the following election. Aside from that, common liberties manhandled by security powers, in addition to the extraordinary debasement, by no uncertainty, delegitimized the system of political force which achieved a sensation of disappointment, unfairness, and mortification among

individual Egyptians. Also, as asserted by Monem (2012: 33), the consistent usage of the crisis laws throughout the span of 30 years has extended the intensity of the police.

For a long time, the resistance's political exercises were compelled and abuses on residents were inescapable. As Paciello (2011: 3) has pointed out, under Hosni Mubarak's rule, the political opposition in Egypt was weakened by the use of various instruments, for example, restraints, provocation, restrictions on the media and press, refusal to sanction parties, and appointive control. Each of these issues unavoidably diminished Mubarak's political authenticity and expanded in power. Some significant highlights are as under:

1. The vast majority of Egyptians live in limited spaces near the banks of the Nile River.
2. Around 40% of Egypt's population live on the fiscal income equivalent of roughly US \$2 per day, with a large part of the population relying on subsidized goods (2010).
3. The unemployment in Egypt is almost 10 times as high for college graduates as it is for people who have gone through elementary school, particularly educated urban youth. Egypt's GDP growth slowed down to 4.5% in 2009.
4. Despite high levels of national economic growth over the past few years, living conditions for the average Egyptian remained poor.

As per Noha Bakr (2012: 58), the Egyptian economy overall was performing beyond anyone's imagination, with its GDP development expanding from just underneath 5% during the 1990s to 7% in 2006-2008. Notwithstanding the monetary development, Ali

Sarihan contends that numerous Egyptians lived in helpless conditions. As recorded by the CIA World Factbook, the swelling proportion in Egypt was extremely high in 2010, at 11.1 percent, which prompted just about 20% of Egyptians living under the neediness level (Sarihan 2012: 75).

Additionally, the hole between the rich and the poor was extraordinary to the point that it prompted the issue of disparity and an imbalanced turn of events. The economy grew prior to the revolution, but this growth did not trickle down, as it benefited only certain classes and areas of the country, particularly the system's relatives. As Noha Bakr has brought up, there were regions in Upper Egypt that were totally estranged from the monetary turn of events, prompting the minimization in society. Aside from that, joblessness had arrived at 9.7%, which was concentrated among youth and graduates. The all out number of the jobless, just before the uprising was about 2.5 million, fundamentally youth aged 20-24 who comprised the primary striking power of the revolution (Korotayev and Zinkina 2011: 167).

4.8.2.1. Corruption

Alongside advancing privatization, numerous pastors delegated during the 2000s advanced debasement on a remarkable scale. They sold huge segments of the public area for their own advantage and diminished public interest in horticulture, land recovery, lodging, instruction, and wellbeing. Thus, they advanced private interest in infrequently effective fares arranged to farm, the development of gated networks for the elite, and the foundation of revenue driven private colleges and emergency clinics (Kefaya, 2006).

The elections in the fall of 2010 brought together this nexus of government, gathering, parliament, and friends of free enterprise. All the bureau priests who ran for parliament were chosen, utilizing their official situations to pay for crusade writing, guarantee administrations, constrain representatives to cast a ballot, and pay off others to help them (Amnesty International, 2010). Top finance managers with close connections to the Mubaraks and to bureau pastors became MPs, empowering them to attack the public authorities coffers from the inside, not only from outside.

Defilement accepted different structures. The sources of President Mubarak's wealth are still being investigated, and the investigator is attempting to piece together the slew of altruistic records that Suzanne Mubarak possessed. It is realized that the Mubaraks' children took payments on business bargains, held free or limited offers in organizations, utilized their functions in venture offices to use business for themselves and their colleagues, and got land and estates complimentary or for negligible installment (New York Times, 2020).

Gamal Mubarak's MED Invest Partners was paid a lot of money to inform western speculators about the buying of stocks and whole companies in Egypt. Gamal's 18 percent stake in EFG Private Equity, the biggest speculation bank in Egypt and an auxiliary of EFG-Hermes, procured 37 million Egyptian pounds (about \$6.25 million) benefits for him in the initial nine months of 2010 alone.¹⁷ of course, the public authorities assigned EFGH ernes to build up a LE 2.5 million asset (about \$425,000) in 2010 to oversee (and profit by) public-private interest in foundation and public-area ventures (Abdou & Zaazou, 2013: 98).

What's more, the Mubarak siblings got free or decreased rate shares, adding up to as much as 50% of the capital, in the biggest exchange and mechanical organizations working in

Egypt (Al Jazeera 2018). Furthermore, the Mubaraks amassed ideal arrangements inland as well as estates in decision-making areas. As noted, Alaa and Gamal got to land by "direct request" from land lords Suleiman and al-Maghribi and profited from the travel industry ventures authorized by the travel industry to serve Garana (Ezzat, 2012).

Land bargains by Minister of Housing (Ahmed al-Maghribi), the travel industry (Zuhair Garana), and transportation (Mohamed Mansour) were among the most complex organizations of debasement. Al-Maghribi was the cousin of both Mansour and Garana, and Mansour and al-Maghribi were accomplices in Mansour and Maghribi Investment and Development (MMID). That aggregate's advantages stretched out across tobacco, vehicles, food, and PCs; they additionally controlled Crédit Agricole Bank.

Mansour's sibling Yassin led Palm Hills Urban Developer, the second-biggest land-holding organization in Egypt, which MMID established. Al-Maghribi not just preferred the Mubaraks in his territory bargains, yet in addition, gave state land and pads expected for low-pay inhabitants to well-known people and workers. Most notably, he has been accused of an unmitigated benefit to himself: as a pastor, he sold land in Qatamiyya at below-market rates to Akhbar al-Youm Investment Company, which then exchanged it for MMID's Palm Hills. Such darling arrangements made other priests' exercises could not hope to compare (Abdelkader, 2013).

Ahmed Ezz's ascent to control offers a much more unprecedented model. In the wake of opening a little steel plant in Sadat City in 1995, he purchased a few public-area steel organizations and immediately arose as the extremely rich proprietor of 60% of Egypt's

steel and iron creation. He controlled (and subjectively raised) the cost of steel and, in this way, controlled development costs all throughout the nation (Goldstone, 2011).

His unique relationship with Gamal Mubarak empowered him to get unstable bank credits and payback old advances by taking out new ones. Financial experts and clergymen extended him courtesies in exchange for what he had done for them. The U.S. minister considered Ezz the most "censured" of the bad politico-financial specialists. (Surely, Ezz Steel's central command in Mohandesseen was burnt on the evening of January 28, 2011, the lone corporate office assaulted during the revolution.)

Ezz's political star rose all the while with his financial force, mirroring his nearby connections to the president's child. He became secretary of authoritative issues of the NDP and an individual from parliament in 2000, joined Gamal's new arrangement board of trustees of the NDP in 2002, and was reappointed to the People's Assembly in 2005. In his post as the seat of the get together arranging and spending council and an individual from the board of trustees for enactment, he ensured that the 2006 Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices would be too powerless to even consider affecting his inclinations. Finally, he coordinated the NDP syndication of the elections in November 2010. His monetary clout empowered him to overlook the name "the purchaser's number one adversary," and he thought he had the political clout to correspondingly disregard famous resentment at his political ruses (Abdelkader, 2013).

Then, the gap between rich and poor got intense. The rich developed gated networks while metropolitan foundations rotted and "casual" lodging thrived. Almost a large portion of the inhabitants of Cairo lived in impromptu territories that needed essential utilities, once in a

while living in wooden shacks. With the casual area involving 60% of the work power — and developing, as a large number of regular laborers lost their positions and in excess of 1,000,000 ranchers lost their property — the World Bank detailed that, by 2006, 62 percent of Egyptians were battling to remain alive on under \$2 every day (Liao, 2011: 119).

Crumbling general wellbeing and instruction frameworks and heightening food costs implied that by far most of the populace couldn't get to the sparkling innovative businesses and exorbitant private medical clinics and schools. Surely, 92 percent of all understudies were packed into inadequately overhauled state-funded schools. The government lacked a genuine financial development methodology, implementing strategies that benefited large corporations while harming small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Joblessness took off among youngsters, who turned out to be truly irritated (Liao, 2011: 119-127).

Some NDP members in parliament were clearly fed up with Finance Minister Boutros Ghali's tactics. During 2010, individuals from the People's Assembly's agrarian panel communicated outrage that he "overlooks ranchers' legitimate requests." The top of the get together's wellbeing council griped, "We get migraines from [his] numerous off-base choices." Even the public security undersecretary for parliament shouted that Boutros Ghali's arrangements made individuals scorn him.

It should likewise be noticed that, all through this period, government organizations perseveringly gathered information and aggregated reports on criminal operations in the public area. These reports covered the spending plans of services and state organizations and their related organizations and banks. They detail instances of wasting assets, selling or buying by direct request as opposed to delicate, and failing to follow legal cycles, among

other infractions. In 2005, the head of an analytical unit within the Ministry of Interior fled to Zurich, where he broadcast, "The Mubarak era will be referred to... as the era of hoodlums. "His official business is the plundering of public cash, and we find that the super-bad, ultra-deadbeats have accomplished state posts" (Lisa, 2011:2-7).

Laws against illegal tax avoidance and pay off were enhanced by the counter-imposing business model law that Ezz had watered down, yet they were once in a while upheld. A long time before the revolution, the press was flooded with information about degenerate pastors and lawmakers, to the point where non-NDP MPs formed a "front against debasement," compelling the gathering to discuss tougher opponents of defilement laws. It's not surprising that after February 11, people said, "We cleaned the system; now it's time to clean all the areas" (Lisa, 2011:2-7).

4.8.2.2 Political Dynamics in Post-Revolutionary Egypt

Egypt has been under dictatorial rulers with the help of a solid military since 1952. Despite widespread opposition and a desire for more support, the constitution was revised to include one-man rule. Throughout the Mubarak regime, the political scene was limited to the National Democratic Party through representation in the People's Assembly and Shura Council, which met with monetary separations, political "deliberation," and Islamist developments (Beitler and Jebb, 2003). The council was a masterpiece. There was a restriction on open exhibits and any such exertion was met by unreasonable utilization of power like nerve gas, elastic shots, and water guns.

These concealments sparked an increase in fights, which became uncontrollable in 2011. It is estimated that the number of fight demonstrations in 2004 was 266, which increased to

630 in 2008 and returned to a normal 5 per day in 2010 (Calleya and Wohlfeld, 2012). This shows the rising uneasiness against public authorities. Following the renunciation of Hosni Mubarak, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), managed by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, took the order of the nation (Schenker, 2012). Individuals were disappointed, raising trademarks' for nobility, democracy, and social equity 'during the mass dissent.

The main parliamentary elections in the post-revolution time frame were led by SCAF in 2011-2012. MB made up about 45 percent of the seats in the lower place of the parliament. It renounced its election-brutality strategy, and its official up-and-comer Morsi won the election with a narrow margin over Ahmed Shafik, the previous clergyman for civil flying in the Mubarak administration (Marwa, 2012). In any case, the antagonistic legal choices caused wild shocks for the newly formed political framework when they declared the newly elected parliament to be ill-conceived (Ahram, 2013).

SCAF arranged a broken constitution and expanded its forces not long before its burden on 17 June 2012. Afterward, President Morsi introduced this constitution on 26 December 2012. It was simply after mass dissent and armed force's merciless crackdown on the nonconformists that constrained the president to require a choice. All the resistance groups were fighting to cancel the remarkable forces of the president. The public authorities guaranteed that the constitution was endorsed by a 68.8 percent vote, yet since the turnout was just 32.9 percent of the all-out qualified electors, the real level of citizens was just 20.1 percent (Nazemroaya, 2013).

The primary civilian president, Morsi, neglected to guarantee the basic rights and tackle the financial emergencies. The military undermined him for 48 hours to deal with the circumstances of the bombing, and he was excused from his office on June 3, 2013. The other flaw was Egypt's new constitution. Morsi stayed in office only for one year and was excused after the arrangement of strikes and fights by the National Salvation Front, AlNour and enemies of Islamist powers. SCAF did indeed catch the government after Morsi's exoneration (BBC News, 2012).

Following two years of Arab uprising, Egypt had been partitioned into four groups; SCAF upheld by Judiciary, MB and its political wing the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), youthful dissidents coordinated in a non-Party development like April 6 Youth development and National Association for Change, and the leftovers of the past system (Baron, 2012). Other minor gatherings, for example, Coptic Christians, who make up about 8 to 12 percent of the population, and Salafis, who won 21 percent of seats in the 2012 parliamentary elections (Sharp, 2012), were also in line to confirm their inclinations in the new plan of intensity.

The current state of the political framework in Egypt shows that it has neither finished its transition to democracy nor it is going towards it. The military actually exists as a strong power, particularly when the Morsi government called them in a way as the Mubarak system used to call them to manage public dissent. It has likewise recharged the crisis laws of the Mubarak period. Judges delegated by the Mubarak system gave decisions opposed to the soul of public order and excused the Parliament. The President, as opposed to calling for sure-fire elections, delayed them on the record of political agitation.

The MB has lost its underlying situation because of its disagreeable approaches and pulling out of beginning responsibilities. Nonconformists set fire to three of its workplaces. Resistance gatherings and minority groups have been continually dissenting (Press TV, 2013). They ensured that all of Mubarak's public authority hardware remained in place, despite the fact that three years had passed since the revolution. The economy is still being guided and directed by global organizations, and Morsi's administration has failed to take any steps to build it on Islamic lines and provide social equity.

One of the significant explanations behind the crash of the cycle of transition was an undemocratic function of the legal executive. Egypt may never have established an independent judiciary in the last 60 years. The relevant conflict between the legal executive and the system named as the "slaughter of judges in which 100 adjudicators were released, who had requested the political changes in 1969 under Gamal Abdul Nasser (IBAHRI, 2011).

Another distinction has been observed between decisions made for political reasons, Islamic tendencies, and philosophical orientation (Pioppi, 2013). Generally, the legal arrangement of Egypt has never met with the global rules of an autonomous legal executive (Brown, 2012). What Egypt required is adjustment in each of the three fields: governmental issues, economy, and security. Society is becoming enraptured by 'civil liberties, independence, Islamism, and secularism,' and the concept of progress is still a long way off (UNDP, 2011).

MB under Morsi neglected to address these issues and convert their democratic yearnings into the real world. Since the excusal of Morsi in July 2013 further deteriorated the

circumstances of basic liberties since General Sisi came into power. He made exceptional moves, which were unfavorable to all democratic standards. The most problematic occurrences were: the confinement of the writer on questionable charges, Minaya preliminary (BBC MEN). More than 1500 Islamists were detained alongside Morsi and Rabaa slaughter (Kingsley, 2014). Notwithstanding perpetrating different abominations, numerous individuals actually see "the military (SCAF) as the security net which shields Egypt from plunging into complete confusion" (Cachalia, 2014).

In the final months of Morsi's exile, there was a decision to draft a new constitution and hold a formal election. Regardless, the result of the 2014 elections was certain at the time, with the military unfailingly seizing power since SCAF excused Morsi. The privileged few of Egypt assumed control over the force again with similar energy and zing. A large number of them accepted putting Islamists behind bars for political difficulty. Anyway, the US demanded to permit the MB to take an interest in governmental issues. Evidently, the military junta concurred. However, the lion's share of them are not prepared to sit with MB since they accept that MB has been engaged in mass killings (The Guardian, 23 July 2013).

Inner pressures were confounded by assailants in the Sinai Peninsula who promised loyalty to the Islamic State in 2014. In 2015, ISIS arranged an influx of assaults in the Sinai against the military, Coptic Christians, and the Sufi people group. It additionally asserted the bringing down of a Russian carrier. Egypt's armed forces dispatched a significant hostile force against ISIS but failed to subdue it. Aggressor groups developed bolder in their assaults, remembering for police and security faculty, in 2016 and 2017.

In 2017 and 2018, the public authorities forced new limitations on controlling nongovernment associations and a good cause. Developing financial hardships additionally drove the public authorities to slice public endowments of power and water, raise fuel costs, and raise public transportation admissions. In 2018, Egypt denoted the seventh commemoration of the Arab Spring uprising by stopping courses at Tahrir Square. In March, el-Sissi was reappointed with 97 percent of the vote, in spite of the fact that the turnout was low and he confronted for all intents and purposes no opposition.

4.9. Egypt under the Rule of El-Sisi

Since Sisi came to power via a military coup in 2013 and became president the following year, military officers and military concerns have increasingly dominated governance. Once-proud civilian institutions such as the judiciary, legislature, central auditing authority, and diplomatic corps have been stripped of independence. A recent law mandating the appointment of a military advisor to each provincial governor enshrined in law what had already been happening in practice; a military officer with veto power is placed alongside high-ranking civilian officials such as ministers and governors (Brown 2017). Elections still take place, but opposition candidates are excluded, processes and results are opaque, and few voters have trouble showing up except for those desperate for a handout of food. Meanwhile, independent political parties, youth movements, media, and civil society organizations have been crushed, with the few courageous survivors being continually hounded to toe the line (Brown, 2017).

In the economy, Sisi has expanded the military's involvement significantly through carefully targeted changes in laws and procedures—as if it were not already enough that

military companies benefit from conscript labor, tax-free status, and free access to vast tracts of government land. The military now controls much of government contracting and has moved aggressively into profitable sectors previously dominated by private companies, including cement, steel, and media. This very week, privately owned cement companies in Egypt are collapsing after a military company began flooding the market with cement.

As to the policy and spending priorities of this military-dominated regime, are they related to the life-and-death challenges facing the Egyptian people: population, water, food, jobs? Not really. A quick look at how Sisi has expended resources over the past five years shows that his attention has been fixed on megaprojects and arms purchases that build his stature and enrich his fellow officers (Issaev and Korotayev, 2014).

While Egyptians sank into ever-greater poverty over the past five years, Sisi has poured resources into vanity megaprojects such as building a new administrative capital in the desert 30 miles east of Cairo at an estimated cost of \$58 billion. Not only did Egypt not need a new capital, but the site makes it inaccessible to most citizens as well as extremely problematic from a water consumption point of view. The city is being built by a military company with significant Chinese investment. As of spring 2019, the Egyptian general in charge of the project said that some \$9 billion had already been spent on the city's infrastructure.

Sisi has also expended much over the last five years building Egypt's arsenal. Egypt was the third largest importer of weapons in the world from 2015-2019, more than doubling its percentage of imports compared to the previous five year period. By my informal calculation, the Egyptian military has spent at least \$9 billion during that time on three

large arms deals with France and Russia, purchasing aircraft including the Russian SU35 as well as warships (Kuimova 2020).

Egypt also received Apache attack helicopters and other advanced weaponry from the United States during the same period. While Egypt has legitimate security concerns—a long border with Libya as well as a terrorist insurgency in the Sinai—it is not at war. These acquisitions seem to be more about building the prestige and patronage networks of the Egyptian military as well as diversifying Sisi's international alliances than about responding to actual threats (Berman and Albo, 2020).

While spending lavishly on megaprojects and weapons, Egypt under Sisi has also borrowed extensively at home and abroad. From the IMF alone, Egypt has borrowed \$20 billion since 2016 (Mossallem 2017), all of which will need to be repaid in tranches beginning in 2021. Gulf donors who poured billions into Sisi's coffers after the coup are less willing or able to do so now as they face their own financial troubles, and so Egypt is almost certain to go back to the IMF for more funding next year to meet its endless need for external financing. Yet the IMF so far has been not been willing to take on the issue of military encroachment on the private sector or Sisi's spending on megaprojects and weapons, much of which takes place from nontransparent military accounts.

The combination of a rapidly growing, youthful Egyptian population whose needs are constantly frustrated with a small military elite that enriches itself while treating civilian concerns with contempt is combustible. There have been several small outbursts of antiSisi popular protests, as well as signs of dissent within the military (Yee & Rashawn, 2019).

4.10. The Implications of the Rise and Fall of Islamist in Egypt for Regional Politics

After the end of thirty years of the regime of Hosni Mubarak, the Muslim brotherhood party (religious party) won the general elections in Egypt. The victory of the Muslim brotherhood has shown the compatibility between Islam and democracy. Egypt was inclined to design their constitution on the basis of Islam in the Post Arab Spring era (Asad, 2015). But within a year, due to the issues of bad governance, President Mohammad Morsi was removed from his post by a military coup which Morsi called an undemocratic removal and compared his presidency with the USA (Kirkpatrick 2013).

The military coup was a result of public protests against Morsi. Although the military took advantage of the protests during Morsi's regime, that situation was created by the bad governance of Morsi. Morsi's supporters believed that because Morsi won a majority in elections and was elected to a four-year term, there would be a significant difference in votes between Morsi and his opponents from the previous regime, indicating that half of Egyptians supported the previous regime (Yaldin and Golov 2013).

Some other factors, including the absence of Parliament due to which President Morsi was not accountable to any one, played a role in Morsi's overthrow (Brown 2012). While contesting themselves for elections, the Muslim brotherhood promised that they would not participate in Presidential elections and also promised good governance in Egypt, but both promises were broken by them, which led to protests against them and also resulted in the death of hundreds of those protesters. There was also fear that the President would hold elections after three years of his term (Chumley 2013). The rise of Islamist power in Egypt

stimulated the rise of Islamic parties in all the Middle Eastern Muslim states. They have leading roles in post-revolution Tunisia and Libya (Plaetzer 2014).

In Syria and Yemen, they have a key role in uprisings. Islamic parties have also won elections in Morocco and Kuwait. The rise of Islamist movements in the Arab countries that have passed through political upheavals over the last three years has become disconcerting now. Some of the pessimists are of the view that the "Arab Spring" has paved the way to an "Islamic Winter" (Grinin, 2012). They think that dictators are replaced by religious fanatics. However, it is too early to lament on the issue.

The Islamist movements have a long history of struggling. Their success was not a surprise. They have long been the most popular and organized movements in their respective countries, and have been reshaping the culture of the Arab lands for decades. The alternative intervals of tolerance and suppression towards the MB by the Egyptian dictators tell the story of their resistance to the latter. In this process, small factions of Islamist movements have resorted to violence, while others have learned to address the political problems through political actions. At the time of the revolution, Islamist movements were well positioned to get "advantage of political openings, and have indeed taken the lead in many of the transitions" (Ismail & Ismael, 1985: 6). In the first decade of the twenty-first century, they took the momentum to defend their faith and implement their political agenda against discrimination and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) (Gunaratna, 2015).

There has been a steady growth of formidable political movements like the MB in Muslim countries wherever they have space to operate. It's a valid question about how would they shape or be shaped by the new politics of the region. In fact, the rise of MB gave strength

to the Muslim movements to fight with the despotic rulers in Yemen, Syria and Bahrain (Welter, 2014). The support these movements could get from the overwhelmingly Muslim population was not possible for any secular movement.

The domino effect of the Iranian Revolution, which inspired these movements but was stifled by unfavorable circumstances, made the time ripe for mass uprising (Foran and Goodwin, 1993). Although it is not a democratic start but keeping the experience of the European political parties, it seems that the Islamic movements would shape their politics on democratic norms as the only way to elevate themselves to the pedestal of governance (Cespi Report, 2010).

The rise of Islamists in western perception resulted in the rise of religious intolerance in society toward minorities. That is already there and in the transition period, it might be aggravated. Not only the religious, but the sectarian differences have already been used by the dictators to divide the people. But it would be confined to minor incidences of violence, not to the level of mass violence, because the Islamic parties which rose to power are those enjoying the reputation of moderate parties, not the extremist ones (Sallam, 2015). The Sunni MB showed a positive gesture towards Shia Iran, ideologically a pole apart from each other. Morsi's official visit is evidence of it. Despite all that, the Iran-Saudi rivalry will continue to plague the peace in Muslim countries (Al-Alawi & Schwartz, 2013).

The third is the implication of the rise of Islamists on Arab-Isreal relations. Since Hamas is close to the MB, it was expected that Egypt would back out from the Camp-David accord, 1979. However, in the early stages, the SCAF's declaration that Egypt would continue to honor its international commitments was interpreted as a sign of relief (New York Times,

2012). Morsi's reluctance to open Gaza's border was criticized, but it shows that the regional security was not likely to change.

Although MB does not support the idea of western styled democracy, it failed to please the counterrevolutionary forces and implement its political ideology and methodology. Consequently, it has been overthrown with the help of western supported factions and a military backed government under General El-Sisi has been established. MB, along with its political wing, Freedom and Justice Party, was banned from participating in the 2014 elections. It has been officially declared a terrorist organization with a violent ideology and pro MB protesters were extensively and publicly targeted (Al Jazeera, 08 March 2014).

All the modern Islamic movements were labelled as extremists by the western media. The whole Arab region is now at risk of chaos after the followers of the West were appalled against the transitional phase of democracy and imprisoned thousands of Islamists. It is certainly a result of western fears and not a direct effect of MB's ideology (Ramahi, 2014).

Even if Egypt had the worst form of democracy, military dictatorship can't become the replacement of democracy, but there were some other factors involved as well. The Egyptian Army, which is also pro-liberal, did not want to accept Islamism as president. The Egyptian Army calculated that the US military would prefer a military dictatorship with puppet democracy over Islamism Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, who were not interested in securing US interests (Tabaar, 2013).

Egypt is among the most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change as well as shocks such as COVID-19. It has a large and rapidly growing population of approximately

102 million, but there is no serious population control program. Only approximately three percent of its land is arable, and that is now being diminished by the effects of climate change, including higher temperatures, more frequent droughts, and soil salinity from the rising Mediterranean Sea (Hassany, 2020).

Egypt receives very little rainfall and has depended for millennia on the plentiful flow of the Nile River from the south, but now it is facing increased competition from Ethiopia and Sudan for Nile water. The government has made some investments in desalination and wastewater treatment, but much water is wasted in outdated irrigation and evaporation. Egyptians desperately need a revolution in water use and agriculture, as well as a comprehensive program to curb population growth, to avoid food insecurity and other disasters in the coming years (BTI Report, 2020)

While President Sisi has received the IMF stamp of approval for cutting government expenditures and generating a modest rise in GDP, at the same time, his people have grown increasingly poor (Egypt Independent 2020). In 2018, the government statistical agency admitted that 32.5 percent of Egyptians were living on less than \$1.50 per person per day, 5 percent more of the population compared to 2015 (IMF report 2019).

The government's cash transfer programs—implemented after many years of urging by the IMF, World Bank, and donors including the United States—reach no more than 10 percent of the population. The World Bank estimated youth unemployment in 2019 to be above 30 percent. These indicators will have worsened due to the pandemic-induced economic recession, which has hit the tourism sector, as well as natural gas prices particularly hard (Saraj al-Din, 2020).

4.11. Civil Society in Egypt

State and civil society in Egypt before 2011. It is worth noting that tracking the history of the nature of the state-civil society relationship in Egypt is important because civil society organizations began to emerge a long time before 2011. Back in the late eighteenth century, the social system in Egypt was formed of communities (carpenters, coppersmiths, etc.) where the expression of interests was through "elders." At the beginning of the liberal era (1923-1952), the Wafd Party was established in 1919, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1923, as well as professional and labor unions were formed (Hanna, 2002).

This era also witnessed the growth of civil activities and expansion of civil society, the promulgation of the 1923 Constitution which stipulated the freedom to form civil associations, thus providing an appropriate political climate for voluntary civil initiatives.

In the post-1952 period, the relationship between the state, on the one hand, and trade unions and social organizations, on the other hand, underwent a number of changes, ranging from tight control in the 1950s and 1960s to more liberalization starting in the 1970s. The following decades witnessed remarkable developments in the role of civil society organizations (particularly the ones with religious background) to help the state with its socio-economic tasks among the grass roots. This helped make way for more independent action by civil state organizations (Kandil, 2006).

Early signs of changes away from a state-centric relationship to a more society-centric one occurred in the first years of the third millennium. In 2005, the Egyptian Movement of

Change "Kefaya" (Aoude and Ibrahim, 2013) (meaning "Enough") was established in 2004, called for civil society, supervise the electoral process and started reporting about the human rights situation in Egypt (Beinin, 2011). In 2006, worker protests erupted at Mahalla spinning company and workers went on strike (Beinin, 2011). The event was supported by a newly born social movement named after the strike date, the 6th of April (El-Mahdi, 2011).

Starting from 2008, there was a remarkable escalation in protests, especially those taking place next to the Parliament and Council of Ministers buildings. Though protests were mainly revolving around socio-economic demands (Fawzy, 2010), both the 6th of April Movement (essentially active on social networks) and Kefaya Movement highlighted the political aspects of these protests, and stressed the necessity of introducing political changes and blocking Mubarak's son's ambition to seize power (Joya, 2011).

At the same time, sporadic news spread from time to time about the heir's behavior toward "old guards" in state institutions. This news raised doubts about the elite unity and its consensus with regard to the succession issue (Lynch, 2011). This unity obviously came to an end when the army took the side of demonstrators on the 25th and 28th of January till the demise of Mubarak rule on the 12th of February, paving the way for a new era where civil society organizations will be among the most influential actors in the Egyptian political scene (Howard and Walters, 2014).

The 25th of January upheaval revived hopes of the possibility of reforming the relationship between the state and society in Egypt (Kandil, 2011). Within the context of the transitional period, the Constitutional Declaration of March 2011 guaranteed the right for citizens of

the state and civil society in Egypt to establish voluntary organizations as defined by law (Joya, 2011). Both Kefaya and 6th April were very active in mobilizing the masses, especially the youth (Bush, 2011). At the beginning of the transitional period, when the Supreme Council of Armed forces (SCAF) took the lead after Mubarak's demise, social movements were on good terms with the post-revolutionary regime because of the support of the army.

However, tensions started to occur when the 6th April Movement voiced its disapproval of the constitutional declaration put to vote by SCAF in March 2011 (Abdullah, 2012). The declaration specified conditions for both presidential and parliamentary elections, stating that the latter should take place prior to the writing of the new constitution (Singermon, 2013). Mutual accusations started to occur between SCAF and the 6th April Movement. The former expressed its concerns about the movement's activities, which were said to encourage incitement against state institutions, including the army, creating a situation that threatened to devolve into total chaos.

As for the movement, the enduring rule of SCAF meant the abortion of any attempt to make real change toward achieving the goals of the revolution. However, tensions did not emanate only from the outside; internal cleavages also started to occur when Ahmed Maher – the leader of the 6th April Movement – was charged with autocratic behavior toward members and colleagues (Gheytanchi and Moghadam, 2014). Splits took place and the movement witnessed early divisions that began in August 2011 and continued till the actual demise of the movement in 2014 (Abdel Rahman, 2011).

On the other hand, human rights organizations (which used to work in a context of relative liberalization during the Mubarak era) took actions in documenting violations against protestors, accusing SCAF of delaying the process of transition to democracy and maneuvering to keep an upper hand over the course of events at the expense of revolutionaries (Stork, 2012). Criticism by these organizations was much more raised as a response to statements made by Fayza Aboul Naga about the illegal funding received by those organizations (especially from the USA) to activate work against state institutions.

Aboul Naga stressed that the revolutionary fervor after January 2011 caused a destabilized atmosphere which was exploited externally to encourage further destabilization at the hands of some NGOs and human rights organizations based in Egypt. When some members were arrested and then released shortly after, it was said that the Egyptian authorities fell under pressure from the USA in favor of human rights organizations (Morayef, 2015).

Though this had a negative impact on the SCAF's image, it had the obvious effect of drawing attention to the potentially dangerous and questionable external liaisons of these NGOs, which was later to be highlighted in order to restrict their role and influence vis-à-vis the state (The Arab Strategic Report, 2011).

The year 2012 signaled the end of the transitional period to democracy when parliamentary and presidential elections took place with debatable results in the overall. When the newly elected president removed the Field Marshal Hussein Tantawy – Minister of Defense – with his Deputy Lieutenant General Sami Anan and referred both to retirement, the step was hailed by NGOs (Human Rights Organizations in particular) as inaugurating a new

phase in the modern history of Egypt where civilians take the lead instead of the military (Abbasi, 2012).

Mohamed Morsi took further steps to dissolve the inherited state institutions, which – according to him – were highly corrupt, inefficient, and inappropriate for putting the "revolutionary targets" into effective implementation. News came out with declarations about the necessity to re-design these institutions totally and recruit new people who are loyal to the revolution (Gunaratna, 2015).

A new project for national construction, "Mashrou, Ennahda" was launched, and the elected president promised Egyptians to expect remarkable improvement in security and economy in 100 days. However, conditions of life worsened and sentiments of frustration aroused among people. When harsh criticisms began to fall on the newly elected political elite, the latter leveled accusations at the "deep state establishments," which were said to be undermining the power of both the revolutionaries and their elected representatives (Asad, 2015).

To protect the new elite from such offenses, hasty measures were taken to issue the final draft of the "constitution of the revolution" to put it to vote in a referendum. The peak of such measures was the issuing of a constitutional declaration in November 2012, where all executive legislative and judicial powers were concentrated in the hands of the elected president. When protestors headed for the presidential palace, they were brutally beaten and seriously injured by the president's supporters from the Muslim Brotherhood (Sallam, 2015). Two consultants of the president resigned, condemning violence against sitters, popular criticism mounted and fears aggravated, especially when the president declared

that sacrificing the lives of some is a cheap price for protecting both revolution and democracy.

Although the year from 2012 to 2013 witnessed a big surge in the number of newly established NGOs – and this should have been considered as a positive signal of civil society empowerment vis-a-vis the state – most of these organizations still fall within the control of the new regime. In addition, there were trials in the Criminal Court for 43 people working in NGOs and accused of receiving illegal funds from foreign countries in June 2013. Verdicts ranged from one year to five years in prison. Conditions were no better for syndicates which enjoyed less and less independence (Morayef, 2015).

The "Rebel" campaign was soon launched in April 2013, calling for early presidential elections, gathering signatures from all over the country to put pressure on Morsi and his supporters. The campaign was met with big success, gathering over 23 million signatures, and this gave momentum to popular mobilization against the political regime which obviously lacked the support of its previous allies in addition to divisions in its own ranks. Protestors swept Al-Tahrir square for three consecutive days (starting from the 30th of June till the 3rd of July 2013) under the protection of army troops. The army specified a 48-h time limit for Morsi to rethink his early election proposal. When no response occurred, the military intervened on the stage to topple Mohamed Morsi and declare Adly Mansour – president of the Supreme Constitutional Court – as temporary president in a new transitional phase (Brown, 2012).

With the demise of Mohamed Morsi's rule, two intertwined processes have been unfolding gradually: the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood and its figures from the political scene,

on the one hand, and the state consolidation of its unity and the restoration of major aspects of its social control, on the other hand (Woltering, 2014). Amidst these two processes, civil society organizations lost most of their momentum and witnessed a noticeable retreat in both status and impact with regard to issues debated in the public sphere. The new regime benefited from both the legitimacy it gained after the dethroning of Morsi and the divisions within civil society to tighten its grip on the course of events (Abdou and Skalli, 2018).

The first measure was the issuing of the "law of demonstration" by the interim president, Adly Mansour, in November 2013. The new law imposed new restrictions on demonstration activities, including the requirement that a license be obtained three days before the marching of a demonstration, and that the timing and location be approved by local security authorities; and that if demonstrations pose a threat to order and laws, the minister of interior has the authority to cancel them (Archive, 2013).

In an act of challenge to the new law, the leaders of 6th April called for demonstrations against it. The authorities responded by arresting the movement leaders, sentencing three of them to three years in prison in line with the articles of demonstration law. When the bombing of Cairo and Daqahliyya security directorates happened on 24/1/2014 and 24/12/2013, respectively (AlMasry AlYoum, 2014), the Muslim Brotherhood was declared as a terrorist organization, and all groups and organizations calling for demonstrations were accused of inciting chaos and disorder.

A TV show called "The Black Box" started in the first quarter of 2014 to release leaks about the 6th April movement, leaks that caused great harm to its public image (Mogeb, 2013). Rumors were spread then that these leaks would not have been publicized without

the help and consent of the security parties, which were in turn accused by the movement members and supporters of illegal violation of private lives (Thabet, 2016). However, the TV anchor defended his program by insisting that the leaks were not about "private" lives; they were about people discussing "public" issues, and thus their discussions should be made public too (AlMasry AlYoum, 2014).

Regardless of the heated debate, the harm was already done, and conditions got worse when some Western leaders called for the immediate release of the detained activists of the 6th April Movement, and affiliates to the Muslim Brotherhood did the same. By this time, the general mood in Egypt was not welcoming to such calls which raised suspicions about dangerous liaisons between the movement, the terrorist Muslim Brotherhood and the external parties, all seen as willing to see more of "revolutionary chaos," disorder and instability (Tabaar, 2013).

When movement members called for a boycott of presidential elections in June 2014, at a time when AL Sisi's popularity was at an all-time high, this added to the movement's negative image and caused further schisms within its ranks. Parliamentary elections were launched in September 2015; some prominent members of the movement participated as "independent" candidates, not affiliated any more to the 6th April group. It was easy then for the government to confiscate the movement properties and headquarters without facing significant opposition (ElWatan News, 2014).

In April 2016, and on the occasion of border demarcation between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, movement members reappeared again to call for protest against "selling Egyptian territories" (Alhramain, 2016). The close convergence of the Muslim Brotherhood and the

movement on this issue allowed state institutions to attack both, especially after the Egyptian–Saudi agreement was approved by the elected parliament. This convergence also occurred with regard to some serious events that struck the country, something that led many to conclude that the movement has been standing in the same trench with the Muslim Brotherhood in inciting chaos and stimulating instability. It has also been possible for the state to portray the 6th April Movement as a public enemy because of another important reason.

Since 2014, several measures have been taken to improve economic and social conditions in Egypt and success news were reported not only internally but internationally; economic reforms led to a sizable increase in foreign exchange reserves; external loans and grants have been used to start huge development in infrastructure; tourism recovered because of overall stability and security; and policies to improve the lives of the poor were also recorded (Economic Review Publication Documents, 2019).

The army took responsibility for pushing productive activities in some areas in addition to its remarkable contribution to housing and infrastructure projects, and the recording of an annual economic growth that amounts to 6 per cent, being one of the highest in the MENA region and even the world (Economic Review Publication Documents, 2019). The Egyptian state has been regaining vital aspects of its social control, and this undoubtedly has helped it to stand firm with regard to pressures coming from civil society groups. The Kefaya Movement (Enough) was in no better position than the 6th April Movement. The former chose to refrain REPS from participation in public sphere debates since 2014 and

stressed only that state policies must always consider and work in line with the "revolutionary targets" (Morayef, 2015).

In addition to the increasing social control practised during this period, the state managed to keep the unity of its main institutions under Al Sisi's strong leadership (Helal, 2015). Not only did these institutions work harmoniously, but also no serious splits were allowed to find way to them. Though this contributed substantially to ensuring a stronger position of the state vis-a-vis civil society organizations, the regime did not rely wholly on this. Actually, there were steps taken to modify laws regulating civil work, so as to alleviate some of the restrictions that set limits on this work in the past years, especially during the turbulent times that followed the 2011 events (Abdel Wahab, 2016).

The main modifications were the measures that must be followed by NGOs to get licenses for work (Al Masry Al Youm, 2010); the fees that should be paid; the minimum and maximum bank deposits necessary to fund their activities; the receiving of grants from external parts; and the penalties implemented (Ahram Online, 2011) all to witness important changes toward more liberalization of NGOs work. These measures were generally welcomed internally and internationally, something that strengthened aspects of social control by the Egyptian state (Fahmi, 2019).

CHAPTER 5

Transition Status towards a Consolidated Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of Tunisia and Egypt

Despite their political and economic heterogeneity, the North African nations and some of the Middle Eastern societies participated in the Arab Spring — share certain fundamental qualities. The Arab upheavals of (2011-2012) mass rallies that challenged autocratic leadership across the Middle East and North Africa took the world by surprise. The thought that the Arab region could finally be releasing the clutches of oppression was exhilarating. But within several years, these dreams had mostly been crushed. Popular mobilization had left in its wake a political scenario strewn with state failure, civil conflict, and authoritarian retreat. To pessimists, this dismal turn in the Arab world was inevitable. But for others, different pathways were possible.

Nowhere is this distinct possibilities expressed more clearly than in the contrast between Tunisia and Egypt. These two nations, equally gifted with historically powerful governments and ethnically homogenous communities, were the first to throw off their long-lived dictators. At the onset of the upheavals, they looked most positioned to move to democracy effectively. At the end of 10 years, however, the two countries found themselves in profoundly different locations. Tunisia has succeeded in breaching the barrier of democratic transition. But Egypt had regressed, embracing authoritarian policies that were in some ways more restrictive than what had come before.

The discussion of Democratic Success/Authoritarian Reversion in Tunisia and Egypt begins with a justification of the puzzle of how we determine Tunisia to be a case of successful democratic transition and Egypt to be a case of authoritarian reversion. The concept of democracy is complex and multi-dimensional (Bayat, 2013: 587-601). But for the sake of simplicity, this study defines successful transition by falling back on convention: the "simple turn over test." Namely, democratic transition begins with the removal of an authoritarian regime and ends when free and fair competitive elections (made meaningful through provision of basic civil liberties) have delivered two successive alternations of power in government (Bayat, 2017).

Clearly, the specified shift is precarious and changeable, and thus falls well short of "consolidation" (Bayat, 2008). Nonetheless, it is a notable and admirable achievement. Authoritarian reversion, on the other hand, is the process that occurs when an authoritarian dictatorship is deposed and a country attempts political openness but fails due to the inability of elections to offer meaningful power alternation (or because civil liberties are so compromised as to make the elections a farce). Tunisia's and Egypt's success and failure (after the dictator's overthrow) seems quite evident in these terms.

Those that place socio-economic elements at the core of study are among the most well known democratization theories. The modernization school, exemplified by Lipset's classic work (Beinin & Vairel, 2013a), associated successful democratization with economic growth since its correlates (such as increasing literacy and urbanization) were reportedly democratizing (Beinin & Vairel, 2013b: 1-29). Marxist-inspired work, on the other hand, related the emergence of democracy to capitalist economic growth and the formation of

social classes (alternatively the "bourgeoisie" or the "working class") whose economic interests drove them to support political openness (Belakhdar, 2015: 137, 27-48).

Other socio-economic studies focused on factors such as economic crisis (viewed as impeding democratization by reducing the rents available to buy popular and elite support for political opening) (Benford & Snow, 2000: 611-639) and high levels of inequality (viewed as impeding democratization by increasing elite fear of democracy's potential redistributive consequences) (Benford & Snow, 2000: 611-639). Other socioeconomic techniques are also at risk of being questioned. The idea that economic disparity weakens democracy has not been empirically supported, nor has the distributive conflict model of democratization (Boubekuer, 2016: 107-127).

The empirical research of third and fourth wave of democratization does not support Acemoglu, Robinson, and Boix's relation of inequality to unsuccessful democratic transitions (Brandes & Engels, 2016: 10-15). Some would argue that Tunisia's inclination for democratization was stronger since its overall success on numerous key "modernization" metrics (literacy, urbanization, and life expectancy) outperformed Egypt's.

Cross-temporal study of the Tunisian situation best demonstrates the indeterminacy of Tunisia's structural benefits. Tunisia had already tried democratic openness in earnest in 1987, when Ben Ali pledged political reform after deposing the country's dictatorial founding father. Given the country's outstanding success on several modernization metrics, optimism was high (literacy, urbanization, size of middle class). But, in the end, Tunisia's

social structural endowments proved ambiguous, and this confidence proved false. Tunisia was guided along a 23-year authoritarian path by Ben Ali (Pioppi, 2013, pp. 51-68).

Instability and a conflicting trajectory characterized the years following the revolution. With the implementation of a structural adjustment programme in 1986, which included the increasing liberalization of international commerce and the privatization of state-owned firms, economic reforms gained fresh momentum. Throughout the 1990s, a government sponsored modernization programme improved the competitiveness of export-oriented businesses. The process of removing reciprocal trade barriers for industrial products with the European Union was completed, at least on paper, on January 1, 2008.

However, there are still a lot of logistical inefficiencies in international trading (e.g., bureaucracy, custom procedures). High unemployment rates (especially among the comparatively well-educated young), persistent regional disparities, the erosion of the welfare state, and blatant corruption at all levels of state administration marked the years leading up to the revolution, despite respectable rates of economic growth.

The empirical and theoretical research of social instability factors has resulted in a large number of papers analyzing events that occurred in many nations at various eras. These research have identified the following as the most major sources of instability:

1. Existence of ethnic tensions and conflicts (inter-confessional, inter-clan, intra-elite);
2. Political order instability
3. Uneven socioeconomic and social benefits distribution;
4. Poverty is widespread;
5. There are structural and geographical dangers present.

6. Corruption in the government is at an all-time high.

7. Existence of a compelling alternative to the current political regime and others.

The primary processes and major determinants of societal instability in this case are determined by the country's kind and historical and sociopolitical condition. The events of the Arab Spring in 2011 and subsequent years give a wealth of data for studying sociopolitical instability in modernizing nations with strong clan traditions. The events of the Arab Spring allows us to discuss the following internal instability variables that are frequent in nations of this sort.

1. In modernizing civilizations, there are objective sources of instability.

2. Political preconditions: political order; intra-elite rivalry; ineffective power transfer mechanisms

3. Internal social, religious, ethnic, and tribal conflicts; b) Social preconditions—the presence of internal social, religious, ethnic, and tribal conflicts;

4. Demographic factors—the presence of "combustible material," which is determined by the demographic component (for example, young unemployment);

5. Foreign factors—the presence of a substantial destabilizing/stabilizing external element that affects the country's growth;

6. Historical context—the occurrence of large-scale battles that resulted in the "combustible material" being burned away in the recent past;

7. Religion factor—the existence or absence of a legal foundation for the Islamist-oriented opposition to function.

8. Subjective (psychosocial, cultural, and historical) instability variables that emerge throughout time:


9. A crisis of unmet modernization aspirations;

10. The existence of a compelling (though maybe fictitious) alternative to the current administration.

In this part, we will examine and evaluate many aspects that affect democratic durability and potentially lead to an appropriate route toward solidified democracy in the post-Arab Spring context (Özhan. 2013: 13; Cook. 2012: 282-290; Anderson, 2011:2; Korotayev & Zinkina, 2011:145).


5.1. Transition to consolidated democracy

Fig. 5. Social Status Index of Egypt




Source: World Bank, WDI, WVS, Arab Barometer, BTI Atlas (2020)

Fig. 6. Social Status Index of Tunisia



Source: World Bank, WDI, WVS, Arab Barometer, BTI Atlas (2020)

Fig. 6. Socio-economic barriers in Tunisia and Egypt



Source: BTI Report (2015-2020)

5.2. Socio-Economic Factors

(TUNISIA (table a), EGYPT (table b))

Population	11.6	HDI	0.739	GDP p.c, ppp	12484
Pop.growth	1.1	HDI rank of 189	91	Gini Index	32.8
Life expectancy	76.3	UN education index	0.659	Poverty	3.2
Urban population	68.9	Gender inequality	0.300	Aid per capita	67.9

Population	98.4	HDI	0.700	GDP p.c, ppp	12390
Pop.growth	2.0	HDI rank of 189	116	Gini Index	31.8
Life expectancy	71.7	UN education index	0.608	Poverty	16.1
Urban population	42.7	Gender inequality	0.450	Aid per capita	1.2

Sources (as of December 2019) The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2019 | UNDP, Human Development Report 2019 (1) Average annual growth rate (2) Gender Inequality Index (GII) (3) Percentage of population living on less than \$3.20 a day at 2011 international prices

Despite the fact that Tunisia has a high level of human development and is sometimes praised as a regional leader in gender equality, significant inequities remain, some of which are structural. Tunisia, which is ranked 95th out of 189 nations in the 2017 Human Development Index, is in the bottom half of nations with "high human development," as defined by the UNDP. Its score of 0.735 is somewhat higher than the previous edition and ranks third among non-oil Arab nations behind Lebanon and Jordan. This reflects better health, education, and income outcomes, albeit the rate of progress has slowed in recent decades. Tunisia's HDI score is 22 percent lower when corrected for inequality, which is higher than the average deduction of 16 percent for nations with high human development. Tunisia's GDP per capita was \$11,911 in 2017, according to the World Bank.

The country's Gini coefficient was 35.8 in 2010 (the most recent data available), down from 40.8 a decade earlier, indicating a decrease in inequality. According to official statistics, the poverty rate in 2015 was 15.2 percent, down from 20.5 percent in 2010 and 23.1 percent in 2005. In 2010, 9.1 percent of Tunisians lived in poverty, based on an income criterion of less than \$3.20 per day at 2011 international PPP-adjusted prices. National averages, on the other hand, obscure major inequalities, such as gender discrepancies and geographical discrepancies.

Tunisia's total unemployment rate was 15.5 percent in the third quarter of 2018. Nonetheless, women accounted for 22.8 percent of the total, while males accounted for 12.5 percent. Higher education graduates were more likely to be unemployed, with a gender

divide of 18 percent male and 38.7% female unemployment in the first quarter of 2018. In 2016, regional unemployment rates ranged from 32 percent in the southern governorate to 6.6 percent in Monastir.

The Gender Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) finds significant disparities: Females have a longer life expectancy at birth (78 years) than males, according to 2017 statistics (73.9 years). However, the average number of years spent in school is lower (6.4 vs. 7.9), and the anticipated gross national income per capita (in 2011 \$PPP) is substantially different: \$4,537 for females vs. \$16,152 for males. Despite its status as a regional pioneer for women's rights, Tunisia falls into the bottom fifth of nations due to an absolute divergence from gender parity in HDI values.

Tunisia's authoritarian legacy is still visible, despite continuing changes. Since the revolution, the state-dominated economic structure has scarcely altered, portions of Tunisia's legal system lag behind the progressive constitution, and security forces have yet to be held completely accountable for continuous human rights violations. Corruption persists in both public and private institutions, and the court continues to function outside of democratic norms.

Finally, despite the fact that many of the present lawmakers were part in the constitution's development, members of Tunisia's parliament have failed to meet deadlines set forth in the 2014 constitution. Egypt, on the other hand, has had paradoxical economic advances. On the one hand, the administration has taken additional efforts to reorganize the economy by moving through with an IMF-mandated reform programme. It passed a series of new

legislation aimed at luring investment, implemented austerity measures to decrease government spending, and changed the tax system, among other things. Indeed, as seen by improving growth rates, a rebound in foreign currency reserves, and an increase in exports, this resulted in optimistic macroeconomic statistics.

Economic indicators		2015	2016	2017	2018
GDP	\$ M	43152.5	41808.4	39952.1	39860.7
GDP growth	%	1.2	1.3	1.8	2.5
Inflation (CPI)	%	4.4	3.6	5.3	7.3
Unemployment	%	15.2	15.5	15.4	15.5
Foreign investment %		2.2	1.5	2.0	2.5
Export growth %		-	-	-	-
Import growth %		-	-	-	-
Current account balance \$ M		-3849.7	-3694.3	-4079.7	-4428.7
Public debt %		55.4	62.3	70.6	77.0
External debt \$ M		27244.8	28363.5	33468.2	34662.6
Total debt service \$ M		2034.1	2036.0	3034.8	2786.2
Net lending/borrowing		-	-	-	-
Tax revenue		-	-	-	-
Government Consumption		19.6	20.5	-	-
Public education spending	% of GDP	6.6	-	-	-
Public health spending	% of GDP	4	3.9	-	-
R&D expenditure	% of GDP	0.6	0.6	-	-
Military expenditure	% of GDP	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.1

Sources (as of December 2019): The World Bank, World Development Indicators | International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military Expenditure Database

Egypt is heavily reliant on fluctuating revenue streams such as tourism, the Suez Canal, and remittances from oil-producing countries, all of which fluctuate with internal events and the global economic environment. As a result, overcoming the most significant socioeconomic hurdles to shift is challenging. As a result, Egypt has a poor degree of development, ranking 115th out of 189 nations in the HDI 2018. Egypt is classified as a lower-middle income country by the World Bank, with a GNI per capita of \$3,010, much below the worldwide average of \$10,366. In 2015, 27.8% of the population, up from 21.6 percent in 2008, lived below the national poverty level. According to Heba al-Laithy, who is working on updating the statistics, the figure might have grown to 35 percent in 2017.

In addition, illiteracy continues at a high level of 25.8%, according to the 2017 census, despite a trend toward improvement. Inequality is widespread, and major segments of society are disadvantaged as a result of their political beliefs, gender, area of residence, or social class affiliation, to mention a few factors. As a result, Egypt's inequality adjusted HDI is 29.2 percent lower than its original HDI, which is considerably higher than the world mean of 20%. Egypt was rated 101 out of 160 nations in the 2017 Gender Inequality Index.

Economic indicators		2015	2016	2017	2018
GDP	\$ M	332698.0	332927.8	235369.1	250895.5
GDP growth	%	4.4	4.3	4.2	5.3
Inflation (CPI)	%	10.4	13.8	29.5	-
Unemployment	%	13.1	12.4	11.8	11.4
Foreign investment		2.1	2.4	3.1	2.7
Export growth	%	0.0	-15.0	86.0	32.2
Import growth	%	1.0	-2.2	52.5	11.3
Current account balance \$ M		-17243.3	-20493.9	-7939.7	-6293.2
Public debt	% of GDP	88.5	96.8	103.2	92.7
External debt	\$ M	49847.2	69173.1	84428.7	98704.9
Total debt service	\$ M	3779.1	6632.2	6684.6	7881.4
Net lending/borrowing	% of GDP	-10.7	-	-	-
Tax revenue	% of GDP	12.5	-	-	-
Government consumption	% of GDP	11.8	11.4	10.1	8.4
Public education spending	% of GDP	-	-	-	-
Public health spending	% of GDP	1.6	1.4	-	-
R&D expenditure	% of GDP	0.7	0.7	0.6	-
Military expenditure	% of GDP	1.7	1.7	1.4	1.2

Sources (as of December 2019): The World Bank, World Development Indicators | International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military Expenditure Database.

Table 3: Comparative Socio-Economic Indicators for Egypt and Tunisia

	Egypt	Tunisia
Adult Literacy (age 15 and older)*	75.2%	81.8%
Mean Years of Schooling (years)*	7.1	7.1
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)*	71.3	75
Population in Multi-dimensional Poverty (%)*)	4.2	1.5
Population near Multi-dimensional Poverty (%)*)	5.6	3.2
Employment in Agriculture (% of total employment)*	28	14.8
Employment in Service (% of total employment)	47.9	51.5
Youth Unemployment (15-24)	35.5	34.5
Mobile Phone Subscription (per 100 people)	111	129.9
Internet Users (% of population)	35.9	48.5
Urbanization (% of population in cities)**	43.1	66.8

Sources: *UN Human Development Report 2016 (<http://hdr.undp.org>) **CIA Factbook (2015)

5.3. Demographic Factors

There are two stages to the political and institutional change process. In the first stage, a significant number of young adults in developing nations undergoing demographic transitions tends to worsen unemployment, extending dependent on parents and increasing dissatisfaction and social unrest. As a result, there is a proclivity for violence or extralegal political reforms. Regimes tend to suppress violence and maintain political order at this time; democratic victories are feasible, but rare. Costa Rica, Jamaica, and South Africa are examples of countries that have managed to maintain democracy in the face of a "youth bulge" (Cincotta, 2011).

The dissipation of a "youth bulge" tends to give a "demographic dividend" in the second stage: the number of children per working adult decreases, and the growth in the working population's middle-aged sector tends to bring economic and social advantages. Evidence

suggests that when the regional average of young adults drops, the number of liberal democracies rises (Cincotta, 2011). As a result, demographic factors play a critical role in transitional transformation.

5.3.1. Population

Tunisia and Egypt have very young populations: 15 to 29-year-olds account for about 30% of the total population; youth unemployment rates are structurally high; and education levels have increased significantly in the last three decades and are, on average, higher than in countries with similar levels of development. These socioeconomic features can have a significant effect in social transformation and, in particular, democratization movements. According to studies, countries with an extremely young or youthful age structure are more prone to experience riots, political violence, and civil war.

In their study of the impacts of demographic structure on political transitions and wars, Leahy et al. (2007) discovered that between 1970 and 1999, 80 percent of all civil wars with at least 25 deaths happened in nations with a population of 60 percent or more under the age of 30. During the 1990s, nations with a relatively youthful population were three times more likely than nations with a mature age structure to face civil unrest. Cincotta (2008) claims that the number of young individuals (15-29 years) in a country's workingage population (15-64 years) approximates the country's relative risk of political violence: for states, a median age of 25 years is a kind of milestone. After that point, the likelihood of civil war decreases, but the likelihood of a liberal democracy rises.

Scholars have pointed out, in addition to Assaad and Todd, that the combination of youth's disproportionate part of the overall population, the "youth bulge," and excessive unemployment causes a society to be in disarray (Amin et al., 2012; Campante and Chor, 2012; Courbage, 2015; Haas and Lesch, 2012; Hoffman and Jamal, 2012; Matthijs et al., 2015; Singer-man, 2013). According to Tsunekawa (2012), one of the five key reasons of the Arab revolutions was a sense of grievance among highly educated unemployed young. Not only does demographic change affect how people live, but it also influences whether or not a society goes through a political transition, such as a revolution, a state breakup, or a regime change.

Until the Arab Spring, the Middle Eastern nations had never seen a surge of democratization. According to the results of the 2016 Arab Barometer, barely one-fifth of Tunisians trust parliament following the Arab Spring, and just 12% trust political parties (Arab Barometer, 2016). In every democracy, especially a nascent one, public trust in important political institutions is critical, as trust is an essential requirement for sustaining the legitimacy of a democratic system, particularly when it faces obstacles.


Democratic regimes, unlike authoritarian regimes, require a certain level of legitimacy, popular support, and trust in order to offer successful governance. This is in contrast to the authoritarian governments that ruled Tunisia before to the Arab Spring, which were able to quell popular unrest through military/security control or political manipulation (Letki, 2006). According to foreign observers, Tunisia's post-Arab Spring successes are

noteworthy, with substantial development in political, electoral, and constitutional concerns that contrast sharply with other Arab Spring countries in the area.

Participants share this assessment of Tunisia's political transition to some extent, praising the country's political evolution, especially in comparison to the civil war scenarios in Syria and Libya, as well as the return to pre-revolutionary military authoritarianism in other countries, such as Egypt. Indeed, since 2011, Tunisia and Egypt have been able to peacefully resolve political differences, hold credible elections, and adopt a progressive constitution that upholds human rights, personal freedom of practice and belief, protects minority rights, and strengthens women's rights and gender equality. The four rounds of fair elections held between 2014 and 2019, as well as the first-ever democratic local elections held in May 2018, were crucial to Tunisia's democratic transition.


Meanwhile, public faith in the government and its institutions is critical for any country's democratic survival, but especially for post-autocratic countries like Tunisia and Egypt as they transition to democracy. When faced with obstacles, public trust is critical to ensure that political structures and institutions have a level of legitimacy in governing (Habermas, 1998). Democratic governments, unlike authoritarian regimes, are concerned with legitimacy, popular support, and public trust in the system; the former can suppress popular discontent through military control and political manipulation (Letki, 2006: 305-325).

Fig.6. Youth and political engagement in post-revolution



Source <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13530194.2020.1765142>

Fig.7. Challenge to Political Engagement



Source <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13530194.2020.1765142>

Tunisian youth continue to endure persistent structural difficulties that date back to Presidents Bourguiba and Ben Ali's post-colonial authoritarian administrations, which strangled political liberties and entrenched socio-economic and geographical inequities. The growing chasm between the political class and the general public, as well as entrenched corruption, which were key triggers of the revolution, continue to shape the political landscape of post-revolution Tunisia and Egypt, particularly among key demographics like youth, women, and regional communities (Perletta, 2018).

The younger, in particular, are exhibiting signals that a lack of political responsibility is translating into a loss of confidence, which is showing itself in a deep feeling of indifference toward political processes and institutions. Given the importance of youth in the various revolutions, their assigned status as youth in eternal "waithood" is a problematic reflection of the political transition's existing constraints. This indefinite time of 'waithood' is symbolic of the country as a whole as it moves away from its colonial and authoritarian past and into a free, independent, and really democratic society (Mansouri, 2020).

5.3.2. Education

Education is another aspect that has traditionally been linked to social progress and democratization. Since the time of Alexis de Tocqueville, it has been widely accepted that increased educational levels are a powerful motivator for the acceptance of institutional democratic changes. Education, along with other economic development-related variables, plays a crucial role in the democracy process, according to the modernization thesis (Lipset, 1959; Almond and Verba, 1963).

The relationship between education and democracy is debatable. Acemoglu et al. (2005), for example, looked at changes in democracy and changes in education and found no correlation between the two variables using fixed-effect regression. However, other research (Glaeser and Ponzetto, 2007; Shleifer, 2007; Castelló-Climent, 2008) have offered substantial evidence for the modernization argument. Murtin and Wacziarg (2011), for example, illustrate how education, particularly basic schooling (and to a lesser degree per capita wealth), is a powerful predictor of democratization over a broad sample of nations from 1870 to 2000.

Since the 1980s, the overall level of education in the region has risen dramatically.

According to a research undertaken by political economists Filipe Campante and David Chor, eight of the top twenty nations in the world that have seen a growth in educational attainment among their population are Middle Eastern and North African countries (Campante & Chor 2012: 168). Tunisia, for example, has raised its average total year of schooling by 4, 07 years in the last three decades (2012: 169).

However, while education rates have risen, the area has struggled with low job market prospects, which is particularly visible in the nations in the center of the protest waves. While many developing nations throughout the world saw significant improvements in education over the same time period, the Arab nations were unique in one sense. In many situations, the Arab world benefited from oil revenues, which aided in the spread of education (2012: 170).

Tunisia and Egypt, on the other hand, are mostly secular and lack substantial natural resources like as oil, therefore this is less significant. Egypt, like many other nations, has a

significant unemployment rate among its youth. In 2011, the International Labor Organization stated that the region's young unemployment rate was over 26%, the highest in the world and more than double the global average (Avina 2013: 78). Protests on a wide scale were held in nations with the greatest unemployment rates. In reality, the Tunisian street seller who ignited the revolution with his act of defiance was a university graduate himself. Many observers have now brought attention to the high unemployment rates among the educated in countries like Egypt and Tunisia, which is contributing to mistrust of government policies and posing a significant barrier to a solidified democracy.

5.4. Popular Support for and Desire for Democracy

Another way to studying democracy connects the character of mass ideals and mass culture to the chances for a successful democratic transition (Porta, 2014). Both philosophically and methodologically, mass culture is a difficult idea (Porta & Diani, 2015). The basic assumption of this approach is that effective democratization is determined by how devoted ordinary folks are to core democratic institutions and ideas. The World Values Survey, several Barometer initiatives, and the Pew Charitable Trust all base their research on this assumption (Desai et al, 2009: 93-125). It does not appear that widespread acceptance of democratic culture is "a requirement for the commencement of democracy" (Dupont & Passy, 2012: 101-104). This is particularly evident in Latin America, where Mainwaring and Perez-Linan find no correlation between public opinion surveys on democracy and changes in regime type over time (Eckstein, 2001).

Survey-based measurements of mass values give little leverage in understanding Tunisia's and Egypt's dissimilar courses. According to the Arab Barometer polls of Egypt and

Tunisia, 79 percent of Egyptians thought democracy to be the greatest form of governance in 2011, compared to 70 percent of Tunisians (Eckstein & Wickham-Cowley, 2003). (Eisenstadt, 1973). Similarly, 98% of Egyptians said democracy was an excellent or very good match for Egypt (El-Mahdi, 2009: 1011-1039), whereas the average Tunisian thought democracy was somewhat suited for Tunisia (El-Mahdi, 2011: 387-402).

In 2012, the Pew Charitable Trusts reported virtually equal levels of support for democracy in Egypt and Tunisia, with Egypt slightly outperforming Tunisia (67 percent of Egyptians vs 63 percent of Tunisians considered democracy to be the preferable form of government). Furthermore, when asked if a robust economy or robust democracy was more important, Egyptians prioritized democracy 48 percent of the time, whereas Tunisians prioritized democracy just 40 percent of the time (Eckstein & Wickham-Cowley, 2003).

5.5. Role of Political Institutions

Political institutions were recognized as the "missing variable" in the research of regime transition by the late 1990s (Francis, 2018). Political scientists are increasingly emphasizing the importance of a country's historical institutional endowment in determining its possibilities for democracy. Some scholars argued that the various institutional characteristics of authoritarian regimes—whether patrimonial, single-party, military, or "post-authoritarian"—produced consequentially diverse patterns of regime susceptibility to disintegration or consolidation (Franklin, 2009: 700-714).

Other scholars focused on specific institutional practices, such as the importance of (routinized) elections (viewed as beneficial to democracy, even if imperfectly practiced, by Bratton and Vandewalle) or specific political structures, such as the presence of "ruling

parties" (Giugni et al, 1999) and Brownlee (2010) as crucial to sustaining authoritarian regimes by resolving elite conflicts. This was crucial in determining the nations' propensity to authoritarian reversal following the 2011 public upheavals.

Tunisia's democratic institutions, which were formed under the 2014 constitution, work efficiently, but not without conflict. On a national level, shifting political alignments have caused tensions between political parties and between Prime Minister Youssef Chahed's ministry and President Beji Caid Essebsi's administration. The long-delayed process of decentralization was finally set off in May 2018 with the conduct of municipal elections, which should allocate more resources and political decision-making to the local level. This element of the third branch of government has yet to be constituted due to a lack of agreement on the selection of justices to the Constitutional Court" (Badran 2013: 112).

While there is widespread disagreement regarding the political system's architecture, no prominent political group intends to publicly dismantle the democratic order in its entirety. The two main political parties, Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes, essentially formed a coalition during the most of the review period. This alliance came to an end without a constitutional order from either party. Democratic values are promoted by key non-governmental groups. (2020 BTI Report)

In contemporary Egyptian history, all political and administrative institutions have been part of authoritarian governments. Following the coup in 2013, the present dictatorship began rebuilding the state in a way that favoured its own survival. The prior institutional structure has to be re-established as part of this. The courts and the government have basically declared their 2019 plans. Most institutions are depicted as democratic in design.

Despite this, virtually all of them lack both input and output legitimacy, and they are ultimately controlled or part of the authoritarian regime (Domingues, 2019).

Democratic institutions, in the eyes of the president, the military, and the security apparatus, exist to wield the regime's authority rather than to oversee and control it. As a result, they ensure that they are outside the reach and control of those institutions, as evidenced by the military's special constitutional standing. The 2014 constitution guarantees that all citizens have equal rights and are not discriminated against. In practice, however, civil freedoms are routinely curtailed, and the majority of Egyptians feel powerless in the face of official agencies such as the police and bureaucracy. Women, like people who, in some way or another, do not conform to the ideal of the "typical Egyptian," continue to fight for equal rights (Zollner 2019).

After a rainbow flag was flown at a performance in September 2017, for example, the media launched a smear campaign against gays. Citizens with opposing political views are disproportionately targeted, as seen by a record number of 60,000 political detainees, according to Human Rights Watch. Excessively extended pre-trial detentions, torture, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings are also commonplace. The pressure on organizations and individuals that help victims of such acts is ongoing.

5.6. Rule of Law

The Constitutional Court will have considerable review powers once it is created. The constitutional deadline to create the court by 2015 has been missed due to a lack of agreement on the recruitment of justices. The idea of the rule of law is broad. The term's various meanings have resulted in "conceptual cacophony" (Moller and Skaaning, 2014: 173). Almost all definitions include the idea of "restricting the arbitrary use of power by subordinating it to clearly defined and established rules," and most include words like "fairness," "equal treatment," "predictability," and "transparency" in their language. However, the users' diverse aims and institutional perches usually result in variances in both focus and treatments (Imad, 2019: 3).

According to the 2014 constitution, Tunisia's political institutions function under a semipresidential system. The executive powers of the president of the republic and the president of the government (prime minister) are shared. Domestic policy dominates the prime minister's portfolio, whilst the directly elected president is in charge of foreign affairs, defense, and national security. The president is expected to advise the government in his policy areas under the complicated power-sharing arrangement. In practice, the current president, Beji Caid Essebsi, has tried to consolidate power in the presidency, which was historically where it was placed before to the 2011 revolution constitution determining the interim or definitive vacancy for the office of president of the republic (Al-Arabi 2018).

In its absence, there is a risk of an unconstitutional transfer of power. The Electoral

Commission, the Audiovisual Communication Commission, and the Human Rights Commission are constitutionally mandated technical agencies that act as checks on elected institutions. Though not all of the commissions have been constituted, several have been criticized for appointing political members. Some restrictions on Tunisia's judiciary's independence remain in place (Pargeter, 2016: 186).

The judiciary is meant to be protected from excessive intervention by both legal and institutional protections of constitutional rank. Judges, for example, are immune from criminal prosecution, and the Supreme Judicial Council, which oversees the judiciary, can only transfer, remove, or dismiss them. This council, together with the president of the republic, appoints judges. The Constitutional Court, which will have comprehensive review powers, has not yet been established, although its interim predecessor has some review jurisdiction over current legislation (the control of the constitutionality of draught law only).

The court is institutionally distinct, but corruption, a lack of resources, and violations of human rights enshrined in the 2014 constitution and appropriate process pose serious obstacles. Civilians are sometimes prosecuted in military courts. Many Tunisians believe that the political shift has resulted in "democratization," rather than a reduction in corrupt behaviours. Bribery is a regular occurrence in everyday life, with the security and healthcare industries apparently being the most impacted. INLUCC, the anti-corruption body, revealed in its annual report for 2017 that it had received over 9,000 complaints, about half of which were within its jurisdiction. It referred 245 instances to the courts.

Cases, on the other hand, take four to seven years to be decided by the courts (McCarthy, 2018).

In August 2018, INLUCC stated that several of its informants had been harassed, dismissed, or even imprisoned. In the framework of its public "war against corruption," the Chahed administration demanded the arrest of numerous high-profile persons in 2017. However, the administration has done little (public) anti-corruption efforts since then. While the INLUCC is underfunded and understaffed during the transition, the permanent constitutional anti-corruption authority has yet to be constituted at the time of writing (McCarthy, 2018).

Only 65,000 out of 350,000 public employees completed the required wealth declaration before the deadline in December 2018. The Assembly of People's Representatives (Assemblée des Représentants du Peuple, ARP) has legislative authority, which can also be exercised directly by the people in referendums. The assembly's capacity to carry out its constitutional role and act as a check on the administration is, however, limited by its size.

Polls suggest that people are dissatisfied with the rule of law. Authorities who commit crimes "always" go unpunished, according to more over half of respondents in the 2018 Afro Barometer Survey, while officials "often" go unpunished, according to 22%. Only 4% believe authorities "never" go unpunished, while 14% feel authorities "rarely" do. Furthermore, 61 percent of respondents felt that disclosing corruption occurrences may result in retribution. Multiple civil society organizations criticized a presidential pardon in December 2018 for a former political consultant to Nidaa Tounes and ex-president Ben Ali in a highly known financial corruption case (Meddeb, 2019).

Tunisia's civil liberties are well-protected under the constitution. Equality before the law; the right to life, human dignity, bodily integrity, privacy, citizenship, and refuge; the presumption of innocence and due process; and humane treatment, political, and social rights are all protected by 2014 constitution. There are also constitutional protections in place to prevent any of these rights from being violated. However, neither the body of legislation nor the state's institutions properly represent or respect these rights. Despite advancements in legislation on due process, discrimination, and gender-based violence, certain groups in society continue to be disadvantaged, not least because authorities do not consistently apply the applicable laws (Perletta, 2018).

The state of emergency has been in place since November 2015, and it has had a negative impact on civil freedoms. According to Human Rights Watch, hundreds of Tunisians remain under house arrest as a result of the state of emergency, albeit conditions have improved. The S17 travel restrictions was imposed on many of those who were placed under house arrest. Individuals suspected of joining a terrorist organization fighting in another country may have their mobility limited both locally and internationally as a result of this policy (Sadiki 2016).

In contrast, Egypt's 2014 constitution, in principle, limited the executive's power while strengthening the legislative branch. Art. 159 gives the parliament the power to impeach the president if he or she violates the constitution or commits a crime, and Art. 161 gives it the power to lose confidence in the president with a two-thirds majority. The parliament elected in 2015, however, is just as feeble as the previous ones, owing to a custom-made election legislation that permitted nearly all regime allies to acquire seats in the assembly.

Their destiny is heavily reliant on the president's and other significant players' support, such as the security apparatus (Meddeb 2019).

Parliament has only spoken out against the administration on a few occasions, and only on a few specific issues. Its primary responsibilities are approval and execution of government projects, as well as support for the president, but it does not monitor or provide a balance of power in the executive branch. Rumors surfaced at the end of 2018 that the constitution would be modified to allow al-Sisi to continue in office when his second term finishes in 2022. His grip over the courts might also be strengthened, eroding the separation of powers even further. The judiciary has traditionally been regarded as a respected institution with a degree of independence, with the 2014 constitution implying additional changes (Hassan, 2020).

All judicial bodies, for the most part, manage their own business and have their own budget. There are three primary strands in the judicial system. Basic civil and criminal problems are handled through the common court system. It is led by the Court of Cassation, which is the last chance for an appeal and also decides on the legitimacy of parliamentary membership. The State Council has sole authority to resolve administrative issues, with the Supreme Administrative Court serving as the last appeals court (Brown, 2014: 296-312).

Finally, the Supreme Constitutional Court has sole jurisdiction over the validity of legislation and the interpretation of legislative texts. While all individuals have the right to appeal civil court verdicts, this does not apply to military tribunals, which have jurisdiction over all offences committed by military personnel as well as civilians who assault military or government property.

Overall, judges have a high level of professional competence and judgmental power. However, events during the course of the review period suggest that the regime is attempting to tighten its control over the court. Al-Sisi, for example, signed law reforms in April 2017 that ended the practice of senior members taking over leadership of judicial organizations in the event of succession. Instead, these bodies must now present a list of three candidates to the president, who will choose one from the list (Lavie, 2020).

Al-Sisi overrode Yehia Dakroury's appointment as chairman of the State Council in June 2017 based on this law, likely due to Dakroury's habit of overturning government decisions. Furthermore, due to the state of emergency and the frequent implementation of the 2015 terrorist law, a growing number of cases regarded to be of national security are being tried in front of State Security Courts of Emergency. The president appoints civilian and military judges to serve on these courts.

The rule of law has been eroded for decades by widespread political corruption and a culture of favouritism and nepotism. As a result, even though the president has often stated his determination to combat corruption and money laundering, the prosecution of office abuse is not prompt and thorough. Several persons, including the head of the customs authority, the governors of Helwan and Menoufia, and officials from the ministry of finance, were charged during the time under consideration.

However, it appears that those who have lost the regime's support are the ones who are being persecuted. While President al-Sisi signed the African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption in June 2018, the government amended legislation on the Administrative Control Authority (ACA) in October 2017. The ACA is

in charge of dealing with all administrative and financial violations of state bodies and the public sector. The new law, among other things, moved ACA's subordination to the president, who now picks the agency's head. ACA's high posts have traditionally been held by former military people, and the investigation sections are overseen by army and police officials. As a result, the ACA is strictly regulated by the regime and may be used to penalize or reward individuals (Jacobsohn 2006; Alsarghali 2020).

The 2014 constitution guarantees that all citizens have equal rights and are not discriminated against. In practice, however, civil freedoms are routinely curtailed, and the majority of Egyptians feel powerless in the face of official agencies such as the police and bureaucracy.

Reform initiatives that focus on the rule of law are inherently political. In both Egypt and Tunisia, the influential forces that emerged following each country's uprising were able to latch on to the idea of rule of law, both out of a real desire to see such reforms implemented but also for their political expediency. Yet once these reforms were no longer politically advantageous to the emerging leadership, attempts to implement them faltered. Both countries illustrate the stark reality that such political support is immensely difficult to cultivate and sustain (Jacobsohn 2006; Alsarghali 2020).

5.7. Role of the Military

The military's characteristics are the most important aspect in explaining the countries' varied paths. The military controlled a significant presence in Egypt. The military was massive in terms of manpower (Guazzone & Pioppi, 2009), expenditures (Gurr, 1970), and the breadth of its economic empire (Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005). (The military's

contribution to the Egyptian economy is estimated to be between 20 and 40%; it includes bakeries, food and home products manufacture, real estate development, petrol stations, nurseries, farms, and slaughterhouses) (Harders, 2003: 191-213).

The issue of historical precedence was much more important. Since the Free Officers deposed the monarchy in 1952, the military has played a dominant role in Egyptian politics. Every Egyptian president has come from the officer corps (Hinnebusch, 2015: 205-217), and despite efforts to limit the military's influence (Hoffmann et al, 2013: 1021), the military continues to have veto power over policymaking (International Crisis Group, 2018).

Egypt's geostrategic location as a frontline state in the Arab-Israeli conflict gave the Egyptian military inexorable prestige. At important times, the military also served as a coercive backstop for the dictatorship (Johnston & Almeida, 2006). As a result, it could never be entirely ignored politically. The military's disproportionate presence resulted in a disproportionate self-perception and institutional culture. Egypt's military considered itself as the country's "guardian" and "ultimate.... protector of national interest" (Kamal, 2015).

When Mubarak's hold on power was significantly threatened in January 2011, the military first displayed ambiguity between the conflicting imperatives created by its selfunderstanding, sense of duty, and institutional interests. On the one hand, the military's long-standing fear of (disorderly) public uprisings led to repression of Mubarak's revolt. The military's estimate of business interests, on the other hand, signaled a level of dissatisfaction with the Mubarak government and its continuation. For decades, Mubarak supported the domestic security apparatus above the military, offering better resources and

privileged political access to the police and the Ministry of Interior (with the express goal of marginalizing the military) (Langor & Lynch, 2014; 180-200).

Furthermore, Mubarak's son (and possible successor), Gamal, had championed a series of neoliberal economic reforms that endangered the military's economic empire throughout the previous decade (Lapegna, 2013; 842-863). As a result, the military was split on whether or not Mubarak's government should be extended, and failed to take decisive action in the early days of the revolt. However, the army leadership appears to have been convinced to intervene by the military's institutional mission to prevent disorder (Lazar, 2017). The military, in particular, did not interfere to defend Mubarak. Rather, it interfered to restore order in Egypt and maintain control over the political process in ways that would protect the military's interests while preventing a public uprising (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011).

From the time it assumed control, the military's authoritarian tendencies were clear. When Hosni Mubarak resigned, the military took control of the executive branch and decided not to appoint a civilian to serve as interim president. Following the country's first constitutional referendum, the SCAF declared itself "the final decision maker and controller of the change process," signaling its contempt for civilian sovereignty (Marwane, 2018).

The military declared the "Selmi Doctrine," giving itself sole control over armed forces matters and veto authority over war declarations, to highlight its independence from civilian supervision (Marzouki & Meddeb, 2016; 119-130). Several months later, the military undermined popular power by agreeing to the High Court's technical invalidation

of the freshly elected parliament. By July 2012, the military had gone a step further in disempowering the people, assuming legislative authority for itself (Masbah, 2017).

Concerned about the expected victor of Egypt's first free and fair presidential election, the military drafted an order limiting the president's administrative powers (McAdam et al, 1996). In addition to interfering with democracy's core institutions, the military took a coercive approach to public dissent and perpetrated numerous human rights violations in the guise of restoring order (McAdam et al, 2001). During the next two years, the military grew increasingly dissatisfied with the government, which had been popularly elected in 2011-2012 and was eventually led by Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi.

The Egyptian economy remained in shambles, political anarchy loomed (as protests continued), and national security fears increased. (The Egyptian military viewed the Muslim Brotherhood's declared intention to participate in the Syrian crisis as dangerous, and Morsi's refusal to discipline Hamas in Gaza as jeopardizing Egypt's national interests) (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1212-1241). Given the government's troubling history, it's hardly unexpected that the military intervened when Egyptians organized enormous public rallies in June/July 2013 asking for Morsi's departure. (In reality, there is evidence that the military aided the public uprising against Morsi by offering political, symbolic, and maybe even material assistance to protestors) (Meijer, 2005:279-291).

On July 3rd, the military removed President Morsi, unilaterally declared a civilian as interim president, and then continued to rule from behind the scenes, led by Minister of Defense Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Sisi won an overwhelming win in fresh presidential elections a year later. A new system of even more eroded civil freedoms and repression emerged

under his leadership, replete with a new constitution guaranteeing the military's inviolability (Mohammed & Jalabi, 2018). Egypt has returned to "electoral authoritarianism" four years after the rebellion, which was in many respects more illiberal than before the upheaval (Morris & McClurg, 1992). The military differences between Egypt and Tunisia could hardly have been starker. Whether in terms of people or resources, the Tunisian military has always been modest (Netterstorm, 2016:383-398).

More importantly, its historical role has been very different. The military has never played a consequential role in Tunisian politics. It was the "product, not the progenitor" of Tunisian independence (O'Donnell et al, 1986). Tunisia's geo-strategic location, far from the Arab-Israeli conflict, spared the country from routine engagement in foreign wars and deprived the military of an important path to clout and stature. Most importantly, both of Tunisia's presidents embraced a strategy aimed at the military's marginalization and political exclusion, starving it of resources and (unintentionally) encouraging it to develop an identity distinct from the regime in power (Omri, 2016).

Over time, the Tunisian military developed an institutional culture and a sense of mission quite different from that found in Egypt. The Tunisian military was "republican" in that it was respectful of civilian control and committed to abiding by constitutional principles (Perletta, 2018). It focused on a limited mandate to defend the country from external threat rather than a grandiose mission to reshape the country according to its own vision. The military's history and self-conception proved crucial in determining the fate of Tunisia's popular uprising. The military's distance from the regime meant it had no corporate investment in the regime's survival and was free to make the political decision to allow the

"revolution" to take its course (Phenix Center for Economics & Informative Studies, 2017).

Army Chief of Staff Rachid Ammar forbade his officers from shooting at the demonstrators and positioned army tanks and armored vehicles to provide protesters with protection from police gun fire (Phenix Center for Economics & Informative Studies, 2018). It was General Ammar who ultimately told Ben Ali "he was finished" and dispatched him to exile. Ammar then handed power to the constitutionally-designated civilian successor and returned to the barracks. The military left it to the fledgling government and civil society to negotiate a new constitution and representative system for Tunisia (Pioppi, 2013:51-68). Equally important for Tunisia's transition to democracy was the military's stance two years later.

In the summer of 2013, the Tunisian transition seemed on the verge of collapse. In the wake of the assassination of two leftist politicians, the deadlocking of the constitutional assembly, and the less than vigilant restraint of Islamic radicals by the Ennahda-led government, popular disaffection erupted. 60 members of the constitutional assembly resigned from their posts and a coalition of political parties backed by 100,000 protestors gathered in Bardo Square demanding the dissolution of the assembly, the resignation of the government, and the replacement of both with teams of unelected technocrats (Roberts, 1997:137-151). This was a "coup d'etat" moment (Roll, 2016:23-43) and some activists approached the military to divine its willingness to intervene in Egypt.

The Tunisian military, however, signaled its unwillingness to provide a military solution to the crisis and the civilians were forced back on themselves to negotiate their way out (Rossi & Von Bülow, 2015). The military's very distinct corporate culture and selfunderstanding played a major role in preventing it from responding to these triggers

(Rucht et al, 1999). In the end, the different character of the military in Egypt and Tunisia put the two countries on very different paths. In both cases, the military's disaffection with, and disinvestment in, the old regime persuaded the military to stand aside and permit popular mobilization to oust the dictator. In both cases, the military's institutional commitment to staving off chaos spelled military intervention to impose order (Rossi & Von Bülow, 2015; Rucht et al, 1999).

However, the different corporate culture and self-understanding of the two militaries (born of their different roles, historically, in both politics and the economy) led them to respond to similar political and economic turmoil in very different ways: The Egyptian military leaned authoritarian while the Tunisian military leaned democratic. This factor proved paramount in explaining the two countries' divergent trajectories as the military set the institutional parameters within which all other variables (civil society, leaders, etc.) came into play.

5.8. Role of Political Elites:

A profusion of thought-provoking publications have attempted to explain the success – or, more frequently, failure – of democracy in authoritarian countries whose power has been challenged by Arab Spring upheavals since 2011. (e.g., Asseburg & Wimmen, 2016; Cavatorta, 2015; Heydemann, 2016; Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015). Some writers in this literature use actor-centered techniques to explain why Tunisia became democratic whereas other nations reverted to authoritarian rule or faced civil wars (e.g., Asseburg & Wimmen, 2016; Heydemann, 2016).

Others, on the other hand, think that long-term structural reasons had a larger role in deciding the disintegration (or resilience) of authoritarian regimes and the success (or failure) of the occasionally subsequent democratic initiatives (e.g., Masoud, 2014; Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015). However, within transition theory, there is widespread agreement that elite actors play a critical role during one critical phase of transformation: the time between the fall of the old authoritarian regime and the adoption of a new constitution (Geddes, 1999:120,136–137; see, for example, Linz & Stepan, 1996; Rustow, 1970; Zayed, 2005).

However, further research is needed to have a better understanding of the behaviour of Arab elites during this period in Arab Spring nations (see also Heydemann, 2016: 202–203). In this sense, a comparison between Tunisia and Egypt is conceptually fascinating. Until early 2013, there were significant commonalities between the two nations. The former authoritarian regimes presided over reasonably robust state structures in both circumstances.

Neither administration, however, was able to use oil rents to ensure the security forces' long-term allegiance or establish uncontested hereditary successions. As a result, when faced with large-scale populist upheavals, their forces sided with the demonstrators or remained neutral, compelling existing autocrats to step down (Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015). Following that, open elections were held in both nations for assemblies tasked with crafting new constitutions. Islamist parties won the founding elections in both nations and took government.

Tunisia, on the other hand, established a democratic system, whilst Egypt's post-Mubarak trajectory suffered substantial losses. Our study objective is to figure out why this happened. While secularist and Islamist elites in both countries were initially split, a compromise between the two camps helped the Tunisian transition succeed, but the absence of such a compromise hampered Egypt's democratic experiment (Asseburg & Wimmen,

2016: 14–15; Boubeker, 2016). It has been suggested that profound 'distrust' (Stepan & Linz, 2013: 23) hindered Islamist and secularist elites in Egypt from reaching an agreement, but efforts by Islamists and secularists to overcome their mutual 'distrust' facilitated an elite compromise in Tunisia (Stepan, 2012: 92).

However, the impact of inter-elite trust in influencing political reform processes in Tunisia and Egypt – as well as other Arab Spring situations – has yet to be thoroughly investigated. This deficiency corresponds to a similar gap in broader research on democratic transformation, which has placed a high value on 'elite pacts' (Geddes, 1999: 120, 136–137; e.g., Linz & Stepan, 1996; O'Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 2013), without paying enough attention to the role of inter-elite trust in the formation of such pacts (Geddes, 1999: 120). The importance of citizens' faith in the political system has been highlighted in several studies on democracy. According to social capital theory, voluntary organizations in civil society foster mutual trust among individuals, therefore strengthening democratic institutions (e.g., Putnam, 1993, 2000). However, experts have yet to investigate how elite trust (or distrust) affects democratic reforms.

5.9. Consensus Building:

Quality of life and governance are becoming increasingly intertwined. The "other" democracy, the one that works in complicated society, is the Consensus Building technique. This strategy has historic origins, but its current success is the consequence of two events: the huge crisis in conventional governance, notably in Western nations, from the 1970s to the present, and the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa. On the one hand, some governments try to solve it by creating more limited places of power that make their own decisions; on the other hand, they try to solve it by naive participation, opening new moments of decision without specific methods, believing that differences can be resolved through "good will" and voting (Lawrence, 2011).

Tunisia has seen nine governments since 2011, all of which have faced a succession of security issues, strong political polarization, fragmentation, and rising unemployment. With relatively high voter turnout and within the context of a progressive constitution passed in 2014, almost 200 registered political parties have contested in four cycles of competitive legislative (2011, 2014, 2019), executive (2014, 2019), and municipal (2018) elections. Despite this procedural democratic accomplishment, political fragmentation in parliament and low trust in political parties are based in the rise of micro-parties and coalition-building techniques that have lasted all election cycles.

Tunisia has been predominantly controlled by cross-ideological coalitions through the system of political consensus since its first elections for the National Constituent Assembly in 2011. The first wave of political splintering occurred in 2011, when elected members of

the three-party coalition government became enraged and formed their own parties, losing huge support bases. Since then, much study has focused on a political fight along ideological lines, particularly between religious and secular parties, for which agreement appeared to be critical in overcoming fault lines and enacting changes.

Consensual pacts have become the dominant negotiation method used to build administrations in the recent decade to overcome legislative stalemate. However, the upshot has been a bleak image for parliament and a loss of public confidence in the political party as a vehicle for acting in the interests of – and negotiating on behalf of – people. The 2015 Nidaa Tounes–Ennahda alliance saw the most fragmentation, with the former splintering and undercutting its newly created support base (Chomiak & Parks, 2019). International and local surveys have continued to show a decline in trust in political parties since then, reaching an all-time low in 2019.

Tunisians elected a split parliament and a new president, Kais Saied, an independent university law professor with no prior political experience, in a surprise landslide victory in October 2019. His proposal was based on a top-down political system being radically restructured in order to promote bottom-up direct democracy. Early critics regarded him as a dangerous populist who used the country's poor political and economic position to run an anti-political party campaign.

According to recent poll data, Tunisians have a higher level of trust in the executive and security agencies, indicating that they prefer a strong presidential system over a balanced parliamentary-executive power structure. According to a study conducted in August 2020, 88% of Tunisians have moderate or high confidence in the President, but just 23% have

moderate to high confidence in the parliament or political parties. Tunisians are generally supportive of a new political configuration, as seen by Saied's popularity and the public's apparent desire for a strong president.

Tunisia's elites, on the other hand, agree on procedural democracy. The government needs elections to be genuine and in general preserve the constitutional political system, according to the major parties and civil society groups. Authoritarian standards survive in practice. The rights of liberals and unelected autonomous state entities are not always recognized. Political decision-making remains highly individualized and frequently takes place outside of the state's formal structures (Geddes, 1999, pp. 120, 136–137; e.g., Linz & Stepan, 1996; O'Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 2013).

The country's main political players — the government, political parties, and social movements — mostly agree on market-based economics and use it to guide their growth plan. However, there is significant debate on the extent to which the government should intervene in the economy. Some politicians, for example, see the privatization of lossmaking SOEs as a viable alternative, while others — like the powerful UGTT trade union — are adamantly opposed. Similarly, the European Union's planned free trade agreement was received with suspicion, even from industry (Colombo & Voltolini, 2017).

None of the anti-democratic elements in Tunisian politics are now powerful enough to halt or reverse the country's democracy. Members and allies of the old Ben Ali administration, fearful of greater examination of their positions under authoritarianism, as well as ultraconservative Islamist groups, see religious teachings as incompatible with a liberal democratic society, are major players in this respect. While violent assaults happened

throughout the review period, only a small fraction of Tunisians agree with their viewpoints, and security forces have been able to crack down on violent organizations and enhance security (Colombo & Voltolini, 2017).

The political deadlock among elite players, which has impeded the development of crucial democratic institutions as stipulated by the constitution, remains a major issue. For example, the absence of the Constitutional Court leaves the country without an institution to arbitrate in exceptional circumstances, such as determining whether a vacancy in the presidency is provisional or permanent, or terminating the president's term in office if the constitution is clearly violated. As a result of the impasse, the absence of the court raises the potential of authoritarian power grabs, especially during significant crises (Perletta, 2018).

The longstanding schism in Tunisian politics between political groups advocating for strict secularism and others advocating for religious beliefs to have a role in public life has resurfaced. President Essebsi declared the end of a four-year collaboration between his secular Nidaa Tounes party and the Islamist Ennahda in September 2017. After a contested transition and divided elections campaign in 2014, the partnership of partners from opposite sides of the political spectrum astonished many observers, and was mediated by the two groups' leaders, Essebsi and Rachid Ghannouchi. They aimed to provide political stability and unity to the country, but the coalition left behind a lack of distinct party political doctrine, an effective lack of a government-opposition dynamic in parliament, and was accused of supporting an authoritarian slide (Cavatorta, 2015: 135-145).

The fall of the coalition quickly resulted in assaults on Ennahda and Prime Minister Youssef Chahed when the president failed to remove Prime Minister Youssef Chahed. The most severe of these allegations was that Ennahda had a hidden "security apparatus" and was involved in the killing of two left-wing MPs in 2013, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi. Ennahda firmly denies these charges, claiming that they are being used as an excuse to outlaw the party, as was the case under the Ben Ali government (Chomiak & Parks, 2019).

Meanwhile, the secretary-general of Nidaa Tounes has filed a lawsuit against Chahed, claiming that his Cabinet reshuffle constituted a "coup d'état" since President Essebsi was not consulted more closely. Chahed declared the launch of a new secular party, Tahya Tounes ("Long live Tunisia"), in late January 2019, which has already surpassed Nidaa Tounes as the second largest formation in parliament behind Ennahda. If it grows its base and joins a coalition with Ennahda after the 2019 elections, polarization between secularists and Islamists might be reduced (Yerkes, 2019).

Other societal divides include regional and intergenerational inequities, which have yet to be successfully addressed. Young people, university graduates, women, and those who live in areas outside of the rich coastal belt are all disadvantaged. The fact that Ennahda's electorate is largely in the southern regions, whereas Nidaa Tounes' supporters are largely in the coastal areas, represents regional distinctions to some extent. Nonetheless, the government must devote greater resources to combating marginalization, with decentralization playing a significant role. Several incidents of social unrest have

demonstrated the strength of the divide between those who are socioeconomically included and those who are not.

Egypt has a big number of newly formed parties and individuals wanting to participate in democratic political access to certain public areas in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. Since the commencement of the strategy of economic liberalization and privatization, a detrimental and mostly unregulated culture of corruption has emerged at a higher (political) level. Despite the difficulty of verifying the figure, Hisham Geneina, former head of the Accountability State Authority (ASA), estimated in June 2016 that Egypt loses roughly EGP 600 billion every year owing to fraud (Volpi, 2017).

However, until the beginning of this year, the most of them were either muted or placed under governmental supervision. As a result, the principal goals of today's political players are to stabilize the country, consolidate the authoritarian system, and ensure the regime's existence. To that purpose, they see democratic changes as unhelpful, and partial political openness in the 2000s as a mistake that allowed the 2011 revolution to take place. In January of this year, al- Sisi has stated unequivocally that he will avoid a repetition of the uprising and will take harsh action against anyone attempting to destabilize the status quo.

The situation is less clear when it comes to the market economy. While there is agreement that fostering economic development is a top objective, the extent to which liberalization and economic changes should be implemented is debatable. The government implemented certain steps to boost market processes as part of the IMF loan, and the corporate elite wishes for a stronger role in the private sector while also wanting to be protected by the state and preserve their monopolies. The military's economic role has grown even further,

and it shows no signs of relinquishing control or allowing more competition. With its massive public companies, the state remains a prominent player, both as a regulator and a competitor (Omri, 2016; Perletta, 2018; (Volpi & Clark, 2019:1-16).

In terms of democratization, the current administration has essentially no true reform-oriented political players. Furthermore, just a few opposition individuals continue to actively call for political transparency. Instead, anti-democratic veto forces dominate policymaking, with the military and security apparatus in particular having a strong role, largely acting outside of constitutional or public control. In comparison to the late Mubarak years, the political power of the private business elite, which sympathizes with economic and political liberalism to some extent, at least as long as its own interests are not at issue, has dramatically decreased (Hassan, 2020).

In the sake of stability and economic recovery, the government puts authoritarian tactics and deep state apparatus ahead of any discourse of political openness. It justifies restrictive rules by citing the war on terror, which severely restricts not just individual liberty but also any discussion of changes. Institutions that are intended to supervise, such as parliament and the courts, have become politicized and primarily loyal to the authorities. The Egyptian nation has a millennium-old history and is ethnically, religiously, linguistically, and culturally homogeneous. Despite this, modern society is profoundly split along various lines. The secularist-Islamist division remained the most visible during the time under consideration (Lazreg, 2021; Mansouri, 2020).

Political activities that incorporate any type of critical engagement with the regime's performance or human rights in general are subject to the most severe restrictions. Work

on social and cultural concerns is being increasingly controlled and controlled. Despite new law passed in December 2017 that theoretically allows for the formation of independent groups, the state-affiliated ETUF maintains its grip. This was bolstered by the regime's all-but-unanimous triumph in union elections in mid-2018 (Mansouri, 2020).

The majority of powerful syndicates, including as the journalists' and physicians' syndicates, are also under state control. Most acts of injustice, such as those that occurred in 2011 and 2012, when over 850 people were killed, as well as thousands who were tortured, detained, and sexually assaulted, are not addressed or investigated by the government, as are the massacres of Morsi supporters in summer 2013, which claimed up to 1,000 lives.

Instead, the dictatorship manipulates memory by accusing its opponents of being terrorists who pose a threat to the state's stability, turning victims into perpetrators on a regular basis. Furthermore, repression of Islamists and revolutionary youth alike continues, with Human Rights Watch reporting that the number of political detainees topped 60,000 in 2018. Their destiny is still mostly unknown. Rather than reaching out to them or compensating them, Al-Sisi has consistently denied that Egypt has any political prisoners and that torture was utilized.

At the same time, the old Mubarak regime's top politicians and officials, including Mubarak himself, his interior minister, his sons, and others, have been cleared of practically all charges. The prosecution of military and security personnel is very uncommon. Only a few low-ranking officials are charged in extreme circumstances, whereas high-ranking officials are exempt from prosecution. Only military tribunals have the jurisdiction to try military

and intelligence agency officials, according to Article 204 of the 2014 constitution, and new law enacted in July 2018 essentially offers top officials immunity for crimes committed in the wake of the 2013 coup (Rossi & Von Bülow, 2015; Volpi & Clark, 2019:1-16; CRS Reports 2020; BTI Altas; 2020, Hassan, 2020).

5.10. Lessons for Egypt and Tunisia

We present lessons that relate to those issues below, based on our examination of historical regime changes throughout the world and recognizing the unique obstacles that Egypt and Tunisia face. Many of these lessons will certainly apply to other situations as well, but we centered our comparative analysis on these two nations since authoritarian governments had already been overthrown when we began our research.

5.10.1. Managing the Effects of Regime Change Mode

One of Egypt's most pressing challenges is reconciling the revolution's surge of optimism with the reality of significant political divisiveness. Many Egyptians agreed on the necessity for political change following the January 25th Revolution, resulting in a moment of national unity. However, once Mubarak and the governing party were deposed, transitional authorities failed to reach an agreement on the outlines of the new political system. Secularists boycotted crucial transition events, such as the crafting of a permanent constitution, rather than legitimize a process they considered as controlled by a single ideological stance. Tunisians are becoming increasingly apprehensive about the country's future, despite the fact that Islamists and secular parties were able to create a unity government (see Valbjørn, 2015; Kao & Lust, 2017; Bank, 2018; Gibney et al., 2019).

The instances from Southern Europe illustrate that the outcome of a regime transition can be determined by whether or not the prior political system was rejected as well as the prior dictatorship. The elimination of discredited institutions was critical to democratization in Spain and Portugal, in particular. This is also likely to be the case in Tunisia, where the ruling party has stretched its tentacles across the country. In Egypt, there is still longing for a military-led security state in some areas. To demonstrate this, consider the presidential election in June 2012, when Ahmed Shafiq, an Air Force general who served under Mubarak and was his final Prime Minister, came close to winning the presidency by pledging stability and a hard hand (Bellin, 2012).

Revolutionary regime shifts do not always result in transformative shifts. In the Philippines, the transition restored democratic institutions and procedures, but politics quickly reverted to the pattern of chronic instability that existed before to martial law. Political behaviour patterns in the Philippines are well-established. Mongolia and Mali, both of which are entering new political terrain, may have an edge in this regard, as do several Arab nations that are building democratic systems for the first time (see Bellin, 2004; Hibou, 2011; Yom, 2015).

5.9.2 Getting Around a Lack of Democratic Experience

Before the revolt, Egypt appeared to have had the benefit of having experienced a mixed, rather than a fully authoritarian, rule. Egyptians had just a rudimentary understanding of democratic procedures and civil society groups on which to base their efforts. Tunisia, on the other hand, is in the midst of a regionally unprecedented transition from a very

autocratic state. A half-century of tight political control and a regime that relied on economic performance to legitimize its authority successfully depoliticized Tunisian society. Tunisia appears to have a long way to go in terms of laying the institutional underpinnings for democracy (Edel, 2018: 20).

Nonetheless, Tunisia's comparative limitations have not prevented it from making greater democratic progress and a smoother transition than Egypt as of early 2013. The prospect that unsuccessful democratic government would compel disgruntled Tunisians, who are accustomed to relative material comfort, to accept a return to so-called legitimacy by results is perhaps the greatest risk to democratization in Tunisia (Santini & Moro, 2019). Though it is difficult to create democratic institutions and procedures when there are few or none, previous experience with political pluralism had little bearing on transition results in the third wave examples we studied.

However, in certain circumstances, the establishment of a foundation that allowed civil society to participate in the transition proved critical. Some of the nations we studied that had effectively democratized had prior experience with political plurality, while others had little or no experience. Civil society and autonomous organizations had begun to grow well before the changes began in countries like Hungary and Poland, and were able to play key roles in mediating the changeover (Santini & Moro, 2019).

In Indonesia and the Philippines, robust civil society institutions that worked within boundaries under authoritarian rule were important to regime transition and the continuation of wide support for democratization. Egypt, which shares this advantage, may

thus be better positioned for democratization than Arab countries like Libya, where civil society was completely shut down—as long as newly empowered institutions, like the Muslim Brotherhood, and long-empowered institutions, like the military, continue to support democratization, as militaries did in both Indonesia and the Philippines (Santini & Moro, 2019; Grewal, 2019).

5.10.3. Establishing Democratic Control of Security Institutions

Security institution reform will be one of the most important policy decisions that will define the amount of democratization in Arab nations in transition. Given their previous behaviour, changes that link troops under the leadership of the interior and defense ministries to the rule of law and respect for human rights will be especially vital in Egypt and Tunisia. While Egypt's military has technically given over control to a civilian leader, many of the institution's advantages and privileges remain in place, and it operates under what Egyptians refer to as "a state above a state" (Grewal, 2019).

As a result, securing the military's cooperation for democracy, despite its strong institutional interests in retaining political power and profitable corporate ventures, will be a difficult task. To keep control of politics and the public in Tunisia, the Ben 'Ali administration deployed a large internal security organization rooted at all levels of society. The dismantling of this infrastructure and the democratic management of lawful internal security organizations will be critical elements of democracy in that country. Many countries' militaries play critical roles in enabling or carrying out regime transitions. However, in other nations, even where the military assisted civilian oppositionists in gaining power rather than grabbing power themselves, a lengthy battle occurred to subordinate the military to democratic civilian authority (De Jaegher & Hoyer, 2019).

Militaries have been successful stewards of democratization at times, but for democracy to be entrenched, they must finally be brought under civilian rule. After partaking in regime transition, several militaries returned to their barracks on their own. In other occasions, civilian authorities had to engage in negotiation or conciliation with military leaders, offering them special advantages and protections in exchange for their support for a new democratic government. To obtain such cooperation, some civilian authorities had to cleanse the officer corps of erstwhile regime sympathizers.

When the military has been discredited as a result of its actions under the previous government or is riven by internal strife, civilian authorities find it simpler to remove them from politics. Some nations, such as Chile and Turkey, took a more gradual approach to transferring authority from military to civilian authority, but others did it more quickly. As evidenced by coup attempts and other attempted subversions of civilian authority during transitions in Argentina, Greece, the Philippines, and elsewhere, subordinating the military to civilian control has been a challenge in both cases where the military was and was not a significant player in the transition process. Even though their armies were not important protagonists in the regime revolutions, Spain experienced a military coup attempt and Peru's government faced a mutiny a few years after the revolutions in both countries. This shows that governments in transition nations should make firmly establishing civilian authority a policy priority, even if the military has not played a significant political role in the transition (De Jaegher & Hoyer, 2019; Edel, 2018; El Kurd, 2019).

Conciliatory tactics can be used to reduce the possibility of coups and, more broadly, to socialize the military into a democratic regime where the risk of backlash is high.

Argentina's new civilian administration felt obligated to tread carefully in seeking responsibility for "dirty war" atrocities; it responded to military revolts by talking with rebel commanders and settling on issues such as prosecutions and pay raises. The military's backing for the opposition in the Philippines during the political crisis that led to Ferdinand Marcos' downfall did not immediately convert into support for the civilian administration that followed. Years after the "people power" revolution, the military was not entirely socialized into democracy (El Kurd, 2019).

A thwarted coup attempt in Greece, on the other hand, provided the government with a chance to act aggressively against former junta loyalists by forcing the retirement of 200 officers. Calculating when to rebalance civil–military power ties is challenging, and each case's characteristics must be taken into account. These dynamics should be taken into account when applying external pressure for rebalancing. Bringing internal security agencies under democratic control provides a new sort of issue. If internal security institutions were foundations of support for the previous administration, new authorities should destroy them. These attempts are hampered by the fact that, unlike military, such organs may have diffused their structures and influence throughout society.

Part of the larger set of institutional reform imperatives necessary for democratizing government is ensuring that internal security organs provide genuine public protection services rather than serving as weapons of regime control. The so-called political police in Tunisia were dismissed by interim authorities, while the State Security Directorate in Egypt was dismantled. Although these bodies were the most heinous in their misuse of power, the whole police force is involved and will require considerable reforms (Muasher, 2019).

5.10.4. Making a New Constitution

Another crucial policy decision is whether and how a new constitution should be drafted and adopted. Constitution-making gives an unrivalled early opportunity for Arab nations which have undergone regime transition to create widespread consensus on a view of the essence of the state and its connection to the people. The Egyptian courts dismissed the first constituent assembly, and its successor was boycotted by secular liberal forces. Despite the very polarizing nature of the process, the Islamist-dominated legislature proceeded to design a constitution, which was approved in a referendum in December 2012.

What was supposed to be a democratic procedure devolved into a straight majority vote, and popular discontent was obvious in the fact that only a third of eligible voters participated in the referendum. Tunisia's constitutional drafters are still working on their charter more than two years after the revolt there. Past experience shows that establishing a new constitution, or changing an existing one, is critical to establishing a framework for democratic administration and enshrining civil freedoms, human rights, and other vital values (Nugent, 2020).

However, constitution-making may also be utilized to promote effective democratization in the short term by solidifying agreement and keeping possible spoilers on board. In Spain, for example, the constitution-making process was utilized to reaffirm the transition's consensus-based approach. Argentina agreed to constitutional amendments to ensure that

possible political spoilers would support the transition. Only when the processes to be utilized have widespread support and the process is not hurried can a constitution-making process fulfil this consensus-building function. Interim constitutional arrangements may often be left in place for a long time with no negative consequences (Nugent, 2020; Koehler & Albrecht, 2021; Tsourapas, 2020).

5.10.5. Broad Lessons from Past Experiences

There is a lot of variety in past transition experiences on several aspects. As a result, it is critical to remember that specific characteristics that tend to support or impede democracy seldom, if ever, determine results. In the process of democratization, leadership and, more broadly, elite commitment to change emerged as critical factors. Internal circumstances and external pressure or assistance, by affecting incentives or the range of options available, can make or break democratization; internal circumstances and external pressure or assistance, by affecting incentives or the range of options available, can make or break those decisions. For effective democracy in Southern and Eastern Europe, European integration provided unrivalled incentives and assistance (Frantz et al., 2020).

The NATO membership procedure was also beneficial in this way. No other area is expected to enjoy comparable advantages in solidifying democracy in the near future. Internal reasons are likely to outweigh practical assistance and pressure for Arab nations. Transitions were shaped by decisions on whether or not to balance change with features of continuity, and if so, how much continuity to include. Opposition leaders in Chile opted to tolerate a high level of continuity over a lengthy, slow transition to democracy. As a result,

the procedure moved at a gradual but steady pace, resulting in a calm and successful outcome. In Spain, reformers opted to modify the character of the political system using existing legal and constitutional frameworks in order to defuse objections from supporters of the previous regime and prevent a legal and political vacuum (Gohdes, 2020).

In other countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, the previous system had become so reviled that integrating aspects of political continuity was impossible, albeit institutions from the previous government were utilized to codify early moves toward democracy in certain areas. Our case studies support academic conclusions that democratization does not require a certain level of economic growth. Because a country's policy implementation capabilities and the robustness of its state institutions are typically tied to its degree of economic development (that is, poorer nations on average have weaker institutions), democracy can occur even with low levels of institutional development like Tunisia. Arab countries transitioning from highly personalist regimes will face significant state-building challenges, and those transitioning from strong institutionalized authoritarian systems will need the same level of institutional reform as Eastern Europe, but democracy does not have to perish as a result of these difficulties (Spannagel et al., 2020).

5.10.6. Implications for External Support for Democratization

The preceding lessons are directly applicable to policy development in nations undergoing political transition. They can be used as a framework for developing policies and diplomatic approaches that reflect reasonable expectations for Arab countries' transition paths, offer a deft mix of incentives and pressure, and draw useful ideas from past experience by external actors aiming to support democratization of foreign governments,

international organizations, and international non-governmental organizations. The previous results and the study as a whole have certain specific policy implications for external funding, which we emphasize below (Frantz et al., 2020).

First, a word of warning arises from our examinations of previous transitions: Be wary of generalizations and oversimplifications about how political transformation will unfold in the Arab East. Many nations have defied expectations, presumably because democracy is a complicated, multilayered process. The lack of basic democratization rules is a source of hope for the Arab Spring. Regardless of the challenges and difficulties faced by many nations, global and regional trends have been toward more democracy, especially in previously considered barren terrain. Furthermore, democratization's structural indeterminacy allows domestic players' policy decisions to alter the course of events and international players to strive to influence events in favourable ways (Josua, 2020).

Though the Arab Spring is frequently described as a single movement, history shows that even shifts inspired or precipitated by the same external circumstances unfold in their own unique dynamics. As a result, policy approaches to democratizing or potentially democratizing Arab countries should be tailored to the specific needs of each country, while keeping in mind that differential treatment by foreign governments based solely on their own interests rather than internal circumstances will be viewed with suspicion. The same respect for local circumstances should drive the approach to transitional justice, which should be led primarily by public mood rather than efforts to achieve external objectives (Santini & Moro, 2019).

The events in Egypt and Tunisia, the nations that sparked the Arab Spring, are expected to have a significant impact on the views of authoritarians and oppositionists across the world. Tunisia appeared to have the best near-term prospects of a successful democratic transition of any Arab country that has experienced a political opening as of early 2013. Despite Tunisia's modest size and lack of geopolitical significance, the country's transformation deserves the international community's robust and well-coordinated political and material assistance, particularly from the EU and the US. Success there might set a powerful, good example for a region plagued by authoritarianism, while failure might have a negative impact (Santini & Moro, 2019).

Policies should take into mind the long-term character of democratization; democratization, particularly in Libya and Yemen, is likely to take several years if it occurs at all. No one should believe that the international community has a toolset to aid in the speeding up of democratic transitions. It is critical to appreciate the limits of outside impact on transition processes after they have begun when developing policy measures. Foreign aid has been found to have no meaningful impact on democracy in the aggregate. The tiny amount of foreign aid dedicated exclusively to the development of democratic institutions and procedures has been demonstrated to have desired but minor impact. Elections and support from civil society tend to be the most successful forms of such assistance. However, democracy aid has not accounted for the majority of the difference in democratic levels (Tsourapas, 2020).

Foreign aid aimed at promoting democratic consolidation in Arab countries undergoing political transition should be carefully targeted. Election support should be a top priority,

not only because it is more likely to have the desired impact than other forms of aid, but also because elections may help to put transitions on the right track, especially when elections are tied to political restructuring through constitutional revision. Elections alone will not bring about democracy, but they are unquestionably vital (Spannagel et al., 2020).

While acknowledging the long-term nature of governance changes and the limited demonstrated success of foreign aid programs focused at aiding such changes, possibilities for institutional change and assisting democratic processes to run more efficiently and effectively should be exploited. Building or strengthening accountability institutions, such as effective and independent judiciaries, professional and independent electoral administrations, parliamentary committee structures and staffs, and internally democratic and externally effective political parties, should be top priorities for institutional reform (Nugent, 2020).

Building civil society should be a goal as well, because civil society organizations have aided in the advancement of democracy. This should include not just support for independent organizations that promote democracy, but also support for independent media, anti-corruption and human rights monitoring organizations, and civic education organizations. However, it is important to avoid tarnishing local groups with the taint of foreign money. The growth of civilian, democratic control of security institutions is one of the institutional reform processes that must be prioritized (Nugent, 2020).

New or continuing military-to-military interactions, support in professionalizing military and internal security organs, and the formation of strategic interdependence through security assistance, security agreements, joint exercises, and other measures can all affect these processes. Reforming police institutions is especially crucial since they are the security organs that engage with the public the most and consequently have a significant impact on the public's assessment of how far democracy has brought actual change. Because the decisions taken by leaders in nations undergoing political transitions will have a significant impact on the speed and consequences of such changes, promoting policies that will assist to entrench democracy will be vital (De Jaegher & Hoyer, 2019).

However, when it comes to significant foreign players, the US has less clout in the Arab world than it did during the post-Cold War transitions, in some Latin American countries, and in locations like the Philippines. When transition processes stutter (as they sometimes do), the US will likely find it difficult to raise the bar for new Arab governments higher than it did for previous ones. Prior to the Arab Spring, the US favoured stability to change in the Arab world, despite the fact that stability has been obtained in many locations through political transformation (Indonesia and many Latin American countries, for example) (El Kurd, 2019).

Arab leaders and the general public may be apprehensive of pivoting to support reform. Economic aid may give some leverage, but whatever amount of economic aid that bilateral donors could possibly contribute in Egypt would be insignificant in comparison to the size of the economy. Tunisia, for one, is a rather prosperous country on its own, while Libya has oil reserves to fund its restoration and growth. In aid-dependent countries, economic

help is more likely to give leverage, however experience in Sub-Saharan Africa shows that such leverage cannot be relied upon to deliver democracy.

The international community should encourage the creation of mutually reinforcing and supporting structures in the Arab world, such as a regional organization for democracies that could attract and facilitate the delivery of institution-building assistance and reinforce democratization through moral suasion, through multilateral actions or international organizations. It may be conceivable to imitate the European integration framework's norm-setting and technical aid parts in small ways (Nugent, 2020; Josua, 2020; Santini & Moro, 2019).

For certain recipient nations, channeling foreign help through a regional body may be more politically acceptable than direct bilateral support. Mutual reinforcement of democratization might occur and be supported among civil society groups and official institutions throughout the Arab world. In this way, the democracy process might build on many people in the Arab world's common experience of seeing authoritarian governments' vulnerabilities revealed, discovering new options, and being encouraged to establish a new future (Clarke & Kocak, 2020; Tsourapas, 2020; Koehler & Albrecht, 2021).

Findings and Conclusion

The ground realities need a better understanding of the social-political culture of the Middle Eastern lands. The Middle East is predominantly Muslim and it's a fact that in Muslim societies the religion can't be separated from the state. Muslims place a high value on religion in both their private and public lives. Therefore, whenever there are elections in the Muslim world, the role of religion will be there. The west needs to wait and give time for the democratic process to take its natural pace and be ready to accept the Islamist variety of democracy, with some attributes of western liberalism intermingled with Islamic values.

Among the countries involved in the Arab uprisings, Tunisia stands out. Its transition to democracy has experienced setbacks, but is still on the train. However, for the future success and stability of Tunisia – and Europe's southern neighbourhood – it is important to understand one simple fact, something approaching a twist of fate: Tunisia's future lies in the very place where the 2010-2011 popular uprising first erupted. Its inland 'periphery regions' are home to Sidi Bouzid, the city where Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in 2011, sparking the chain of events that led to the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime. Away from the economically developed coast familiar to Europeans, Tunisia's periphery plays host to many of the afflictions that, if left unchecked, could bring to an end Tunisia's lonely battle to establish a full-fledged democracy (Clarke & Kocak, 2020).

Six years on from the revolution, Tunisia's long-neglected hinterland continues to suffer from a rampant informal economy, high unemployment, corruption and an underdeveloped

private sector. Recent efforts made by the central government to improve security in the periphery, especially along the border with Libya and Algeria, have resulted in increased securitization in these areas and upset the cross-border economy that the local population has long relied on for its livelihood. As a result, the legitimacy of post-2011 democratic governments has withered in the eyes of the people.

Meanwhile, long-standing smuggling, jihadi and tribal networks have increasingly overlapped and combined to increase instability and hinder progress towards greater socioeconomic development. The government has in turn done itself no favours thanks to its fragmented central structures, its failure to take advantage of the significant international support and investment made in Tunisia since the revolution, and its possible participation in corruption reaching from the central decision-making level down to regional and local levels.

6.1. Scope, Conditions and Implications for the Arab World

So far, it has drawn on a check list of factors derived from 40 years of democratization research to explain the divergent outcomes witnessed in Egypt and Tunisia post 2011. From our analysis, it is clear that the character of military, civil society, and leadership proved to be the most important factors in explaining the puzzle of Egyptian and Tunisian divergence.

The study of the Tunisian and Egyptian cases may yield some modest insight into the scope conditions that govern a number of democratization check-listed stimuli, highlight the distinctive lessons of the Arab region's experimentation with democratization, and suggest some implications for further democratization in the Arab world. In terms of scope

conditions, the comparison of Tunisia and Egypt confirms a number of axioms about when certain factors "matter" for democratization.

The experience of the two cases confirms that for middle income countries, structural factors such as the level of economic development prove less decisive in shaping a successful transition to democracy than other factors such as elite commitment and institutional endowment. The Tunisian and Egyptian comparison also confirms that mass commitment to democratic values (at least as measured by public opinion polls) seems less crucial than elite commitment when it comes to the short-term objective of democratic transition. The time frame may also govern which institutional endowments matter most for democratization.

For the shorter term goal of setting in place democratic institutions, endowment with a politically modest military may be the most important. For the longer term goal of delivering effective accountable governance, endowment with other institutions such as robust political parties or well-established practice of elections may prove more significant. As for the distinctive lessons suggested by the Arab region's experimentation with democratization, three in particular stand out. First, the experience of Tunisia and Egypt confirms the need to re-conceptualize our notion of what constitutes "fatal polarization" for democracy (El Kurd, 2019; Nugent, 2020).

It is seen as detrimental to democracy because it undermines the possibilities of bargaining and compromise, makes political competition appear "zero-sum," and threatens to impose permanent losses on key political actors who may in turn become fatally disaffected with democracy. In contrast to Sartori, however, Latin Americanists like Mainwaring,

PerezLinan, Karl, and others have finessed the concept of polarization, arguing that it is not so much the ideological distance between political actors that is problematic for democracy as it is a matter of "intransigence and urgency" (Hazbun & Valbjørn, 2018:5; Fawcett, 2020)

If ideologically conflicting political actors are willing to embrace longer time horizons to achieve their policy objectives, then democracy-saving compromise can be achieved. In Latin America of the 70s and 80s, where the primary ideological divide focused largely on distributional issues, the survival of democracy turned on the willingness (especially on the part of the left) to take the long view-postponing some of its re-distributional objectives to allay the worst fears of the business community and its military allies.

By contrast, in the Arab world today, the most searing ideological binary is cultural: Islamist vs. non-Islamist. Yet here too, the level of ideological distance between key parties need not spell democratic breakdown if political actors are willing to embrace longer time horizons. This is one of the key lessons of the Tunisia-Egypt comparison. In Tunisia, the ideological divide between the Islamist and non-Islamist camps was in many ways much more severe than it was in Egypt.

In Tunisia, the willingness of the Islamist leadership to "take the long view" and pursue its policy agenda gradually made the Islamist stance less threatening to its opponents and kept the transition process moving forward. The Tunisia/Egypt comparison highlights the temporal dimension of polarization and the important role that "playing the long game" can have in averting democratic breakdown even in countries deeply riven on identity lines.

Second, the experiences of Tunisia and Egypt (as well as the Arab Spring in general) point to the consequences for democratization of international changes: the end of uni-polarity and the retreat of the liberal hegemon (Fawcett, 2020). As Plattner points out, much of the third and fourth wave of democracy took place during a unique period where the overwhelming dominance of the US and its democratic allies created an international environment favorable to pro-democracy struggles.

But now, well into the Second century, increasingly assertive non-democracies, whether major world powers (such as Russia and China) or regional players (such as Iran and Saudi Arabia) regularly throw their weight against democratization in neighboring or "client" countries. This has proven true in Egypt, (as well as in Syria, Bahrain and beyond). The impact of this international factor (along with major powers' long-standing willingness to subsidize authoritarian regimes in the Arab world to combat terrorism and contain Islamic radicalism) highlights significant international challenges to a "fifth wave." (Inglehart and Norris, 2013)

Third, the Arab region's experimentation with democratization (and its abrupt suspension) makes clear yet again that, for most people, democracy ranks far below economic and physical security in terms of prioritization. This is by no means unique to the Arab world, but the trade-off between security and freedom is perceived as especially stark in the Arab world today. Surrounded by the chaos of failed states, the violent radicalism of competing religious movements, and the general state of economic and personal insecurity, most citizens in the region, at both the elite and mass level, display little appetite for democracy.

In war-torn countries like Syria and Libya, democracy seems a far-fetched goal. But even in relatively stable authoritarian countries (Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia) the liberal-minded have been disarmed by the threat of neighboring chaos as well as their governments' forceful self-congratulation over the delivery of order. The current lack of commitment to the cause of democratization, especially among the elite, is the single most important obstacle to democratic progress in the Arab world today. The region's experience makes clear once again that order comes before freedom (Inglehart, 2005, Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, Inglehart, 2013).

To conclude, what lessons do the Egyptian and Tunisian cases suggest for the rest of the Arab world regarding possibilities of democratization? To some degree, the generalizability of these cases is limited by the fact that both Tunisia and Egypt score exceptionally high on two factors often considered auspicious for democracy: ethnic homogeneity and robust "stateness." The absence of one or the other in so many countries in the region creates a serious hurdle to successful democratization. And even if these hurdles are surmountable, the Tunisian and Egyptian cases do not show the way (Busse, 2021; Del Sarto, 2017; Kamel, 2017; Schofield, 2018).

In addition, both Tunisia and Egypt are relatively rent-poor (Tunisia more than Egypt) and so neither can speak to the special challenges that its "resource-cursed" neighbors face in attempting democratization. That said, the Egyptian and Tunisian cases do suggest two generalizable lessons for the region, one pessimistic and one optimistic. The pessimistic lesson has already been touched upon: the region's deep enmeshment in international power struggles and patronage, due to its endowment with oil and gas resources and the fact that

it is a geographic nucleus of Islamic radicalism and terror, means that democratization will continue to face international challenge more often than support (Busse, 2021 (Clark & Cavatorta, 2018; Glasius et al., 2018; Grimm et al., 2020; Grimm et al., 2020).

At the same time, the study of the Tunisian and Egyptian comparison suggests an optimistic lesson as well: that elite commitment mobilized at pivotal moments can indeed establish democratic institutions, even in daunting contexts. This has proven true in countries all around the world. Perhaps paradoxically, Tunisia's success (as well as Egypt's tumultuous path to failure in 2013) suggests the possibility of choice. Democratization in the Arab world, as elsewhere, is messy. It is reversible. But it is not impossible.

6.2. Recommendations

- Against the serious threat of terrorism and economic weakness, Tunisia's young democratic institutions have remained stable. This alone should count as an achievement in a region marked by conflict, repression and instability. Yet, for democracy to establish firm roots, standstill is not an option. Now that security has improved, Tunisia's politicians should finally complete the institutional framework and undertake structural economic reform to deliver a democratic dividend to citizens whose 2011 rebellion was triggered by poverty and marginalization. In fact, these can be mutually conducive.
- In the area of institutional reform, the overdue creation of the Constitutional Court is a matter of urgency. As the ultimate legitimate arbiter between

state institutions, the court is sorely needed to provide stability in the event of future crises and prevent the country sliding back into authoritarianism.

It also has an important role to play in realizing the rights contained in the progressive 2014 constitution by examining the constitutionality of pre2011 legislation. To improve governance, increase accountability and tackle corruption, the judiciary needs further reform, and the constitutional Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Authority needs to become operational and be backed by sufficient funding. Ensuring stability is one part of an effort to lure back investors (domestic and international) and nurture much-needed private sector growth. Another part is to thin out Tunisia's thick jungle of regulations, beginning with those that are simply out of date. Privatization of loss-making state-owned enterprises is neither a realistic option nor necessary to improve their performance. They should thus be profoundly reformed under continued state ownership.

- Structural reforms will only produce tangible benefits for citizens in the medium to long term. Amid declining support for democracy, economic growth is needed soon. With a high public wage bill, expenditure on subsidies and debt service swallowing the government's revenue, the state will not be able to kickstart economic growth on its own. Thus, international partners should step up support, for instance, via a generous rescheduling of its more than \$32 billion foreign debt. This would facilitate the Tunisian government's work in implementing structural reform. As the conflict in Libya shaved almost a quarter off potential Tunisian economic

growth between 2011 and 2015, efforts to stabilize the country would also bring considerable benefits to Tunisia. In turn, the Tunisian authorities should continue their efforts to reduce their dependence on European markets and reach out to its regional neighbors. Reviving the deal under which Libyan oil could be purchased in Tunisian dinars would save the country precious hard currency.

- With more fiscal capacity – and this would also require improved revenue as well as a reduction in spending on the public wage bill and subsidies – the government could focus on investment. This is needed to develop the skills base Tunisia requires to climb the value chain and attract international investors. Particularly in the disadvantaged regions, improvements in public and social infrastructure are also part of dealing with the historic injustice people in these areas have experienced. Accelerating efforts to increase renewable energy production could be part of this and would further reduce the country's vulnerability to external shocks, which comes with a dependence on oil imports.

Overall, Egypt witnessed more setbacks than progress during the period under review. While developments with regard to the country's economic transformation were inconsistent, the regime showed no interest in democratization, but instead consolidated authoritarianism and strict state control. In order to initiate Egypt's political and deepen its economic openness, the Egyptian leadership should work on the following strategic priorities:

- Undertake institutional reforms: The leadership should establish better checks and balances by reducing the power concentration with the president, strengthening the legislature and holding free and fair parliamentary elections, and making the judiciary more independent than it is at present. Moreover, the political system should be decentralized and regions granted more autonomy. Finally, the military and the security apparatus must be placed under civilian oversight.
- Start a reconciliation process and reduce cleavages: The leadership should abandon its uncompromising and repressive approach and promote reconciliation and investigate acts of injustice. Moreover, it should stop favoring some segments of society over others, and actively promote equal opportunity.
- Allow for political participation: The leadership should support a more inclusive political system, first of all, by revising restrictive legislation, such as the NGO law and the protest law. Instead, civil society engagement at all levels of policy-making should be encouraged, an independent party landscape allowed to develop, and public discourse promoted.
- Balance security policies: The leadership should not subordinate individual liberties to its strict security policies. Moreover, a more balanced approach must be applied in the fight against terrorism, and be based not exclusively on military countermeasures, but include a focus on socioeconomic development and opportunities for political participation.
- Make the economy more sustainable: The leadership should refocus its approach away from capital-intense and toward labor-intense sectors. This

would not only generate more job opportunities, but also strengthen production capacities and exports. Moreover, attempts to formalize the informal economy and increase tax collection capacities must be undertaken.

- Balance the side effects of economic reforms: The leadership should increase its efforts to counter growing poverty and injustice by effectively mitigating rising living costs. The subsidy system must be better targeted at the needy and effective support programs launched.

The international community can support the process by focusing on the following strategic priorities:

- Acknowledge limited influence, but not sideline democratization: The international community, and Western states in particular, have to accept that they cannot shape domestic developments. However, human rights and political liberalization must not be disregarded. Even if strict conditionality hardly works, Western governments should refrain from actively supporting the regime and providing it with a propaganda platform.
- Do not focus on macroeconomic data: The international community should be sensitive to tensions between neoliberal economic reforms and possible effects on social development. It should not push the government to generate growth and implement structural reforms and austerity measures by all means, but instead encourage effective mitigation of rising living costs and support the population.

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